My original intention was to have compiled a summary of the history of the Caucasus, where I spent nearly three years, and to which a short account of the Crimea would only have served as an introduction. The increasing interest attaching to the latter subject, however, made me pay more attention to it; so that I now offer to the public some notices on that country and the shores of the Sea of Azof, without being able to add anything upon what I hoped to make the main subject of my inquiry. Some chapters upon the Caucasus are already partly written, but I have not had sufficient time to prepare them for insertion in the present volume, although intimately connected with it. They relate to a country replete with the deepest interest, and I hope that, ere long, some more competent hand than mine may vindicate the character of those heroic mountaineers, whom many are accustomed unjustly to stigmatize as barbarians. Though unlettered, they possess equal claims to our admiration with our own Saxon and Norman ancestors, or with the Swiss in the days of Tell, for they possess that stubborn love of independence and that “spirit of divinest liberty,” which is the root of all good.

When peace shall be made, it will be most fortunate should we be able to secure the freedom of the Eastern coast of the Black Sea by treaty, for the independence of that country would form one of the best securities against Russian aggression. At the Caucasus Russia may be said to end, and a new class of nationalities to begin, and she can only desire to possess that mountain range with the intention of extending her conquests beyond it.

The Caucasus, that is, the mountain range itself, and the countries that lie at the foot of them, to the north and south, are the most convenient entrance to the heart of the great table-land of Asia, which, when once thoroughly subdued, might constitute an impregnable citadel whence Russia would be enabled to extend her influence and dominion in every direction. The Caucasus is the real citadel of Russian power in the South and East, although as yet beleaguered by the nations from which it has been partially wrested. Russia has surrounded it by an army of 170,000⁠[4] men, and carefully keeps its inhabitants from communication with civilized Europe. We have never acknowledged the sovereignty of the Russians over this territory, nor over the Christian provinces to the south of the Caucasus. If her blockade were permanently removed from the eastern coast of the Black Sea, and the brave inhabitants of the mountains allowed to carry on a liberal commerce with Europe, their energies would be quickly turned from war to peaceful arts.

Those who designate the Circassians as mere warlike barbarians should remember that we ourselves were but warlike semi-barbarians in the early ages of our history, and that the manly character which made us so formidable in the days of the Plantagenets enabled us ultimately, with better directed energies, to raise our great commercial empire in the eighteenth century. The Circassians and the other mountain tribes resemble us in many particulars: they debate every great affair in a national council; they venerate the ancient usages and ordinances which form their constitution; and they have the same gradation of ranks and aristocratic feelings which distinguish ourselves.

Above all points of resemblance to us, they have clung to their independence with Anglo-Saxon tenacity; and shall we, when peace shall be made, allow their rude and gigantic enemy again to surround them with her liberated forces, till she exterminate them by brute power, and no memorial be left of unsuccessful virtue save that which history will assuredly record in their favour?

We acknowledged the independence of the Colonies of Spanish America while they were still struggling with the mother country; we went still further with Greece, for we gave them active assistance, having not only the French, but the very Russians themselves for our allies. Surely, then, there exist far more cogent reasons for assisting the Circassians, who have never been conquered by the Russians. Up to the breaking out of the present war the Russians had only an ever-disputed possession of the actual ground occupied by their fortifications and protected by their cannon, and they have been constantly resisted by the mountaineers, who have ever refused to acknowledge the sovereignty of the Emperor.

The coast of Circassia is now free, and all that is required is that it should be kept so, without being again subjected to a barbarous blockade. If a consul were placed there, and merchants encouraged to frequent it, its gallant inhabitants would soon yield to the civilizing influences of Europe, and engage themselves in developing its boundless resources.

We may rest satisfied that the freedom of the Caucasus will form an important element towards the diminution of Russian influence in the East.

I agree with Mr. Gladstone in thinking we must look for future security not only by reducing the power of Russia, but by raising that of Turkey and the other independent peoples bordering on the Black Sea. Free communication and free trade once firmly established there, the question might be considered as in a great measure settled. It is true that you cannot impose free trade upon Russia, who occupies half the coasts of the Black Sea; but you may claim your right to traffic with the Circassians on the east coast of that sea, and protect your commerce there by an authorized agent. So great are the advantages of unrestricted trade—so much does commerce strengthen and civilize, that the liberal tariff of Turkey, and the opening of the Principalities (as stated in App. E), have been, in an indirect manner, the cause of the present war; for, with freedom of trade, the Christian subjects of the Porte, for some years before the commencement of hostilities, had so much increased in importance and wealth, that they excited the jealousy of Russia, and she feared that if she did not claim in time a closer protectorate over them, they might escape her altogether. I say this, assuming it to have always been a cardinal point in the politics of Russia, in due time, to advance her empire to Constantinople and Athens.

Although I believe the whole Russian nation to be bent upon certain measures of territorial aggrandizement, I have not failed to acknowledge in my notices the general pacific character of the people. They are not a martial nation; that is, they are not a nation which takes delight in war for the sake of braving its dangers and revelling in its excitement; but theirs is the patient, enduring, indomitable courage which will face any dangers to compass certain ends. The Russian nation has been misdirected by its rulers as to the true objects of national glory, and by an exorbitant tariff and other measures has been kept from mixing with other European nations, lest it should learn juster ideas of the points in which true glory and prosperity consist, and become impatient of a military organization, the object of which is to carry out indefinite schemes of conquest.

I have lived among the Russians, and I have learnt to respect them as a strong, earnest, unprejudiced people, with a great principle of growth in them, and who will work out the defects of their character, and become some day an honour to civilization. They were the only nation in the world, I believe, with whom we had never been at war.⁠[5] None can more deeply regret than I do that we have been obliged now to try their mettle.

We must remember that we have a Court to deal with which combines the deep calculation of Europe with the wiles of Asiatic intrigue, and that we shall assuredly be over-reached, if we do not insist upon sufficient guarantees. We must also remember that the conquest of Constantinople is the settled determination of Russia, and has been the prime object of ambition to that country ever since the ninth century, when the Russian fleets first appeared before its walls; and that, if we are determined (as I hope is the case) that they shall never possess it, we must take care, whenever peace shall be made, that it be rendered perfectly secure, and the approaches to it guarded with the greatest possible care.

If we yield, as Mr. Gladstone and his friends wish us to do, to the first offers of Russia, we shall fail in our paramount object, and become the laughing-stock of the world. The lives of the brave will have been wasted, and the successes we have gained will be of no avail; Russia, at the first favourable opportunity, will renew the struggle, with the advantages of railroads and all modern inventions. In dealing with so subtle an enemy it will be wise not to hesitate, but push on, and, treating Russia as she wished to treat Turkey, require from her effectual guarantees that she will not again disturb by her ambition the peace of Europe.

The supineness and indecision of the European Powers for the last thirty years have enabled Russia to take up an insolent position towards Europe; and the fears of our own imaginations have contributed to swell the prestige of the Colossus of the North, and to render his intrigues successful. Our statesmen are now fully convinced of the gravity of our position, and the extent of Russian intrigue both in Asia and in Germany. I had myself personal experience of it last year in the latter country. In returning from India in March, 1854, I spent a day at the little German state of ———— —— ——, to visit a German friend well versed in the secret politics of his country. He told me how ashamed he was of his countrymen, who were false to their true interests, and cowered beneath the power of Russia. In the morning, when he came to breakfast with me in my hotel, an officer took him aside to speak to him. When my friend returned to me, he said, “You would not believe yesterday the degree of influence which Russia exercises in Germany; you have here a proof of it. That officer who took me aside commands the —— troops, and he called me aside to show me a diamond ring and an autograph letter from the Emperor of Russia, flattering him, and conferring upon him an order. That man is henceforward the devoted servant of Russia.” My friend, who is himself a distinguished littérateur, assured me that there were nearly two thousand literary persons in Germany who openly received their quarterly pensions at the Russian embassies to uphold Russian interests. He even authorized me to authenticate these statements by the use of his name, which nevertheless I refrain from doing.

As so much is now said by some parties respecting the supposed fairness and moderation of Russia, I will relate two anecdotes of what happened under my own cognizance in the East. When the Russians seized, about the year 1840, the island of Ashtoráda, near Asterabad, at the south-east corner of the Caspian Sea, which they have since fortified and garrisoned, and when they explored with steamers the Gourgan and Atrak, rivers flowing exclusively through the Persian territory, but leading in the direction of the best road to India, there was one Turcoman Chief resolutely hostile to them, whom they could neither frighten nor seduce. One night, therefore, troops were disembarked, his house was surrounded, and he and all his sons were carried off and conveyed into the interior of Russia, whence, at the prayer of a very influential personage, his place of exile was changed to Tiflis, where I knew him.

The second is a more daring violation of the territory of the same power, with whom, be it remembered, we have a treaty of alliance, and at the court of which we have long had a minister constantly residing. A certain member of the Georgian royal family, Suleiman Khan,⁠[6] lived in the Persian provinces ceded to Russia in 1828, and having an inveterate enmity to that power, he refused to remain there when they became Russian, and fled into a remote part of Persia. After many years he thought he might venture to come and live at Tabreez, the capital of Azerbiján, and near his own country. He had sounded the Russian consulate, and found them apparently favourable, and when he arrived he was invited to dinner by the Russian Consul-General. Everything passed off very agreeably until after dinner, when, as he was sitting on a sofa with the Consul, drinking his coffee, the latter begged to be excused for an instant, and left the room. Immediately upon his quitting, a file of Russians appeared at the door, with their pieces levelled at the Khan, and the Consul, from behind them, told him he was extremely sorry that he was obliged to treat a guest in so uncourteous a manner, but that he must execute his orders, that Suleiman Khan must consider himself a prisoner, and prepare instantly to be conveyed into the interior of Russia.

This fact was told me by the English Consul at Tabreez, when I arrived at that city some short time after this event had occurred, and I dined with the Russian Consul in question, now holding a high post in Russian diplomacy, in the very room where it happened. Of course, when proceedings of this sort were overlooked by our Government, there is no wonder that Russia grew emboldened, and believed that no European power dared to interfere with her.

We have begun at last, after thousands of lives and millions of treasure have been expended in attacking the only strong position of Russia in the Black Sea, to attack some of the long line of vulnerable points which she presents. Our successes at Kertch, Berdiansk, Mariopol, Taganrok, and Soujuk Caleh have been as easy as they have been important, and we have now only to continue the same course of action.

I can state, on the authority of persons intimately acquainted with those countries, in answer to what Mr. Cobden said in the House of Commons, that the blow we struck in the Sea of Azof has been the severest which we have dealt to Russian power—that all the stores we destroyed at Kertch belonged to the Government, and not to private individuals, and that the same was the case with every bag of flour and oats destroyed at Berdiansk, Mariopol, and Taganrok. The Russian Government, as is well known, has always supplied Sevastopol and their other fortresses on the coast of the Black Sea with stores and ammunition from the interior of the country by means of the Sea of Azof, as is explained in my work. It is known that they had just completed large purchases of stores for Sevastopol which we intercepted in our late expedition, so that the merchants had received their money, and the loss wholly fell on the Government.⁠[7] If our fleet had penetrated to Rostof, we should probably have destroyed a still larger amount of stores, and at the latter place the shot and shells which are brought down there from the foundry at Lugan, and from Siberia, for transmission to the Russian fortresses in the Black Sea. Perhaps this may be reserved for another expedition; for close to Rostof are Novo Tcherkask, the capital of the Don Cossacks, and Naketchiván, an Armenian town, and the head-quarters of many Armenian houses deeply engaged in supplying the commissariat of the Russian army. From the eastern coast of the Sea of Azof may also be obtained large herds of fine horses for our cavalry, and fat beasts for the subsistence of our army.

The taking of Anapa will allow the Circassians to overspread the country as far as the Bosphorus, and even to cross it and assist us in the Crimea, a part of which they formerly occupied, and from which some of their noblest families make it their boast to have come.

From Soujuk Caleb it is now friendly country to Ekaterinodár on the Kuban, the capital of the Black Sea Cossacks; and if judicious persons be sent to treat with the Circassians, a long line of easy and important victories will be opened to us. But in the East, still more than in the West, everything depends upon a judicious selection of agents; and it is especially necessary, among free mountaineers, to gain their confidence by kind, considerate conduct, and to persuade them that you have no projects for your own aggrandizement, but wish, by confirming their independence and adding to their strength, to render them a strong bulwark against Russian aggression.