The Duke of Norfolk was the most experienced general whose services were available to Henry at this crisis, but the King was very reluctant to trust him, as he was suspected of sympathy with the rebels. At the first alarm Henry had sent for Norfolk, but it has already been shown how he was superseded at the last moment by Suffolk[1118]. When the danger again became pressing, however, Henry was obliged to face the risk of employing him.
In order to understand how this came about, it is necessary to go back to 9 October, when Norfolk was at Woolpit, mustering the men of Norfolk and Suffolk. He was anxiously awaiting orders to go northward, and wrote to Henry that he was willing to serve under the Duke of Suffolk. He expected to have 2500 men under him in the course of a few days. As to artillery, “I have my own five fawcons and twenty brass hakbushes, but want gunners.” He was badly in need of bows and arrows, and begged that they might be sent at once[1119]. Three hours after his letter was despatched he received orders to ride to the King at Windsor, and he set out the same night by moonlight[1120]. He had hardly reached Colchester next morning, after a fifty mile ride, when despatches arrived ordering him to be at Ampthill on 16 October with the troops which he had just mustered. He was overjoyed at being ordered to the front at last, but in spite of his professed willingness to serve under Suffolk he wrote to Cromwell asking that his right as Marshal of England to command the vanguard, should be recognised. For the rest he was all obedience and loyalty; he would not fail; he himself would be at Ampthill, as such was the King’s pleasure[1121]. But the troops would be obliged to go round by Cambridge and Huntingdon. Ampthill was thirty miles south of Huntingdon, and Norfolk knew that it was impossible for them to be there on the appointed day[1122], but he was determined not to risk Henry’s displeasure, and said nothing of his difficulties to the King. He sent an account of his precautions for the quiet of the country, where he left his son Thomas with 300 men, and begged that his eldest son the Earl of Surrey might go with him[1123]. The beautiful and accomplished Surrey seems to have been the only living creature whom the cold-blooded old warrior really loved.
On Thursday 12 October the Duke of Norfolk was at home at Kenninghall, and wrote to Cromwell that though the men could not be at Ampthill on the 17th, he hoped to have them as far as Cambridge. From Cambridge to Huntingdon was only twelve miles and “it were pity with ill-horsed men” to go back thirty miles to Ampthill. If the King, whom he still expected in person, would consent, Norfolk would meet him at Huntingdon on the 18th “with a company meet to be a pretty wing to a battle.” In spite of his boast of their efficiency, Norfolk did not dare to ride to the King until his men were well on their way, and if Surrey did not go with them they were likely to dwindle in numbers[1124].
Norfolk was rather aggrieved that the King had commanded fewer gentlemen to join his company than had gone with Suffolk[1125]. The reason of this was that when the King received good news from Lincolnshire, he believed that the rebellion was over[1126], and orders were actually sent out on the 12th and 15th to countermand the Ampthill musters[1127]. In spite of Norfolk’s complaint, the knights and abbots who had received the King’s orders to join Norfolk were able to provide plenty of men, though they lacked means to equip them. “If I had harness and time to carry footmen I could bring three times as many,” Norfolk declared, and every letter ends with an urgent request for “at least 400 bows and 500 sheaves of arrows. This were better than gold or silver, for, for money, I cannot get bows nor arrows.”[1128] He hoped these stores would be at Cambridge when his men arrived there[1129].
On Sunday 15 October Norfolk was with the King at Windsor[1130]. On the same day, Henry sent long instructions to Shrewsbury and Suffolk about the arrangements to be made in Lincolnshire[1131]. If the rebellion in Holderness was already pacified, they were to work together; if not, Suffolk must advance to Lincoln, while Shrewsbury marched against the Yorkshire insurgents. The King seems to have had no doubt that his force would be large enough to settle their business[1132].
When Norfolk arrived at Windsor, he found that the Ampthill musters had been countermanded, and that the King had given up all intention of going north. There seemed nothing for him to do but to arrange for the laying of posts[1133]. But on leaving Windsor that night he met a messenger on the road with letters from Lord Darcy[1134]. These were the letters dated from Pontefract on the 13th, and they proved so alarming that Norfolk returned to Windsor[1135].
At last the King realised that the Yorkshire rebellion was not a mere demonstration of sympathy with Lincolnshire, but an entirely distinct and far more serious protest against his policy. He instantly changed his plans. If the worst were true, Norfolk must be given a joint commission with Shrewsbury to proceed against the rebels, and must take command of the troops at Ampthill before they dispersed. The Marquis of Exeter, who was also mustering men, was to be his second in command[1136]. A postscript was added to Shrewsbury’s instructions to inform him of this arrangement, and to direct him to suppress the Yorkshire rising at once, if he was strong enough,—if not, to wait for Norfolk, who would join him with 5000 men[1137].
The King, who had been reassured for a moment by the harmless end of the Lincolnshire rising, was now really alarmed by the news from Yorkshire[1138]. On 17 October Leonard Beckwith reached Windsor bringing from York letters from the lord mayor and Sir George Lawson in which they begged for protection against the rebels[1139]. Next day another messenger arrived with letters from Darcy describing the serious state of affairs. This man also carried by word of mouth a lengthy account of the rebels and the rumours which circulated among them[1140]. Whether because he repeated only what he knew would please the King, or because anything which did not suit the royal mind was omitted in writing down his report, these “bruits” contain no word of the rebels’ real demands, but give as their only grievances the imaginary taxes on burials and christenings, white bread and white meat, and so forth[1141].
The King “had no great trust in Darcy.” He was hard put to it to find money for the troops under Shrewsbury, Suffolk, and Norfolk, and he never seems even to have contemplated sending any money and stores to Pontefract. Cromwell, who was in London, received orders from Windsor “to make shift to the utmost” to get money, and if he could not raise enough, to coin the King’s plate in the Jewel House[1142].
On 22 October it was known in London that Hull had surrendered, and it was feared that many of the Lincolnshire captains would fly thither. The King sent orders to Cromwell to “taste the fat priests thereabouts;” Dr Chamber had already presented the King with 200 marks, and Dr Lupton had given £200[1143].
The arrival of any news from the north was watched for with lynx eyes, less because it was of so much interest to the government than because the King lived in constant fear that the rebellion would spread southward. For instance, when Harry Sais reached London safely without the horses, he related his adventures to his master, Christopher Askew[1144]. Askew had some interest in the little Benedictine nunnery at Clementhorpe, York, which had lately been dissolved. The abbess had promised him £30 to be her suitor to the Queen, and had offered to present 300 marks to the Queen herself, if the house might stand. But it had been dissolved in spite of the abbess’ efforts, and there the matter had ended for the time. When the Pilgrims restored the scattered sisterhood, the abbess sent word to Askew by Sais that she was again in a position to bribe the Queen, and that if she could by this means legalise her position, her brother-in-law, one of the Ellerkers, would convey the money through the disturbed country. Askew informed the Queen’s chancellor of this renewed offer, and through him it came to Cromwell’s ears. On 26 October Askew and Sais were examined before the Council. By this time it was “in every man’s mouth that Pontefract Castle was given over.”[1145]
Meanwhile Norfolk set out from Windsor for Ampthill on Monday 16 October, authorised to muster 5000 men[1146]. At Amersham he received a letter from his son Surrey, who had reached Cambridge with his forces on Sunday night. About 9 o’clock letters had arrived at Cambridge for the Duke, which Surrey had been instructed to open. They proved to be from Cromwell and the Privy Council, announcing that Lincolnshire was quiet again, and that the advance of the troops was therefore to be delayed till further orders were received. Surrey dared not make this news public, lest the men should disperse without waiting for definite orders. After consulting only two friends, he decided to hold musters at Cambridge next day, and wrote to his father for advice. Many of the gentlemen in their zeal had sent two or three times as many men as they had been commanded to provide, and Surrey was obliged to send for 1500 extra coats. These “liveries” may have been embroidered with the famous white lion of the Howards, but more probably they were the ordinary English uniform of that day, white tunics with St George’s red cross on the back and breast. Food was so dear that the soldiers could not make 3s. 4d. keep them for two days, although this was an exceptionally high wage, as 8d. a day was usual in most parts of the country. In spite of these drawbacks, Surrey boasted that the company was “judged by those here who have seen many musters the finest ever raised on such short warrant.”[1147]
Many more men had been collected than the 5000 that Norfolk was authorised to muster, for Exeter had at least 2000 and 1000 more were coming from Gloucestershire. All Norfolk’s soldierly instincts protested against dismissing men while the extent of the rising was still so uncertain. He wrote to Henry to ask that he might be allowed to keep at least 6000; even then nearly 2000 would have to be sent home[1148]. But as no orders came to the contrary, the 2000 were dismissed when Norfolk reached Ampthill[1149].
On Tuesday 17 October Suffolk with Fitzwilliam, Russell and the rest of the royal troops entered Lincoln, and by securing the capital placed themselves in a position to keep the county in subjection[1150]. The Humber and the lower reaches of the Trent were guarded against the Pilgrims’ crossing[1151].
On the same day Shrewsbury was at Newark with 7000 men[1152]. He had heard from Darcy that the rebels were 40,000 strong. In spite of this he was anxious to advance. He had just received the King’s commission to act as his lieutenant in Yorkshire in conjunction with Norfolk[1153], and he wrote to the Duke that if the rebels were really too strong to be attacked, he would “keep them in play” until Norfolk could bring up his 5000 men to Doncaster, which Shrewsbury begged him to do as quickly as possible[1154].
On Wednesday 18 October Shrewsbury sent Lord Hussey, who had brought him 200 horsemen, to the King[1155]. About midnight, when lying at Southwell, the Earl received news that Pontefract Castle was besieged and the Earl of Northumberland taken, and above all that the rebels were before him at Doncaster, which had risen at their instigation. He sent at once to Suffolk for as many horsemen as could be spared, under the command of Fitzwilliam or Brian[1156].
Norfolk and Exeter received Shrewsbury’s letter of the 17th at 6 o’clock in the evening of Wednesday 18 October. They were together at Ampthill in no very enviable position. The 2000 men mustered there were only waiting for their wages before disbanding. Norfolk’s own men were still at Cambridge, Exeter’s at Buckingham, and the Gloucestershire gentlemen at Stony Stratford, all obediently awaiting further orders, according to their last instructions. Although there was no great difficulty in ordering them to set out for Doncaster, uniting at various points on the way, it would take them over a week to get there. They could not advance more than 20 miles a day, as they were badly horsed and the roads were deep in autumn mud. It was impossible to preserve order and discipline on the march unless wages were regularly paid, but money was scarce and went fast. The men could not feed their horses and themselves for 8d. a day, and the £10,000 which had been sent to the Duke was not enough to pay off the disbanded company and also to provide for those going northward. Norfolk was afraid to set out without money to last as far as Doncaster, as an unpaid army might dissolve in the face of the rebels, or advance only as a disorderly rabble[1157]. Shrewsbury had sent for £20,000, and the King, expecting Norfolk and Exeter to reach him much sooner than was practicable, wrote that they should receive their next wages from Gostwick in Shrewsbury’s camp. As to the amount per day, the King flatly refused to raise it.
The generals received this despatch early on Thursday 19 October. They could not afford to delay any longer, but money must be obtained at once. In their answer to the King they explained that they could not be with Shrewsbury for a week or more. Let the King only lend them £1000 each and send it to Stamford on Saturday 21 October; they would repay him at the end of the campaign. As it was the King’s pleasure that no higher wages should be paid, the men should have only the ordinary amount from the government. But they could not live on 8d. a day; they were to be divided into companies (probably of 100 men) under captains, and “if the men grudge upon reasonable ground for lack of money,” Norfolk “will cause the captains to give them money out of their own purses.” From this it is evident that it was almost as costly to fight for the King as to fight against him[1158].
After sending off this despatch, Norfolk rode to his own company at Cambridge, leaving Exeter at Ampthill to discharge the last of the 2000. This was finally done on Friday 20 October, though Sir Anthony Browne, who was collecting men for the Duke of Suffolk, secured 600 of the best mounted. “The rest, being mostly horsed, made haste home to spare their charges.” These men were “able and well furnished” and were very much displeased at being dismissed, after all the trouble of attending the musters, without having seen any fighting[1159]. But on Friday night Norfolk at Cambridge, and Sir William Paulet and Sir William Kingston at Beaconsfield, received imperative orders from the Council that they should on no account dismiss any men. If some had gone already they must be resummoned and sent to Suffolk under Sir Anthony Browne, with ten pieces of ordnance[1160]. Norfolk promptly answered that the Ampthill men could not be recovered. He must have felt a certain satisfaction in making this reply, for he was very angry that the troops which had been refused him should be granted to Suffolk. Sir Anthony Browne had secured 600 horsemen, and Norfolk marvelled that he should need such a large number, unless there was a new outbreak in Lincolnshire. He added bitterly, “I am apt to think that some desire great company more for glory than necessity.” As for the munitions he was ordered to send to Suffolk, he could not spare any. He had never even heard of the ten pieces of ordnance he was now ordered to give up. What he had was his own, and so small that it was carried in two carts. As to money, £2000 had been despatched to him, but he had only received £1200. More was promised him in ten days, but “neither I nor my lord Marquis will be able to keep our companies so long without money.” If he had not unsparingly spent £1500 of his own “here would have been ill work. The pension of France hath now done no hurt to me nor the King’s affairs.”[1161] Sir William Paulet and Sir William Kingston returned to Ampthill and did their best to produce the missing 2000 men, but evidently they had little hope of success[1162]; in the end the attempt was abandoned, after a brisk correspondence about the men and the munitions for Suffolk had been carried on for some time[1163].
On Saturday 21 October “the Lord Privy Seal’s band” consisting of 200 horsemen under Richard Cotton joined Norfolk. The leader’s letter describes the conditions under which the troops advanced:
“Pleaseth it your lordeship to be advertysed that according to your commandement I have presented your company to my lorde of norffolk and Mr browne the hoole nomber of them was cc. we be all apoynted to attende upon Mr brownen who haith willed me to take like charge of your lordshipes company like as yor lordshipe commanded me at my departing frome you, which god willing there shalbe no defaulte in me for wante of good will to do that thing that the kinges highness may be truley served. And to the advauncement of your honore, by the advice of Mr Browne I have retorned back xl of your company of such as ware worste horsed, so that we ar nowe clx of as well-horsed men as any ar in the company and no suche of no one manes brynging. There were dyvers of essex men which ar tall men of person and good archers to the nomber of xii which hade no sadles butt rode uppon panylles after there countre facion which I thought was not to your honour. Soe I have bought them sadles with other apperell for there horses according as in my conceyte was meyte for your honour. Great murmer and gruging there was amonges your lordshipes company by cause thay thought the waiges of viiid by the day was to little to fynde them and there horses. Soe as well as my pore witt will serve me I have pacefied them with fare wordes soe that there is little said thereof nowe emonges any of us. Your lordship haith here many of your houshold servauntes which ar yonger brether and as I am privye unto have no greate store of money; they be at your lordshipes horseyng; ether they shall marre there horses for lacke of meat or elles make suche sheftes for money that shall not stend well with your lordshipes honor. I beseche your lordship to pardon me for wrytting this rudely and pleyne unto you butt I se the thynges that is like to ensue that I can no lesse doe if I shall do according as your lordship put me in trust, but to advertyce you. I beseche your lordship that I may know your pleasure in the premisses if it please you that I shall geve unto every gentilman being a yonger brother asertyn [sum] which in my pore oppenyon ware moche to your honour. Your pleasure knowen therein I shall lay forthe the money of myne owen purse till wee retorne.
This berer William Jonson haith by mysfortune hurte his arme soe that he is not able to goo in this vyage. I assure your lordship we shall have agret lacke of hym in the company for he was a man that toke moche payne in provyding of lodinge for all oure company. I trust your lordshipe will take no displeasure with me for keping one of your cokes here for we may ill spare hym emonges the company. This the holy gost have you in hys costodye. Frome burne the xxi day of october
On 18 October the King had despatched letters to Shrewsbury by Thomas Miller, Lancaster Herald, with orders that the Earl should advance on the rebels immediately, “not doubting that they will seek to hide themselves at your approach.”[1165] Shrewsbury was to send the herald to the rebels with an enclosed proclamation. The effect of this mission has already been told[1166].
In obedience to his orders, Shrewsbury advanced; but these orders were issued in the mistaken belief that Norfolk would join him in a day or two. On Saturday 21 October when Shrewsbury was as far north as Scrooby[1167], Norfolk had only reached Cambridge and Exeter was still further behind[1168]. The King was aware of Norfolk’s situation, but did not know how far Shrewsbury had advanced. He wrote to Norfolk, commending his intention of sending letters and proclamations to the rebels, in order to pacify them, if possible, without a battle. He bade him forward orders to Shrewsbury to guard the line of the Trent and hold the bridges at Nottingham and Newark. Shrewsbury was to “settle himself in such a strong place as he may keep without danger till Norfolk come to him.” As soon as their forces were united, they were to wait together on the Trent until the rebels either attempted a crossing or dispersed[1169]. This admirable plan of campaign seems to have been originally Norfolk’s own; unfortunately it was frustrated by Shrewsbury’s advance. The line of the Don, which Shrewsbury proposed to defend, had none of the advantages of the Trent. The river was smaller and could easily be forded even in winter. The people on both banks favoured the rebels; food was therefore hard to get, and the country was barren, low and unhealthy.
At 6 o’clock in the morning of Monday 23 October Norfolk was at Newark in great uneasiness of mind. Attended only by four servants, he had far outridden his company, which could not be expected until the next day, while Exeter would not arrive till the day after. The distance between Newark and Doncaster was then called thirty miles, but by modern reckoning it is nearer forty. Norfolk had already written to Shrewsbury, imploring him on no account to risk a battle. If Shrewsbury should be forced to fight and were defeated, the only chance of checking the rebels was for Suffolk and himself to hold the bridges over the Trent. He feared the result of Shrewsbury’s advance so much that he wrote to ask the King to send orders that Suffolk must co-operate with him[1170]. For two nights Norfolk had had no rest, but now he indulged in three or four hours’ sleep at Newark Castle. When he awoke, it was to find that Lord Talbot had ridden in from his father’s camp. Shrewsbury was lying on the south bank of a little river called Goole Dyke, about four miles south of Doncaster, which he intended to enter by Rossington Bridge.
Lord Talbot’s news was good. Shrewsbury had no intention of fighting until Norfolk joined him on Wednesday or Thursday; but he hoped he would be able to advance from Doncaster before that, as his men were dying “very sore of the sickness.” The rebels had made no attempt to win the bridges at Doncaster and Rossington. It was “sore bruited” that they would not fight at all. Many true subjects had enlisted under the King’s banner. Sir Henry Saville had been among his tenants at Wakefield “and brought much harness and men from them.” Sir Brian Hastings had left Hatfield and brought in his “300 tall horsemen,” but Suffolk had not yet sent the detachment which Shrewsbury needed as scouts and skirmishers. So far Talbot was reporting what he knew to be true; in addition he had heard rumours that Sir Richard Tempest had captured one of the rebel leaders, and that Lord Dacre and Lord Scrope were marching south by way of Skipton and Wakefield to join the King’s army. This rumour, however, was unfounded, although Talbot believed it. Sir Richard Tempest was with the rebels at Pontefract, and Lord Scrope was riding to their musters at the head of the dalesmen, while Lord Dacre was lying neutral in Naworth Castle[1171]. Lord Talbot also brought news of the surrender of Pontefract, and hinted at his suspicions of Darcy’s loyalty. Pontefract Castle, he said, was considered stronger than Newark, and Norfolk agreed that Newark might be held against any force which had not heavy ordnance,—“greater pieces than demi-culverins.”
Shrewsbury was evidently in as much danger of under-estimating the rebels’ strength as Norfolk had been of over-estimating it. The news did not entirely overcome Norfolk’s anxiety; he still feared “only two things,—lack of victual and my lord Steward’s fighting before his coming.” Talbot carried back Norfolk’s instructions as to how Shrewsbury’s camp should be fortified and defended in case of a sudden attack. Norfolk was in hopes that many of the rebels would come over to him on hearing the letters and proclamations which he was about to send, for ever since the victory of Flodden he had been more beloved in the north than any other nobleman, a circumstance which had not escaped the King’s jealous notice[1172].
The two armies, that of the Pilgrims and that of the King, were now in touch with one another, and it is possible to follow their movements simultaneously.
On Monday 23 October, when Lord Talbot was with Norfolk at Newark and Shrewsbury’s forces lay at Rossington Bridge, the rebels continued their advance from Pontefract. Gostwick, Shrewsbury’s treasurer, was at Tickhill, south-west of Rossington, and from there he sent for Lawrence Cook, the Prior of the White Friars at Doncaster, and ordered him to cross the water and ride towards Pontefract to view the Pilgrims’ army, bringing back word of their number and equipment. The prior secretly sympathised with the Pilgrims, but, like many of his brethren, he was much more afraid of the King. He went among the rebels in perfect safety and even had an interview with Aske, either at Pontefract or somewhere near it on the road south. The prior easily gathered what information he needed and gave some in return. The captain asked if Shrewsbury’s men were in Doncaster, and finding they had not even reached the town, still less prepared it for defence, he said he would be there before them and lie there that night. Perhaps he said this in the heat of the moment, or he may have given a misleading account of his plans in order to hurry Shrewsbury’s advance, for he was too able a leader to risk a battle with a swollen river in his rear[1173]. Another reason for avoiding Doncaster was the presence of the plague in the town; the Pilgrims seem to have escaped the infection by keeping to the north of the river[1174]. The prior told Aske that Gostwick expected a large sum of money from the King. It arrived at Tickhill next day, and Aske sent to know if it had come, but the prior, being then so much nearer the King’s forces, assured the messenger untruly that it had not. After his inspection of the rebels on Monday (or possibly the day before, as he gives no dates) he returned quietly to Doncaster, and thence went to Shrewsbury and reported what he had seen[1175].
On Monday Sir Thomas Percy and his 4000 men advanced from Wentbridge to Hampole, about six miles away[1176], where he was joined by the forces of the Bishopric and Richmondshire, under Lords Latimer, Lumley, and Neville, Sir Thomas Hilton, and Robert Bowes[1177]. These companies completed the “vaward,” which was altogether about 12,000 strong. They encamped near “a little nunnery beside Robin Hood’s Cross.”[1178]
Next morning, Tuesday 24 October, Aske rode into the camp at Hampole, and ordered a muster on the neighbouring heath “above Barnesdale.”[1179] The men of the North and West Ridings, who had remained at Pontefract, were now coming forward under Sir Robert Constable; they formed the “middle ward.” The “rear ward,” composed of the men from Mashamshire and the Dales, had not yet reached Pontefract[1180], and only the Archbishop and Lord Darcy remained in the town with their own servants[1181]. They had been left “for their ease,” and indeed Lee’s military ardour was not such as to enable him to spend nights in the open among all the discomforts of an autumn campaign; while Darcy was over eighty, and though still vigorous in body and mind, suffered much from his old wound. Nevertheless, when their absence became known at the muster, the commons’ suspicion was aroused, and they held them “in great jealousy and despair,” for what was considered lack of zeal, if not positive unfaithfulness[1182].
It was perhaps at this time that Darcy suggested to Lee that the Pilgrims’ oath and articles should be printed, in order that they might circulate more freely and that their principles might be known. Lee protested against this, as he did against every decided step, and the matter was allowed to drop[1183]. It is an interesting question where Darcy proposed to have the articles printed. To send them abroad would have taken too long, as the printed copies were wanted at once. There had formerly been a printing-press at York, and possibly one at Beverley, but that was twenty years ago, and the press had long since been removed[1184]. This difficulty may have had as much to do with the abandonment of the scheme as the Archbishop’s remonstrances.
While the muster was being held at Barnesdale Heath on Tuesday, Lancaster Herald was brought to Aske and delivered a letter to the rebel leaders from Shrewsbury at Doncaster. It was read, and the captains held a brief council before the host. They decided that Aske should ride to Pontefract and consult Darcy as to their answer, and the captain immediately set out, only pausing to appoint two gentlemen, Robert Delariver and Anthony Brackenbury, to see to Miller’s comfort and safety[1185]. The letter was one of those brought by Talbot from Norfolk. The Duke suggested that much useless bloodshed might be prevented if “four of the discreetest men of the north parts” came to the lords at Doncaster and explained the causes of the rising. Hostages would be given in pledge of their safety[1186].
There is no account of the considerations which affected the decision of Aske and Darcy as to the answer. They were quite willing to treat; this was the first occasion on which the King or his lieutenants had made any inquiry as to the causes of their assembly, and such a tacit admission that they were not in arms from mere wilfulness was a step forward. The Pilgrims had always protested their loyalty to the King’s person. They thought that he had been led astray by lowborn favourites, but, if he would grant the petition of his faithful subjects, war was the last thing that they desired. On the other hand, if he refused to redress grievances which were felt by so large a part of his kingdom, his subjects would be justified in using armed force to bring him to a more reasonable frame of mind. Such was the attitude of the Pilgrims, and they could not maintain it if they attacked the King’s army before their petition had been presented, and consequently before they knew whether the King would grant it or reject it. The pressing question during the next few days was, were they to sacrifice this conditional loyalty and use their advantage over Norfolk’s weakness?
It was a momentous problem which they had to solve. If they gave battle, and failed, their cause was lost for ever; but if they won the immediate result would be a civil war, and that a religious civil war, of all forms of strife the bitterest and most cruel; it might be complicated by a foreign invasion, which, in those days of England’s weakness, might conceivably have led to conquest and annexation. The Pilgrims were not blind to these possibilities. They declared that though they had taken up arms to amend their own affairs, they would accept no help from Scotland, and if an invasion was threatened during the time of insurrection, they protested that they were as ready as ever to defend the Borders. To plunge the country into war was a desperate step which they had only contemplated as a possible last resource in the future. Nevertheless their present situation was tempting; the King’s army was before them, barring their road south, but scattered, unprovided, fainthearted and entirely at their mercy. It was in their power to strike a decisive blow—a blow from which the King’s party might never recover. It is easy to guess what would have been the decision of a Caesar or a Cromwell; but the Pilgrims had no such leader in their ranks. Aske and Darcy were not world’s wonders, and they made their choice as disinterested men, honestly desiring their country’s good, were likely to do.
They determined to accept the Duke’s offer of a conference, but they did not altogether trust him. They would not risk four of their leaders in his host, but they proposed that four, six, eight, or twelve lords and gentlemen from each side should meet at some place on neutral ground. The northern gentlemen would then explain the grievances which had forced them to rise, and would discuss these points and the best road to a peaceful conclusion with the Duke and his companions[1187].
If this proposal were accepted, it would be well to have a clearer and fuller set of articles than had yet been drawn up, and Aske applied to the Archbishop for help as to the wording of the “spiritual articles.” Lee had already been requested by various gentlemen to help them in this matter, but he had not the smallest intention of doing anything so imprudent. He first returned evasive answers, and when pressed said testily, “that they had spun a fine thread if they made so great a business and could not tell why.”[1188] He was very anxious to go home, and Aske would probably have been glad to give him leave, for, though he expected money and advice from high ecclesiastics, he did not encourage them to march with the army[1189]; but the commons were in a suspicious mood[1190], and Aske did not dare to return from Pontefract to Hampole without both Darcy and Lee. The Archbishop’s servants told him that Aske had threatened to “strike off his head” if Lee did not go to the field, and “from that day he accounted himself a prisoner and went with Lord Darcy.”[1191] Nevertheless the Pilgrims continued to believe that the Archbishop sympathised with their cause[1192].
The vanguard returned from the muster to their camp at Hampole for the night of Tuesday 24 October. The weather was bad, and early next morning, as the men crouched over their smoking camp fires, cooking their rations as best they could, a little troop of about thirty horsemen from Doncaster appeared, which hovered round the camp, examining their numbers and position[1193]. When no one could strike an enemy beyond longbow range, warfare was a very intimate and personal affair. It does not seem that much notice was taken of the reconnoitring party, until they chanced upon a couple of stragglers from the Pilgrims’ camp, doubtless in search of stray poultry; the King’s men seized these two, made them fast and began their retreat[1194]. The shouts of their captured comrades roused the Pilgrims, “all men ran to their horses,” and after a hot pursuit the King’s men were obliged to let their prisoners go and hasten their own retreat[1195]. The whole camp was in commotion, every man who could get to his horse joining in the chase. Stapleton was among the first, who never paused till they reached the top of Scawby Hill. Before them lay the valley of the Don; the thirty horsemen, undiminished, were making for the bridge at the gallop. Inflamed by the sight of a flying foe, the Pilgrims looked upon Doncaster as absurdly near and unprotected. There was a general cry to surprise the town by a sudden attack. Wild and disordered as the pursuers were, an attempt so utterly unexpected might have perhaps been successful. But Stapleton thought the risk too great, and riding along the ragged front of the company, he succeeded by commands, entreaties and reasonings in turning them from their purpose[1196].
Other skirmishes took place in the two or three days during which the armies lay facing one another. One was doubly interesting as it concerned the badge of the Five Wounds, and caused the only known casualty among the Pilgrims. “Mr Bowes scrimmaged with his company with the scoriers (scouts) of the Duke of Norfolk’s host, and there one of Mr Bowes’ own servants ran at another of his own fellows, because he had a cross on his back, and weened he had been on the party of the Duke of Norfolk’s host, and there with a spear killed his own fellow. And for that chance then was there a cry for all men to have the badge of I H S or the Five Wounds on him both before and ’hind them. And there, to his (Aske’s) knowledge, was all the men that was slain or hurt of either party, during all the time of business.”[1197] The unlucky Durham man must have put on his white coat with St George’s cross, which he would be accustomed to wear at the King’s musters.
On Wednesday 25 October Aske, Darcy and the Archbishop left Pontefract, and came to Hampole, overtaking on the way Sir Robert Constable and the middle ward, who had probably lain at Wentbridge the night before. The rear ward seem to have reached Pontefract and taken up their quarters there either this day or Thursday[1198]. Lancaster Herald was brought to the captain by the two in whose charge he was left, and he was despatched to Doncaster with the message that the Pilgrims were willing to arrange a conference[1199].
The vanguard had gone forward to Pickburn, about a mile nearer to Doncaster than Hampole, where the middle ward now occupied their old camp. The little nunnery had been converted into headquarters for Lord Darcy and the gentlemen of his division. A dry resting-place was very desirable “for there was a sore rain, which raised the waters, especially the Don,” and “the people were lodged in woods and villages.”[1200] Aske sent out only skirmishers on “scoutwatch,” as it was called; these were Bishopric men, who, like all Borderers, were particularly expert at this open, individual kind of fighting. There were no scouts born and bred to the work in the King’s host, and the Pilgrims had the best of it in the various little brushes which took place, the redcross men who showed themselves on the north bank of the river being promptly encountered and forced to take refuge with their own people across the bridge.
While Lord Darcy, the Archbishop and Sir Robert Constable were taking up their quarters at Hampole, Aske rode on to Pickburn to hear the reports of the scouts and spies as they came in, and to take counsel with the commanders of the vanguard. In the evening Lancaster Herald returned to the Pilgrims’ camp with further messages from Shrewsbury. He brought, not an answer to their last proposal, but an exhortation to the rebels prepared by Norfolk some days before, which bade them either humbly submit themselves to the King’s mercy as ungrateful traitors, or make ready to abide danger by battle, to be given them by the Duke “in place convenient.”[1201] Shrewsbury must simply have sent it on as soon as it arrived without considering how far the negotiations had already advanced. It was particularly irritating to the Pilgrims, as it appeared to be a deliberate set-back to all schemes for a peaceful settlement.
A long debate followed the reading of the letters. The insurgent leaders knew that their numbers were overwhelming. Shrewsbury could not muster, at the highest estimate, 8000 men at Doncaster. Most of his army were at Scrooby; Norfolk and Exeter at places even further south[1202]. Such cavalry as he had were ill-horsed; many, “every third man,” according to rumour, were with the Pilgrims at heart[1203]; the rest were “faint” and without enthusiasm; such as did not desert outright were not likely to give much trouble if attacked with vigour[1204]. Aske’s scouts brought him word as to where every company of the enemy was quartered, and how the bridge was defended and guarded; no muster could take place on the south bank without his knowledge. In contrast to Shrewsbury’s troops, the Pilgrims were at least thirty thousand strong; they were “as tall men, well-horsed and well appointed, as any men could be.” Every witness attests their devotion to their cause. “There were neither gentlemen nor commons willing to depart, but to proceed in the quarrel; yea, and that to the death.”[1205] In these circumstances the leaders naturally resented Norfolk’s haughty and final tone, as if he had command of the situation. The Durham lords were ready to accept the new messages as a sign that all further negotiations were broken off; they advised that the challenge should be accepted, and that the attack should be made at once[1206]. There was little to fear as to the issue. Norfolk afterwards declared that Doncaster was in the greatest danger “if the rebels had taken their advantage like men of war.” As soon as the rain ceased and the waters of the Don fell, Shrewsbury’s position would be quite untenable[1207].
Aske, however, headed a party in the council which favoured moderate measures[1208]. He pointed out that they had assembled for the very purpose of laying their grievances before the King for remedy. There was no shame in discussing their petition with the King’s lieutenant; it was only another step on their Pilgrimage[1209]. Norfolk, Shrewsbury, and the other lords of the old noble blood were the very men that the Pilgrims were suggesting as more suitable counsellors for the King than his lowborn favourites; the lords had probably more sympathy for the rebels’ demands than they dared to show. It was bad policy to attack those most able to further the petition at court, where the Pilgrims had little influence. Whatever the result of a pitched battle, it would make a civil war inevitable. Even though the Pilgrims were successful at first, the King might prove the stronger in the end, and all the nobles and gentlemen of the northern counties would be “attainted, slain and undone, and the country made a waste for the Scots.”[1210]
Darcy was in favour of negotiating for another reason. In his opinion “it were better (to) have garrison war than hosting war in time of winter.”[1211] The Pilgrims were not hampered by the bad weather to the same extent as the royal troops. They were advancing at their leisure, without ordnance, and they were well supplied with food and fuel from a base not a dozen miles away. Nevertheless a truce would give them time to organise and develop. They would be able to determine on the best places to hold, and to provide for their defence in case the petitions were refused. They might possibly receive money and encouragement from the Pope. Above all, the leaders could trust the commons not to lose heart during a short truce. All were steadfastly determined to fight if the King would not listen to them[1212]. Of course the King would equally be able to strengthen himself; but the Pilgrims trusted a good deal to the secret assurances of sympathy which they received from the midland and southern shires. The King might summon a larger army, he was not likely to raise one any more loyal.
In brief Aske and those who thought with him “feared not the royal troops though they were 40,000,” but they did not desire civil war. Their one aim was certain political and religious reforms, and they endeavoured to bring their object to pass in as constitutional a manner as was then possible. They would lose little or nothing by consenting to negotiate for a truce; they might gain much; at least they would preserve their consistency.
These were the chief considerations which Aske laid before the council. The earlier ones are stated in his own writings, while the later may be gathered from the circumstances. His arguments convinced the lords and gentlemen. They decided that they were strong enough to treat, and that they would accept Norfolk’s first offer, not his second. Lancaster Herald was again despatched with the message that four gentlemen would come, upon due pledges, to speak with the Duke next day. Robert Bowes, who was to be one of the four, set out at once with Aske for Hampole to announce the arrangement to Darcy and Constable[1213].
None of the leaders entirely trusted the Duke. They thought that he would not “dishonour himself by making a night attack—a kind of battle seldom heard of, especially at that season, being November,”[1214] but they were quite prepared for such an infringement of military etiquette. The first question that Darcy asked Bowes was “who was that night in scoutwatch?” This being satisfactorily answered, they discussed the details of the meeting next day, and also what their tactics should be in case of battle[1215]. It was not improbable that no peaceful settlement would be concluded, and in that case they would be able to make the most of their present advantage after having done their best to avoid war.
On the night of Wednesday 25 October Norfolk, with Surrey and about thirty gentlemen and servants, lay at Welbeck. His men, ordnance and artillery, were at Tuxford, while Exeter had reached Nottingham with only part of his company. At midnight Norfolk was roused by the arrival of posts from the north, who brought the news that Shrewsbury had arranged to treat with the rebels, and that the Duke’s presence at Doncaster was urgently required.
The letter which he wrote to the King before setting out shows that the Pilgrims did him no injustice when they suspected his intentions:
“Sir havyng this present hour receyved the lettre herin closed and never hard one worde fro my lord steward but this sith Monday last at v in the morning not with standyng dyvers sent fro me to hym to know of his newes, I being in bed and not a slepe accompanyed with suche as be named in a sedul herin closed, I have taken my horse only accompanyd with my brother William and Sir richard page, Sir arthur darcy and iiii of my servants to ryde towards my lord steward accordyng to his desire, not knowyng wher th’ enemys be nor of what nomber, nor no thyng more than is conteyned in their letter, wherin I am so far priked that what so ever shalbe the sequell I shall not so spare the litle poure carkes that for any ease or danger other men shall have cause to obiect any lageousnes in me and Sir most humble I besech you to take in gode part what so ever promes I shall make unto the rebells (if any suche I shall by th’ advyse of others make) for sewerly I shall observe no part theroff for any respect of that other myght call myn honour distayned langer than I and my company with my lord marquess may be assembled to gyder, thynkyng and repewting that none oth nor promes made for polecy to serve you myn only master and soverayne can destayne me who shall rather be torne in a myllion of peces then to show one poynt of cowardise or untrouth to your maieste.
Sir I trust the sendyng for me is ment to gode purpose and if it chaunse to me to myscary most noble and gracious Master be gode to my sonnys and to my poure doghter. And if my lord steward had not advansed fro trent unto my comyng and that then I myght have folowed th’ effect of my letter wryten you from Cambrige these traytors with ease myght have be[en] subdewed. I pray god that hap torne not to moche hurt. In hast at Welbek xiiii myles fro dancaster at xii at nyght.