2. Footnote: It was during this dispute between New York and Vermont that Gen. Ethan Allen, then residing in the latter State, received large offers from the British to use his influence to detach Vermont from the Union and annex it to Canada. Of course these offers were indignantly rejected.
In our last notice of the movements and operations of the contending armies in the southern States, we left Cornwallis, after a dreary and disastrous retreat, at Wynnsborough. The Americans, in the meantime, were not idle. Defeated, but not subdued, they were active in preparing to renew the struggle. After the defeat and dispersion of his army at Camden, General Gates retreated to Charlotte, eighty miles from the field of battle. There he halted to collect the straggling fugitives and to endeavor from the wreck of his discomfited army to form a force with which he might check or impede the advancing foe. He was soon joined by Generals Smallwood and Gist, and about 150 dispirited officers and soldiers. Most of the militia who escaped returned home, and General Caswell was ordered to assemble those of the neighboring counties. Major Anderson of the Third Maryland regiment, who had collected a number of fugitives not far from the field of battle, proceeded toward Charlotte by easy marches in order to give stragglers time to join him. But as Charlotte was utterly indefensible and as no barrier lay between it and the victorious enemy Gates retreated to Salisbury and sent Colonel Williams, accompanied by another officer, on the road leading to Camden to gain information of the movements of Cornwallis, and to direct such stragglers as he met to hasten to Salisbury. From Salisbury Gates proceeded to Hillsborough, where he intended to assemble an army with which he might contend for the southern Provinces.
It was from Hillsborough that he wrote the letter to Washington, which we have already quoted, desiring the exertion of his influence to prevent his being superseded in the command of the southern army.
At Hillsborough every exertion was made to collect and organize a military force and ere long Gates was again at the head of 1,400 men. Even before the royal army entered North Carolina that State had called out the second division of its militia, under Generals Davidson and Sumner, and they were joined by the volunteer cavalry under Colonel Davie.
When Cornwallis entered Charlotte, Gates ordered General Smallwood to take post at the fords of the Yadkin in order to dispute the passage of the river, and Morgan, who had joined the southern army with the rank of brigadier-general, was employed with a light corps to harass the enemy.
When Cornwallis retreated Gates advanced to Charlotte; he stationed General Smallwood further down the Catawba on the road to Camden and ordered Morgan to some distance in his front. Such was the position of the troops when Gates was superseded in the command of the southern army.
On the 5th of October (1780) Congress, without any previous indications of dissatisfaction, had passed a resolution requiring Washington to order a court of inquiry into the conduct of Major-General Gates, as commander of the southern army, and to appoint another officer to that command till such inquiry should be made. The order of Congress to inquire into the conduct of Gates was unsatisfactory, as we have already seen, to Washington. It was afterward dispensed with and Gates restored to a command in the army.
Meanwhile Washington recommended Major-General Greene to Congress as a person qualified to command the southern army. Greene, by his activity, intrepidity, and good conduct, had gained the confidence of Washington long ago; he had desired him to have the command when Gates was appointed, as we have already seen, and he now again recommended him as an officer in whose ability, fortitude, and integrity he could trust. On the 2d of December (1780) Greene arrived at Charlotte and informed Gates of his commission. That was the first official notice which Gates, the former favorite of Congress, received of his removal from the command of the southern army. Next day Gates resigned the command of the army with becoming dignity and patriotism, and Greene, who was dissatisfied with the treatment which he had received, behaved toward him with the most polite attention.
In a few hours after Greene entered on his command he received the report of one of Morgan's foraging parties, not far from Camden. The party advanced to the vicinity of the British posts at Clermont, which was viewed by Col. William A. Washington, who saw that it was too strong to be taken by small arms and cavalry, the only weapons and force present; he therefore had recourse to stratagem. Having made an imposing show of part of his men and having placed the trunk of a pine tree in such a situation as, at a distance, to have the appearance of a cannon, he summoned the post to surrender, and it yielded without firing a shot. The Tory Colonel Rugely and 112 men whom he had collected in the place were made prisoners. This inconsiderable event elated Greene's army and was considered by them as a good omen of success under their new leader.
General Greene's situation was embarrassing. His army was feeble, consisting, on the 8th of December (1780), of 2,029 infantry, of whom 1,482 were in camp and 547 in detachments; 821 were Continentals and 1,208 were militia. Besides these there were 90 cavalry, 60 artillerymen, and 128 Continentals on extra service, constituting in all a force of 2,307 men.
In North Carolina there were many Loyalists, and hostilities were carried on between them and their republican neighbors with the most rancorous animosity. The country was thinly inhabited and abounded in woods and swamps. The cultivated parts were laid waste by hostile factions, and no magazines for the army were provided. The troops were almost naked, and Greene obliged to procure subsistence for them day by day.
He found that he could not long remain at Charlotte for the country between that place and Camden, having been traversed by the contending armies, was quite exhausted. In order, therefore, to procure subsistence for his troops, as well as to distract and harass the enemy, Greene, though fully aware of the danger of such a measure, felt himself constrained to divide his little army.
General Morgan had been invested with the command of the light troops by Gates, and Greene placed him at the head of one of the divisions of his army, consisting of nearly 400 infantry under Lieutenant-Colonel Howard, 170 Virginia riflemen under Major Triplett, and 80 light dragoons under Lieut.-Col. William A. Washington. With this small force Morgan was sent to the south of the Catawba to observe the British at Wynnsborough and Camden and to shift for himself, but was directed to risk as little as possible. On the 25th of December (1780) he took a position toward the western frontier of South Carolina, not far from the confluence of the Pacolet and Broad rivers, and about fifty miles northwest from Wynnsborough. With the other division of his army Greene left Charlotte on the 20th of the same month (December, 1780), and on the 29th arrived at Hick's Corner on the east side of the Pedee, opposite the Cheraw hills, about seventy miles northeast from Wynnsborough, where he remained some time. He marched to that place in the hope of finding more plentiful subsistence for his troops, but his difficulties in that respect were not much diminished, for the country was almost laid waste by the cruel feuds of the hostile factions.
General Morgan did not long remain inactive. On the 27th of December (1780) he detached Colonel Washington with his dragoons and 200 militia, who next day marched forty miles, surprised a body of Loyalists at Ninety-six, killed or wounded 150 of them, and took 40 prisoners, without sustaining any loss. At that time Morgan was joined by Major M'Dowell with 200 North Carolina, and by Colonel Pickens with 70 South Carolina militia.
The British had to contend not only with the force under Greene and Morgan, but were also obliged to watch other adversaries not less active and enterprising. Sumter had been defeated by Tarleton on the 18th of August (1780), and his followers dispersed, but that daring and indefatigable partisan did not long remain quiet. He was soon again at the head of a considerable band and had frequent skirmishes with his adversaries. Always changing his position about Enoree, Broad, and Tiger rivers, he often assailed the British posts in that quarter. On the 12th of November (1780) he was attacked at Broad river by Major Wemyss, but repulsed the party and made the major prisoner. On the 20th of the same month he was attacked by Tarleton at Black Stocks, near Tiger river; the encounter was sharp and obstinate; Tarleton was repulsed with loss, but Sumter was wounded in the battle, and, being unfitted for active service, his followers dispersed. Sumter showed much humanity to his prisoners. Although Wemyss had deliberately hanged Mr. Cusack in the Cheraw district, and although he had in his pocket a list of several houses burned by his orders, yet he met with every indulgence. At Black Stocks the wounded were kindly treated.
Other partisan chiefs arose and among them General Marion held a distinguished place. He had commanded a regiment in Charleston at the time of the siege, but having received a wound which fractured his leg, and being incapable of discharging the {1} active duties of his office, he withdrew from the town. On the advance of Gates, having procured a band of followers, he penetrated to the Santee, harassed the British detachments, and discouraged the Loyalists. After the defeat of the Americans at Camden he rescued a party of Continental prisoners who were under a British guard. So ill was he provided with arms that he was obliged to forge the saws of the sawmills into rude swords for his horsemen, and so scanty was his ammunition that at times he engaged when he had not three cartridges to each of his party. He secured himself from pursuit in the recesses of the forest and in deep swamps. {2}
Cornwallis impatiently waited the arrival of reinforcements. After the victory at Camden, when he was flushed with the sanguine hope not only of overrunning North Carolina, but of invading Virginia, General Leslie was detached from New York to the southward with a considerable body of troops, and, according to orders, landed in Virginia, expecting to meet the southern army in that State. On finding himself unable to accomplish his lofty schemes, and obliged to fall back into South Carolina, Cornwallis ordered Leslie to re-embark and sail for Charleston. He arrived there on the 13th of December (1780), and on the 19th began his march with 1,500 men to join Cornwallis. His lordship resolved to begin offensive operations immediately on the arrival of his reinforcements, but, in the meantime, alarmed by the movements of Morgan for the safety of the British post at Ninety-six, he detached Tarleton with the light and legion infantry, the fusiliers or Seventh regiment, the first battalion of the Seventy-first regiment, 350 cavalry, 2 field pieces, and an adequate number of the royal artillery, in all about 1,100 men, with orders to strike a blow at Morgan and drive him out of the province. As Tarleton's force was known to be superior to that under Morgan, no doubt whatever was entertained of the precipitate flight or total discomfiture of the Americans.
Meanwhile Cornwallis left Wynnsborough and proceeded toward the northwest, between the Broad and Catawba rivers. General Leslie, who had halted at Camden in order to conceal as long as possible the road which the British army was to take, was now ordered to advance up the Catawba and join the main body on its march. By this route Cornwallis hoped to intercept Morgan if he should escape Tarleton, or perhaps to get between General Greene and Virginia and compel him to fight before the arrival of his expected reinforcements. The British generals encumbered with baggage and military stores, marching through bad roads, and a country intersected by rivulets which were often swollen by the rains, advanced but slowly. Tarleton, however, with his light troops, proceeded with great celerity and overtook Morgan probably sooner than was expected.
On the 14th of January (1781) Morgan was informed of the movements of the British army and got notice of the march of Tarleton and of the force under his command. Sensible of his danger he began to retreat, and crossed the Pacolet, the passage of which he was inclined to dispute, but, on being told that Tarleton had forded the river six miles above him, he made a precipitate retreat, and at ten at night on the 16th of January the British took possession of the ground which the Americans had left a few hours before.
Although his troops were much fatigued by several days' hard marching through a difficult country, yet, determined that Morgan should not escape, Tarleton resumed the pursuit at three next morning, leaving his baggage behind under a guard with orders not to move till break of day. Morgan, though retreating, was not disinclined to fight. By great exertions he might have crossed Broad river or reached a hilly tract of country before he could have been overtaken. He was inferior to Tarleton in the number of his troops, but more so in their quality, as a considerable part of his force consisted of militia, and the British cavalry were three times more numerous than the American. But Morgan, who had great confidence both in himself and in his men, was apprehensive of being overtaken before he could pass Broad river, and he chose rather to fight voluntarily than to be forced to a battle. Therefore, having been joined by some militia under Colonel Pickens, he halted at a place called the Cowpens, about three miles from the line of separation between North and South Carolina. Before daylight on the morning of the 17th of January (1781), he was informed of the near approach of Tarleton, and instantly prepared to receive him.
The ground on which Morgan halted had no great advantages, but his dispositions were judicious. On rising ground, in an open wood, he drew up his Continental troops and Triplett's corps, amounting together to nearly 500 men, under Lieutenant-Colonel Howard. Colonel Washington with his cavalry was posted in their rear, behind the eminence, ready to act as occasion might require. At a small distance in front of his Continentals was a line of militia under Colonel Pickens and Major M'Dowell, and 150 yards in front of Pickens was stationed a battalion of North Carolina and Georgia volunteers under Major Cunningham, with orders to give one discharge on the approaching enemy, and then to retreat and join the militia. Pickens was directed, when he could no longer keep his ground, to fall back with a retreating fire and form on the right of the Continentals.
Scarcely were those dispositions made when the British van appeared. Tarleton, who had been informed by two prisoners of Morgan's position and strength, instantly formed his troops. The light and legion infantry and the Seventh regiment, and a captain with fifty dragoons on each flank, constituted his first line; the first battalion of the Seventy-first regiment and the rest of the cavalry composed the reserve. Formerly Tarleton had succeeded by sudden and impetuous assaults, and, entertaining no doubt of speedy and complete victory on the present occasion, he led on his men to the attack with characteristic ardor, even before his troops were well formed. The British rushed forward impetuously, shouting and firing as they advanced. The American volunteers, after a single discharge, retreated to the militia under Pickens. The British advanced rapidly, and furiously attacked the militia, who soon gave way and sought shelter in the rear of the Continentals. Tarleton eagerly pressed on, but the Continentals, undismayed by the retreat of the militia, received him firmly, and an obstinate conflict ensued. Tarleton ordered up his reserve, and the Continental line was shaken by the violence of the onset. Morgan ordered his men to retreat to the summit of the eminence and was instantly obeyed. The British, whose ranks were somewhat thinned, exhausted by the previous march and by the struggle in which they had been engaged, and believing the victory won, pursued in some disorder, but, on reaching the top of the hill, Howard ordered his men to wheel and face the enemy; they instantly obeyed and met the pursuing foe with a well-directed and deadly fire. This unexpected and destructive volley threw the British into some confusion, which Howard observing, ordered his men to charge them with the bayonet. Their obedience was as prompt as before, and the British line was soon broken. About the same moment Washington routed the cavalry on the British right, who had pursued the flying militia and were cutting them down on the left and even in the rear of the Continentals. Ordering his men not to fire a pistol, Washington charged the British cavalry sword in hand. The conflict was sharp, but not of long duration. The British were driven from the ground with considerable loss and closely pursued. Howard and Washington pressed the advantage which they had gained; many of the militia rallied and joined in the battle. In a few minutes after the British had been pursuing the enemy, without a doubt of victory, the fortune of the day entirely changed; their artillerymen were killed, their cannon taken, and the greater part of the infantry compelled to lay down their arms. Tarleton, with about forty horse, made a furious charge on Washington's cavalry, but the battle was irrecoverably lost, and he was reluctantly obliged to retreat. Upwards of 200 of his cavalry, who had not been engaged, fled through the woods with the utmost precipitation, bearing away with them such of the officers as endeavored to oppose their flight. The only part of the infantry which escaped was the detachment left to guard the baggage, which they destroyed when informed of the defeat, and, mounting the wagons and spare horses, hastily retreated to the army. The cavalry arrived in camp in two divisions; one in the evening, with the tidings of their disastrous discomfiture, and the other, under Tarleton himself, appeared next morning. In this battle the British had ten commissioned officers and upwards of 100 privates killed. More than 500 were made prisoners, nearly 200 of whom, including twenty-nine commissioned officers, were wounded. Two pieces of artillery, two standards, 800 muskets, thirty-five baggage wagons and about 100 horses fell into the hands of the Americans whose loss amounted only to 12 men killed and 60 wounded. The British force under Tarleton has been commonly estimated at 1,100 men, and the American army at 1,000, although Morgan, in his official report to Greene, written two days after the battle, states it to have been only 800. {3}
Cornwallis was at Turkey creek, twenty-five miles from the Cowpens, confident of the success of his detachment or at least without the slightest apprehension of its defeat. He was between Greene and Morgan and it was a matter of much importance to prevent their junction and to overthrow the one of them while he could receive no support from the other. For that purpose he had marched up Broad river and instructed General Leslie to proceed on the banks of the Catawba in order to keep the Americans in a state of uncertainty concerning the route which he intended to pursue, but the unexpected defeat of his detachment was an occurrence equally mortifying and perplexing and nothing remained but to endeavor to compensate the disaster by the rapidity of his movements and the decision of his conduct.
He was as near the fords of the Catawba as Morgan and flattered himself that, elated with victory and encumbered with prisoners and baggage, that officer might yet be overtaken before he could pass those fords. Accordingly, on the 18th of January, (1781) he formed a junction with General Leslie and on the 19th began his remarkable pursuit of Morgan. In order the more certainly to accomplish his end at Ramsour's Mills he destroyed the whole of his superfluous baggage. He set the example by considerably diminishing the quantity of his own and was readily imitated by his officers although some of them suffered much less by the measure. He retained no wagons except those loaded with hospital stores and ammunition and four empty ones for the accommodation of the sick and wounded. But notwithstanding all his privations and exertions he ultimately missed his aim for Morgan displayed as much prudence and activity after his victory as bravery in gaining it. Fully aware of his danger he left behind him, under a flag of truce, such of the wounded as could not be moved with surgeons to attend them, and scarcely giving his men time to breathe he sent off his prisoners under an escort of militia and followed with his regular troops and cavalry, bringing up the rear in person. He crossed Broad river at the upper fords, hastened to the Catawba, which he reached on the evening of the 28th, and safely passed it with his prisoners and troops next day—his rear having gained the northern bank only about two hours before the van of the British army appeared on the opposite side.
Much rain had fallen on the mountains a short time before and it rained incessantly during the night. The river rose and in the morning was impassable. Morgan made a hair-breadth escape, for had the river risen a few hours sooner he would have been unable to pass and probably would have been overtaken and overwhelmed by his pursuers and had the flood in the river been a little later Cornwallis might have forced a passage and entirely discomfited the American division. But it was two days before the inundation subsided, and in that interval Morgan sent off his prisoners towards Charlottesville, in Virginia, under an escort of militia and they were soon beyond the reach of pursuit. The Americans regarded the swelling of the river with pious gratitude as an interposition of Heaven in their behalf and looked forward with increased confidence to the day of ultimate success.
Morgan called for the assistance of the neighboring militia, and prepared to dispute the passage of the river; but on the 31st of January (1781), while he lay at Sherwood's ford, General Greene unexpectedly appeared in camp and took on himself the command. Toward the end of December, (1781) Greene, as already mentioned, took a position at Hick's creek on the east side of the Peedee, and had in camp 1,100 Continental and State troops fit for service. On the 12th of January (1781) he was joined by Col. Henry Lee's partisan legion which arrived from the North and consisted of 100 well-mounted horsemen and 120 infantry. This reinforcement was next day dispatched on a secret expedition and in order to divert the attention of the enemy from the movements of the legion, Major Anderson, with a small detachment was sent down the Peedee. On the night of the 24th, Lee surprised Georgetown and killed some of the garrison, but the greater part fled into the fort which Lee was not in a condition to besiege.
Although Cornwallis perceived that he would meet with opposition yet he determined to force the passage. The river was about 500 yards wide, three feet deep, and the stream rapid. The light infantry of the guards under Colonel Hall, accompanied by a guide, first entered the ford; they were followed by the grenadiers who were succeeded by the battalions. As soon as Davidson perceived the direction of the British column he led his men to the point where it was about to land. But before he arrived the light infantry had overcome all difficulties and were ascending the bank and forming. While passing the river, in obedience to orders, they reserved their fire, and, on gaining the bank, soon put the militia to flight. Davidson was the last to retreat and on mounting his horse to retire he received a mortal wound.
The defeat of Davidson opened the passage of the river. All the American parties retreated, and on the same day the rest of the British army crossed at Beattie's ford. Tarleton, with the cavalry and the Twenty-third regiment, was sent in pursuit of the militia, and being informed on his march that the neighboring militia were assembling at Tarrant's tavern, about ten miles distant, he hastened with the cavalry to that place. About 500 militia were assembled and seemed not unprepared to receive him. He attacked them with his usual impetuosity and soon defeated and dispersed them with considerable slaughter. The passage of the river and the total discomfiture of the party at Tarrant's tavern so much intimidated the inhabitants of the country that the royal army received no further trouble from the militia till it had passed the Yadkin.
A grand military race now began between the retreating Americans under Greene and the pursuing British under Cornwallis. Greene marched so rapidly that he passed the Yadkin at the trading ford on the night between the 2d and 3d of February (1781), partly by fording and partly by means of boats and flats. So closely was he pursued that the British van was often in sight of the American rear and a sharp conflict happened not far from the ford, between a body of American riflemen and the advanced guard of the British army, when the latter obtained possession of a few wagons. Greene secured all the boats on the south side and here it again happened as at the Catawba—the river suddenly rose by reason of the preceding rains and the British were unable to pass. This second escape by the swelling of the waters was interpreted by the Americans as a visible interposition of Heaven in their behalf and inspired then with a lofty enthusiasm in that cause which seemed to be the peculiar care of Omnipotence.
Greene, released from the immediate pressure of his pursuers, continued his march northward and on the 7th of February joined his division under Huger and Williams near Guilford Courthouse.
In order to cover his retreat and to check the pursuing enemy Greene formed a light corps out of Lee's legion, Howard's infantry, Washington's cavalry, and some Virginia riflemen under Major Campbell, amounting to 700 men, the flower of the southern army. As General Morgan was severely indisposed the command of these light troops was given to Col. Otho Holland Williams, formerly adjutant-general.
Having refreshed his troops, and made the necessary arrangements on the morning of the 10th of February (1781), Greene left Guilford Courthouse on his march towards the Dan, and was pursued by Cornwallis, who had been detained by the long circuit which he was obliged to make in order to pass the Yadkin. The retreat and pursuit were equally rapid, but the boldness and activity of the American light troops compelled the British to march compactly and with caution, for on one occasion Colonel Lee charged the advanced cavalry of the British army suddenly and furiously, killed a number, and made some prisoners. On this occasion Cornwallis felt the loss of the light troops who had been killed or taken at the Cowpens. He was destined to regret their loss through the rest of the campaign.
Greene's precautions and preparations for passing the Dan were successful and on the 14th of February he crossed that river at Boyd's and Irwin's ferries with his army, baggage, and stores. Although his light troops had marched forty miles that day, yet the last of them had scarcely reached the northern bank when the advanced guard of the British army appeared on the other side of the river.
The escape of Greene into Virginia without a battle and without any loss except a few wagons at the Yadkin, was a severe disappointment to Cornwallis. He had entirely failed in his attempts against Greene, but he was consoled by the reflection that he had completely driven him out of North Carolina, and that now there was nothing to hinder the loyal inhabitants from openly espousing the British cause and reinforcing the royal army.
Cornwallis now gave up the pursuit and repaired to Hillsborough with the view of calling out and organizing the Royalist forces. His adherents, though here particularly strong, did not come forward to the extent expected. The larger portion, as elsewhere, regarded the cause with that passive and inert attachment which we have remarked to be generally prevalent and even the more zealous having suffered severely by former premature displays, dreaded lest the republican cause should regain the ascendancy. The view also of the distress and exhaustion of the British troops after so long a march was by no means alluring. Yet seven companies were formed and detachments began to come in from different quarters.
On the other hand, Greene, having obtained a reinforcement of Virginia militia, repassed the Dan and with his light troops endeavored to annoy the British army and prevent recruiting. Major Lee surprised a detachment of Royalists who mistook him for Tarleton and cut them nearly to pieces. On account of the exhausted state of the country at Hillsborough, Cornwallis soon withdrew to a position on the Allimance creek between Haw and Deep rivers, where he could be better supplied and support his friends who were numerous there. Greene, however, by an active use of his cavalry and light troops, severely harassed his opponent and by changing his own position every night, eluded the attempt to bring him to an engagement.
At length General Greene, having received reinforcements which raised his army to above 4,200 men, of whom about a third were regulars, determined to offer battle. This was what Cornwallis had eagerly sought, yet his own effective force being reduced to somewhat under 2,000 he felt now some hesitation, and probably would have acted more wisely in maintaining the defensive. Even the enterprising Tarleton observes that in his circumstances defeat would have been total ruin, while any victory he might expect to gain could yield little fruit. All the habits and views of Cornwallis, however, being directed to an active campaign, he formed his resolution and, on the 15th of March (1781), proceeded to the attack. Greene had drawn up his army very judiciously near Guilford Courthouse mostly on a range of hills covered with trees and brushwood.
Greene made disposition of his troops in the following order: The first line was composed of North Carolina militia, the right under General Eaton and the left under General Butler, with two pieces of artillery under Captain Singleton. The right flank was supported by Kirkwood's Delawareans, Lynch's riflemen, and the cavalry, all under Lieutenant-Colonel Washington, and the left in like manner by Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell's riflemen and the infantry of the legion, all under Lieutenant-Colonel Lee. The second line, which was formed 300 yards in the rear of the first, consisted of two brigades of Virginia militia, the right under General Lawson and the left under General Stevens. The third, 400 yards in reserve was formed upon the brow of the hill near the courthouse. The right of this line was composed of Hawes's and Greene's Virginia regiments under General Huger; the left of the first and second Maryland regiments, the former under Gunby, the latter under Ford—the whole commanded by Colonel Williams. In the center of the last line was placed the remainder of the artillery.
Captain Singleton commenced his fire, which was returned by the enemy, who had formed their line of battle—the right wing under General Leslie and the left under Lieutenant-Colonel Webster, with the artillery in the center under Lieutenant-Colonel McLeod. The first battalion of the guards, under Lieutenant-Colonel Norton, served as a support for the right, and the second, with one company of grenadiers under General O'Hara, for the left wing. Tarleton's dragoons were held in reserve. The British commander having made all his dispositions advanced, fired one round, and charged bayonets. Our militia having given a few shots while the enemy was at a distance were seized by a panic when they saw him coming down upon them. Many of them threw away their muskets, and the entreaties of Butler, Eaton, and Davie, with the threats of Lee, were of no avail. Almost the entire body fled. The artillery now retired to the left of the Marylanders. At this crisis the enemy considered victory as already within his grasp and continued to push on when he was attacked on his right and left by Lee and Washington. Cornwallis perceiving this threw one regiment out to engage Lee, and one regiment together with his light infantry and yagers to resist Washington, filling up the breach thus created by advancing the grenadiers with two battalions of the guards, which had formed the supports to the flanks. Lee and Washington fell back in good order, delivering their fire until they came up with the second line which gave battle in good earnest. The right flank was supported by Washington, who ordered Lynch's riflemen to fall upon the left of Webster, who had to be supported by O'Hara. Here Webster ordered the Thirty-third regiment to attack Lynch and was thereby in a measure relieved. O'Hara charged the Virginia right wing, which was obliged to yield ground. Lee on the left nobly did his duty and firmly held his position. When the militia on the right gave way those on the left fell back and were not rallied until they came up on the left of the third line. Campbell's riflemen and Lee's legion stood perfectly firm and continued the contest against one regiment, one battalion, and a body of infantry and riflemen. The American reserve, with the artillery posted in a most favorable position, was fresh and ready for the word of command. Webster having overcome the Americans of the second line in his front advanced upon the third and was received by Gunby's Maryland regiment with a most galling fire which made his troops falter. Gunby advanced, charging bayonets, when the enemy was completely routed.
Leslie, after the left of the Virginia militia gave way, advanced to the support of O'Hara, who had forced the American right wing, and the combined commands of these generals charged the Second Maryland regiment of the third line. This regiment, panic-stricken, fled. Gunby, coming up at the time, held the enemy in check and a deadly conflict ensued. Gunby having his horse shot under him, Lieutenant-Colonel Howard assumed the command. Washington seeing how hot was the battle at this point pushed forward and charged the enemy, and Howard advancing with his bayonets leveled, the British were completely routed.
The pursuit was continued for some distance when Cornwallis came up and determined to gain the victory at any cost. He opened the fire of his artillery alike on friend and foe, causing an indiscriminate slaughter of British and Americans.
The British were rallied at all points, and Greene, considering it better to preserve the advantages he had gained, withdrew his forces. This was done in good order and Cornwallis continued the pursuit but a short distance. The loss of the Americans was about 400 in killed and wounded; that of the British about 800. The enemy retained the field, but his victory was both empty, and disastrous.
Notwithstanding Cornwallis claimed a victory he resolved to fall back on Wilmington, near the mouth of Cape Fear river, where he could recruit his troops and obtain supplies and reinforcements by sea.
Greene retreated about fifteen miles, taking post behind a small stream called Troublesome creek, where he expected and awaited an attack.
1. Footnote: Marion was a strict temperance man. Being at a dinner party where the guests, determined on a hard drinking bout, had locked the door to prevent his exit, he jumped out of a second-story window, and broke his leg. This was the wound above referred to. It occasioned him to leave the city. He thus escaped surrendering when Charleston fell, and his temperance preserved to the country one of its bravest defenders.
2. Footnote: Marion, on account of his successful stratagems and sudden surprises of the British, was called by them the Swamp-Fox. His own countrymen styled him the Bayard of the South.
3. Footnote: The action at the Cowpens was one of the medal victories. Congress had separate gold medals struck in honor of it, and presented to Morgan, Howard, and Col. William A. Washington. The name Cowpens, according to Irving, comes from the old designation of Hannah's Cowpens, the place being part of a grazing establishment belonging to a man named Hannah. The worthy grazier could hardly have foreseen the immortality which was destined to attach to his Cowpens.
While the events recorded in the last chapter were passing Washington was by no means a passive spectator. He held a constant correspondence with Greene and sent him all the aid he could. Writing to him on the 9th of January, 1781, he says: "It is impossible for anyone to sympathize more feelingly with you in the sufferings and distresses of the troops than I do, and nothing could aggravate my unhappiness so much as the want of ability to remedy or alleviate the calamities which they suffer and in which we participate but too largely.
"The brilliant action of General Sumter and the stratagem of Colonel Washington deserve great commendation. It gives me inexpressible pleasure to find that such a spirit of enterprise and intrepidity still prevails." {1}
Writing to Greene again (on the 21st of March, 1781), he says: "You may be assured that your retreat before Lord Cornwallis is highly applauded by all ranks and reflects much honor on your military abilities." Such words, from such a man, must have inspirited Greene amidst his toils and perils.
Greene, writing to Washington three days after the battle of Guilford Courthouse, says: "In my former letters I enclosed to your Excellency the probable strength of the British army, since which they have been constantly declining. Our force, as you will see by the returns, was respectable, and the probability of not being able to keep it long in the field, and the difficulty of subsisting men in this exhausted country, together with the great advantages which would result from the action if we were victorious, and the little injury if we were otherwise, determined me to bring on an action as soon as possible. When both parties are agreed in a matter all obstacles are soon removed. I thought the determination warranted by the soundest principles of good policy and I hope events will prove it so though we were unfortunate. I regret nothing so much as the loss of my artillery, though it was of little use to us, nor can it be in this great wilderness. However, as the enemy have it, we must also."
"Lord Cornwallis," he writes in the same letter, "will not give up this country without being roundly beaten. I wish our force was more competent to the business. But I am in hopes, by little and little, to reduce him in time. His troops are good, well found, and fight with great obstinacy.
"Virginia has given me every support I could wish or expect since Lord Cornwallis has been in North Carolina, and nothing has contributed more to this than the prejudice of the people in favor of your Excellency which has been extended to me from the friendship you have been pleased to honor me with."
The reader will not fail to observe the soundness of Greene's judgment as to the beneficial effect of the battle of Guilford Courthouse. It was truly a disastrous victory for Cornwallis and a fortunate defeat for Greene, whose subsequent operations we must now notice.
When Greene took his position at the ironworks on Troublesome creek after the battle of Guilford Courthouse he expected that Cornwallis would follow up his advantage and attack him without delay. He therefore prepared again to fight. His army, indeed, was much diminished, but he had lost more in numbers than in effective strength. The militia, many of whom had returned home, had shown themselves very inefficient in the field. As soon as he received certain information that instead of pursuing, Cornwallis was retreating, he resolved to follow him and advanced accordingly.
Greene was now in his turn the pursuer and followed Cornwallis so closely that skirmishes occasionally happened between his advanced parties and the rear guard of the British army, but no conflict of importance ensued. On the morning of the 28th of March he arrived at Ramsay's Mills, on Deep river, a strong post which the British had evacuated a few hours before, crossing the river by a bridge erected for the purpose. There Greene paused and meditated on his future movements. His army, like that of the British, for some time past had suffered much from heavy rains, deep roads, and scarcity of provisions. On reaching Ramsay's Mills his men were starving with hunger and fed voraciously on some fresh quarters of beef left behind by the British army. The troops were much exhausted and stood in need of repose and refreshment. Besides in that critical state of the campaign he found himself reduced to a handful of Continentals. Most of the militia had left him. Small as his army was he found great difficulty in procuring subsistence for it.
Cornwallis had fairly the start of the Americans and was advancing to a place where he would find more plentiful supplies and easily communicate with the sea; so that Greene was sensible that with the force then under his command he could make no impression on him. He resolved, therefore, instead of following his opponent, to proceed to South Carolina. That step, he thought, would oblige Cornwallis either to follow him or to abandon his posts in the upper parts of the southern States. If he followed him North Carolina would be relieved and enabled to raise its quota of men for the Continental service, but if he remained in that State or proceeded to the northward it was likely that the greater part of the British posts in South Carolina and Georgia would be reduced and that those States would be restored to the Union. He entertained little apprehension of Cornwallis being able with the force then under his command to make any permanent impression on the powerful State of Virginia.
Having refreshed his troops and collected provisions for a few days Greene moved from Ramsay's Mills, on Deep river, on the 5th of April (1781), toward Camden, and on the morning of the 20th of the same month encamped at Logtown in sight of the British works at that place.
Soon after his arrival at Wilmington, Cornwallis received certain information that Greene was proceeding to South Carolina, and it threw him into much perplexity. He was alarmed for the safety of Lord Rawdon, but, though desirous of assisting him, he was convinced that the Americans were already so far advanced that it was impossible for him to arrive at Camden in time to succor Rawdon if he should need it. His lordship's fate and that of his garrison would probably be decided long before he could reach them, and if Greene should be successful at Camden, he, by attempting to relieve it, might be hemmed in between the great rivers and exposed to the most imminent hazard. On the other hand, if Rawdon should defeat Greene there would be no need of his assistance. A movement so perilous in the execution and promising so little in the result was abandoned and Rawdon left to his own resources.
Greene, without regard to the movements of his opponent, pushed on and established himself at Hobkirk's Hill, about a mile from Rawdon's headquarters at Camden. The militia having either deserted or their term of service being expired his force was reduced to 1,800 men, but those in fact included all on whom he could ever place much dependence. Camden was occupied by Rawdon with about 800 men, the other troops being employed upon the defense of detached posts, yet his position was judged so strong as to afford no hope of success in a direct attack. The object aimed at was, by throwing out detachments which might capture the forts and cut off the supplies in his rear, to compel him gradually to fall back. Lee, for this purpose, was sent with a strong party to cooperate with Marion and Sumter. The English general seeing the hostile troops thus reduced to about 1,500, formed the bold resolution of attacking them. Making a large circuit round a swamp he came upon their left flank quite unexpectedly, while the soldiers were busied in cooking and washing. This first surprise was never wholly recovered, yet they quickly stood to their arms and formed in order of battle. They had even gained some advantages when the First Maryland regiment, considered the flower of the army and which had highly distinguished itself both at Cowpens and Guilford, fell into confusion, and when ordered to make a retrograde movement, converted it into a complete retreat. The other corps also, beginning to give ground, Greene thought it expedient to cause the whole to retire. The loss on each side was about 260 killed and wounded, and the Americans carried off fifty prisoners, including six officers.
This battle, commonly called the battle of Hobkirk's Hill, reflected much honor on Lord Rawdon considering the disproportion of force which was, in fact, greater than at Guilford, yet it did not change materially the relative situation of the armies. Greene could still maintain his position and support the detachments operating in the rear of his adversary.
Lee and Marion proceeded next against Fort Watson on the Santee which commanded in a great measure the communication with Charleston. Having neither artillery nor besieging tools they reared a tower above the level of the rampart whence their rifle fire drove the defenders, and themselves then mounted and compelled the garrison to surrender. They could not, however, prevent Colonel Watson from leading 500 men to reinforce Lord Rawdon, who then advanced with the intention of bringing Greene again to action, but found him fallen back upon so strong a position as to afford no reasonable hope of success. His lordship finding his convoys intercepted and viewing the generally insecure state of his posts in the lower country, considered himself under at least the temporary necessity of retreating thither. He had first in view the relief of Mott's House, on the Congaree, but before reaching it had the mortification to find that with the garrison of 165 it had fallen into the hands of Marion and Lee. He continued his march to Monk's Corner, where he covered Charleston and the surrounding country.
The partisan chiefs rapidly seized this opportunity of attacking the interior posts and reduced successively Orangeburg and Granby on the Congaree, and early in June, Augusta, the key of upper Georgia, surrendered to Lee and Pickens. In these five forts they made 1,100 prisoners. The most important one, however, was that named Ninety-Six, on the Saluda, defended by a garrison of 500 men. Orders had been sent to them to quit and retire downward but the messenger was intercepted and Colonel Cruger, the commander, made the most active preparations for its defense. Greene considered the place of such importance that he undertook the siege in person with 1,000 regulars. He broke ground before it on the night of the 23d of May (1781), and though much impeded by a successful sally on the following day, proceeded with such energy that by the 3d of June the second parallel was completed and the garrison summoned, but in vain, to surrender. On the 8th, he was reinforced by Lee from the capture of Augusta and though he encountered a most gallant and effective resistance trusted that the place must in due time fall. Three days after, however, he learned that Rawdon, having received a reinforcement from Ireland, was in full march to relieve it and had baffled the attempts of Sumter to impede his progress. The American leader, therefore, feeling himself unable to give battle saw no prospect of carrying the fortress unless by storm. On the 18th (June, 1781), an attack against the two most commanding outworks was led by Lee and Campbell, the former of whom carried his point, but the latter, though he penetrated into the ditch and maintained his party there for three-quarters of an hour, found them exposed to so destructive a fire as compelled a general retreat. {2} The siege was immediately raised and Lord Rawdon, on the 21st, entered the place in triumph. Being again master of the field, he pressed forward in the hope of bringing his antagonist to battle but the latter rather chose to fall back towards the distant point of Charlotte in Virginia, while Rawdon did not attempt to pursue him beyond the Ennoree.
Notwithstanding this present superiority his lordship, having failed in his hopes of a decisive victory and viewing the general aspect of the country, considered it no longer possible to attempt more than covering the lower districts, of South Carolina. He therefore fell back to Orangeburg on the Edisto and though he attempted at first to maintain Cruger with a strong body at Ninety-Six was soon induced to recall him. Greene, being reinforced by 1,000 men under Marion and Sumter, reconnoitered his position but, judging it imprudent to attack, retired to the high hills of the Santee, July the 15th (1781), and both armies, exhausted by such a series of active movements, took an interval of repose during the heat of the season.
Lord Rawdon being at this time obliged by ill health to return to England left the army under the command of Colonel Stuart, who, to cover the lower country, occupied a position at the point where the Congaree and Wateree unite in forming the Santee. Greene, having received reinforcements from the North and collected all his partisan detachments soon found himself strong enough to try the chance of battle. His approach on the 7th of September (1781) with this evident view induced the British to retire down the river to the strong post of Eutaw Springs, whither the American army immediately followed.
On the 8th of September, Greene determined to attack the British camp, placing as usual his militia in front, hoping that the English in charging them would get into confusion, but from apprehension of this the latter had been warned to keep their posts till ordered to move. The American front, however, maintained their ground better than usual and the British having become heated and forgetting the warnings given pushed forward irregularly. They were then charged by the veterans of the second line and after a very desperate struggle driven off the field. There lay in their way, however, a large brick building and adjacent garden, where Stuart had placed a strong corps which could not be dislodged and which kept up a deadly fire which checked the victors, enabling the retreating troops to be formed anew. At the same time Colonel Washington attacked the British flank, but finding it strongly posted amongst the woods he was repulsed with great loss and himself taken prisoner. The American general seeing no hope of making any further impression, retreated to his previous position. The conflict lasted four hours and great bravery was shown on both sides. Colonel Campbell was mortally wounded. Learning the British were dispersing he exclaimed, like Wolfe at Quebec, "Then I die contented!" and immediately expired.
In this bloody and doubtful battle both parties claimed the victory though the Americans with most reason as the general result was greatly to their advantage. It was certainly far from decisive and the British loss in killed and wounded was much greater than that of the Americans, who also carried off above 500 prisoners. The British commander, prompted as well probably by the result of the day as by the general state of the country and the numbers and activity of the American light troops, conceiving himself unable to maintain so advanced a position, retired during the evening of the 9th (September 1781), and proceeded down to Monk's Corner, where he covered Charleston and its vicinity. To this and to Savannah were now limited that proud British authority which had lately extended so widely over the southern States. {3}
Thus ended the campaign of 1781 in South Carolina. At its commencement the British were in force all over the State. History affords but a few instances of commanders who have achieved so much with equal means as was done by General Greene in the short space of twelve months. He opened the campaign with gloomy prospects but closed it with glory. His unpaid and half-naked army had to contend with veteran soldiers, supplied with everything that the wealth of Great Britain or the plunder of Carolina could procure. Under all these disadvantages he compelled superior numbers to retire from the extremity of the State, and confine themselves in the capital and its vicinity. Had not his mind been of the firmest texture he would have been discouraged, but his enemies found him as formidable on the evening of a defeat as on the morning after a victory.
The reader will not fail to perceive how important a bearing the operations of Greene in the South had upon those of Washington in the North. Before recovering North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, Greene had partly led and partly driven Cornwallis into Virginia, where he was destined to be conquered by Washington and the war was thus to be virtually terminated. How this was accomplished will now be the object of our attention. Virginia had insensibly, as it were, become the principal theater of war. General Leslie had been sent thither to reinforce Cornwallis, who it was hoped might penetrate through the Carolinas, but after Ferguson's disaster he was ordered to go round by Charleston. With the view, however, of creating a diversion in favor of the southern army, Clinton, in December, 1780, sent Arnold with 1,600 men to the Chesapeake. That infamous traitor, displaying all his wonted activity, overran a great extent of country and captured Richmond, the capital, destroying great quantities of stores. Washington, most anxious to strike a blow against him, prevailed upon Destouches, the French admiral to proceed thither with a land force but the latter was overtaken by Arbuthnot and endured a hard battle which though not admitted to be a defeat obliged him to return to Newport; thus Arnold escaped the danger of falling into the hands of his enraged countrymen. Clinton, still with the same view, sent another force of 2,000 men under General Phillips which arrived in the Chesapeake on the 26th of March (1781). This officer being complete master of the field, overran the country between the James and York rivers, seized the town of Petersburg, as also Chesterfield Courthouse, the militia rendezvous, and other stations, destroying great quantities of shipping and stores, with all the warehoused tobacco. Lafayette, then in command of about 3,000 men for the defense of Virginia, succeeded by skilful maneuvering in securing Richmond.
Operations seemed at a stand, when, late in April, intelligence was received of Cornwallis' march from South Carolina toward Virginia and, in spite of every effort of Lafayette, he, at the end of May (1781), joined Phillips at Petersburg, taking the command of the whole army. Being then decidedly superior he took possession of Richmond and began a hot pursuit of Lafayette, who retreated into the upper country so rapidly and so skillfully that he could not be overtaken. The English general then turned back and sent a detachment under Colonel Simcoe, who destroyed the chief magazine at the junction of the two branches of James river. Tarleton pushed his cavalry so swiftly upon Charlotteville, where the State Assembly was met, that seven members were taken and the rest very narrowly escaped. Lafayette, however, now returned with a considerable force and by his maneuvers induced the British commander to retire to Williamsburg. He afterward continued his retreat to Portsmouth in the course of which the former made an attack but was repulsed and would have been totally routed had not his strength been estimated above its real amount.
The movement of Cornwallis into Virginia had been wholly disapproved by Clinton who complained that, contrary to all his views and intentions, the main theater of war had been transferred to a territory into which he never proposed more than partial inroads, considering it very difficult to subdue and maintain. His grand object had always been first to secure New York and, if sufficient strength was afforded, to push offensive operations thence into the interior. Hoping, therefore, that the Carolinas, once subdued, might be retained by a small force, he had repeatedly solicited the partial return of the troops. Cornwallis defended the movement by observing that his situation at Wilmington, allowing no time to send for instructions, obliged him to act on his own responsibility. Communicating also with the government at home he urged that the Carolinas could not be securely held without the possession also of Virginia; that this might be attained by a vigorous effort, and would make Britain mistress of all the southern Colonies, whose resources could be then employed in conquering the more stubborn regions of the North. These arguments, recommended by his lordship's brilliant achievements at Camden and elsewhere, convinced the ministry, and Lord Germaine wrote to the Commander-in-Chief to direct his principal attention to the war in Virginia and to the plan of conquest from south to north. The latter, considering himself thus slighted, solicited permission to resign and leave the command to an officer who enjoyed greater confidence, but his merits being highly estimated this tender was not accepted.
Under the apprehension inspired by the threatening movements of Washington and the French army against New York, he had ordered a considerable reinforcement from Virginia, but countermanded it on receiving the above instructions, along with an additional body of troops. He had formed, apparently, a favorite plan somewhat of a compromise between the two. It is nowhere distinctly developed in his letters, but by a passage in one very active operations were proposed at the head of the Chesapeake, to be combined probably with a movement from New York and comprehending Philadelphia and Baltimore. Aware that this plan required the maritime command of that great inlet, he inquired if ministers would insure its maintenance, and they made this engagement without duly considering its difficulties. Under these views he directed Cornwallis to occupy and fortify a naval position at the entrance of the bay, specially recommending Old Point Comfort, at the mouth of James river. This measure did not harmonize with Cornwallis' views; however, he obeyed, but, the above position being declared by the engineers indefensible, he recommended, in preference, Yorktown on the York river, which was agreed to and operations actively commenced at the latter end of August. The whole British force at this time in Virginia was about 7,000 men.
1. Footnote: Referring to the affair at Rugely's Mills, where Colonel Washington frightened the militia colonel into a surrender by means of a pine log mounted like a cannon.
2. Footnote: On this occasion Kosciusko, the Polish general, particularly distinguished himself.
3. Footnote: In the southern provinces the campaign of 1781 was uncommonly active. The exertions and sufferings of the army were great. But the troops were not the only sufferers; the inhabitants were exposed to many calamities. The success of Colonel Campbell at Savannah laid Georgia and the Carolinas open to all the horrors which attend the movements of conflicting armies and the rage of civil dissensions for two years.
In those provinces the inhabitants were nearly divided between the British and American interests, and, under the names of Tories and Whigs, exercised a savage hostility against each other, threatening the entire depopulation of the country. Besides, each of the contending armies, claiming the provinces as its own, showed no mercy to those who, in the fluctuations of war, abandoned its cause or opposed its pretensions. Numbers were put to death as deserters and traitors at the different British posts. One of those executions, that of Colonel Hayne, happened at Charleston on the 4th of August, while Lord Rawdon was in that town, preparing to sail for Europe, and threatened to produce the most sanguinary consequences.
Colonel Hayne had served in the American militia during the siege of Charleston, but, after the capitulation of that place and the expulsion of the American army from the province, he was, by several concurring circumstances, constrained, with much reluctance, to subscribe a declaration of allegiance to the British government being assured that his services against his country would not be required. He was allowed to return to his family, but, in violation of the special condition on which he had signed the declaration, he was soon called on to take up arms against his countrymen, and was at length threatened with close confinement in case of further refusal. Colonel Hayne considered this breach of contract on the part of the British, and their inability to afford him the protection promised in reward of his allegiance, as absolving him from the obligations into which he had entered, and accordingly he returned to the American standard. In the month of July he was taken prisoner, confined in a loathsome dungeon, and, by the arbitrary mandate of Lord Rawdon and Colonel Balfour, without trial, hanged at Charleston. He behaved with much firmness and dignity, and his fate awakened a strong sensation.