245 Topic. V. vii. p. 137, a. 21-b. 2.
20. Comparison with the Idea:— If the respondent sets up A as proprium of B, you will turn your mind to the Idea of B, and note whether A is proprium of this Idea, in the same sense and under the same aspect as it is affirmed to be proprium of B. If it be not so, you will have an argument in refutation of the respondent. Thus, if he maintains that it is a proprium of man to be at rest, you will argue that this cannot be so, because to be at rest is not the proprium of the Self-man (αὐτοάνθρωπος) quatenus man, but quatenus Idea. Vice versâ, you will have an affirmative argument, if you can show that it is the proprium of the Idea. Thus, since it is a proprium of the self-animal quatenus animal to be composed of soul and body, you may infer that to be composed of soul and body is really a proprium of animal.246
246 Ibid. b. 3-13.
21. Locus from More and Less:— Suppose the respondent to affirm A as proprium of B: you will have an argument against him, if you can show that what is more A is not proprium of that which is more B. Thus, if to be more coloured is not proprium of that which is more body, neither is to be less coloured proprium of that which is less body; nor is to be coloured proprium of body simply. Vice versâ, if you can show that what is more A is proprium of what is more B, you will have an affirmative argument to establish that A is proprium of B. Thus, to perceive more is proprium of that which is more living. Hence, to perceive simply is proprium of that which is living simply; also, to perceive most, least, or less, is proprium of that which is most, least, or less living, respectively.247
247 Ibid. viii. p. 137, b. 14-27.
If you can show that A simply is not proprium of B simply, you have an argument to establish that what is more or less A is not proprium of that which is more or less B. If, on the other land, you show the affirmative of the first, this will be an argument sustaining the affirmative of the last.248 Perhaps you can show that what is more A is not proprium of what is more B: this will be an argument to show that A is not proprium of B. Thus, to perceive is more proprium of animal than to know is proprium of man; but to perceive is not proprium of animal; therefore, to know is not proprium of man. Or again, if you can show that what is less A is proprium of what is less B, this will form an argument to show that A is proprium of B. Thus, natural mansuetude is less proprium of man than life is proprium of animal; but natural mansuetude is proprium of man: therefore life is proprium of animal.249 Farther, if you can show that A is more a proprium of C than it is a proprium of B, yet nevertheless that it is not a proprium of C you may thence argue that A is not a proprium of B. Thus, to be coloured is more a proprium of superficies than it is a proprium of body; yet it is not a proprium of superficies; therefore, it is not a proprium of body. This last variety of the locus of More and Less (Aristotle remarks) affords no corresponding affirmative plea;250 for the same predicate cannot be a proprium of many subjects. If A be really a proprium of superficies, it cannot be also proprium of body. Lastly, you may perhaps be able to show that C is more a proprium of B than A is a proprium of B; yet, if C is not a proprium of B, you will infer negatively that neither is A proprium of B. Thus, to be perceivable is more proprium of animal, than to be divisible is proprium of animal; yet to be perceivable is not proprium of animal, and, therefore, neither is to be divisible proprium of animal. You may invert this argument for the affirmative, if you can show that C is less a proprium of B than A is a proprium of B, yet still that C is a proprium of B; hence you will infer, à fortiori, that A is a proprium thereof. E.g., If to perceive is less a proprium of animal than to live is a proprium thereof, yet to perceive is a proprium of animal; then, to live is so likewise.251
248 Ibid. b. 28-p. 138, a. 3.
249 Topica, V. viii. p. 138, a. 4-12.
250 Ibid. p. 138, a. 13-20: κατασκευάζοντι δὲ ὁ τόπος οὗτος οὔκ ἐστι χρήσιμος· ἀδύνατον γάρ ἐστι ταὐτὸ πλειόνων ἴδιον εἶναι.
251 Ibid. a. 21-30.
22. Locus from Equal Relation:— Arguments both negative and affirmative may in like manner be obtained by comparing different things which are (not more or less propria, but) alike or equally propria of some other subject. If A is as much a proprium of B as C is proprium of D, while yet A is not a proprium of B, you may hence infer that C is not a proprium of D. If, under this hypothesis, A is a proprium of B, you may infer affirmatively that C is a proprium of D.252 Or, if A and C be, alike and equally, propria of the same subject B, then, if you show that A is not proprium thereof, you will infer negatively that C is not so; if you show that A is proprium of B, you will infer affirmatively that C is so likewise. Or, thirdly, if A be, alike and equally, a proprium of B and of E, then, if you can show that A is not a proprium of E, you may infer negatively that it is not a proprium of B. Here, however, the counter-inference affirmatively is not allowable; for the same proprium cannot belong as proprium to two distinct subjects, as was stated before.253
252 Ibid. a. 30-b. 15.
253 Ibid. b. 16-22.
23. Locus from Potentiality:— No potentiality whatever can belong to Non-Ens. Accordingly, if A, the proprium affirmed of a subject B, is a potentiality, this must imply some real Ens in which it inheres, and which is correlate to the subject. But, if in the specification of the proprium no allusion is made to such correlate, you will attack it as a bad proprium — as a potentiality inhering in Non-Ens or nothing. E.g., if the case be, It is a proprium of air to be respirable, you will refute this by pointing out that this is true only when there exist animals in whom the potentiality of breathing resides; that no mention is made by the respondent of this correlate or of any other correlate; in other words, that, so far as the specification is concerned, the correlate is passed over as Non-Ens or a non-entity. Therefore the proprium is not a good proprium.254 Again, suppose the affirmation to be, It is a proprium of Ens to be capable of doing or suffering something; this will be defensible because it is only when the subject is Ens, that it is declared to have such proprium.255
254 Topica, V. ix. p. 138, b. 27-37. οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ εἴπας ἀέρος ἴδιον τὸ ἀναπνευστόν τῇ δυνάμει μὲν ἀπέδωκε τὸ ἴδιον (τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον ἴδιον οἷον ἀναπνεῖσθαι ἀναπνευστόν ἐστιν), ἀποδέδωκε δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὸ μὴ ὃν τὸ ἴδιον· καὶ γὰρ μὴ ὄντος ζῴου, οἷον ἀναπνεῖν πέφυκε τὸν ἀέρα, ἐνδέχεται ἀέρα εἶναι· οὐ μέντοι μὴ ὄντος ζῴου δυνατόν ἐστιν ἀναπνεῖν· ὥστ’ οὐδ’ ἀέρος ἔσται ἴδιον τὸ τοιοῦτον οἷον ἀναπνεῖσθαι, τότε ὅτε ζῴον οὐκ ἔσται τοιοῦτον οἷον ἀναπνεῖν. οὐκ ἂν οὖν εἴη ἀέρος ἴδιον τὸ ἀναπνευστόν.
Respirability (the proprium here discussed) being a relative term, Aristotle demands that the correlate thereof shall be named and included in setting out the proprium. If this be not done, a refutative argument may be drawn from such omission — that the respondent was not aware of the relativity. We may remark here that this objection is founded on a bad or incomplete specification of the proprium in question: it is not an objection against the reality of that proprium itself, if carefully described. The objection belongs to that class which Aristotle had discussed before, at the commencement of Book V.
255 Ibid. p. 139, a. 1-8.
24. Locus from the Superlative:— Suppose the affirmation to be, It is a proprium of fire to be the lightest of all bodies: this you may refute by showing that, if fire ceased to exist, there would still be some other body the lightest of all bodies. Therefore the proprium may still be predicated of something else, when its alleged subject has ceased to exist. The proprium and its subject are not reciprocating and co-extensive; therefore it is not a true proprium.256
256 Ibid. a. 9-20.
VI.
We now enter on the Sixth Book, containing the Loci bearing on Definition. In debates respecting Definition, there are five points on any of which the attack and defence may turn:—257
1. That which the definer enunciates as a definition may not be true at all, even as a predicate of the definiend or subject to be defined; or at least not true of everything that bears the name of the subject.
2. The definiend may have been included in a genus, but not in that genus to which it rightly and specially belongs.
3. The definition given may not be specially appropriate to the definiend (i.e., it may include, not only that but, other matters besides).
4. The definition, though unobjectionable on any of the above three grounds, may nevertheless not declare the Essence of the definiend.
5. Lastly, the definition may be good in substance, but badly expressed or set out.
257 Topic. VI. i. p. 139, a. 24-35: τῆς δὲ περὶ τοὺς ὅρους πραγματείας μέρη πέντε ἐστίν.
As to the first of these five heads, the Loci bearing thereupon have already been enumerated in the Third Book, on Accident: in accidental predications the question raised is always about the truth or falsehood of the predication.258 As to the second and third of the five heads, these have been dealt with in the Fourth and Fifth Books, enumerating the Loci on Genus and Proprium.259
258 Topic. VI. i. p. 139, a. 36.
259 Ibid. b. 3.
There remain the fourth and fifth heads, on which we are about to enter: (1) Whether the definition is well expressed or set out (the fifth head); (2) Whether it has any right to be called a definition at all, i.e., whether it declares the Essence of the subject (the fourth).260 The fifth is taken first, because to do a thing well is always more difficult than to do it simply, and is therefore likely to afford greater opening for argumentative attack.
260 Ibid. b. 6.
The definition, while unobjectionable in substance, may be badly set out in two ways. First, it may be indistinct in terms — not plain nor clear. Next, it may be redundant: the terms may include more than is required for the definition. Under each of these defects of expression several loci may be indicated.261
261 Ibid. b. 12-18.
1. Indistinctness may arise from the employment of equivocal terms in the definition. Or it may arise from the term to be defined being itself equivocal; while the definer, taking no notice of such equivocation, has tried to comprehend all its senses under one and the same definition. You may attack him either by denying that the definition as given covers all the different meanings of the definiend; or you may yourself distinguish (which the definer has omitted to do) these different meanings, and show that none of them or few of them are covered by the definition.262
262 Topic. VI. ii. p. 139, b. 19. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ τοῦ ὁριζομένου πλεοναχῶς λεγομένου μὴ διελὼν εἶπεν· ἄδηλον γὰρ ὁποτέρου τὸν ὅρον ἀποδέδωκεν, ἐνδέχεταί τε συκοφαντεῖν ὡς οὐκ ἐφαρμόττοντος τοῦ λόγου ἐπὶ πάντα ὧν τὸν ὁρισμὸν ἀποδέδωκεν.
The term συκοφαντεῖν surprises us here, because the point under consideration is indicated by Aristotle himself as a real mistake; accordingly he ought not to characterize the procedure whereby such mistake is exposed as mere cavil — συκοφαντία. Alexander, in the Scholia (p. 287, b. 1, Br.), says that Aristotle intends to apply the term συκοφαντεῖν to the respondent who advances this bad definition, not to the assailant who impeaches it. But the text of Aristotle does not harmonize with this interpretation.
2. Indistinctness may arise from defining by means of a metaphor; but Aristotle treats you as a caviller if you impugn this metaphor as though it were proprio sensu.263 He declares it to be wrong, but he seems to think that you ought to object to it at once as a metaphor, without troubling yourself to prove it inappropriate.
263 Ibid. b. 32: ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ τὴν μεταφορὰν εἰπόντα συκοφαντεῖν ὡς κυρίως εἰρηκότα. Here again we have the word συκοφαντεῖν to designate what seems a legitimate mode of argumentative attack.
3. Indistinctness will arise if the terms of the definition are rare or far-fetched or founded upon some fact very little known.264 Definitions given by Plato are cited to illustrate this.
264 Ibid. p. 140, a. 3: πᾶν γὰρ ἀσαφὲς τὸ μὴ εἰωθός.
4. Indistinctness arises from the employment of a poetical image, which is even worse than a professed metaphor: as where law is defined to be — a measure or image of things by nature just.265
265 Ibid. a. 6-17. χεῖρον ὁποιουοῦς τῶν κατὰ μεταφορὰν λεγομένων.
5. The definition is indistinct, if it does not, while making known the definiend, make clear at the same time its contrary.266
266 Ibid. a. 18.
6. The definition is also indistinct if it does not, when enunciated, make known what the definiend is, without requiring that the definiend itself shall be expressly enunciated. The definition by itself ought to suggest at once the name of the definiend. Otherwise, the definer is no better than those archaic painters, who, when painting a dog or a horse, were compelled to write the name alongside in order that the animal might be recognized.267
267 Ibid. a. 20. This last condition is a high measure of perfection to exact from a definition. Assuredly Aristotle’s own definitions often fall lamentably short of it.
Such are the Loci regarding Indistinctness in the setting out of the definition. The second defect is Redundancy.
1. Redundancy will arise if the terms of the definition include either all things absolutely, or all things contained in the same genus as the definiend; since the definition ought to consist of a generic term to discriminate the definiend from all extra-generic things, and a differential term to discriminate it from other things within the same genus. A definition of the kind mentioned will be useless through redundancy.268 It will also be open to the like objection, if it includes what is merely a proprium of the definiend, over and above the essential attributes; or, indeed, if it includes any thing else except what is required for clearly bringing out the definiend.269 It will be still worse, if it comprises any attribute not belonging to all individuals of the species; for then it will not even be a proprium or a reciprocating predication.270
268 Topic. VI. iii. p. 140, a. 23-32. Alexander, however, remarks very pertinently, that the defects of such a definition are defects of substance rather than of expression. Aristotle has passed unconsciously from the latter to the former: ἐν μὲν τῇ πρώτῃ τῶν ἐφόδων δόξειεν ἂν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης μετάγειν εἰς τὰς πραγματικὰς ἐξετάσεις (Schol. p. 287, b. 27, Br.).
269 Ibid. a. 37: ἁπλῶς δ’ εἰπεῖν, ἅπαν περίεργον οὗ ἀφαιρεθέντος τὸ λοιπὸν δῆλον ποιεῖ τὸ ὁριζόμενον.
270 Ibid. b. 16.
2. Repetition is another fault sometimes committed. The same attribute may be predicated twice over. Or a particular and narrow attribute may be subjoined, in addition to a more general and comprehensive attribute in which it has already been included.271
271 Ibid. b. 27-p. 141, a. 22.
So much for the faults which belong to the manner of expressing the definition tendered. Next, as bearing on the matter and substance of the definition, the following loci are distinguishable.
1. The first of these loci is, if the matter of the definition is not prius and notius as compared with the definiend. It is one of the canons of Definition, the purpose of which is to impart knowledge of the definiend, to introduce nothing except what is prior by nature and better known than the latter. The essence of each definiend — the being what it is — is one and only one. If a definition be given, other than that by means of what is prius and notius, it would follow that the same definiend might have two distinct essences; which is impossible. Accordingly, any proposition tendered as a definition but enunciating what is not prior by nature and better known than the definiend sins against this canon, and is to be held as no true definition at all.272
272 Ibid. iv. p. 141, a. 24-b. 2.
The locus here indicated by this general feature is one, but it includes a number of varieties.273 More known, or less known, it should first be observed, has two distinct meanings: either more or less known absolutely (by nature); or more or less known to us. Absolutely, or by nature, the point is better known than the line; the line, than the superficies; the superficies, than the solid; the prius, than the posterius. But to us the reverse is true. The solid, as object of sensible perception, is earlier known and more known than the superficies; the superficies, than the line; the line, than the point; the posterius, than the prius. To us means to the bulk of mankind: absolutely or by nature refers to the instructed, superior, teaching and expository, intellects.274 There may be some cases in which the notius nobis coincides and is identical with the notius naturâ;275 but, as a rule, the two are distinct, and the one is the inverse of the other. A genuine and perfect definition is one which enunciates the essence of the Species through Genus and Differentiæ, which are both of them absolutely prior and more knowable than the Species, since, if they be supposed non-existent, the Species is nowhere to be found. No man can know the Species without knowing its Genus and Differentiæ; but you may know the Genus and Differentiæ without knowing the Species; hence the Species is more unknowable than they are.276 This is the true scientific definition; but there are persons incapable of acquiring knowledge by means of it. To these persons, an imperfect explanation or quasi-definition must be given, by means of matters knowable to them.277 Those, however, who regard such imperfect explanations as true definitions, must be reminded that, upon that hypothesis, we should be compelled to admit many distinct definitions of the same definiend. For individuals differ from each other in respect to what is more knowable: what is more so to one man is not more so to another. Indeed the same man differs from himself on this point at different periods: to the early and untrained mind objects of sensible perception are the most knowable; but, when a man has been improved by training and instruction, the case is reversed, and the objects of intellect become the most familiar to his mind.278 To define properly, therefore, we must enunciate, not the notiora nobis but, the notiora naturâ or simpliciter; understanding by this last phrase, not what is more knowable to all actual men but, what is more knowable to men of well-trained and well-constituted intellect; just as, when we speak of the wholesome, we mean what is wholesome to the well-constituted body.279 These conditions of Definition you must thoroughly master, and apply to each debate as the occasion may require. Your task in refuting an alleged definition will be the easiest in those cases where it conforms to neither of the above conditions; that is, when it enunciates neither what is notius naturâ nor what is notius nobis.280
273 Ibid. v. p. 142, b. 20.
274 Topic. VI. iv. p. 141, b. 3-14.
275 Ibid. b. 22.
276 Ibid. b. 25.
277 Ibid. b. 16.
278 Ibid. b. 34.
The general mental fact here noticed by Aristotle may be seen philosophically stated and explained in the volume of Professor Bain on the Emotions and the Will. (Chapter on Consciousness, sect. 19, p. 581, 2nd ed.)
“A sensation is, under any view of it, a conscious element of the mind. As pleasure or pain, we are conscious in one way; as discrimination, we are conscious in the other way, namely, in a mode of neutral excitement. — But this is not all. After much contact with the sensible world, a new situation arises, and a new variety of the consciousness, which stands in need of some explanation. When a child experiences for the first time the sensation of scarlet, there is nothing but the sensibility of a new impression more or less intense.… It is very difficult for us to realize or define this original shock, our position in mature life being totally altered. It is the rarest thing for us then to come under a radically new impression; and we can only, by help of imperfect analogies, form an approximate conception of what happens at the first shock of a discriminative sensation. The process of engraining these impressions on the mind after repetition, gives to subsequent sensations quite a different character as compared with the first. The second shock of scarlet, if it stood alone, would doubtless resemble the preceding; but such is the nature of the mind, that the new shock will not stand alone, but restores the notion or idea or trace that survived the former. The sensation is no longer the primitive stroke of surprise, but a coalition of a present shock with all that remains of the previous occasions. Hence it may properly be said, when we see, or hear, or touch, or move, that what comes before us is really contributed more by the mind itself than by the object present. The consciousness is complicated by three concurring elements — the new shock, the flash of agreement with the sum total of the past, and the feeling of that past as revived in the present. In truth, the new sensation is apt to be entirely over-ridden by the old; and, in place of discriminating by virtue of our susceptibility to what is characteristic in it, our discrimination follows another course. For example, if I have before me two shades of colour, instead of feeling the difference exactly as I am struck at the moment, my judgment resorts to the round-about process of first identifying each with some reiterated series of past impressions; and, having two sum-totals in my mind, the difference that I feel is between those totals. If I made a mistake, it may be attributed not so much to a wrong act of discrimination, as to a wrong act of identification. — All sensations, therefore, after the first of each kind, involve a flash of recovery from the past, which is what really determines their character. The present shock is simply made use of as a means of reviving some one past in preference to all others; the new impression of scarlet is in itself almost insignificant, serving only as the medium of resuscitating the cerebral condition resulting from the united force of all the previous scarlets. — Sensation thus calls into operation the two great intellectual laws, in addition to the primitive sensibility of difference. — When we consider ourselves as performing the most ordinary act of seeing or hearing, we are bringing into play those very functions of the intellect that make its development and its glory in its highest manifestations.”
279 Topic. VI. iv. p. 142, a. 10.
280 Ibid. a. 12; also, a. 32.
The canon being, That what is posterius must be defined by its prius, — the definer may sin against this in defining the prius by its posterius; e.g., if he defines the stationary and the determinate by means of the moveable and the variable.281 Also, when his definition is neither prius, nor posterius, but of equal position with the definiend, he is at fault. This may happen (1) when he defines by an Opposite (for, according to some, the science of Opposites is one and the same, and it is impossible that either one of a pair can be absolutely more knowable than the other; though it is true that no relative can be understood or explained without the knowledge of its correlative, e.g., double and half); or (2) when he includes the definiend itself in his definition, either under its proper name or any other name;282 or (3) when he defines by means of a contra-specific to the definiend — by something of equal specific rank or position, which is therefore simul naturâ therewith (e.g., Odd is that which is greater than even by unity); or (4) when he defines by something specifically subordinate (e.g., An even number is that which may be bisected, where bisected means divisible by two, itself one among the even numbers283).
281 Ibid. a. 20: πρότερον γὰρ τὸ μένον καὶ τὸ ὡρισμένον τοῦ ἀορίστου καὶ ἐν κινήσει ὄντος.
282 Topic. VI. iv. p. 142, a. 22-b. 6.
283 Ibid. b. 7-19: πάλιν, εἰ τῷ ἀντιδιῃρημένῳ τὸ ἀντιδιῃρημένον ὥρισται — ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ διὰ τῶν ὑποκάτω τὸ ἐπάνω ὥρισται.
2. The second locus (after that bearing on the Prius et Notius) of argument for impugning a definition is, where it does not enunciate the genus in which the definiend is really included. The mention of the genus, as enunciating the fundamental essence of the definiend, ought to stand first in the definition. If your opponent defines body — that which has three dimensions, or man — that which knows how to count, you attack him by asking, What is it that has three dimensions? What is it that knows how to count? No genus has been assigned.284