Moreover, the proprium will not be well set out, if it be such as does not necessarily belong to the subject, but is only shown by the evidence of sense to belong thereunto. In this case, when the subject is out of the reach of sensible perception, no one knows whether the supposed proprium still continues as its attribute. Thus, suppose the thesis to enunciate as a proprium of the sun, that it is the brightest star borne in movement above the earth: the fact that it is so borne in movement above the earth is one that we know by sensible perception only; accordingly, after the sun sets and we cease to see it, we cannot be sure that it continues to be borne in movement. If a proprium knowable as such by sense be chosen, it ought to be one which is also knowable independently, as belonging to the subject by necessity. Thus, if a man enunciates, as proprium of superficies, that superficies is what first becomes coloured or first receives colour, this is a proprium well set out. For we know clearly that it must always belong to a superficies; though we may also obtain the additional evidence of sense, by looking at some perceivable body.217

Perhaps too the thesis may enunciate the Definition as if it were a Proprium; which is another ground for objecting that the proprium is not well set out. Thus, the thesis may enunciate, as proprium of man, that man is a land animal walking on two feet. Here what is given as proprium is the essence of man, which never ought to be affirmed in the proprium. To set out the proprium well, the predicate ought to reciprocate and to be co-extensive with the subject, but it ought not to affirm the essence thereof. A good specimen of proprium well set out is the following, Man is an animal by nature gentle; for here the predicate is co-extensive with the subject, yet does not declare the essence of the subject.218

Lastly, the proprium, to be well set out, though it does not declare the essence of the subject, yet ought to begin by presupposing the generic portion of the essence, and to attach itself thereunto as a constant adjunct or concomitant. Thus, suppose the thesis to enunciate, as proprium, Animal is that which has a soul; this will not be well set out, for the predicate is not superadded or attached to the declared generic essence of animal. But, if the thesis enunciates, as proprium of man, Man is an animal capable of acquiring cognition, — this will be a proprium well set out, so far as the present objection is concerned. For here the predicate declares first the generic essence of the subject, and then superinduces the peculiar adjunct thereupon.219

Thus far Aristotle has pointed out certain conditions to be attended to in determining whether a Proprium is well set out or described, without determining whether it be really a Propium or not. It may perhaps be truly predicated of the subject, and may even admit of a better description which would show it to be a proprium of the subject; but the description actually set out is defective, and the assailant is entitled to impeach it on that ground. He now proceeds to a larger discussion: What are the conditions for determining whether the supposed Proprium be really a Proprium at all, in respect to the subject of which it is predicated? Assuming that the description of it is not open to impeachment on any of the grounds above enumerated, are there not other real grounds of objection, disproving its title to the character of Proprium?220

1. Suppose your respondent to set up A as a proprium of B: you will examine first whether A can be truly predicated of B at all; next, if it can so be, whether it is truly predicable of B quâ B, or of every thing that comes under B quâ B. Thus, if he contends that not to be deceived by reason is a proprium of scientific men, you will be able to show that this does not hold in geometry, since geometricians are deceived by pseudographemes or scientific paralogisms. Or, should the respondent deny that A is a proprium of B, you will succeed in refuting him, if you can prove that A is truly predicable of every B and quâ B. Thus, it is a proprium of man to be an animal capable of acquiring knowledge; because that attribute is truly predicable of every man quâ man.221

2. Again, suppose your respondent affirms a given proprium A of B: you will examine whether A can be truly predicated of every thing called B, and whether B can be truly predicated of every thing called A; if not, the alleged proprium will not hold. Thus the affirmation, A god is an animal participant of knowledge, is a true affirmation; but it would not be true to say, A god is a man: wherefore, to be participant of knowledge is not proprium of man; and, if this be the proprium which the respondent undertakes to maintain, you will be able to refute him. On the other hand, if what he undertakes is the negation of a proprium (A is not a proprium of B), you will establish the affirmative against him by showing that of every thing respecting which A can be truly affirmed B can be affirmed also, and vice versâ. You will thus show that A is a true proprium of B.222

3. Again, the respondent may perhaps affirm the subject itself as a proprium of something inherent in the subject. You may refute this by showing that, if it were so, the same thing would be a proprium of several things differing from each other in species. On the other hand, the respondent may perhaps deny that something inherent in the subject is a proprium: you may then refute him by showing that it is truly predicable of the subject only, and not truly predicable of any thing else.223

4. The respondent may perhaps affirm as a proprium something contained in the essence of the subject: if so, you will refute him by showing this. On the other hand, if he denies something to be a proprium, you will refute him by showing that, though it is not contained in the essence of the subject, it is nevertheless predicable co-extensively therewith.224

5. The respondent may affirm as a proprium that which is not a necessary concomitant of the subject, but may either precede or follow it. Or, on the other hand, he may deny something to be a proprium which you can show to be a constant and necessary concomitant of the subject, without being included either in its definition or differentia. In each case you will have a ground for refuting him.225

6. The respondent may affirm as a proprium of the subject what he has already denied of the same subject under some other name; or he may deny of it what he has already affirmed of it under some other name. You will have grounds for refuting him.226

7. If there be two subjects (e.g., man and horse) the same with each other in species, the respondent may affirm respecting one of them a proprium which is not the same in species with the proprium of the other. Thus, it is not a constant proprium of horse to stand still spontaneously; accordingly neither is it a constant proprium of man to move spontaneously; these two propria being the same in species, and belonging both to man and to horse quatenus animal.227 If, therefore, the respondent affirms the one while he denies the other, you have an argument in refutation. On the other hand, he may propound as thesis the denial of the one proprium, while he affirms or admits the other. Here too you will be able to make good the counter-affirmation against his denial, on the ground of that which he admits. Thus, if it be proprium of man to be a walking-biped, it must also be proprium of bird to be a flying-biped. The two pairs, man and bird, walking and flying, are the same in species with each other, since both pairs are subordinates under the same genus: man and bird are species, flying and walking are differentiæ, under the same genus animal. This locus, however, is not universally applicable; for perhaps one of the two predicates may not be of exclusive application to the subject, but may belong to other subjects also. Thus walking-biped designates only one variety — man; but walking-quadruped designates several — horse, ass, dog, &c. Walking-quadruped therefore is not a proprium of horse.228

8. There is some difficulty in discussing the proprium, when the respondent is assailed by a sophistical dialectician who avails himself of the equivocal application of Idem and Diversum: contending that Subject with an Accident becomes a different subject — e.g., homo albus, a subject different from homo (so that, when a proprium has been shown to belong to homo, it has not been shown that the same proprium belongs to homo albus); and that the Abstract is a different subject from the Concrete — e.g. cognition, from the cognizing man (so that what has been shown as proprium of cognition has not been shown as proprium of the cognizing man). If the respondent shall himself set up these negatives, leaving to you the task of establishing the proprium against him, you will meet him by saying that homo is not a subject absolutely different and distinct from homo albus, but that there is only a notional distinction, the same subject having here two names each with a distinct connotation: homo has its own connotation; homo albus has also its own connotation, embodying in one total that which each of the terms connotes. And, when the Sophist remarks that what is a proprium of scientia cannot be predicated also as a proprium of homo sciens, you will reply that it may be so predicated, only with a slight change of inflection. For you need not scruple to employ sophistical refutation against those who debate with you in a sophistical way.229

9. The respondent may perhaps intend to affirm as proprium something which by nature belongs to the subject; but he may err in his mode of stating it, and may predicate it as always belonging to the subject. Thus, he may predicate biped as a proprium always belonging to man. Under this mode of expression, you will be able to show that he is wrong; for there are some men who have not two feet. On the other hand, if the respondent denies biped to be a proprium of man, relying upon the statement that it is not actually true of every individual, you will be able to show against him that it is so in the correct phraseology of belonging to man by nature.230

10. That which is affirmed as a proprium may belong to its subject either primarily and immediately, or in a secondary way — relatively to some prior denomination of the same subject. In such cases it is difficult to set out the proprium in terms thoroughly unobjectionable. Thus, the superficies of a body is what is first coloured: when we speak of corpus album, this is by reason of its white superficies. Album is a proprium true both of body and of superficies; but the explanation usually given of Proprium will not hold here — that, wherever the predicate can be affirmed, the subject can be affirmed also. Album is proprium of superficies; and album can be truly affirmed as also proprium of body; but superficies cannot be truly affirmed of body.231

11. The respondent who is affirming a Proprium may sometimes err by not clearly distinguishing in what mode, and in respect to what precise subject, he intends to affirm it. There are ten different modes, in one or other of which he always proposes to affirm it:—232

a. As belonging to the subject by nature. E.g., Biped is by nature a proprium of man.

b. As belonging to the subject simply — in some way or other. E.g., To have four fingers, belongs to Koriskus or some other individual man.

c. As belonging to the species. E.g., It belongs to fire to be the most subtle of all bodies.

d. As belonging absolutely (ἁπλῶς, καθάπερ ζῴου τὸ ζῆν) — in virtue of the essence of the subject — per se.233

e. As belonging to the subject by reason of some primary intervening aspect or attribute thereof. E.g., Prudence is a proprium of the soul, looked at quatenus reasonable or intellectual.

f. As belonging to that primary attribute or special aspect, logically distinguished and named separately from the subject. E.g., Prudence is a proprium of the logistikon or rationale.

g. As belonging to the subject viewed as possessing or holding in possession. E.g., The scientific man possesses that acquired mental habit which renders him incapable of having his convictions farther altered by discussion.

h. As belonging to some possession held by a possessing person. E.g., Science is unalterable by discussion; where science, a possession of the scientific man, is assigned as subject of the proprium, unalterable by discussion.

i. As belonging to a subject which is partaken or held in participation by another subject lying behind. E.g., Sensible perception is a proprium of the genus animal which genus is partaken or held in participation by this individual man, that individual horse, &c.; whence it may be predicated not only of animal but also of man, as thus participant.

k. As belonging to the ultimate subject partaking. E.g., To live is a proprium of this particular man or horse, participant in the genus animal, in the way just indicated.

Now each of these varieties of the Proprium is liable to its own mode of erroneous setting out or description. Thus the corresponding errors will be:—234

a. Not to add the qualifying words by nature.

b. Not to state the proprium as simply belonging, when it does only belong to the subject now, and may presently cease to belong.

c. Not to state the proprium as belonging to the species. If he omits these words, he may be told that it belongs to one variety alone among the species (e.g., should it be a superlative) and not to others: perhaps it may belong to some conspicuously, and to others faintly. Or perhaps, if he does add the express words — to the species, he may err, inasmuch as there exists no real species properly so called.

e. f. Not to distinguish whether he means to affirm it of B by reason of A, or of A directly: he will lay himself open to the objection that his proprium, and the subject term of which he declares it to be a proprium, are not co-extensive in predication.

g. h. Not to distinguish whether he intends as subject the person possessing, or the possession. If he leaves this undetermined, the objector may attack him on one ground or the other.

i. k. Not to distinguish whether he means as subject the partaker, or the genus which is partaken. Here too the objector will have ground for attack either from one side or from the other.

In case the respondent should enunciate his proprium in any one of the above defective ways, you will thus know where to find objections against him. But, if you undertake yourself to enunciate a proprium, you will avoid laying yourself open to the objections, by discriminating under which of these heads you intend to affirm it.235

12. Again, the respondent may perhaps affirm as proprium a predicate really identical with the subject, though under a different name. Thus, he may declare to τὸ πρέπον to be a proprium τοῦ καλοῦ: you may then refute him by showing that πρέπον is identical with καλόν. If he is on the negative side, denying A to be a proprium of B on the ground that A is identical with B, you will make out the affirmative against him by showing that A is not identical with B, but only co-extensive and reciprocating therewith. Thus, you may show that animated substance is not identical with animal, but a proprium of animal.236

13. Where the subject is homœomeric, the respondent may declare as proprium of the whole what cannot be truly affirmed as proprium of a part separately; or he may declare as proprium of a part separately what cannot be truly declared as proprium of the whole. In either case, you have a plausible argument for refuting him; but your refutation will not be always conclusive, because there are various cases in which what is true of each homœomeric part is not true of the whole; and vice versâ. If your position in the debate is affirmative, you will select as illustration some case in which what is by nature true of the whole is also true of each separate part: e.g., The earth as a whole, and each of its parts, tend by nature downwards. This is a proprium of the earth.237

14. Respecting Opposita, there are different loci for different varieties.

a. Contraria. — Suppose the respondent to affirm A as proprium of B: you will examine whether the contrary of A is proprium of the contrary of B. If it be not, then neither is A proprium of B. Thus, if best is not a proprium of justice, neither can worst be a proprium of injustice. If the respondent is on the negative side, you may prove the affirmative against him by showing that the contrary of the alleged proprium is a proprium of the contrary of the alleged subject.238

b. Relata. — Suppose the respondent to affirm a relatum A as proprium of a relatum B, you may refute him by showing that the correlate of A is not proprium of the correlate of B. Suppose him to deny the same, you will refute him by proving the affirmative between correlate and correlate.239

c. Habitus et Privatio. — Suppose the respondent to affirm an attribute of the habitus B, as proprium thereof: you may refute him by showing that the corresponding attribute of the privatio correlating with habitus B, is not proprium of that privatio. Suppose him to take the negative side, you will refute him by proving the affirmative of this latter proposition.240

15. Respecting Contradictory Propositions (affirmation and negation of the same), more than one mode of dealing may be stated. Wherever the affirmation is a proprium of the subject, the negation cannot also be a proprium thereof; and vice versâ. If the affirmative predicate be not a proprium of the affirmative subject, neither can the negative predicate be proprium of the negative subject; and vice versâ. If the affirmative predicate be proprium of the affirmative subject, the negative predicate will also be proprium of the negative subject. The same predicate cannot be proprium both of the affirmative subject and of the negative subject.241

16. Respecting two or more Contra-Specific Terms under the same genus and exhausting the whole genus:— Suppose A and B contra-specific terms used as subjects; C and D contra-specific terms used as predicates. If C be not a proprium of A, neither will D be a proprium of B; thus, if perceivable (αἰσθητόν) is not a proprium of any other species (except gods) included under the genus animal, neither will intelligible (νοητόν) be proprium of a god. Again, if C be a proprium of A, D also will be a proprium of B. Thus, if it be a proprium of prudence to be by its own nature the excellence of the rational or calculating soul (λογιστικοῦ), we must also affirm as proprium of temperance that it is the excellence of the appetitive soul (ἐπιθυμητικοῦ).242

17. Respecting Cases or Inflections, either of the subject B, or the predicate A:— If the case or inflection of the predicate be not a proprium of the corresponding case or inflection of the subject, neither will the predicate be proprium of the subject. If the case or inflection of the predicate be a proprium of the corresponding case or inflection of the subject, then the predicate itself will also be proprium of the subject. Pulchré is not proprium of justé; therefore, pulchrum is not proprium of justum.

This locus will be found available in combination with the preceding locus bearing on Opposita. Not only opposita themselves, but also the cases and inflections of opposita, may be adduced as arguments, following the rules above laid down.243

18. Analogous cases or propositions:— If the respondent affirms A as proprium of B, you have an argument against him by showing that something analogous to A is not proprium of a subject analogous to B. Thus, the builder, in relation to house-making, is analogous to the physician, in relation to health-making; now health-making is not the proprium of the physician, and therefore neither is house-making the proprium of the builder. If the respondent has advanced a negative, you will apply this same locus in the affirmative against him: e.g., as it is the proprium of the gymnast to impart a good habit of body, so it is the proprium of the physician to impart health.244

19. Esse, and Generari or Fieri:— If A considered as Ens is not the proprium of B considered as Ens, then neither will A considered as Fiens be the proprium of B considered as Fiens. Vice versâ, on the affirmative side: if the former of these two be the fact, you may argue that the latter is the fact also.245