Chaucer's Works, Volume 2 — Boethius and Troilus

The wreker Attrides, that is to seyn, Agamenon, that wroughte

and continuede the batailes by ten yeer, recovered and purgede

in wrekinge, by the destruccioun of Troye, the loste chaumbres of

mariage of his brother; this is to seyn, that he, Agamenon, wan

ayein Eleyne, that was Menelaus wyf his brother. In the mene

whyle that thilke Agamenon desirede to yeven sayles to the

Grekissh navye, and boughte ayein the windes by blood, he unclothede

him of pitee of fader; and the sory preest yiveth in

sacrifyinge the wrecched cuttinge of throte of the doughter; that

is to seyn, that Agamenon let cutten the throte of his doughter by the

preest, to maken allyaunce with his goddes, and for to han winde

with whiche he mighte wenden to Troye.

Itacus, that is to seyn, Ulixes, biwepte his felawes y-lorn, the

whiche felawes the ferse Poliphemus, ligginge in his grete cave,

hadde freten and dreynt in his empty wombe. But natheles

Poliphemus, wood for his blinde visage, yald to Ulixes Ioye by

his sorwful teres; this is to seyn, that Ulixes smoot out the eye of

Poliphemus that stood in his forehed, for which Ulixes hadde Ioye,

whan he say Poliphemus wepinge and blinde.

Hercules is celebrable for his harde travailes; he dauntede the

proude Centaures, half hors, half man; and he birafte the dispoylinge

fro the cruel lyoun, that is to seyn, he slowh the lyoun and

rafte him his skin. He smoot the briddes that highten Arpyes

with certein arwes. He ravisshede apples fro the wakinge dragoun,

and his hand was the more hevy for the goldene metal.

He drow Cerberus, the hound of helle, by his treble cheyne. He,

overcomer, as it is seyd, hath put an unmeke lord foddre to his

cruel hors; this is to seyn, that Hercules slowh Diomedes, and made

his hors to freten him. And he, Hercules, slowh Ydra the serpent,

and brende the venim. And Achelous the flood, defouled in his

forhed, dreynte his shamefast visage in his strondes; this is to

seyn, that Achelous coude transfigure him-self in-to dyverse lyknesses;

and, as he faught with Hercules, at the laste he tornede him in-to a

bole; and Hercules brak of oon of his hornes, and he, for shame,

hidde him in his river. And he, Hercules, caste adoun Antheus

the gyaunt in the strondes of Libie; and Cacus apaysede the

wratthes of Evander; this is to seyn, that Hercules slowh the

monstre Cacus, and apaysede with that deeth the wratthe of

Evander. And the bristlede boor markede with scomes the

shuldres of Hercules, the whiche shuldres the heye cercle of

hevene sholde thriste. And the laste of his labours was, that he

sustened the hevene up-on his nekke unbowed; and he deservede

eft-sones the hevene, to ben the prys of his laste travaile.

Goth now thanne, ye stronge men, ther-as the heye wey of the

grete ensaumple ledeth yow. O nyce men, why nake ye youre

bakkes? As who seyth: O ye slowe and delicat men, why flee ye

adversitees, and ne fighten nat ayeins hem by vertu, to winnen the

mede of the hevene? For the erthe, overcomen, yeveth the sterres';

this is to seyn, that, whan that erthely lust is overcomen, a man is

maked worthy to the hevene.

She hadde seyd, and torned the cours of hir resoun to some

othre thinges to ben treted and to ben y-sped. Thanne seyde I,

'Certes, rightful is thyn amonestinge and ful digne by auctoritee.

But that thou seidest whylom, that the questioun of the divyne

purviaunce is enlaced with many other questiouns, I understonde

wel and proeve it by the same thing. But I axe yif that thou

wenest that hap be any thing in any weys; and, yif thou wenest

that hap be anything, what is it?'

Thanne quod she, 'I haste me to yilden and assoilen to thee

the dette of my bihest, and to shewen and opnen the wey, by

which wey thou mayst come ayein to thy contree. But al-be-it

so that the thinges which that thou axest ben right profitable to

knowe, yit ben they diverse somwhat fro the path of my purpos;

and it is to douten that thou ne be maked wery by mis-weyes, so

that thou ne mayst nat suffyce to mesuren the right wey.'

'Ne doute thee ther-of nothing,' quod I. 'For, for to knowen

thilke thinges to-gedere, in the whiche thinges I delyte me greetly,

that shal ben to me in stede of reste; sin it is nat to douten of

the thinges folwinge, whan every syde of thy disputacioun shal han

be stedefast to me by undoutous feith.'

Thanne seyde she, 'That manere wol I don thee'; and bigan

to speken right thus. 'Certes,' quod she, 'yif any wight diffinisshe

hap in this manere, that is to seyn, that "hap is bitydinge

y-brought forth by foolish moevinge and by no knettinge of

causes," I conferme that hap nis right naught in no wyse; and I

deme al-outrely that hap nis, ne dwelleth but a voice, as who seith,

but an ydel word, with-outen any significacioun of thing submitted

to that vois. For what place mighte ben left, or dwellinge,

to folye and to disordenaunce, sin that god ledeth and constreineth

alle thinges by ordre? For this sentence is verray and

sooth, that "nothing ne hath his beinge of naught"; to the

whiche sentence none of thise olde folk ne withseyde never; al-be-it

so that they ne understoden ne meneden it naught by god,

prince and beginnere of werkinge, but they casten [it] as a manere

foundement of subiect material, that is to seyn, of the nature of

alle resoun. And yif that any thing is woxen or comen of no

causes, than shal it seme that thilke thing is comen or woxen of

naught; but yif this ne may nat ben don, thanne is it nat possible,

that hap be any swich thing as I have diffinisshed a litel heer-biforn.'

'How shal it thanne be?' quod I. 'Nis ther thanne no-thing

that by right may be cleped either "hap" or elles "aventure of

fortune"; or is ther aught, al-be-it so that it is hid fro the peple,

to which these wordes ben covenable?'

'Myn Aristotulis,' quod she, 'in the book of his Phisik, diffinissheth

this thing by short resoun, and neigh to the sothe.'

'In which manere?' quod I.

'As ofte,' quod she, 'as men doon any thing for grace of any

other thing, and an-other thing than thilke thing that men

entenden to don bitydeth by some causes, it is cleped "hap."

Right as a man dalf the erthe by cause of tilyinge of the feeld,

and founde ther a gobet of gold bidolven, thanne wenen folk that

it is bifalle by fortunous bitydinge. But, for sothe, it nis nat of

naught, for it hath his propre causes; of whiche causes the cours

unforeseyn and unwar semeth to han maked hap. For yif the

tilyere of the feld ne dolve nat in the erthe, and yif the hyder of

the gold ne hadde hid the gold in thilke place, the gold ne hadde

nat been founde. Thise ben thanne the causes of the abregginge

of fortuit hap, the which abregginge of fortuit hap comth of causes

encountringe and flowinge to-gidere to hem-self, and nat by the

entencioun of the doer. For neither the hyder of the gold ne the

delver of the feeld ne understoden nat that the gold sholde han

ben founde; but, as I sayde, it bitidde and ran to-gidere that he

dalf ther-as that other hadde hid the gold. Now may I thus

diffinisshe "hap." Hap is an unwar bitydinge of causes assembled

in thinges that ben don for som other thing. But thilke ordre,

procedinge by an uneschuable bindinge to-gidere, which that

descendeth fro the welle of purviaunce that ordeineth alle thinges

in hir places and in hir tymes, maketh that the causes rennen and

assemblen to-gidere.

Tigris and Eufrates resolven and springen of oo welle, in the

cragges of the roche of the contree of Achemenie, ther-as the

fleinge bataile ficcheth hir dartes, retorned in the brestes of hem

that folwen hem. And sone after tho same riveres, Tigris and

Eufrates, unioinen and departen hir wateres. And yif they comen

to-gideres, and ben assembled and cleped to-gidere into o cours,

thanne moten thilke thinges fleten to-gidere which that the water

of the entrechaunginge flood bringeth. The shippes and the

stokkes arraced with the flood moten assemblen; and the wateres

y-medled wrappeth or implyeth many fortunel happes or maneres;

the whiche wandringe happes, natheles, thilke declyninge lownesse

of the erthe and the flowinge ordre of the slydinge water governeth.

Right so Fortune, that semeth as that it fleteth with slaked or

ungovernede brydles, it suffereth brydles, that is to seyn, to be

governed, and passeth by thilke lawe, that is to seyn, by thilke

divyne ordenaunce.'

'This understonde I wel,' quod I, 'and I acorde wel that it is

right as thou seyst. But I axe yif ther be any libertee of free wil

in this ordre of causes that clyven thus to-gidere in hem-self; or

elles I wolde witen yif that the destinal cheyne constreineth the

movinges of the corages of men?'

'Yis,' quod she; 'ther is libertee of free wil. Ne ther ne was

nevere no nature of resoun that it ne hadde libertee of free wil.

For every thing that may naturely usen resoun, it hath doom by

which it decerneth and demeth every thing; thanne knoweth it,

by it-self, thinges that ben to fleen and thinges that ben to desiren.

And thilke thing that any wight demeth to ben desired, that axeth

or desireth he; and fleeth thilke thing that he troweth ben to

fleen. Wherfore in alle thinges that resoun is, in hem also is

libertee of willinge and of nillinge. But I ne ordeyne nat, as who

seyth, I ne graunte nat, that this libertee be evene-lyk in alle

thinges. Forwhy in the sovereines devynes substaunces, that is

to seyn, in spirits, Iugement is more cleer, and wil nat y-corumped,

and might redy to speden thinges that ben desired. But the

soules of men moten nedes be more free whan they loken hem in

the speculacioun or lokinge of the devyne thought, and lasse free

whan they slyden in-to the bodies; and yit lasse free whan they

ben gadered to-gidere and comprehended in erthely membres.

But the laste servage is whan that they ben yeven to vyces, and

han y-falle from the possessioun of hir propre resoun. For after

that they han cast awey hir eyen fro the light of the sovereyn

soothfastnesse to lowe thinges and derke, anon they derken by

the cloude of ignoraunce and ben troubled by felonous talents; to

the whiche talents whan they aprochen and asenten, they hepen

and encresen the servage which they han ioyned to hem-self; and

in this manere they ben caitifs fro hir propre libertee. The whiche

thinges, nathelesse, the lokinge of the devyne purviaunce seeth,

that alle thinges biholdeth and seeth fro eterne, and ordeineth

hem everich in hir merites as they ben predestinat: and it is seyd

in Greek, that "alle thinges he seeth and alle thinges he hereth."

Homer with the hony mouth, that is to seyn, Homer with the

swete ditees, singeth, that the sonne is cleer by pure light; natheles

yit ne may it nat, by the infirme light of his bemes, breken or

percen the inwarde entrailes of the erthe, or elles of the see. So

ne seeth nat god, maker of the grete world: to him, that loketh

alle thinges from an heigh, ne withstondeth nat no thinges by

hevinesse of erthe; ne the night ne withstondeth nat to him by

the blake cloudes. Thilke god seeth, in oo strok of thought, alle

thinges that ben, or weren, or sholle comen; and thilke god, for

he loketh and seeth alle thinges alone, thou mayst seyn that he is

the verray sonne.'

Thanne seyde I, 'now am I confounded by a more hard doute

than I was.'

'What doute is that?' quod she. 'For certes, I coniecte now

by whiche thinges thou art troubled.'

'It semeth,' quod I, 'to repugnen and to contrarien greetly,

that god knoweth biforn alle thinges, and that ther is any freedom

of libertee. For yif so be that god loketh alle thinges biforn, ne

god ne may nat ben desseived in no manere, than mot it nedes

been, that alle thinges bityden the whiche that the purviaunce of

god hath seyn biforn to comen. For which, yif that god

knoweth biforn nat only the werkes of men, but also hir conseiles

and hir willes, thanne ne shal ther be no libertee of arbitre; ne,

certes, ther ne may be noon other dede, ne no wil, but thilke

which that the divyne purviaunce, that may nat ben desseived,

hath feled biforn. For yif that they mighten wrythen awey in

othre manere than they ben purveyed, than sholde ther be no

stedefast prescience of thing to comen, but rather an uncertein

opinioun; the whiche thing to trowen of god, I deme it felonye

and unleveful. Ne I ne proeve nat thilke same resoun, as who

seyth, I ne alowe nat, or I ne preyse nat, thilke same resoun, by

which that som men wenen that they mowen assoilen and

unknitten the knotte of this questioun. For, certes, they seyn

that thing nis nat to comen for that the purviaunce of god hath

seyn it biforn that is to comen, but rather the contrarye, and that

is this: that, for that the thing is to comen, therfore ne may it

nat ben hid fro the purviaunce of god; and in this manere this

necessitee slydeth ayein in-to the contrarye partye: ne it ne

bihoveth nat, nedes, that thinges bityden that ben purvyed, but

it bihoveth, nedes, that thinges that ben to comen ben y-porveyed:

but as it were y-travailed, as who seyth, that thilke answere

procedeth right as thogh men travaileden, or weren bisy to enqueren,

the whiche thing is cause of the whiche thing:—as, whether the

prescience is cause of the necessitee of thinges to comen, or elles

that the necessitee of thinges to comen is cause of the purviaunce.

But I ne enforce me nat now to shewen it, that the bitydinge of

thinges y-wist biforn is necessarie, how so or in what manere

that the ordre of causes hath it-self; al-thogh that it ne seme nat

that the prescience bringe in necessitee of bitydinge to thinges to

comen. For certes, yif that any wight sitteth, it bihoveth by

necessitee that the opinioun be sooth of him that coniecteth that

he sitteth; and ayeinward also is it of the contrarye: yif the

opinioun be sooth of any wight for that he sitteth, it bihoveth by

necessitee that he sitte. Thanne is heer necessitee in that oon

and in that other: for in that oon is necessitee of sittinge, and,

certes, in that other is necessitee of sooth. But therfore ne

sitteth nat a wight, for that the opinioun of the sittinge is sooth;

but the opinioun is rather sooth, for that a wight sitteth biforn.

And thus, al-thogh that the cause of the sooth cometh of that

other syde (as who seyth, that al-thogh the cause of sooth comth

of the sitting, and nat of the trewe opinioun), algates yit is ther

comune necessitee in that oon and in that other. Thus sheweth

it, that I may make semblable skiles of the purviaunce of god

and of thinges to comen. For althogh that, for that thinges ben

to comen, ther-fore ben they purveyed, nat, certes, for that they

ben purveyed, ther-fore ne bityde they nat. Yit natheles,

bihoveth it by necessitee, that either the thinges to comen ben

y-purveyed of god, or elles that the thinges that ben purveyed of

god bityden. And this thing only suffiseth y-nough to destroyen

the freedom of oure arbitre, that is to seyn, of oure free wil. But

now, certes, sheweth it wel, how fer fro the sothe and how up-so-doun

is this thing that we seyn, that the bitydinge of temporel

thinges is cause of the eterne prescience. But for to wenen that

god purvyeth the thinges to comen for they ben to comen, what

other thing is it but for to wene that thilke thinges that bitidden

whylom ben causes of thilke soverein purvyaunce that is in god?

And her-to I adde yit this thing: that, right as whan that I wot

that a thing is, it bihoveth by necessitee that thilke selve thing be;

and eek, whan I have knowe that any thing shal bityden, so

byhoveth it by necessitee that thilke thing bityde:—so folweth it

thanne, that the bitydinge of the thing y-wist biforn ne may nat

ben eschued. And at the laste, yif that any wight wene a thing

to ben other weyes thanne it is, it is nat only unscience, but it is

deceivable opinioun ful diverse and fer fro the sothe of science.

Wherfore, yif any thing be so to comen, that the bitydinge of hit

ne be nat certein ne necessarie, who may weten biforn that thilke

thing is to comen? For right as science ne may nat ben medled

with falsnesse (as who seyth, that yif I wot a thing, it ne may nat

be false that I ne wot it), right so thilke thing that is conceived by

science ne may nat ben non other weys than as it is conceived.

For that is the cause why that science wanteth lesing (as who

seyth, why that witinge ne receiveth nat lesinge of that it wot); for

it bihoveth, by necessitee, that every thing be right as science

comprehendeth it to be. What shal I thanne seyn? In whiche

manere knoweth god biforn the thinges to comen, yif they ne be

nat certein? For yif that he deme that they ben to comen

uneschewably, and so may be that it is possible that they ne

shollen nat comen, god is deceived. But nat only to trowen that

god is deceived, but for to speke it with mouth, it is a felonous

sinne. But yif that god wot that, right so as thinges ben to

comen, so shullen they comen—so that he wite egaly, as who

seyth, indifferently, that thinges mowen ben doon or elles nat

y-doon—what is thilke prescience that ne comprehendeth no

certein thing ne stable? Or elles what difference is ther bitwixe

the prescience and thilke Iape-worthy divyninge of Tiresie the

divynour, that seyde: "Al that I seye," quod he, "either it shal be,

or elles it ne shal nat be?" Or elles how mochel is worth the

devyne prescience more than the opinioun of mankinde, yif so be

that it demeth the thinges uncertein, as men doon; of the whiche

domes of men the bitydinge nis nat certein? But yif so be that

non uncertein thing ne may ben in him that is right certein welle

of alle thinges, thanne is the bitydinge certein of thilke thinges

whiche he hath wist biforn fermely to comen. For which it

folweth, that the freedom of the conseiles and of the werkes of

mankind nis non, sin that the thoght of god, that seeth alle

thinges without errour of falsnesse, bindeth and constreineth

hem to a bitydinge by necessitee. And yif this thing be ones

y-graunted and received, that is to seyn, that ther nis no free wille,

than sheweth it wel, how greet destruccioun and how grete

damages ther folwen of thinges of mankinde. For in ydel ben

ther thanne purposed and bihight medes to gode folk, and peynes

to badde folk, sin that no moevinge of free corage voluntarie ne

hath nat deserved hem, that is to seyn, neither mede ne peyne; and

it sholde seme thanne, that thilke thing is alderworst, which that

is now demed for aldermost iust and most rightful, that is to seyn,

that shrewes ben punisshed, or elles that gode folk ben y-gerdoned:

the whiche folk, sin that hir propre wil ne sent hem nat to that oon

ne to that other, that is to seyn, neither to gode ne to harm, but constreineth

hem certein necessitee of thinges to comen: thanne ne

shollen ther nevere ben, ne nevere weren, vyce ne vertu, but it

sholde rather ben confusioun of alle desertes medled with-outen

discrecioun. And yit ther folweth an-other inconvenient, of the

whiche ther ne may ben thoght no more felonous ne more wikke;

and that is this: that, so as the ordre of thinges is y-led and

comth of the purviaunce of god, ne that no-thing nis leveful to

the conseiles of mankinde (as who seyth, that men han no power to

doon no-thing, ne wilne no-thing), than folweth it, that oure vyces

ben referred to the maker of alle good (as who seyth, than folweth

it, that god oughte han the blame of oure vyces, sin he constreineth us

by necessitee to doon vyces). Thanne is ther no resoun to hopen in

god, ne for to preyen to god; for what sholde any wight hopen to

god, or why sholde he preyen to god, sin that the ordenaunce of

destinee, which that ne may nat ben inclyned, knitteth and streineth

alle thinges that men may desiren? Thanne sholde ther be doon

awey thilke only allyaunce bitwixen god and men, that is to seyn,

to hopen and to preyen. But by the prys of rightwisnesse and of

verray mekenesse we deserven the gerdoun of the divyne grace,

which that is inestimable, that is to seyn, that it is so greet, that it

ne may nat ben ful y-preysed. And this is only the manere, that is

to seyn, hope and preyeres, for which it semeth that men mowen

speke with god, and by resoun of supplicacioun be conioined to

thilke cleernesse, that nis nat aproched no rather or that men

beseken it and impetren it. And yif men wene nat that hope ne

preyeres ne han no strengthes, by the necessitee of thinges to

comen y-received, what thing is ther thanne by whiche we mowen

ben conioined and clyven to thilke soverein prince of thinges?

For which it bihoveth, by necessitee, that the linage of mankinde,

as thou songe a litel her-biforn, be departed and unioined from

his welle, and failen of his biginninge, that is to seyn, god.

What discordable cause hath to-rent and unioined the bindinge,

or the alliaunce, of thinges, that is to seyn, the coniunccioun of god

and man? Whiche god hath establisshed so greet bataile bitwixen

thise two soothfast or verray thinges, that is to seyn,

bitwixen the purviaunce of god and free wil, that they ben singuler

and devyded, ne that they ne wolen nat be medeled ne coupled

to-gidere? But ther nis no discord to the verray thinges, but they

clyven, certein, alwey to hem-self. But the thought of man, confounded

and overthrowen by the dirke membres of the body, ne

may nat, by fyr of his derked looking, that is to seyn, by the vigour

of his insighte, whyl the soule is in the body, knowe the thinne

subtil knittinges of thinges. But wherfore enchaufeth it so, by so

greet love, to finden thilke notes of sooth y-covered; that is to

seyn, wherfore enchaufeth the thoght of man by so greet desyr to

knowen thilke notificacions that ben y-hid under the covertoures of

sooth? Wot it aught thilke thing that it, anguissous, desireth to

knowe? As who seith, nay; for no man travaileth for to witen

thinges that he wot. And therfore the texte seith thus: but who

travaileth to witen thinges y-knowe? And yif that he ne knoweth

hem nat, what seketh thilke blinde thoght? What is he that

desireth any thing of which he wot right naught? As who seith,

who so desireth any thing, nedes, somwhat he knoweth of it; or

elles, he ne coude nat desire it. Or who may folwen thinges that ne

ben nat y-wist? And thogh that he seke tho thinges, wher shal he

finde hem? What wight, that is al unconninge and ignoraunt,

may knowen the forme that is y-founde? But whan the soule

biholdeth and seeth the heye thoght, that is to seyn, god, than

knoweth it to-gidere the somme and the singularitees, that is to

seyn, the principles and everich by him-self.

But now, whyl the soule is hid in the cloude and in the derkenesse

of the membres of the body, it ne hath nat al for-yeten

it-self, but it with-holdeth the somme of thinges, and leseth the

singularitees. Thanne, who-so that seeketh soothnesse, he nis in

neither nother habite; for he noot nat al, ne he ne hath nat al

foryeten: but yit him remembreth the somme of thinges that he

with-holdeth, and axeth conseil, and retreteth deepliche thinges

y-seyn biforn, that is to seyn, the grete somme in his minde: so that

he mowe adden the parties that he hath for-yeten to thilke that he

hath with-holden.'