Criminality and economic conditions

It is evident that the nature of the soil, the climate, the physical environment in a word, must have an important influence upon the mode of production, and consequently upon society.27

It is easily understood why those who inhabit the regions of Siberia covered with snow have not become agriculturists; and why Holland, without mines of iron and coal has not become a great manufacturing country, but instead, situated upon the sea and traversed by great rivers, has become commercial. But these physical factors have remained constant or nearly constant during historical periods, while the organization of society has undergone changes that have great effects. We cannot explain these changes by a constant factor.

Plechanow formulates this very well in his “Beiträge der Geschichte des Materialismus.” He says: “The character of man’s natural environment determines the character of his productive activity, of his means of production. The means of production, however, determines the reciprocal relationships of men in the process of production as inevitably as the equipment of an army determines its entire organization, and all the relationships of the individuals of which it is made up. Now the reciprocal relations of men in the social process of production determine the entire structure of society. The influence of the natural environment upon this structure is therefore incontestable. The character of the natural environment determines that of the social environment. For example: ‘The necessity of computing the time of the rising of the Nile, created Egyptian astronomy and with it the domination of the priestly caste as guides in agriculture.’

“But this is only one side of the matter. Another side must also be considered if one is not to draw entirely false conclusions. The circumstances of production are the result, the productive forces are the cause. But the effect becomes a cause in its turn; the circumstances of production become a new source of the development of the productive forces. This leads to a double result.

“1. The mutual influence of the circumstances of production and the productive forces causes a social movement, which has its own logic and a law of its own, independent of the natural environment. [108]For example: Private property in the primitive phase of its development is always the fruit of the labor of the property-holder himself, as may be very well observed in the Russian villages. There necessarily comes a time, however, when it becomes the reverse of what it was before: it supposes the work of another, and becomes capitalistic private property, as we can likewise see any day in the Russian villages. This phenomenon is the effect of the immanent law of the evolution of private property. All that the natural environment can accomplish in this case consists in accelerating this movement through favoring the development of the productive forces.

“2. Since the social evolution has its own logic, independent of any direct influence from the natural environment, it may happen that a people, though inhabiting the same land and retaining almost the same physical peculiarities, may have at different epochs of its history social and political institutions which are very little similar, or even totally different one from another.”28

Crime being a social phenomenon, and society being influenced, as we have seen, by the physical environment, one might say that this environment is a factor in criminality. He who reasons thus would have to grant that the physical environment is only an indirect factor, and therefore a very remote cause. It would be as fair to say that the invention of gunpowder was one of the causes of all murders committed with fire-arms. However, in reasoning thus I believe we forget that crime is an historic phenomenon, modifying itself according to the condition of society, and consequently regulated by laws that are independent of the physical environment. In other words, the environment is the reason why a people provides for its needs by working the material that nature has furnished; but the manner in which this work is done is independent of this environment. And it is upon this manner of working that criminality depends. An example taken from practice will make clear what I have been saying.

From the nature of the soil of Sicily it is possible to work sulphur mines there. The criminality of Sicily is very great, especially in the parts where the mines are found, and many murders particularly are committed there. We might be disposed to believe that here the physical factors came into play. Now it is true that the nature of the soil is the cause of the exploiting of the mines, but the criminality is dependent entirely upon the way in which the exploiting is done, and this has nothing to do with the physical environment. To particularize: these mines are exploited in the capitalistic fashion, i.e., [109]with the aim of getting as much profit as possible, which brings it about that the workers are untaught, demoralized and made degenerate by ill-paid labor, excessively severe, and carried on in an unwholesome atmosphere. Hence come the higher figures for criminality.29

Most authors who have concerned themselves with the influence of these physical factors, have only observed their direct influence upon man. Many of them have paid no attention to the importance that these factors may have for the character of society, and they have taken no account of the fact that society develops according to laws independent of the physical environment. Phenomena have been ascribed to the direct influence of the physical environment, which have no such relationship. It is a fact pretty generally recognized, for example, that the number of violent crimes is greater in the South than in the North. The cause frequently given is the obvious one that it is the difference of climate. But this overlooks the fact that the phase of social development reached in the southern countries is totally different from that in the northern countries, and this difference explains that of the criminality against persons. Upon this subject Professor Tarde says: “Statistics compiled in epochs when, civilization not having passed from the South to the North, the North was more barbarous, would certainly have shown that crimes of blood were more numerous in the northern climates, where now they are more rare, and would have induced the Quetelets of that day to formulate a law precisely the reverse of the one now stated. For example, if we divide Italy into three zones, Lombardy, Central, and Southern Italy, we shall find that at present there are in the first 3 homicides to the 100,000 inhabitants annually, in the second nearly 10, and in the third more than 16. But shall we estimate that in the palmy days of Grecia Major, when Crotona and Sybaris flourished in the south of a peninsula which, in the North, was totally peopled with brigands and barbarians, except for the Etruscans, the proportion of bloody crimes would not have been reversed? At present there are in Italy, in proportion to the population, sixteen times as many homicides as in England, nine times as many as in Belgium, and five times as many as in France. But we could swear that under the Roman Empire it was quite otherwise, and that the savage Britons, and even the Belgians and the Gauls surpassed the effeminate Romans in habitual ferocity of manners, in vindictive fury and bravery. [110]According to Maine the Scandinavian literature shows that homicide during the period of barbarism was a ‘daily accident’ with these peoples of the North, at present the mildest and most inoffensive in Europe.”30

It is plain from what has gone before that I have not wished to deny the direct influence of the physical environment upon man. Indeed, it is a fact which the whole world has observed. According to many persons, then—and a number of scientific researches have proved it—a high degree of criminality against persons proceeds from a hot temperature, while a low temperature, on the other hand, leads to many crimes against property. This implies not only that the kind of crime is different in hot countries from that in cold, but also that the change of the seasons with their variations in temperature have the corresponding effects.

I will not fatigue the reader by citing an unlimited number of examples to prove that the exceptions to this rule are very numerous. We cannot find a greater number of crimes against persons and a smaller number of crimes against property with each degree nearer the equator. If this were the case dishonesty would be unknown at the equator, and everyone there would be very violent. There are countries which, though in the same latitude, are very different as to crime, as there are others, much alike as to crime though situated far from each other, etc., etc.31 The adherents of the theory of the “physical environment” explain these exceptions by saying that they are caused by the “social environment.” By so doing they recognize that the latter may entirely alter and even annihilate the influence of the former. Let us concern ourselves rather with the different kinds of crime, and investigate the influence which the physical environment exercises upon it.

In the first place, as to the assertion that cold increases the number of crimes against property it is unnecessary to speak at length, for nearly all authors are agreed that not physical but economic causes come into play here. Cold increases men’s needs; they must have warmer clothing and a well heated dwelling. But it is clear that all this is no motive for stealing. For the person of means gets what he wants with his own money. It is the present social organization that, [111]during the severe weather, does not permit people to provide for the needs that are more numerous then, for the opportunity to work is more often lacking in winter than in summer.

As to crimes against persons Professor Ferri is of the opinion that the direct influence of temperature is as follows: “The increase of acts of violence to persons, which is observed in connection with higher temperatures, must be chiefly dependent upon the direct physiological effect of heat upon the human organism. For by the greater warmth the consumption of material for the production of animal heat is cut down, and hence a surplus of force is stored up capable of being used for other purposes. But this, in union with the heightened irritability of temper, may easily degenerate into that criminal activity which shows itself in acts of violence to persons. With this psychological effect of the heat, it is true, there is coupled, in the case of the poorer classes who form the majority of the population, the effect of more easily obtained and more plentiful food, but this social cause in this connection is of less importance than the direct biological influence.”32

The first explanation of Professor Ferri is astonishing because everyone feels that the heat has a different effect upon himself than the one given. The fact that during hot weather the consumption of bodily fuel is not so great as in cold weather cannot be considered as the most important point in treating of the question of crime. Heat enervates men, weakens their organism, and is the cause of men’s doing as little as possible. It has, then, just the opposite effect to that ascribed to it.33

More than once I have had occasion to point out that it is unjust to say that the improved food of the poorer classes in summer can be the cause of the greater criminality during that season. If this were the case the persons who are well nourished at all times would furnish the greatest number of violent criminals. Now we know that just the contrary is the case. In my opinion the explanation is to be sought in the fact that in summer people come into contact with one another more, and consequently there is more opportunity for evil doing.34 But this in itself cannot naturally explain the increase of crimes. Watering-places, where the bourgeoisie attempt to escape from the effects of the heat, are not places where crimes against persons [112]occur in great numbers. Yet the concentration of many people in a limited space is there very great. The degree of cultivation of the people determines the greater or less ease with which quarrels arise. And what proves that this degree need not be very high is the fact that acts of violence are very rare among the bourgeois, the greater number of whom have only a superficial culture.

The most convincing proof that the increase of violent crimes in spring has no direct connection with the heat, is found in the fact that this increase is already very great in the months in which in the North of Europe there is absolutely no question of heat properly so called (i.e. in March and April); and in the second place the course of crimes during the week must be noted, with the maximum on Sunday, when naturally the heat is no greater than on other days; and in the third place, the maximum is not to be found at the hottest time of the day.35

The increase of sexual crimes in hot seasons is in part only apparent, because those who commit these crimes then operate more out of doors, and a greater number of arrests results. For the rest, it must be conceded that the sexual instinct in general is quickened a little during the spring and summer, and as a consequence sexual acts increase. But this does not mean that these acts are therefore criminal. The principal reason why sexual crimes increase during the hot weather is to be found in opportunity, which occurs much more frequently than in cold weather. The proverb says: “opportunity makes the thief”, and this is still more applicable to sexual criminals.36

I am therefore of the opinion that the social factors must not be included in the etiology of crime. They have their influence upon the structure of society, they have also their influence upon man, but it depends upon social conditions whether this influence takes a criminal direction or not.37 [113]

Before taking up our analysis of “Socialismo e criminalità”, I would remark that this division of the factors into three groups has to do exclusively with the individual criminal, and thus loses sight of the question why such an action in any place whatever, at any time whatever, is regarded as criminal? Such a query brings out the fact that we are here concerned with social factors only.

Let us take up now the exposition of Chapter I of “Socialismo e criminalità.” Turati, in his “Il delitto e la questione sociale” has made the following objections to Professor Ferri’s theses. Professor Ferri distinguishes five categories of criminals: insane criminals, incorrigible born-criminals, habitual criminals, criminals from passion, and occasional criminals. In the first two categories individual factors play a very important rôle; however, according to Professor Ferri’s investigations these two groups include but 20% to 25% of the whole number of criminals, and deducting the insane, only 10% remain. Since criminals form only the minority of the population, and physical factors have only a slight influence, it follows that these factors influence rather the form than the cause of the crime. The three factors work nearly all the time. It is clear, therefore, that the two other factors alone will not be strong enough to produce crime at a time when the social factor is eliminated, as has been proved by the socialistic colony at New Lanark, which preserved an exemplary morality for four years. Then, without taking account of the crimes that are the consequence of viciousness of life or of the abnormal economic condition, the authors of great crimes (except technical and professional ones) are less numerous among the well-to-do than among the lower classes, where the anthropological elements are nearly the same. And if the different classes show anthropological differences, this is not because these differences are innate in individuals on account of being born in the lower classes, but because they are produced and brought about by poverty, bad education, etc. The true causes of crime are consequently social conditions, and in the last analysis economic conditions.

Professor Ferri’s argument against what has just been said may be summed up as follows: Will there be no social atmosphere in a socialistic state? Or rather, will this atmosphere be so perfect that the germ of the smallest social factor of crime will be absent? Do we suppose that when poverty is suppressed, jealousy will disappear at the same time? If legal marriage is abolished will that prevent an ugly man from violating or killing a beautiful woman who refuses to accept him? It may be objected that in this case the man is not [114]an habitual or an occasional criminal, but a born-criminal, or an insane criminal, or a criminal from passion. Well and good, but then in this future state we shall still be far removed from an earthly paradise.

Turati commits the following errors in his reasoning: First, he sets aside the insane criminals; wrongly, according to Professor Ferri, for, although insane, they are criminals. Second, 20%, the figure to which born and insane criminals count up, is a very large number out of 60,000 prisoners. Third, Professor Ferri claims that it is incorrect to say that the other causes are reduced to zero the moment the social factors of crime are suppressed. For even with occasional criminals, where the environment plays a very important part, an individual factor must make its effect felt, or the individual would not become criminal.

Professor Ferri asks, on the other hand: How does it happen that out of a hundred working-men living in the same environment, only a very few fall into crime? This can be explained only by admitting individual and physical causes. When socialists say that these individual differences are innate simply in consequence of the poverty in which ancestors of the persons in question have lived for thousands of years, the author admits this reasoning in great part, but thinks nevertheless that he is right in maintaining that these qualities are innate in certain individuals at the present time.

With regard to the fact that a very high morality was maintained in New Lanark, the author says: first, that he would very much like to convince himself with his own eyes, especially since he has read that in this colony the habit of celebrating Christmas eve with excessive drinking was kept up; second, that he knows that crimes were committed in a communistic colony of that time; further we are not to forget that difficulties are increased in a great city.

The following chapter is entitled: “Benessere e criminalità.” To the unproved assertion of the socialists that bad economic conditions are the principal if not the only cause of crime, the author opposes some facts to prove that this statement is largely incorrect. To this end he divides crimes into three groups: first, crimes against property, second, crimes against persons or crimes of blood, and third, crimes against morals. Besides these three categories there are many crimes which have neither directly nor indirectly any connection with bad economic conditions; for example, crimes against honor, insults, or abuse of power.

First, then, the crimes against property. The author recognizes [115]that most of these crimes are caused by bad economic conditions. But it is an exaggeration, he says, to say that all these crimes result from such conditions. This is to overlook crimes against property committed out of revenge. However, in a communistic society there would necessarily be cases of theft still, without taking into account kleptomania, etc. For the articles of consumption would still remain private property; and why should one not rob his fellow-citizen from jealousy? Or is it not probable that someone would prefer to take from his neighbor the thing he needs rather than make a trip of some miles to get it from a central store? But if we admit that the bad economic conditions of the time are the cause of the crimes against property, it remains to find the causes of the crimes of the other groups. Though he recognizes that economic conditions occupy a place in the etiology of these last crimes, as, for example, murder from cupidity, the author does not believe that this can be made a general rule. When socialists object that the man of the future will be morally improved, Professor Ferri is of the opinion that at the present moment we have to do with the men of today and not with the men of the future.

The study of criminality in France during the years 1825–80 has shown an extraordinary increase in crimes against persons and against morals during the years 1848–52. A minute examination shows the author that it was due to the great increase in the consumption of meat and wine, both very cheap at this time, and also to a rise in wages. The result of the betterment in economic conditions was, therefore, an increase in the crimes mentioned.

Professor Ferri finds another proof in the following table:

[116]

It follows from this table that the farming class, which, if you except vagabonds, is the class with the least means, shows the figure relatively lowest, and that the assertion of the socialists, that those who are brought to the bar of justice are almost all from the proletariat, is inaccurate.

—I shall not discuss the question, whether the proletariat furnishes a disproportionately large contingent of criminals. The arguments of Professor Ferri do not seem very strong to me. “Agricultural class”, for example, is too vague a distinction. What an enormous distinction between the rich farmer and the poor day-laborer, who earns only a few francs a week! Yet both are included in the first group.—

When we examine the course of crime in France during the period 1826–80, we see a considerable increase in the crimes against property, morals, and persons, while the economic conditions have improved during these years even for the proletariat. To what cause is this increase to be ascribed? It is impossible to attribute it to a relaxation of the strictness of the police and the courts, for the activity of these has become greater. Further, where it is evident that there are such strong causes of crime, it would be madness to think that a greater severity of penalties leads to a diminution of criminality. It is for this reason that the school to which the author belongs insists not upon the increase of penalties, but rather upon the elimination of causes. Hence the doctrine of “penal substitutes.”

The true cause is the following: The more abundantly a man is nourished, the more his organic forces are developed; there is, therefore, a greater activity which may express itself in more acts of honest labor, but may also express itself in an increased number of unlawful acts. And then we must not lose sight, especially with regard to sexual crimes, of the existence of a biological and of a sociological law, namely, first, that the generative force of animals and of man increases in proportion to the abundance and ease of nutrition; second, that by a continual development of foresight, the nations which follow the advice of Malthus are more and more giving the lie to the law that he formulated, since with them population shows a tendency to increase less rapidly than the means of existence, and almost in inverse proportion to wealth. This is why criminality is increasing in France, where the system of foresight is greatly developed, and where the population enjoys better nutrition than formerly.

Professor Ferri is of the opinion that we can derive from the observed [117]facts the following rules: first, criminality increases in extent but diminishes in violence; second, scarcity makes crimes against property increase, and decreases those against persons, while abundance has the opposite effect; third, civilization decreases the number of homicides, but increases that of suicides; fourth, a development of foresight with regard to births prevents an excessive increase of the population, and consequently an excessive increase of pauperism, but increases the figures for sexual crimes.

Turati makes the following objections to these statements: In the first place, in civilized countries, crimes against persons are much less numerous than crimes against property, and just in proportion to the degree of civilization. Why is it not likely that in the end the criminogenous influence of nutrition will disappear in consequence of the law in accordance with which crimes increase in number, but decrease in grossness and intensity? Further, it is doubtful whether this influence is so strong. The true cause is not good nutrition but the Malthusian check, and it is this last which leads to crime, precisely in the proletariat, since in this class prostitution cannot act as a safety valve; and bad economic conditions are the cause of the “moral restraint.”

Professor Ferri recognizes that there is a partial truth in this reasoning, but makes the following objections: that crimes of blood are more numerous than crimes against morals and yet have no relation to the Malthusian check; that, as regards crimes against morals, it is not correct to say that the proletariat are driven to them by economic causes; that it is the proletarians that multiply the fastest, and the well-to-do classes who do not wish to have many children; and that the individual and biological factors would always remain, and lead to crimes against persons, even if the aforesaid cause of sexual crimes were to disappear. In the following chapters the author treats of the assertion of Turati that an improvement in education and the new “social atmosphere” will bring about a change.

—The criticism of the chapter of which I have just been speaking may be summed up as follows: Like so many other authors, Professor Ferri understands the expression, “economic conditions”, in a very limited sense. He includes only direct influences, and in this way it is very easy to prove that they explain only a part of criminality. But this interpretation is very incomplete, since all social life is influenced by economic conditions. In proving, therefore, like many other authors, that while an improvement in the economic condition [118]of the working-class is accompanied by a decrease in crimes against property, it is also accompanied by an increase of sexual crimes and crimes against persons, Professor Ferri forgets not only that the lack of education leads to crimes of violence, but also that in our present society the possibility of satisfying the sexual appetites depends upon the social position of the individual. The argument, in opposition to Turati, “that Malthusianism is applied chiefly by persons of some means” is not a happy one for one who wants to prove that economic conditions have not a considerable influence. For the reason of this is just the difficulty of procuring a good position for many children, and, in the case of landholders, the desire to avoid a too great division of the land. These are purely economic causes.—

“Educazione e criminalità” is the title of the third chapter. The human brain is an organic mechanism, similar (but with numerous exceptions) to an inorganic mechanism in this, that it is subject to the great law of the conservation of energy, which manifests itself, among other ways, in inertia. From which it comes that man at all times has had an irresistible tendency to make use of a general principle as a basis for his logical structures. Without this he would always be forced to build each new structure from the ground up, which would involve the waste of too much cerebral energy. Opposed to this law is another which teaches us that life is impossible in a state of absolute repose, but that it requires a perpetual changing of the organic and physio-psychic materials. Hence it comes that eternal and absolute truths change at different epochs, and that they seem stable only when compared with the secondary truths, which are subject to the fashions of the time.

According to the author, then, there are truths that are more general and nearly inalterable, but there are others which, though general also, are more secondary, only retain their force during several generations, and end by being changed. Such, for example, are the views concerning human life, formulated by the great thinkers, then accepted by the majority, and finally supplanted by other truths. This is why science makes progress by dogmas. It is modern science that has made the great step in recognizing that these dogmas are relative and alterable.

Against this reasoning two objections can be alleged. First, that Spencer has given the name “hypothesis” to his doctrine of evolution, while Professor Ferri calls it a dogma. The author on the other hand thinks that his opinions and those of Spencer are exactly alike, [119]for he calls the doctrine in question a relative and alterable dogma, and Spencer says of it: what I have given is an hypothesis; but so long as there is nothing better, that will explain a greater number of facts, I have a right to consider it as the image of the knowable truth, until the contrary is proved. In the second place, it may be asked: “Does man always oscillate between truth and error; will he never know an absolute and eternal truth?” According to Professor Ferri the answer to this question is not difficult. The origin as well as the aim of faith is the effort to give to men a relatively stable support, which they cannot find elsewhere. All discussion with the adherents of a theological opinion is excluded; and as for the others, ought they not to recognize that the life of human thought is just the constant proof of the continual modification of the so-called eternal verities?

After this introduction the author enters upon the subject itself. At the beginning of the 19th century the dogma was dominant, that instruction was the panacea for all crimes. Later many of the publicists, including the socialists, advanced the opinion that the true remedy for criminality was education. Just as the first theory was incorrect, Professor Ferri would show that the second is equally so.

The question is, can education lead man to good or to evil; and if it can, how far can it lead him? The scientific pedagogues have not treated this question, as far as the author knows. Without furnishing proofs the socialists admit that education can modify man in many respects. Owen, for example, says: “every child may be brought up to have in his later life only good habits, or bad, or a mixture of the two, according to his education.”

It is necessary to distinguish three kinds of education—physical, intellectual, and moral. First, a general observation applicable to all kinds of education. In his physical, intellectual, and moral make-up, each individual is the product of a countless number of ancestors, to whom he is bound by unchangeable laws of heredity. From this it is clear that the power of education, which acts only during a limited number of years, is small compared to that of the influences to which a man’s ancestors have been subjected for thousands of years. The question becomes, then: “what are the limits of such modification?” Further it is necessary to determine just how far this modification is due to education, and how far to environment. For education, properly so called, i.e. the direct and methodical influence of the educator upon his pupil, differs in many respects from that of the physical and social environment. This is why the author treats this latter in a special chapter, and limits himself now [120]to education alone. The question is therefore reduced to this: “how far can a man (the educator) modify the constitution of another man (the pupil)?”

One more observation should precede the study of the question, namely that a force, or a complexus of forces, can be influenced only by other homogeneous forces. Now when we examine how far physical or biological education can make its influence felt, we see that this influence may be very great, though naturally limited, in proportion to the knowledge we have of the structure and functioning of the organs which it is attempted to modify. As to intellectual education, the results are much less, since the knowledge of the organs involved is much smaller. As to moral education, the following question is one to which pedagogues have given little attention: “how far do morality or immorality, good or bad character, depend upon the education received at home and in school?”

Spencer lays down the fundamental rule that the moral conduct of man can be studied scientifically only on condition of being considered as forming part of the conduct in general, and also of the activity in general, of all living beings. Sergi is of the same opinion. And this is correct, Professor Ferri thinks, if, as these two authors do, one studies the conduct and character of man in their constituent elements, in their genesis and development, without taking into consideration the variability of the character, and consequently of the conduct, of man because of his education. In our case, in studying the constituent elements, the genesis, the development, and the variability of the moral part of the character and conduct of man, it is necessary to separate these parts, and to limit ourselves to a special study of one of them.

All psychologists are agreed that the moral conduct of a man (including criminal conduct) although having naturally a certain relationship with his muscular and intellectual condition, depends directly and intimately upon the condition of his feelings, emotions, and passions in their moral aspect. Hence it is clear that the problem is: “how far can these feelings be modified by education?”

Let us first of all note that the expression, “a man of good (or bad) birth”, does not imply that there are persons who are totally good or totally bad, for these two qualities always appear in combination. It only indicates whether the good or the bad qualities predominate.

It is certain that some persons have become criminals from lack of moral education, added to bad surroundings. In this case this lack of education has favored the greater development of the bad [121]germs, which, however, gives us no right to conclude that the converse would be true: that education can improve the moral character, strengthening the good germs to such a point that they have the mastery over the bad. For we must not lose sight of two things: first, that the bad germs that show themselves in our present society are the anti-social instincts, opposed to the sociability and sympathy upon which life is based, while the good germs are the social instincts; second, that, since individuals reproduce morphologically and physiologically during life the different phases that man and animal have gone through, it is in the lowest strata of his character that man preserves the savage and anti-social feelings that are the consequences of the condition in which the race has lived heretofore, while the germs of the modern social ideas are to be found in the higher and more recent parts. Hence it follows that the anti-social instincts, being of a more ancient date than the social instincts, are stronger than they and are not stifled by them. And then, the environment, the present civilization, is also partly the cause. This is why the author agrees with Sergi that in our present society there are individuals who are constantly driven to crime by their organic and psychical constitution, made up in great part of the deeper, anti-social strata (the born-criminals and incorrigibles), and that there are others whose constitution is formed primarily of the more recent, social strata, and who become criminal only under extraordinary impulses, in consequence of a volcanic eruption, as it were, from the deeper, anti-social strata (criminals from passion). While Sergi is of the opinion that the anti-social instincts will little by little become latent, lose their force, and cease to act, Professor Ferri thinks that this will be the case only with the minority of men.

Now in order to weaken the anti-social tendencies, it is, according to the author, necessary to know, first, their seat; second, their composition. Up to the present, psychology has made no study of the human passions, emotions, and feelings, and consequently cannot give us this information. It must therefore be considered as impossible that education should so stifle the existing bad germs and strengthen the good ones that these last should finally have the upper hand.

Moral education consists only of a series of auditory and visual sensations, impressed upon the individual by means of advice and example, which brings it about that it is more especially a moral instruction, which makes its mark in the intellect, but leaves intact the seat of the passions and feelings, which are the true motive forces [122]of the moral conduct. Moral education becomes little by little more systematic, bases itself more than formerly upon the biological principle that each organ and function is developed by exercise, and consequently is improving. The author believes that we must nevertheless not deceive ourselves into fancying that too much has been accomplished, so long as the origin and condition of the moral and immoral germs are unknown. Further, he is of the opinion that the product of centuries is not to be destroyed in a few years.

In order to prove what has just been said the author cites the following example, which, according to him, is not uncommon. A family includes four or five children; all are reared with the greatest care, each in a different manner according to his character. The result is that three or four of them become more or less good and industrious citizens, while one becomes an incorrigible vagabond. This difference does not depend upon education.

Now it will be asked: is education, then, always and altogether useless? Here a distinction must be made. There is one small category of persons who are good and honorable and remain so under all circumstances, and this exclusively from their organic condition. Opposed to this is another group who are always bad and show anti-social instincts. These last are such from an innate organic and psychic anomaly. Between these two is to be found the very numerous class of individuals in whom the good and bad qualities are combined. For this last class education may be of some importance, but environment is still more so. Hence, in order to lower the number of occasional criminals, criminal sociology demands “penal substitutes.” For it is from this intermediate class that criminals are recruited. However, environment and education are of less importance for this category than heredity.

The conclusions drawn by the author are, then: first, that a development of the physiology and psychology of the human passions is very desirable, in order to improve the means at the disposal of education; and second, that the opinion of Owen, that education can make a bad man good, is incorrect.

—In my criticism I shall limit myself to the principal questions. In the first place I believe that the argument of Professor Ferri, based on the supposition that scientific socialists believe that “education is the omnipotent fact”, is futile. For scientific socialists do not hold this opinion. Owen (who belongs to the Utopists) might be thought to hold it, though he does not use the word education in [123]the narrow sense given by Professor Ferri, but it will be very difficult to find such an opinion in Marx, or Engels, or any of their followers. Although holding that circumstances have a very great influence upon the individual, they do not attribute this to the systematic, conscious influence of one individual upon another, which is what is commonly meant by education. For the purposes of Professor Ferri’s argument it may be very useful to make a nice distinction between education and atmosphere, but this distinction is not therefore justified. The impressions gained by a child whether from the atmosphere in which he lives or deliberately impressed upon him by his teacher, are hardly distinguishable. Just out of class he plays with his comrades, and this easily makes him forget the moral lessons he has just received. A mother forbids her child to do a certain thing, and a little later he sees an older member of the family do with impunity what has been forbidden in his own case. It is because of this over-nice distinction that the argument of the author loses much of its value.

In the second place, as the author himself partly admits, the influence that education may exert cannot be exactly fixed, no matter what progress pedagogical science may make, for the following reasons. It is only in school that the scientific pedagogical method is applied, and plainly in an incomplete and imperfect manner. In order that children shall be taught and developed they must be well fed and well clothed. Without this the results will be very small, but pupils insufficiently fed and clothed are to be counted by thousands. It is also necessary that a class include as few pupils as possible, in order that the instructor may not have to divide his attention too much. Yet how many cases are there where this is found? For these reasons, to which might be added others, all of an exclusively economic nature, the school does not contribute as much as it might to moral education. The advantage of the education given in school over that furnished by the parents consists in its practical application, at least in part, according to pedagogical rules. The parents who set themselves to bring up their children on scientific principles are so few as to be easily counted. Almost all are novices in this very difficult trade; little attention is paid to whether parents are ignorant or educated, good or bad, patient or irascible, capable or incapable, in short, of bringing up their children. The present organization of society is based upon the fiction that the person who gives life to a child is also fitted to bring it up. Further, existing social conditions put many parents, however capable they [124]might otherwise be, in a position where they cannot give their children any care, on account of the long working-day, the labor of married women, etc. These remarks, it seems to me, are in themselves enough to show that we cannot just now come to a definite conclusion, that the influence of education may extend to such and such a point, but no further.

In the third place, it remains to make valid objections to the principal thesis that forms the foundation of the chapter. Here it is in brief. There was a time when men lived in anti-social conditions; all were enemies one of another. This situation lasted for ages until the social sentiments grew up and civilization developed. But these anti-social germs having lasted for ages, while the social germs are only of recent date, it follows that the former are generally much stronger than the latter. This is why the tendency to evil has predominated in man, and why crime has such enormous dimensions.

I am of the opinion that this argument is based upon an error. In Part II of this work I shall attempt to show that the opinion of Professor Ferri (and other authors), that in the early ages all men were enemies and animated by anti-social feelings, is false. I shall endeavor also to show that the present constitution of society does not give rise to social feelings, but anti-social. Finally it is very problematical whether the hypothesis the author uses, namely that acquired characteristics may be inherited, is defensible; the contrary is coming more and more to be believed. But we cannot in any case admit the transmission of morality itself by heredity, as Professor Ferri does, when he speaks of men who remain good under all circumstances, and consequently of men who must have been born with innate moral prescriptions. A child is never born with positive knowledge; he is born with a brain more or less fitted for the reception and development of knowledge. There was never a child who, from his birth, knew the rules “thou shalt not steal”, “thou shalt not kill”, etc. But the organs destined to become the seat of morality differ with each individual like other organs. When the author says, then, that there are men who remain good under all circumstances, he says, in effect, that there are men whose moral organs are very susceptible, and who consequently remain better than men whose organs are less susceptible. Therefore the accumulation of anti-social feelings in man of the present day, through heredity, is imaginary. Finally, Professor Ferri neglects to note the difference in nature and intensity between the needs of different men. For this is the cause of the great inequality of results obtained from the same [125]education given to persons of equal capacity for receiving moral impressions. If a man has great needs it takes a much more intense moral effort to keep him from satisfying them in an immoral manner, than is the case with a man whose needs are slight.—

The following chapter, “Ambiente e criminalità”, begins with the assertion of Professor Ferri that the thesis of the socialists concerning the influence of the social atmosphere upon all the manifestations of human activity, and consequently upon criminality, is in great measure correct. The difference between the views of socialism and of sociology, therefore, is here only a question of limits.

According to the author here is the thesis in question: as soon as the social revolution or transformation which the socialists desire has taken place, the social atmosphere will become excellent, and man will then be morally higher than he is at present. He then examines the parts of this statement one by one.

First, Professor Ferri gives the classic formula of historic materialism, set forth by Marx in his “Zur Kritik der politischen Oekonomie”, taken by the author, however, from Loria’s criticism of the work of Puviani in the “Rivista critica delle scienze giuridiche e sociali.” “In the memorable preface to the Kritik der politischen Oekonomie, published in 1859, Marx sets forth for the first time the daring theory that all the manifestations of mankind, in the juridic order as well as in the religious, philosophical, artistic, criminal, etc., are exclusively determined by economic relations, so that to each phase of these there corresponds a different form of human manifestations, as its necessary product.”

Just as in biology the phenomena of nutrition are related to the other vital phenomena, so is the economic aspect of human activity related to the other aspects. Economic conditions have, then, a great influence on the social life, but the author believes it an exaggeration to say that economic conditions fix it exclusively. Further, in this statement no attention is paid to the fact that the other phenomena react in their turn upon the economic conditions, and therefore become determining factors.

Then it is said that man will be morally better when he finds himself in a purified atmosphere. This the author admits in part—how far he admits it will be easily understood by one who knows his opinion with regard to the physical, individual, and social factors of crime, and his ideas about education.

Like most of the statements of the socialists, this has, according [126]to Professor Ferri, the fault of being too simple and consequently too absolute. Human life is already so complicated (and social life still more so) that only very little can be explained by simple formulae. It is easy to say, “Abolish private property and all the cases of theft will disappear”; “abolish legal marriage, and adultery, uxoricide, infanticide, and the other crimes against morality will disappear.” But it is not therefore true. For, even in a communistic society a born-vagabond, who has a constitutional aversion to work, will commit thefts just the same. To all this it may be objected that these cases are pathological, and that these persons should be shut up in an insane asylum—but in reasoning thus one admits at the same time that such a society would not yet be an earthly paradise. Further it is pure metaphysics to believe that social institutions like property and the family are the consequences of a caprice of man or of a dominant class, and can therefore be abolished by a stroke of the pen. Everything that exists, in nature as in society, is the result of causes that are only the links in an infinite chain. Hence it is impossible to modify society at a stroke, in accordance with a plan drawn up by a theorist. This does not mean that every modification of society is excluded; but the situation predicted by the socialists is so much more beautiful than the present that it would not be a step, but a leap, forward. And by their prediction they deny evolution, for they constantly preach to the proletariat that the whole will be realized in the very near future.

We come now to the major premise of the socialistic thesis, namely the social revolution or transformation. The question which Professor Ferri puts to the socialists in regard to the matter is this: how long will it take you to realize your projects? There are two answers to be given according as one believes this realization possible by revolution or by evolution.

First, that by revolution. Leaving out of consideration the fact that a revolution could not take place without cruel acts being committed, with a consequent upsetting of the moral feelings, it must first of all be asked whether it is easy to bring about a revolution. The author is of the opinion that Laveleye is perfectly right when he says: “that a revolution has become an easy thing; that a social evolution is inevitable; but that a social revolution is impossible, since one cannot change by force in a single day the economic constitution of society.”

Neither the word nor the fact of revolution inspires the author with [127]fear. He recognizes that it may be in the line of evolution, although it remains an exception and is in fact a pathological manifestation of evolution. Nevertheless the question arises, what does the revolution of a day, a month, or even a year signify in comparison with the evolution that goes on during thousands of years? Does not a revolution always lead to a reaction? Suppose, however, that this reaction does not happen; will the whole people have become more moral at a single shock? What did the great French Revolution accomplish? Much, in appearance; in reality, little. It follows from what has gone before that we can modify the environment in a way and with a rapidity that will seem great to one generation but not at all great to the whole of humanity.

Now the solution by evolution. As we have already remarked, Professor Ferri recognizes that criminality will be diminished by an improvement of the environment. However, since it is impossible to make all at once general and substantial changes, it is necessary to make every effort to obtain partial improvements. This is why the positive penal school defends the doctrine of “penal substitutes.” In his “Il delitto, etc.”, Turati calls them palliatives; he says that it is impossible to find a specific remedy for each crime; that there is only one universal remedy: the equal distribution of wealth, education, and the happiness coming from love and knowledge, in so far as this will be socially possible. Professor Ferri thinks that Turati’s objections are not based upon good reasons, because, first, the theory of penal substitutes is not limited to the designation of special means of treating special crimes, but it gives also universal means for all kinds of crimes; second, the improvements suggested by the author and his adherents have the great advantage of having been drawn up according to scientific researches, and of being immediately practicable. How could the desired transformation ever be reached if the whole system of penal substitutes were only a useless palliative?

There are only two roads leading to success; that of a violent revolution—which Turati rejects—and that of successive improvements. But it is just this which the positive penal school desires, and this is why the difference between this school and the scientific socialists has entirely disappeared. However, the error of the socialists is always that they want to get everything at one blow, and they attach too little value to what is within reach. There are many socialists who fear that the bourgeoisie will never give up their privileges without force, and who consequently have still much sympathy [128]with revolution. However, this fear is not well founded. For most social improvements have been made by the dominant class without being compelled by revolutionary force.

Professor Ferri draws the conclusion that the social environment is circumscribed by economic conditions for the most part, and that these have a very great influence upon criminality. The socialists and the evolutionary sociologists differ, then, in this, that the first believe they can make themselves useful by protesting and prophesying, while the others think that it is more practical and more scientific to apply themselves to partial improvements.

—One cannot read this chapter without being astonished at the decided tone with which the author declares himself against a theory which he only knows from what he has heard said about it. The classic formula of historic materialism is quoted at second hand from a criticism of Professor Loria upon a work of Puviani, who says that the economic evolution is in its turn determined by the constant increase of the population (a theory entirely opposed to that of Marx).

And how the idea of this theory is treated! Let the reader judge for himself. In the original we read: “In the social production of their life men enter into fixed, necessary relationships in production, independent of their will, relationships which correspond to a definite stage in the development of their material powers of production. The sum total of these relationships forms the economic structure of society, the real basis upon which the juristic and political superstructure is erected, and to which definite forms of social consciousness correspond. The form of production of the material life conditions the social, political, and intellectual life-process in general. It is not the consciousness of mankind that determines their being, but their social being that determines their consciousness.”38 3

It is unnecessary for us to linger over this point. Professor Loria has stated the theory inaccurately, and Professor Ferri, who has depended upon Loria, combats something that Marx never said, and thinks that he has discovered the further error that account is not taken of the fact that each cause is in its turn an effect, and vice versa. This too it is an injustice to impute to the founders of historic materialism. Engels says upon this subject: “… according to the materialistic conception of history, production and reproduction [129]of the material life are, in the last analysis, the determining factors in history. Marx and I have never claimed more. When the proposition is distorted thus: the economic factor is the sole determinant, the proposition is transformed into one devoid of sense, abstract, absurd. The economic situation is the basis, but the different factors of the superstructure—political forms of the struggle of the classes and its results—constitutions imposed by the victorious class after the battle has been won, etc.—juridical forms, and also the reflections of all these actual conflicts in the minds of those who have taken part in them, political, juridical, and philosophical theories, religious conceptions, and their ulterior development into systems of dogmas, have also their influence upon the march of the historic struggles, and especially in many cases determine the form of it. All these factors act the one upon the other, and finally the economic movement ends necessarily by dominating over the infinite crowd of chances.… Without this the application of the theory to any historic period would be easier than the solution of a simple equation of the second degree.”39

Among the reproaches that Professor Ferri throws at the head of the socialists there is also that they wrongly believe it possible to change society at a single stroke. The author adds here some observations upon revolution and evolution. It is necessary to take up this question, since again Professor Ferri does not correctly represent the opinions of the Marxists. There is no question that Marx and his adherents do not suppose that they can change society at a stroke. Although evolutionists, Marx and his followers call themselves revolutionists. Many of their adversaries consider this a contradiction. I think that they are wrong, and that on the contrary the opposite is true, that every evolutionist in social matters who is not a revolutionist, has not the courage to support the consequences of his doctrine. For he who believes that society constantly undergoes quantitative changes ought to recognize that these must lead in the long run to a qualitative difference, in which case a revolution has taken place. The Marxists are consequently at once evolutionists and revolutionists, since, recognizing that there are continual quantitative changes, they strive for the total overturning of society as based upon the capitalistic system, and consequently for the foundation of the socialistic order. All this relates, then, only to an economic and social revolution. It follows, then, logically from what has [130]gone before that the scientific socialists do not aspire primarily to a political revolution; on the contrary they wish to attain their ends as far as possible by legal means; as far as possible, which means, if the ruling classes do not prevent them from obtaining by legal means what they want. But in the contrary case they do not dread undertaking even a political revolution as soon as the proletariat shall be sufficiently prepared and organized. Professor Ferri is further of the opinion that there is no longer any difference between the socialists who are at the same time evolutionists, and the sociologists, since all reach out toward quantitative changes. However, Professor Ferri forgets to say that the abolition of the private ownership of the means of production is not one of his “penal substitutes”, and that there is consequently a fundamental difference, since socialists advocate only the modifications which accord with the tendencies of collectivism.

Finally, Professor Ferri is of the opinion that the bourgeoisie will voluntarily relinquish their privileges, as the ruling classes have often already done. For this tremendous assertion he does not give any proofs, and would find it difficult to do so.—

The title of the fifth chapter is: “L’avvenire morale dell’umanità.” The socialists—so the author begins—believe that there is a great difference between them and the positivist sociologists, in that the latter consider crime as an inevitable social evil, while the socialists see in it only a passing phenomenon. Professor Ferri, on the contrary, claims that crime, that is, the act which endangers the conditions of existence, as well as the penalty, the corresponding reaction, defensive or preventive, both have their roots in the animal kingdom, and are consequently phenomena more or less inseparable from humanity. However, this sociological induction is not to be taken in an absolute, but in this relative sense: first, that in criminality it is necessary to distinguish two divisions, of which the one is determined by the normal saturation, and the second by the abnormal super-saturation; second, that the author and his adherents do not understand by the “absolute necessity” of crime that crime will always exist, but only that it will exist in the immediate future (19th and 20th centuries), and that they retain this expression because they regard it as useless and impossible to make predictions concerning times more remote than this.

With regard to future morality Professor Ferri considers in this chapter the two following socialistic theses: [131]

I. The struggle for existence which has hitherto reigned among men, will find no place in the socialistic society.

II. In the socialistic society, egoism, which has been the basis of the moral and social life, will have to give place to altruism.

First, then, the question of the permanence of the struggle for existence. Professor Ferri cites here the opinions of Labusquière (“Rivista internazionale del socialismo,” 1880) and of Professor Loria (“Discorso sur Carlo Darwin,” 1882). Abridged, Labusquière says as follows: Is the struggle for existence, an integral part of the evolution of animals, also a “conditio sine qua non” of the development of humanity? No, since it prevents the total development by putting the majority of men in a most precarious situation. We cannot picture man as living all alone. He has always lived and will always live in a society. This demands a certain solidarity, without which a society is not imaginable. We cannot admit, then, the necessity of a continual struggle—at least we cannot admit the necessity, on the part of some, of receiving the fruits of the labor of others. The struggle for existence is necessary among animals, since they are not able to produce, and consequently must live upon such fruits as nature gives. But man can produce, and the productive forces increase just as men support one another more.

The opinion of Professor Loria is summed up as follows: the thesis that the Darwinian theory is entirely applicable to political economy is false. It is said that it justifies social inequality; nature being aristocratic, in society also the aristocracy occupies the place that belongs to it. According to Professor Loria this argument is as without sense as the argument that, since nature is a murderess, murder is justifiable. The view in question is not a legitimate conclusion from the theory as advanced by Darwin, but is simply a false interpretation made by some of his followers. There are no reasons why this struggle should always exist, but we are quite justified in supposing that it will disappear, having been but a transitory stage. For as long as egoism was the sole human motive, the struggle for existence was a necessary condition of initiative and progress. But altruism is more and more developing, and it is not Utopian to believe that some day man will reach out after physical and moral perfection, not with the aim of conquering his less-favored fellows, but with the higher aim of self-development. We forget too much how different is the struggle for existence among animals and among men. While in nature it is the strongest, hardiest, and most skilful who come out of the contest victorious, and consequently survive, [132]in the present contest it is not the best (the workers and the capitalists who introduce improved methods of work), but those who are enriched by the labor of others, who are the conquerors. In the social struggle we perceive three phenomena which do not appear in the struggle in nature: military selection (which is an obstacle to the perfection of the human race); sexual selection (in which not strength and beauty, but money and class-prejudice determine the choice); and the economic system (which by the accumulation of capital in the hands of a few, forces the workers to lead a life that exhausts them, and is the reason why the ill-nourished classes form the majority). This is why the results of the struggle for existence are so different for man from those of the combat in nature.

Professor Ferri makes the following objections to what has been said above: In treating questions like these it is necessary not to confuse two theories, that of Spencer and that of Darwin. For the latter is connected with the former as a part with the whole. Darwinism is expressed in the law of natural selection, while the theory of Spencer is that of evolution, a law which rules not only the animal and human world, but also the whole knowable universe.

After this introductory observation he attacks the theses that Labusquière and Loria have developed. The great error committed by Labusquière and by most of the socialists is their failing to grasp the idea of the continuity and naturalness of social phenomena. There results in such cases an erroneous distinction between societies of man and those of animals; hence they do not see that the combat, proved as always existing in the case of animals and men as well, is a natural law. And then Labusquière and his followers forget that while the sociologists explain this combat, that is not at all saying that they justify it. In any case the assertion of the socialists that it will be possible to make this combat cease at once, after only a very brief delay, is false. As to the question of knowing whether it will ever cease, this will be examined later.

Then Professor Ferri remarks that we must not confuse the principle of a natural law with its manifestations. In the case in question this would be saying that in recognizing that the struggle for existence is a law which rules in the animal kingdom and among men, it is necessary also to think that the forms of the combat have been, and remain, the same. The author believes, for example, that it would be desirable to mitigate the present economic combat and to carry it to a higher plane, without therefore being an adherent of the maxim, [133]“each one according to his needs”, the application of which would ruin the human race entirely.

In criticising the law of the struggle for existence, we very often forget that it does not stand alone, but that there is another beside it, which in the long run levels all the inequalities produced by this conflict. We see thus that individuals, families, and races raise themselves above the general plane, reach the maximum of power, wealth, and intelligence, to fall again below the average.

We cannot admit that the struggle for existence, which is a principle of life, and the cause of human and animal evolution, will disappear some day because men, animated by humanitarian ideas, ardently desire it. The opinion that in the course of time this struggle is becoming and will become less and less violent and brutal, is scientifically more correct and humanitarian as well. It may be that after centuries and centuries a day will come when every individual will have his material existence assured. But the struggle for moral existence will not yet disappear on that account. For every need satisfied causes in its turn new needs to spring up, and rekindles the conflict. The socialists evince great one-sidedness in understanding by the struggle for existence only the struggle for food, forgetting that there is a struggle in every sphere.

It is claimed that there is a great difference between the struggle for existence among men and that among animals, and that consequently the results differ; that in the animal kingdom it is the strongest who remain victorious, while among men it is only a small minority of the weaker and less industrious who rule over the majority making up the ill-nourished classes. According to Professor Ferri this opinion also is incorrect; otherwise the consequences of the conflict would have a result entirely contrary to that in the animal kingdom; the human race would deteriorate instead of advancing. And the facts prove that the human race has made progress, organic, mental, social, and economic. The survival of the weaker, the less industrious, is only partial and apparent. Malon says that in our present society it is not those who are individually superior who conquer, but those who have the exclusive disposition of the social forces. But how have these forces fallen into the hands of these few? Only because in this phase of human evolution, they were the stronger, the best fitted. It is forgotten that there is not only a struggle between classes, but also between individuals, and that, by the greater and greater increase of altruism it is also the more altruistic workmen and employers who conquer. For an altruistic [134]workman, who works with zeal and has his employer’s interests at heart, and an altruistic employer who treats his employes well, will be more able to maintain themselves than those who act differently. It is only in appearance, then, that the less strong and industrious property-owners are the victors; if this were the case it would soon cease to be so.

The conclusion of the author, then, is that the struggle for existence, which is a normal aspect of honorable activity, and an abnormal aspect in criminal activity, is the supreme law of the human race in the past and in the present, and consequently in the future; but this struggle will be carried on by means less and less rude and bloody.

The second part of the chapter treats of egoism and altruism. The individual, considered as such, is only egoistic; but considered as a member of a community he is also altruistic. We must therefore interpret the subject in the following manner: that a gradual evolution is taking place from egoism to altruism, between which, accordingly, is found ego-altruism.

There are now two questions that must be answered, first, will man ever come to be purely altruistic? second, if so, how long will it take to bring it about?

According to the author every evolutionist must answer affirmatively to the first question (at least if we exclude the absolute form in which it is put by many socialists, namely that egoism will disappear entirely), for the slow and continual evolution of morality teaches us that egoism is always decreasing and altruism increasing. But how much time is needed to realize this moral paradise? The answers made to this question by the socialists and by the sociologists differ greatly. The former are of the opinion that this will be possible almost immediately, or at least in a little while, while the latter think that it is impossible that it should take place so quickly. Since the author has busied himself in the preceding chapters with the influence of education upon morality he limits himself now to treating the question, how much time is needed for this moral progress?

According to Professor Ferri we do not properly grasp this question if we do not recognize that the evolution of morals has progressed but very slowly during the past centuries. Doubtless much has been accomplished, but not enough to justify the prediction of the socialists. Soury is quite right when he says: “we deceive ourselves [135]greatly if we think that the man of the present day differs much from the man of antiquity, from the barbarian, and the savage.” When we examine the period of barbarism we see that homicide, cannibalism, and theft form the greater part of the criminality, while the first two are not often punished by the tribe, or are even obligatory. Impetuosity of the passions, ferocity, insensibility to pain in self or others, disloyalty, implacable revenge, improvidence, and superstition form the principal part of the moral life. All these traits still exist, though less strongly than formerly, in the man of the present, and especially in the individual born in the lower classes. Except in pathological cases cannibalism no longer appears in the civilized world, but this does not make it impossible that it would reappear in time of great famine. However, the high moral qualities which present-day man can show, are also to be found among savages, only with gradual differences.40 The number of honorable and moral persons has increased relatively, which makes it certain that in the future morality will rise higher than at present, but this will not take place quickly, but very slowly, like all the other changes that have taken place.

It is therefore impossible that the predictions of the socialists should come true in a short time, and that crime, poverty, ignorance, and immorality should disappear as soon as society is transformed and revolutionized. It will only be the sublime end toward which the human race must always aspire.

—In order to avoid repetitions I will make no criticism of this chapter, since I should have to refute almost all the theses here laid down, but will treat of the questions of the struggle for existence, and egoism and altruism, in Part II of this work.—

In his “Conclusione”41 Professor Ferri compares society to a sick person at whose bedside there meet three friends of his, who all wish him well. The first declares confidently that the soul dominates the body and that consequently material remedies are of no avail. The second says, on the contrary, that it is only a total change of the environment in which he is living that can cure the invalid. The third also believes that modifications are necessary, but he contents himself [136]with partial improvements, though the second friend calls them only palliatives. The first is the spiritualist,42 the second the socialist, and the third the sociologist.

—Having given my opinion after each chapter, a general criticism of “Socialismo e Criminalità” is superfluous. The impression that the book makes is strange. The author attacks the socialists as “excessively anti-scientific and sentimental”, while he vaunts the “great scientific character of the sociologists.” Yet these last, notwithstanding their great scientific character, combat a doctrine which they know only in part or not at all. Scientific socialism is left out of the discussion.

The best proof of the weakness of his attack against socialism is to be found in the fact that the author has for several years ranked himself among the socialists, of whom he has become one of the most fervent and intelligent chiefs.

As regards his opinion on the criminal question Professor Ferri has made no change, or almost none.43—