The extreme moderation with which M. Thiers had expressed himself came as a great surprise to the British government. M. Guizot, sincerely as he desired to see peace maintained, was strongly of opinion that so mild an exposition of the French case was strangely inconsistent with the warlike attitude which his government had adopted, since the beginning of the crisis. He contented himself, in consequence, with placing M. Thiers’ despatches in Lord Palmerston’s hands, and made no attempt to discuss or to defend the opinions expressed in them.[646] Their contents, when communicated to the assembled British ministers, removed at once the danger that acute differences of opinion might lead to a disruption of the government. At the Cabinet Council of October 10, it was simply decided that Lord Ponsonby should be directed to urge the Porte to reinstate Mehemet Ali in the governorship of Egypt and to make the appointment hereditary in his family, provided he would consent to make an early submission to the Sultan. At the same time, it was agreed that a copy of these instructions should be sent to Lord Granville for communication to the French government.[647]
But, in spite of the pacific language used by M. Thiers in his despatches, the situation still gave cause for anxiety. The lower classes in Paris had been greatly stirred by the Jacobinical declamations of the Radical press. On October 15, as Louis Philippe was entering the Tuileries, he narrowly escaped the bullet of an assassin. The would-be regicide, an individual named Darmès, when arrested and questioned, declared that he was by profession “a conspirator and an exterminator of tyrants.” This outrage and other anarchical symptoms were not without effect upon the bourgeoisie.[648] The signs of the times pointed clearly to the probability that war abroad would be followed by a revolution at home. Meanwhile, rumours were current that the government was preparing some sudden act of aggression—an “Anconade”[649] as it was called. It was said that the military occupation of some position in Turkey was contemplated. The sudden recall, however, to Toulon of the French fleet, which had been cruising in Greek waters, seemed to prove, not only that the government could have no such intention, but that it was desirous of avoiding the danger of any chance collision with the British squadron operating off the Syrian coast. Nevertheless, after the return home of Admiral Hugon’s fleet, reports about the warlike plans of M. Thiers assumed a more concrete form. Lord Granville, on October 12, received information from a person, who stipulated for a special remuneration should his intelligence prove accurate, that the French government had decided to seize one of the Balearic Islands.[650]
The strategic importance of these Spanish islands had been enhanced by the French occupation of Algiers. Situated about midway between Toulon and the African coast, they would, in the hands of France, enable her to control the western Mediterranean. The British Foreign Office and the Admiralty had, in consequence, been always on the alert, lest she should by any means succeed in establishing herself at Port Mahon. It had been ascertained that many of the inhabitants were not at all averse to the idea of a French annexation of Minorca.[651] But, in addition to the military advantages to be derived from the occupation of the Balearic Islands, there were political reasons which made both Palmerston and Bulwer suspect that M. Thiers might regard a coup d’éclat in Spain as a useful counterstroke to the Treaty of July 15.[652] The struggle between Christina[653] and the Progressistas had been raging for some weeks past, and now appeared certain to terminate in the complete defeat of the Queen Regent. Upon the subject of Spanish affairs the British government held views which were diametrically opposed to those entertained at the absolute Courts. Any stroke directed against Espartero and the Radicals could not fail to be applauded at Vienna, Berlin, and St. Petersburg. A French intervention in Spain might, therefore, be the means of sowing discord between Great Britain and her continental allies.
Lord Granville at once sent off a special messenger to Madrid to warn the British minister of the blow which was impending, and Palmerston also wrote to Mr. Aston to the same effect. Espartero,[654] when the news was communicated to him, undertook to strengthen the garrison of Port Mahon, and promised to resist manfully any French aggression. Melbourne, at the same time, took the opportunity of remonstrating strongly with Louis Philippe through the King of the Belgians.[655] England, he wrote, could not sit still whilst France continued to arm and to threaten. She must, if the present situation were prolonged, take measures to safeguard her interests. This communication probably reached Louis Philippe on October 19. So long as he had believed that Mehemet Ali was capable of offering a serious resistance to the allied Powers, he had approved of the menacing attitude of his government. But, when the Pasha’s impotence was made manifest, he realized the expediency of adopting different tactics. He understood the difficulties of M. Thiers’ position. Already the more extreme of the various groups composing his parliamentary majority were beginning to testify their displeasure at the pacific tone of his despatch of October 8, which had been published in the English papers. At the approaching meeting of the Chambers heated and violent recriminations were to be apprehended. Louis Philippe, however, had also perceived that, notwithstanding the clamour of the newspapers, a healthy current of public opinion was running in the direction of peace. People were beginning to realize that, under existing conditions, war and revolution were synonymous terms. Some of M. Thiers’ colleagues had, moreover, it is said, privately intimated that, if peace were to be maintained, the King must take upon himself to dismiss his present ministers.[656] But the adoption of this disinterested advice was fraught with certain unpleasant consequences. For the past fortnight the Constitutionel, M. Thiers’ chief organ, had been insinuating that all his efforts to uphold the honour and dignity of France were frustrated by the Sovereign. The King was, therefore, under no illusions as to the manner in which his minister purposed to cover his retreat.
The Chambers were to assemble on October 28. M. Thiers, about a week before, submitted to Louis Philippe a draft of the proposed Speech from the Throne. It contained a distinctly warlike paragraph, and announced that 150,000 more men would be called up for service with the colours. The King objected, and whilst the matter was under discussion, he received Lord Melbourne’s letter. It is very possible that a perusal of its contents may have served to overcome his last hesitations. He refused to employ the language which his minister proposed to place in his mouth. M. Thiers, thereupon, tendered his resignation, which was promptly accepted. Marshal Soult agreed to form a new government, of which the real head was to be M. Guizot, the French ambassador in London, into whose charge the King had confided the portfolio of Foreign Affairs.
M. Thiers was not wholly responsible for the position in which France found herself at the time of his downfall. When he took office, the mistakes of his predecessor had already carried the country a great distance upon the road to isolation. Nevertheless, the brief period of his second administration affords an instructive example of the many mistakes which a very able man may commit. The two principal objects which he set himself to achieve were utterly incompatible. He sincerely desired to retain the friendship of Great Britain and, at the same time, he proposed to establish Mehemet Ali as the ruler of an independent State, which was to owe its separate existence to French patronage. But, inasmuch as Lord Palmerston was resolved to drive the Pasha out of Syria and greatly to restrict his power, he was obliged to seek to attain his ends by tortuous methods. Thus, whilst he strove to prolong and to embarrass the negotiations in London, he endeavoured secretly, and in flagrant violation of the collective note of July 27, 1839, to cajole the Porte into conceding the demands of the Pasha. He was able to persuade himself that the young Sultan and his ministers, rather than follow the congenial advice of the Powers which desired to curb the ambition of Mehemet Ali, would listen to the unpalatable counsels of France, the friend of their arch-enemy the Viceroy of Egypt. A policy founded upon so erroneous a conception of human nature was fore-doomed to failure. The intrigues of the French agents at Alexandria and Constantinople[657] were exposed, the correspondence of M. Coste found its way into Lord Palmerston’s drawer at the Foreign Office, and the treaty between the four Powers and the Porte was concluded on July 15.
But M. Thiers was guilty of another error. He, the student of war, the Napoleon civil, as Metternich named him, altogether failed to understand the strategic situation in the East. Unlike Lord Palmerston, who foresaw that the Pasha’s position in Syria would be untenable, from the moment that he was deprived of the command of the sea, Thiers conceived it possible that Ibrahim could assume the offensive in Asia Minor, and at the same time maintain, in the midst of a hostile population and through a most difficult country, his communications with Egypt. His plans were, accordingly, based upon the supposition that the Powers would experience serious difficulty in expelling the Egyptians from Syria. The Pasha’s resistance, he was confident, would not be overcome before the winter, and would, doubtless, necessitate the intervention of a Russian army. But, were the Tsar to despatch a large force to Asia Minor, national jealousies and suspicion would be aroused. Then France, having completed her military preparations, could enter upon the scene and impose her will upon a disunited and disheartened coalition. In pursuance of this plan, M. Thiers made divers attempts to draw the chief Italian States into an alliance with France. But his proposals were unheeded both at Turin and at Naples.[658] In one direction only would his overtures appear to have met with any response. King Otho, the young Bavarian prince whom the protecting Powers had placed upon the throne of Greece, attracted by the prospect of obtaining Crete, seems to have promised to invade Thessaly, whenever France should give the signal for a general outbreak of hostilities.[659]
But all these schemes were rendered abortive by the state of impotence to which Ibrahim was reduced by the arrival of the British fleet in Syrian waters. After the success of Stopford’s operations at Beyrout, M. Thiers was forced either to resign or to plunge France, with King Otho for her only ally, into a war with the whole of Europe. It is impossible to believe that he can ever have thought seriously of adopting this last alternative. But Louis Philippe’s unalterable resolution to maintain the peace made it safe for him to advocate a bellicose policy, seeing that he would never be called upon to carry it out. By proposing certain warlike measures, such as the seizure of the Balearic Islands and a large increase of the army, he intended to compel the King to dismiss him. Thus he would be enabled to escape from the difficulties in which he was involved, whilst upon Louis Philippe would rest the reproach of having tamely submitted to the dictation of Lord Palmerston.
The injury done to the House of Orleans was not, however, the only consequence of M. Thiers’ proceedings in 1840. His warlike declamations and the frequent allusions in his newspapers to the left bank of the Rhine awoke recollections in Germany which had slumbered for a generation. The amazing popularity of Becker’s Song of the Rhine[660] testifies to the strength of the national sentiment which the French threats had aroused. The significance of this, and other manifestations of German feeling, did not escape Prince Metternich. “M. Thiers,” he wrote bitterly, “likes to be compared to Napoleon. With respect to Germany he resembles him closely, indeed, he may justly be said to surpass him. In six weeks he has accomplished as much in that country as the Emperor during ten years of war and oppression.”[661]
The Soult-Guizot Cabinet had been formed upon the basis of the maintenance of peace. But innumerable difficulties confronted it. Whilst pursuing a strictly pacific policy, ministers could not afford to disregard the national susceptibilities which the events of the past few months had aroused. Guizot, accordingly, before leaving London, and after his return to France, declared constantly that the fate of the new ministry was in the hands of the British government. If only he could be enabled to state that the Powers were prepared to make concessions to M. Thiers’ successors, which they would not have made to M. Thiers himself, he was confident that he could defeat his opponents. But, if it were resolved rigorously to execute the treaty against Mehemet Ali, he and his colleagues would surely be overwhelmed and the King would be forced to call the war party into his counsels. Without doubt, his friends Reeve and Greville proved most useful in propagating this opinion.[662] Palmerston, however, was quite unmoved. He scouted the notion that France would resort to extreme measures in defence of the Pasha, and he was determined that the British interests, involved in the expulsion of Mehemet Ali from Syria, should not be sacrificed in order to strengthen the parliamentary position of a foreign government.
At the time of M. Thiers’ resignation, his despatch of October 8 was still unanswered. But, before M. Guizot had been long installed at the Foreign Office, he received Lord Palmerston’s reply to it. The contents of this document caused him the greatest irritation. After exposing with remorseless logic the fallacies of M. Thiers’ arguments, Palmerston laid down the principle that the future government of Egypt concerned the Porte alone. He has generally been blamed for not employing a more conciliatory tone in this, his first important communication with M. Guizot, who was not responsible for the opinions of his predecessor in office. Palmerston, however, had two distinct objects in view, and it is open to question whether he would have attained his ends, had he employed less uncompromising language. His despatches, both of November 2 and November 20, were clearly written with the purpose of convincing M. Guizot of the necessity of regarding Syria as altogether lost to Mehemet Ali, and of thus putting an end to the efforts which were being made to preserve for him the southern portion of Palestine. Secondly, by intimating that the Pasha’s reinstatement in the government of Egypt would depend upon his prompt compliance with the Sultan’s demands, Palmerston evidently intended to force M. Guizot to exert all his influence over Mehemet Ali in favour of a complete surrender.[663]
Events, meanwhile, had been moving rapidly in Syria. Before the middle of October the Turkish flag waved once more over Beyrout and Saïda, the ancient Sidon, whilst Napier, at the head of a Turkish division and some detachments of British and Austrian marines, completely defeated and put to flight the redoubtable Ibrahim. As early as October 5, Palmerston had desired the Lords of the Admiralty to advise Sir Robert Stopford of the importance of promptly restoring the fortress of Acre to the Sultan.[664] The allied commanders appear to have been somewhat undecided as to the propriety of attacking this famous stronghold, the key of Syria. In view of the lateness of the season, Stopford himself was very reluctant to embark upon operations against it.[665] But Palmerston’s despatch overcame his irresolution and induced him to listen to the bolder counsels of Napier, Walker, and Jochmus. Acre, which had successfully resisted Bonaparte and which had held Ibrahim in check for six months, surrendered, on November 3, to the British admiral after an engagement of a few hours’ duration. The moment the news reached London, Stopford was directed to send “a competent officer” to Mehemet Ali to signify to him that, provided he would restore the Turkish fleet and give an undertaking in writing to evacuate Syria, Adana, Arabia, the Holy Cities and Crete, the Powers would recommend the Porte to reappoint him to the governorship of Egypt.[666] But, before these instructions could take effect, Napier, who had arrived off Alexandria with his squadron, had seen fit to conclude, upon his own responsibility, an agreement with Mehemet Ali. In this unauthorized convention, which was signed on November 27, it was stipulated that the Pasha should surrender the Turkish fleet and evacuate Syria, on the understanding that the four Powers in return would guarantee to him the hereditary tenure of the Pashalic of Egypt.[667]
Napier, who was a strong Radical, appears to have been privately urged by certain members of the Cabinet to seize the first opportunity of concluding a peace with Mehemet Ali.[668] But, whatever his reasons may have been for acting in so irregular a manner, the main provisions of his treaty, unquestionably, accorded with the instructions sent to Stopford on November 14. Palmerston, in consequence, decided to signify his approval of the arrangement, with one important reservation.[669] Under no circumstances “could Great Britain singly, or the four Powers jointly, guarantee to a subject a grant of administrative authority made to him by his Sovereign, within the dominions of that Sovereign.” But at Constantinople Napier’s proceedings aroused the greatest indignation, and the Sublime Porte, with the full concurrence of the ambassadors of the Powers, pronounced the convention null and void.[670] The same course was adopted by Stopford, who sent Captain Fanshawe, his flag captain, to Alexandria to declare that the convention of November 27 could not be ratified, and that Mehemet Ali must submit unconditionally to the terms which the Powers were prepared to offer to him.[671]
Mehemet Ali could not do otherwise than yield. The fall of Acre had decided the fate of Syria. Fanshawe’s task was thus easy of execution, and, on December 16, he arrived at Constantinople bringing with him a letter from Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier, in which the Pasha conceded every demand and, with regard to Egypt, threw himself upon the generosity of the Sultan.[672] The Turkish ministers, however, were little disposed to show mercy to a fallen enemy who, in the days of his strength, had caused them so much anxiety. Nor were the British ambassador and the Austrian internuncio in favour of treating Mehemet Ali leniently. But Metternich had been terribly alarmed by the French armaments, and had sent strict instructions to his agent at Constantinople to terminate the eastern question with as little delay as possible. Baron Stürmer was, in consequence, reluctantly obliged to counsel the Porte to confer upon the Pasha the hereditary tenure of Egypt. Ponsonby, however, was more tenacious of his opinions, and, although Palmerston, after the Cabinet Council of October 10, had directed him to advise the Turkish government to grant the heredity to Mehemet Ali,[673] he declined to join with his colleagues in pressing the Porte to adopt this measure. He was doubtful, he declared, whether the Pasha’s letter to the Grand Vizier should be regarded as an act of complete submission. Before pronouncing a decided opinion upon that point, he must wait in order to see whether the Pasha by his actions intended to prove the sincerity of his promises.[674] But, on January 10, 1841, he received Palmerston’s despatch on the subject of Napier’s convention, wherein it was distinctly laid down that Great Britain approved of the principle of conferring the heredity upon Mehemet Ali.[675] This second intimation of the views of his government was too clear for even Ponsonby to venture upon disregarding it. He was, in consequence, obliged to advise the Porte to make the required concession. The Turkish ministers no sooner perceived that the Powers were unanimously in favour of it, than they promised to take the necessary steps for investing Mehemet Ali with the hereditary government of Egypt.[676]
Two days before this concession was extorted from the Porte, Mehemet Ali surrendered the Ottoman fleet to the commissioners sent to receive it. Furthermore, he gave the necessary orders for the evacuation of Crete and the other territories which he had promised to restore to the Sultan. His son Ibrahim, with the remnants of the army of Syria, had by this time arrived at Gaza, on the Egyptian frontier. He had himself been attacked by jaundice, and his troops had suffered cruelly in their retreat.[677] But their losses would have been far heavier, had it not been for the Napier Convention. The British officers employed in Syria had considered themselves in honour bound to observe the armistice, which was one of the conditions of that irregular agreement.[678]
Mehemet Ali having thus made his submission, it remained only to determine the conditions under which the hereditary governorship of Egypt should be conferred upon him. The Porte was very naturally desirous to circumscribe in every possible way, the powers which it had reluctantly consented to delegate. Some weeks, accordingly, were spent in discussing the affair with the ambassadors. But, at last, on February 13, 1841, the Porte issued a firman of investiture, and sent off a special envoy to Egypt to present it to Mehemet Ali.[679]
The French government, meanwhile, rigidly abstained from any kind of interference, M. Guizot from the tribune of the Chamber declared his intention of preserving the peace, whilst at the same time maintaining the armaments which, by reason of her isolation, France could not afford to reduce. The Opposition inveighed fiercely against the attitude which the government proposed to adopt. M. Thiers gave his version of the negotiations and protested that, had he been able to remain in office, he would have armed upon a gigantic scale, not only in order to prevent the execution of the Treaty of July, but in order to obtain a revision of the territorial settlement of 1815. To support their statements, he and his former colleagues recklessly divulged the contents of confidential documents, and disclosed military secrets.[680] Nevertheless, ministers obtained a majority in both Chambers on the question of their foreign policy. The attention of the assembly, during the remainder of the session, was chiefly directed to matters connected with the fortification of Paris. The enormous expenditure entailed by that measure, and by the other military preparations of M. Thiers had a very sobering effect upon the popular Chamber. The crisis, it was computed, would cost the country not less than one hundred and fifty millions of francs.[681]
No sooner had M. Guizot emerged successfully from the initial stages of the parliamentary struggle, than he applied himself diligently to the task of bringing back France into the Concert of the Powers. The German Courts, he was well aware, were most anxious to terminate a situation pregnant with dangerous possibilities. In the eyes of Metternich and of Baron Werther, the Prussian minister, the isolation of France threatened the peace of Europe, and, in order to put an end to it, they were prepared to settle “tant bien que mal,”[682] the eastern question. Under ordinary circumstances the Tsar Nicholas might have been expected to oppose the resumption by France of her place in the Concert of the Powers. But he had now strong reasons of his own for desiring that her isolation should cease. He had instructed Brunnow to undertake that the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi should not be renewed, because experience had proved that it was of no practical value.[683] The Cabinet of St. Petersburg had arrived at the conclusion that, for the better protection of the southern provinces of Russia, the question of the Dardanelles should be regulated by some European agreement. But no compact of that nature would be likely to endure, unless France were to be made a party to it.[684]
Although it suited Nicholas that France should re-enter the European Concert, his dislike of Louis Philippe, and of the régime of July was as strong as ever. Whilst proposing to close the eastern question with some “final transaction to which France might be invited to adhere,”[685] he also suggested that the treaty for the pacification of the Levant should be converted into a quadruple alliance, “providing against the contingency of an attack by France upon the liberties of Europe.” His main reason, he informed Lord Clanricarde, for making this proposal, was to establish a close understanding with Great Britain.[686] Metternich had not “the spirit of a gentleman,” and neither England nor Russia ought to place any confidence in him.[687] The British government, however, was unable to entertain the suggestion. “All formal engagements of the Crown,” Lord Clanricarde was instructed to explain, “must be submitted to Parliament, and Parliament might not approve of an engagement which should bind England prospectively.” Nor was there any way in which this difficulty could be overcome. It would not be removed by the verbal agreement into which the Imperial Cabinet had declared its readiness to enter, should the constitutional obstacles to the conclusion of a more formal compact prove insuperable. “A verbal engagement would bind the ministers who made it, but might be disavowed by their successors, and thus the Russian government might be led to count upon a system of policy which might not eventually be pursued. . . . Under these circumstances,”concluded Lord Palmerston, “it seems to Her Majesty’s government that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg should be satisfied to trust to the general tendency of the policy of Great Britain, which leads her to watch over the maintenance of the balance of power.”[688]
Whether or not M. Guizot obtained any inkling of the Tsar’s proposals, he appears to have ascertained quickly that the three absolute Courts wished to close the eastern question in order that France should resume her place in the Concert. But he was very far from certain whether Lord Palmerston’s views coincided with those of his continental allies. He was not without fear that it might be the secret intention of Great Britain to drive Mehemet Ali out of Egypt. From the moment he had taken office, he had declared that the fate of Syria must be left to the chances of war, but that no French government could acquiesce in the expulsion of the Pasha from his Egyptian governorship. So long, however, as France maintained her armaments Metternich would be most unlikely to consent to any further measures of hostility against Mehemet Ali. Thus by playing upon the fears of the German Courts, he could bring considerable pressure to bear upon Palmerston. Nor was it only in this way that he proposed to counteract the schemes which he suspected the British minister of harbouring. Lord Holland was dead, and the French party was greatly discredited, but he could still depend upon the assistance of “Bear” Ellice,[689] Greville and his other English friends, whenever an opportunity of thwarting Palmerston should arise. For the purpose of organizing as much opposition as possible to the Foreign Secretary, he had, in the month of November, 1840, despatched Baron Mounier upon a special mission to London.[690] At the same time Baron Bourqueney, the French chargé d’affaires, was instructed confidentially to discuss the situation with his colleagues, but, under no circumstances, was he to make any direct proposals to Lord Palmerston. He was constantly to declare that the isolation of France must continue, so long as the treaty of July should be in existence.
M. Guizot had made no mistake in supposing that Palmerston would rather have seen Mehemet Ali deposed than invested with the hereditary tenure of Egypt. But, as he pointed out to the Ottoman ambassador, it was his rule in all affairs “to be content with what was practical,”[691] and Lord Beauvale’s despatches from Vienna made it clear that Metternich would never consent to take part in expelling the Pasha from Egypt.[692] Palmerston, therefore, accepted the situation and was prepared to be satisfied with an arrangement which restricted the authority of Mehemet Ali to his Egyptian Pashalic. He was opposed to the plan, which had been proposed at one time, of inviting France to participate in the final settling between the Sultan and the Pasha. As the avowed protector of Mehemet Ali she could not, he contended, fail to bring a dangerous element of discord into the conference.[693] Nevertheless, at the beginning of January, 1841, Baron Bourqueney, after having been his guest for a few days at Broadlands, felt convinced that “he was really anxious to discover some way of bringing back France into the concert, although he was still undecided as to the manner in which it should be effected.”[694] The correctness of this surmise was before long confirmed by the event. After the decision of the four Powers to press the Porte to confer the heredity upon Mehemet Ali had been embodied in the collective note of January 30, 1841, Palmerston himself took the initiative and invited Baron Bourqueney to call upon him at the Foreign Office, in order to discuss future arrangements.
The conferences which were thus begun on February 18 continued until March 5, and resulted in the framing of two diplomatic instruments. The first, termed the protocol, was only to be signed by the representatives of the Powers which were parties to the Treaty of July 15, 1840. The difficulties which had induced the Porte to invoke the assistance of the four Courts being now at an end, the wish was recorded “of expressing in the most formal manner the respect due to the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire, in virtue of which it has, at all times, been prohibited for ships of war of foreign Powers to enter the straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus.” With this principle, which was of general and permanent application, France was to be formally invited to concur. The second document consisted of a treaty, known as The Convention of the Straits, according to which the Sultan undertook to close the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to the warships of all foreign nations, and the Sovereigns of Great Britain, France, Prussia, Austria and Russia pledged themselves to uphold this ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire.[695]
M. Guizot, after the plenipotentiaries had agreed to certain small verbal alterations, pronounced himself satisfied with both documents. Nevertheless, the full powers to sign, which Baron Bourqueney was expecting to receive, were not transmitted. For the present, he was merely authorized to initial the convention.[696] The news had reached Paris that Mehemet Ali was greatly displeased with the conditions attached to his firman of investiture, and that he had, in consequence, refused to accept it. The decree in question had never been submitted to the approval of the ambassadors at Constantinople, and it now appeared that the heredity, which it professed to confer, was of an entirely fictitious nature. At the death of Mehemet Ali, it was provided that his successor was to be chosen by the Sultan from among any of his descendants. Furthermore, the appointment of all officers of the Egyptian army, above the rank of captain, was to be regulated by the Porte. Lastly, the Pasha complained that the amount of the tribute imposed upon him was far too heavy. Rather than submit to conditions so humiliating he would once more appeal to arms.[697]
Three months elapsed before the points in dispute could be settled. Meanwhile, the French government resumed its attitude of complete aloofness, and M. Guizot declared that no powers to sign could be sent to London, so long as the possibility existed that coercion might once more be applied to the Pasha under the terms of the Treaty of July. To the great annoyance of the German Courts, Palmerston was resolutely opposed to any declaration that the objects of that treaty had been attained. A premature dissolution of the alliance, he maintained, would only encourage Mehemet Ali to adopt a more defiant attitude, and must increase the difficulties of adjusting his relations with the Sultan.[698] “A question,” he insisted, “could not be really finished merely by saying that it was so.”[699] Metternich was compelled reluctantly to admit the force of this argument.[700] But, whilst he acknowledged the necessity of maintaining the alliance, his agents insinuated freely that Palmerston desired to embarrass the negotiations, in order to drive Mehemet Ali to commit some act of violence.
The conduct of Lord Ponsonby, it must be admitted, suggested that his chief had no great wish to discover a peaceful solution of the Egyptian question. When the news arrived at Constantinople that Mehemet Ali had refused to accept the firman, he at once advised the Porte to hold no further communication with him. The Sublime Porte, he declared, need no longer fear the military power of Mehemet Ali. “His destruction might be the consequence[701] of his again venturing to defy the Sultan.” The patience with which Lord Palmerston submitted to Ponsonby’s deviations from his instructions is undeniably suspicious. It is practically certain, however, that no secret understanding existed between them. Palmerston’s personal views with regard to Mehemet Ali accorded so completely with those of his agent, that he was induced to regard with a lenient eye his reluctance to carry out a distasteful task. But, whilst treating him with great forbearance, he never allowed Lord Ponsonby to impose his opinions upon him. On January 26, 1841, in a despatch endorsed by Queen Victoria with the significant words “highly approved,”[702] he told him plainly that his counsels to the Porte were not in harmony with his instructions. Again, on March 16, he prescribed the necessity of overcoming the obstacles to a settlement so emphatically, that Ponsonby wrote in reply, that he perceived that “the end which he was expected to attain was the arrangement of this affair with Mehemet Ali at any rate” (sic).[703] Nor can it reasonably be contended that his tone changed after the Pasha’s refusal to accept the conditions of the firman of investiture. On the contrary, in his instructions of April 10, he laid stress upon the necessity of adjusting the points in dispute with as little delay as possible, and absolutely dissented from Ponsonby’s view that the Sultan should hold no direct communication with Mehemet Ali.[704]
Ponsonby was, therefore, obliged to join with his colleagues in advising the Porte to modify the firman of February 13. Their representations, combined with an intimation from Baron Stürmer that Austria[705] would withdraw from the alliance if her counsels were disregarded, soon produced the desired effect. On April 14, Ponsonby was able to report that the Divan had decided that the succession of Mehemet Ali should be regulated in accordance with the principle of primogeniture, that he should have the power of dealing with the promotion of all officers below the rank of brigadier-general, and that the amount of his tribute should be reduced.[706] Nevertheless, some weeks elapsed before the Porte could be induced to embody these concessions in a new firman. For this delay Ponsonby was in no way responsible. On the contrary, he appears to have entered a vigorous protest against the procrastinating policy of the Turkish ministers.[707] Greatly to Metternich’s annoyance, however, Palmerston persisted in refusing to declare that the objects of the Treaty of July had been fully achieved. The French government, therefore, continued to withhold from Baron Bourqueney the authority to sign the Convention of the Straits. But M. Guizot was consumed with anxiety to conclude the affair, and in consequence of Palmerston’s attitude he was now compelled to instruct his agents in Egypt to urge Mehemet Ali to accept the amended firman, which they were to declare was no longer open to any reasonable objections.[708]
Mehemet Ali was too astute to offer any further resistance. On July 8, 1841, Ponsonby’s singularly laconic despatch reached London, announcing “the satisfactory intelligence”[709] that the Pasha had accepted the new firman, and had made a complete submission to the Sultan. The representatives of the Powers which were parties to the Treaty of July, thereupon, affixed their signatures to the protocol, which they had initialed four months before, announcing that the objects of their alliance had been fully attained. Three days later the isolation of France was formally terminated. On July 13, the plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, Russia, Prussia and France signed the Convention of the Straits by which their respective Sovereigns pledged themselves to uphold the principle of the closure of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to the warships of the Powers.
The conclusion of the Convention of the Straits was the last important act of the Melbourne government. After sustaining a defeat on the sugar question, on May 18, ministers, in the subsequent motion of want of confidence brought forward by Sir Robert Peel, found themselves in a minority of one. At the general elections which followed, the Conservatives obtained a decisive victory. The Whigs, in consequence, retired from office, and Lord Palmerston was replaced at the Foreign Office by Lord Aberdeen.
Palmerston’s conduct of the Turco-Egyptian affair has been the subject of much adverse criticism. M. Thureau-Dangin and other French writers have asserted that his eastern policy, in 1840, was based upon the desire deliberately to injure France. The Treaty of July, they contend, was simply a retaliation upon Louis Philippe, because he had declined to interfere more actively in the civil war in Spain. Nor does Palmerston escape censure at the hands of the chief English historian of this period. Sir Spencer Walpole,[710] re-echoing the views of Lord Holland and the French party, charges him with having sacrificed the greater to the lesser object. The good understanding with France, which Palmerston compromised so recklessly, was a matter, he argues, of far more importance to England than any question connected with the rule of the Sultan or of the Pasha over Syria and Arabia. Furthermore, he accuses him of inconsistency. His alliance with the absolute Courts, in 1840, was a complete negation of the policy which, in 1834, had led him to conclude the Quadruple Treaty with Liberal France for the maintenance of constitutionalism in Spain and Portugal.
To these different charges there are certain obvious answers. It has been shown that Palmerston, far from maliciously desiring to exclude France from the treaty for the pacification of the Levant, honestly endeavoured to persuade her to combine with Great Britain, and the other Powers in the affair. It was only when he perceived that M. Thiers was secretly working to establish conditions in the Mediterranean, which could not fail to have a prejudicial effect upon his country’s highest interests, that he decided to act without her. He by no means undervalued the importance of good relations with France, but, in order to preserve them, he was not prepared to shut his eyes to proceedings which might some day imperil the safety of British India. The public statements of M. Thiers and of certain of his colleagues are alone sufficient to justify Lord Palmerston’s policy in 1840. Under the question as to whether Syria and Arabia should be restored to the direct rule of the Sultan, which Sir Spencer Walpole dismisses as a secondary consideration, lay the question as to whether a great naval Power should gain a footing upon the shores of the Persian Gulf.
The reasoning by which the same writer seeks to justify his accusation of inconsistency is still more unconvincing. The Treaty of July was concluded for a definite purpose which involved no repudiation of the principles underlying the Quadruple Treaty of 1834. Yet Sir Spencer Walpole, apparently, regards it as a betrayal of Liberalism that England, in a question of eastern policy, should have separated herself from a constitutional Power and have allied herself with the absolute Courts of Russia, Austria and Prussia. Under any circumstances such a contention would be difficult to uphold, but when applied to France, in 1840, it becomes altogether inadmissible. Neither Louis Philippe nor his principal ministers were Liberals in the proper sense of the word. Treaty engagements notwithstanding, their attitude towards the cause of liberty in Spain, although not so openly proclaimed, was almost as unsympathetic as that of the Cabinets of the autocratic monarchies. Louis Philippe, Molé, Guizot and even Thiers, when they did not actively oppose it, did nothing to assist the development of popular government in Europe.
But whatever verdict may be passed upon Palmerston’s Egyptian policy, his rare skill and determination in carrying it out must command universal admiration. Although ruin, disgrace and perhaps impeachment must have been the penalty of failure, he never wavered in his resolution to execute his treaty in all its details. His indomitable spirit stimulated the courage of his allies abroad and triumphed over the opposition of his fellow-ministers at home. When he quitted the Foreign Office British prestige stood at a height which it had not reached since the Battle of Waterloo. His most persistent detractors had been forced to admit the correctness of his military judgment and his prescience in treating as of no account the warlike threats of Louis Philippe and of M. Thiers.
“Palmerston,” wrote Reeve regretfully, “has bowled out every one.”[711] Charles Greville was moved to enthusiasm. “The elder Pitt,” he records, “could not have manifested more decision and resource. Success is much more attributable to Palmerston than to our naval and military commanders, and, probably, solely to him.”[712]
CHAPTER IX
THE CORDIAL UNDERSTANDING
Lord Aberdeen, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs in Sir Robert Peel’s Cabinet, had held the same office in the government of the Duke of Wellington. He had had to deal, as will be remembered, with the question of the recognition of Louis Philippe and with the attitude which England was to observe towards the revolution in Belgium. His first experience of diplomacy had been gained in the days of the great war. In 1813, as quite a young man, he had been sent upon a special mission to Vienna, and had been concerned in the negotiations which had resulted in the entry of Austria into the coalition. During the campaign in Germany he had accompanied the headquarters of the allied armies and had been profoundly impressed by the scenes of which he had been a witness. Whether justified or not, the belief prevailed widely that, should complications arise, the spectacle of Leipsic after “the battle of the nations” would be ever present before the eyes of England’s Foreign Secretary.[713]
With regard to the more important questions which the Foreign Office had in hand, or with which it had recently been called upon to deal, Aberdeen was in substantial agreement with Palmerston. He approved of his policy in the Egyptian affair and endorsed his views as to the necessity of encouraging Spain to shake off the influence of France. But he was at the same time intensely desirous of replacing Franco-British relations upon their former intimate footing, and of allaying the irritation which the Treaty of July had aroused. To attain this end he was prepared to make far greater concessions than any to which Palmerston would have consented. No one was so convinced as he of the truth of the saying, ascribed to the Duke of Wellington, that the peace of Europe would remain unbroken, so long as France and England were united. It was not in their policies, but in their personal characters, that lay the real difference between Aberdeen and Palmerston. Aberdeen was by nature conciliatory. Palmerston was instinctively combative, and would rarely deny himself the pleasure of relentlessly exposing the fallacies of an opponent’s arguments. Aberdeen, although in some respects more of a Liberal than his predecessor, had a scholar’s abhorrence, which had been intensified by his former relations with Metternich and other continental statesmen, of all movements of a revolutionary character. Palmerston was a man of coarser fibre, but of wider sympathies, than his grave and studious successor.
Notwithstanding the earnest desire of both Lord Aberdeen and of M. Guizot to bring matters to a successful conclusion, the first important transaction between the new British government and the French Foreign Office led to no satisfactory result. In 1831, and again in 1833, France and England had contracted certain engagements towards each other for the purpose of suppressing the slave trade. They had agreed that their cruisers should stop and overhaul any suspected vessel, whether flying the French or the British flag. Palmerston, however, had not been content with an arrangement, which limited the right of search to ships purporting to be of French or English nationality. He, accordingly, in combination with France, made representations on the subject to the other Powers and succeeded in inducing them to agree to the principle which the French and English governments had adopted. The new convention, to which all the chief European Powers were to be parties, was ready for signature at the time when it became evident that a change of government in England was about to take place. Palmerston, who had always been keenly interested in suppressing the slave trade, was particularly anxious that his name should be affixed to an international agreement which, he hoped, would prove the means of abolishing a traffic which he abhorred. M. Guizot, however, saw fit purposely to delay matters in order to deprive him of this satisfaction. Nor did he make any secret of his reasons for acting in this manner. Palmerston’s attitude towards him, he complained to Henry Bulwer, had been unfriendly. In his dispatch of November 2, 1840,[714] he had shown a total lack of consideration for the difficulties of his position, and in a recent speech to his constituents at Tiverton he had made some highly offensive remarks about the manner in which the French military authorities in Algeria were carrying on their war with the Arab tribes.[715]
But, once Lord Aberdeen was installed in Downing Street, M. Guizot’s objections to proceeding with the slave trade convention disappeared. The necessary powers were sent to Sainte-Aulaire, the French ambassador, and, on December 20, 1841, the treaty, regulating the right of search, was signed in London. It was soon clear, however, that M. Guizot had been mistaken in supposing that the Chamber would agree to ratify the agreement into which he had entered. The opposition to slavery had never been so pronounced in France as in England, and the Treaty of July had greatly stimulated the old feeling of jealousy of British maritime supremacy. By reason of England’s naval preponderance, the duty of stopping suspected vessels must necessarily devolve chiefly upon her officers. Both in the French Chambers and in the press it was hotly contended that the new treaty was but a device, by means of which England purposed to arrogate to herself the right of policing the sea. So keen was this feeling that M. Guizot was forced to inform the British government that France would be unable to ratify. Popular opposition, it was thought, would diminish with time, and the protocol was accordingly kept open, in the hope that France might still become a party to the treaty. But this expectation was not fulfilled, and on November 9, 1842, the definite withdrawal of France was officially communicated to Lord Aberdeen. The affair caused no little resentment and disappointment in England. Three years later, however, M. Guizot was enabled to re-open the question. By that time the relations of the two countries were upon a more friendly footing, and the Duc de Broglie and Dr. Lushington, the commissioners of their respective governments, succeeded, in consequence, in arriving at an agreement. The new treaty, signed on May 29, 1845, fulfilled all the essential conditions of previous conventions, but provided that, in future, the right of search in African waters should be exercised by a joint Franco-British squadron.[716]
Spanish affairs, however, were destined to be the question which was to occupy the chief attention of the two governments. It has been related how, in the autumn of 1840, Christina had been forced to quit Spain, and how, in the spring of the following year, the Cortes had elected Espartero sole Regent of the kingdom. This solution of the difficulty was by no means acquiesced in as satisfactory by all parties. The elevation of the popular general to the head of the government was necessarily regarded as a victory for the Progressistas and, consequently, as a triumph for English diplomacy. Indeed, since the abdication of the Queen-Mother, the Moderados, as a parliamentary party, had almost ceased to exist. But their leaders still continued to correspond with Christina, whose house in the Rue de Courcelles in Paris soon became the centre of a vast conspiracy against the new Regent.
Whilst it was thus a matter of common notoriety that the Moderado chiefs, together with General Narvaez and other military rivals of Espartero, were plotting in Paris[717] to overthrow the new order of affairs in Spain, the question of the young Queen’s marriage suddenly sprang into prominence. Isabella was not yet twelve years of age, but already the selection of her husband was the subject of grave deliberations in Paris and in London. Christina had always considered it to be vitally important that her daughter should marry a member of one of the great reigning families. As far back as the year 1838, at a most critical period of the civil war, when it was evident that no assistance was to be expected from Louis Philippe, she had suggested to the British minister that Isabella might be affianced to an English prince. If the difficulties arising from the difference of religion should prove insurmountable, she would be satisfied with the betrothal of her daughter to a member of the House of Coburg, “on account of the excellent education which the princes of that family had received, and on account of their near connection with Her Britannic Majesty.”[718] Villiers was without instructions upon the point, but he took upon himself to declare unhesitatingly that the English match could never be effected. Christina, thereupon, announced her intention of marrying her daughter to a son of the Archduke Charles of Austria. It was a combination which, “she was now convinced, afforded the best means of pacifying the country.” The negotiations at Vienna, she informed him, would be entrusted to M. de Cea Bermúdez and their success would largely depend upon the amount of support given them by the British government.[719]
Palmerston, upon receiving Villiers’ despatch, immediately conveyed to him “Her Majesty’s gracious approbation of the course which he had pursued.”[720] At the same time, he informed him that the British government could not possibly take part in M. de Cea’s negotiations at Vienna, “without in the first instance communicating thereupon with the government of France and, as the King of the French would be extremely averse to such a marriage, it was not probable that such a communication would contribute much to the accomplishment of the object.” Nor was there any likelihood, he predicted, that the Austrian Cabinet would entertain the offer. This view of the case was soon borne out by the event. Metternich at once disclaimed any intention of listening to Christina’s proposals, whilst M. Molé, who, notwithstanding the secrecy which had been observed, was aware of the reasons of M. de Cea’s presence at Vienna, declared to Lord Granville that “the armed intervention of France would, undoubtedly, be the consequence of any attempt to place an Austrian prince upon the throne of Spain.”[721]
The triumph of the constitutionalists and the termination of the civil war necessarily invested Isabella with an importance which she had not possessed, whilst the issue of the struggle was uncertain. Once the stability of her throne seemed assured, she appeared to Louis Philippe in the light of a most eligible daughter-in-law. In the month of November, 1839, Christina’s former minister, Count Toreno, was understood to be engaged in negotiating a marriage between a son of the King of the French and the young Queen of Spain. The scheme, reported the British chargé d’affaires, had numerous supporters. But the Queen Regent had informed him privately that “she was hostile to the match and had other views for her daughter.”[722] It is probable that Christina was perfectly sincere in thus declaring her intentions to Mr. Southern. Nor is there any reason to suppose that, after her abdication, her objections to the French marriage diminished. But, inasmuch as she was residing in Paris and hoped to obtain the assistance of Louis Philippe to her schemes for overturning Espartero, she was necessarily compelled to conceal her real sentiments. The re-establishment of French ascendancy at the Court of Madrid occupied a foremost place in the policy both of the King and of M. Guizot. So long, however, as Espartero and the Progressistas were in power there was little prospect that they would be enabled to bring their plans to a successful conclusion. Under the circumstances, therefore, they were disposed to regard with a friendly eye the proceedings of the military and Moderado malcontents in Paris. Bulwer strongly suspected that some kind of a compact existed, whereby Louis Philippe promised indirectly to assist the conspirators, and Christina, in return, undertook to employ her parental influence over Isabella in favour of her marriage with the Prince de Joinville or the Duc d’Aumale.[723]
The insurrection against Espartero broke out early in October, 1841. The standard of rebellion was raised by O’Donnell at Pampeluna and by the generals commanding the garrisons of Vittoria and Saragossa. But their plans, which had been so carefully matured in Paris, miscarried, and the loyal troops experienced little difficulty in dispersing their followers and in restoring tranquillity. Madrid, in the meanwhile, had been the scene of one of the most dramatic episodes in recent history. On the night of October 7, Generals Concha and Diego Leon, at the head of a band of military conspirators, penetrated into the palace with the object of carrying off the young Queen. But when they attempted to ascend the grand staircase they encountered a determined party of halberdiers. A furious struggle then ensued. The crash of musketry reverberated through the palace, and bullets struck the walls of the room in which the terrified Isabella had sought refuge with her attendants. But help was soon forthcoming. The resistance of the halberdiers had enabled the national militia, which was animated by strong Liberal and Progressista sentiments, to assemble. At the appearance of the citizen soldiers the conspirators either fled or laid down their arms. Some of their leaders escaped to France, but Leon was captured and, a few days later, paid the penalty of his treason, his youth, his good looks and his former distinguished services earning for him a sympathy which the circumstances of his case in no way justified.
“With respect to the share of the French government in organizing and promoting this enterprise,”wrote Lord Aberdeen, “I do not think it necessary to enter into an enquiry at present. We have received the most positive assurances that they have been entirely strangers to the undertaking. Whatever may be the value of these assurances, the attempt having happily failed, there appears to be no advantage in testifying suspicion and distrust.”[724] He, accordingly, directed Bulwer to do all in his power to persuade Olozaga, the Spanish minister, to adopt as moderate a tone as possible in his communications with M. Guizot. The Spanish government was naturally deeply incensed at the encouragement which the conspirators had received in Paris, and their representations on the subject included a demand for the expulsion of Christina from France. This was peremptorily refused and the relations of the two countries began to assume a very disquieting appearance. In Bulwer’s opinion, were Louis Philippe to receive any encouragement from Austria or Prussia, he might not improbably embark upon a war with Spain. “Should hostilities break out,” he warned Lord Aberdeen, “Barcelona would be the French objective, on account of the effect which its capture would have on those Courts which are fearful of the democratic opinions prevailing there.”[725]
Aberdeen’s instructions to Mr. Aston, the British minister at Madrid, were of the same nature as those transmitted to Bulwer in Paris. He was to warn the Spanish ministers of the folly of provoking a rupture with France. But, at the same time, he was to assure Espartero that “the policy of Great Britain would continue to be directed towards the maintenance of the real independence of Spain and to her protection from whatever quarter she might be threatened.”[726] Meanwhile, the British government would make every effort to induce the Northern Courts formally to acknowledge the sovereignty of Isabella.[727] Whether designedly or not, however, the endeavours of Lord Aberdeen in this direction were frustrated by France. Owing in a great measure to his good offices, the Spanish government withdrew its demand for Christina’s expulsion.[728] Louis Philippe, thereupon, directed M. de Salvandy, who some weeks earlier had been appointed ambassador at Madrid, to proceed to his post. But this measure, which seemed to foreshadow the establishment of more harmonious relations between the two countries, led to a most unfortunate complication. Salvandy, upon his arrival at Madrid, insisted upon being allowed to place his credentials in the hands of Isabella herself and absolutely declined to present them to Espartero, the Regent. Both sides invoked precedents in support of their attitude and pressed their arguments with the greatest warmth. Finally, Salvandy withdrew from Madrid taking with him all the members of his embassy, with the exception of his second secretary, the Duc de Glücksberg, a son of Louis XVIII.’s favourite minister, the Duc Décazes.