Henry of Monmouth, Volume 1 / Or, Memoirs of the Life and Character of Henry the Fifth, as Prince of Wales and King of England

CHAPTER VII.

glyndowr's vigorous measures. — slaughter of herefordshire men. — mortimer taken prisoner. — he joins glyndowr. — henry implores succours, — pawns his plate to support his men. — the king's testimony to his son's conduct. — the king, at burton-on-trent, hears of the rebellion of the percies.

1402-1403.

If Owyn Glyndowr, as we have supposed, allowed Wales to remain undisturbed by battles and violence through the winter[131] and spring, it was only to employ the time in preparing for a more vigorous campaign. The first battle of which we have any historical certainty, was fought June 12, 1402, near Melienydd, (Dugdale says, "upon the mountain called Brynglas, near Knighton in Melenyth,") in Radnorshire. The whole array of Herefordshire was routed on that field. More than one thousand Englishmen were slain, on whom the Welsh were guilty of savage, unheard-of indignities. The women especially gave vent to their rage and fury by actions too disgraceful to be credible were they not recorded as uncontradicted facts. For the honour of the sex, we wish to regard them as having happened only once; whilst we would bury the disgusting details in oblivion.[132] Owyn was victorious, and took many of high degree prisoners; among whom was Sir Edmund Mortimer, the uncle of the Earl of March. Perhaps the most authentic statement of this victory as to its leading features, though without any details, is found in a letter from the King to his council, dated Berkhampstead, June 25.

"The rebels have taken my beloved cousin,[133] Esmon Mortymer, and many other knights and esquires. We are resolved, consequently, to go in our own person with God's permission. You will therefore command all in our retinue and pay to meet us at Lichfield, where we intend to be at the latest on the 7th of July." The proclamation for an array "to meet the King at Lichfield, and proceed with him towards Wales to check the insolence and malice of Owyn Glyndowr and other rebels," was issued the same day. On the 5th of July,[134] the King, being at Westminster, appointed Hugh de Waterton governor of his children, John and Philippa, till his return from Wales. An order of council at Westminster, on the last day of July, the King himself being present, seems to leave us no alternative in deciding that Henry made two expeditions to Wales this summer; the first at the commencement of July, the second towards the end of August. This appears to have escaped the observation of historians. Walsingham speaks only of one, and that before the Feast of the Assumption, August 25; in which he represents the King and his army to have been well-nigh destroyed by storms of rain, snow, and hail, so terrible as to have excited the belief that they were raised by the machination of the devil, and of course at Owyn's bidding. This order of council is directed to many sheriffs, commanding them to proclaim an array through their several counties to meet the King at Shrewsbury,[135] on the 27th of August at the latest, to proceed with him into Wales.[136] The order declares the necessity of this second array to have originated in the impossibility, through the shortness of the time, of the King's chastising the rebels, who lurked in mountains and woods; and states his determination to be there again shortly, and to remain fifteen days for the final overthrow and destruction of his enemies. How lamentably he was mistaken in his calculation of their resistance, and his own powers of subjugating them, the sequel proved to him too clearly. The rebellion from first to last was protracted through almost as many years as the days he had numbered for its utter extinction. The order on the sheriff of Derby commands him to go with his contingent to Chester, "to our dearest son the Prince," on the 27th of August, and to advance in his retinue to Wales. On this occasion,[137] it is said that Henry invaded Wales in three points at once, himself commanding one division of his army, the second being headed by the Prince, the third by Lord Arundel. The details of these measures, under the personal superintendence of the King, are not found in history. Probably Walsingham's account of their total failure must be admitted as nearest the truth. That no material injury befel Owyn from them, and that neither were his means crippled, nor his resolution daunted, is testified by the inroads which, not long after, he made into England with redoubled impetuosity.

The following winter, we may safely conclude, was spent by the Welsh chieftain in negociations both with the malcontent lords of England, and with the courts of France and Scotland; in recruiting his forces and improving his means of warfare;[138] for, before the next midsummer, (as we know on the best authority,) he was prepared to engage in an expedition into England, with a power too formidable for the Prince and his retinue to resist without further reinforcement. During this winter also a most important accession accrued to the power and influence of Owyn by the defection from the royal cause of his prisoner Sir Edmund Mortimer, who became devotedly attached to him. King Henry had, we are told, refused to allow a ransom to be paid for Mortimer, though urged to it by Henry Percy, who had married Mortimer's sister. The consequence of this ungracious refusal[139] was, that he joined Glyndowr, whose daughter, as the Monk of Evesham informs us, he married with the greatest solemnity about the end of November.[140] In a fortnight after this marriage, Mortimer announced to his tenants his junction with Owyn, and called upon them to forward his views. The letter, written in French, is preserved in the British Museum.

Of the Prince himself, between the end of August 1402, and the following spring, little is recorded. In March 1403 he was made Lieutenant of Wales by the King, and with the consent of his council, with full powers of inquiring into offences, of pardoning offenders, of arraying the King's lieges, and of doing all other things which he should find necessary. This appointment, implying personal interference, would lead us to infer, either that he tarried through the winter in the midst of the Principality, or near its borders, or that he returned to it early in the spring.[142] To this year also we shall probably be correct in referring the following letter of Prince Henry to the council, dated Shrewsbury, 30th May; but which Sir Harris Nicolas considers to have been written the year before. That it could not have been written by the Prince at Shrewsbury on the 30th of May 1402, seems demonstrable from the circumstance of his having been personally present in the Tower of London on the 8th of May, and of his having executed a deed in the Castle of Tutbury on the 26th of May 1402. Whilst the probability of its having been written in the end of May 1403, is much strengthened by the ordinance of the King, dated June 16, 1403, in which he mentions the reports which he had received from the Prince's council then in Wales of Owyn Glyndowr's intention to invade England; and also by the order made July 10, 1403, by the King, that the council would send 1000l. to the Prince, to enable him to keep his people together,—the very object chiefly desired in this despatch. The letter is in French.

On this letter it is impossible not to remark that, so far from having an abundant supply of money to squander on his supposed vices and follies, Henry was compelled to pawn his own little stock of plate and jewels to raise money for the indispensable expenses of the war.

The first direct mention made of the Prince after this is found in the ordinance above referred to, dated June 16, 1403, which informs us that he certainly was then in Wales, and strongly implies that he had been there for some time previously. The King says, "I heard from many persons of my son the Prince's council, now in Wales, that Owyn Glyndowr is on the point of making an incursion into England with a great power, for the purpose of obtaining supplies. I therefore command the sheriffs of Gloucester, Salop, Worcester, and Hereford, to make proclamation for all knights, and gentlemen of one hundred shillings' annual income, to go and put themselves under the governance of the Prince." Another letter from Henry to his council, dated Higham Ferrers, July 10, 1403,[143] is deeply interesting, not only as bearing testimony to the persevering bravery of his son Henry, but as affording an example of the uncertainty of human calculations, and the deceitfulness of human engagements and friendships. He informs the council that he had received letters from his son, and information by his messengers, acquainting him with the gallant and good bearing of his very dear and well-beloved son, which gave him very great pleasure. He then commissions them to pay 1000l. [144] to the Prince for the purpose of enabling him to keep his soldiers together. "We are now," he adds, "on our way to succour our beloved and loyal cousins, the Earl of Northumberland and Henry his son, in the conflict which they have honourably undertaken for us and our realm; and, as soon as that campaign shall have ended honourably, with the aid of God, we will hasten towards Wales."[145]

This letter had not been written more than five days when King Henry became acquainted with the rebellion of those, his "beloved and faithful lieges," to assist whom against his northern foes he was then actually on his road. His proclamation for all sheriffs to raise their counties, and hasten to him wherever he might be, is dated Burton-on-Trent, July 16, 1403. On the morrow he sent off a despatch to his council, informing them that Henry Percy, calling him only Henry of Lancaster, was in open rebellion against him, and was spreading far and wide through Cheshire the false rumours that Richard was still alive. He then assures them, "for their consolation," that he was powerful enough to encounter all his enemies; at the same time expressing his pleasure that they should all come to him wherever he might be, except only the Treasurer, whom he wished to stay, for the purpose of collecting as large sums as possible to meet the exigence of the occasion. The Chancellor, on Wednesday, June 18th, met the bearer of these tidings before he reached London, opened the letters, and forwarded them to the council with an apology.[146]

CHAPTER VIII.

the rebellion of the percies, — its origin. — letters of hotspur, and the earl of northumberland. — tripartite indenture between the percies, owyn, and mortimer. — doubts as to its authenticity. — hotspur hastens from the north. — the king's decisive conduct. — he forms a junction with the prince. — "sorry battle of shrewsbury." — great inaccuracy of david hume. — hardyng's duplicity. — manifesto of the percies probably a forgery. — glyndowr's absence from the battle involves neither breach of faith nor neglect of duty. — circumstances preceding the battle. — of the battle itself. — its immediate consequences.

1403.

In analysing the motives which drove the Percies, father and son, into rebellion, we are recommended by some writers to search only into those antecedent probabilities, those general causes of mutual dissatisfaction, which must have operated on parties situated as they were with regard to Henry IV. The same authors would dissuade us from seeking for any immediate and proximate causes, because "chroniclers have not discovered or detailed the beginning incidents." But we shall scarcely be able to do justice to our subject if we strictly follow this prescribed rule of inquiry. The general causes enumerated by Hume, and expatiated upon in modern times, we may take for granted. Undoubtedly ingratitude on the one side, and discontent on the other, were not only to be expected, but, as we know, actually prevailed. "The sovereign naturally became jealous of that power which had advanced him to the throne, and the subject was not easily satisfied in the returns which he thought so great a favour had merited." But we are by no means left to conjecture abstractedly on the "beginning incidents," as the proximate causes of the open revolt of the family of Percy have been called: Hotspur's own letters, as well as those of his father Northumberland, the existence of which seems not to have been known to our historians, prepare us for much of what actually took place. We have already observed the indications of wounded pride, and indignation, and utter discontent, which Hotspur's despatches from Wales evince. Another communication, dated Swyneshed, in Lincolnshire, July 3, is more characteristic of his temper of mind than the preceding, and makes his subsequent conduct still more easily understood.[147] Sir Harris Nicolas has so clearly analysed this letter, that we may well content ourselves with the substance of it as we find it in his valuable preface.

"Hotspur commenced by reminding the council of his repeated applications for payment of the money due to him as Warden of the East March; and then alluded to the other sums owing to his father and himself, and to the promise made by the treasurer, when he was last in London, that, if it were agreeable to the council, 2,000 marks should be paid him before the February then last past. He said he had heard that at the last parliament, when the necessities of the realm were explained by the lords of the great council to the barons and commons, the war allowance was demanded for all the marches, Calais, Guienne and Scotland, the sea, and Ireland; that the proposition for the Scotch marches was limited to 37,000l.; and that, as the payment for the marches in time of truce, due to his father and to him, did not exceed 5,000l. per annum, it excited his astonishment that it could not be paid in good faith; that it appeared to him either that the council attached too little consideration to the said marches, where the most formidable enemies which they had would be found, or that they were not satisfied with his and his father's services therein; but, if they made proper inquiry, he hoped that the greatest neglect they would discover in the marches was the neglect of payment, without which they would find no one who could render such service. On this subject he had, he said, written to the King, entreating him that, if any injury occurred to town, castle, or march, in his charge, from default of payment, he might not be blamed; but that the censure should rest on those who would not pay him, agreeably to his Majesty's honourable command and desire. He begged the council not to be displeased that he wrote ignorantly in his rude and feeble manner on this subject, because he was compelled to do so by the necessities not merely of himself, but of his soldiers, who were in such distress, that, without providing a remedy, he neither could nor dared to go to the marches; and he concluded by requesting the council to take such measures as they might think proper."

Two letters from the Earl of Northumberland, the one to the council in May, the other to the King, dated 26th June 1403, breathe the same spirit with those of his son Hotspur, and would have led us to anticipate the same subsequent conduct; at least they ought to have prepared the King and council for the resentments of two such men, overflowing with bitter indignation at the neglect and injustice with which they considered themselves to have been treated.

"The last of these letters (we quote throughout the words of the same Editor) is extremely curious. Northumberland commenced by acknowledging the receipt of a letter from the King, wherein Henry has expressed his expectation that the Earl would be at Ormeston Castle on the day appointed, and in sufficient force, without creating any additional expense to his Majesty; but that, on consideration, the King, reflecting that this could not be the case without expenses being incurred by the Earl and his son Hotspur, had ordered some money to be speedily sent to them. Of that money the Earl said he knew not the amount, nor the day of payment; that his honour, as well as the state of the kingdom, was in question; and that the day on which he was to be at Ormeston was so near, that, if payment was not soon ordered, it was very probable that the fair renown of the chivalry of the realm would not be maintained at that place, to the utter dishonour and grief of him and of his son, who were the King's loyal subjects; which they believed could not be his wish, nor had they deserved it. 'If,' the Earl sarcastically observed, 'we had both been paid the 60,000l. since your coronation, as I have heard you were informed by those who do not wish to tell you the truth, then we could better support such a charge; but to this day there is clearly due to us, as can be fully proved, 20,000l. and more.' He then entreated the King to order his council and treasurer to pay him and his son a large sum conformably to the grant made in the last parliament, and to their indentures, so that no injury might arise to the realm by the non-payment of what was due to them.' To this letter he signed himself 'Your Matathias, who supplicates you to take his state and labour to heart in this affair.'"

There is so much sound reasoning also and good sense in the review of these proceedings, presented to us by the same pen, that we cannot do better than adopt it. The Author's subsequent researches have all tended to confirm that Editor's view:

"This letter preceded the rebellion of the Percies by less than four weeks; and that event may, it is presumed, be mainly attributed to the inattention shown to their requests of payment of the large sums which they had expended in the King's service. They were not only harassed by debts, and destitute of means to pay their followers, but their honour, as the Earl expressly told the King, was involved in the fulfilment of their engagements; a breach of which not only exposed them to the greatest difficulties, but, in the opinion of their chivalrous contemporaries, perhaps affected their reputation. That under these circumstances, and goaded by a sense of injury and injustice, the fiery Hotspur should throw off his allegiance, and revolt, is not surprising; but it is matter of astonishment that Henry should have hazarded such a result. To the house of Percy he was chiefly indebted for the crown; and it is scarcely credible that at the moment of their defection it could have been his policy to offend them. The country was at war with France and Scotland, Wales was then in open rebellion, and Henry was far from satisfied of the general loyalty of his subjects. Can it be believed that he desired to increase his enemies by adding the most powerful family in the kingdom to the number? Nor can Henry's constant efforts to prevent the people from becoming disaffected, be reconciled with the wish to excite discontent in two of the most influential and distinguished personages in the realm. It is shown in another part of this volume, (Minutes of Privy Council,) that the King had not the slightest suspicion of Hotspur's revolt until it took place; and it appears that, when he heard of it, he was actually on his route to join that chieftain, and, to use his own words to his council, 'to give aid and support to his very dear and loyal cousins, the Earl of Northumberland and his son Henry, in the expedition which they had honourably commenced for him and his realm against his enemies the Scotch.' Instead of refusing to pay to the Percies the money which they claimed, from the desire to lessen their power, or to inflict upon them any species of mortification, all which is known of the state of this country justifies the inference that Henry had the strongest motives for conciliating that family. The neglect of their repeated demands seems, therefore, to have arisen solely from his being unable[148] to comply with them; and the King's pecuniary embarrassments are shown by the documents in this work to have been of so pressing and so permanent a nature, that there is no difficulty in believing such to have been the case. It is deserving of observation, however, that the discontent which is visible in the letters of Hotspur and his father, is as much at the conduct of the council as at that of the King; and jealousy of their superior influence with Henry, and possibly a suspicion that they endeavoured to injure them in his estimation, as well as to impede their exertions in his service, by withholding the necessary resources, may have combined with other causes in producing their disaffection."[149]

Not Shakspeare only, in his highly-wrought scene at the Archdeacon of Bangor's house, but our historians also and their commentators, instruct us to refer to a point of time very little subsequent to the date of the last letter from the Earl of Northumberland the celebrated Tripartite Indenture of Division. Shakspeare has traced, with such exquisite designs and shades of colouring, the different characters of the contracting parties in their acts and sentiments, and has thrown such vividness and life and beauty into the whole procedure, that the imagination is led captive, superinducing an unwillingness to doubt the reality; and the mind reluctantly engages in an examination of the truth. But, consistently with the principles adopted in these Memoirs, the Author is compelled to sift the evidence on which the genuineness of the treaty depends. The document, if it could have been established as trustworthy, could not have failed to be interesting to every one as a fact in general history, whilst the English and Welsh antiquary must in an especial manner have been gratified by being made acquainted with its particular provisions. At all events, whatever opinion may be ultimately formed of its character as the vehicle of historical verity, it is in itself too important, and has been too widely recognised, to be passed over in these pages without notice.

Sir Henry Ellis, to whom we are indebted for having first called attention to the specific stipulations of this alleged treaty, with his accustomed perspicuity and succinctness thus introduces the subject to his reader:

"Sir Edmund Mortimer's letter is dated December 13 (1402), and the Tripartite Indenture of Partition was not fully agreed upon till toward the middle of the next year. The negociation for the partition of the kingdom seems to have originated with Mortimer and Glyndowr only. The battle of Shrewsbury was fought on July 21st, 1403. The manuscript chronicle, already named, compiled by one of the chaplains[150] to King Henry V, gives the particulars of the final treaty, signed at the house of the Archdeacon of Bangor, more amply than they can be found elsewhere. The expectation declared in this treaty that the contracting parties would turn out to be those spoken of by Merlin, who were to divide amongst them the Greater Britain, as it is called, corroborates the story told by Hall. The whole passage is here submitted to the reader's perusal: the words are evidently those of the treaty." The reader is then furnished with a copy of the Latin original: but, since no point of the general question as to its genuineness appears to be affected by the words employed, the following translation is substituted in its place.

The above learned Editor of this instrument (to whose labours in rescuing from oblivion so many original documents relative to these times we are repeatedly induced to acknowledge our obligations,) seems to have fallen into some serious mistakes here. Either influenced by the fascinating reminiscences of Shakspeare's representations, or following Hall with too implicit a confidence, he has altogether overlooked the date assigned in the manuscript itself to the execution of this partition deed, and the persons between whom the agreement is there said to have been made. So far from countenancing the assumption that "the indenture was finally agreed upon towards the middle of the year next after the date of Edmund Mortimer's letter announcing his junction with Owyn (December 14th, 1402)," the manuscript expressly states that the covenant was made on the 28th of February,[151] in the fourth year of Henry IV; and that the contracting parties were Henry Earl of Northumberland, Sir Edmund Mortimer, and Owyn Glyndowr. Hall, on whom there exists strong reason for believing that Shakspeare rested as his authority, asserts that the contracting parties were Glyndowr, the Lord Percy (by which title he throughout designates Hotspur), and the Earl of March. Hall's expressions would lead us to infer that the circumstance was not generally recognised or known by the chroniclers before his time, but was recorded by one only of those with whose writings he was acquainted. "A certain writer," he says, "writeth that this Earl of March, the Lord Percy, and Owyn Glyndowr were unwisely made believe by a Welsh prophesier that King Henry was the Moldwarp cursed of God's own mouth, and that they were the Dragon, the Lion, and the Wolf which should divide the realm between them, by the deviation, not divination, of that mawmet Merlin." Hall then proceeds to tell us that the tripartite indenture was sealed by the deputies of the three parties in the Archdeacon's house; and that, by the treaty, Wales was given to Owyn, all England from Severn and Trent southward and eastward, was assigned to the Earl of March, and the remnant to Lord Percy.

The strange confusion made either by Hall, or "the certain writer" from whom he draws his story, of Owyn's prisoner and son-in-law, Edmund Mortimer, with the Earl of March his nephew, then a minor in the King's safe custody, throws doubtless great suspicion on his narrative; nevertheless, such as it is, (allowing for that mistake,) his account seems far more probable than the statement given in the Sloane manuscript,—the only authority, it is presumed, now known to have reported the alleged words of the treaty. It is much more likely, that the project of dividing South Britain among the houses of Glyndowr, Mortimer, and Percy, should have been entertained before the battle of Shrewsbury, when the Earl of Worcester's malicious love of mischief might have suggested it, and Hotspur's headstrong impetuosity might have caught at the scheme, and their troops, not yet dispirited by defeat, might have been sanguine of success, than after that struggle, when the old Earl of Northumberland[152] was the only representative of the house of Percy who could have signed it. The cause of Owyn, Mortimer, and Northumberland had so sunk into its wane after Hotspur's death, that they could then scarcely have contemplated as a thing feasible the division of the fair realm of England and Wales among themselves. Of the authority of the manuscript from which the indenture is extracted, the Author (for reasons stated in the Appendix) is compelled to form a very low estimate. And if such a deed ever was signed, it is far less improbable that the manuscript (full, as it confessedly is elsewhere, of errors) should have inserted it incorrectly in point of chronological order, than that the contracting parties should have postponed their contemplated arrangement to a period when success must have appeared almost beyond hope. Independently, however, of the suspicion cast on the document by the date assigned to it in the manuscript, it seems to carry with it internal evidence against itself. The contract was made by Edmund Mortimer, the Earl of Northumberland, and Owyn, and among them the land was to be divided; but, so far from the report of such an intended distribution being corroborated by any other authority, there is much evidence to render it incredible. Edmund Mortimer's own genuine letter, for example, announcing his adhesion to Owyn, which preceded this agreement, makes no allusion to the Percies, or even to himself, as portionists. "The cause," he says, "which he espoused would guarantee to Owyn his rights in Wales, and, in case Richard were dead, would place the Earl of March on the throne." It is, indeed, scarcely conceivable that the nobles, the gentry, and the people at large would have suffered their land to be cut up into portions, destroying the integrity of the kingdom, and exposing it with increased facilities to foreign invasion, and interminable intestine warfare; whilst neither of the three who were to share the spoil had any pretensions of title to the crown. It is scarcely less inconceivable that three men, such as Mortimer, Glyndowr, and Northumberland, could have seriously devised so desperate a scheme.

On the whole, the Author is disposed to express his suspicion that the entire story of the tripartite league is the creature only of invention, originating in some inexplicable mistake, or fabricated for the purpose of exciting feelings of contempt or hostility against the rebels.

In examining the various accounts of the battle of Shrewsbury with a view of putting together ascertained facts in right order, and distinguishing between certainty,—strong probability,—mere surmise,—improbabilities,—and utter mistakes, we shall find it far more easy to point out the errors of others, than to adopt one general view which shall not in its turn be open to objections. Still, in any important course of events, it seems to be a dereliction of duty in an author to shrink from offering the most probable outline of facts which the careful comparison of different statements, and a patient weighing of opposite authorities, suggest. Before, however, we enter upon that task, it will be necessary to clear the way by examining some other questions of doubt and difficulty.

To Mr. Hume's inaccuracies, arising from the want of patient labour in searching for truth at the fountain-head, we have been led to refer above. His readiness to rest satisfied with whatever first offered itself, provided it suited his present purpose, without either scrutinizing its internal evidence, or verifying it by reference to earlier and better authority, is forced upon our notice in his account of the battle of Shrewsbury. Just one half of the entire space which he spares to record the whole affair, he devotes to a minute detail of the manifesto which Hotspur is said to have sent to the King on the night before the battle, in the name of his father, his uncle, and himself. This document, at least in the terms quoted by Mr. Hume, is proved as well by its own internal self-contradictions, as by historical facts, to be a forgery of a much later date.

The first charge which the manifesto is made to bring against Henry is, that, after his landing at Ravenspurg, he swore on the Gospel that he only sought his own rightful inheritance, that he would never disturb Richard in his possession of the throne, and that never would he aim at being King. And yet another item charges him with having sworn on the same day, and at the same place, and on the same Gospel, an oath (the very terms of which imply that he was to be King) that he never would exact tenths or fifteenths without consent of the three estates, except in cases of extreme emergence. Again, "It complained of his cruel policy (says Mr. Hume, without adding a single remark,) in allowing the young Earl of March, whom he ought to regard as his sovereign, to remain a captive in the hands of his enemies, and in even refusing to all his friends permission to treat of his ransom;" whilst it is beyond all question that the person whom this pretended manifesto confounds with the Earl of March, "taken in pitched battle," was Sir Edmund Mortimer. The Earl of March was himself then a boy, and was in close custody in Henry's castle of Windsor. The manifesto, as Hume quotes it, is evidently full of historical blunders; its author had followed those historians who had confounded Edmund Mortimer with the Earl of March; and yet Mr. Hume adopts it on the authority of Hall, and gives it so prominent a place in his work.

But even as the manifesto is found in its original form in Hardyng, (though the blunders copied by Hume from Hall[153] do not appear there in all their extravagance and absurdity,) something attaches to it exceedingly suspicious as to its character and circumstances. Independently of the internal evidence of the document itself, which will repay a careful scrutiny, the very fact of Hardyng having withheld even the most distant allusion to such a manifesto in the copy of his work which he presented to Henry VI, the grandson of the King whose character the manifesto was designed to blast, at a time so much nearer the event, when the reality or the falsehood of his statement might have been more easily ascertained, contrasts very strikingly with the forced and unnatural manner in which, many years after, he abruptly thrusts the manifesto in Latin prose into the midst of his English poem. He then[154] desired to please Edward IV, to whom any adverse reflection on Bolinbroke would be acceptable.

The document, however, itself savours strongly of forgery. In the first place, it purports to be signed and sealed by Henry Percy, Earl of Northumberland, (though the Earl at that time was in Northumberland,) Henry Percy, his first-born son, and Thomas Earl of Worcester, styling themselves Procurators and Protectors of the kingdom. Should this apparent contradiction be thought to be reconciled with the truth by what Hardyng mentions, that the document was made by good advice of the Archbishop of York, and divers other holy men and lords; it must be answered that it could not have been drawn up for the purpose of being used whenever an opportunity might offer, for, in the name of the three, it challenges the King, and declares that they will prove the allegations "on this day," "on this instant day," twice repeated. Evidently the writer of the document had his mind upon the fatal day of Shrewsbury.

Again, one of their principal charges seems to have emanated from a person totally ignorant of some facts which must have been known to the Percies, and which are established by documents still in our hands. The words of the clause to which we refer run thus: "We aver and intend to prove, that whereas Edmund Mortimer, brother of the Earl of March, was taken by Owyn Glyndowr in mortal battle, in the open field, and has UP TO THIS TIME[155] been cruelly kept in prison and bands of iron, in your cause, you have publicly declared him to have been guilefully taken, [ex dolo,—willingly, as Hall quotes it, to yield himself prisoner to the said Owyn,] and you would not suffer him to be ransomed, neither by his own means nor by us his relatives and friends. We have, therefore, negociated with Owyn, as well for his ransom from our own proper goods, as also for peace between you and Owyn. Wherefore have you regarded us as traitors, and moreover have craftily and secretly planned and imagined our death and utter destruction."

This clause of the manifesto declares the King to have publicly proclaimed that Edmund Mortimer, who was taken in pitched battle, had fraudulently given himself up to Owyn. The King's own letter to the council[156] is totally irreconcileable with his making such a declaration. He announces to them the news which he had just received of Mortimer's capture, as a calamity which had made him resolve to proceed in person against the rebels. "Tidings have reached us from Wales, that the rebels have taken our very dear and much beloved Edmund Mortimer." Again, the clause avers that the King had suffered the same person, Edmund Mortimer, to be kept cruelly in prison and iron chains up to that time, and would not suffer him to be ransomed. In contradiction to this charge, we are assured by the early chroniclers[157] that Owyn treated Mortimer with all the humanity and respect in his power; and that because he possessed not the means of paying a ransom, he had, as early as St. Andrew's day, (30th of November 1402, less than six months after his capture, and nearly eight months before the alleged delivery of the manifesto,) been married to the daughter of Owyn with great solemnity; and, "thus turning wholly to the Welsh people, he pledged himself thereafter to fight for them to the utmost of his power against the English."

Another expression in this clause, incompatible with the truth, but quite consistent with the mistakes which from very early times prevailed as to the circumstances preceding the battle of Shrewsbury, charges the King with having pronounced the three Percies to be traitors, and with having secretly planned and imagined their ruin and death; and this is said to have been signed and sealed by Northumberland, then remaining in the north. Whereas the truth, established beyond controversy, though little known, is, that, up to the very day when the King announced to the council Hotspur's rebellion,—barely four days before the battle,—he had entertained no idea of their disloyalty. Even in his last preceding despatch he informed the council that he was on his way "to afford aid and comfort to his very dear and faithful cousins, the Earl of Northumberland and his son Henry, and to join them in their expedition against the Scots."[158]

These considerations, among others, throw so many and such weighty suspicions on the manifesto, that it can scarcely be regarded as deserving of credit. Nor must the Author here disguise his conviction, that the whole is a forgery, guiltily made for the purpose of blackening the memory of Henry IV, and of casting odium on the dynasty of the house of Lancaster.

Another important mistake into which tradition seems to have betrayed some very pains-taking persons is that which charges Owyn Glyndowr with a breach of faith, and a selfish conduct, on the occasion of the battle of Shrewsbury, utterly unworthy of any man of the slightest pretensions to integrity and honour. He is said by Leland to have promised Percy to be present at that struggle: he is reported by Pennant to have remained, as if spell-bound, with twelve thousand men at Oswestry. The History of Shrewsbury tells us of the still existing remains of an oak at Shelton, into the top-most branches of which he climbed to see the turn of the battle, resolving to proceed or retire as that should be; having come with his forces to that spot time enough to join the conflict. The question involving Owyn Glyndowr's good faith and valour, or zeal and activity, is one of much interest, and deserves to be patiently investigated; whilst an attentive examination of authentic documents, and a careful comparison of dates, are essential to the establishment of the truth. The result of the inquiry may be new, and yet not on that account the less to be relied upon.

That Owyn gladly promised to co-operate with the Percies, there is every reason to regard as time; that he undertook to be with them at Shrewsbury on that day of battle cannot, it should seem, be true. Probably he never heard of any expectation of such an engagement, and the first news which reached him relating to it may have been tidings of Percy's death, and the discomfiture of his troops. The Welsh historians unsparingly charge him with having deceived his northern friends on that day: and some assert that he remained at Oswestry, only seventeen miles off; others that he came to the very banks of the Severn, and tarried there in safety, consulting only his own interest, whilst a vigorous effort on his part might have turned the victory that day against the King. This is, perhaps, within the verge of possibility; but is in the highest degree improbable. That the reports have originated in an entire ignorance of Owyn's probable position at the time, and of the sudden, unforeseen, and unexpected character of the struggle to which Bolinbroke's instantaneous decision forced the Percies, will evidently appear, if, instead of relying on vague tradition, we follow in search of the reality where facts only, or fair inferences from ascertained facts, may conduct us.

It appears, then, to be satisfactorily demonstrable by original documents, interpreted independently of preconceived theory, that, four days only before King Henry's proclamation against the Percies was issued at Burton upon Trent, Owyn Glyndowr was in the extreme divisions of Caermarthenshire, most actively and anxiously engaged in reducing the English castles which still held out against him, and by no means free from formidable antagonists in the field, being fully occupied at that juncture, and likely to be detained there for some time. It must be also remembered that the King published his proclamation as soon as ever he had himself heard of Hotspur's movements from the north, and that even his knowledge of the hostile intentions of the Percies preceded the very battle itself only by the brief space of five days. This circumstance has never (it is presumed) been noticed by any of our historians; and the examination of the whole question involves so new and important a view of the affairs of the Principality at that period, and bears so immediately on the charge made against the great rebel chieftain for dastardly cowardice or gross breach of faith, that it seems to claim in these volumes a fuller and more minute investigation than might otherwise have been desirable or generally interesting. The documents furnishing the facts on which we ground our opinion, are chiefly original letters preserved in the British Museum, and made accessible to the general reader by having been published by Sir Henry Ellis.[159] That excellent Editor, however, has unquestionably referred them to an earlier date than can be truly assigned to them.[160] Independently of the material fact which they are intended to establish, they carry with them much intrinsic interest of their own; and although the detail of the evidence in the body of the work might seem to impede unnecessarily the progress of the narrative, the dissertation in its detached form is recommended to the reader's careful perusal. Should he close his examination of those documents under the same impression which the Author confesses they have made on himself, he will acquiesce in the conclusion above stated, and consider this position as admitting no reasonable doubt,—That, a few days only before the fatal battle of Shrewsbury, Owyn Glyndowr was in the very extremity of South Wales, engaged in attempts to reduce the enemy's garrisons, and crush his power in those quarters; with a prospect also before him of much similar employment in a service of great danger to himself. And when we recollect that probably Henry Percy as little expected the King to meet him at Shrewsbury, as the King a week before had thought to find him or his father in any other part of the kingdom than in Northumberland, whither he was himself on his march to join them; when we recollect the nature and extent of the country which lies between Pembrokeshire and Salop; and reflect also on the undisciplined state of Owyn's "eight thousand and eight score spears, such as they were;" instead of being surprised at his absence from Shrewsbury on the 21st of July, and charging him with having deserted his friends and sworn allies on that sad field, we are driven to believe that his presence there would have savoured more of the marvellous than many of his most celebrated achievements. The simple truth breaks the spell of the poet's picture, and forces us to unveil its fallacy, though it has been pronounced by the historian of Shrewsbury to "form one of the brightest ornaments of the pages of Marmion." To whatever cause we ascribe the decline of Owyn's power, we cannot trace its origin to a judicial visitation as the consequence of his failure in that hour of need. The poet's imagination, creative of poetical justice, wrought upon the tale as it was told; but that tale was not built on truth. The lines, however, deserve to have been the vehicle of a less ill-founded tradition.

"E'en from the day when chained by fate,
By wizard's dream or potent spell,
Lingering from sad Salopia's field,
Reft of his aid, the Percy fell;—
E'en from that day misfortune still,
As if for violated faith,
Pursued him with unwearied step,
Vindictive still for Hotspur's death."[161]

Those who feel an interest in tracing the localities of this battle with a greater minuteness of detail in its circumstances than is requisite for the purpose of these Memoirs, will do well to consult the "Historian of Shrewsbury." The following is offered as the probable outline of the circumstances of the engagement, together with those which preceded and followed it.

The Earl of Northumberland and his son Hotspur were engaged in collecting and organizing troops in the north, for the professed purpose of invading Scotland as soon as the King should join them with his forces. Taking from these troops "eight score horse," Hotspur[162] marched southward from Berwick at their head, and came through Lancashire and Cheshire, spreading his rebellious principles on every side, and adding to his army, especially from among the gentry. He proclaimed everywhere that their favourite Richard, though deposed by the tyranny of Bolinbroke, was still alive; and many gathered round his standard, resolved to avenge the wrongs of their liege lord. The King, with a considerable force, the amount of which is not precisely known, was on his march towards the north, with the intention of joining the forces raised by the Percies, and of advancing with them into Scotland, and, "that expedition well ended," of returning to quell the rebels in Wales. He was at Burton on Trent when news was brought to him of Hotspur's proceedings, which decided him[163] instantly to grapple with this unlooked-for rebellion. Hotspur was believed to be on his road to join Glyndowr, and the King resolved to intercept him.

So far from inferring, as some authors have done, from the smallness of the numbers on either side, that the country considered it more a personal quarrel between two great families than as a national concern, we might rather feel surprise at the magnitude of the body of men which met in the field of Shrewsbury.[164] It must be remembered that the King did not "go down" from the seat of government with 14,000 men; but that the army with which he hastened to crush the rising rebellion consisted only of the troops at the head of whom he was marching towards the north, of the body then under the Prince of Wales on the borders, and of those who could be gathered together on the exigence of the moment by the royal proclamation. It must be borne also in mind that (according to all probability) barely four days elapsed between the first intimation which reached the King's ears of the rebellion of the Percies, and the desperate conflict which crushed them. As we have already seen, the King, only on the 10th of July, (scarcely eleven days before that decisive struggle,) believed himself to be on his road northward to join "his beloved and loyal" Northumberland and Hotspur against the Scots.

The Prince of Wales, who, as we infer, first apprised the King of this rising peril, was on the Welsh borders, near Shrewsbury; and he formed a junction with his father,—but where, and on what day, is not known. Very probably the first intimation that Henry of Monmouth himself had of the hostile designs of the Percies, was the sudden departure of the Earl of Worcester, his guardian, who unexpectedly left the Prince's retinue, and, taking his own dependents with him, joined Hotspur.

At all events, delay would have added every hour to the imminent peril of the royal cause, and probably Hotspur's impetuosity seconded the King's manifest policy of hastening an immediate engagement; and thus the "sorry battle of Shrewsbury" was fought by the united forces of the King and the Prince on the one side, and the forces of Hotspur and his uncle the Earl of Worcester on the other, unassisted by Glyndowr.

That the opposed parties engaged in "Heyteley Field,"[165] near that town, is placed beyond question. With regard to their relative position immediately before the battle, there is no inconsiderable doubt. Some say that the King's army reached the town and took possession of the castle on the Friday, only three hours before Hotspur arrived: others, following Walsingham, represent Hotspur as having arrived first, and being in the very act of assaulting the town, when the sudden, unexpected appearance of the royal banner advancing made him desist from that attempt, and face the King's forces. Be this as it may, on Saturday the 21st of July, the two hostile armies were drawn up in array against each other in Hateley Field, ready to rush to the struggle on which the fate of England was destined much to depend. Whether any manifesto were sent from Hotspur, or not, it is certain that the King made an effort to prevent the desperate conflict, and the unnecessary shedding of so much Christian blood. He despatched the Abbot of Shrewsbury and the Clerk of the Privy Seal to Hotspur's lines, with offers of pardon even then, would they return to their allegiance. Hotspur was much moved by this act of grace, and sent his uncle, the Earl of Worcester, to negociate. This man has been called the origin of all the mischief; and he is said so to have addressed the King, and so to have misinterpreted his mild and considerate conversation, "who condescended, in his desire of reconciliation, even below the royal dignity," that both parties were incensed the more, and resolved instantly to try their strength. The onset was made by the archers of Hotspur, whose tremendous volleys caused dreadful carnage among the King's troops. "They fell," says Walsingham, "as the leaves fall on the ground after a frosty night at the approach of winter. There was no room for the arrows to reach the ground, every one struck a mortal man." The King's bowmen also did their duty. A rumour, spreading through the host, that the King had fallen, shook the steadiness and confidence of his partisans, and many took to flight; the royal presence, however, in every part of the engagement soon rallied his men. Hotspur and Douglas seemed anxious to fight neither with small nor great, but with the King only;[166] though they mowed down his ranks, making alleys, as in a field of corn, in their eagerness to reach him. He was, we are told, unhorsed again and again; but returned to the charge with increased impetuosity. His standard-bearer was killed at his side, and the standard thrown down. At length the Earl of Dunbar forced him away from the post which he had taken. Henry of Monmouth, though he was then no novice in martial deeds, yet had never before been engaged on any pitched-battle field; and here he did his duty valiantly. He was wounded in the face by an arrow; but, so far from allowing himself to be removed on that account to a place of safety, he urged his friends to lead him into the very hottest of the conflict. Elmham records his address: whether they are the very words he uttered, or such only as he was likely to have used, they certainly suit his character: "My lords, far be from me such disgrace, as that, like a poltroon, I should stain my noviciate in arms by flight. If the Prince flies, who will wait to end the battle? Believe it, to be carried back before victory would be to me a perpetual death! Lead me, I implore you, to the very face of the foe. I may not say to my friends, 'Go ye on first to the fight.' Be it mine to say, 'Follow me, my friends.'" The next time we hear of Henry of Monmouth is as an agent of mercy. The personal conflict between him and Hotspur, into the description of which Shakspeare has infused so full a share of his powers of song, has no more substantial origin than the poet's own imagination. Percy fell by an unknown hand, and his death decided the contest. The cry, "Henry Percy is dead!" which the royalists raised, was the signal for utter confusion and flight.[167] The number of the slain on either side is differently reported. When the two armies met, the King's was superior in numbers, but Hotspur's far more abounded in gentle blood. The greater part of the gentlemen of Cheshire fell on that day. On the King's part,[168] except the Earl of Stafford and Sir Walter Blount, few names of note are reckoned among the slain.

The Earl of Worcester, Lord Douglas, and Sir Richard Vernon, fell into the hands of the King; they were kept prisoners till the next Monday, when Worcester and Vernon were beheaded. The Earl's head was sent up to London on the 25th (the following Wednesday), by the bearer of the royal mandate, commanding it to be placed upon London bridge.

Thus ended the "sad and sorry field of Shrewsbury."[169] The battle appeared to be the archetype of that cruel conflict which in the middle of the century almost annihilated the ancient nobility of England. Fabyan says, "it was more to be noted vengeable, for there the father was slain of the son, and the son of the father."