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Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics

Chapter 87: INDEX.
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About This Book

The work presents a systematic account of moral theory that treats ethics as the science of conduct, defining moral action by its relation to ends and examining obligation, duty, and the nature of the will. It situates moral life within social institutions and collective ideals, analyzes individuality as capacity interacting with environment, and contrasts desire as ideal activity with possession. It considers the formation and function of moral rules, the concept of moral badness, and offers critical comparisons with rival views to build an account of moral development as growth in freedom grounded in social ideas and institutional realization.

INDEX.

  • Absolute—and relative Ethics, according to Spencer 72.
  • Accountability—See responsibility.
  • Activity—human, the subject-matter of ethics 1 ff.
  • —the object of desire 21 ff.
  • —the standard of pleasure 45; 50.
  • —equals exercise of function 101.
  • —opposed to mere possession 209; 215; 218; 220.
  • —two sides of 219.
  • —see freedom.
  • Æsthetic feelings—may be moral 199.
  • —see art.
  • Agent—moral, one capable of acting from ideas 3.
  • —see person.
  • Alexander, S.—quoted: on idea of sum of pleasures 46.
  • —referred to: 9; 46; 77; 111; 134; 158; 165; 202; 216; 221; 227.
  • Altruism—how identified with egoism 59.
  • —reconciled, by Spencer, with egoism 70 ff.
  • —conflicts, at present, with egoism 76.
  • —older moralists termed benevolence 195.
  • —not necessarily moral 107.
  • —not disguised selfishness 109.
  • —may equal charity 125.
  • Amusements—moral nature of 133.
  • Approbation—nature of 161.
  • Aristotle—quoted: on pleasure 18;
  • on pleasure and character 29;
  • on the mean 136.
  • —referred to: 31.
  • Art (and Science)—nature of interest in 111.
  • —distinction of fine and useful 112.
  • —interest in, why moral 113 ff.
  • —interest in, really social 118 ff.
  • —life an, 120.
  • —essentially dynamic 126.
  • Asceticism—means formalism 94.
  • —element of truth in 95.
  • —results when interest is excluded 106.
  • Aspiration—involved in morality 213; 222.
  • Autonomy—Kant's conception of justified 149.
  • Badness—of environment a factor in right action 176; 224.
  • —its source and factors 214.
  • —its relation to goodness 223.
  • —potential and actual 223.
  • —of good people 232.
  • Bain, A.—quoted: that pleasure is a self-evident criterion 16;
  • his definition of utilitarianism 53;
  • on obligation 140; 141.
  • —referred to: 17; 66; 227.
  • Barratt—quoted: that all pleasure is individual 14.
  • Baseness—why badness becomes 219.
  • Benevolence—see altruism.
  • Bentham, J.—quoted: pleasure both criterion and motive 15;
  • self-evident criterion 16;
  • all motives good 34 ff.;
  • hedonistic calculus 36 ff.;
  • identity of individual and general pleasure 57 ff.;
  • influence of law 59.
  • —referred to: 53.
  • Birks—referred to: 66.
  • Blackie, J. S.—referred to: 66.
  • Bradley, F. H.—quoted: on pleasure and desire 21;
  • scientific interest not necessarily social 122;
  • on merely individual conscience 189.
  • —referred to: 25; 26; 42; 48; 54; 91; 124; 134; 165; 221.
  • Browning, R.—referred to: 111.
  • Butler—Bishop, quoted: on conscience 167.
  • —referred to: 110.
  • Caird, E.—quoted: on collision of moral ends 88.
  • —referred to: 21; 82; 87; 91; 92; 93; 95; 109; 111; 149; 165.
  • Calderwood—referred to: 158; 166.
  • Capacity—its relation to environment 97.
  • —increased by moral action 206.
  • Carlyle, T.—referred to: 128.
  • Casuistry—inevitable, if moral end is not wholly social 119.
  • Character—reciprocal with conduct 9.
  • —the source of motive, desire and moral pleasure 26 ff.
  • —separated from conduct by hedonists 32 ff.
  • —and virtues 227 ff.
  • —see capacity, conduct, interests and motive.
  • Charity—idea of, involves social inequality 125.
  • Christianity—ethical influence of 224.
  • —has no specific ethical code 231.
  • Coit, S.—referred to: 28; 66.
  • Commands—moral value of: 203.
  • Common Good—an ethical ideal 51.
  • —not furnished by hedonism 60.
  • —not furnished by Kant 91.
  • —why necessarily involved in morality 117; 217; 222.
  • —demands reciprocal satisfaction of individual and society 127.
  • —its existence postulated by moral conduct 130.
  • —results from exercise of function 168.
  • —constituted by activity 169 ff.
  • —realized in institutions 173.
  • —development of 210.
  • —see institutions and society.
  • Comprehensiveness—growth of, in moral end 210 ff.
  • Conduct—defined 3.
  • —relation to consequences 7.
  • —relation to character 9.
  • —an individual system 133.
  • —a social system 136.
  • —how related to character 163.
  • —see activity, consequences, character and motive.
  • Conflict—of moral ends 88 ff.
  • —morality has an aspect of 151; 227.
  • Conscience—Bain's idea of 141.
  • —equals consciousness of action 181.
  • —elements in 182.
  • —not a special faculty 183.
  • —kinds of 183 ff.
  • —not merely individual 188.
  • Conscientiousness—nature of 199.
  • —does not equal introspection 200.
  • —nor application of code 201.
  • —a cardinal virtue 232.
  • Consequences—moral value of 7 ff.; 84; 114; 160.
  • —excluded from morality by Kantianism 13; 29.
  • —identified with moral value by hedonism 33.
  • —responsibility for 160.
  • Criterion—hedonistic is pleasure 15.
  • —criticism of hedonistic 31 ff.
  • —two ends to be met by every 32.
  • —of higher and lower pleasures 49 ff.
  • —when pleasure may be a 50.
  • —Mill's really social 63.
  • —Spencer's really social 73.
  • —Kant's nominally formal 79 ff.
  • —the real 132 ff.
  • —its elasticity 135.
  • Darwin, C.—referred to: 78.
  • Demoralization—involved in badness 220.
  • Desire—pleasure as end of 16; 18 ff.
  • —defined 19.
  • —how spiritualized 23.
  • —not purely pleasurable 27.
  • —an expression of character 28.
  • —excluded from moral motive by Kant 79.
  • —all or no involved in morality 94.
  • —relation to pleasure 83.
  • —particular, an abstraction 96.
  • —how distinguished from interest 103.
  • —opposed to reason by Kant 147.
  • —when opposed to moral action 148; 155; 213; 216.
  • —how socialized, 237.
  • Dewey, J.—referred to: 25; 78; 194.
  • Disinterestedness—equals full interest 107.
  • —an aspect of cardinal virtue 232.
  • Disposition—Bentham on 35.
  • Dualism—the Kantian 148 ff.
  • Duty—see obligation.
  • Egoism—see altruism.
  • Empiricism—Spencer's reconciliation with intuitionalism 69 ff.
  • End—moral: see common good; function; motive.
  • Environment—defined by relation to capacity 99 ff.
  • —meaning of adjustment to 115 ff.
  • —moral, exists in institutions 171.
  • —badness of, an element in right action 176; 190.
  • —enlarged by moral action 207.
  • Ethical World—discussed 167 ff.
  • —nature illustrated 168.
  • —relation to moral law 174.
  • —see Institutions.
  • Ethics—defined 1.
  • —divided 3.
  • —its object according to Spencer 68.
  • —see theory.
  • Evolution, Theory of—combined with hedonism 67 ff.
  • —not really hedonistic 71 ff.
  • —its real standard objective 72.
  • Faith—a factor in moral progress 123; 127 ff.
  • —in humanity, meaning of 129.
  • —why demanded in moral action 217; 222.
  • Feelings—natural and moral 5 ff.; 25 ff.; 87.
  • —sympathetic relied upon by utilitarians 57.
  • —necessary in moral activity 85.
  • —active, equal interests 102.
  • —moral, defined by end 108;
  • see also motive.
  • —value of 195 ff.
  • —moral, not too narrowly limited 199.
  • Freedom—is object of desire 24.
  • —equals exercise of function 138.
  • —various aspects of 158.
  • —of choice defined 159.
  • —of indifference discussed 161 ff.
  • —actualized in rights 172; 174.
  • —positive, realized in virtues 229.
  • Function—union of capacity and circumstance in act 103.
  • —freedom found in exercise of 164 ff.
  • Gizycki—referred to: 66.
  • God—an external, cannot be the source of obligation 149.
  • Goethe—referred to: 128.
  • Golden Rule—identified by Mill with principle of utilitarianism 59.
  • —gives no directions as to conduct 204.
  • —is a concrete statement of ethical postulate 205.
  • Green, T. H.—quoted: on desire and pleasure 21;
  • on sum of pleasures 43;
  • on nature of happiness 45;
  • on conscientiousness 200; 202;
  • on goodness 215.
  • —referred to: 9; 25; 42; 54; 110; 158; 165.
  • Grote, J.—referred to: 66; 158.
  • Guyau—referred to: 66; 143.
  • Hedonism—defined 14 ff.
  • —its paradox 25.
  • —confuses feeling and idea 26; 43 ff.
  • —summarized 30.
  • —all motives good 33.
  • —its calculus 36.
  • —fails to provide laws 39 ff.
  • —its contrast with Kantianism 82 ff.
  • —its treatment of obligation 140 ff.
  • —is correct in holding rightness to be pleasurable 228.
  • —truth and falsity in 234.
  • Hegel—quoted: on reflective conscience 188;
  • on merely individual conscience 189.
  • Hinton, J.—quoted: on altruism 109;
  • on badness 216.
  • —referred to: 202.
  • Hodgson, S. H.—referred to: 14.
  • Idealism—when feeble 128.
  • Ideals—moral, progressive, 206.
  • Imperative, Categorical—of Kant 147.
  • —of conscience 191.
  • Impulse—and pleasure 17.
  • —and desire 22.
  • —nature of action from 159.
  • —see desire.
  • Individuality—defined 97.
  • —not identical with inner side alone 98.
  • —evils of defining from this standpoint 110.
  • —made by function 131.
  • —realized is autonomy 150.
  • —realized is freedom 164.
  • —growth in 210.
  • —see freedom and rights.
  • Institutions—nature of 169 ff.
  • —sovereignty, rights and law inhere in 171 ff.
  • —influence of, upon conscience 184; 189.
  • —movement of, the source of duties, 194.
  • —see common good and society.
  • Interests—are functions on personal side 102 ff.
  • —classified and discussed 104 ff.
  • —social, involve science and art 123 ff.
  • —realized in institutions 170.
  • —their relation to conscience 198.
  • —pure, are virtue 228.
  • —the active element of 218.
  • —the freeing of, the moral goal 233.
  • James, Sr., H.—referred to: 202.
  • James, Wm.—quoted: on pleasure and desire 20.
  • —referred to: 77.
  • Kant—agrees with hedonism as to end of desire 79.
  • —his end an abstraction 84.
  • —his practical ideal that of Mill and Spencer 93.
  • —value of his theory 93.
  • —his theory of obligation 147.
  • —his conception of autonomy 149.
  • —his idea of duty 156.
  • —his conception of practical reason 191.
  • —quoted: on pleasure 47;
  • on pleasure as common good 52;
  • on priority of duty to good 78;
  • on good will 79;
  • his formula for right action 80;
  • illustrations of moral law 80 ff.
  • —referred to: 14; 78; 212; 221; 235.
  • Kantianism—compared with hedonism 82 ff.
  • —its practical breakdown 90.
  • Knowledge—moral effect of advance in 207.
  • —socializes wants 237.
  • —see art.
  • Laurie, S. S.—quoted: on happiness 66.
  • —referred to: 227.
  • Law—utilitarian use of 58; 61 ff.
  • —Kant's moral, formal 78.
  • —relation to desire 94.
  • —realized in institutions 172; 174.
  • —of the 'is', not merely of the 'ought' 175.
  • —idea of, in general 195.
  • —see obligation.
  • Lawlessness—involved in morality 216.
  • Leckey—referred to: 66.
  • Limitation—the basis of moral strength 128.
  • Lincoln, A.—anecdote regarding 28.
  • Lotze—referred to: 16; 166.
  • Love—the union of duty and desire 154.
  • Martineau, J.—quoted: on the difficulty of the hedonistic calculus 38.
  • —referred to: 42; 78; 158; 166; 227.
  • Maurice, F. D.—referred to: 191.
  • Merit—means social desert 225.
  • Mill, J. S.—criticizes Kant 91.
  • —his equivoke of pleasure and pleasant thing 20.
  • —his fallacy 56.
  • —introduces quality of pleasure into hedonism 42; 46.
  • —quoted: pleasure self-evident criterion 16;
  • end of desire 17;
  • on rules of morality 39 ff;
  • on moral tribunal 48;
  • on utilitarian standard 53;
  • on importance of law and education 59;
  • on social feeling 63 ff.
  • —referred to: 25; 30; 49.
  • Morality—sphere of as broad as conduct 2; 154.
  • —not dependent upon an individual's wish 167 ff.
  • —realized in institutions 170.
  • —struggle for private, bad 202.
  • —in the nature of things 233.
  • Motive—defined 5.
  • —two elements in 10.
  • —determined by character 28.
  • —never bad according to hedonism 33.
  • —formal and legislative according to Kant 80.
  • —not a subjective mood 232.
  • Norms—in philosophy 1.
  • Obligation—in conflict with pleasure 76 ff.
  • —how related to function 138.
  • —theories regarding 139.
  • —distinct from coercion 144.
  • —enforced, not created by power 145.
  • —Kantian idea of criticized 148.
  • —does not relate simply to what ought to be, but is not 151; 174 ff.
  • —relation to conscience 183.
  • —how made known 190 ff.
  • —practical value of sense of 196.
  • —must be individualized 197; 201.
  • —when opposed to desire 213; 216.
  • —the union with desire the moral ideal 234.
  • —see desire, law and universal.
  • Pater—referred to: 66.
  • Pathological—all inclination, according to Kant 86.
  • —opposed to active 212.
  • Paulsen—referred to: 67; 111.
  • Person—is one capable of conduct 97.
  • Pleasure—an element in activity 24.
  • —not the moving spring to action 26.
  • —sum of, dependent on objective conditions 44 ff.
  • —quality of, similarly dependent 47 ff.
  • —may symbolize action 51.
  • —general, a vague idea 62.
  • —fixed by social relations 65; 77.
  • —not a sufficient guide at present 75.
  • —dependent on self-realization 83.
  • —all right action involves 228.
  • —see desire and hedonism.
  • Postulate—moral, defined 129 ff.
  • —equals Golden Rule 205.
  • Problem—moral 3.
  • Progress—necessary in moral action 135 ff.
  • —moral, nature of 209.
  • Prudence—not outside moral sphere 105.
  • Reason—opposed to desire by Kant 147.
  • —Kant's conception too immediate 150.
  • —practical, idea of 191.
  • Reformation—possibility of 162 ff.
  • Relativity—of morals, means what 136.
  • Responsibility—nature of 160 ff.
  • —of parents and children 203.
  • Reverence—Kant regards as sole moral feeling 86.
  • Rights—exist by common will 172.
  • Rousseau—his influence upon Kant 148.
  • Royce, J.—referred to: 61; 111.
  • Rule—moral, not a command 204.
  • —a tool of analysis 204.
  • Satisfaction—moral, creates new wants 208.
  • —good and bad 217.
  • Science—nature of interest in 111.
  • —the preëminent moral means 237.
  • —see art.
  • Schurman, J. G.—referred to: 78.
  • Self—interest in 105 ff.
  • —involves sympathy 109.
  • —dualism in self, how arises 216.
  • —knowledge of 237.
  • Selfishness—involved in immorality 216.
  • Self-sacrifice—its moral nature 222.
  • Sentimentality—immoral 113.
  • —escape from, only through knowledge 120.
  • —results from abstract idea of duty 157.
  • —refined, equals sensuality 220.
  • Shakespeare—quoted: on common good 131.
  • Sidgwick, H.—quoted: on the hedonistic assumption 43;
  • on utilitarian standard 53;
  • on intuitional utilitarianism 54.
  • —referred to: 14; 16; 18; 66; 111; 227.
  • Society—its moral influence 146; 157.
  • —its relation to obligation 152.
  • —constituted by moral relationships 175.
  • —development of, changes moral ideals 207.
  • —see common good, institutions.
  • Socrates—author of idea of reflective conscience 188.
  • —initiator of modern ethical spirit 237.
  • Sorley—referred to: 78; 111.
  • Sovereignty—exists in common will and good 171.
  • —ultimate possessed in humanity 173.
  • Spencer, H.—believes in fixed social ideal 73 ff.; 235.
  • —quoted: on pleasure as a necessary effect 68;
  • not immediate object of desire 69;
  • egoism and altruism 70 ff.;
  • on ideal man 73;
  • equilibrium of functions 74;
  • on obligation 142; 143.
  • —referred to: 16; 67; 72; 73; 74; 75; 76; 111; 125; 235.
  • Stephen, L.—quoted: on feeling as universal motive 27;
  • on sympathy 109 ff.
  • —referred to: 16; 25; 67; 68; 78; 111; 165; 227.
  • Struggle—when morality is a 212.
  • —changed by Christianity into movement 225.
  • —see conflict.
  • Sully, J.—referred to: 17.
  • Theory—ethical and conduct 1.
  • —ethical, sub-divided 13.
  • —ethical, not casuistry 89.
  • —value of 186.
  • Universal—a, lacking in hedonism 37.
  • —Kant's emphasis of 80.
  • —Kant's, formal 80; 85; 90.
  • —Kant's, leads to conflict 87.
  • —true, equals organization, 88; 90; 96.
  • —bad action cannot be 221.
  • —means a method, not a thing 136.
  • —found in movement of character 234.
  • —see law.
  • Utilitarianism—is universalistic hedonism 13; 53.
  • —defined by Mill, Sidgwick, Bain, 53.
  • —criticized 54 ff.
  • —assumes social order 63 ff.
  • —combined with evolution 67.
  • Virtue—change in nature of 211.
  • —correlative to duty 225.
  • —distinguished from merit 226.
  • —is an interest of character 228.
  • —two types of 229.
  • —cardinal 230.
  • Wants—see desires.
  • Wilson (and Fowler)—referred to: 67.
  • Will—Kant's good will 79.