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Slavery as an industrial system

Chapter 16: § 1. Introduction.
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About This Book

The work examines slavery as an organized economic institution through comparative ethnographic evidence from small-scale and non-industrial societies, surveying its geographic distribution and varied forms. Employing an inductive method, it considers origins, legal status, household authority, treatment of dependents and children, and the labour roles slaves perform, while engaging with contemporary theorists and critiques. The author integrates case records with theoretical discussion to show how bondage intersects with kinship, property, and social hierarchy, and to distinguish between domestic unfreedom, servile labor, and other forms of dependent status across cultures.

[Contents]

§ 1. Introduction.

Having now determined what is the meaning of the term “slavery”, we are about to inquire, what is its social signification, what place does it occupy in those societies where it formerly existed or still exists? As this book confines itself to ethnological investigations, we shall try to throw light on this problem with the help of the data supplied to us by the study of savage races. But then we must first know, whether slavery exists among all savage tribes, and, if not, whether it is confined to certain races of men or to certain parts of the world; and further, whether it is found on all levels of lower culture, or on some only, and if the latter, on which. The solution of these problems requires a survey of the occurrence of slavery among wild tribes in the several parts of the globe. This survey will occupy the present chapter.

A few words have still to be said about our method of ascertaining the existence or non-existence of slavery in every particular case.

To one unacquainted with our science the task to be performed now may seem very easy: we have only to consult the ethnographical literature bearing on any tribe, and to look whether slavery is mentioned; if it is mentioned in an affirmative sense, slavery exists; if in a negative sense or not at all, slavery does not exist. But every one familiar with ethnographical literature knows that it has not to be used in such a rough-and-ready manner. The statements of ethnographers [42]are not to be accepted without much caution and a thorough criticism1.

The observance of the following rules will, so far as we can judge, give to our conclusions the highest possible degree of probability.

1º. If it is stated that slavery exists, is this sufficient evidence of its existence? Our definition, arrived at in the first chapter, lies within the limits of ordinary language; therefore it is probable that our informants have used the term in the same sense we attach to it. There are, however, many cases in which the words “slave” and “slavery” are applied to something quite different from their true meaning, as will be seen from our survey of the matter. Thus it is necessary to ask for more evidence than is given by the mere term “slavery”.

a. If it sufficiently appears that in some tribe there are men considered to be the property of others, we need not doubt whether slavery exists.

b. If this is not clearly proved, there is still one particular, that being mentioned makes the existence of slavery very probable, viz. the fact that people are bought and sold within the tribe, except of course women sold for wives. For other kinds of subjected persons, serfs, lower classes, and subjects of a despot, are not bought or sold, at least not within the tribe. Beyond the limits of the tribe a man may be sold without previously having been a slave. Thus some African despots sell their subjects to Arabian slave-traders; such a sale does not prove that slavery exists within the tribe. But when a man is sold within the tribe, either he was already a [43]slave, or he becomes such, e.g. as a punishment; in both cases slavery is practised by the tribe2.

c. If the particulars on record are quite insufficient to determine the nature of the alleged slave-state, the possibility of a mistake is much lessened by several writers, independently of each other, stating that slavery exists.

d. Finally, the general trustworthiness of the writer or writers must be taken into account.

2º. If we are told that there are no slaves, it is very probable that slavery really does not exist, for slavery is a phenomenon rather easy to observe, and the ethnographers are generally inclined to use the word in a too wide rather than in a too restricted sense. There is no need here for the extreme scepticism with which we have to receive an assertion of any tribe having no religion3. This does not prevent, of course, that if we find the existence of slavery denied by a writer who is generally badly informed, we may reject such an assertion.

3º. The greatest difficulties are presented by those cases in which no mention is made of slavery. Here the utmost caution has to be observed.

a. If it clearly appears from the description, that there are people considered to be the property of others, without the word “slavery” being used, the conclusion is evident.

b. Perhaps some facts are mentioned which make the existence of slavery highly improbable. We shall see that the main source of slavery is captivity in war; so, if it is stated that no captives are made, or that the lot of the captives is something else than slavery, the non-existence of slavery is probable. But even then it is not quite certain: there may still be slaves, acquired by other means. Further: if it is stated that there are no social classes, or if the classes are enumerated and slaves are not among them, there is a strong presumption that slavery does not exist. Yet here too there is no certainty; for slaves, among savage tribes, have not always the aspect of a social class. The description of the [44]division of labour between the sexes may also suggest to us the non-existence of slavery. When we are informed that the men do some kinds of work and the women some other kinds, we are inclined to think: if there were slaves, their special work would be mentioned too. But this argument is most dangerous; for the slaves very often have no special kind of work allotted to them.

We see that none of these criteria prove quite reliable. Yet, taken together, they give a high degree of probability. And it is not even necessary that all of them can be ascertained. If an ethnographer, known to be trustworthy, gives us an elaborate description, pretending to be a picture of the whole social life of the tribe he describes, it were a wonder if he had entirely omitted slavery, while it existed; the more so as this phenomenon is not so difficult to recognize. The same argument obtains a fortiori, when several such descriptions of the same tribe exist.

4º. In doubtful cases we may take into account the state of the group to which a particular tribe belongs. It may be that in the general descriptions of a group no mention is made of slavery; that, further, all tribes belonging to this group of which we are well informed prove to have no slaves. If, then, the information we get concerning a particular tribe belonging to the same group, is not complete enough to rely upon, there is a strong presumption that this tribe will be in the same state as the rest of the group, i.e. that it does not keep slaves. Under the same conditions we may suppose that a tribe belonging to a slave-keeping group keeps slaves. The term “group” has to be taken here in a sociological, not in an anthropological or linguistic sense, and its application must be somewhat restricted. It must consist of tribes, that live in somewhat similar conditions and the institutions of which closely resemble each other; e.g. Australia (the continent) is a group in this sense, North America is not. It is almost superfluous to add, that this group-argument may be used only to strengthen existing, but insufficient, evidence.

We confine ourselves here to the phenomena of savage life; therefore we shall exclude the semi-civilized peoples. An exact distinction, however, between these two classes of peoples has [45]not yet been made4; so we are fully aware of the possibility of mistakes, made here in this respect. As we were not able to apply any exact criterion, we have more or less followed our general impressions, paying most attention to the development of political institutions. So for instance we have excluded the Kabyls of Northern Africa, because their detailed legal system, as described by Hanoteau and Letourneux5, proves that politically they have passed beyond the stage of savagery. And a developed political organization cannot exist without profoundly marking such an institution as slavery.

We shall find that several savage tribes have to a considerable extent been influenced by civilized or semi-civilized nations. In such cases the question arises: have we to deal here with phenomena of unadulterated savage life? This question is important and deserves full attention. We shall see that many savage tribes in their true aboriginal state have been acquainted with slavery, whereas many others when first discovered did not practise it; so neither the existence nor the non-existence of slavery must necessarily be due to foreign interference; either may be aboriginal, and must be supposed to be so wherever there is not a strong presumption to the contrary6. But there are also many cases in which foreign influence has undoubtedly been at work. We must, then, make a distinction. If the influence of the civilized or semi-civilized nation has led to a, so to speak, normal development, i.e. a development, which lies within the limits of primitive culture, we have to deal with a phenomenon of savage life. For instance, commercial intercourse with a nation of higher civilization has brought about an accumulation of wealth and a social differentiation, which render the existence of slavery possible. In such case we may safely speak of slavery as practised by savages, for it is the effect of trade in general, not of intercourse with a [46]civilized nation as such, that we have to deal with here. If, on the contrary, there has been an abnormal development, i.e. a development which does not take place in countries inhabited by savages only, the present condition of the savage tribe has no interest to us. For instance, measures have been taken by a civilized nation on purpose to abolish slavery. Then we, for our purpose, must consider the savage tribe concerned as keeping slaves, and pay attention only to the descriptions of its institutions as they were before the abolition.

The ensuing paragraphs will show which savage tribes keep slaves and which do not keep any. The groups into which we have divided the several tribes are mainly geographical, not intended to answer any anthropological purpose. As long as the meaning of the term “race” is so unstable as at present, we think it better not to operate with it. Our groups are nearly the same as those given by Schurtz in his Völkerkunde.

At the end of each paragraph its result will be mentioned. The “positive cases” are the tribes which probably keep slaves, the “negative cases” those which probably do not keep slaves. Under the head of “no conclusion” we have given the cases in which the probability that slavery exists is nearly as great, or as little, as the inverse probability. The tribes, the names of which are printed in italics, are those which afford “clear cases”, i.e. where the probability nearly amounts to certainty.

At the end of the chapter a brief recapitulation will show the occurrence of slavery among savages in the several parts of the globe.

When, in the following paragraphs, we say: “Such a tribe keeps slaves,” or: “Such a tribe does not keep slaves,” this does not imply that the same state of things still prevails. The tribe we speak of may have died out; or, where slavery existed, it may have been abolished. When we know that such a thing has taken place, we shall use the past tense. But in many cases the only information we have got concerning some tribe dates from many years back; and we do not know what has become of this tribe in the meantime. Then, not to be obliged always to use such tedious formulas as: “In Mr. X.’s time slavery existed among such a tribe,” we shall simply say: “slavery exists.” Whether it still exists is certainly of [47]much interest to a philanthropist; but to us, for the purposes we have set ourselves in the present volume, it is quite immaterial.