INTRODUCTION.

The only apology which I offer for this authentic account of an event which (having occurred more than forty years ago), can scarcely be supposed to possess much interest for the reader of to-day, is, that having been a participant in the battle myself, I feel a sort of pride in having an accurate and complete account of it handed down to posterity.

In my humble judgment no such account has ever yet appeared; and although I am but indifferently equipped for the task—having dabbled but slightly in literature, during my busy life of three score and ten years,—yet I trust that my earnest desire to relate the facts just as they occurred—and which I propose to do, without fear or favor—will atone for any shortcomings from a purely literary point of view. Although I have said that no accurate and complete narrative of this occurrence has ever been published, the reader must not therefore assume that there exist no published accounts of it whatever. On the contrary, it has been described more or less at length, by so many different writers, both in transitory and permanent form, that my chief embarrassment arises rather from a superabundance than from a paucity of materials.

In the library of the N.Y. Historical Society are to be found no less than ninety-seven books and pamphlets giving what purport to be "full, true and particular" accounts of the attack upon New York by the British fleet in the year 1890.

The titles of some of these contributions to contemporaneous history are decidedly amusing and suggestive of the sensational spirit which was such a marked characteristic of the general literature, and especially of the newspaper press of that period.

For instance, we have among them, "The New Armada;" "The British Blackmailer;" "Modern Piracy;" "The Doom of the Iron Clads;" "The Disappearance of the British flag from North America;" and one, more pretentious than the rest, is entitled "An inquiry into the causes which led to the acquisition of Canada by the United States of America."

In addition to these numerous books and pamphlets, the newspapers of the period contained page after page of the most vivid and sensational accounts, in which truth and falsehood, and sense and absurdity, are so evidently mingled, that no conscientious historian would be willing to utilize them as reliable authorities. Nevertheless, a perusal of them even at this late day, may be found interesting to many of my readers, and as they are kept on file in most of the leading city libraries, they are within easy reach of all.

The reader of to-day will be vastly amused in looking over these old journals, at the evidences to be found on every page, and in almost every column, of intense and bitter rivalry and jealousy between their several editors and proprietors. Indeed the journalistic world at that period seems to have been suffering from an absolute epidemic of sensationalism, which extended not only to the reading matter, but to the "make up" as well; and in addition to the prurient details of social scandals, divorce proceedings, and horrible crimes, the reader's attention was sought to be attracted by glaring and suggestive head lines, such as would be tolerated in no respectable metropolitan journal of the present day. As an evidence of how our tastes are influenced by our surroundings, I may here state, that while I am now shocked at the total lack of good taste and the superabundance of sensational vulgarity displayed by most of the newspapers of that day, yet I cannot remember that I regarded them with any such feelings at that time, although I was a man, and certainly is competent a judge of propriety then, as I am now. But this is to be a history, not a moral treatise.

With such a mass of material at my command, it will be apparent that it has been no slight task to sift out the grain from the chaff, and to condense the vast accumulation of authorities into a comparatively brief volume like this.

I am fully aware that there are many defects in it, both of omission and commission; but of one thing the reader may rest assured.

I have at least been conscientious in my efforts to get at the exact truth, and to correct numerous errors which previous historians have made, either through carelessness, prejudice, or willfulness.

With this brief introduction, and with extreme diffidence, I submit my work to the consideration of the candid, unprejudiced, and I trust, kindly disposed reader.

SAM'L BARTON.

NEW YORK, October, 1930.

THE BATTLE OF THE SWASH

AND

CAPTURE OF CANADA.

CHAPTER I.

THE UNITED STATES PRIOR TO 1890.

Before entering upon a detailed account of what naval experts of all nationalities have conceded to be the most interesting and important naval event of that remarkable century (the nineteenth), whose later years many of my older readers can doubtless remember, I will endeavor to present in as brief and concise a manner as possible, a summary of the events which preceded it, and the causes which led up to it; as without such an explanation the story of the battle itself would possess little or no historical value.

The first thing which it is necessary for me to explain, is my reason for choosing the title "The Battle of the Swash."

I am not aware that this title has ever been used before, but if the reader will consult a chart of the Harbor of New York, he will at once see the propriety of it.

It will be seen that what is known among pilots as the "Swash," is a straight channel, forming a sort of a hypotenuse to the two sides of the main ship channel, which bends almost at a right angle at the Southwest spit.

Assuming, therefore, that the Narrows is effectually blockaded with torpedoes or other obstructions, and that an attacking fleet desired to bombard New York at long range, and at the same time be in a position to withdraw easily and quickly in case of repulse or accident, the Swash Channel is the point which would naturally be chosen. The British Admiral was undoubtedly familiar with the upper and lower Bays of New York, and therefore it is not at all strange that he selected this spot as a base of his operations against the city.

Here he anchored his fleet; and here the battle—such as it was—was fought. I therefore claim that the title which I have chosen, is a most appropriate one; and if this little work is to possess any value as a historical authority, the remarkable contest herein recorded, will be known to future generations as "The Battle of the Swash."

Having thus "made my title clear," I will endeavor to summarize briefly the events, which either directly or remotely, contributed to the final catastrophe, and induced Canada to declare war against the United States.

And here at the very outset of my task, I am confronted with greater difficulties than at any other portion of it.

Our ancestors of the Nineteenth Century were so constantly occupied in making history, that they seemed to have little or no time to record it; and therefore there will probably never be any adequate historical record of the settlement, improvement and development of the vast continent of North America. I regard this as in a measure a calamity to the whole human race; for I think that history may be searched in vain for any such grand and marvelous example of progress and development, as that exhibited by our ancestors of the last century.

In consequence of this dearth of detailed information, I have been obliged to rely upon such data as could be collected from the files of newspapers, magazines and similar publications, for the following meagre sketch of the industrial and political condition of the United States previous to the year 1890.

What has been called the "War of the Rebellion" occurred in the years 1861-5 inclusive; and was an attempt by the southern slave holding States, to secede from the Union, and establish a separate confederacy, based upon Free Trade and Human Slavery. Although the rights of the slaveholders were fully acknowledged by the law of the land, yet the growth of the sentiment in favor of abolition of slavery was so rapid throughout the Northern States, that the Southerners became alarmed lest their property rights should be ignored and denied; and after several years of defiant wrangling and threatening, at length formally seceded from the Union, and by the attack on Fort Sumter—a fort in Charleston Harbor—inaugurated the long and bloody conflict which finally resulted in the total abolition of slavery, and the restoration of the authority of the United States Government, in all portions of United States territory.

Previous to this war, the United States occupied a front rank among the maritime powers of the world.

The "American Clipper Ships" (vessels propelled entirely by sail power; which for purposes of ocean navigation is now practically obsolete) were considered the perfection of marine architecture, and bore the stars and stripes proudly and triumphantly upon every sea.

Over 2000 establishments were engaged in the shipbuilding industry, giving employment to over 20,000 skilled laborers, whose wages amounted to more than $12,000,000 annually; and who built from $30,000,000 to $40,000,000 worth of vessels each year.

During the ten years immediately preceding the "War of the Rebellion," 67 per cent. of the vessels entering the ports of the United States, carried the American flag; as against 33 per cent. carrying foreign flags.

In 1887 only about 15 per cent. were American, as against 85 per cent. foreign.

Several causes had conspired to bring about this vast and disastrous decline in American ownership.

The first, and most effective of these, unquestionably grew out of the almost unconcealed and anxious efforts of England, to prevent the Northern States from bringing the war to a successful issue, and thus assuring the restoration of the Union.

The cause of this animus on the part of England, was, as is always the case, where any of her interests are involved, a purely and intensely selfish one.

The Northern, and especially the New England States, were mercantile and manufacturing States, and had become formidable rivals to England in the two great interests in which the latter power had hitherto deemed herself unapproachable. The American shipowner outsailed and underbid his English competitor in all parts of the world; and the American manufacturer, by improved methods and ingenious mechanical appliances, had begun to successfully compete with his English rival, not only in American markets, but in foreign ones as well; and Englishmen viewed with unconcealed dismay, the imminent prospect of having their immense carrying trade as well as their enormous manufacturing interests, ruined by the competition of their enterprising and ingenious American rivals.

Indeed, so marked had this development been, that an eminent French writer, De Tocqueville, in a book called "Democracy in America," written nearly twenty years previous to the outbreak of the "War of the Rebellion," in a chapter entitled "Some considerations on the causes of the Commercial prosperity of the United States," wrote as follows:

"The inhabitants of the United States constitute a great civilized people, which fortune has placed in the midst of an uncultivated country, at a distance of three thousand miles from the central point of civilization. America consequently stands in daily need of Europe. The Americans will, no doubt, ultimately succeed in producing or manufacturing at home, most of the articles which they require; but the two continents can never be independent of each other, so numerous are the natural ties between their wants, their ideas, their habits, and their manners. The Union has peculiar commodities which have now become necessary to us, as they cannot be cultivated, or can be raised only at an enormous expense, upon the soil of Europe. The Americans consume only a small portion of this produce, and they are willing to sell us the rest. Europe is therefore the market of America, as America is the market of Europe; and maritime commerce is no less necessary to enable the inhabitants of the United States to transport their raw materials to the ports of Europe, than it is to enable us to supply them with our manufactured produce.

"The United States must therefore either furnish much business to other maritime nations, even if they should themselves renounce commerce, as the Spaniards of Mexico have hitherto done, or they must become one of the first maritime powers of the globe.

"The Anglo-Americans have always displayed a decided taste for the sea. The Declaration of Independence by breaking the commercial bonds which united them to England, gave a fresh and powerful stimulus to their maritime genius. Ever since that time, the shipping of the Union has increased almost as rapidly as the number of its inhabitants. The Americans themselves now transport to their own shores nine-tenths of the European produce which they consume. And they also bring three-quarters of the exports of the New World to the European consumer. The ships of the United States fill the docks of Havre and of Liverpool, whilst the number of English and French vessels at New York is comparatively small. Thus, not only does the American merchant brave competition on his own ground, but even successfully supports that of foreign nations in their own ports. This is readily explained by the fact, that the vessels of the United States cross the seas at a cheaper rate....

"It is difficult to say for what reason the Americans can navigate at a lower rate than other nations; one is at first led to attribute this superiority to the physical advantages which nature gives them; but it is not so.

"The American vessels cost almost as much to build as our own; they are not better built, and they generally last a shorter time. The pay of the American sailor is more considerable than the pay on board European ships, which is proved by the great number of Europeans who are to be found in the merchant vessels of the United States. How happens it then, that the Americans sail their vessels at a cheaper rate than we can ours? I am of opinion that the true cause of their superiority must not be sought for in physical advantages, but that it is wholly attributable to moral and intellectual qualities....

"The European sailor navigates with prudence; he sets sail only when the weather is favorable; if an unforeseen accident befals him, he puts into port; at night, he furls a portion of his canvass; and when the whitening billows intimate the vicinity of land, he checks his course, and takes an observation of the Sun.

"The American neglects these precautions and braves these dangers. He weighs anchor before the tempest is over; by night and by day he spreads his sheets to the wind; he repairs as he goes along, such damage as his vessel may have sustained from the storm; and when he at last approaches the term of his voyage, he darts onward to the shore as if he already descried a port.

"The Americans are often shipwrecked, but no trader crosses the seas so rapidly. And, as they perform the same distance in shorter time, they can perform it at a cheaper rate.....

"I cannot better explain my meaning, than by saying that the Americans show a sort of heroism in their manner of trading. The European merchant will always find it difficult to imitate his American competitor who, in adopting the system which I have just described, does not follow calculation, but an impulse of his nature.....

"Reason and experience prove that no commercial prosperity can be durable if it cannot be united, in case of need, to naval force. This truth is as well understood in the United States as anywhere else; the Americans are already able to make their flag respected; in a few years they will make it feared.....

"Nations, as well as men, almost always betray the prominent features of their future destiny in their earliest years. When I contemplate the ardor with which the Anglo-Americans prosecute commerce, the advantages which aid them, and the success of their undertakings, I cannot help believing that they will one day become the first maritime power of the globe. They are born to rule the seas, as the Romans were to conquer the world."[*]

[*] "Democracy in America," by Alexis de Tocqueville. Translated by Henry Reeve, Esquire. Edited with notes by Prof. Francis Owen, of Harvard University, Cambridge, 1863, Vol. 1, p. 648 to 552.

To a reader of the present day, these words, albeit they were written nearly a hundred years ago, seem to have been almost inspired by superhuman wisdom, so accurately do they describe the present position of the United States as a maritime power; but if any American could have read them about the time of the "Battle of the Swash," they would have seemed either to convey the severest sarcasm of which human speech is capable, or else to have been the wild and unmeaning utterances of drivelling idiocy. For at this time, thanks to English privateers, and American stupidity and indifference, the American flag had practically disappeared from the ocean.

As has been already mentioned, English shipowners and manufacturers were suffering severely from American competition; they therefore hailed the possible or probable dismemberment of the American Union with delight, and immediately upon the outbreak of the "War of the Rebellion," determined to aid the seceding States in every possible way. These States were exclusively agricultural communities, raising most of the cotton which formed such an important portion of the raw material required by English factories. Like all partially developed agricultural communities, they had no capital to invest in vessels or factories; and in case they secured their independence, they were pledged to Free Trade, and would thus offer a vast and profitable carrying trade to English ships; and a vast and profitable market for English goods. The temptation was a great one; too great in fact to be resisted; and a short time after the commencement of the war, a number of so-called "Confederate cruisers," which had been built and fitted out in English ports with English money, were scouring the ocean, capturing and destroying American merchant vessels wherever they could find them, and compelling the transfer of such as were not destroyed, to the protection of some neutral flag. As our ancestors were at that time engaged in a life and death struggle to maintain their national existence, they could only protest against this selfish and unfriendly action of England; but the guilt of the latter power was practically conceded at an arbitration conference held at Geneva several years later, at which the sum of $15,000,000 was awarded as damages to be paid by England for the depredations committed by these piratical cruisers upon American commerce. The mischief, however, was done; our ocean commerce had been ruined; and England could well have afforded to pay $15,000,000 annually for having thus paralyzed her great maritime rival.

Concurrently with this wiping out of our shipping by English cruisers, iron and steel began to be used as a substitute for wood in ship building; and by the time that the rebellion had been finally crushed, our shipbuilders found themselves utterly unable to compete with those of Great Britain on account of the greater cost of materials and wages here, as well as the absence of machinery and appliances for building iron and steel vessels. Gold remained at a premium for several years after the conclusion of the war; and this, together with the tariff on imported materials required in ship building, rendered competition with foreign builders absolutely impossible. To make matters worse, all the principal maritime nations of Europe inaugurated a system of subsidies or bounties, which stimulated shipbuilding enormously, and increased the supply of vessels so rapidly, that carrying rates fell to figures, with which unsubsidized vessels could not possibly compete. England, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland, and finally Spain, went into the subsidy business; and the latter power actually subsidized lines of steamers to the extent of over $1,000,000 per annum, to run along our whole Atlantic and Pacific Coasts, trading between Mexico and Central America on the south, and Canada and British Columbia on the north, and stopping at all important American ports on their respective routes.

The only demand for American built vessels was for the coasting trade; but this demand was sufficient to induce the establishment of several large iron shipyards, most of which were located on the Delaware River, at or near Philadelphia, Chester, and Wilmington.

Thus was inaugurated that interest which has since attained such enormous proportions, as to give to the Delaware River the sobriquet of "The American Clyde."

The vessels built at these yards, even in those early days, proved conclusively that American shipbuilders were still the best in the world, and then as now, American coastwise steamships were conceded to be the finest and fleetest and best vessels of their class afloat. The absolute refusal of Congress to offer any subsidy, or even to offer decent compensation to American vessels for carrying the mails to foreign countries, effectually prevented the building of any ships suitable for that trade; and while England and France and Germany and Spain were building swift merchant steamers on plans approved by their naval departments, and paying them liberal annual subsidies for the privilege of chartering or purchasing them at a fixed price, at any time, and converting them into aimed cruisers; thus providing themselves at a comparatively trifling cost with a most formidable and efficient auxiliary naval force; the Congress of the United States, with an apathy or indifference which seems utterly unaccountable at the present time, absolutely refused to do anything to encourage the rebuilding of the American Merchant Marine.

That such a suicidal policy should have been persisted in for more than twenty years after the close of the war, at a time when the annual receipts of the Treasury were over $100,000,000 in excess of the government requirements, and when the extraordinary spectacle was presented day after day, of senators and members of Congress, wrangling and arguing over the question of "how to dispose of the surplus," seems absolutely incredible; and yet, a perusal of the files of the newspapers published during this period, (say from 1875 to 1888) will satisfy the most skeptical reader that it is strictly true. For the convenience and satisfaction of such of my readers as may not be able easily to refer to these files, I reproduce a few articles and communications from some of the journals of that period.

SUBSIDIES TO BRITISH STEAMSHIPS—ARRANGEMENTS
WITH THE WHITE STAR AND CUNARD LINES.

From the New York Journal of Commerce, March 31, 1887.

"A Liverpool cablegram received yesterday says: 'At the meeting of the stockholders of the Cunard Steamship Company to-day the chairman announced that the Government had granted the company an annual subvention of $85,000 for a period of five years for the 'carrying of the mails.'

"Details of the agreement entered into between the British Admiralty and the owners of the White Star and Cunard companies, by which certain of their vessels are placed at the disposal of the Government on specified terms, are contained in a late parliamentary paper. The White Star Line agrees to hold at the disposition of the Government for purchase or hire, at the option of the Admiralty, to be exercised from time to time during the continuance of the agreement, the following vessels: Britannic, value £130,000; Germanic, £100,000; Adriatic, £100,000; Celtic, £100,000. In the event of purchase the foregoing prices were to be held as the values of the vessels on January 1, 1887, plus 10 per cent. for compulsory sale, less an abatement of 6 per cent. per annum on the depreciated annual value for the period that might elapse between January 1, 1887, and the date of purchase by the Government. In the event of charter by the Admiralty the rate of hire of the before-mentioned vessels was fixed at the rate of 20s. per gross registered ton per month, the owner providing the crew, or at the rate of 15s. per gross registered ton per month, the Admiralty finding the crew, all risks of capture and of hostilities being assumed by the Admiralty. The company has determined to build one or two vessels of high speed and of such a type and speed as will render them specially suitable for service as armed cruisers, and in accordance with the plans and specifications submitted and approved by the Admiralty. In consideration of this the Admiralty will have to pay to the company an annual subvention at the rate of 15s. per gross registered ton per annum. On February 8, the Admiralty accepted similar proposals made by the Cunard Line in respect to the following vessels: Etruria, value £310,000; Umbria, £301,000; Aurunia, £240,000; Servia, £193,000; Gallia, £102,000—a subvention of 15s. per gross registered ton per annum, to be paid to the company on account of the Etruria, Umbria and Aurania during the continuance of the postal contract, and in the event of the termination of that contract before these three vessels received five years' payment, the company to be entitled to receive for the balance a subvention at the rate of 20s., the five vessels being still held at the disposition of the Government. In the event of the Cunard Company building new vessels for the mail service, they will submit the plans to the Admiralty for approval.

"The subvention will amount to about £6,500 for each of the new vessels of the White Star Line, so long as they carry the mails, or £8,500 should the mails be withdrawn. The annual charge for the retention of the Cunarders Etruria, Umbria and Aurania is stated at £5,400 each.

The Admiralty announce that they are ready to make the same arrangement as with the White Star Company for the first ten steamers that may be offered by any of the British steamship companies."

The following letter from Admiral D. D. Porter shows conclusively the feeling which must have existed in Naval circles upon the subject of the revival of the American Merchant Marine. The letter was addressed to a Mr. Aaron Vanderbilt, representing the American Shipping and Industrial League and was published in the New York World and other journals, some time during the year 1888.

DEAR SIR: I received your letter and pamphlet this morning in relation to American shipping. It is a matter in which I am greatly interested. I only wish I really had some influence in this country to help forward measures for the advancement of our mercantile marine, without which we can never be a great naval power. I have written a great deal on the subject and the files of the Senate have now many letters of mine in favor of granting subsidies to ocean steamships, in order to open lines wherever they could be run to advantage. Indeed, I have been so persistent in this matter ever since the close of the civil war that I ran the risk of being considered queer—for that is the term people apply nowadays to men of progressive ideas, whose opinions come in conflict with those of persons who are altogether guided by local prejudices.

I have written a good deal for the American Protectionist on the subject, also a long article for the Chicago Inter Ocean, covering one side of the paper, which had an extensive circulation in the West. I wrote so much that I was afraid I might come under the head of "penny-a-liner," but all to no purpose, as the cause didn't seem to advance an inch.

This country is a young giant, full of resources, overflowing with wealth, and the people themselves full of progressive ideas, yet you see how difficult it is to get anything done even for the defense of our coast and great cities.

With all our wealth and enterprise we are, owing to the force of circumstances over which our people seem to have no control, Bourbons up to the hub, learning nothing and forgetting nothing.

The nation that can put the most ships and the best ships on the sea will be the one that can set the world at defiance. No nation can put its commerce on its bottom again, after it has been broken up as ours has been, without subsidies, which are considered by some people as opposed to our institutions, although I myself cannot see it: but subsidies to steamships that must carry our products over the world and bring back other products in return must help every industry in the country. Every State in the Union is interested in having our commerce re-established, no matter at what cost. Think what an impetus the establishment of great lines of steamships would give to our iron and steel interests. How many thousands of mechanics who are now out of employment would again enjoy ample compensation for their labor. What rejoicings there would be throughout the land at such an event. How the cotton and hemp manufactories would be crowded with workers. Think how many million yards of canvas would be spread upon the ocean.

The great British steam lines which are running to and from our ports so frequently, bring their coal from England and take little back from this country. Think of the coal-mines that would be worked to supply our great ocean steam lines should we ever establish such as are necessary to the country. Sit down and reckon the different industries that would be benefited by the establishment of great steamship lines, and you will be surprised at the amount that would be thrown into the hands of the laboring people of this country.

What is the object of a government if it is not to build up the industries of a country, as opposed to those of other countries? A republican government should be the best in the world. Its legislators should advance all its industries. It should be more paternal in its organizations than any other, for those who are elected to office are put there by the people to promote their interests. We have gone on for the past twenty-five years, showing no more ability to cope with the matters to which I have referred than the minor republics of South America, which scarcely hold any place in the estimation of the world. Instead of being a government for the people, ours seems to be a government made for the advantage of a select clique.

I almost despair, although not naturally of a despairing nature. I thought when our civil war was over and there was no longer a question which could seriously divide the country, that we would put our household in order and unite to become the great nation of the world, which we are fully capable of doing; but, with thousands of others who helped to fight for the country and put it on its legs again, I have been wofully disappointed, particularly in the decadence of that ocean commerce which was once second only to Great Britain.

Even Spain, that has been for years behind all other nations, and for more than sixty years has been considered the most effete government in Europe—Bourbon all over—has now taken the lead of us, has voted millions in a lump to build up her navy, and is about to establish those very steam lines which should have been American. If this country does not take proper steps to resurrect our commerce and place a number of steamship lines on a footing with those of European countries, foreigners may well say that the resources of the country have been developed faster than the education of the people has progressed, and that the Americans are not sufficiently advanced in intelligence to understand that no nation can be a first-class power that allows another to do its carrying. For my part, I expect to step out soon without witnessing the fulfilment of any of my cherished ideas. As for the "naval reserve" they are talking about at present, it ought to have been established in the days of the Revolution.

Every steamship that we build for ocean service should be able to carry guns, and the Government should condemn her for national use whenever it is considered necessary—in fact, exercise greater power over the mercantile marine than over the militia. An organization of this kind, however, can only be established by stringent acts of Congress, without which no action of the Secretary of the Navy or a board of officers would enable the Government to use merchant vessels.

Nothing, however, in this direction can be done the present session, and we can only hope that a more enlightened feeling in regard to these matters will be shown in the future than has prevailed in the past.

The people who make this outcry against "subsidies" apparently do not reflect that no nation in the world has gone so far in this direction as the United States. For instance, the grants to the great railroads which connect the Atlantic with the Pacific, by which millions of dollars and millions upon millions of the public lands were given, enough to have built up our mercantile marine and navy twenty times over; yet few people have objected to these donations on the part of the Government, as it was felt to be the only means by which we could open the country for settlement and obtain control of the great commerce of the East.

That was the great cry at the time, but unfortunately we only half did the work we started to accomplish, and failed to continue the road to China by not appropriating money to put upon the Pacific a sufficient number of steamships to entirely control the China trade, and give us a large number of fast and powerful vessels that could, when necessary, be transformed into heavily armed men-of-war for the protection of our northwest coast.

At the present time a single powerful vessel of an enemy could devastate the whole of that coast. I remain, very truly yours, DAVID D. POUTER, Admiral.

In a letter to the New York Tribune, published in May, 1887, Mr. H. K. Thurber, Pres't of the N. Y. & Brazil S. S. Co., among other strong language, used the following:

"'Trade is following the flag' with a vengeance. The policy that mails on the ocean should not be paid a much higher rate than 'inanimate freight' is bringing its fruits home to us in a very unpleasant manner. The direct contrary policy of England, France, Germany, Spain and Italy is driving the stars and stripes from the Ocean. Will Americans sit tamely by and see this insane policy continued?"

The following letter addressed to this same Mr. Thurber, and, (curiously enough) signed by a person bearing the same name as the author of this book, (probably a member of the same family) was also published in several newspapers about this time.

NEW YORK, Sept. 16, 1887.

H. K. Thurber, Esq., President U. S. & B. S. S. Co.:

DEAR SIR: I am in receipt of your pamphlet, and I beg to say that in my humble judgment it is entirely unanswerable, and that the mere statement of facts which it contains should bring the blush of shame to every American cheek.

Indeed, if we were not living witnesses and victims of it, it would be utterly beyond belief that such a stupid and vicious system as that under which our mercantile marine is being absolutely strangled "in the house of its friends" could prevail in any country having the slightest pretensions to intelligence or enterprise; and it is certainly not too much to say that if our present laws had been framed by our worst national enemies or our bitterest commercial rivals, they could not be more effectual in paralyzing our foreign commerce and rendering us as nearly as possible a cipher among the nations of the earth.

Two years ago I was obliged to give up active business on account of ill health, and since that time I have traveled quite extensively in Europe, and the most striking fact which confronted me at every turn, was the enormous increase and development of foreign trade among nations which we have hitherto regarded as only second or third rate commercial powers. This remarkable development, in which France and Germany took the lead, has extended to other countries, and Italy, Spain and even little Belgium, are rapidly coming to the front as great maritime nations. Upon inquiring into the causes of this remarkable increase of commercial activity, I found that it was entirely due to the policy of "protection by bounty" or subsidy. Moreover, it has been made principally at the expense of the United States of America.

England has of course suffered to some extent also: but I think it is entirely within bounds to assume that at least 75 per cent. of the foreign traffic secured by these enterprising Europeans within the last fifteen or twenty years, is traffic which rightfully belongs to us, and which we should have had, if our law-makers had exhibited the slightest desire to foster our commercial interests. Walking along the magnificent wharves of Antwerp, I saw steamer after steamer loading and unloading for and from ports in South America, whose trade by every natural law should come to us. It was the same at Southampton and Liverpool and Havre, and even away down in Naples there were evidences on every hand of how we Americans are being robbed of what may be justly considered our birthright; that is, South American, West Indian, and even Mexican trade. The intense and monumental stupidity which permits this process to continue, is doubtless amusing to those who profit by it, but it is death to us as a maritime nation.

It seems inconceivable that with an overflowing Treasury, and with exports of over $700,000,000 per annum, our shipping interest should be thus wiped out of existence merely because a lot of idiots have inherited a political superstition which invariably throws them into spasms of indignant protest whenever the word "subsidy" is mentioned. This inherited superstition is practically all there is behind the opposition to a fair and reasonable system of protection and encouragement to our shipping interest.

Of what use are arguments in the face of patent and notorious facts? Our commerce was swept from the ocean during our civil war. Its place has been usurped by subsidized vessels of other countries. Against these vessels unsubsidized ones cannot compete successfully. This is the whole question in a nutshell.

Shall we, by a judicious system of paying a fair price for American mail service, restore our foreign commerce, and take once more the front rank among maritime nations? Or shall we continue to yield to the paralyzing influence of a mere word, which only represents an idiotic and threadbare superstition; and turn our whole enormous export trade over to our foreign competitors, who, while ridiculing our stupidity, gladly take advantage of it, and pocket the profits which we thus thrust upon them? Public sentiment is gradually changing on this great subject; and the demand for reasonable and sensible legislation in the interest of American shipowners will soon make itself heard with no uncertain sound. Meanwhile, the fact that practical and intelligent business men are taking part in the public discussion of it, is one of the most encouraging signs of the times.

I remain, yours very truly,
        SAM BARTON.

It is scarcely necessary for me to say that the foregoing letter expresses what my sentiments would have been at that time, quite as fully and as well, as I could, if I had written it myself.

Not only had our merchant marine thus been permitted to be wiped out of existence, but our navy had also become worn out and decayed, and our antiquated coast fortifications were the laughing stock of military and naval experts all over the world.

Concerning the deplorable condition of the United States Navy, Secretary Whitney, in his annual report for 1885, said, "At the present moment it must be conceded that we have nothing which deserves to be called a navy. It is questionable whether we have a single naval vessel finished and afloat at the present time, that could be trusted to encounter the ships of any important power—a single vessel that has either the armor for protection, speed for escape, or weapons for defense."

This was a notorious fact, as was also the defenseless condition of our seaboard cities.

Mr. Samuel J. Tilden—who was the democratic candidate for President of the United States in 1876, and who was believed by many to have been elected, notwithstanding the decision of the electoral commission in favor of Mr. Hayes—had in a public letter, made a very strong appeal for the utilization of the so-called surplus revenues in fortifying our coasts.

Admiral Porter in his report for the year 1887, also made the following astounding statement in this connection:

"Two heavy iron-clads could commence at the eastern-most point, and proceed along the coast to Texas, laying every city under contribution. In time of war, the torpedo system will be useless for defense in the absence of proper fortifications and guns. For the event of war we are no more prepared than we were a year ago; although we have made a beginning to repair simply the waste in our navy for the past twenty-five years."

A writer in the North American Review of July, 1888, had also called attention to the utterly defenseless condition of our seaports, and showed that a hostile fleet anchored in New York Harbor, could destroy property valued at $1,500,000,000 in New York, $600,000,000 in Brooklyn, and $100,000,000 in Jersey City. The only alternative to such a bombardment would be the payment of a ransom, whose amount would of course bear some relation to the immense amount of property involved.

The New York Herald had also, during the summer of 1887, published a series of sensational articles, showing the enormous amounts of property thus exposed on our Atlantic, Pacific and Gulf coasts. It will thus be seen that our ancestors had not even the excuse of ignorance, in permitting such a state of affairs to continue. The question had been the subject of frequent conferences and investigations; and committees and sub-committees had reported upon it, times without number. The fortification board had estimated the cost of a complete system of coast defences, including armored turrets and casemates, barbette and mortar batteries, rifled guns, torpedoes, torpedo boats and floating batteries, at $126,377,800; and bills had been introduced looking to the gradual expenditure of that amount of money, such expenditure to cover a period of ten years. But all such propositions were met by the "economical" statesmen of that day, with howls of indignant protest; and were characterized as attempts to steal and squander the proceeds of an excessive and burdensome system of taxation, which was levied for the sole benefit of a privileged class of manufacturers, monopolists and capitalists. Thus these backwoods statesmen, nine-tenths of whom would probably have failed, if they had attempted to carry on any business more extensive than the keeping of a peanut stand, assumed to be the judges of what was the best economy for a nation of over 60,000,000 of people, and exemplified their ideas of economy by rolling up an annual pension list of about $150,000,000; spending $30,000,000 or $40,000,000 in so-called river and harbor improvements and public buildings in different parts of the country; and absolutely throwing away $20,000,000 or $30,000,000 in paying exorbitant premiums for the privilege of cancelling a debt not yet due. And thus it had come to pass, that in the year of grace, 1886, the United States of America, with a population of more than 60,000,000, with a coast line whose length was more than double that of any other country, with an annual available revenue of more than $100,000,000, notwithstanding that its system of taxation was lighter and less burdensome than that of any other nation, and its laboring classes better paid, better housed, better clothed, better fed, and better educated than any similar classes in any other portion of the world; and with an annual foreign commerce exceeding $1,600,000,000 in value, found itself practically without any merchant marine, and actually without a single war vessel with the "necessary armor for protection, speed for escape, or weapons for defense;" with its coasts and harbors entirely unprotected, and its seaports,—containing property aggregating more than $10,000,000,000 in value—utterly defenseless, and absolutely inviting attack from any nation which possessed a modern iron-clad, armed with two or more long range guns, capable of throwing a shell ten miles or so. This will doubtless seem an incredible statement to readers of the present day; and yet it is strictly true. Moreover, these rural solons, in their zeal for what they considered "economy," unsettled the industrial interests of the country by an acrimonious discussion of the tariff; and the most lightly taxed, prosperous, intelligent and wealthy community in the world was asked to believe that it was ground down and oppressed by an excessive and burdensome system of taxation; and "the surplus," "the surplus," "THE SURPLUS," was held over it constantly in terrorem, as a monster that was eating out the nation's vitals, and would soon involve it in financial ruin.

Meanwhile, new fortifications were recommended year after year, and the necessity for these was conceded by both political parties; but—they were not built.

Elaborate estimates for the establishment of gun foundries were made and favorably reported on; but—the foundries were not built. Huge appropriations for formidable armored battle ships were talked over and recommended; but—the armored battle ships were not built.

Bills looking to the re-establishment of our mercantile marine by the adoption of a similar system of encouragement to that in vogue among all modern maritime nations, were introduced, and debated on, and argued over; but—the bills were not passed, and our merchants were obliged to continue shipping their goods in foreign bottoms. And all this criminal failure to adopt ordinary defensive precautions, was justified on the ground of "economy." If history ever exhibited a striking instance of the folly of "saving at the spigot and wasting at the bung," our ancestors of the latter part of the nineteenth century may fairly claim pre-eminence as exhibitors in that line. But I must not anticipate.

CHAPTER II.

SECRETARY WHITNEY'S EFFORTS TO REBUILD THE NAVY.

Upon his accession to the Presidency in March, 1885, President Cleveland had appointed a Mr. William C. Whitney, a New York lawyer, secretary of the Navy; and although he had had no previous experience in naval matters, he seems to have been profoundly impressed with the necessity of rebuilding the Navy, and bringing it up to a standard more in consonance with modern methods, and more in keeping with the vast national interests which it might at any time be suddenly called upon to protect and defend. During his entire term of office, Secretary Whitney's reports and official communications were invariably couched in the most earnest and vigorous language; and bore the strongest possible testimony to the serious importance with which he regarded his position; and it is not too much to say that many of the features which at present cause the United States Navy to rank first among the navies of the world, grew out of suggestions and recommendations made by Secretary Whitney.

Like all reformers, however, his path was beset with many difficulties; and although he persisted bravely in the task he had set for himself, he encountered so many obstacles and discouragements, that his health became seriously impaired, and it was only at the earnest solicitation of the President, and leading members of his party, that he consented to serve his full term of four years. During President Cleveland's administration party feeling ran very high, and the Republicans, who had recently been ousted from power, after a continuous enjoyment of it for twenty-four years, seemed to look upon any effort to alter or increase or improve the Navy, as a reflection upon their previous management of the department. Consequently, Secretary Whitney found himself opposed and hampered at every turn; and his well-meant and intelligent efforts in the direction of reform, encountered the open or concealed opposition of Republican Senators and Congressmen; and as the Republicans still held control of the Senate by a narrow majority, but few of his recommendations were at first favorably acted upon. Thus does party prejudice at times outweigh patriotism; and thus the best interests of the country are often neglected or jeopardized in obedience to the behests of a political boss, or in deference to the supposed necessities of a partisan organization.

It is difficult at this late day, to conceive of such a state of affairs as this; but as a partial vindication of our ancestors against a charge of what might almost be called high treason, we must remember that the passions and prejudices which grew out of the "War of the Rebellion," still found a resting-place in the bosoms of most of the older inhabitants; and these extended to the political discussions of the day, rendering party feeling exceedingly bitter and vindictive.

In fact, what would at present be regarded as an absurd impossibility, was then an actual fact; and the two great political parties of the country, twenty years after the close of the Civil War, found themselves divided on precisely the same sectional lines, which had existed previous to and during that conflict; and the most casual reference to the journals of that date can scarcely fail to reveal one or more allusions to "The Solid South," as a political entity whose interests must have necessarily been antagonistic to the other portions of the Union.

The vast manufacturing and mineral interests of Alabama, Georgia and Tennessee, were then in their infancy; and the people of those States still hugged the delusion of free trade, as a sort of an inherited political superstition, in common with the other Southern States, whose interests were almost wholly Agricultural, and which have since found their proper and logical political affiliation with the Agricultural States of the West and Northwest.

During President Cleveland's term of office, the Senate, as has before been remarked, was Republican by a small majority. The House of Representatives, however, was Democratic; so that there was a practical deadlock on all party questions; and as nearly every question that arose became more or less of a party one, scarcely anything in the way of practical legislation was accomplished. In fact it would seem that about the only measures which could safely run the gauntlet of both houses, were bills of the nature of jobs to rob the treasury, which were passed by what were called (in the political slang of that day) "logrolling" methods.

For instance, if a river or harbor needed improvement, the member of Congress in whose district it was situated, looked around for other members who had one or more rivers or harbors similarly affected; and a number of these, combining together, would originate what was called a "river and harbor bill," in which each member's district was to have a good slice of the total appropriation. Then, if there were not votes enough to secure the passage of the bill, other members were drummed up, and were offered appropriations for creeks and harbors in their districts—the expenditure of which would of course be under the direction of their political friends—and thus, at every session of Congress, a gigantic appropriation bill, amounting frequently to $20,000,000 or $25,000,000 was passed; two thirds of which in all probability was sheer robbery. A similar system was pursued with reference to public buildings in different parts of the country; and the extraordinary spectacle was presented, of Senators and Representatives meeting in Washington, year after year, wrangling over these appropriations, and exhibiting their ignorance of the cardinal principles of political economy, in long-winded harangues about "the treasury surplus," while they permitted the United States Navy to go to decay, refused appropriations to fortify the harbors and coasts, and utterly failed to do anything to foster and encourage the re-establishment of the American Merchant Marine, whose value as a nursery or training school for the development of a naval force, had been so conclusively shown in the earlier days of the Republic.

At the time of Secretary Whitney's accession to office, the whole available naval force of the United States consisted of a few old wooden vessels, so rotten as to be scarcely seaworthy, three or four iron-hulled steam corvettes and frigates, of an antiquated and obsolete type, and a few vessels of the "Monitor," or revolving turret style (so called from the fact that the first vessel of this type was called the "Monitor").

These latter, however, were in an unfinished, rotten and rusty condition, having from motives of "economy" been permitted to lie and rot at their docks ever since the conclusion of the Civil War; and were therefore utterly useless for any sudden emergency; as several month's work would have been required to finish the unfinished ones, and repair the completed ones. It is true, that a commencement to rebuild the navy had been attempted during President Arthur's administration, and two modern cruisers, (the Boston and Chicago) and a despatch boat (the Dolphin) were approaching completion when Mr. Whitney became Secretary of the Navy. These vessels, however, were only partially successful; and when finished, were found to fall far below the requirements of the contracts; and it was only after a long series of tests, and many expensive alterations, that they could be rendered serviceable.

In spite of all obstacles, however, Secretary Whitney did make considerable progress in rebuilding the Navy. During the years 1887 and 1888, several new cruisers were added to its effective force, and the construction of two heavily armored battle ships was commenced. Numerous experiments were also made with torpedoes, and various submarine systems were tried with greater or less prospects of success.

A lieutenant in the army named Zalinski, had invented a pneumatic gun, which he claimed would safely throw a dynamite shell a distance of two miles; and a vessel was built expressly to carry guns of this kind. Discussion more or less heated, concerning the disgracefully unprotected condition of our seaboard cities, had been carried on in the newspapers, and at length, early in 1889, the city of New York (or rather a few of its more public-spirited citizens) organized a system of volunteer harbor defense militia.

The Legislature having been appealed to in vain, private subscriptions were started, and a fund was raised sufficient to charter one or two harbor tug boats, and to equip a marine battalion, mostly of longshoremen and stevedores, who were drilled in torpedo practice, electric light signaling, boarding, cable cutting, anchor tripping, night attacks, and various other plans for annoying or disabling supposed hostile ships in our harbor. This drilling and exercise were supervised and carried on under the direction of intelligent naval officers, detailed for that purpose by the Navy Department, and although the limited means at the disposal of the originators of this plan, prevented them from accomplishing any very important results, yet their efforts were instrumental in getting together a splendid body of men, who could be relied upon at any time, in case of a sudden emergency, to volunteer their services; and whose practical skill as a signal corps, and perfect knowledge of the harbor, would render their co-operation of the utmost value to the regular naval force in time of war.

This was in fact the origin of our present magnificent and complete "Harbor Defense Corps," which has so often challenged the admiration of foreign naval experts. Anybody who should at this time publicly advocate its abolition or its curtailment, on mere grounds of "economy," would be ridiculed as an idiot, or branded as a traitor; and yet the Legislature of New York refused even to grant its members exemption from jury duty, on account of the protest of a few intelligent and incorruptible(?) back country members.

Having thus given a general resumé of the condition and situation of the United States up to the years 1887 and 1888, I will in the next chapter endeavor to give a succinct and intelligible review of the events which had a more direct and immediate effect in causing the "Battle of the Swash."

CHAPTER III.

CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES.

It would be foreign to the purpose of this work, besides being a useless reviving of animosities and prejudices, now happily forgotten, were I to discuss the merits of the controversy between Canada and the United States; which from trifling and unimportant beginnings, gradually increased in bitterness and intensity, until it finally embroiled the two countries, and England as well, in war. The contest was long ago waged to its legitimate and final arbitrament; and its results have been acquiesced in by all the interested parties, and are a part of the history of the nineteenth century.

Nevertheless a brief sketch of the origin and progress of this controversy, seems essential to this narrative, as showing the motives which actuated Canada and England in their final action.

This sketch I will endeavor to make as brief as is consistent with a clear presentation of the subject-matter.

Long previous to the Revolutionary War, in which the American Colonies secured their independence from British domination, and founded the United States of America, the vast value of the fisheries on the George's and Grand Banks, and along the North American and Newfoundland coasts, had been fully demonstrated; and even as early as the sixteenth century, nearly all of the maritime nations of Europe sent fleets to catch the fish which were known to abound there.

The French and English, however, at length succeeded in obtaining exclusive possession of the privilege; although as late as 1783, Spain put forward a claim of the right to participate in it.

This claim was, however, not pressed. Previous to the successful revolt of the American Colonists in 1770, several wars had occurred between England and France, the final result of which had been to expel the French from Canada, and to secure to England a practical monopoly of these valuable fisheries. The fishing industry had by this time vastly increased in value and importance, and was very largely engaged in by the people of the New England Colonies.

Indeed the importance of the industry was such, that the long point of Massachusetts was christened Cape Cod; gilded codfish were largely used as weather vanes on church spires, and on the public buildings; a painted codfish hung in the State House in Boston, as a constant reminder to the law-makers of the importance of the fishing interest; and the fortunate and enterprising fishermen, who accumulated wealth sufficient to enable them to pass the autumn of their lives amid quiet and luxurious surroundings, came to be known as the "Codfish Aristocracy."

In the year 1783 a treaty of peace was finally concluded between the United States and Great Britain, which defined the rights of the citizens of the United States to these privileges, as follows:

ARTICLE III.

It is agreed that the people of the United States shall continue to enjoy unmolested the right to take fish of every kind on the Grand Bank, and on all the other banks of Newfoundland; also in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and all other places in the sea where the inhabitants of both countries used at any time heretofore to fish; and also that the inhabitants of the United States shall have liberty to take fish of every kind on such part of the coast of Newfoundland as British fishermen shall use (but not to dry or cure the same on that island), and also on the coasts, bays, and creeks of all other of His British Majesty's dominions in America, and that American fishermen shall have liberty to dry and cure fish in any of the unsettled bays, harbors and creeks of Nova Scotia, Magdalen Islands and Labrador, so long as the same shall remain unsettled; but so soon as the same or either of them shall be settled it shall not be lawful for the said fishermen to dry or cure fish at such settlement without a previous agreement for that purpose with the inhabitants, proprietors or possessors of the ground.

This article clearly defined the rights of the American fishermen, and if it could have remained in force, and its provisions been honorably carried into effect, no further trouble would probably ever have arisen over the subject of the fisheries.

In 1812, however, the United States engaged in a second war with Great Britain, and in the treaty of peace which was negotiated at Ghent, in the year 1814, no mention whatever was made of the right of the American people to take fish in Canadian waters. The reason for this omission, seems to have been that the American representatives, among whom were Henry Clay and John Quincy Adams, maintained that the rights guaranteed by article three of the treaty of 1783, were not created by that treaty, but were merely recognized by it, as permanent rights already existing, and of such a character that they were not to be affected or superseded by any rupture of friendly relations, or even by war.

The same treaty, (1783) had conceded to the British the right to free navigation of the Mississippi River, but since that treaty had been signed, the United States had purchased the Louisiana Territory from France, and had thus metamorphosed that great river into an exclusively American waterway. The American commissioners therefore, being unauthorized to concede navigation rights on the Mississippi, in consequence of this change of ownership, the British commissioners claimed some concession as an offset to this refusal; and a compromise was agreed upon, by which no mention was made either of the British claim to navigate this river, or of the American claim to fish in Canadian waters.

The situation, however, was not satisfactory, and after a long diplomatic correspondence between the two governments, a new treaty was negotiated in London in the year 1818, which among other things, contained the following provision:

"That the inhabitants of the United States shall have forever in common with the subjects of His Britannic Majesty, the liberty of taking fish of any kind, on that part of the southern coast of Newfoundland which extends from Cape Race to the Ramean Islands; on the western and northwestern coasts of Newfoundland, from the said Cape Race to the Quispen Islands; on the shores of the Magdalen Islands; and also on the coasts, bays, harbors, and creeks, from Mount Joly to the southern coast of Labrador, to and through the Straits of Belle Isle, and thence northwardly, indefinitely along the coast. And that the American fishermen shall have liberty forever, to dry and cure fish in any of the unsettled bays, harbors and creeks, in the southern part of Newfoundland hereinbefore described, and of the coasts of Labrador; but as soon as the same or any portion thereof, shall be settled, it shall not be lawful for said fishermen to dry or cure fish at such portion so settled, without previous agreement for such purpose, with the inhabitants, proprietors or possessors of the ground.

"And the United States hereby renounces forever, any liberty heretofore enjoyed or claimed by the inhabitants thereof, to take, dry, or cure fish, on or within three marine miles of any of the coast, bays, creeks, or harbors of His Britannic Majesty's dominions in America not included in the above mentioned limits. Provided, however, that the American fishermen shall be permitted to enter such bays or harbors for the purpose of shelter, of repairing damages therein, of purchasing wood and obtaining water, and for no other purpose whatever. But they shall be under such restrictions as shall be necessary to prevent their taking, drying, or curing fish therein, or in any other manner whatever, abusing the privileges hereby secured to them."

This treaty, which may fairly be said to have been the cause of all the trouble which afterwards arose on the fishery question, was negotiated on the part of the United States, by Mr. Rush, then American Minister at the Court of St. James, and Mr. Gallatin, his associate commissioner; but as it was subsequently ratified by the Senate of the United States, it would be scarcely fair to hold those two gentlemen wholly responsible for the disgraceful and humiliating surrender of rights and privileges which had hitherto been freely conceded to American fishermen.

The treaty, by its very terms, invited disturbances and misunderstandings, which were not slow in manifesting themselves.

In the very next year, (1819) the English Parliament passed an Act, which provided that American vessels found within the three-mile limit might be seized and condemned; and imposed fines on such as refused to depart from such bays or limits, after being warned. The Canadian Parliaments, taking the cue from this legislation of the mother country, passed numerous and stringent laws and regulations, which they claimed were necessary to carry out the provisions of the treaty; but which the Americans claimed were needlessly annoying, oppressive, and unneighborly.

Among other claims, what was known as the "Headland theory" was advanced, under which the three-mile limit was claimed not to follow the sinuosities of the coast, but to be a line three miles outside of a straight line drawn from point to point, or headland to headland of the coast; no matter how far apart these points or headlands might be, or how extensive the bay or gulf might be which lay between them. Under this construction of the treaty, Nova Scotia claimed the right to close the Straits of Canso to our fishermen; and to make her claim to exclusive jurisdiction over that body of water more plausible, annexed Prince Edward's Island.

Numerous seizures of American vessels were made and a strained condition of affairs ensued, which lasted a number of years, and which temporarily culminated in 1843, in the seizure of an American fishing vessel, called the "Washington," in the Bay of Fundy, at a point more than ten miles from the nearest shore. This induced a protest from the United States, in response to which the English Government agreed to waive the Headland theory as far as it related to the Bay of Fundy, but not as to any other bay or gulf.

The contention continued, and in 1851 the English Government announced its intention of sending a fleet to the fishing grounds for the purpose of enforcing its rights.

More diplomatic correspondence ensued, and at length, in 1853, a board of arbitration was empowered to decide this phase of the controversy; and decided that bays ten miles or more in width, were to be considered as part of the open sea. This was followed in 1854, by what has been called the reciprocity treaty; which, in consideration of the abolition of the three-mile restriction, and of the restoration of the rights to take fish, and to cure and dry the same on the Canadian Coasts, which had been conceded without any equivalent in the treaty of 1783, the United States agreed to admit nearly all Canadian products free of duty.