[11] [The Treaty between England, Russia, Austria, and Prussia for the settlement of the affairs of the East, by compelling the Pasha of Egypt to relinquish Syria, and to restrict his dominion in Egypt, was signed in London on July 15, 1840. France having declined to concur in this policy, the Treaty was signed without her, and without her knowledge. This event was of the gravest consequence, and brought Europe to the brink of war.]
M. Dedel[12] told me the other day that he thought, without reference to his policy, Palmerston had conducted himself with a légèreté quite unaccountable; that the Duke of Wellington, when he was at Windsor, had talked over the state of affairs with Melbourne, and said to him, ‘I do not say that I disapprove of your policy as far as regards Mehemet Ali; perhaps I do not think that you go far enough; not only would I not leave him in possession of a foot of ground in Syria, but I should have no scruple in expelling him from Egypt too. But what is Mehemet Ali or the Turk in comparison with the immeasurable importance of preserving peace in Europe? this is the thing alone to be regarded, and I give you notice that you must not expect our support in Parliament of the policy which you have chosen to adopt.’[13] In the meantime there is an increasing impression here that no war will take place; public opinion is not yet much excited, and is nothing like so excitable as it is in France upon questions of foreign policy, where everybody thinks and talks on the subject; but if it ever is effectually roused, it will be much stronger and probably more consistent here than there. My brother writes me word that the King is most anxious to preserve peace, and is now feeling the pulse of the country, and doing his utmost to ascertain what the state of public opinion is, for his own guidance in the approaching crisis. Though now acting in apparent unison with Thiers, he would have no scruple in resisting the course of policy in which Thiers is embarked, if he found he could count upon the support of the country in his own pacific views; and it is the possibility of such a contest occurring in France which renders the question so very delicate and difficult, and makes the issue dependent on contingencies which no sagacity can foresee or provide for. Out of this complication Palmerston’s wonderful luck may possibly extricate him, though it must be owned that he is playing a very desperate game.
[12] [Dutch Minister at the Court of St. James.]
[13] Clarendon, to whom I told this, said it was not true: he had said nothing about their support, but had said, ‘I approve of your policy, but you must have no war.’
September 5th, 1840
I have been more in the way of hearing about the Eastern Question during the last week than at OPPOSITION TO LORD PALMERSTON. any previous time, though my informants and associates have been all of the anti-Palmerston interest—Holland House, and Clarendon, Dedel (who objects to the form more than the fond), and Madame de Lieven, who is all with Guizot, because he is devoted to her, and she feels the greatest interest where she gets the most information. Clarendon showed me the other day a long letter which he wrote to Palmerston in March last, in which he discussed the whole question, stating the objections to which he thought Palmerston’s policy liable, and suggesting what he would have done instead. It was a well-written and well-reasoned document enough.
Those who are opposed to Palmerston’s policy, and even some who do not object to the policy itself so much as to the manner in which it has been worked out, feel confident that the means will fall very short of accomplishing the end, and that peace will be preserved by their very impotence at a great expense of the diplomatic reputation of the parties concerned; and they are confirmed in this notion by the failure of some of the anticipations in which Palmerston so confidently indulged, especially the conduct of the Pasha and the Syrian insurrection. Clarendon says that, ‘whatever his opinions may have been, now that they are fairly embarked in Palmerston’s course, he must as earnestly desire its success as if he had been its original advocate.’ But both he and Lord Holland have been so vehemently committed in opposition to it, that, without any imputation of unpatriotic feelings, it is not in human nature they should not find a sort of satisfaction in the frustration of those measures which they so strenuously resisted, and this clearly appears in all Lord Holland said to me, and in Lady Holland’s tone about Palmerston and his daring disposition.
September 6th, 1840
On arriving in town this morning, I found a note from M. Guizot, begging I would call on him, as he wanted to have a few minutes’ conversation with me. Accordingly I went, and am just returned. His object was to put me in possession of the actual state of affairs, and to read me a letter he had just received from Thiers, together with one (either to Thiers or to him) from their Consul-General at Alexandria.
Thiers’ letter expressed considerable alarm. After describing the failure of Walewski and the other French agents, and enlarging upon the efforts they had made, and were still making, to restrain the Pasha, and prevent his making any offensive movement, he said that this was the Pasha’s ultimatum. He offered, if France would join him and make common cause with him, to place his fleets and armies at her disposal, and to be governed in all things by her advice and wishes, a thing utterly impossible for France to listen to. Upon the impossibility of this alliance being represented to him, the prudence of keeping quiet strenuously urged upon him, and the utmost endeavours made to convince him that a defensive policy was the only wise and safe course for him, he had engaged not to move forward, or take any offensive course unless compelled to do so, by violence offered to him; his army was concentrated at the foot of the Taurus, and there (but in a menacing attitude) he would consent to its remaining; but if any European troops were to advance against him, or be transported to Syria, any attempt made to foment another insurrection in Syria, or any attack made upon his fleet, or any violence offered to his commerce, then he would cross the Taurus, and, taking all consequences, commence offensive operations. In that case, said Guizot, Constantinople might be occupied by the Russians, and the British fleet enter the Sea of Marmora; and if that happened, he could not answer for the result in France, and he owned that he (and Thiers expressed the same in his letter) was in the greatest alarm at all these dangers and complications. He had seen Palmerston this morning, and read Thiers’ letter to him. I asked him if it had made any impression on Palmerston. He said, ‘Not the slightest;’ that he had said, ‘Oh! Mehemet Ali cédera; il ne faut pas s’attendre qu’il cède à la première sommation; mais donnez-lui quinze jours, et il finira par céder.’ Guizot said that the failure of so many of his predictions and expectations had not in the slightest degree diminished Palmerston’s THE POLICY OF FRANCE. confidence, and that there was in fact no use whatever in speaking to him on the subject. Guizot is evidently in great alarm, and well he may be, for there can be no doubt that his Government are in a position of the greatest embarrassment, far from inclined to war, the King especially abhorring the very thoughts of it, and at the same time so far committed that if the four allies act with any vigour and drive Mehemet Ali to desperation, France must either kindle the flames of war, or, after all her loud and threatening tone, succumb in a manner not only intolerably galling to the national pride, but which really would be very discreditable in itself.
Guizot dwelt very much upon their long-continued and earnest efforts to make the Pasha moderate and prudent, and on the offers he had made to join the allies, and unite the authority of France to that of all the others for the purpose of preventing the Pasha from advancing a step further, provided they would leave him in his present possessions. I certainly never saw a man more seriously or sincerely alarmed, and I think (now that it is so near) that the French Government would avoid war at almost any cost; but the great evil of the present state of affairs is, that the conduct of the question has escaped out of the hands of the Ministers and statesmen by whom it has hitherto been handled, and henceforward must depend upon the passions or caprice of the Pasha, and the discretion of the numerous commanders in any of the fleets now gathered in the Mediterranean, and even upon the thousand accidents to which, with the most prudent and moderate instructions from home, and the best intentions in executing them, the course of events is exposed. As Guizot said, Europe is at the mercy ‘des incidents et des subalternes.’ He promised to keep me informed of everything that might occur of interest.
September 10th, 1840
The day after I saw Guizot I related to Clarendon all that had passed, when he told me that Melbourne was now become seriously alarmed, so much so that he had written to John Russell, ‘he could neither eat, nor drink, nor sleep,’ so great was his disturbance. Lord John was also extremely alarmed, and both he and Melbourne had been considerably moved by a letter the former had received from the Duke of Bedford, enclosing one from Lord Spencer, in which he entered into the whole Eastern Question; and said that it was his earnest desire to give his support to the Government in all their measures, but that it would be contrary to his judgement and his conscience to support them in their policy on this question. This appears to have made a great impression upon them, but not the least upon Palmerston, who is quite impenetrable, and who always continues more or less to influence his colleagues; for Lord John, after meeting Palmerston at Windsor, came back easier in his mind, and, as he said, with a conviction (not apparently founded on any solid reason), ‘that they should pull through.’ Palmerston, so far from being at all shaken by anything Guizot said to him, told him that the only fault he had committed was not taking Lord Ponsonby’s advice and proceeding to action long ago. The second edition of the ‘Times’ mentions a violent note delivered by Pontois to the Porte. I thought this of such consequence that I sent the paper to Guizot, and begged him, if he could, to afford the means of contradicting it. He wrote me word he would, as soon as he had des renseignements plus précis. In the meantime, I find Metternich has protested against the tone of Pontois’ communication, which was verbal and not written. His own account of it to Thiers exhibited strong, but not indecent language.
In the evening (day before yesterday), Guizot dined at Holland House, and met Clarendon and Lord John Russell, with the latter of whom he had a long talk, and he hoped that he had made an impression on him. Yesterday morning I was enabled to read the Cabinet minute, submitting to the Queen the expediency of making the Treaty, to which was appended the dissent of Clarendon and Holland, with their reasons assigned in a short but well-written and well-reasoned paper. The Queen desired to keep it, and there can be little doubt that in her heart she coincides with them, for Leopold is frightened out of his senses, and is sure to have ADMIRAL NAPIER’S PROCLAMATION. made her in some degree partake of his alarm. She told Melbourne that, of all things, what astonished her most was the coolness and indifference of Palmerston. It is remarkable that Clarendon, who expresses himself with energy, was never asked to Windsor while Leopold was there, Palmerston being there the whole time; and the day that Leopold departed, Clarendon was invited.
Yesterday morning arrived a fresh budget of alarming news, amongst the rest a proclamation of Admiral Napier, which people are disposed to consider a forgery and an impossibility, but which was believed at Paris and by Guizot here, and consequently raised a storm there, and put the Ambassador in despair. Clarendon went to him in the afternoon, when he broke out: ‘Mon cher Comte, I appeal to you, as representing the Government, to tell me what I am to think of such a proceeding as this, and how is it possible that I can continue to ‘gérer les affaires de mon gouvernement’ here, if such provocations as this proclamation are to occur.’ Clarendon acknowledged that if this proclamation was authentic, nothing was to be said in its defence, but urged that no definite judgement should be formed till they had some conclusive information; but he told me, that he should not be surprised to find that it was authentic and in virtue of instruction from Ponsonby, and he fully expected Palmerston would highly approve of it. When it was suggested to Palmerston that it might with every effort be impossible to prevent the Pasha from crossing the Taurus, he said, ‘So much the better if he did, that he would not be able to retreat, his communication be cut off, and his ruin the more certainly accomplished.’
September 12th, 1840
Yesterday at Windsor for a Council, when Prince Albert was introduced. The Ministers who were there had a sort of Cabinet afterwards, and a discussion about increasing the naval force, which Lord Minto thought they could not venture to do without calling Parliament together; but they agreed that this was to be avoided, and would be on every account objectionable. They might incur any expense for naval affairs on their own responsibility, and Parliament would be sure to bear them out. After dinner, a messenger came, and Melbourne went out to read the contents of his box. I remarked that nobody occupied his chair next the Queen; it was left vacant, like Banquo’s, till he came back, so that it was established as exclusively his. I heard this morning what this box contained: letters from Sir F. Lamb,[14] to Palmerston, in which he told him that he wished him every success in his present undertaking, would do everything that he could to assist him, but acknowledged that he had not the least notion what he could do, or how anything could be done by anybody; intimating his conviction, in short, that their Convention was not executable. As for Metternich, he is at his wit’s end, and occupied night and day in thinking how he can se tirer d’affaire. He tells Lamb that as to contributing a guinea or a soldier towards the operation, it is quite out of the question, and begs him never to mention such a thing, and that if the Treaty could quietly fall to the ground it would be a very good thing. It is, however, entirely contemplated by the other Powers that Russia shall occupy Constantinople, and march to the assistance of the Sultan if necessary; but it is quite clear that Metternich is resolved to prevent a war by any means, and that he would not care for his share of humiliation or the object of the Convention being baffled. All this, however, does not damp the ardour or diminish the confidence of Palmerston, who says, ‘Everything is going on as well as possible.’
[14] [Sir Frederic Lamb, afterwards Lord Beauvale, was at this time ambassador at the Court of Austria.]
When I got to town I found a note from Guizot begging I would call on him. I went, and he read me a letter from Thiers about ‘the note’ of M. de Pontois at Constantinople, in which he explained that it was a verbal communication, and not a note, and that it had been grossly exaggerated; and he read me Pontois’ despatch to Thiers. I then asked him if he knew anything of Metternich and his disposition; and when he said, no, and asked me very anxiously if I could tell him anything, I told him that I ALARM OF LORD MELBOURNE AND LORD JOHN. thought it was so strongly turned towards peace, and he was so anxious to relieve himself from the embarrassment in which he was placed, that they might turn it to good account, if they were to set about it.
September 13th, 1840
All last week at Doncaster; nothing new, but a considerable rise in the funds, indicating a reviving confidence in peace. Have seen nobody since I came back.
September 22nd, 1840
Came from Gorhambury yesterday. Got a letter from the Duke of Bedford, in which he says, ‘John has been here for the last week and has spoken very freely and openly to me on the state of our foreign relations. Matters are very serious, and may produce events both at home and abroad which neither you nor I can calculate upon. John is very uneasy and talks of going to town. You are aware that he came up from Scotland unexpectedly. Between ourselves, I think he is disposed to make a stand, and to act, if occasion requires it, a great part—whether for good or evil, God alone knows. Nobody, not even his colleagues, except Melbourne, knows what is passing.’ In a postscript he said that Lord John had urged Melbourne to summon a Cabinet, and, accordingly, one is summoned to meet next Monday. This is mysterious, but it can only mean one thing. Lord John, already alarmed by Lord Spencer’s letter, and dreading the possibility of a war, is resolved to oppose Palmerston’s headlong policy, and, if it be necessary, to risk a rupture in the Cabinet, and take upon himself the administration of Foreign affairs. The Foreign Office was originally that which he wished to have, and when Melbourne returned to office, they proposed to Palmerston to take either the Home or Colonial, but he would not hear of anything but the Foreign department.
I talked over this letter with Clarendon last night (from whom I have no secrets), and he, while fully agreeing in the propriety of calling the Cabinet together, and making the future transaction of foreign affairs a matter for the Government and not for the Foreign Office only, and of course well disposed to buckle on his armour on this question, acknowledged that Palmerston would have very good reason to complain of any strong opposition from that quarter, inasmuch as he had been all along encouraged to proceed in his present line of policy by the concurrence and support of John Russell, who was in fact just as much responsible as Palmerston himself for the present state of affairs.
The beginning of the business may be traced to a Cabinet held at Windsor last autumn, when the general line of policy, since acted upon by Palmerston, was settled. From that time, however, the rest of the Ministers seem never to have interfered, or taken any interest in the matter, and Palmerston conducted it all just as he thought fit. This year Cabinet after Cabinet passed over, and no mention was ever made of the affairs of the East, till one day, at the end of a Cabinet, Palmerston, in the most easy nonchalant way imaginable, said that he thought it right to mention that he had been for a long time engaged in negotiation upon the principles agreed upon at the Cabinet at Windsor, and that he had drawn up a Treaty, with which it was fit the Cabinet should be acquainted. At this sudden announcement his colleagues looked very serious, but nobody said a word, except Lord Holland, who said, ‘that he could be no party to any measure which might be likely to occasion a breach between this country and France.’ No discussion, however, took place at that time, and it was agreed that the further consideration of the matter should be postponed till the next Cabinet. The following day, Palmerston wrote a letter to Melbourne, in which he said that he saw some hesitation and some disapprobation in the Cabinet at the course which he had recommended for adoption, and as he could only hope to succeed by obtaining unanimous support, he thought it better at once to place his office at Melbourne’s disposal. Melbourne wrote an answer begging he would not think of resigning, and reminding him that the matter stood over for discussion, and then sent the whole correspondence to Clarendon. Clarendon immediately wrote word that he felt under so much obligation to Palmerston that it was painful to him to oppose him; but as he could not support him in his Eastern THE EASTERN QUESTION. policy, it was much better that he should resign, and begged Melbourne would accept his resignation. Melbourne however said, ‘For God’s sake, let there be no resignations at all,’[15] that his and Lord Holland’s retirement would have the effect of breaking up the Government; and then it was suggested that they might guard themselves by a minute of Cabinet (that which they subsequently drew up and gave the Queen) from any participation in the measures they objected to. After this, Palmerston continued to do just as he pleased, his colleagues consentientibus or at least non dissentientibus, except Holland and Clarendon, with whom nevertheless he seems (especially the latter) to have gone on upon very good terms. Latterly, however, since the affair has got so hot and critical, though their social relations have been uninterrupted, and the Palmerstons have been constantly dining at Holland House, Palmerston has never said one word to Lord Holland on the subject, and he is unquestionably very sore at the undisguised manner in which Lord Holland has signified his dislike of Palmerston’s foreign policy, and the great civilities that Lord and Lady Holland have shown to Guizot for some time past.
[15] I own I cannot see why. Their retirement would have proved the unanimity of the rest, and would rather have strengthened Palmerston than not.
The manner in which business is conducted and the independence of the Foreign Office are curiously displayed by the following fact. Last Wednesday a Protocol was signed (very proper in itself), in which the four Powers disclaimed any intention of aggrandising themselves in any way. The fact of this Protocol was told to Clarendon by Dr. Bowring, who had heard it in the City, and to Lord Holland by Dedel, neither of these Ministers having the slightest notion of its existence. In the meantime, while the apprehensions of Melbourne and John Russell, thus tardily aroused, have urged them to the adoption of a measure which may possibly break up the Government, or at all events bring about some important changes of one sort or another, the French are making vigorous preparations for war, and, having persuaded the Pasha to send a new proposal to Constantinople, Thiers has intimated that, if this be rejected, France will give him active support, and then war will be inevitable. The crisis, therefore, seems actually on the point of arriving, and while all the world here fancies that war is impossible, it appears to be nearer than ever it was.
Guizot committed a great gaucherie the other day (the last time he was at Windsor), which he never could have done if he had had more experience of Courts, or been born and had lived in that society. The first day, the Queen desired he would sit next to her at dinner, which he did; the second day the Lord-in-waiting (Headfort) came as usual with his list, and told Guizot he was to take out the Queen of the Belgians, and sit somewhere else; when he drew up and said, ‘Milord, ma place est auprès de la Reine.’ Headfort, quite frightened, hastened back to report what had happened; when the Queen as wisely altered, as the Ambassador had foolishly objected to, the disposition of places, and desired him to sit next herself, as he had done the day before.
September 23rd, 1840
I called on Guizot yesterday morning, found him apprised of the meeting of the Cabinet on Monday next, when I told him that I could not help thinking he might materially contribute to the adoption of some resolution conducive to peace, that I had no doubt there would be very lively discussions at this Cabinet, and it was of great importance he should, if he could, afford an appui to the peace party. He said he would willingly do anything he could. I said, ‘for example, could he say on the part of his Government, that, in the event of the new terms proposed by Mehemet Ali being accepted, France would guarantee their due performance on the part of the Pasha, and that she would join in coercive measures against him if he attempted to infringe them, or commit any act of aggression against the Porte?’ He said, ‘that he was not authorised to make such a declaration, but he had no doubt he could engage so far, and that France would not hesitate to pledge herself to join the other Allies and act against Mehemet Ali in such a DIFFERENCES IN THE CABINET. case as I had supposed.’ I asked him if he would write to his Government forthwith, as there was still time to get an answer before the Cabinet met, and he promised he would; but, he added, that with every desire to say what might furnish an argument for those in the Cabinet who are disposed to accept the proffered arrangement, he did not know how to hold any communications—for with Palmerston he could not, and Melbourne and John Russell were out of town. I told him, however, that Lord John would be in town on Thursday, and he promised he would call on him on Friday and talk to him; adding that he thought the last time he saw him he was well disposed. I told him that Lord John was not a man who said much, and that I could not answer for his opinions, but that I was quite convinced Palmerston would find some of his colleagues seriously alarmed, and no longer disposed to submit quietly to whatever he might be pleased to settle and to dictate. He asked me who were the Ministers with the greatest influence, and whose opinions would sway the Cabinet; and I told him Melbourne and John Russell, without a doubt, and whatever they resolved upon, the rest would agree to. But it is most extraordinary that while all reflecting people are amazed at the Government being scattered all abroad at such a momentous crisis, and instead of being collected together for the purpose of considering in concert every measure that is taken, as well as the whole course of policy, with any changes and modifications that may be called for, the Ministers themselves, such of them at least as are here, cannot discover any occasion for any Cabinets or meetings, and seem to think it quite natural and proper to leave the great question of peace or war to be dealt with by Palmerston as a mere matter of official routine. Lord Minto and Labouchere could not imagine why a Cabinet was called, nor by whom, and Palmerston still less. The day before the summons, he told Labouchere he might safely go into the country, as there was no chance of a Cabinet; and now Minto can only imagine that they are summoned to discuss the time to be fixed for the prorogation or the meeting of Parliament.
September 26th, 1840
On Wednesday I went to Woburn, and, as soon as I arrived, the Duke carried me off to his room and told me everything that had taken place, and the exact present posture of affairs. John Russell has for some time past been impressed with the necessity of bringing the Eastern Question to a settlement, to avert all possibility of a war with France, and he has repeatedly urged Melbourne in the strongest terms to do something to prevent the danger into which the policy of the Treaty is hurrying us. None of the Ministers, except Melbourne himself, and Palmerston, have been apprised of these remonstrances, nor are any of them at this moment aware of what has been and is passing. Palmerston has been indignant at the opposition thus suddenly put forward by Lord John, and complains (not, I think, without very good cause), that after supporting and sanctioning his policy, and approving of the Treaty, he abandons him midway, and refuses to give that policy a fair trial. This he considers unjust and unreasonable, and it must be owned he is entitled to complain. Lord John, however, as far as I can learn, not very successfully justifies himself by saying that it was one thing to defend the treaty, of which he approved and does still, and another to approve the measures which are apparently leading us into a war. Between the urgent remonstrances of Lord John and the indignant complaints of Palmerston, Melbourne has been at his wit’s end. So melancholy a picture of indecision, weakness, and pusillanimity as his conduct has exhibited, I never heard of. The Queen is all this time in a great state of nervousness and alarm, on account of Leopold; terrified at Palmerston’s audacity, amazed at his confidence, and trembling lest her uncle should be exposed to all the dangers and difficulties in which he would be placed by a war between his niece and his father-in-law. All these sources of solicitude, pressure from without, and doubt and hesitation within, have raised that perplexity in Melbourne’s mind which has robbed him (as he told Lord John) of appetite and sleep. At length, after going on in this way for some time, matters becoming so bad between Palmerston and Lord John that Palmerston LORD JOHN CALLS A CABINET. refused to have any communication with him, Lord Spencer’s letter, the continued state of danger, and the prospect of some arrangement growing out of the new propositions, made Lord John determine to take a decided course, and he accordingly requested Melbourne to call a Cabinet, which was done, and this important meeting is to take place on Monday next. At this Cabinet, Lord John is prepared to make a stand, and to propose that measures shall be taken for bringing about a settlement on the basis of mutual concession, and he is in fact disposed to accept the terms now offered by the Pasha with the consent and by the advice of France. He anticipates Palmerston’s opposition to this, and his insisting upon a continuance of our present course; but he is resolved in such a case to bring matters to an issue, and if he is overruled by a majority of the Cabinet, not only to resign, but to take a decisive part in Parliament against Palmerston’s policy, and to do his utmost there, with the support which he expects to obtain, to prevent a war. He is aware that his conduct might not only break up the Whig Government and party, but that it may bring about an entirely new arrangement and combination of parties, all of which he is willing to encounter rather than the evils and hazards of war. On the other hand, if Palmerston refuses to accede to his terms, and if unsupported by the Cabinet he tenders his resignation, Lord John is ready to urge its acceptance, and himself to undertake the administration of our foreign affairs. In short, he has made up his mind, and that so strongly, that I do not think it possible he can fail either to carry his point or to break up the Government, or at least bring about very material changes in it.
Prepared as I was, by the Duke of Bedford’s letter, for something of this sort, I was not prepared for anything so strong and decisive; and while I expressed my satisfaction at it, I did not conceal my opinion that Lord John’s course had not been at all consistent, and that Palmerston, when the moment of discussion came, would have a good case against his antagonist colleague. While I was at Woburn, I had constant running talk about this matter with the Duke, but not a word with Lord John, to whom I never uttered, nor he to me.
Yesterday I returned to town, when I found that Lord John had written both to Lord Holland and Clarendon, shortly, but saying that he thought the new proposals made the matter stand very differently. I dined at Holland House, where the Palmerstons dined also. My own opinion from the first moment was, that Palmerston never would agree to any arrangement, but I thought it just possible, if he became impressed with the magnitude of the danger, that he might anticipate Lord John, by himself suggesting some attempt to profit by the disposition of the Pasha to make concessions. But any such possibility was speedily dissipated, by a conversation which I had with Lady Palmerston, who spoke with the utmost bitterness and contempt of these proposals, as totally out of the question, not worth a moment’s attention, and such as the other Powers would not listen to, even if we were disposed to accept them; and that we were now bound to those Powers, and must act in concert with them. She told me a great deal, which I knew (from other sources) not to be true, about Metternich’s resolution not to make the slightest concession to France and the Pasha; and her brother Frederic’s strenuous advice and opinion to that effect. She complained, and said that Frederic complained, of the mischief which was done by Cabinets which only bred difficulties, intrigues, and underhand proceedings, and plainly intimated her opinion that all powers ought to be centred in, and all action proceed from, the Foreign Office alone. I told her that I could not see the proposals in the same light as she did, that some mutual concessions in all affairs must be expected, and that she was so accustomed to look at the matter only in a diplomatic point of view that she was not sufficiently alive to the storm of wrath and indignation which would burst upon the Government, if war did ensue upon the rejection of such terms as these, which, as far as I had been able to gather opinions, appeared to moderate impartial men fair and reasonable in themselves, and such as we might accept without dishonour. We had COUNT WALEWSKI’S MISSION TO EGYPT. a very long talk, which was principally of importance as showing the state of her husband’s mind, and I told Lord Holland afterwards what I had said to her, at which he expressed great satisfaction. I found afterwards that there has been a correspondence between Palmerston and Holland, begun by the former, and the object of it to vent his complaints at the undisguised hostility of Holland House to the Treaty and its policy. It ended by Holland’s refusing to continue it, and referring Palmerston to the Cabinet on Monday, when the whole question would come under consideration.
This morning I received a note from Guizot, begging I would call on him as soon as I could. I went almost directly, when he produced a letter from Thiers, in which he desired Guizot to go immediately to Palmerston, and in the most formal and solemn manner to deny, in his name and in the name of France, that the mission of Walewski[16] had had any such object as that which had been imputed to it; that he had not endeavoured to persuade the Pasha not to accede to the terms imposed upon him, and that if he was disposed to accept them, ‘La France ne se montrerait pas plus ambitieuse pour lui qu’il ne l’était pour lui-même,’ and would certainly not interfere to prevent the execution of the Treaty. Moreover, he was to say that Walewski had not gone to Constantinople as the agent of the Pasha, but only to convey to M. de Pontois the intelligence of the communication which the Pasha had made to the Sultan through Rifat Bey, Rifat Bey having been despatched on the 6th with a very submissive letter from Mehemet Ali to the Sultan, in which he asked him to grant certain terms, the substance of which has been already made known. Guizot then said that he had likewise received authority to declare that if the Sultan accepted the terms proposed by Mehemet Ali, or even some modification of them (such as France could approve of), with the consent and concurrence of his Allies, and if he invited France to be a party to the new arrangement, and to join in guaranteeing a due execution of its provisions, France would accept such invitation, and would join the other Allies in compelling Mehemet Ali to a strict observance of the arrangement, and would, if necessary, use measures of coercion and hostility against him if he failed in a due performance, or infringed the limits assigned to him. I told M. Guizot that nothing could be more satisfactory than these communications, and he said that he had already asked for an interview with Palmerston, in order to impart the same to him. He then wanted to know if he might speak to Lord John if he met him at Holland House or elsewhere; but I advised him not, and told him that Palmerston was suspicious and jealous, and would take umbrage at any of his colleagues holding communications upon affairs which were his peculiar concern. He acquiesced altogether, and it was agreed that I should call on him to-morrow morning and hear what had passed between Palmerston and him. I took the opportunity of telling him on that occasion that the great evil, and that which rendered all negotiation and arrangement so difficult, was the absence of all reciprocal confidence, that we had none in his Minister (Thiers), and that the national pride and vanity (of which we, like themselves, had a share) were wounded by the ostentatious preparations for war, and the menacing and blustering tone of the press. He acknowledged these evils and their bad effects, and only shrugged up his shoulders at what I said about Thiers, of whom he has no good opinion himself, as is well known.
[16] [Count Walewski had been despatched to Alexandria with a mission from M. Thiers, and one of the grievances of Lord Palmerston against France was that this emissary was supposed to have been sent either to encourage Mehemet Ali in his resistance to the Allied Powers, or to negotiate a separate arrangement between the Pasha and the Sultan, under the auspices of France, so as to cut the ground from under the other Powers. This M. Thiers stoutly denied in his correspondence, and he denied it to me with equal energy when I dined with him at Auteuil on October 8.]
When I left him, I wrote a long letter to the Duke of Bedford, detailing all that had passed, and as I cannot now doubt that Lord John knows his brother communicates with me, and it was of importance that he should be apprised immediately of what had passed, I resolved to send him my CONCILIATORY PROPOSALS. letter to read, and desired him to forward it to Woburn. He afterwards dined with me, and when he came to dinner, he said he had read my letter, and that it was very important.
September 27th, 1840
Went to Guizot, who began by telling me he had been with Palmerston yesterday, who had acknowledged très loyalement that there was not and could not be any truth in the report (about Walewski), said his manner to him (as it had always been) was excellent. Guizot then complained of the facility with which he gave ear to reports like these and to all that was said against France; but he left him well enough satisfied with his reception. He then asked in what state the question was, and I told him that it was in such a state that I had no hesitation in saying war was impossible, and that if the ‘transaction’ was such as we could in honour accept, we should accept it; that the best thing to be hoped was, that Palmerston would make up his mind to a ‘transaction’ in the Cabinet, and would himself take the initiative; but that at all events there were others who were resolved not to pursue any longer this course of policy, and that if he was inexorable it must end in his resignation.
Before I went to Guizot I saw Clarendon, who had had a good deal of talk with Lord John, who spoke to him just in the strain which the Duke of Bedford had already described to me. Melbourne is to be in town to-day, and what Lord John expected and hoped was, that he would be able to persuade Palmerston to give way, and himself propose to acquiesce in Mehemet Ali’s proposals. In that case, Lord John said, he should not say a word. If Palmerston would not do so, then it would be for him to take his own course, and he and Clarendon have both agreed to resign if they should be overruled; and the latter said he thought he could answer for Lord Holland doing the same. While returning home I was overtaken by Palmerston, who was on his way to Lord John’s house; and they are now closeted together, so that at least they will have it all out before the Cabinet to-morrow. Guizot gave me a copy of Cochelet’s despatch, with an account of what had passed between Mehemet Ali, himself, Walewski, and the four Consuls-General, which ended in the transmission of his new proposal to the Porte.
September 28th, 1840
Lord John and Palmerston had a long conversation, amicable enough in tone, but unsatisfactory in result. However, Lord John did not appear to be shaken in his determination, but rather inclined to an opinion that Palmerston would himself be disposed to give way. Any such expectation ought to have been dissipated by a letter which Lord John received meanwhile from Palmerston, in which he talked with his usual confidence and levity of ‘the certainty of success,’ the ‘hopeless condition of the Pasha,’ and the facility with which the Treaty would be carried into effect.[17]
[17] Everything turned out according to his anticipations.
In the morning, after I had been with Guizot (and after Palmerston’s interview with Lord John), he went to Palmerston and communicated fully the offer of France, saying he would not enter into the details of the question, but he could not help reminding him of the failure of so many of his confident expectations. Palmerston said that there would be no sort of difficulty in enforcing the Treaty, and that then France might join if she pleased. Guizot replied that this was out of the question, that France was now ready to join in a transaction fair and honourable to both parties, but she would not stand by, see the question settled without her, and then come in to bolster up an arrangement made by others, and with which she had had no concern. In the evening he went to Holland House, where he told Melbourne what he had communicated to Palmerston; found him in a satisfactory disposition, but Melbourne said that there was a danger greatly to be feared, and that was, that our ambassador at Constantinople, who was very violent against Mehemet Ali, and not afraid of war, might and probably would urge the immediate rejection of the Pacha’s proposal and every sort of violent measure.[18] Guizot, naturally enough, expressed (to me) his astonishment that the LORD PALMERSTON’S RESOLUTION. Prime Minister should hold such language, and that, if he had an ambassador who was likely to act in such a manner so much at variance with his political views, he did not recall him or supersede him by a special mission. This, however, was very characteristic of Melbourne; and I told Clarendon, urging him to insist that some positive understanding should be come to, upon the conduct to be adopted by Ponsonby. There can be no doubt that Palmerston and Ponsonby between them will do all they can to embroil matters, and to make a transaction impossible, and Palmerston writes just what he pleases without any of his colleagues having the least idea what he says. The result of the whole then is, that the Cabinet meet at three to-day, and that Lord John will have to stand forth in opposition to Palmerston’s policy, and to propose the adoption of measures leading to an amicable arrangement. A few hours will show how the rest are disposed to take it.
[18] As he did.
CHAPTER IX.
The Cabinet meets — The Government on the verge of Dissolution — The Second Cabinet — Palmerston lowers his Tone in the Cabinet — But continues to bully in the Press — Taking of Beyrout — Deposition of Mehemet Ali — Lord John acquiesces — Total Defeat of Peace Party — Lord John Russell’s False Position — His Views — Lord Granville’s Dissatisfaction — Further Attempts at Conciliation — Prevarication of Lord Ponsonby — Newspaper Hostilities — Discussion of the French Note of the 8th October — Guizot’s Opinion of the Note of the 8th October — Louis Philippe’s Influence on the Crisis — Summary of Events — Death of Lord Holland — Lord Clarendon’s Regret for Lord Holland — M. Guizot’s Intentions as to France — Effects of the Queen’s Partiality for Melbourne — Resignation to Thiers — Bickerings in the Ministry — Lord John Russell’s Dissatisfaction with Lord Palmerston — Lord John resigns — Lord John demands the Recall of Lord Ponsonby — Lord Palmerston defends Lord Ponsonby — M. Guizot’s Policy — Conciliatory Propositions fail — Attitude of Austria — Asperity of Lord Palmerston — Operations in Syria — Success of Lord Palmerston and his Policy — Baron Mounier’s Mission to London — Birth of the Princess Royal — Results of the Success of Lord Palmerston’s Measures — The Tories divided in Opinion as to the Treaty — Retrospect of the Year — Lord Holland.
September 29th, 1840: Wednesday
The Cabinet met on Monday evening and sat till seven o’clock. The account of the proceedings which has reached me is to the last degree amusing, but at the same time pitoyable. It must have been à payer les places to see. They met, and as if all were conscious of something unpleasant in prospect, and all shy, there was for some time a dead silence. At length Melbourne, trying to shuffle off the discussion, but aware that he must say something, began: ‘We must consider about the time to which Parliament should be prorogued.’ Upon this Lord John took it up and said, ‘I presume we must consider whether Parliament should be called together or not, because, as matters are now going on, it seems to me that we may at A CABINET ON THE EASTERN QUESTION. any moment find ourselves at war, and it is high time to consider the very serious state of affairs. I should like,’ he added, turning to Melbourne, ‘to know what is your opinion upon the subject.’ Nothing, however, could be got from Melbourne, and there was another long pause, which was not broken till somebody asked Palmerston, ‘What are your last accounts?’ On this Palmerston pulled out of his pocket a whole parcel of letters and reports from Ponsonby, Hodges, and others, and began reading them through, in the middle of which operation someone happened to look up, and perceived Melbourne fast asleep in his armchair. At length Palmerston got through his papers, when there was another pause; and at last Lord John, finding that Melbourne would not take the lead or say a word, went at once into the whole subject. He stated both sides of the case with great precision, and in an admirable, though very artful speech, a statement which, if elaborated into a Parliamentary speech and completed as it would be in the House of Commons, was calculated to produce the greatest effect. He delivered this, speaking for about a quarter of an hour, and then threw himself back in his chair, waiting for what anybody else would say. After some little talk, Palmerston delivered his sentiments the other way, made a violent philippic against France, talked of her weakness and want of preparation, of the union of all the Powers of Europe against her, said that Prussia had 200,000 men on the Rhine, and (as Lord Holland said) exhibited all the violence of ’93. Lord John was then asked, since such were his opinions, what course he would advise? He said he had formed his opinion as to what it would be advisable to do, and he produced a slip of paper on which he had written two or three things. The first was, that we should immediately make a communication to the French Government, expressing our thanks for the efforts France had made to induce the Pasha to make concessions for the purpose of bringing about a settlement; and next, to call together the Ministers of the other Powers, and express to them our opinion that it would be desirable to re-open negotiations for a settlement of the dispute in consequence of the effects produced by the mediation of France. There then ensued a good deal of talk (in which, however, the Prime Minister took no part), Lord Minto espousing Palmerston’s side, and saying (which was true enough), that though Lord Holland and Clarendon, who had all along opposed the Treaty, might very consistently take this course, he did not see how any of those could do so who had originally supported and approved of it; to which Lord John quietly and briefly said, ‘The events at Alexandria have made all the difference.’ This was in fact no answer; and Minto was quite right, especially as Lord John had taken his line before the events at Alexandria were known. Of the Ministers present besides Minto, Macaulay seemed rather disposed to go with Palmerston, and talked blusteringly about France, as he probably thought a Secretary of War should. Labouchere was first one way and then the other, and neither the Chancellor nor the Chancellor of the Exchequer said one word. The result was an agreement, that it would be disrespectful to Lord Lansdowne, considering his position, to come to any resolution in his absence; and as he could not arrive before this day, that the discussion should be adjourned till Thursday (to-morrow) by which time he and Morpeth would be here. They were all to dine with Palmerston, and a queer dinner it must have been.
October 1st, 1840
No progress made, everything in statu quo. The dinner at Palmerston’s on Monday after the Cabinet, went off well enough. In the evening Clarendon had a long conversation with Lady Palmerston, who repeated to him everything she had said to me, and seemed confident enough that Palmerston would carry his point at last. He told her, however, that if he persisted, the Government must be broken up, as at least half a dozen would resign, and that she must be aware Government could not go on if either Palmerston or John Russell resigned (putting in Palmerston out of civility). He thought he had made some impression on her. The next day they all dined at Holland House. There he had again some talk with Palmerston himself, amicable enough, but leading to nothing; to what Clarendon LORD JOHN’S PACIFIC SENTIMENTS. said about breaking up the Government, Palmerston did not reply a word. Afterwards Palmerston had a long talk with Lord Holland, but not satisfactory. Morpeth has arrived, and naturally enough was extremely embarrassed. He had supported Palmerston originally, and was not aware of any impending change of policy, or any change in anybody’s opinion, and he felt that it was an extraordinary whisk round. Melbourne, of course, hopped off to Windsor the moment the Cabinet was over, and instead of remaining here, trying to conciliate people and arrange matters, he left everything to shift for itself. Having shown the Queen a letter of John Russell’s, which she was not intended to see, he sent to Lord John a letter of hers, which probably she did not mean him to see either. She said, among other things, that she thought it was rather hard that Lord Palmerston and Lord John could not settle these matters amicably, without introducing their own personal objects, and raising such difficulties. She added one thing in her letter which may lead to some important consequences. She said that it was her wish that some attempt should be made to open communications with the French Government. If Palmerston chooses to give way, he may make her wishes the pretext for doing so, and yield to them what he refuses to everybody else.
I saw Guizot, who showed me a letter he had written to Thiers, telling him as far as he knew how matters stood, of the difficulties there were, and entreating him to moderate the French press. He also showed me a note from John Russell, in which, after thanking him for not speaking to him at Holland House, as it was better he should only talk to Palmerston or Melbourne, he added that he begged he would not consider that the articles which had lately appeared in the ‘Morning Chronicle’ and ‘Observer’ were approved of by the Government, and repudiated any connexion or concurrence with them. He had pronounced in the Cabinet a violent philippic against the newspapers, which was entirely directed at Palmerston, who, he knows very well, writes constantly in them, and Guizot knows this also. Guizot, therefore, if he had any doubt before of Lord John’s sentiments, can have none now. An article appeared in the ‘Times’ on Tuesday strongly in favour of peace and harmony with France and the acceptance of the Pasha’s offers. Guizot, of course, was delighted with it; but I found it had taken in other quarters, for Dedel asked me if I had read it, and said it was the true view of the question, and Ben Stanley said the same thing to me at dinner, and that he had found at Manchester and elsewhere a strong public opinion, of which he was sure Palmerston was not aware, and would not believe in if told. Dedel showed me a letter from Fagel, giving an account of a conversation he had with Louis Philippe, in which the King disclaimed any ambitious design or desire for war, but said he was determined to put France in a respectable state of preparation; very firm language. Dedel had been at Peel’s, but got nothing out of him except that he did not know whether he should have made such a treaty, but as it was made we ought to abide by it. The Tories will turn this business to good account, end as it may; they have beau jeu. But what Neumann said to Dedel is anything but confirmatory of Palmerston’s stories of Austrian stoutness, for he told him it would be a very fortunate thing if the Sultan would accept Mehemet Ali’s new proposals.[1]