JOURNAL.
September 24.—My view is this, as to the operations of British forces. I will put three steamers, each with two guns on them, and an armed force of infantry at disposal of any British authority, will send these steamers to either Metemma, opposite Shendy, or to the cataract below Berber, to there meet any British Force which may come across country to the Nile. These steamers, with this force coming across country, will (D.V.) capture Berber and then communicate with Kartoum. The steamers will have a month’s provisions. I would not attempt to pass the bulk of British Force across country, only the fighting column, to co-operate with the three steamers. No artillery is wanted with either force; it is not needed in any way in this country. When Berber is taken I should keep the bulk of the forces there, and send up the fighting column to Kartoum, after having arranged for its provisions, for I cannot feed them; then, in combination with us, clear out rebels from A to B,—an affair of a week; then decide on your future policy. It is absolutely necessary to understand that we cannot hurry over this affair.[75] If we do we will incur disaster. I have spoken of the division of British forces into two lots, one a small fighting column co-operating across country with the steamers which will meet them, where you like, on the left bank of the White Nile; the other, composed of bulk, without artillery, coming up right bank of the Nile. Now if I were doing this, I should, by the Abbas steamer, work up by Merowé,[76] Abou Hamed, to Berber, by a series of small stations with small garrisons. I should at once get on each step of the Nile ladder steam launches from Cairo, &c., and put them in the open strips as previously explained in page 49 of my journal, Vol. No. I.[77] I then have my route open to Dongola where the bulk of the forces remain.
Saying the chain of posts is established, that, in the interim, the Arab forces at A and B are dispersed, then you say evacuate. Well, without moving the bulk, and, with the aid of the fighting column, you can get down the Sennaar lot, while steamers can bring down the Equator and Bahr Gazelle garrisons. Now this will take at least six months from the present date (for you will not come for a month). You then begin your downward march, and are harassed all the way,[78] and the Mahdi will say he kicked you out. You see you are in for six months, and if you evacuate all your prestige vanishes. It is therefore, I say, either, when once you have got up to Kartoum, give the country to the Turks, or else establish Zubair, and (instead of expending time in going up to Sennaar and the Equator) combinating with us, commence an attack upon Kordofan. You must be here six months. How will you spend the time? Will you at the end of six months allow it to be said you are kicked out, or will you not establish some government and retire with dignity. The cost is the same in both cases in money; but in honour one costs a great deal more. If Zubair falls, after some time, what is it to you? You did your best and save your honour, and you save a mint of difficulties and troubles, which these expeditions to Sennaar and Equator involve. You will not be obliged to go fifty miles beyond Kartoum.[79] As for the Equator, give it to me, and I will (D.V.) keep it from Zubair. It is a thousand pities to give up Kartoum to the Mahdi when there is a chance of keeping it under Zubair.
The fighting force can take the guns of the steamers, if they need artillery; they are very good guns and have field carriages with limbers. I shall not send down the castellated barges or the Krupp guns. Should you cross the desert en masse, the way to guard your communications is to occupy, with a company, all the wells in a good large radius, for the Arabs cannot come down on your line of communication, not being able to get water. This is the only way to deal with the Bedouins, or slave hunters.
The elephants came up by the wells of Gabra,[80] direct from Debbeh to Kartoum. Care should be taken on approaching Omdurman, for there are rather a timid lot there (fellaheen).
You must consider whether you will not send down those dreadful Bashi Bazouks, the scum of Alexandria, and the fellaheen soldiers, on arrival, for they are of little use, and eat us up.
For my part, I should not hesitate to ride down with three hundred men (having taken precaution to have made arrangements with the Kababish tribe) from Kartoum to Debbeh.
There is no difficulty in making flying bridges across the Nile with the country boats, however wide, using telegraph wire twisted in six or eight strands.
Seyd Mahomet Osman’s little boy, aged nine years, was caught by Arabs, and behaved like a hero: “He was not going to be a Dervish. He was as much the Mahdi as Mahomet Achmet; and they might kill him if they liked, &c. He was going to stay with the Government and Gordon Pasha.” They left him alone.
The Sandjak described the scene as splendid: the little fellow with flaming eyes, gesticulating and stamping with fury.
“U. S. C.,[81] 6.30 p.m.—Did you ever hear of such a thing? ——[82] is appointed —— to ——. A more barefaced job never was perpetrated. Why, the man has done nothing, absolutely nothing. Atrocious! But what can you expect? The whole lot of them are off again, a regular autumn flight! What! eh! you will see them all at Christmas” (waxing more wrath). “I declare I have half a mind to go to the Mahdi,” &c. Page interrupts: “Lady —— is waiting in the brougham.” Collapse and exit.
I cannot too much impress on you that this expedition will not encounter any enemy worth the name in an European sense of the word; the struggle is with the climate and destitution of the country. It is one of time and patience, and of small parties of determined men, backed by native allies, which are got by policy and money. A heavy lumbering column, however strong, is nowhere in this land. Parties of forty or sixty men, swiftly moving about, will do more than any column. If you lose two or three, what of it—it is the chance of war. Native allies above all things, at whatever cost. It is the country of the irregular, not of the regular. If you move in mass you will find no end of difficulties; whereas, if you let detached parties dash out here and there, you will spread dismay in the Arab ranks. The time to attack is the dawn, or rather before it (this is stale news), but sixty men would put these Arabs to flight just before dawn, which one thousand would not accomplish in daylight. This was always Zubair’s tactics. The reason is that the strength of the Arabs is their horsemen, who do not dare to act in the dark. I do hope you will not drag on that artillery: it can only produce delay and do little good. I can say I owe the defeats in this country to having artillery with me, which delayed me much, and it was the artillery with Hicks which, in my opinion, did for him.[83]
Ten thousand times better for us to perish than for you to run the risk; and besides that, I have a confident belief we will not (D.V.) perish. The usual hammer and tongs fusillade will go on, but they will not attack the place, and we will not go out against them; while you will creep on quietly and safely, and send out your feelers, making raids upon these Arabs. I would let Buller have full swing for all these little biting expeditions. I believe he is well off (and I think not married, which is an enormous advantage); and he and his subordinates will learn scouting, &c., in a good school. It is this very same warfare we will have to exercise if ever we would oppose Russia in her advance on Afghanistan—i.e., of going up and landing in the Persian Gulf, and cutting in on their flank. So it will be a good school for him and his.
The wretched peasant, with that filthy cloth, which you see, is a determined warrior, who can undergo thirst and privation, who no more cares for pain or death than if he were of stone. The young fellows even have a game by which they test who will bear the lash of the hippopotamus’ whip best. They are in their own land; the pains of war are their ordinary life; and they are supported by religion of a fanatical kind, influenced by the memory of years of suffering at the hands of an effete set of Bashi Bazouks. No; if our Kentish or Yorkshire boys are to come up to help me, it is not with my wish, unless with the greatest precaution. Thank God we have few Europeans here, and those I can (D.V.) care for, and you need not fear for our retreat; and if we die, why, when we entered the army we sold our lives at so much a day. I verily believe no merchant would give me £200, which, to me, is the current value of the man in this world.
It is the most extraordinary thing, quite incomprehensible, that with only one exception, that of Zubair’s man who came from Cairo (with Egerton’s famous despatch about contracts), not one single messenger has entered this place on the proper initiative of outsiders. It has been invariably my messengers, who were sent out by me, from Kartoum, who did bring me any news. It would seem as if those outside seemed to think it was my duty to send out and bring in news for myself, and that they had nothing to do with it. Either these officers outside do not care to spend a sou in spies to give me information, or else they think it is a matter of supreme indifference, whether I know what is going on or not; and I must say when my messengers do come back, they bring me scarcely any information of import. There is a lot of “I hope you are well,” &c.; men like Kitchener and Chermside might be expected to have more brains than that.[84] If I had not exerted myself in the spy business, we never would have had a word, I verily believe. I never saw such a poor lot as these outsiders. Even if they had had to pay £20 out of their own pockets, one might have expected them to do it, considering the circumstances. They might have been paid back. But neither Her Majesty’s Ministers in Cairo, nor these men have seemed to care a jot to inform us. Silly foolish questions are all we ever have got from them, and it is not to be wondered at, that I am indignant with such unpatriotic conduct, and not inclined to be over civil beyond my duty. I never saw such a feeble lot in my life! One has only to compare the telegrams, &c., we sent down, with the rubbish sent in by our own messengers I paid for.
Two children and three escaped soldiers came in to-day from the Arabs, but had no news.
Read “Floyer’s” telegram, with Kitchener’s note to Stewart on same paper—it perfectly exasperates one. Kitchener asks Stewart “what he can do for him”—nothing of what has gone on with respect to the Soudan since Graham’s expedition. Of course men are not obliged to write at all.
I altogether decline the imputation that the projected expedition has come to relieve me. It has come to SAVE OUR NATIONAL HONOUR in extricating the garrisons, &c., from a position our action in Egypt has placed these garrisons. I was relief expedition No 1. They are relief expedition No 2. As for myself I could make good my retreat at any moment if I wished. Now realise what would happen if this first relief expedition was to bolt and the steamers fell into the hands of the Mahdi: this second relief expedition (for the honour of England engaged in extricating garrisons) would be somewhat hampered. We the first and second expeditions are equally engaged for the honour of England. This is fair logic. I came up to extricate the garrisons and failed. Earle comes up to extricate garrisons and (I hope) succeeds. Earle does not come to extricate me.[85] The extrication of the garrisons was supposed to affect our “national honour.” If Earle succeeds the “national honour” thanks him and I hope rewards him, but it is altogether independent of me, who for failing incurs its blame. I am not the rescued lamb, and I will not be.
Had Gessi dared to have communicated with me like these men have, he would have heard of it; but he never did.
The Towfikia steamer went up and saw no Arabs at Giraffe to-day.
Look at this: I send down a spy, A. Kitchener and Co. send him back with answer. If Kitchener and Co. thought, they would know that A., being seen passing to and fro, must incur suspicion; however, A. happily gets through with risk (not having, by the way, had one penny from K. and Co.); then all communication stops till I send down B. What is K. doing at Debbeh? that he could not write a better letter than to tell me the names of the generals and regiments—a matter of the most supreme indifference to Kartoum.
September 25.—Arabs came down to the Blue Nile in some force, but the Mansowrah going up, and our men pushing along the bank, they all fled. I am going to Halfeyeh to see the Shaggyeh, who are the worry of my heart. Having gone down, I found a very fair market, and the Shaggyehs less irritating than I expected to find them.
Question. What was the policy of her Majesty’s Government in sending up General Gordon?
Answer. To endeavour to retire the garrisons by quiet means.
Question. What is the object of General Earle’s expedition?
Answer. The same. General Gordon having failed.
Question. If General Earle’s expedition is for the retreat of General Gordon and ends there, what is the result?
Answer. Her Majesty’s Government agree that they abandon the garrisons.
There is no possible escape from the situation.
According to accounts from Bourré, the Arabs had come down in some force at night, and had hid in villages near Bourré, meaning to fall upon our foraging parties; they did not bargain for the Mansowrah coming up with her two guns, and so caught a Tartar when they emerged to attack our men, and went off in great confusion and some loss.
An escaped soldier came in from the Arabs—no news. He was so dreadfully itchy, I could not keep my patience, or keep him in my room. He saw himself in the mirror, and asked who it was; said he did not know! and really he did not seem to know. It stands to reason that in countries where there are no mirrors, every one must be a complete stranger to himself, and would need an introduction.
I wrote to Waled a Goun, Arab commander-in-chief, as follows:—“I went to Halfeyeh to see Shaggyeh, found five men there; they wanted me to kill them, for being of your family, who had gone back to you after pretending to join me. I questioned these five men; they said they could not bear the smell of you, and that the Shaggyehs had wanted their things, and so had invented the accusation. I have no scales to weigh the truth—perhaps Mahomet Achmet Mahdi has—so, as you have sent me many soldiers of late, I send you these men. I have taken the body of your Peacock” (alluding to the man who came in with the wonderful Dervish dress), “but I send you the plumage of your bird on another body.” I have put the dress on one of the men I sent out.
“Why did you run away so swiftly to-day? was Abou Gugliz there? It could not be you, for you said so much about your desire to die at the fortifications.”
“As for knowing the truth in the Soudan it is impossible, for the devils of lying and robbery are riding all over the country.”
I gave them a dollar each; they leave to-morrow. I have also given them a captured Arab flag and a captured Dervish cap each, so they will go out a grand procession, and as it is their Sunday (Friday), they will arrive at church parade.
Thousands of cranes, with their curious cry, are passing over every day (“The cranes of Ibycus.” Few ever read Schiller’s poems. I only know Bulwer’s translation, but they have grand things in them. “The Veiled Image of Truth at Sais,” “The Ring of Polycrates,” for who can bear plain truth? Who can bear success?)
The notables were in a regular state about my going to Halfeyeh to-day. A deputation came to prevent it, but it was of no use. The Mudir threw himself down and embraced my feet, begging me not to go; but, as I thought his solicitude was actuated more by the wish to prevent me going to where he has, I expect, been robbing right and left, than my security, I did not attend much to him. I should break the hearts of our F.O., for I say openly, “As your Government is bad, and will give you nothing when you are decrepit, rob away gaily, but with wisdom, and do not let me hear of it.”
The Arabs will be in an awful rage to-morrow with the procession of the five Dervishes with captured flags, &c. You can scarcely imagine the state (well known to Stewart, Power, and Herbin) one gets in, when one is constantly hearing explosions; what with the guns, mines, and musketry, one’s nerves get strained, and nothing can drop without one thinking it is an explosion. What the Russians underwent at Sevastopol must have been terrible. As Hansall, the Austrian Consul, says, it is abrutissant. It has slackened off now, but still any loud noise, in this clear air, makes me jump (i.e., be, for a moment, afraid) like any man who rides knows, when his horse, as it were, sinks completely beneath him, on a sudden start.
I look forward to the advent of some of the Royal Navy more than anything. There are such a lot of splendid cutting-outs and surprises to be made by the steamers, and the steamers are first-rate in every respect. Each steamer is worth two thousand men, if well handled, and they have all on board grub and ammunition, and want no commissariat officers.
If I were Earle, I would leave all the principal medical officers at Dongola, and only take on the lowest ranks of the Army Medical Department.
The Principal Medical Officers are bores and croakers, and want all sorts of attention. A man is a fool or a physician at forty years of age. All in this country you want is to keep the communication open, and Cockle will do that. As for wounds, there will be none, for Arabs give no quarter; neither will we, I expect, if we go over one hundred miles of desert.
At Halfeyeh to-day, going round the Fort, a tallow-faced Egyptian dashed out with the most fearful whine. I tried to calm him, no good, so Cassim el Mousse, the Shaggyeh Meleh, interfered; no use! the man (?) threw himself on the ground, and deluged himself and me with dust, so Cassim gave him a wipe over the head with his Hippo whip, and I ordered him to be taken out of the ranks and brought to Kartoum; en route my cavasses came and remonstrated, saying he ought to be secured, for he was the most notorious thief of Alexandria; so, justly or not, I have put him in prison.
It would be a great mistake to think the troops are down in the mouth. We have certainly lost a lot; but the men are as determined as ever, and only think it their due if they are aided. Stewart talks of their cowardice, but it is a cowardice of calculation, and it would be a great mistake if the expeditionary force for the extrication of the garrisons comes up here, and thinks the men are going to say they are in extremis. (I leave out Cairo troops and the Bashi Bazouks.) The black soldiers do not think they have been beaten. There are not many armies which would bear with the equanimity these troops do, the loss of say one-fifth of their numbers killed, which was the case in one defeat (only twenty days ago) of Mahomet Ali Pasha.
The steamers from Sennaar will I think be in to-morrow.
The question to-day at Halfeyeh was this. Certain heads of families had gone over to the Arabs with Saleh Pasha (we put a sponge over that affair), and their adherents, being in Kartoum, had not gone over (not their fault); those who had gone over with Saleh Pasha, afterwards came over to me, and asked for their adherents to be given back to them. To this the chiefs of families, who had been in Kartoum and who had kept these adherents under them, objected, so it became a question what to do. I decided to ask each man his desire. “Will you go with A. or B.?” The men came in at the door, and after having elected, they went out of the window, for there were not two doors; they elected as they wished, and went out of the window. Some came in and thought that all that was required of them was to come in at the door, and go out of the window as quickly as possible without answering! I do love to study mankind; he is far better than any landscape. These fellows knew well enough I was going to put their decision on them, and tried to avoid giving any, as to with whom they would go. It was somewhat of a gymnastic process for them to go out of the window, and they made a good mess of it; but if I had let them go out of the door by which they had entered, inextricable confusion would have occurred. As it was, we had resurrections at the door of those who had departed by the window, which caused some bother. The two rival chiefs were present, and one’s object was to prevent the elector looking at either while he elected; sometimes it was necessary to secure that the pug-face was fairly on the clerk, the electing officer, who asked the question A. or B. I will back the eye for knowledge more than any other organ. A man who does not look you in the face in answering is 99 times in 100 a liar.
September 26.—There is one great question, and if you know a person, say, K. is faithless and is seeking his own, ought one to be down on him? We have an example in our Lord. He knew Judas was going to betray Him, yet He did not denounce him; from which I infer, if we know even that K. is going to rat, or be faithless, unless he, K., gives positive proof of such intention, we ought to treat K. as J., of whom we have no suspicion of treachery. I am inclined (satanically I own) to distrust every one, i.e., I trust every one. I believe that circumstances may arise when self-interest will almost compel your nearest relative to betray you to some extent. Man is an essentially treacherous animal; and although the psalmist said in his haste “all men are liars,” I think he might have said the same at his leisure.
“You may depend upon it, I will do my best for you”—to chief clerk W.O. “Why, if you give it to him we must give it to more than forty. It is out of the question.” What is the result? Why the him will go to his club and say, “Why I was promised it and did not get it.” Whereas if he had weighed the words, he would have seen he was promised only “the best he could do.” This is a breach of confidence, but it is an example. A man long ago dead —— was asked by a lady to recommend her son for an appointment —— (who was most honest), wrote saying so-and-so wants such and such a thing, but that he did not think the young man for whom the appointment was solicited was worth much. —— wrote to the lady to say he had done his best. Unfortunately he placed the letters into wrong envelopes. The lady never looked on —— again. Well, I suppose —— was treacherous to the lady. He might have refused to write, but he did more—he did the young man harm by saying he was not worth much.
I like to take things in a light-hearted way. I like the tacit contract, “that if you are useful to me I will use you”; and “that” (with full belief) “if I cease to be useful to you you will leave me.” I try and act, “do to others as they wish you to do to them.” I would never put a man in any position I would not put myself.
Although man is the essence of treachery, I believe every man wishes to be honest; his interests prevent him.
The five men went out to Arab lines with their Arab flags, on which a church parade, which was going on, dispersed.
It is a curious fact that any effort to relieve the garrisons made from the outside is contemporaneous with the expiration of the period stated in March of the time they could hold out, viz., six months. There are some ugly suspicious circumstances all the way through! The consequence will be a far greater expense. Had efforts been made quietly between March and August to span with proper transport between Wady Halfa and Hannek,[86] much of the present difficulties to an advance would have been got over, and security would have been felt everywhere that efforts were really being made. There is a humility in Baring’s telegram asking my advice as to routes for access to Kartoum. “Sir E. Baring having gone to London, I am charged by Her Majesty’s Government to tell you to keep them informed not only as to immediate but as to any prospective danger at Kartoum, that you should advise them in order to be prepared for any such danger as to force necessary to secure your retreat, its amount, character, route for access to Kartoum, and time for its departure. Her Majesty’s Government does not entertain your proposal to supply you with Turkish or other forces for the purpose of undertaking military expeditions, such being beyond scope of your commission, and at variance with the policy which was the purport of your mission to the Soudan. If with this knowledge you continue at Kartoum, you should state cause and intention with which you so continue.”[87] If the telegrams I sent down in March to Baring are referred to, it will be seen I had already[88] informed him of all he could possibly want to know, and I specially said that the expedition by the route of Wady Halfa would be (as it was at that epoch) a mere picnic party.
Man proposes—God disposes. Any one who two-and-a-half years ago had said that the Gladstone ministry would not only go to Egypt, and, not content with one expedition to the Soudan (Graham’s), would go in for two expeditions, would have been scouted as a madman; and it certainly is curious that Mr. Gladstone, in “—— Review”[89] of 1878, combating Mr. Dicey’s ideas for the annexation of Egypt, should have stated that this annexation was impossible on account of the Soudan!
There is one thing, which, in the opinion of the world, would expunge all disagreeables from the whole question, i.e., if the abolition of slavery were proclaimed. It would be a difficult job, but would be possible if we took our time, and at Lord Mayor’s dinners, &c., it would be a platform no one could come up to.
4 p.m. Steamers from Sennaar in sight. Now we shall be all together again, thank God!
The Arabs off the south front are all agog at sight of the steamers coming down. Those on the Blue Nile are firing on the steamers. I sent up Mansowrah to help them. The Arabs are in the houses. Expenditure of ammunition is enormous, I should think. The three steamers have passed the place where the Arabs are. They came down one by one, which was not wise.
From the top of the Serail one commands view all round for miles.
It will be a satisfaction to Her Majesty’s Navy to know that it is our navy which has, humanly speaking, saved us. It really is a splendid fleet and naval arsenal. The steamers have come in; the Arabs were numerous and had five guns; seven of their shells struck the steamers (Arabs had also two rocket tubes). The steamers brought down 2000 ardebs, and report Sennaar well off, and no Arabs in arms in all their district. Seyd Osman Mahomet is said to have occupied Katarif with his men. A sheikh has promised to capture the steamer Mahomet Ali, which is up the River Dinder, and to hand her over to the Sennaar Governor. Wad Medinet did not fire on the steamers, but brandished spears, &c.; our loss in passing the gauntlet was three killed and eight wounded.
The Arabs have no conscience; they make my captured soldiers serve the guns, and otherwise act against us under pain of death!
I declare my people do, in a feeble way, what is wanted, and do not deserve the character of cowards; they bear defeat far better than other peoples, and they are good-tempered over it. We English are the cream, all acknowledge that, but we will not exist on two dates a day, as these men do, without a murmur.
The steamer Bordeen was struck by two shots, one near water-line. The Ismailia steamer received three, the Talataween steamer received two shots. Happily all got down safe. The Arabs fired from guns and rifles with fury—we could see that from the roof. All the steamers have got small-pox from bullet-marks! Our chief of the arsenal, Hussein Bey, had been sharp enough to have bits of old tents ready to stop shot-holes. Had we not had these we might have lost the Bordeen steamer.
The Arabs had three forts (breastworks) along the river-bank, rather above Giraffe. I mentioned that we lost three killed and eight wounded; now mark this, on their way down the steamers met three escaped soldiers from the Arabs; they took them on board, and, odd to say, of those killed and wounded, were these three men, two having been killed, and the other badly wounded! This is remarkable. If we could believe it, we are as safe in the fiercest battle as in a drawing-room in London.
September 27.—I have arranged to send down three steamers to Shendy to co-operate with Dongola forces, and to raise the Shaggyeh tribes. I have sent out a man to warn Dongola of this fact. He carries no letters, only a small slip, stating he is a “true man.”
It is of no use sending up to Sennaar again for dhoora, for we have no money to pay for it, and it is a risk with these Arab guns. Steamer Ismailia received three shells; steamer Bordeen two; steamer Talataween two. Some made tremendous holes, and one in Bordeen was close to water-line; it is wonderful how they escaped. The poor escaped soldiers were asleep in the hold, when a shell entered and burst; two were killed, one was seriously wounded.
Two men came in from the Arabs. One said he was the Mahdi, the other said a courier had come to the Arabs, saying the English were at Berber; they knew nothing of yesterday’s fight.
Our steamers are of about the same consistency as the Thames steamboats, so you may imagine the risk there is of putting them under artillery fire.
Towfikia steamer went up the White Nile exchanging musketry fire with the Arabs.
My beautiful steamers, which used to be comparatively sweet, now stink like badgers. As for the swell Ismailia she is a cess-pit.
Several other shots struck the upper works of the steamers; evidently they were under a nasty fire, and as for bullet marks they are spotted all over. Among the three killed (two of them escaped soldiers) one was a little boy.
Another slave came in at Omdurman, but had no news.
Great female squawking under the window of the Serail, approaching to yells. On examination I find the noise comes from a black female fighting the cavass. On enquiry I find my lady had gone down to buy dhoora with two dollars in her hand, and had been pushed by some ungallant fellow, and the dollars fell into the river. Though I do not see that the responsibility was upon me, I gave her the two dollars, and comforted her black soul. It would be a comfort if all the troubles of life were got rid of so cheaply.
Having undergone considerable anxiety owing to the Shaggyeh tribe in our lines during the blockade, we got rid of them to Halfeyeh as soon as we could.[90] But when they got to Halfeyeh, and met their brethren who had been with the Arabs, and who had come over to us, the former were seized with distrust of the latter, and so we are obliged to bring these latter into Kartoum. I do not think it any risk, for the Shaggyeh have lied so very much to the Arabs that nothing would ever make peace between them, so I do not feel any discomfort about them.
It is not comfortable to see your steamers with a hole in them through which you could push your head and shoulders, and that not a foot above the water-line. The Bordeen had that, the shell came in on one side and burst on penetrating the other plate of the other side.
To my mind, these Egyptian mountain guns are far preferable to those steel guns of ours, with their wretched small calibre, and I would prefer a smooth bore howitzer to an Armstrong for these wars.
I made Nutzer Bey a Pasha for his Sennaar trip, and send him down with Cassim el Mousse to Metemma to await advance of Her Majesty’s forces. Ibraham Tongi and Mousse Beys refused, or rather declined to go unless also made Pashas, which I did not see, so these worthies stay here.
B. to A.—“Well you know I had to send on the telegram, and I added I hoped Stewart was well. That fellow G. takes exception to this, and says va sans dire, that I could not have wished that Stewart was ill. Most unjust. Had I added anything to this telegram, I might have got into a row, which would never do, but what was the use of pampering to inordinate curiosity?”
A. to B.—“Well he pitched into me for asking Stewart to tell me if I could do anything for him (the communications being so easy), and for telling him the names of the Generals (to my mind a most important matter, for it would strike terror among the Arabs), he says he does not care who the Generals are (which is sheer heresy and perfectly sickening). I shall write nothing more to him except the purest official documents. It is very clear his liver is out of order, to go and attack officers of his own corps like that. It is atrocious!”
September 28.—Two women and a man came in to-day; they say the Mahdi is not at Schatt, but at Rahad. Hussan Effendi and another directed the guns against the steamers. The women say the Arabs had three guns, not five. The Arabs did not lose many from their people’s accounts. Among the three guns there was a Krupp, they say.
Say for a moment that the object of Her Majesty’s Government is simply to enable me to retreat, and is irrespective of the retreat of the garrisons—then all the loss of life in this neighbourhood on both sides was thrown away, inasmuch as if I had not come there would have been a speedier collapse, without the loss of life (at least such is probable). The Government may say that they had reasonable hopes that I would succeed; I will neither say I gave them such assurance or that I did not give it. I think I was neutral in giving or in not giving such assurance.
When the steamers get to Shendy, they will be only 150 miles from Ambukol, which is a little higher up the Nile than Debbeh (35 miles). Three more slaves came in from the north; they had run away from their master, and will enter the army. I expect we shall have lots of this sort of thing.
Arabs show no disposition to close our road to Shendy as yet, and I believe the country up to that place is with Kartoum (I cannot say the Government, for I do not know what the Government is).
One of the greatest sinners in the way of getting Egypt into financial difficulties (whence all this trouble) is ... who in the Crimea used to sell cheeses and other things at exorbitant prices.
Sir Samuel Baker will be disgusted to know that the crack vessel he got from Samuda, the Ismailia, the biggest of his lot, is the worst of the larger fighting steamers. She is a good yacht, but nothing more. All these steamers we owe to Sir Samuel Baker.
A Frenchman, Monsieur de Bizemont, brought up the steamers from Cairo, through all the cataracts. Monsieur le Blanc was with him. Mr. Higginbotham, C.E., took the steamers in sections across the Korosko desert.
September 29.—To-morrow is Bairam. I have made Ferratch Pasha take over the festivities. The Talataween, Mansowrah, and Saphia, (D.V.) leave for Shendy to-morrow night with 100 men on board of each. Cassim el Mousse goes with them. I send a slip to Lord Wolseley, to be forwarded with a spy. The two journals of events from 10th to 30th September, and map of Berber, will go with steamers, in hopes of their being able to find a more secure road of sending them to Debbeh or elsewhere.
I found we had 700 bags of Indian rice in store. I have issued it on account of pay to the troops, at two okes[91] per dollar. They will sell it at three okes per dollar. It wipes off my debt to them, and they will gain.
An escaped soldier came in, and says Mahdi has had three messengers from Metemma, saying British troops were coming up in shoals, and so he had a dream, in which he was ordered back to Kordofan.
I hope the officers and men of Her Majesty’s forces will be considerate to the Egyptian soldiers and sailors; they do not understand English, but as they have done some good service, I hope they will be kindly treated. They are a trying lot, as I well know, but if it were not for them, our soldiers would have to tramp many a weary sandy mile. It is one of my joys that I never have to see Great Britain again. I hope to get out of this affair, and either go to the Congo, viâ Equatorial Province, or by Brussels. At any rate I shall never have to undergo the worries I underwent during the week I was in England this year. I say this in order that those who may have to do with me may know how very determined a man’s will must be who does not wish (and indeed will not ever) go back to England again, and to whom continuance in Her Majesty’s Service, except for the honour of it, is a matter of indifference.
I am now going to be egotistic, but it will save a mint of trouble, and I may be pardoned, considering the circumstances. By being so I may save myself what I should much regret, a quarrel.
My idea is to induce Her Majesty’s Government to undertake the extrication of all people or garrisons, now hemmed in or captive, and that if this is not their programme, then to resign my commission and do what I can to attain it (the object). As long as a man remains in Her Majesty’s Service he is bound to obey the orders of his superiors, but if he resigns he cannot be held as insubordinate if he disobeys. Of course it may turn on the question of whether once having entered the service of Her Majesty’s Army, one is free to leave it at one’s will. But we officers are not like the private soldiers engaged for a term of years, and perhaps one may risk dismissal if the cause is worthy of it—which, I think, the question of abandoning the garrisons is.
I say this, because I should be sorry for Lord Wolseley to advance from Dongola without fully knowing my views. If Her Majesty’s Government are going to abandon the garrisons, then do not advance. I say nothing of evacuating the country, I merely maintain that if we do so, every one in the Soudan, captive or hemmed in, ought to have the option and power of retreat. Having given them that option and power, I have nothing more to say, and I would not care whether the country is evacuated or not.
It is a miserable country, but it is joined to Egypt, and to my idea it would be difficult to divorce the two.
I will end these egotistical remarks by saying that no persuasion will induce me to change my views; and that as to force, it is out of the question, for I have the people with me—at any rate of the towns which hold out. Therefore, if Her Majesty’s forces are not prepared to relieve the whole of the garrisons, the General should consider whether it is worth coming up—in his place, if not so prepared,[92] I would not do so. I do not dictate, but I say what every gentleman[93] in Her Majesty’s Army would agree to—that it would be mean (coûte que coûte) to leave men who (though they may not come up to our ideas as heroes) have stuck to me, though a Christian dog in their eyes, through great difficulties, and thus force them to surrender to those who have not conquered them, and to do that at the bidding of a foreign Power, to save one’s own skin. Why the black sluts would stone me if they thought I meditated such action. Stewart knows all this and used to groan over perversity.
September 30. The Arabs fired seven shells last night at 9 p.m. which fell inside the lines, but did no harm. To-day being Bairam, they fired four rounds in their camp—a salute I suppose.
The spy who came in yesterday, says the report is rife that Seyd Mahomet Osman’s men have entered Katarif.
The three steamers will leave here to-day for Shendy at 4 p.m.
I shoved off the Bairam reception upon Ferratch Pasha, who held it upon the lines. I am not up to these affairs, and I think he likes them.
As soon as ever I hear of the arrival of troops at Berber, down will go the Greeks, Bashi Bazouks, and Fellaheen soldiers with a month’s provisions. The people of Berber then can send them on, as best they can—they will be off my hands. I have everything ready to send them. We have no telegraph wire left up here to repair the lines, so Floyer had better see to it; all ours has been used in the wire entanglements.
The troops on board the steamers are Fellaheen soldiers. If Berber is captured, better take them out and keep them (they are part of their way to their homes), and replace them with such black troops as may be released at Berber; but see after these white soldiers’ pay, and rations, and do not neglect them.
We do not want to be told the steamers are dirty, for we know it.
If coming up, see beforehand that Arabs have not a gun or guns at the Shoboloha Pass, and if wood has to be looted, loot those people on the left bank of the Nile, not those on the right.
I do not care much to have Wood’s men here; there will be sure to be rows between them and our blacks, and they are not favourites in the Soudan. Still less do I want to see Bashi Bazouks, or tribes who have been taken into our pay, for they will rob right and left.
I have prepared the beads, copper rods, uniforms, &c., to send up to the Equator as soon as it is possible. Report says the garrison of the Equator is at Fashoda.
The sister steamer to Abbas will be finished in twelve days. We made, or rather Hassan Bey made, a first-rate crank.
Remember, we have very few dollars here, and gold is depreciated in value. We have only £1,000 in the treasury.
It would be as well to tell the Greek creditors, who may be coming up, that there is not the least probability that the Government, whatever it may be, will look at any of their claims until at least a year has expired.
We have painted the steamers up; they are whited sepulchres.
I hope Ibrahim Tongi and Moussa Beys, who will come down with the first lot, who leave this (after the hoped-for capture of Berber), will be sent on to Cairo at once, and not given appointments, on any consideration, at Berber or elsewhere.
I like trying to find solutions for this Soudan problem. This is the last. Let Towfik Pasha send up Abdel Kader Pasha, as Governor-General, to replace me at once. As soon as the Firman comes, I am out of calculation, and Her Majesty’s Government can do what they like, for Abdel Kader will follow their dictum. Such an act would not in the least vex me. Lord Wolseley can then do what he thinks fit with respect to the Soudan, the abandonment, and all the etceteras, and I am free of all responsibility to the people and to the troops, or with respect to the money affairs, dhoora, &c., &c. But in this case, it must be borne in mind, I am not the “rescued lamb,” simply having been sent up to perform a certain mission, i.e., extrication of garrisons. I failed, and was replaced by Abdel Kader and a British Force. It is for them to explain any change in their programme.
The same remarks, appended to the end of Volume I, are added to this in re Mr. Power and Foreign Office, &c.
C. G. Gordon.
30th September, 2 p.m., Kartoum.
I really think that as Her Majesty’s Government and I are in such opposite camps (at least I think so)—in re the extrication of the garrisons—it would save a mint of trouble if Towfik Pasha were to replace me by Abdel Kader Pasha, with whom Her Majesty’s Government could do as they liked. At any rate, a scandal would be avoided; and I think Abdel Kader would be well received by all. Of course I should have the privilege of laughing in my sleeve if, after all, Her Majesty’s Government found they could not get out without the establishment of Turks or Zubair, or the retention of the Soudan under Egypt. I, therefore, as an adieu, recommend this course, for it opens a speedy exit for me without rows, and clears me of all responsibility whatever.
C. G. Gordon.
BOOK III.
On outside wrapper(a handkerchief):
No secrets as far as I am concerned.
C. G. GORDON.
Lt.-Colonel Stewart, C.M.G.,
Chief of the Staff, or Lord Wolseley, G.C.B.
Soudan Expeditionary Force.
Journal of Events—Kartoum, Vol. III.
From 1st Oct. to 12th Oct., 1884.
On cover at back:
General Gordon’s Journal
From 1st Oct. to 12th Oct., 1884.
EVENTS IN KARTOUM.
It will require pruning down if published.
C. G. GORDON.
1/10/84.
On inside sheet:
EVENTS AT KARTOUM.
General Gordon’s Journal, Vol. III.
From Oct. 1st to——1884.
If published, must be pruned down.
C. G. GORDON.