[1] Hill’s ‘Colonel Gordon in Central Africa,’ p. 373.

[2] See Appendix.

[3] From Pall Mall Gazette extra, “Too Late,” No. 14.

[4] Egypt, No. 9, Encl. 3, 43.

[5] General Gordon had been incorrectly informed by his spies about Abdel Kader, who had not left Cairo.

[6] This department must not be confounded with the one associated with the Quartermaster-General at the War Office.

[7] The military, civilians, Ulemas, inhabitants and settlers in Kartoum telegraphed on August 19th to the Khedive as follows: “Weakened and reduced to extremities, God in His mercy sent Gordon Pasha to us in the midst of our calamities of the siege, and we should all have perished of hunger and been destroyed. But we, sustained by his intelligence and great military skill, have been preserved in Kartoum until now.”—Egypt, No. 35, p. 112; see also Appendix AB.—Ed.

[8] In this passage we have an example of the old and perfect fairness with which General Gordon dealt with others. Before allowing Mustapha Faki, the neutral, to join his ranks and aid him against the Mahdi, he must first himself be satisfied that such a step would not endanger Faki Mustapha’s life. Success or failure was still doubtful. This, of course, he could not tell Mustapha, but would it be right and just to use him while such a doubt existed? Gordon was of opinion that it would not, and thus he bade Mustapha wait events, and do for him that only which involved no risks.—Ed.

[9] Tuti is an island at the junction of the White and Blue Nile.—Ed.

[10] Near El Obeyed and about 200 miles from Kartoum.—Ed.

[11] Vide Sir Henry Gordon’s Prefatory Note.—Ed.

[12] A small town eight miles north of Kartoum.—Ed.

[13] Berber is about 200 miles from Kartoum.—Ed.

[14] English Consular Agent at Berber. According to M. Herbin’s telegram from Kartoum received by M. Barrère on 22nd September, 1884, Cuzzi had gone to Kordofan, but whether free or as a prisoner was not stated.—Egypt, No.35 (1884), No.142.—Ed.

[15] Duem is a town on the White Nile about 100 miles from Kartoum.—Ed.

[16] A cereal very much resembling Indian corn.—Ed.

[17] The Sheikh el Obeyed declared for the Mahdi in March 1884.

[18] At first sight there might seem something of a contradiction in these sentiments, but, when weighed, they will be found consistent and sound. They convey an idea which was constantly at work in General Gordon’s mind, and this to the effect that man should make every effort towards the attainment of perfection, and then, and not till then, leave the issue to God; that he should, in fact, draw on all earthly resources—as the instrument of God—and that, these exhausted, he should then look to Heaven for aid not to be drawn from earth.—Ed.

[19] “Behold, therefore I am against thee, and against thy rivers, and I will make the land of Egypt utterly waste and desolate, from the tower of Syene even unto the border of Ethiopia.

“No foot of man shall pass through it, nor foot of beast shall pass through it, neither shall it be inhabited forty years.

“And I will make the land of Egypt desolate in the midst of the countries that are desolate, and her cities among the cities that are laid waste shall be desolate forty years; and I will scatter the Egyptians among the nations, and will disperse them through the countries.”

“Yet thus saith the Lord God; at the end of forty years will I gather the Egyptians from the people whither they were scattered:

“And I will bring again the captivity of Egypt, and will cause them to return into the land of Pathros, into the land of their habitation; and they shall be there a base kingdom.”—Ed.

[20] Appendix A and A 1.

[21] Appendix B.

[22] “Go, and with ghouls and afrits rave.”—The Giaour.

[23] These words may be taken literally. Such was Gordon’s power and influence in 1879, when he resigned the Governor-Generalship of the Soudan.—Ed.

[24] “And Pharaoh said unto Joseph, I am Pharaoh, and without thee shall no man lift up his hand or foot in all the land of Egypt.”—Ed.

[25] “Everything one does is known, and the only regret is that I am a Christian. Yet they would be the first to despise me if I recanted and became a Mussulman.”—Extract from General Gordon’s Letter, dated Kassala, December 7th, 1877.—Ed.

[26] “I have upset so many vested interests, that the only people I can count on are the Ulemas, to whom I gave back all their ancient privileges, which had been taken away from them by Ismail Pasha Yacoub.”—Extract from General Gordon’s letter dated Kartoum, May 4th, 1877.—Ed.

[27] “If fighting occurs, it is the Soudanese conservative of their property fighting the Soudanese communists, who desire to rob them.”—Extract from General Gordon’s Memorandum received by Sir E. Baring, February 4th, 1884.—Egypt, No. 12.—Ed.

[28] “We have, thank God, passed our dangers. Whether they were imaginary or not I do not know, but we were threatened by an attack from thousands of determined blacks, who knew I was here. Now very few Englishmen know what it is to be with troops they have not a bit of confidence in. I prayed heartily for an issue, but it gave me a pain in the heart like that I had when surrounded at Masindi. I do not fear death, but I fear, from want of faith, the results of my death—for the whole country would have risen.”—Extract from General Gordon’s letter dated Toashia, July 11th, 1877. Ed.

[29] Appendix C.

[30] Appendix C 1.

[31] Lupton Bey was Governor of the Bahr el Gazelle.

[32] According to a telegram from M. Herbin to M. Barrère, Slatin Bey, formerly Governor of Darfour, had by this time joined the Mahdi, and by him had been placed in command of the Kordofan cavalry, which force was supposed to represent the most formidable contingent of the Mahdi’s army.—Ed.

[33] Appendix D.

[34] Dollars.

[35] An ardeb is equal to five bushels.

[36] The Names of Mission at Obeyed.

Prétres à Kordofan.

1. Don Luigi Bonorni, Superior.
2. Don Guiseppe Ohrwalder.
3. Don Paulo Nusignoli.
4. Fra Isodoro Locatelli.
5. Fra Guiseppe Regusto.

Sœurs.

1. Teresa Grigolini, Superioress.
2. Fortunata Corce.
3. Catarina Chincherini.
4. Cometta Corsi.
5. Elizabetta Venturini.
6. Maria Caprini.

[37] Kings of Egypt.—Ed.

[38] The commander of a company.—Ed.

[39] “Surviving Soudanese declared that the two Pashas in command charged back into their own square; the soldiers, recognising them, opened their ranks to let them through; and into the gap thus made the rebel cavalry followed. The treachery, doubtless pre-arranged, was complete in its success, but retribution was close at hand. When the battle was over these two traitors, Said and Hassan, came into Gordon’s tent, and the General offered them drink. They refused; Gordon’s secretary, divining the reason, drank first, and the Pashas, who had suspected poison, followed suit. During the remainder of that day they lay hidden in their homes, for the soldiers were crying aloud for vengeance, and would have murdered them at once had they appeared in the streets. The next day they were tried by court-martial, and found guilty of communication with the enemy and of having treacherously murdered their own men. In the house of Hassan a great store of rifles and ammunition was discovered; and it was proved that both he and his colleague had stolen the two months’ pay given to the troops on account of six months’ arrears. They had also taken into the field with them seventy rounds of cannon ammunition, instead of eight, the usual number, so that the rebels’ guns might be well supplied for future attacks on Kartoum. The trial was long and patient, but the verdict was apparent from the beginning. Hassan and Said were found guilty, and on the same evening, amid expressions of universal delight, they were shot by the men they had betrayed.”—The Story of Chinese Gordon, pp. 92-3, v. ii.—Ed.

[40] i.e. Natives from Halfeyeh report.—Ed.

[41] Those for, and those against the Mahdi.—Ed.

[42] “I strongly suspect that he (the Mahdi) is a mere puppet put forward by Elyas, Zubair’s father-in-law, and the largest slave-owner in Obeyed, and that he has assumed a religious title to give colour to the defence of the popular rights.”—General Gordon’s view as expressed to the Editor of “Pall Mall Gazette” on Jan. 8, 1884.—Ed.

[43] A woman.—Ed.

[44] Shendy is ninety-five miles from Kartoum.—Ed.

[45] Colonel Prout was appointed by General Gordon to the command of the Equatorial Provinces at the date of the latter’s resignation in the autumn of 1876.—Ed.

[46] “The eye that mocketh at his father and despiseth to obey his mother, the ravens of the valley shall pick it out, and the young eagles shall eat it.”—Prov. xxx. 17.

[47] Zubair is the correct spelling. It must not be forgotten that Zubair is of very high family, being a direct descendant of the “Abbassides.”—Ed.

[48] Appendix E.

[49] Lord Wolseley and staff left Cairo for Wady Halfa ten days after Gordon wrote those words.—Ed.

[50] Lord Granville on May 17, 1884, instructed Mr. Egerton to communicate the following message from Her Majesty’s Government to General Gordon:—

“Having regard to the time which has elapsed, Her Majesty’s Government desire to add to their communication of the 23rd April as follows:—As the original plan for the evacuation of the Soudan has been dropped, and as aggressive operations cannot be undertaken with the countenance of Her Majesty’s Government, General Gordon is enjoined to consider and either to report upon, or, if feasible, to adopt, at the first proper moment, measures for his own removal and for that of the Egyptians at Kartoum who have suffered for him or who have served him faithfully, including their wives and children, by whatever route he may consider best, having especial regard to his own safety and that of the other British subjects.

“With regard to the Egyptians above referred to, General Gordon is authorised to make free use of money rewards or promises at his discretion. For example, he is at liberty to assign to Egyptian soldiers at Kartoum sums for themselves and for persons brought with them per head, contingent on their safe arrival at Korosko, or whatever point he may consider a place of safety; or he may employ and pay the tribes in the neighbourhood to escort them. Her Majesty’s Government presume that the Soudanese at Kartoum are not in danger. In the event of General Gordon having dispatched any persons or agents to other points, he is authorised to spend any money required for the purpose of recalling them or securing their safety.”—Egypt, 22, 1884, No. 22.—Ed.

[51] Appendix E.

[52] i.e. The telegram given on page 39.—Ed.

[53] See ante, note on page 39.—Ed.

[54] “The danger to be feared is not that the Mahdi will march northward through Wady Halfa; on the contrary, it is very improbable that he will ever go so far north. The danger is altogether of a different nature. It arises from the influence which the spectacle of a conquering Mahommedan Power, established close to your frontiers, will exercise upon the population which you govern. In all the cities in Egypt it will be felt that what the Mahdi has done they may do; and, as he has driven out the intruder and the infidel, they may do the same. Nor is it only England that has to face this danger. The success of the Mahdi has already excited dangerous fermentation in Arabia and Syria. Placards have been posted in Damascus calling upon the population to rise and drive out the Turks. If the whole of the Eastern Soudan is surrendered to the Mahdi, the Arab tribes on both sides the Red Sea will take fire. In self-defence the Turks are bound to do something to cope with so formidable a danger, for it is quite possible that if nothing is done the whole of the Eastern Question may be reopened by the triumph of the Mahdi.”—General Gordon’s views, as expressed to the Editor of the “Pall Mall Gazette.”—Ed.

[55] A town nearly opposite to Shendy, on the left bank of the Nile.—Ed.

[56] An old hot-bed of slavery on the White Nile.—Ed.

[57] “Ismail, the ex-Khedive, fully considered that to maintain his hold of the Soudan, he must improve his communications with it and Egypt proper. Unfortunately, in his wish to bring the Soudan trade down the Nile through Egypt proper, he was led to abandon its natural outlet by the route from Berber to Suakin, across the 280-mile desert, and determined to make a railway through the desert along the Nile past the Cataracts from Wady Halfa to Hanneck, a distance of 180 miles. Contracts were made, and some £450,000 were spent on the line; but financial difficulties arose, and in 1877 it came to a standstill some fifty or sixty kilometres south of Wady Halfa. It was evident that on this grand scale the continuation of the line could not be hoped for, so I studied the question. There was the line made from Wady Halfa for say fifty miles; and therefore 130 miles remained to be got over before this barrier of desert was passed. By the researches of Colonel Mason and Mr. Gooding, and also by my own personal examination, the river for this 130 miles was shown to be not continuously encumbered by rocks. There were, as it were, long strips of open, water between the ridges of rocks,—one of these strips was forty miles in length. Now steamers built in England had in full flood been hauled up every one of these ridges, and had thus been brought to Kartoum and had plied to Gondokoro. My idea was to bring up small steamers during high Nile, place them on all the open strips of water of any reasonable extent; and thus work them from ridge to ridge in these open spaces. I proposed further to have only one crew, and to ship them from steamer to steamer so as to save expense. At those places where the ridge was of any great length, I proposed to use tramways to get over the space between the debarking landing-place of one open water-way to the embarking wharf of the other open water-way. Thus, by using the water-way where open, and tramways where the river was encumbered, I should get over these 130 miles. I calculated that the cost of all this work, steamers, and tramways, &c., would be £70,000, while the railway, if carried, would have cost over a million and a half. However, the revolts, troubles of different kinds, and other things, prevented this being carried out, and the controllers would not take it up; so, after an expense of nearly half-a-million, the railway exists with its end en l’air, with its valuable stores perishing, while Egypt proper has no more hold over the Soudan than was had by Ancient Egypt.”—See “Colonel Gordon in Central Africa,” p. 315.—Ed.

[58] “On the 18th Feb., the day General Gordon arrived at Kartoum, he recommended in the strongest manner that Zubair should be sent up, and gave his reasons in detail.”—Egypt, No. 12, 1884. Enclosure in No. 114.

“On March 9, Sir Evelyn Baring recommended that Zubair should go up, such a recommendation being in harmony with the policy of evacuation.”—Egypt, No. 12, 1884, in 115 & 222.—Ed.

[59] This cannot be traced—Ed.

[60] Egypt, 1884, Nos. 201-56. See also Egypt, 1884, Nos. 35-166.

[61] Appendix F.

[62] About 180 miles from Kartoum.—Ed.

[63] Appendix G.

[64] Appendix E.

[65] Between forty and fifty miles west of Duem.—Ed.

[66] A pass about midway between Shendy and Halfeyeh.—Ed.

[67] “London, 12th.—Debates on Egypt, House of Commons, subject Egypt. Gladstone declined communicate Northbrook’s instructions. Declared Anglo-French accord dead letter.

“13th.—Financiers—German, Austrian, Russian—attack England’s attitude. Conference considered must lead coalition against England. Fitzmaurice stated British Government not prepared change advice given Egypt withdraw from Kartoum.

“13th.—Parliament closed till 15th September. Message hopes mission Northbrook suggest useful counsels. England will continue to fulfil public duties imposed upon her by events in Egypt.

“17th August.—The 88th, 46th, and 56th regiments, with expedition of 19th Hussars and corps of Mounted Infantry, go to Halfa.

“London, 19th.—General Erle commands expedition Halfa. Buller chief of staff.”

“Dear General Gordon,

“I send you the above as the last public news we have heard. I have been appointed Inspector General of the Soudan Telegraph, but at present I can’t get beyond Debba to inspect them, as Mr. Hudai has captured the Merowi telegraph office, and the Sirdar will not let us advance. I am ordered back to Halfa, and am leaving by boat this morning. With kind regards to Colonel Stewart,

“Yours sincerely,

“E. A. Floyer.”

“Debba, 22nd August, 1884.”

[68] “Dear Stewart,

“Can I do anything for you or General Gordon? I should be awfully glad if you will let me know. The relief expedition is evidently coming up this way, but whether they will go by Berber or attempt the direct road from here I do not know. The Mahdi is in a bad way; he has abandoned Parfur, and has no reinforcements to send to Kartoum and Sennaar, which are asked for.

“Yours always,

“H. H. Kitchener.”

[69] Appendices K and L.

[70] Appendix M.

[71] “Dear General Gordon,

“Mr. Egerton has asked me to send you the following:—August 30th. Tell Gordon steamers are being passed over second cataracts, and that we wish to be informed through Dongola exactly when he expects to be in difficulties as to provisions and ammunition.” Message ends, “Lord Wolseley is coming out to command. The 35th Regiment is now being sent from Halfa to Dongola. Sir E. Wood is at Halfa. General Earle, Dormer, Buller, and Freemantle are coming up Nile with troops. I think an expedition will be sent across from here to Kartoum, while another goes with steamer to Berber. A few words about what you wish done would be very acceptable.”

“Yours,

“H. H. Kitchener, R.E.

“Debbeh, August 31st.”

[72] “Cairo, August 20th, 10.30 p.m.

“To General Gordon,

“445737—905309—185115—417291—552676—792996—271381—511906—689363—945242—226739—648255—102037—626054—535222—672318—277535—134971—467430—203151—804960—483289—681510.”

The following was written on the back of this cipher telegram:—

“Your letters of 13/7/84 and 20/7/84 have been received, and their contents telegraphed on. The last news here is the 35th Regiment has been ordered to advance from Halfa to Dongola at once. General Earle commands expedition, Buller C. of S., Dormer and Freemantle brigades. All coming up. Lord Wolseley leaves London directly to take over supreme command. All well here. Mudir working well. No danger. Sir E. Wood is at Halfa sending on troops.

“H. H. Kitchener.

“Debbeh, 29th August, 1884.”

[73] Telegram Mudir of Dongola, saying Cairo Government had shown pressing benevolence for him to evacuate and thus rivet the “tombstone” over Kartoum.—Ed.

[74] The two black Pashas condemned to death by court-martial for treachery on March 20th.

[75] I.e., the future of the Soudan.—Ed.

[76] I.e., 4th Cataract.—Ed.

[77] I.e., p. 52.—Ed.

[78] “In Colonel Coetlogon’s opinion the rebels will retire south on the approach of the British, and await events. General Gordon would certainly refuse to go unless the population and garrison were guaranteed safe departure. The population and garrisons of Kartoum and Sennaar amount to about 40,000 to 50,000 souls, and it would take two years to remove them. As the places become evacuated the rebels would enter and become hostile in front and in the rear.”—Times, 13 Sept., 1884.—Ed.

[79] General Gordon proposed to the Government to give to the King of the Belgians the Bahr Gazelle and Equatorial provinces, and from the first time he suggested the appointment of Zubair, he had determined to defend those provinces from all slave raids.—Ed.

[80] The Gabra wells are about thirty miles to the north-west of Kartoum.—Ed.

[81] United Service Club.—Ed.

[82] The blanks are General Gordon’s.—Ed.

[83] The following extract from Herodotus is pasted on the opposite side of page in the original journal:—“The spies having seen everything returned home; and when they reported all they had passed, Cambyses marched against the Ethiopians without making any provision for the subsistence of his army, or once considering that he was going to carry his arms to the remotest parts of the world; but as a madman and not in possession of his senses, as soon as he heard the reports of the Icthyophagi he set out on his march ... but before the army had passed over a fifth part of the way all the provisions were exhausted, and after the provisions the beasts of burden were eaten. Now if Cambyses had then led back his army he would have proved himself a wise man. He, however, went on; but afterwards none, except the Ammonians, and those who have heard their reports, are able to give account of them; for they neither reached the Ammonians or returned back, but the report was that heaps of sand covered them over and they disappeared.” General Gordon has written against this extract:—“Hicks’ army disappeared. This expedition was made into these lands.”—Ed.

[84] General Gordon was under the impression that Colonel Chermside was at Debbeh, whereas he was, in fact, at Suakin.—Ed.

[85] The primary object of the expedition up the Valley of the Nile is to bring away General Gordon and Colonel Stewart from Kartoum. When that object has been secured no further offensive operations of any kind are to be undertaken.—Egypt, No. 35, 1884; No. 157.—Ed.

[86] Upper part of Nubian Desert.—Ed.

[87] From British agent and Nubar Pasha to General Gordon, sent 5th May from Suakin; reached 29th of July.—Ed.

[88] Telegram from General Gordon to Sir E. Baring dated Feb. 27, 1884, says: “You have to say whether the partial evacuation of the Soudan fulfils your objects,—if it does not, then you must act by Indian Moslem troops from Wady Halfa; and do so at once by sending detachments of troops to Wady Halfa.”—Egypt, No. 12 (1884), Enclosure 1, in No. 229. And again, on Feb. 29, “Should you wish to intervene, send 200 British troops to Wady Halfa and adjutants to inspect Dongola, and then open up Suakin-Berber road by Indian Moslem troops. This will cause an immediate collapse of the revolt. Whether you think it worth while to do this or not you are, of course, the best judge. I can only tell you the modus operandi of an expeditious intervention. If you decide against this you may probably have to decide between Zubair and the Mahdi. Zubair with £100,000.”—Egypt, No. 12 (1884), Enclosure 5, No. 229.—Ed.

[89] “Nineteenth Century,” August, 1877.—Ed.

[90] A telegram from Mudir of Dongola says that “on the 24th July, the Emir Abou Kanga and his army, who had come from Kordofan, were slaughtered, and that before the messenger quitted Kartoum another fight occurred, in which the son of Sheikh Sid and his followers were killed on the 30th August, and the siege raised. This is confirmed by a letter sent to me by Cassim-el-Mousse Bey, stating that he and his soldiers were at Halfeyeh, and that the Shaggyeh tribe and people had come in and tendered their submission.—Egypt, No. 35, 1884, No. 133.—Ed.

[91] An oke equals 3½ lbs. troy.—Ed.

[92] The position of the garrisons in Darfour, the Bahr-el-Gazelle and Equatorial provinces renders it impossible that you should take any action which would facilitate their retreat without extending your operations far beyond the sphere which Her Majesty’s Government is prepared to sanction.

As regards the Sennaar garrison, Her Majesty’s Government is not prepared to sanction the dispatch of an expedition of British troops up the Blue Nile in order to insure its retreat.

From the last telegrams received from General Gordon, there is reason to hope that he has already taken steps to withdraw the Egyptian portion of the Sennaar garrison.

You will use your best endeavours to insure the safe retreat of the Egyptian troops which constitute the Kartoum garrison, and of such of the civil employés of Kartoum, together with their families, as may wish to return to Egypt.

As regards the future government of the Soudan, and especially of Kartoum, Her Majesty’s Government would be glad to see a Government at Khartoum which, so far as all matters connected with the internal administration of the country are concerned, would be wholly independent of Egypt.—Lord Wolseley’s Instructions, Egypt, No. 35, 1884, No. 157.—Ed.

[93] “I am strongly against any permanent retention of the Soudan, but I think we ought to leave it with decency, and give the respectable people a man to lead them, around whom they can rally, and we ought to support that man by money and by opening road to Berber. Pray do not consider me in any way to advocate retention of Soudan; I am quite averse to it, but you must see that you could not recall me nor could I possibly obey until the Cairo employés get out from all the places. I have named men to different places, thus involving them with Mahdi; how could I look the world in the face if I abandoned them and fled? As a gentleman, could you advise this course? It may have been a mistake to send me up, but having been done I have no option but to see evacuation through, for even if I was mean enough to escape I have no power to do so. You can easily understand this; would you do so? If you were the people of Khartoum, you would, like they would, make terms with Mahdi by making me backsheesh Mahdi.”—Gen. Gordon to Sir E. Baring, Kartoum, March 3, 1884; Egypt, No. 12, 1884; No. 231. This telegram, forwarded by Sir E. Baring to Lord Granville, was received by H. M. Ministers on March 11, 1884. On April 3 Mr. Gladstone stated in the House of Commons that “General Gordon was under no orders and under no restraint to stay at Kartoum.”—Ed.

[94] Abdel Kader was then Minister of War. In March 1882, he was appointed to succeed Raouf Pasha as Governor-General of the Soudan, and on the 11th of May he reached Kartoum and assumed his duties. He carried on an active campaign against the Mahdi until March 26th, 1883, when Al-ed-Din Pasha was publicly proclaimed at Kartoum, Governor-General of the Soudan, in his place. In January 1884 Abdel Kader was selected by the Egyptian Government as their envoy to Kartoum. He at first accepted the position and then declined it. Upon this the Egyptian Government requested Her Majesty’s Government to select a well-qualified British officer to go to Kartoum instead of Abdel Kader. General Gordon was the officer selected. Thus, in suggesting Abdel Kader as his successor, General Gordon was suggesting the very man whom he had succeeded.—Ed.

[95] The instructions conveyed to Lord Wolseley by Her Majesty’s Government were to the effect that the primary object of the expedition was to bring away General Gordon and Colonel Stewart from Kartoum. He was moreover enjoined not to advance further southwards than was absolutely necessary in order to attain the primary object of the expedition.—Ed.

[96] It must be borne in mind that when Gordon wrote this he expected the expedition to reach Kartoum before the middle of November and not towards the end of January. The strength of the rebels had materially increased during December and January.—Ed.

[97] General Sir Lintorn Simmons, G.C.B.—Ed.

[98] “I have ascertained within the last few weeks that the principal agent in the surrender of the city was not Ferratch Pasha, as originally stated, but a certain civilian exile from Egypt who had acted at one time under Arabi as Secretary of the Ministry of Marine. I know the history of this man well, and can vouch for its accuracy, as I often heard it at Cairo when I was there. Four years or so ago Awaan was an honest and zealous employé in the Cadastral Survey under Sir Auckland Colvin—a service which of all others under the Control was the most inefficient, and is now acknowledged to have been so. Awaan, provoked at the waste and mismanagement, one day had the temerity to draw up a memorandum of what he knew and to send it to his chief. The answer was his dismissal. He then appealed to the native press—for there was some liberty in those days—and his grievance made him a hero; and when Arabi came to power he gave him this place as secretary, which he held at Alexandria down to the bombardment. I never heard of his taking any prominent part in the politics of that eventful time, but on Sir Auckland Colvin’s landing he was among the first persons arrested. Lord Charles Beresford tried him by one of his courts-martial and found him guilty of exciting to rebellion, or some such charge. He was handed over to the Circassian tender mercies, and, after seventy-four days in irons in the terrible Borgho prison, he was exiled to Kartoum. He was clearly a political prisoner if ever there was one; and when Lord Dufferin promised us the amnesty at the compromise of Arabi’s trial, I wrote to him recommending Awaan’s case to his special attention, and I have his answer, with a memorandum, curiously enough, by the very Sir Charles Wilson who was afterwards to reap such bitter disappointment at his hands. But Lord Dufferin declined to interfere, and Awaan was left at Kartoum to his revenge. On January 26 it was he who, with the English again at his gates, negotiated its surrender to its Arab deliverer.”—Mr. Wilfred Blunt in a letter to the ‘Times’ of May 4, 1884.—Ed.

[99] “One of the most painful parts of this business is the constant and continual reports one hears of the intended treachery of this or that influential man. I have, though greatly tired, kept my faith in all men, and have resisted any of those measures which never benefit and which throw widespread alarm throughout the town. Men who belonged to the beleaguered Shaggyeh and who had been shut up with them escaped here without arms, saying that the Shaggyeh had gone over to the enemy, while others would come from them beseeching for aid. I am glad to say that without exception the people of the town and the troops have behaved themselves in a most kind and proper way. This binds me not to leave them until I can do so under Government which would give them some hope of peace.”—General Gordon’s telegram to Sir E. Baring, received at Cairo end of March, 1884. Egypt, No. 12, No. 287.—Ed.

[100] To strike with a slipper during a dispute is with Moslems the greatest insult one man can offer another.—Ed.

[101] On Feb. 11th, 1884, General Gordon telegraphed from Berber to Sir Evelyn Baring: “I would not, if I were supreme, try again any Egyptian forces at Suakin, but would engage 3000 Turkish troops in British pay. That would settle the affair. It would be sufficient for the Padishah’s troops to appear to cause a collapse of all fanatical feeling.”—Ed.

[102] “Several telegrams have been sent from press asking about what I said respecting slaves. The question asked me was this: Did I insist on the liberation of slaves in 1889 as per Treaty 1877? I answered that the Treaty would not be enforced in 1889 by me, which, considering the determination of Her Majesty’s Government respecting Soudan, was a self-evident fact. The question is one of slave-holding, not of slave-hunting, and, in my opinion, that Treaty of 1877 will never be carried out in Cairo as to slave-holding.”—General Gordon’s telegram to Sir E. Baring, received at Cairo Feb. 21, 1884, Egypt 12, No. 132.—Ed.

“Let it be known to you all that I have been appointed, in concert between the Khedive’s Government and the Government of Great Britain, Governor-General of the whole Soudan; and the Soudan has now become an independent State, to govern itself without the intervention of the Egyptian Government in any way whatever.”—General Gordon’s Proclamation to All the Notables and Inhabitants in the Soudan, Feb. 13, 1884.—Ed.

[103] General Gordon is here probably quoting the views of Herbin, the French Consul.—Ed.

[104] Though, as shown in a previous note, General Gordon was right in assuming no expedition would have been sent had he not been in Kartoum with Stewart, he is also right in saying, “The expedition comes up to deliver the garrisons,” for the avowed policy declared in the instructions of Her Majesty’s Government to Lord Wolseley was that steps were to be taken to insure the safe retreat of the Egyptian troops and civil employés.—Ed.

[105] Court of Enquiry.—Ed.

[106] This forecast is in a fair way of being fulfilled.—Ed.

[107] It seems pretty clear that this is Olivier Pain.

[108] Not received from the Government with these Journals.

[109] “European Consuls came to me to-day with the question whether Kartoum was menaced. I replied that it was not so, directly, but that the road to Berber was threatened. They asked me if I could help them to go to Berber. I replied ‘Yes.’ There is no doubt that when these Europeans leave, it will be a most significant sign to the people in this town and in the provinces that no assistance is likely to come to Kartoum. Under these circumstances, what do you recommend me to say in order to neutralise the ill-effects of their departure?—General Gordon to Sir Evelyn Baring, Kartoum, March 9, 1884, 11.30 p.m. Egypt, No. 12 (1884), Inclosure in No. 242.

“You know exactly the position of the different garrisons so far as I can explain it, and that there is no probability of the people rallying round me, or of paying any attention to my Proclamation.

“If you mean to make the proposed diversion to Berber (of British troops), and to accept my proposal as to Zebehr, to instal him in the Soudan and evacuate, then it is worth while to hold on to Kartoum.

“If, on the other hand, you determine on neither of these steps, then I can see no use in holding on to Kartoum, for it is impossible for me to help the other garrisons, and I shall only be sacrificing the whole of the troops and employés here.

“In this latter case, your instructions to me had better be that I should evacuate Kartoum, and, with all the employés and troops, remove the seat of government to Berber. You would understand that such a step would mean the sacrificing of all outlying places except Berber and Dongola.

“You must give a prompt reply to this, as even the retreat to Berber may not be in my power in a few days; and, even if carried out at once, the retreat will be of extreme difficulty.

“I should have to leave large stores, and nine steamers which cannot go down. Eventually, some question would arise at Berber and Dongola, and I may utterly fail in getting the Cairo employés to Berber.

“If I attempt it, I could be responsible only for the attempt to do so.

“Once the Mahdi is in Kartoum, operations against him will be very arduous, and will not serve Sennaar and Kassala.”

“Kartoum, March 9, 1884, 11.40 p.m.

“If the immediate evacuation of Kartoum is determined upon, irrespective of outlying towns, I would propose to send down all the Cairo employés and white troops with Colonel Stewart to Berber, where he would await your orders. I would also ask Her Majesty’s Government to accept the resignation of my commission, and I would take all steamers and stores up to the Equatorial and Bahr Gazelle Provinces, and consider those provinces as under the King of the Belgians.

“You would be able to retire all Cairo employés and white troops with Stewart from Berber to Dongola, and thence to Wady Halfa.

“If you, therefore, determine on the immediate evacuation of Kartoum, this is my idea. If you object, tell me.

“It is the only solution that I can see if the immediate evacuation of Kartoum, irrespective of the outlying towns, is determined upon.”—Ibid.—Ed.

[110] “I have received your telegram of the 9th inst., informing me that you have received a letter from General Gordon from which it appears that that officer contemplates proceeding to Bahr Gazelle and the Equatorial Provinces. I have to state that Her Majesty’s Government are of opinion that General Gordon should not at present go beyond Kartoum.—Earl Granville to Sir E. Baring, Feb. 11th, 1884. Egypt, No. 12 No. 4.—Ed.

[111] Romulus Gessi, who was formerly employed as interpreter at the headquarters of the army before Sebastopol, and who did such excellent work against the slave-hunters in the Soudan as General Gordon’s lieutenant in 1878. Gessi was subsequently appointed Governor of the Bahr Gazelle, but was obliged to retire owing to the intrigues of Raouf Pasha. He died at the hospital at Suez in 1881.—Ed.

[112] General Gordon’s chief complaint against the Intelligence Department was that they spent no money in bribing natives to try and get messages through to Kartoum; had they done so, many, he held, would have volunteered, and some must have succeeded.—Ed.

[113] General Gordon to Sir E. Baring, March 1st.—“Re policy. I maintain firmly policy of eventual evacuation, but I tell you plainly it is impossible to get Cairo employés out of Kartoum unless the Government helps in the way I told you.”—Inclosure 1 in No. 229, No. 12 in Blue Book No. 12.

Sir Evelyn Baring replies in a telegram dated March 2nd, 1884:—“I have received your eleven telegrams of the last four days on matters of general policy. I am most anxious to help and support you in every way, but find it very difficult to understand exactly what you want. I think your best plan will be to reconsider the whole question carefully and then state to me in one telegram what it is you recommend, &c.”

[114] Earl Granville to Mr. Egerton, April, 23rd, 1884:—“Gordon should be at once informed by several messengers ... that we do not propose to supply him with Turkish or other force for the purpose of undertaking military expeditions, such being beyond the scope of the commission he holds, and at variance with the pacific policy which was the purpose of his mission to the Soudan; that, if with this knowledge, he continues at Kartoum, he should state to us the cause and intention with which he so continues.”—Egypt, No. 12 (1884), No. 36.—Ed.

[115] Supposed remarks of British soldiers crossing the desert upon camels.

[116] Saddles.—Ed.

[117] Allusion to images produced on the retina by an excited or exhausted brain.—Ed.

[118] See Appendix, “The Insurrection of the False Prophet.”

[119] Goba is on the right bank of the Blue Nile, to the north of Tuti Island, and within two miles of Kartoum.—Ed.

[120] See p. 141.

[121] Appendix P.

[122] It would be interesting if some Member of Parliament would ask Her Majesty’s Government for information on this subject.—Ed.

[123] Appendix P.

[124] I.e., the priest.—Ed.

[125] Appendix Q.

[126] Many of General Gordon’s “instincts” have been no less remarkable than many of his escapes. In a telegram to Sir Evelyn Baring, dated March 1st, he said, “I will do my best to carry out my instructions, but feel convinced I shall be caught in Kartoum.”—Ed.

[127] It is worth while to note how readily Her Majesty’s Government, who had declined all General Gordon’s suggestions while he lived, accepted this posthumous piece of advice.—Ed.

[128] In his ‘Wild Tribes of the Soudan,’ Mr. F. L. James gives an account of how he and his party were treated by Ala-ed-Deen and the Bey at Senheit. This Bey was no other than Ferratch Pasha, who is said to have opened the gates of Kartoum. “We had engaged camels at Senheit,” says Mr. James, “for some weeks’ shooting in the vicinity. On our return, a steamer was leaving Massowah for Suez, which we could only catch by taking the same camels on to the coast. Our Shaggyeh drivers objected, saying the road to the sea was out of their country, and their camels were tired—perfectly valid excuses. We offered them half as much again as the proper fare, but they still demurred, fearing that the Governor of Massowa would take their camels, make them carry for the Government, and probably never pay them. On obtaining a letter for the Bey at Senheit (Ferratch), asking (as we fondly imagined) Ala-ed-Deen, who was at that time Governor of Massowah, to let them go free, they consented to accompany us. On our arrival we presented the letter, which, we found, merely stated that the garrison of Senheit was in want of salt, and that he had better load up the camels with some, and return them to him.”—Ed.

[129] Appendix Q.

[130] The Mahdi declared that the Archangel Gabriel had twice appeared to him and commanded him to unsheath the sword of faith in order to reform the bad Moslem and to found a Mussulman Empire which would be followed by universal peace.—Ed.

[131] The action of Her Majesty’s Government had now raised the question in General Gordon’s mind as to whether he was justified in punishing any of the inhabitants of Kartoum who were hedging with the Mahdi. He was almost disposed to let them hedge if it gave them a better chance of their lives.—Ed.

[132] Appendix R.

[133] Hansall.—Ed.

[134] These distinctions are in satirical allusion to some mistake made at the Foreign Office.—Ed.

[135] Appendix S.

[136] There is a good-natured, and half playful ring about these orders, but the fact must not be overlooked that they are distinct commands. General Gordon, while Governor-General of the Soudan, had the right to issue orders to anyone in the Soudan, and no one was more cognizant of this right than he.—Ed.