The Old Riddle and the Newest Answer

{250}

Huxley's lecture exhibiting the pedigree we have been considering was delivered in 1876. We have already seen that six years earlier he had declared himself satisfied, after much search, that though other genealogies might be doubtful, we had in the case of the Horse something really satisfactory. But the pedigree of 1870—which he thus indicated as scientifically established—was totally different from that of 1876, and was acknowledged as erroneous by the very acceptance of the latter. In 1870 the ancestry presented for Equus consisted of Hipparion, Anchitherium, and Plagiolophus. Of these, Hipparion was in 1876 specifically disallowed as a direct ancestor: Anchitherium was displaced by Miohippus, and although we are told that these creatures "correspond pretty nearly," the Horse cannot be descended from both, especially as they dwelt in different hemispheres. Finally Plagiolophus disappears from the amended pedigree altogether. Nothing could more vividly illustrate the danger of such speculations than that an authority so clear-headed and conscientious as Professor Huxley should thus proclaim his acceptance of a genealogy which he had on after information to renounce. Nor to him alone have such misadventures happened. Mr. Darwin too thought the claim of Hipparion to ancestral equine rank to be beyond dispute. "No one will deny," he wrote,[284] "that the Hipparion is intermediate between the{251} existing horse and certain older ungulate forms." Yet, as we see, this has been denied by his champion Huxley himself.

(iv.) The materials available for the reconstruction of these various equine forms, are far less satisfactory than might easily be supposed. As a rule, each is known to us only by small fragments of its skeleton, so that we can have no assurance as to what the whole animal was really like, or even that all parts assigned to one creature really belonged to him. We can accordingly feel no certainty that if we could see any of these as a whole we should find it possible to suppose that the horse descended from it. Thus in Hippidium, an American genus closely allied to Equus, it is at least doubtful whether the digits did not terminate in claws.[285] One species of Hippidium is known only by a solitary tooth. Of Hyracotherium only the skull has been found: of Orohippus only parts of jaws and teeth and a forefoot: of Epihippus, "only incomplete specimens."[286] Accordingly, Professor Williamson, speaking of the discoveries of Professor Marsh and others, thus expresses himself:[287]

(v.) It should likewise be remarked that in one not unimportant particular, the plates so commonly given to illustrate the horse's ancestry do not fairly represent the facts. It would appear from them that all the animals were much of a size, which doubtless greatly assists the imagination in picturing them as all in one line of descent. But as a matter of fact they differed in stature extremely, and the remoter supposed progenitors were comparative pigmies. Hyracotherium, for instance, was "about the size of a hare,"[288] and according to Professor Cope, Orohippus was the exact counterpart of this diminutive steed. The hypothetical Hippops, which Professor Marsh locates in the lower Tertiary or upper Secondary rocks, can, he thinks,[289] now "be predicated with{253} {254}certainty;" and amongst other things it "probably was not larger than a rabbit, perhaps much smaller." Sometimes, so far as evidence goes, it even seems that in respect of size there was deterioration instead of advance as the lineage progressed. Thus Epihippus, found in the Upper Eocene, is considerably smaller than Protorohippus, found in the Middle Eocene; "but," says the American pamphlet,[290] "no doubt there were others of larger size living at the same time," which will scarcely be called convincing.

(vi.) Worthy of notice also is "the remarkable circumstance that in the line of evolution culminating in the modern Horse, a parallel series of generically identical or closely allied forms occurs in the Tertiaries of both Europe and North America, from which it has been suggested that on both continents a parallel development of the same genera has simultaneously taken place."[291] And, as we have seen, while the American pedigree must have been entirely different from the European, it terminates equally in both continents with the genus Equus, if not actually with Equus caballus.[292] But, on any mechanical system of evolution, it is impossible to suppose that developments conducted along separate roads could thus be brought to meet in one terminus.[293] Mr. Darwin did not {255}conceive it possible that the same species should be produced twice over, "if even the very same conditions of life, organic and inorganic should recur,"[294] and the production of genuine horses, not only in widely diverse circumstances, but through totally different ancestors, must appear still less conceivable. Consequently, says Mr. Mivart,[295] "it follows from this generic identity, that classification will be no longer Darwinian, but one more Aristotelian, and will regard, not the origin but the outcome of development, whether of the individual or the species."

(vii.) There is, however, another consideration more serious than any of the above. In order to set the theory of genetic Evolution upon a sound and substantial basis, it is not sufficient to show that the last ungulate is lineally descended from the first,—Equus from Eohippus, Hyracotherium, Phenacodus, or Hippops,—but that this first ungulate himself—whichever it was—has been, or at least may have been, similarly developed from a non-ungulate Mammalian ancestor, the common parent of all the protean forms assumed by his progeny. To develop all these from one original, through a graduated series in each case, by the infinitesimal process of descent with modification, would require a period{256} of time inconceivably long—immensely longer than that required to change one ungulate into another. Ungulates, as has been said, are a highly specialized type of Mammals, and although they walked on the nails of five digits instead of only one, a vast amount of Evolution would be required to bring them even to this point, from that whence all Mammals are said to have started. There must also have existed, while this development was in progress, a teeming and multitudinous mammalian life, as raw material for its operations—and of this at least some trace should remain.

But, so far as we know, the first Ungulates made their appearance upon earth quite as soon as did any other mammals from which they could possibly have sprung. Phenacodus, is in fact described as,[296] "The most primitive Eocene mammal yet discovered." He appears in the Lower Tertiary; while the Secondary and Mesozoic rocks beneath,—the whole period covered by which would be none too long for the evolution of Tertiary mammals generally,—are practically devoid of mammalian remains altogether, exhibiting only a few small marsupials, from which we can no more suppose Phenacodus and the huge and various beasts who were his Eocene contemporaries to have developed, than from opossums the size of shrew-mice.

It also complicates matters not a little to find that when placental mammals first show themselves{257} all over the world at the beginning of the Eocene,—while this highly specialized order of the Ungulates seems to have been much the most numerous, it had a host of contemporaries, of extreme diversities of structure:—as for instance Unguiculates (or clawed animals) allied to the Hyena and the Fox, Rodents (gnawing animals) akin to the Squirrel, as well as Whales and Bats. Of the Cetaceans, Sir J. W. Dawson tells us:[297]

The Bats, as is obvious, would require quite as much transformation from the generalized mammalian type as the Whales themselves, though in quite{258} another direction. But they appear with their wings fully developed, in the Eocene, in both Hemispheres.

Such instances are by no means singular, nor are like difficulties confined to the Eocene. In the Miocene above, about the time when Anchitherium flourished, there appeared a family with whom he might claim relationship, for they were not only akin to the Ungulates but Perissodactyles, or "odd-toed," like himself. These were the "Proboscideae"—"the beasts that bear between their eyes a serpent for a hand," in other words the Elephants and their allies. These, like other families, amongst their earliest representatives included the giants of their race, for some of their Miocene specimens[301] are about half as large again as{259} the largest of our modern elephants. Professor Ray Lankester has recently declared[302] that we now understand the genetic affinities of these creatures, whose faces have been pulled out into trunks with the nose at the extremity, and in support of his statement he adduces the features of the cranium as exhibited in certain recently-discovered specimens. But how far can conclusions be called final which are based upon such partial evidence?[303] As M. Gaudry, convinced Evolutionist as he is, acknowledges, in regard of this very matter:[304]

Such then are some of the still unanswered questions connected with the genesis of the Horse, "the most famous instance of geological evidence"{260}[305] which Professor Huxley selects as proving Evolution to demonstration. It is by no means easy to understand how it could ever be supposed to merit any such description. In view of the various difficulties recited above it can hardly be thought that there is satisfactory evidence even of the modicum of Evolution for which alone are such arguments brought, namely within the limits of the Equidæ. Even were the reality of this established to the full, how would such evidence compare with that we have heard, drawn not from one corner of Organic Nature, but from a review of the great lines of its history?[306]

We find indeed that while Professor Huxley declares palæontology to be the main support of Evolution, other authorities tell us the exact contrary.

Similarly Professor Williamson,[308] speaking of the efforts made to obtain evidence on behalf of Evolution, says: "Not only living, but extinct animals{261} have been appealed to; Professor Huxley especially has, with his wonted skilfulness, made use of the latter to buttress the geological side of the structure, which is confessedly its weakest one."

More important than all,—Mr. Darwin himself fully acknowledged that the palæontological evidence is far short of what it should be:—and attempted to meet the difficulty by pleading the imperfection of the geological record:—a plea to be more fully considered presently.

We must not leave unnoticed the method of dealing with the geological record adopted by Professor Haeckel. Of this we have already seen a slight specimen,—- in the gratuitous and baseless assertion that the apetalous Dicotyledons date as far back as the Trias, at the very bottom of the Secondary period, by which, were it a fact, a serious Evolutionary void would be filled. In the same manner he draws a perfectly imaginary picture of the submarine forests of primeval days, in which "we may suppose" all the forms of after vegetation to have begun their career as seaweeds.[309]

But in regard of his favourite doctrine of the bestial origin of man, he goes much further, and prints[310] an elaborate genealogy upon which Professor Huxley in reviewing him makes no adverse remark. In this he exhibits, as a simple matter of scientific fact, an "Ancestral Series of the human pedigree," which ninety-nine per cent, of his readers{262} will naturally suppose to be based upon palæontological evidence. This wonderful genealogy stands thus:

1. Monera. 2. Single-celled Primeval animals. 3. Many-celled Primeval animals. 4. Ciliated planulæ (Planæada). 5. Primeval Intestinal animals (Gastræada). 6. Gliding Worms (Turbellaria). 7. Soft-worms (Scolecida). 8. Sack worms (Himatega). 9. Acrania. 10. Monorrhina. 11. Primeval fish (Selachii). 12. Salamander fish (Dipneusta). 13. Gilled Amphibia (Sozobranchia). 14. Tailed Amphibia (Sozura). 15. Primeval Amniota (Protamnia). 16. Primary Mammals (Promammalia). 17. Marsupialia. 18. Semi-apes (Prosimiæ). 19. Tailed narrow-nosed Apes. 20. Tail-less narrow-nosed Apes (Men-like Apes). 21. Pithecanthropus (Speechless or Ape-like Man). 22. Talking Man.

This kind of "Science" does not deserve to be treated seriously. It will be sufficient to cite another observation of M. de Quatrefages:[313]

{264}

It is in this fashion that Professor Haeckel habitually solves the Riddles of the Universe.

As Vogt himself wrote,[314] "We shall be compelled to patch and alter these genealogical trees of species, which up to this time have been set forth as the last word of Science, and especially of Darwinism."

And Du Bois-Reymond,[315] "Man's pedigree, as drawn up by Haeckel, is worth about as much as is that of Homer's heroes for critical historians."

There remains to be considered Darwin's own explanation of the admitted deficiency of palæontological evidence.

{265}

How imperfect this record is he proceeds to argue at length, and he has no difficulty in showing how much of it has at one time or other been defaced by natural causes, and how small a portion has been laid open to our inspection. But although his demonstration on this point is continually quoted, as though it solved the difficulty, it does not appear that it need detain us long.

It is, in the first place, obvious that the absence of evidence cannot prove the truth of the theory of Evolution or any other, and it is proof of that theory which is required. Apart from palæontological facts, as Professor Huxley has told us, there can be no conclusive evidence one way or the other; and if the geological record be not sufficiently complete to supply such evidence, the theory cannot possibly claim to be scientifically established.

Is it not also, as M. de Quatrefages has remarked, very singular that precisely that evidence must be supposed always to have perished which the Evolution theory imperatively requires, while so much remains which appears to contradict it?

But, moreover, as Mr. Carruthers says, incomplete though the record undoubtedly is, and limited as is our knowledge even of what exists,—there still remains a vast mass of information which it has actually supplied, and there seems to be no reason for denying that, as to the particular point under consideration, its testimony is ample. If, as on the principles of genetic Evolution must be the case, there were in each line of descent no successive{266} species or genera, made up of forms clustered round one point in the course of development more than another, how comes it that we find always and everywhere just such isolated clusters, naturally forming genera and species; and that in no single instance do we find any trace of the graduated series linking them together? Is it not quite impossible to suppose, that at all points in Nature we stumble upon exactly those instances which disguise, and apparently contradict, the method upon which she invariably works?

It is likewise obvious that the practice of Evolutionists is quite inconsistent with their own plea, for their arguments are constantly unmeaning except on the assumption that the geological record is sufficiently complete for practical purposes. In the example of the Horse, for instance, which we have been considering, the whole case for his Evolution is based upon the supposition that the completed Equus did not exist during the earlier periods when Eohippus, Anchitherium, Hipparion and the rest of them were preparing the way for his appearance, and that none of these lived simultaneously with others more ancient still which are set down as their ancestors. But on what does such a supposition rest? Simply on the absence of remains of the more developed, in the strata containing those of the less developed. If such a reason be sufficient—which we will not question—it is likewise sufficient to establish the non-existence of intermediate forms to bridge the wide breaches in{267} the supposed pedigree, and we must accordingly conclude that such intermediate forms there never were.

It is no less evident that whatever further evidence is found, may tell the wrong way, from the evolutionary point of view, no less than the right one; either by discrediting supposed link-forms, or by introducing us to new and strange types which increase our difficulties by requiring lines of communication to be established with them. Thus, as Mr. Mivart tells us,[317] "It is undeniable that there are instances which appeared at first to indicate a gradual transition, which instances have been shown by further investigation and discovery not to indicate truly anything of the kind." Another example of the same sort is furnished by the recent discovery of Arsinoetherium, a genus of very large and heavy hoofed beasts, the relics of which have been recently discovered in the upper Eocene of Egypt. This creature was something like a large rhinoceros, but had no connexion whatever with that family. In fact, we are told, its horns, of which it has four, two on top of its head, and two smaller above the eyes, and also its teeth, make it stand quite apart from all other mammals.

It thus appears that when the theory of genetic Evolution comes to the bar of Palæontology, the most favourable verdict to which it can pretend is, Not proven.{268}

One thing is certain. All the evidence we possess in regard of Organic Evolution, leaves the question of the origin, the propagation, and the development of life exactly where it has always been. No force has been found by Science to which we may ascribe the origin of the world we know.

As the Count de Saporta writes:[318]

So too M. Blanchard:[319]

{269}

And, in like manner, Darwin's great ally and admirer, Sir Charles Lyell, when he had time to realize all the bearings of his friend's theory, wrote to him,[320]—"I think the old 'creation' is almost as much required as ever."{270}

XVIII

The Nature of this Cause was the object of our quest. In particular we set ourselves to examine the assertion now so loudly made that Science has found a full explanation in the forces of the Universe{271} itself as they come within her cognizance, that is to say, the material forces which she can directly observe, and upon which she can experiment. In particular we have studied the Law of Evolution, in its various significations, and other laws subsidiary to it, in order to determine, from the point of view of reason and Science alone, whether it can be said that the prime factor of which we are in search is thus supplied.

The result has been to make it evident that while modern discovery has immensely multiplied and magnified the marvels which have to be accounted for, it has disclosed nothing which can be supposed to account for them in a manner to satisfy our reason. So far as the forces of Nature are concerned, the mysteries that lie beyond are even darker than they were. The origin and nature of matter and force, the source of motion, of life, of sensation and consciousness, of rational intelligence and language, of Free-will, of the reign of law and order to which all Nature testifies,—all these are for Science utterly unsolved problems, which, as some amongst her teachers tell us, must remain for ever insoluble. Even less prospect, if possible, can there be that any mechanical forces will ever account for perception of the sublime and beautiful,—and above all—of the distinction between right and wrong.

Here, then, Science stops,—confessing that she can be our guide no farther, and lending no colour whatever to the unscientific pretensions which are so noisily advanced by some persons in her name.{272} Her domain is the world of sense, and it is evident that nothing existing within that realm can possibly furnish an explanation which will satisfy our intellectual need for causality.

Are we therefore to say that we can know nothing concerning the First Cause to which the phenomena of the Universe are due? Such is the Agnostic's position. What we have no means of knowing, he says, we must not pretend to know. It were irrational and dishonest to do so. When Science fails us, the true wisdom is to profess ignorance,—thus only can our position still be scientific.

But is such a principle itself scientific? Is it not a gratuitous and monstrous assumption that we can know nothing but that of which our senses directly tell us? That the Universe has a cause is no less certain than that the Universe exists, for of that cause it is the monument. And, as of the whole, so of every part or element which it contains, it is absolutely certain that there must be a cause, and one adequate to the production of what has actually been produced; for as the proverb says, "Nothing is to be got out of a sack but what is in it." From such conclusions there is no escape;—and since it is impossible to find the cause required within the world of material forces and sensible phenomena, it becomes no less obvious that it must lie beyond, across the frontier which nothing material can pass.

Therefore, also, we know something concerning{273} that Cause,—very little, perhaps, in comparison with what we cannot know,—but still something very substantial. We know that such a Cause exists. We know that it must possess every excellence which we discover in Nature,—all that she has, and more; since what she derives from it, the Cause of Nature has of itself. In it must be all power, for except as flowing from it there is no power possible. Finally, as a capable Cause of law and order in Nature, and of Intellect and Will in man, the First Cause must be supereminently endowed with Understanding, and Freedom in the exercise of its might,—or it would be inferior to its own works.

It is therefore not easy to understand how we can avoid the conclusion of the distinguished men of Science whom we have heard declare that they assume "as absolutely self-evident" the existence{274} of a Deity who is the Creator and Upholder of all things.

It will probably be answered that this is mere Anthropomorphism; which formidable term appears by many to be considered sufficient to close the whole question, and to rule the idea of a personal God out of court. Did not Voltaire remark that if in the beginning God made man to His own image and likeness, man has well repaid Him ever since? And what can be more conclusive than that?

But what—after all—does "Anthropomorphism" mean in this connexion? Simply, that being men we have to speak in human terms, even of what is superhuman. By no possibility can we do anything else. Limited as we are by the conditions of our nature, we can find no mode of expression except such as is based upon sensible experience; and although we can convince ourselves by rational inference of the existence, and to some extent of the character, of what is beyond sense, we can frame no description of it, nor even a phantasm or image by means of imagination, except so far as we are able to draw upon the phenomena of the external world. Thus it is that artists who endeavour to represent an immaterial being, as an angel, a djinn or a sprite, though the essence of the object they would depict is that it has no body, have perforce to give it one, though they make it as little gross as possible, for otherwise they could not portray it at all. But however such images may be refined{275} and etherealized they are intended to be understood only as conventional figures to suggest to the mind its own concept, which is as different from them as the notes produced by a singer are from those on the score from which he sings. No one imagines that the genius of Music is a young woman holding a shell to her ear, or that the Cherubim are heads and wings and nothing more. So it is with statements of the Theistic belief concerning the First Cause, or God. To put this into words we are compelled to use the only materials within our reach, and to borrow our phraseology from that which, within our experience is the highest and noblest element found in the Universe,—namely our own intelligence and will. These beyond question must be transcendentally possessed by the Cause on which they depend. So far Anthropomorphism is sound sense; that is to say, so long as it attributes all possible excellence to the source of all. It is foolish and unscientific only when it attributes to the Absolute and Unconditioned the limitations of an inferior order of being. We may truly say that a penny is contained in a pound,—but it does not follow that a sovereign must be of copper. According to the scientific doctrine that all our familiar forms of energy are ultimately derived from the Sun, it might well be argued from observation of a farthing rushlight that Solar Energy includes heat and light; but not that it is fed on tallow. This appears to be plain and obvious enough, often as{276} it is forgotten or ignored. As Sir Oliver Lodge has lately put the matter:[322]

Or as Professor Baden Powell expresses the same argument:[323]

The reluctance frequently manifested by scientific men to admit the force of so plain an argument, appears to be generally due to a fundamental misconception. It is constantly assumed that to introduce the element of purpose in Nature is to{277} deny the continuity of Natural law, and that to speak of design in regard of a process or a structure, is equivalent to saying that a non-natural agent intervenes at that particular point and takes the work out of Nature's hands. This, it may be supposed, was Professor Huxley's idea when he spoke of "the commoner and coarser forms of teleology," giving as an instance the supposition that eyes were constructed for the purpose of enabling their possessors to see. It might indeed be replied that, at any rate, it is less difficult to suppose this, than that eyes were constructed without any purpose of seeing, or knowledge of the laws of optics;—but evidently it is taken for granted that Theists imagine every purposive item in nature to be violently introduced from without, like the forms of lions or peacocks into which topiarian gardeners clip their shrubs. But, as has been said, the laws of Nature are the expression of the mind of God: it is through them that He accomplishes His design. As Professor Romanes came to see at the close of his life, it is strange what jealousy there is of admitting the Creator into Creation. "It is still assumed on both sides," he wrote,[324] "that there must be something inexplicable or miraculous about a phenomenon in order to its being divine,"—and although we must utterly demur to such a description of the position of Theists, it undoubtedly is true of their adversaries. Their objections on this head can only signify that{278} it is with the laws of Nature as with a railway locomotive from which the driver, having got up steam and set it going, jumps off, leaving it entirely to its own devices. But, as a legislator, if rightly interpreted, speaks by the mouth of every judge who administers the law in practice, and applies it to concrete cases,—so the Author of Nature, whose laws cannot be perverted, provides through them for all that is to be operated by the forces He has instituted.

So it is that, as Professors Stewart and Tait have told us, we must conceive of Him as not the Creator only, but likewise the Upholder of all things, while Lord Kelvin declares[325] we are unmistakably shown through Nature that she depends upon one "ever-acting Creator and Ruler." It is in this omnipresence of Divine influence that Monism finds the modicum of plausibility which serves it for a foundation. It runs, indeed, into the absurdity of endeavouring to explain such Omnipresence by identifying the finite with the Infinite, and attributing to matter qualities which all experience, and very specially all scientific experience, contradicts; but, for all that, it scores a distinct point as against mere materialism, which Comte declares to be "the most illogical form of metaphysics," and the late Sir Leslie Stephen, "not so much error as sheer nonsense." Theism avoids the error of either extreme. While it teaches the essential and fundamental distinction{279} between the Absolute and the contingent, between the Creator and His creatures, it teaches likewise that He is ever present in His works, and that in their every operation He is manifested.

And so, in the words of Rivarol, God is the explanation of the world, and the world is the demonstration of God. The acceptance of a Self-existent, All-powerful, and intelligent Being can alone serve as a basis for any system of Cosmogony which satisfies our intellectual need of causation; while, on the other hand, the nature of this Being, as necessarily beyond the scope of our senses, can be known to us only indirectly through the effects of which He is the cause.

By no one has this conclusion been more clearly stated than by Lamarck, the real father of Organic Evolutionism, whom many would therefore represent as an atheist. His words are so much to the point that with them we may conclude.[326]

{280a}

APPENDIX

A. Evolution and the lower forms of life (p. 165).

A SINGULARLY instructive field for the study of the mutability or stability of species should be afforded by the lower forms of life, in which organization is reduced to a minimum, they being mere masses of protoplasm without even a containing envelope, while their nourishment is of the simplest. It would therefore appear that environment should be all-potent to modify them and produce specific{280b} modifications, while the extreme rapidity with which they propagate their kind, and that unisexually, ought to require no vast extent of time to make such transmutations apparent.

It is found, however, on the contrary, that nowhere in organic nature does the type remain more rigidly persistent. Professor Macbride, for example, tells us,[327]

"The Myxomycetæ may be regarded as the organic group in which the forces of heredity,—whatever these forces may be—are at their maximum: they have responded as little as possible to the influence of their environment."

To the same effect speaks Professor Paulesco of Bucharest, of other elementary organisms.[328]

What is still more remarkable, these same organisms are extremely sensitive to altered conditions of environment, which have a direct and immediate influence, gravely modifying their morphological and physiological characters, changes in respect of light, minute alterations of temperature, or the introduction of a new chemical substance, even in infinitesimal quantity, frequently causing them to assume forms very different from the specific type, and profoundly modifying their nutritive processes.

Here, it was at first thought, when Pasteur revealed their history, is clear evidence of specific transformation. But he presently convinced himself and others that it is not so, for although liable to assume such polymorphic forms according to the conditions in which they find themselves, there is no alteration of specific nature, and if the original circumstances be restored, the original forms reappear—"une élasticité functionelle de la cellule lui permettant de se plier à des conditions variées d'existence sans changer d'être." (Pasteur.)

As M. Duclaux adds:[329]

"La notion d'espèce ne disparait pas pour cela. La variabilité est un caractère comme un autre, bien que plus{281} difficile à inscrire dans la classification, et une espèce est aussi bien définie par les sensibilités diverses qu'elle manifeste que par la petite liste des mots et de propriétés dans laquelle on croyait pouvoir autrefois enfermer toute son histoire.... La lien de l'espèce c'est la loi qui préside à ces changements, et la variété des formes et des fonctions n'est pas du tout en contradiction avec l'unité de l'espèce."

B. Note on Chap. XV. p. 203.

Since the foregoing pages have been in type there has come to hand the New York Literary Digest of January 23, 1904, containing the following article (p. 119).

"Are the Days of Darwinism Numbered?"

The recent death of Herbert Spencer lends special timeliness to the above topic, which is being actively debated just now in German theological circles. The immediate cause of the revival of interest in the present status of the Darwinian theory is found in a lengthy article by the veteran philosopher, Edward von Hartmann, which appears in Oswald's Annalen der Naturphilosophie (vol. ii. 1903), under the title 'Der Niedergang der Darwinismus' ('The Passing of Darwinism'). That the famous 'philosopher of the unconscious' is not prejudiced in favour of biblical views has been more than clear since the publication of his Selbstzersetzung der Christentums ('Disintegration of Christianity') in 1874. Hartmann in his new article has this to say—

'In the sixties of the past century the opposition of the older group of savants to the Darwinian hypothesis was still supreme. In the seventies, the new idea began to gain ground rapidly in all cultured countries. In the eighties, Darwin's influence was at its height, and exercised an almost absolute control over technical research. In the nineties, for the first time, a few timid{282} expressions of doubt and opposition were heard, and these gradually swelled into a great chorus of voices, aiming at the overthrow of the Darwinian theory. In the first decade of the twentieth century it has become apparent that the days of Darwinism are numbered. Among its latest opponents are such savants as Eimer, Gustav Wolf, De Vries, Hoocke, von Wellstein, Fleischmann, Reinke, and many others.'

These facts, according to Hartmann's view, while they do not indicate that the Darwinian theory is doomed, undermine its most radical features:

'The theory of descent is safe, but Darwinism has been weighed and found wanting. Selection can in general not achieve any positive results, but only negative effects; the origin of species by minimal changes is possible, but has not been demonstrated. The pretensions of Darwinism as a pure mechanical explanation of results that show purpose are totally groundless.'

Other scholars think that Hartmann does not do full justice to the reaction that has set in, particularly in Germany, against Darwinism. This sentiment is voiced by Professor Zoeckler, of the University of Greifswald, in the Beweis des Glaubens (No. xi.), a journal which recently published a collection of anti-Darwinian views from German naturalists. He calls the article of Hartmann 'the tombstone-inscription [Grabschrift] for Darwinism,' and goes on to say: