CHAPTER XXXVIII.
The second order however, after this, is that which comprehends the middle genera of wholes, is the cause to all things of progression and prolific power, and is in continuity with the first order of the intellectual Gods. What else therefore than life is every where in continuity with the intelligible and true being? For it is the medium between intellect and the intelligible, conjoining intellect to the intelligible, and expressing the intelligible power which collects together the one and being. As the intelligible therefore is to the one and hyparxis, so is life to power, and intellect to being. And as in intelligibles, the one is the object of desire, but being aspires after the participation of the one, and power collects being to the participation of the one, and the one to a communion with being, (for the one here is not imparticipable, and exempt from all power) so likewise the intelligible is the object of desire to intellect, but intellect is filled with it. And life binds indeed intellect to the intelligible, but unfolds the intelligible to intellect. Whence also, I think, those who are wise in all divine concerns, call the one and hyparxis intelligible. But that which is primarily being, they call[301] the first intellect, conformably to this analogy. Life therefore, is the medium between being and intellect, in the same manner as power subsists between the one and being. And all these, viz. the intelligible, life, and intellect are primarily in intelligibles; but secondarily in intelligibles and intellectuals; and according to a third diminution, in intellectuals. In intelligibles however, being is according to essence; for there intellect is primarily according to cause. But in intellectuals, intellect indeed, is according to essence; but the natures prior to intellect, are according to participation. Since therefore, life is surveyed in a threefold respect, in intelligibles indeed according to cause; but in intelligibles and intellectuals, according to hyparxis; and an intellectuals,[302] according to participation, it is indeed necessary that the life which is in the intellectual order, should both be life, and participate of the causes generative of life prior of itself. The one therefore of the intellectual Gods which is arranged in the middle, is not motion, but that which is moved. For prior to this, it has been demonstrated by Plato, that all life is motion. For soul is self-motive because it is self-vital. And intellect is on this account moved, because it has the most excellent life. The first vivific cause, therefore, of the intellectual Gods, is primarily allotted motion. If, however, it was the first-effective and highest life, it would be requisite to denominate it motion, and not that which is moved. But since it is life as in intellectuals, but is filled from exempt life, it is at the same time motion, and that which is moved. Very properly, therefore, does Parmenides demonstrate that the one in this order is moved, because it proceeds from the causes of all life that are placed above it, and is analogous to the middle centre of intelligibles, and to the middle triad of intelligibles and intellectuals. Hence also, Socrates in the Phædrus calls this middle triad Heaven; for the whole of it is life and motion. But that which is moved, is the middle in intellectuals, as being filled from it, [i.e. from the life in the middle triad of intelligibles and intellectuals;] since eternity also, which is arranged according to the intelligible wholeness, is all-perfect life, and all life, according to Plotinus. There, however, the middle is life according to cause; but in intellectuals, it is life according to participation; and in the order between these, it is life according to essence, proceeding indeed from intelligible life, (as Parmenides also manifests, characterizing both according to wholeness, though the wholeness in intelligibles is different from that which is in intelligibles and intellectuals, as we have before observed,) but producing after this, intellectual life. For that which is moved, is indeed entirely allied to the circulation of the Heaven, and to intellectual and intelligible life.
Moreover, the permanency which is coordinate with this motion, is not one certain genus of being, as neither is motion. For beings indeed are naturally adapted to participate of the genera of being; but the superessential goods of the Gods, are expanded above the order of beings. If, therefore, Parmenides here, assuming the one itself by itself, surveys in this motion and permanency, he evidently does net attribute the elements of being to the Gods, but assigns to them peculiarities appropriate, all-perfect, and transcending wholes. And thus asserting that the one is moved and stands still, according to motion, indeed, he delivers the vivific hyparxis of the Gods, the generative fountain of wholes, and the leading cause of all things. But according to permanency, he delivers the unpolluted monad coordinated with motion, and which connectedly-contains the middle centres of the guardian triad. For as the summit of the guardian triad, is united to the first father, according to the first hypostasis, thus also the deity who contains the middle bond of the unpolluted leaders, is by a congeniality of nature consubsistent with the motive cause of all the Gods, which moves wholes, and is primarily moved from itself. And through this deity, the prolific power of this Goddess [Rhea] is firmly established in herself. Producing likewise, and multiplying all things, she is [through this deity] exempt from wholes, and inflexibly exists prior to her progeny. With respect, therefore, to motion here and permanency, the former indeed is the fountain of the life and generative power that proceeds to all things; but the latter,[303] establishes the whole vivific fountain in itself, but is from thence filled with the prolific rivers of life. Parmenides, therefore, delivering to us these things, and the progression of them, demonstrates that that which is moved is generated from that which is in another, but that which stands still, from that which is in itself. For the first monad of the paternal triad constitutes the natures posterior to it. And after the same manner, the highest of the unpolluted triad, and which is intelligible as in this triad, imparts at one and the same time the middle and last monad of the triad. On this account, also, motion here is better than permanency. For as a subsistence in another is according to cause more ancient than the subsistence of a thing in itself, so likewise that which is moved, is causally more ancient than that which is permanent. For the unpolluted Gods, are in power subordinate to the fathers, and are comprehended in them.