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The war and our financial fabric

Chapter 29: APPENDIX A
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About This Book

The work gathers lessons from a major financial crisis and examines banking, credit, and currency problems revealed by wartime strain. It argues that banks do not create credit but convert existing wealth into liquid capital, enabling circulation and preventing economic stagnation. The author analyses reserve ratios and contends that both private banks and the central bank cannot simultaneously maintain high gold proportions without collectively ceasing to lend, making rigid reserve rules impractical. He recommends an elastic legal-tender mechanism and segregation of deposits into pure deposits and loan-deposits to clarify reserve responsibilities and reduce harmful hoarding, and stresses that panics are psychological rather than mathematical phenomena.

APPENDIX A

The following pre-war Bank of England return, of June 24th, 1914, may be regarded as a normal return, and it can be compared with the abnormal return appearing in Chapter IX.

Issue Department.

£ £
Notes issued 56,753,275 Government debt 11,015,100
Other securities 7,434,900
  Gold coin and bullion 38,303,275
56,753,275 56,753,275

Banking Department.

£ £
Proprietors’ capital 14,553,000 Government securities 11,046,570
Rest 3,160,254 Other securities 39,994,619
Public deposits 18,074,214 Notes 28,050,150
Other deposits 44,915,911 Gold and silver coin 1,624,988
Seven-day and other bills 12,948  
80,716,327 80,716,327

The proportion of the reserve this week was 47⅛ per cent.