I have before spoken of the very great readiness with which any stranger gains admittance to Congress to listen to the debates. As a broad feature, I believe their discussions are carried on in a sober, practical, business-like manner; nevertheless, most outrageous scenes have occurred. I subjoin the following extract, not from any one sentence it contains, but from its continuity, as a proof that the tone of the House is not worthy of the dignity of so great a country. A member of any community may get up and use the most gross and offensive language; but if the offender be immediately called to order, and made to retract the offensive expressions, the community thus vindicates its character. Should, however, the most gross and offensive language be used by two members for any length of time without any interference, reprobation, retraction, or punishment, the community as a body must fairly be considered, by their silence, as endorsing such conduct.

The extract is taken from that widely circulating journal, "the Illustrated London News:—

"In the House of Representatives at Washington, on the 11th ult., the following amusing but disgraceful scene occurred between two of the members—Messrs. Stanly and Giddings. The former having charged the latter with uttering a falsehood, the following conversation ensued:—

"Mr. Stanly: 'It is usual for one who has no regard for the decencies of life to relieve himself from responsibility by pronouncing statements false, and it is characteristic of the man who sneaked away from this House, and took his pay for work which he did not do.

"Mr. Giddings: 'When the gentleman descends to low vulgarity, I cannot follow him, I protest against Dough-faces prompting the gentleman from South Carolina.

"Mr. Stanly: 'It is the business of a scavenger to have anything to do with him, and I will have to wash my hands after handling him; but the thing has to be done, as he has thrust himself on us as a kind of censor. It is a small business for me, and I don't know how I can descend any lower than to take hold of the hon. member for Ohio. (Cry of 'Good.')

"Mr. Giddings: 'Will you hear me?

"Mr. Stanly: 'Nobody wants to hear you, but I will indulge you.

"Mr. Giddings: 'The gentleman is barking up the wrong tree.

"Mr. Stanly: 'The galled jade winces again.

"Mr. Giddings: 'The gentleman sha'n't crack the overseer's lash to put me down.

"Mr. Stanly: 'I hope that the gentleman will not gnash his teeth so hard; he might hurt himself. Who is here playing the overseer over white men—who but he, who is throwing his filthy gall and assailing everybody as Northern Whig Dough-faces, and what he calls the vile slave-holders? He is the only man who acts in that way. We don't raise the overseer's lash over our slaves in North Carolina. If that member was in the southern country, nobody would own him as a black man with a white skin—(laughter)—but he would be suffered to run wild as a free negro, and in the course of three weeks he would be brought up to the whipping-post and lashed, for stealing or slandering his neighbours. (Laughter.) If I say that he is a gentleman, I tell a falsehood.

"The Speaker (to Mr. Stanly)—'Will the gentleman suspend for a moment?

"Mr. Stanly: 'We ought to suspend that fellow (pointing to Mr. Giddings) by the neck. (Laughter.)

"Mr. Giddings: 'The gentleman from North Carolina reminds me of the boy who turned round so fast that the hind part of his breeches was on both sides. (Laughter.) The gentleman says that I was at Norristown, too; but where was he and the members of the House? Why, drinking their grog. (Laughter.)

"Mr. Stanly: 'I charge the official reporters not to let his (Mr. Giddings') felonious hand touch one word of what I say, for we know how he on a former occasion misrepresented my colleague from the Orange district, and his own colleague from the Chillicothe district, having altered his own speech after he got to his room with his coloured friends. (Laughter.) He talks about my associates: but has anybody ever seen him in private decent company? Free negroes may call to see him. He does not let his right hand know what his left doeth. He alludes to my absence; but I have not set myself up as a standard. I don't say I'm always in the house as I ought to be. He says we were here drinking our grog during Christmas times. Where was he? In Philadelphia, drinking beer and eating oysters with free negroes. (Laughter.) Which was the best off? Judge ye. (Laughter.) He thinks he was better off than we were. [Mr. Stanly paused, and, looking towards Mr. Preston King, who was standing near Sir. Giddings, remarked, raising his voice to a higher pitch, "Help him out; he needs a little more poison." (Voices, "Ha, ha! Good! Ha, ha!")] I quit this subject in disgust. I find that I have been in a dissecting-room, cutting up a dead dog. I will treat him as an insane man, who was never taught the decencies of life, proprieties of conduct—whose associations show that he never mingled with gentlemen. Let him rave on till doomsday.'

"The conversation then ceased."

Any one who has seen much of American gentlemen, must know that such language as the above contains would be reprobated by them fully as strongly as by any gentleman in this country. To doubt that would be to do them a gross injustice. Does not, therefore, the recurrence of such scenes go far to prove, that the advance of ultra-democratic principles has the effect of lowering the tone of the Representative Chamber, and that men of liberal education and gentlemanly bearing do not constitute the majority in that House? In the days of Washington, would any member have dared to use, or would any other member have for a moment tolerated, such language? It is but justice to say, that the tone of the Senate Chamber is far more dignified; and many who have been members of that body have established a world-wide reputation both as orators and statesmen.

Let us now turn for a few minutes to that important subject, the Judiciary of the States, one peculiar feature of which is, its being a co-ordinate branch of the Legislature. The Supreme Court of the United States is the highest tribunal in the country; it consists of a Chief Justice and eight associate Justices, the Attorney-General, a reporter, and a clerk. All questions affecting foreign ambassadors, consuls, &c., are tried before this court; and it is a final court of appeal in cases involving constitutional questions, and various others, too long to enumerate here. It has even the power of annulling the acts of the Federal Congress at Washington, if such acts are contrary to the Constitution.

The following article in the Constitution regulates the terms upon which alone any change may be made, and which is of so peculiar and conservative a character that I insert it in full:—

"ARTICLE V.—Power of Amendment.
"The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the
application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the several States,
shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either
case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this
Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of
the several States, or by conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the
one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress;
provided that no amendment which may be made prior to the year one
thousand eight hundred and eight, shall in any manner affect the first
and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first article, and that
no State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage
in the Senate."

The foregoing article is a remarkable instance of prudence and forethought, and acts as the strongest safeguard against hasty measures, which in times of great excitement may sometimes obtain a majority that would afterwards be regretted by all parties. If the principle involved in any question is really felt to be of vital importance, the majority can dissolve the Union if they consider the object in view worth the sacrifice.

The salary of the Chief Justice is about 1050l. a-year. This court is, I believe, invariably composed of men of the highest talent and integrity; their appointment is from the President, and endorsed by the Senate, and their tenure of office is "during good behaviour."[CD] There has, fortunately, been no change in the manner or term of these appointments; but, in the different States, the democratic mania has removed the old landmarks of prudence bequeathed to them by their fathers. Mr. Tremenheere tells, that in 1833 only 5 States out of the 24 had adopted the principle of electing Judges, and appointing them for a term of years; in 1844, 12 States out of the 29 had adopted the principle; and in 1853, 22 out of the 31 States had come to the same resolution. We surely have in these facts a most important warning of the danger of introducing too much of the democratic element into the constitution of any country. Reflect, if but for a moment, on the danger to the community, where the selection of the Judges of the land may be guided by political rancour or public clamour; the bare knowledge that such may be the case, even if the purity of the masses be so great as not to admit of such sinister influence, the bare possibility, I say, is calculated to lower the respect in which it is most desirable the judiciary should ever be held,[CE] and to deter the most pure and high-minded citizens from offering their services. The salaries of the Judges range from 250l. to 400l. a-year.

The next point to which I would call attention, is to be found in Art. I., sect. 6, of the Constitution of the United States, the last clause of which runs thus:—"No person holding any office under the United States shall be a member of either House during his continuance in office." This was probably one of the most extraordinary blunders such an able body of men as the framers of the Constitution ever made; and if their object was to guard against corruption, and the undue influence of the leading men of the country, it has most signally failed, as the Act before referred to, of February, 1853, fully testifies. Only conceive the effect of excluding all the Cabinet and high functionaries from seats in the Lords and Commons; conceive the great statesmen of this country being obliged to hand over the introduction of most important measures, and the defence and explanation of them, to other hands. On this point, Mr. Justice Story remarks: "Thus, that open and public responsibility for measures, which properly belongs to the executive in all governments, especially in a republican government, as its greatest security and strength, is completely done away. The executive is compelled to resort to secret and unseen influence,—to private interviews and private arrangements,—to accomplish its own appropriate purposes, instead of proposing and sustaining its own duties and measures by a bold and manly appeal to the nation in the face of its representatives. One consequence of this state of things is, that there never can be traced home to the executive any responsibility for the measures which are planned and carried at its suggestion. Another consequence will be—if it has not yet been—that measures will be adopted or defeated by private intrigues, political combinations, irresponsible recommendations, by all the blandishments of office, and all the deadening weight of silent patronage; ... ministers may conceal or evade any expression of their opinions."

In charity it should be presumed that in all nations which possess anything worthy of the name of free institutions, the ablest men of the political majority constitute the Cabinet; and, by the enactment we are considering, all this talent is excluded from the councils of the nation, whereas all the talent of the Opposition may be there arrayed against their measures. I confess it is beyond my penetration, to see how this can be reconciled to justice or common sense; in no one principle of their Government did they more completely ignore the wisdom and experience of the mother country, and in the object they had in view they appear to have most completely failed. It is but fair to the democrats to say it is no act of theirs; they inherited the misfortune, and are likely to keep it, as it is one of the fundamental principles of their Constitution, and they have a salutary dread—much to their praise—of tinkering up any flaw they find in that document, lest in mending one hole they make two. They have, as a nation, so greatly prospered under its combined enactments, and possess such an unlimited independence in their individual States, that although the exclusion of the Cabinet is now very generally admitted to be an error, I saw no inclination to moot the question; probably, lest other questions affecting the slave and non-slave-holding States might be brought on the boards, and again disturb the bonds of union.

Another very remarkable—and in a Republic anomalous—feature in the government, is the power of the President, who, by the Constitution, is enabled during his four years' tenure of office to rule in total opposition to the majority, obstructing all the measures they may bring forward, unless the majority amounts to two-thirds in both Houses of Congress.

Article I., section 7, clause 2, runs thus:—"Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the United States; if he approves, he shall sign it, but if not, he shall return it with his objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to re-consider it. If after such re-consideration two-thirds of that House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be re-considered, and if approved by two-thirds of that House, it shall become a law," &c.

This power of the President has been used by Washington, Jackson, Tyler, and Polk; particularly by Tyler, who opposed the wishes of the majority even when those wishes were backed by his own ministry. During the discussions on the Constitution, many of the wisest heads at that eventful period desired to establish the Presidency for life, but eventually the term of four years was agreed upon; and if such powers of obstructing the wishes of a majority were to accompany the office, it certainly was a prudent conclusion they arrived at. In a densely populated community like Great Britain, such powers, whether in the hands of the sovereign or the ministers, would produce a revolution in much less time than four years. It may, however, be questioned, whether these powers are not productive of evil, by rendering necessary such frequent elections for the Presidency. On this point, Mr. Justice Story states: "The inconvenience of such frequently recurring elections of the chief magistrate, by generating factions, combining intrigues, and agitating the public mind, seems not hitherto to have attracted as much attention, as it deserves." And Chancellor Kent remarks, that "the election of a supreme executive magistrate for a whole nation affects so many interests, addresses itself so strongly to popular passions, and holds out such powerful temptations to ambition, that it necessarily becomes a strong trial to public virtue, and even hazardous to public tranquillity."

There is another evil which attends these frequent elections of the chief magistrate—namely, the enormous patronage at his disposal, and the mass of jobbery and corruption to which the exercise of it almost invariably leads. Besides the appointment of nearly ever military, naval, civil, judicial, and revenue-collecting official—some of these subject, it is true to the approval of the Senate—Mr. Justice Story remarks, that with regard to inferior offices "his patronage probably includes ninety-nine out of every hundred of the lucrative offices of the government." His great rival in patronage is the Postmaster-General, who has power to appoint and remove all deputy-postmasters, which, as the number of post-offices is 22,688, amounts to something considerable.

This power was doubtless intended for the public good, and in order that incompetent or inefficient persons should be removed. To the honour of Washington, it is recorded that during his eight years' Presidency only nine removals took place. To President Jackson they are indebted, as I have before remarked, for the introduction of the present corrupt system. According to Justice Story, on his entering office he removed 233 employés; since then, the snowball has been steadily increasing till the present moment; it has now reached an amount which it would require Mr. Babbage's machine to calculate. Who can doubt that such vast patronage, has far more influence in the selection of a President, than any personal qualification for the high and important post? Nothing could prove more clearly that such influences are paramount to all others than the last election. There were eight candidates on the democratic side, of whom General Pierce was not one; all the eight had their special friends, and each party was loth to lose the chance of patronage which their friend's election might reasonably lead them to hope for. Thus they fought so vigorously that there was no chance of any one having the requisite number of votes, i.e., a majority of the whole number polled.

The Convention being deputed by the different States to select from the candidates already in the field, how do they get out of the difficulty at the eleventh hour? They take upon themselves to nominate a candidate for the Presidential chair, who was not fettered by any particular followers, and from whom all parties hoped they would receive some share of the loaves and fishes as a reward for their support. The electors endorsed the new selection of the Convention, and General Pierce, lately commanding a brigade in the Mexican war, was elected by a most astounding majority. Scarcely any President was ever elected with such all-but unanimity, and the Press was equally undivided in its praises. Every paper I read, in every place I passed through, was full of the most unbounded eulogy. But mark the change a few months made. Before the end of the year, one-half of that Press, which had bespattered him with such fulsome adulation during the honeymoon of which his inauguration was the centre, were filling their columns with long and loud complaints, if not abuse. And what was the chief burden of their invective? It was the manner in which he distributed his patronage. In short, they were discontented with the share they received of the loaves and fishes, and thus the target of their adulation during the summer of hope, became the butt for their abuse in the winter of disappointment.

There is another subject connected with these elections, which speaks with warning voice against the presumable advantage of democracy. I would not be misunderstood as casting the slightest reflection upon the amiable qualities, intellectual powers, or administrative talents of any American citizen who has been raised to the Presidency during later years. Let any candid reader, however, whether English or American, look at the following lists of Presidents since the Constitution, and he cannot fail to observe that while the franchise was restricted in nearly every State, those called to that high post were the marked men of the highest talent in the country—men whose reputation and abilities were patent to the whole community; while, with the increase of democracy, those selected during later years are men who, whatever their virtues and capabilities, were comparatively unknown. In the case of General Franklin Pierce, he was never even named by the community; but, as we have shown, was selected by the Convention at the eleventh hour, as a compromise of political partisanship. Let us not forget, that while some of the later Presidents were elected, Calhoun, Clay, and Webster—whose names are the just pride of the Republic, and household words in every family—were passed over.[CF] Surely these simple facts may afford us subject for profitable reflection.


We will now pass on from the Governor of the Republic to the Governors of individual States. Their salaries vary in different States, and range from 300l. to 2000l. a-year. Their election is in some States by the people, in others by the legislature: their term of office varies; in some States the election is annual, and in all for a very limited period; and under them each separate State has its own House of Representatives and its Senate. The chief power, which resides in the Governor alone, is that of pardon; and here we may observe, that it is only reasonable to suppose that so enlightened a community as the United States would not for any considerable number of years have tolerated the most flagrant abuse of such a power as that of pardon; and consequently that if it be found that such abuse do now exist, it must have grown with the ever-growing democratic element.

Mr. Tremenheere quotes largely from a work by Dr. Lieber, Professor of Political Philosophy in the State College of South Carolina. Among others of a similar character, the following passage occurs:—"I consider the indiscriminate pardoning so frequent in many parts of the United States, one of the most hostile things, now at work in our country, to a perfect government of law." He elsewhere states "that the New York Committee had ascertained that there are men who make a regular trade of procuring pardons for convicts by which they support themselves." Further on he says, "To this statement we have now to add the still more appalling fact, which we would pass over in silence if our duty permitted it, that but a short time ago the Governor of a large State—a State among the foremost in prison discipline—was openly and widely accused of taking money for his pardons. We have it not in our power to state whether this be true or not, but it is obvious that a state of things which allows suspicions and charges so degrading and so ruinous to a healthy condition, ought not to be borne with." He then subjoins this note:—"While these sheets are going through the press, the papers report that the Governor of a large State has pardoned thirty criminals, among whom were some of the worst characters, at one stroke, on leaving the gubernatorial chair."—Among the conclusions Dr. Lieber draws on this point, is the following astounding one—"That the executive in our country is so situated that, in the ordinary course of things, it cannot be expected of him that he will resist the abuse; at least, that he will not resist it in many cases."

The foregoing extracts are certainly entitled to no small weight when it is remembered they come from the pen of a republican professor, writing upon "Civil Liberty and Self-government." I do not pretend to say that such gross cases as those referred to by him came within my cognizance during my travels, but I most certainly did hear charges made against governors, in more than one instance, of granting pardons through corrupt influence.

I have now given a cursory review of the leading features in the executive of the United States; and I have endeavoured, while doing so, to point out the effects which the gradual inroads of the democratic element have produced. The subject is one of the deepest interest to us as Englishmen, inasmuch as it is the duty of every government to enlarge, as far as is consistent with the welfare of the nation, the liberty of the subject. The foregoing remarks on the constitution of the United States appear to me conclusive as to one fact—viz., that the democratic element may be introduced so largely as that, despite a high standard of national education and worldly prosperity, its influence will produce the most pernicious effect upon the government of the country.

This truth cannot be too strongly brought forward, for undoubtedly change is the mania of the day; and as, in a free country, all constitutional changes must have a liberal tendency, it behoves our legislators to study deeply and patiently the effect produced upon any country whose constitution is more democratic than our own, so as to enable them, while steadily advancing with the age, to know when the well-being of their country requires them, as true patriots, to resist those measures which threaten injury to the social fabric committed to their guidance. No field can afford them more profitable subjects for reflection than the United States. Independent of the fact that her institutions are more democratic than our own, she possesses natural advantages that enable her to carry them out, such as we do not; and, therefore, the British statesman may always study her career with profit when any great liberal movement is being agitated in his own country.

Lest any one should be disposed to imagine that the statements I have made, or the deductions I have drawn, are merely the prejudices of a traveller brought up under a constitutional monarchy, I will add a passage showing the conclusions at which one of the ablest men in America has arrived.

Bishop Hopkins, in an address delivered before the House of Convocation of Trinity College, Hartford, after eulogizing the wisdom and patriotism, of the founders of his country, as being "the wise master builders of the noblest republic in the world," asks what is its present state after seventy years' brief experience? Behold the reply:—"First, then, we hear on every side the charge of political corruption. Bribery is practised in all our elections. The spoils of office are expected as a matter of course by the victorious party. The President of the United States dares not be impartial; for, if he were, he would lose the confidence of his friends without gaining the confidence of his enemies. The oldest statesmen, and the most prominent, cannot follow the dictates of their own judgment and conscience without being reproached as though they were laying a trap for the presidential chair. The very laws of Congress are set down as the results of personal venality or ambition. The House of Representatives, or even the Senate Chamber, are disgraced every year by fierce passion and violent denunciation. The barbarous and unchristian duel is anticipated as quite inevitable unless it be averted by explanations which may satisfy worldly honour, in utter contempt of all religious principle. And no member of either House can go to the performance of his public duties with any security that he may not be insulted by coarse invective before the day is closed. Yet our rulers are never weary of lauding the character of Washington, as if they were quite convinced that the time had passed by when they might be expected to verify the language of praise by the act of imitation. When we look into the other classes of the community, the same charge of venality and corruption meets us again. Our merchants are accused of all sorts of dishonest management; our brokers, of stock-jobbing; our city aldermen, of bribery; our lawyers, of knavery; our justices, of complicity with the guilty. The same worship of Mammon seems to govern the whole, and the current phrase, 'the almighty dollar,' is a sad but powerful exponent of the universal sin which involves the mass of our population."

Being perfectly aware what a "glass house" of corruption we ourselves are living in, I do not quote the foregoing by way of "throwing a stone," but insert it merely as a warning of the direction in which we should not seek for an advance in purification.


FOOTNOTES:

[CB]

Why is it that, in our yearly debate in Parliament, and in all the journals of the day, from the Times down even to the Morning Advertiser, the United States are always quoted as a republic where the ballot succeeds, when there is no excuse for the most commonly educated man being ignorant of the fact, that the ballot, as understood in this country, does not exist among them? To their honour be it said, they hold secret voting in sovereign contempt.


[CC]

The Ballot, by the Rev. SYDNEY SMITH. 1839.


[CD]

This expression, both in America and England, is tantamount to—for life.


[CE]

Vide ante, opinion of New York Press upon the trial of Matthew F. Ward.


[CF]