Hannibal, having drawn together his forces from all quarters, both those which he had in winter quarters, and those which he had in the garrisons of the Bruttian territory, came to Grumentum in Lucania, with the hope of regaining the towns which through fear had revolted to the Romans. To the same place the Roman consul proceeded from Venusia, exploring the way as he went, and pitched his camp about fifteen hundred paces from the enemy. The rampart of the Carthaginians seemed almost united with the walls of Grumentum, though five hundred paces intervened. Between the Carthaginian and Roman camps lay a plain; and overhanging the left wing of the Carthaginians and the right of the Romans were some naked hills, which were not objects of suspicion to either party, as they had no wood upon them, nor any hiding-places for an ambuscade. In the plain which lay between them skirmishes hardly worth mentioning took place between parties sallying from the outposts. It was evident that what the Roman aimed at was to prevent the enemy from going off, while Hannibal, who was desirous of escaping thence, came down with all his forces, and formed in order of battle. Upon this the consul, imitating the crafty character of his enemy, ordered five cohorts, with the addition of five maniples, to pass the summit by night and sit down in the valleys on the opposite side; a measure to which he was prompted the more strongly in proportion as he felt that there could exist no suspicion of an ambuscade in hills so uncovered. Of the time for rising up from their retreat and of falling upon the enemy he informed Tiberius Claudius Asellus, a military tribune, and Publius Claudius, praefect of the allies, whom he sent with them. The general himself, at break of day, drew out all his forces, both foot and horse, for battle. Shortly after, the signal for battle was given out by Hannibal, and a noise was raised in the camp, from the troops running hastily to arms; then both horse and foot eagerly rushed through the gates, and spreading themselves over the plain, hastened to the enemy. The consul perceiving them thus disordered, gave orders to Caius Aurunculeius, a military tribune of the third legion, to send out the cavalry of the legion to charge the enemy with all possible vehemence, for that the enemy had spread themselves like cattle in such disorder throughout the whole plain, that they might be knocked down and trampled under foot before they could be formed.

Hannibal had not yet gone out of the camp, when he heard the shout of his troops engaged; and thus roused by the alarm, he hastily led his forces against the enemy. Already had the Roman horse spread terror through the Carthaginian van; the first legion also of the infantry and the right wing were commencing the action, while the troops of the Carthaginians, in disorder, engaged just as chance threw each in the way of horse or foot. The battle became more general by reinforcements, and the number of those who ran out to the combat. Hannibal, amid the terror and confusion, would have drawn up his troops while fighting, (which would not have been an easy task unless to a veteran general with veteran soldiers,) had not the shouts of the cohorts and maniples, running down from the hills, which was heard in their rear, created an alarm lest they should be cut off from their camp. After this they were seized with a panic, and a flight commenced in every part; but the number slain was less, because the nearness of the camp offered to the terrified troops a shorter distance to fly. For the cavalry hung upon their rear, and the cohorts, running down the declivities of the hills by an unobstructed and easy path, charged them transversely in flank. However, above eight thousand men were slain, above seven hundred made prisoners, and eight military standards taken. Of the elephants also, which had been of no use in such a sudden and irregular action, four were killed and two captured. The conquerors lost about five hundred Romans and allies. The following day the Carthaginian remained quiet. The Roman having led out his troops into the field, when he saw that no one came out to meet him, gave orders that the spoils of those of the enemy who were slain should be collected, and that the bodies of his own men should be gathered into one place and buried. After this, for several days following in succession, he came up so near the enemy's gates that he almost seemed to be carrying in his standards. But at length Hannibal at the third watch, leaving a number of fires and tents in that part of the camp which faced the enemy, and also a few Numidians who might show themselves in the rampart and the gates, decamped and proceeded towards Apulia. As soon as it dawned, the Roman army came up to the trenches, and the Numidians, according to the plan concerted, took care to show themselves for a little time on the rampart and in the gates; and having deceived the enemy for some time, rode off at full speed, and overtook their friends on their march. The consul, when all was silence in the camp, and he could now no where see even the few who at break of day had walked up and down, sent two horsemen in advance to reconnoitre; and after he had ascertained that all was safe enough, ordered his troops to march in; and after staying there only while his men distributed themselves for plunder, sounded a retreat and led back his forces long before night. The next day he set out as soon as it was light, and following the rumour and the track of the enemy by forced marches, came up with them not far from Venusia. Here also an irregular battle took place, in which two thousand of the Carthaginians were slain. The Carthaginian quitting this place made for Metapontum, marching by night and over mountainous districts in order to avoid a battle. Thence Hanno, who commanded the garrison of that place, was sent into Bruttium with a small party to raise a fresh army. Hannibal, after adding his forces to his own, went back to Venusia by the same route by which he came, and proceeded thence to Canusium. Nero had never quitted the enemy's steps, and when he himself went to Metapontum, had sent for Quintus Fulvius into Lucania, lest that region should be left without protection.

Meanwhile four Gallic horsemen and two Numidians, who were sent to Hannibal with a letter from Hasdrubal, after he had retired from the siege of Placentia, having traversed nearly the whole length of Italy through the midst of enemies, while following Hannibal as he was retiring to Metapontum, were taken to Tarentum by mistaking the roads; where they were seized by some Roman foragers, who were straggling through the fields, and brought before the proprietor, Caius Claudius. At first they endeavoured to baffle him by evasive answers, but threats of applying torture being held out to them, they were compelled to confess the truth; when they fully admitted that they were the bearers of a letter from Hasdrubal to Hannibal. They were delivered into the custody of Lucius Virginius, a military tribune, together with the letter sealed as it was, to be conveyed to the consul Claudius. At the same time two troops of Samnites were sent with them as an escort. Having made their way to the consul, the letter was read by means of an interpreter, and the captives were interrogated; when Claudius, coming to the conclusion that the predicament of the state was not such as that her generals should carry on the war, each within the limits of his own province, and with his own troops, according to the customary plans of warfare, and with an enemy marked out for him by the senate, but that some unlooked for and unexpected enterprise must be attempted, which, in its commencement, might cause no less dread among their countrymen than their enemies, but which, when accomplished, might convert their great fear into great joy, sent the letter of Hasdrubal to Rome to the senate; and at the same time informed the conscript fathers what his intentions were; and recommended that, as Hasdrubal had written to his brother that he should meet him in Umbria, they should send for the legion from Capua to Rome, enlist troops at Rome, and oppose the city forces to the enemy at Narnia. Such was his letter to the senate. Messengers were sent in advance through the territory of Larinum, Marrucia, Frentana, and Praetutia, where he was about to march his army, with orders that they should all bring down from their farms and towns to the road-side provisions ready dressed for the soldiers to eat; and that they should bring out horses and other beasts of burden, so that those who were tired might have plenty of conveyances. He then selected the choicest troops out of the whole army of the Romans and allies, to the amount of six thousand infantry and one thousand horse; and gave out that he intended to seize on the nearest town in Lucania and the Carthaginian garrison in it, and that they should all be in readiness to march. Setting out by night he turned off towards Picenum, and making his marches as long as possible, led his troops to join his colleague, having left Quintus Catius, lieutenant-general, in command of the camp.

At Rome the alarm and consternation were not less than they had been two years before, when the Carthaginian camp was pitched over against the Roman walls and gates; nor could people make up their minds whether they should commend, or censure, this so bold march of the consul. It was evident that the light in which it would be viewed would depend upon its success; than which nothing can be more unfair. They said, "that the camp was left near to the enemy, Hannibal, without a general, and with an army from which all the flower and vigour had been withdrawn; and that the consul had pretended an expedition into Lucania, when he was in reality going to Picenum and Gaul, leaving his camp secured only by the ignorance of the enemy, who were not aware that the general and part of his army were away. What would be the consequence if that should be discovered, and Hannibal should think proper either to pursue Nero with his whole army, who had gone off with only six thousand armed men, or to assault the camp, which was left as a prey for him, without strength, without command, without auspices?" The disasters already experienced in the war, the deaths of two consuls the preceding year, augmented their fears. Besides, all these events had occurred "when there was only one general and one army of the enemy in Italy; whereas now they had two Punic wars, two immense armies, and in a manner two Hannibals in Italy, inasmuch as Hasdrubal was descended from the same father, Hamilcar, was a general equally enterprising, having been trained in a Roman war during so many years in Spain, and rendered famous by a double victory, having annihilated two armies with two most renowned generals. For he could glory even more than Hannibal himself, on account of the celerity with which he had effected his passage out of Spain, and his success in stirring up the Gallic nations to arms, inasmuch as he had collected an army in those very regions in which Hannibal lost the major part of his soldiers by famine and cold, the most miserable modes of death." Those who were experienced in the events which had occurred in Spain, added, that "he would not have to engage with Caius Nero, the general, as an unknown person, whom, when accidentally caught in a difficult defile, he had eluded and baffled like a little child, by drawing up fallacious terms of peace." Under the dictation of fear, which always puts the worst construction upon things, they magnified all the advantages which the enemy possessed, and undervalued their own.

45. When Nero had got such a distance from the enemy that his plan might be disclosed without danger, he briefly addressed his soldiers, observing, that "there never was a measure adopted by any general which was in appearance more daring than this, but in reality more safe. That he was leading them on to certain victory. For as his colleague had not set out to prosecute the war which he conducted, until forces both of horse and foot had been assigned to him by the senate to his own satisfaction, and those greater and better equipped than if he had been going against Hannibal himself, that they would, by joining him, however small the quantity of force which they might add, completely turn the scale. That when it was only heard in the field of battle (and he would take care that it should not be heard before) that another consul and another army had arrived, it would insure the victory. That rumour decided war; and that the most inconsiderable incidents had power to excite hope and fear in the mind. That they would themselves reap almost the entire glory which would be obtained if they succeeded, for it was invariably the case that the last addition which is made is supposed to have effected the whole. That they themselves saw with what multitudes, what admiration, and what good wishes of men their march was attended." And, by Hercules, they marched amid vows, prayers, and commendations, all the roads being lined with ranks of men and women, who had flocked there from all parts of the country. They called them the safeguards of the state, the protectors of the city and empire of Rome. They said that the safety and liberty of themselves and their children were treasured up in their arms and right hands. They prayed to all the gods and goddesses to grant them a prosperous march, a successful battle, and a speedy victory over their enemies; and that they might be bound to pay the vows which they had undertaken in their behalf; so that as now they attended them off with anxiety, go after a few days' interval they might joyfully go out to meet them exulting in victory. Then they severally and earnestly invited them to accept, offered them, and wearied them with entreaties, to take from them in preference to another, whatever might be requisite for themselves or their cattle. They generously gave them every thing in abundance, while the soldiers vied with each other in moderation, taking care not to accept any thing beyond what was necessary for use. They did not make any delay nor quit their ranks when taking food; they continued the march day and night, scarcely giving as much to rest as was necessary to the requirements of the body. Messengers were also despatched in advance to his colleague, to inform him of his approach, and to ask whether he wished that he should come secretly or openly, by day or night, whether they should lodge in the same or different camps. It appeared most advisable that they should come into the camp secretly by night.

A private signal was sent through the camp by the consul Livius, that each tribune should receive a tribune, each centurion a centurion, each horseman a horseman, each foot-soldier a foot-soldier; for it was not expedient that the camp should be enlarged, lest the enemy should discover the arrival of the other consul, while the crowding together of several persons, who would have their tents in a confined place, would be attended with less inconvenience, because the army of Claudius had brought with them on their expedition scarcely any thing except their arms. Claudius, on the very march, had augmented his numbers by volunteers; for not only veteran soldiers, who had completed their period of service, but young men also offered themselves without solicitation; and, as they vied with each other in giving in their names, he had enlisted those whose personal appearance and bodily strength seemed fit for military service. The camp of the other consul was near Sena, and Hasdrubal's position was about five hundred paces from it. Nero, therefore, when he was now drawing near, halted under cover of the mountains, in order that he might not enter the camp before night. Having entered when all was still, they were severally conducted into their tents by the men of their own description, where they were hospitably entertained with the utmost joy on the part of all. The next day a council was held, at which Lucius Porcius Licinus, the praetor, was present. He had his camp joined to that of the consuls, and before their arrival, by leading his army along the heights, sometimes occupying narrow defiles that he might intercept his passage, at other times harassing his troops while marching by attacking their flank or rear, he had baffled the enemy by all the arts of war. This man was, on the present occasion, one of the council. Many inclined to the opinion that an engagement should be deferred till Nero had recruited his soldiers, who were weary with marching and watching, and had employed a few days in acquiring a knowledge of his enemy. Nero urged, not only by persuasion, but with the most earnest entreaties, "that they would not render rash by delay that measure of his which despatch had made safe. That Hannibal, who lay in a state of torpid inactivity in consequence of a delusion which would not continue long, had neither attacked his camp, left as it was without a leader, nor had directed his course in pursuit of him. That the army of Hasdrubal might be annihilated, and he might retire into Apulia before he stirred a step. The man who by delay gave time to the enemy both betrayed the camp to Hannibal, and opened a way to him into Gaul, so that he might effect a junction with Hasdrubal at his leisure, and when he pleased. That they ought to give the signal for battle instantly, and march out into the field, and take advantage of the delusion of their enemies present and absent, while neither those were aware that they had fewer, nor these that they had more and stronger forces to encounter." On the breaking up of the council the signal for battle was displayed, and the troops immediately led into the field.

The Carthaginians were already standing before their camp in battle-array. This circumstance delayed the battle: Hasdrubal, who had advanced before the line with a few horsemen, remarked some old shields among the enemy, which he had not seen before, and some horses leaner than the rest their numbers also appeared greater than usual. Suspecting therefore, what was really the case, he hastily sounded a retreat, and sent a party to the river from which they got their water, where some of them might be intercepted, and notice taken whether there were perchance any there whose complexions were more than ordinarily sun-burnt, as from a recent march. At the same time he ordered a party to ride round the camp at a distance, and note whether the rampart was extended in any part, and also observe whether the signal sounded once or twice. Having received a report of all these particulars, the fact of the camp's not being enlarged led him into error. There were now two camps, as there were before the other consul arrived, one belonging to Marcus Livius, the other to Lucius Porcius, and to neither of them had any addition been made to give more room for the tents. But the veteran general, who was accustomed to a Roman enemy, was much struck by their reporting that the signal sounded once in the praetor's camp, and twice in the consul's; there must therefore be two consuls, and felt the most painful anxiety as to the manner in which the other had got away from Hannibal. Least of all could he suspect, what was really the case, that he had got away from Hannibal by deceiving him to such an extent, as that he knew not where the general was, and where the army whose camp stood opposite to his own. Surely, he concluded, deterred by a defeat of no ordinary kind, he has not dared to pursue him; and he began to entertain the most serious fears that he had himself come too late with assistance, now that affairs were desperate, and lest the same good fortune attended the Roman arms in Italy which they had experienced in Spain. Sometimes he imagined that his letter could not have reached him, and that, it having been intercepted, the consul had hastened to overpower him. Thus anxious and perplexed, having put out the fires, he issued a signal at the first watch to collect the baggage in silence, and gave orders to march. In the hurry and confusion occasioned by a march by night, their guides were not watched with sufficient care and attention. One of them stopped in a place of concealment which he had beforehand fixed upon in his mind, the other swam across the river Metaurus, at a ford with which he was acquainted. The troops, thus deserted by their guides, at first wandered up and down through the fields; and some of them, overpowered with sleep, and fatigued with, watching, stretched themselves on the ground here and there, leaving their standards thinly attended. Hasdrubal gave orders to march along the bank of the river until the light should discover the road; but, pursuing a circuitous and uncertain course along the turnings and windings of that tortuous river, with the intention of crossing it as soon as the first light should discover a place convenient for the purpose he made but little progress; but wasting the day in a fruitless attempt to discover a ford, for the further he went from the sea the higher he found the banks which kept the river in its course, he gave the enemy time to overtake him.

First Nero arrived with the whole body of his cavalry, then Porcius came up with him, with the light infantry. And while these were harassing his weary troops on every side, and charging them, and the Carthaginian, stopping his march, which resembled a flight, was desirous of encamping on an eminence, on the bank of the river, Livius came up with all his foot forces, not after the manner of troops on march, but armed and marshalled for immediate action. When they had united all their forces, and the line was drawn out, Claudius took the direction of the battle in the right wing, Livius in the left; the management of the centre was given to the praetor. Hasdrubal, when he saw that an engagement was inevitable, giving over the fortification of a camp, placed his elephants in the front line, before the standards; on either side these he placed in the left wing the Gauls to oppose Claudius, not so much from any confidence he reposed in them, as because he believed them to be dreaded by the enemy; the right wing he took to himself against M. Livius, together with the Spaniards, in whom, as being veteran troops, he placed his greatest hopes. Behind the elephants, in the centre, the Ligurians were posted; but his line was rather long than deep. The Gauls were covered by a hill, which extended in front. That part of the line which was occupied by the Spaniards, engaged the left wing of the Romans, the whole of whose right wing, extending beyond the line of battle, was unengaged. The hill before them prevented their making an attack either in front or flank. Between Livius and Hasdrubal a furious contest arose, and the slaughter on both sides was dreadful. Here were both generals, here the major part of the Roman horse and infantry, here the Spaniards, veteran troops, and experienced in the Roman manner of fighting, and the Ligurians, a nation inured to war. The elephants were also driven to the same place which, on the first onset, disordered the van, and had made even dislodged the standards; but afterwards, the contest growing hotter, and the shout increasing, they became less submissive to their riders, and ranged to and fro between the two lines, as if not knowing to which side they belonged, like ships floating about without rudders. Claudius, when he had striven in vain to advance up the hill, repeatedly calling out to his soldiers, "To what purpose then have we performed so long a march with such expedition?" when he found it impossible to make his way to the enemy in that quarter, withdrawing several cohorts from the right wing, where he saw they would occupy an inactive station, rather than join in the fight, led them round the rear of the line, and, to the surprise not only of the enemy but his own party, charged their right flank; and such was their rapidity, that after showing themselves on their flank, they almost immediately made an attack on their rear. Thus on all sides, in front, flank, and rear, the Spaniards and Ligurians were cut to pieces; and now the carnage had even reached the Gauls. Here the least opposition was found; for a great number of them had quitted their standards, having slunk off during the night, and laid themselves down to sleep up and down the fields, while even those who were present, being tired with marching and watching, for their bodies are most intolerant of fatigue, could scarcely carry their arms upon their shoulders. And now it was mid-day, and thirst and heat gave them over to the enemy to be killed or captured in multitudes.

More elephants were killed by their guides than by the enemy. They used to have with them a workman's knife, with a mallet. When these beasts began to grow furious, and attack their own party, the rider, placing this knife between the ears, just on the joint by which the neck is connected with the head, used to drive it in, striking it with all the force he could. This was found to be the most expeditious mode of putting these bulky animals to death, when they had destroyed all hope of governing them. This method was first practised by Hasdrubal, a general whose conduct both frequently on other occasions, and especially in this battle, deserved to be recorded. By encouraging the men when fighting, and sharing equally in every danger, he kept up the battle. Sometimes by entreating, at other times by rebuking, the troops, when tired and indisposed to fight from weariness and over-exertion, he rekindled their spirits. He called back the flying, and restored the battle in many places when it had been given up. At length, when fortune decidedly declared for the Romans, lest he should survive so great an army which had been collected under the influence of his name, he put spurs to his horse and rushed upon a Roman cohort, where he fell fighting, as was worthy of the son of Hamilcar and the brother of Hannibal. At no time during that war were so many of the enemy slain in one battle; so that a defeat equal to that sustained at Cannae, whether in respect of the loss of the general or the troops, was considered to have been retorted upon him. Fifty-six thousand of the enemy were slain, five thousand four hundred captured. The other booty was great, both of every other kind, and also of gold and silver. In addition to the rest, there were recovered above four thousand Roman citizens, who had been taken by the enemy, which formed some consolation for the soldiers lost in that battle. For the victory was by no means bloodless. Much about eight thousand of the Romans and the allies were slain; and so completely were even the victors satiated with blood and slaughter, that the next day, when Livius the consul received intelligence that the Cisalpine Gauls and Ligurians, who had either not been present at the battle or had made their escape from the carnage, were marching off in one body without a certain leader without standards, without any discipline or subordination; that if one squadron of horse were sent against them they might be all destroyed, he replied, "Let some survive to bear the news of the enemy's losses and of our valour."

Nero set out on the night following the battle, and marching at a more rapid rate than when he came, arrived at his camp before the enemy on the sixth day. As he was not preceded by a messenger, fewer people attended him on the march; but the joy felt was so great, that they were almost insane with delight. Neither state of feeling at Rome can be well described or told, whether that in which the citizens were when in doubtful expectation of the issue, or when they received the intelligence of victory. Every day, from the time that news arrived that the consul Claudius had set out, from sun-rise to sun-set, none of the senators ever quitted the senate-house, or did the people depart from the forum. The matrons, as they had themselves no means of affording assistance, had recourse to prayers and entreaties, and going about to all the temples, wearied the gods with vows and supplications. While the city was in this state of solicitude and suspense, a vague report first arrived that two Narnian horsemen had come from the field of battle into the camp which stood as a defence in the entrance to Umbria, with intelligence that the enemy were cut to pieces. At first they rather heard than credited this news, as being too great and too joyful for the mind to take in, or obtain a firm belief. Even the very rapidity with which it had arrived formed an obstacle to its reception; for it was stated that the battle took place two days before. After this a letter was brought which had been sent by Lucius Manlius Acidinus, from his camp, on the subject of the arrival of the Narnian horsemen. This letter being conveyed through the forum to the tribunal of the praetor, drew the senators out of the senate-house; and with such eagerness and hurry did the people crowd to the doors of the senate-house, that the messenger could not approach, but was dragged off by persons who asked him questions, and demanded vociferously that the letter should be read on the rostrum before it was read in the senate. At length they were put back and restrained by the magistrates; and thus the joy was gradually dispensed to their overpowered spirits. The letter was read first in the senate, and then in the assembly of the people. The effect was various, according to the difference in the cast of men's minds, some thinking that there were already sure grounds for rejoicing, while others would place no confidence in the news, till they listened to ambassadors, or a letter from the consuls.

At the time when Spain appeared to be relieved in proportion to the degree in which the weight of the war was removed into Italy, by the passage of Hasdrubal, another war sprang up there equal in magnitude to the former. At this juncture, the Romans and Carthaginians thus occupied Spain: Hasdrubal, son of Gisgo, had retired quite to the ocean and Gades; the coast of our sea, and almost the whole of that part of Spain which lies eastward, was subject to Scipio and the Romans. The new general, Hanno, who had passed over from Africa, to supply the place of the Barcine Hasdrubal, with a new army, and formed a junction with Mago, having in a short time armed a large number of men in Celtiberia, which lies in the midway between the two seas, Scipio sent Marcus Silanus against him, with no more than ten thousand infantry and five hundred horse. Silanus, by marching with all the haste he could, (though the ruggedness of the roads, and narrow defiles obstructed with thick woods, which are very frequent in Spain, impeded him,) yet being guided by deserters from Celtiberia, natives of that place, reached the enemy, anticipating not only messengers but even all rumour of his coming. From the same source he ascertained, when they were about ten thousand paces from the enemy, that they had two camps, one on each side of the road in which they were marching; that the Celtiberians, a newly-raised army, in number above nine thousand, were on the left, and that the Carthaginian camp was stationed on the right. The latter was secured and protected by outposts, watches, and every kind of regular military guard, while the former was disorderly and neglected, as belonging to barbarians, who were raw soldiers, and were under the less apprehension, because they were in their own country. Silanus, concluding that this was the camp to be attacked first, ordered the troops to march as much as possible towards the left, lest he should be observed from any point by the Carthaginian outposts, and sending scouts in advance, pushed on towards the enemy at a rapid pace.

He was now about three thousand paces from the enemy, when as yet none of them had perceived him. The ground was covered with craggy places, and hills overgrown with bushes. Here in a hollow valley, and on that account unexposed to the view, he ordered his men to sit down and take refreshment. In the mean time the scouts returned, confirming the statements of the deserters. Then the Romans, collecting their baggage in the centre, took arms, and marched to battle in regular array. They were a thousand paces off when they were descried by the enemy, when suddenly all began to be in a state of hurry and confusion. At the first shout and tumult, Mago quitted the camp and rode up at full speed. As there were in the Celtiberian army four thousand targeteers and two hundred horsemen, this regular legion, as it formed the flower of his troops, he stationed in the first line; the rest, composed of light-armed, he posted in reserve. While he was leading them out of the camp thus marshalled, the Romans discharged their javelins at them before they had scarcely cleared the rampart. The Spaniards stooped down to avoid the javelins thrown at them by the enemy, and then rose up to discharge their own in turn; which the Romans having received according to their custom in close array, with their shields firmly united, they then engaged foot to foot, and began to fight with their swords. But the ruggedness of the ground, while it rendered ineffectual the agility of the Celtiberians who were accustomed to a skirmishing kind of battle, was at the same time not unfavourable to the Romans, who were accustomed to a steady kind of fight, except that the narrow passes and the bushes, which grew here and there, broke their ranks, and they were compelled to engage one against one and two against two, as if matched together. The same circumstance which obstructed the enemy's flight, delivered them up, as it were, bound for slaughter. And now when almost all the targeteers had been slain, the light-armed and the Carthaginians, who had come up to their assistance from the other camp, having been thrown into confusion, were put to the sword. Not more than two thousand of the infantry, and all the cavalry, fled from the field with Mago before the battle was well begun. The other general, Hanno, was taken alive, together with those who came up when the battle was now decided. Almost the whole of the cavalry and the veteran infantry, following Mago in his flight, came to Hasdrubal on the tenth day in the province of Gades. The newly-raised Celtiberian troops, stealing off to the neighbouring woods, fled thence to their homes. By this very seasonable victory, a stop was put to a war which was not by any means so considerable as that to which it would have grown, had the enemy been allowed, after having prevailed upon the Celtiberians to join them, to solicit other nations also to take up arms. Scipio, therefore, having liberally bestowed the highest commendations on Silanus, and entertaining a hope that he might bring the war to a termination, if he did not impede it by a want of activity on his own part, proceeded into the remotest part of Spain against Hasdrubal. The Carthaginian, who then happened to be encamped in Baetica, in order to prevent his allies from wavering in their allegiance, retired quite to the ocean and Gades, in a manner much more resembling a flight than a march. He was afraid, however; that while he kept his forces together, he should form the principal object of attack. Before he crossed the strait to Gades he sent them into different cities, that they might both provide for their own safety by the help of walls, and for that of the town by their arms.

Scipio, seeing the enemy's forces thus distributed, and that to carry about his forces to each of the several cities would be rather tedious than important, marched his army back. Not to leave all that country, however, to the Carthaginians, he sent his brother, Lucius Scipio, at the head of ten thousand foot and one thousand horse, to besiege the most important city of that quarter, called by the barbarians Orinx, and situated on the borders of the Milesians, a nation of Spain so called. The soil is fertile, and even silver is dug out of it by the inhabitants. This place served as a fort to Hasdrubal, from which he might make incursions on the inland states. Scipio encamped near the city. Before he formed his lines round it, he sent to the gates to sound the inclinations of the inhabitants, by a direct interview, and persuade them to make trial of the friendship of the Romans rather than of their power. As they answered nothing of a friendly nature, he threw a double trench and rampart round the place, dividing his army into three parts, in order that one division might assault it while the other two rested. The first of these beginning the attack, a furious and doubtful contest ensued. It was by no means easy to approach and bring the ladders to the walls, on account of the weapons which fell upon them; and even of those persons who had raised them, some were thrown down with forks made for the purpose, others were in danger of being laid hold of by iron grapples, and dragged up hanging to the wall. Scipio, seeing that the contest was equalized owing to the fewness of his party, and that the enemy, fighting from the wall, were superior to him, called off the first division and attacked them with the two others together. This so terrified the besieged, who were already fatigued with fighting with the former, that not only the townsmen forsook the walls in sudden flight, but the Carthaginian garrison, fearing that the town had been betrayed, also quitted their posts and collected themselves into a body. Upon this the inhabitants began to be alarmed, lest if the enemy broke into the town they should kill all they met indiscriminately, Carthaginian or Spaniard. They therefore suddenly threw open the gates and rushed out of the town, holding their shields before them, lest any weapons should be cast at them from a distance, and stretching out to view their bare right hands, that it might be seen they had thrown away their swords. Whether this was not observed, in consequence of the distance, or whether some deception was suspected, is not known; but an attack was made on the deserters, and they were put to death as a hostile force. Through this gate the enemy marched into the city in battle-array. The other gates were cut through and broken down with axes and sledges; and as each horseman entered, he galloped off to seize the forum, as had been ordered. A body of veteran troops were also added to the horse to support them. The legionary troops spread themselves in every part of the city, but neither killed nor plundered any, except such as defended themselves with arms. All the Carthaginians were put under guard, with more than three hundred of the inhabitants, who had shut the gates. The rest had the town put into their hands, and their property restored. About two thousand of the enemy fell in the assault on this city, and not more than ninety of the Romans.