Indeed, they beat the Syracusans far more than eight times, before the gods turned against the Athenians and dashed them to the ground when at the height of their pride.
XVIII. Nikias was present, in spite of his sufferings, at most of these actions; but when his disease grew worse, he was forced to stay in the camp with a small guard, while Lamachus took the command of the army, and fought a battle with the Syracusans, who were endeavouring to build a counter-wall which would obstruct the Athenians in building their wall of circumvallation. The Athenians were victorious, but followed up their success in such a disorderly manner that Lamachus was left alone and exposed to the attacks of the Syracusan cavalry. He at once challenged their leader, a brave man named Kallimachus, to single combat, and both received and inflicted a mortal wound. His dead body and arms fell into the hands of the Syracusans, who at once charged up to the Athenian walls, where Nikias lay helpless. The extremity of the danger roused him, and he ordered his attendants to set fire to a quantity of timber which had been brought thither to construct military engines, and to some of the engines themselves. This desperate expedient checked the Syracusans, and saved Nikias and the Athenians; for the rest of the Syracusan forces on perceiving so great a body of flame returned in haste to their city.
This affair left Nikias in sole command, and he had great hopes of taking the place; for many cities in Sicily had formed alliances with him, ships laden with corn kept arriving to supply his camp, and all began to be eager to be on his side, and to share in the fruits of his success. The Syracusans themselves sent to propose terms of peace, for they despaired of being able to defend their city any longer against him. At this time Gylippus too, a Lacedæmonian who was sent to assist them, heard during his voyage that they were completely enclosed and reduced to great straits, but held on his voyage notwithstanding, in order that even if, as he imagined, all Sicily had fallen into the hands of the Athenians, he might at any rate defend the Greek cities in Italy from sharing its fate. The air indeed was full of rumours that the Athenians were carrying all before them, and that the good fortune and skill of their general rendered him invincible. Even Nikias himself was so elated by his apparent good fortune, that he forgot his wonted prudence, and imagining from the secret intelligence which he had from his friends within Syracuse that it was on the point of surrender, neglected Gylippus altogether, and kept so bad a watch at the straits of Messina with his fleet, that Gylippus managed to cross there and land in Sicily. Here he at once proceeded to gather an army together, but in a quarter of the island far away from Syracuse, so that the people of Syracuse knew nothing of his arrival. They even appointed a day for the public assembly to meet and discuss terms of surrender with Nikias, and were about to attend it, as they thought that it would be best for them to come to terms before the city was quite surrounded by the wall of the Athenians. There was now only a very small portion of this left to be finished, and all the materials for building it were collected on the spot.
XIX. At this crisis there arrived at Syracuse Gongylus, a Corinthian, in one trireme. All crowded round him, to hear what news he brought. He informed them that Gylippus would soon come to their aid by land, and that other triremes besides his own were on their way by sea. This intelligence was scarcely believed, until it was confirmed by a message from Gylippus himself, bidding them march out and meet him. They now took courage and prepared for battle. Gylippus marched into the town, and at once led the Syracusans out to attack the Athenians. When Nikias had likewise brought his army out of their camp, Gylippus halted his men, and sent a herald to offer them an armistice for five days, on condition that they would collect their effects and withdraw from Sicily. Nikias disdained to answer this insulting message; but some of his soldiers jeeringly enquired whether the presence of one Spartan cloak and staff had all at once made the Syracusans so strong that they could despise the Athenians, who used to keep three hundred such men, stronger than Gylippus and with longer hair, locked up in prison, and feared them so little that they delivered them up to the Lacedæmonians again. Timæus says that the Sicilian Greeks despised Gylippus for his avaricious and contemptible character, and that when they first saw him, they ridiculed his long hair and Spartan cloak. Afterwards, however, he tells us that as soon as Gylippus appeared they flocked round him as small birds flock round an owl, and were eager to take service under him. This indeed is the more probable story; for they rallied round him, regarding his cloak and staff to be the symbols of the authority of Sparta. And not only Thucydides, but Philistus, a Syracusan citizen by birth, who was an eye-witness of the whole campaign, tells us that nothing could have been done without Gylippus. In the first battle after his arrival, the Athenians were victorious, and slew some few Syracusans, amongst whom was the Corinthian Gongylus, but on the following day Gylippus displayed the qualities of a true general. He used the same arms, horses, and ground as before, but he dealt with them so differently that he defeated the Athenians. Checking the Syracusans, who wished to chase them back to their camp, he ordered them to use the stones and timber which had been collected by the Athenians, to build a counter-wall, reaching beyond the line of circumvallation, so that the Athenians could no longer hope to surround the city. And now the Syracusans, taking fresh courage, began to man their ships of war, and to cut off the stragglers with their cavalry. Gylippus personally visited many of the Greek cities in Sicily, all of whom eagerly promised their aid, and furnished him with troops; so that Nikias, perceiving that he was losing ground, relapsed into his former desponding condition, and wrote a despatch to Athens, bidding the people either send out another armament, or let the one now in Sicily return to Athens, and especially beseeching them to relieve him from his command, for which he was incapacitated by disease.
XX. The Athenians had long before proposed to send out a reinforcement to the army in Sicily, but as all had gone on prosperously, the enemies of Nikias had contrived to put it off. Now, however, they were eager to send him assistance. It was arranged that Demosthenes should employ himself actively in getting ready a large force, to go to reinforce Nikias in the early spring, while Eurymedon, although it was winter, started immediately with a supply of money, and with a decree naming Euthydemus and Menander, officers already serving in his army, to be joint commanders along with him. Meanwhile, Nikias was suddenly attacked by the Syracusans both by sea and land. His ships were at first thrown into confusion, but rallied and sank many of the enemy, or forced them to run on shore; but on land Gylippus managed at the same time to surprise the fort of Plemmyrium, where there was a magazine of naval stores and war material of all kinds. A considerable number of the garrison, also, were either slain or taken prisoners; but the most serious result was the stoppage of Nikias's supplies, which heretofore had been easily and quickly brought through the Great Harbour, while it remained in the hands of the Athenians, but which now could not reach his camp by sea without a convoy and a battle.[2] Moreover, the Syracusan fleet had not been defeated by any superiority of force of the Athenians, but by the disorder into which it had been thrown by pursuing the enemy. They therefore determined to renew the conflict with better success.
Nikias, on his part, was unwilling to fight a second time, thinking it was folly to fight with a diminished and disheartened force when he knew that Demosthenes was hurrying to his aid with a large and unbroken armament. However, Menander and Euthydemus, the newly-elected generals, were eager to distinguish themselves by performing some brilliant action before the arrival of Demosthenes, and to eclipse the fame of Nikias himself. The pretext they used was the glory of Athens, which they said would be dishonoured for ever if they should now appear afraid to accept the Syracusans' offer of battle. The battle was fought: and the Athenian left wing, we are told by Thucydides, was utterly defeated by the skilful tactics of the Corinthian steersman Aristion. Many Athenians perished, and Nikias was greatly disheartened, for he had now proved unfortunate both when sole commander and when acting with colleagues.
XXI. Matters were in this posture when Demosthenes was descried in the offing, approaching with a splendid armament which struck terror into the hearts of the enemy. His fleet consisted of seventy-three ships, on board of which were five thousand heavy-armed troops, and three thousand javelin men, archers, and slingers. The glittering arms of the troops, the flaunting banners of the ships of war, and the music of the flutes to which the rowers kept time with their oars, made a gallant display, which delighted the Athenians as much as it depressed the Syracusans. These latter, indeed, were struck with dismay, and thought that their last victory had been won in vain, and that they were labouring to no purpose against a foe whose ranks were continually reinforced.
Nikias was not long allowed to feast his eyes on this welcome spectacle undisturbed. Demosthenes, as soon as he landed, insisted on the necessity of instantly attacking Syracuse, and putting an end to the siege, either by capturing the place, or by returning at once to Athens in case of failure. Against this Nikias, who was alarmed at the idea of such vigorous action, urged that it would be unwise to run such a risk. Delay, he argued, favoured the besiegers more than the besieged, as their resources must soon fail, in which case their allies would desert them and they would again be brought to the necessity of capitulating. Nikias adopted this view because of what he heard from his secret correspondents within the city, who urged him to continue the siege, telling him that already the Syracusans began to feel the war too great a burden for them to support, and that Gylippus was very unpopular among them, so that in a short time they would utterly refuse to hold out any longer, and would come to terms with the Athenians. Nikias could only hint at these secret sources of information, and so his counsels were thought by his colleagues to be mere cowardice. They declared loudly that the original mistake was about to be repeated, and the first terror-stricken impression of the armament frittered away, until familiarity with the sight of it had bred contempt in the breasts of their enemies. They therefore eagerly seconded the proposal of Demosthenes, and forced Nikias, though sorely against his will, to yield to their representations. Accordingly, Demosthenes with the land force assaulted the outlying fort on the high ground of Epipolæ by night, and took it by surprise, killing part of its garrison and putting the remainder to flight. He did not halt there, but followed up his success by marching further on towards the city, until he was met by some Bœotian heavy-armed troops, who had been the first to rally, and now in a compact mass met the Athenians with their spears levelled, and with loud shouts forced them to give way with severe loss. The whole Athenian army was by this thrown into confusion and panic, as the fugitives broke the formation of those troops who were still marching to the front, so that in some cases they actually fought with one another, each believing the others to be enemies. Thus the Athenians fell into sad disorder and ruin; for they were unable to distinguish friends from foes in the uncertain light, as the moon, now nearly setting, glanced upon spear-points and armour without showing them clearly enough to enable men to see with whom they had to deal. The moon was behind the backs of the Athenians: and this circumstance was greatly against them, for it made it hard for them to see the numbers of their own friends, but shone plainly on the glittering shields of their antagonists, making them look taller and more terrible than they were. Finally, attacked as they were on every side, they gave way and fled. Some were slain by the enemy, some by their own countrymen, and some were dashed to pieces by falling down the precipices; while the rest, as they straggled about the country, were cut off by the Syracusan cavalry. Two thousand men perished, and of the survivors few brought back their arms.
XXII. Nikias, who had expected this reverse, now cast the blame of it upon Demosthenes; and he, admitting his error, besought Nikias to embark his army and sail away as quickly as possible, pointing out that no further reinforcement could be hoped for, and that they could not hope for success with the force now at their disposal. Even had they been victorious, he argued, they had intended to leave their present camp, which was unhealthy at all times, and was now in the hot season becoming pestilential. The time was the beginning of autumn, and many of the Athenians were sick, while all were disheartened. Nikias, however, opposed the idea of retreat, not because he did not fear the Syracusans, but because he feared the Athenians more, and the treatment which as an unsuccessful general he would probably meet with. He declared that he saw no reason for alarm, and that even if there was, that he would rather perish by the hands of the enemy than those of his countrymen. A very different sentiment to that which was afterwards uttered by Leon the Byzantine, who said, "My countrymen, I had rather be put to death by you than to be put to death together with you."
With regard to the place to which it would be best for them to remove their camp, that, Nikias said, was a question which they might take time to discuss.
Demosthenes, seeing that Nikias was thus obstinate, and conscious that his own project, when adopted, had led to a frightful disaster, ceased pressing him to raise the siege, and gave the other generals to understand that Nikias must have secret reasons, from his correspondents within the city, which led him to persevere thus obstinately in remaining where he was. This caused them also to withdraw their objections to remaining; but when another army came to assist the Syracusans, and the Athenians began to perish from malaria, even Nikias himself agreed that it was time to retreat, and issued orders to his men to hold themselves in readiness to embark.
XXIII. When all was ready, and the enemy off their guard, as they did not expect the Athenians to retreat, an eclipse of the moon took place, which greatly terrified Nikias and some others who, from ignorance or superstition, were in the habit of taking account of such phenomena. That the sun should be sometimes eclipsed even the vulgar understood to be in some way due to the moon intercepting its light: but what body could intercept the moon's light, so that suddenly the full moon should pale its light and alter its colour, they could not explain, but thought that it was a sinister omen and portended some great calamity.
The treatise of Anaxagoras, the first writer who has clearly and boldly explained the phases and eclipses of the moon, was then known only to a few, and had not the credit of antiquity, while even those who understood it were afraid to mention it to their most trusted friends. Men at that time could not endure natural philosophers and those whom they called in derision stargazers, but accused them of degrading the movements of the heavenly bodies by attributing them to necessary physical causes. They drove Protagoras into exile, and cast Anaxagoras into prison, from whence he was with difficulty rescued by Perikles; while Sokrates, who never took any part in these speculations, was nevertheless put to death because he was a philosopher. It was not until after the period of which I am writing that the glorious works of Plato shed their light upon mankind, proving that Nature obeys a higher and divine law, and removing the reproach of impiety which used to attach to those who study these matters, so that all men might thereafter investigate natural phenomena unreproved. Indeed, Plato's companion Dion, although the moon was eclipsed when he was starting from the island of Zakynthus to attack the despot Dionysius, was not in the least disturbed by the omen, but sailed to Syracuse and drove out the despot. Nikias at this time was without a competent soothsayer, for his intimate friend, Stilbides, who used to check a great deal of his superstition, died shortly before this. Indeed, the omen, if rightly explained, as Philochorus points out, is not a bad one but a very good one for men who are meditating a retreat; for what men are forced to do by fear, requires darkness to conceal it, and light is inimical to them. Moreover men were only wont to wait three days after an eclipse of the moon, or of the sun, as we learn from Autokleides in his book on divination; but Nikias persuaded them to wait for another complete circuit of the moon, because its face would not shine upon them propitiously before that time after its defilement with the gross earthy particles which had intercepted its rays.[3]
XXIV. Nikias now put all business aside, and kept offering sacrifices and taking omens, until the enemy attacked him. Their infantry assailed the camp and siege works, while their fleet surrounded the harbour, not in ships of war; but the very boys and children embarked in what boats they could find and jeered at the Athenians, challenging them to come out and fight. One of these boys, named Herakleides, the son of noble parents, ventured too far, and was captured by an Athenian ship. His uncle Pollichus, fearing for his safety, at once advanced with ten triremes which were under his command; and this movement brought forward the rest of the Syracusan fleet to support him. An obstinate battle now took place, in which the Syracusans were victorious, and many of the Athenians perished, amongst whom was their admiral Eurymedon. And now the Athenians refused to remain before Syracuse any longer, and called upon their generals to lead them away by land, for the Syracusans after their victory had at once blockaded the entrance to the harbour, so that no passage was left. Nikias and the other generals refused to agree to this proposal, as they thought it would be a pity to abandon a fleet of so many transports, and nearly two hundred ships of war. They placed the flower of the land force on board the ships, with the best of the slingers and darters, and manned one hundred and ten triremes, for they had not sufficient oars for a larger number. Nikias now abandoned the great camp and walls of investment, which reached as far as the temple of Herakles, and drew the army up on the beach as spectators of the battle. Thus the Syracusan priests and generals were able for the first time since the siege began to sacrifice to Herakles, as they were wont to do, while the people were manning their fleet.
XXV. The Syracusan soothsayers promised them the victory if they awaited attack and did not begin the attack: for Herakles himself never struck the first blow, but always waited for his enemies to attack him. The sea-fight which now took place was the fiercest and most obstinately contested of all those which took place throughout the war, and its varying fortunes were shared with agonizing interest by the Athenian army and the citizens on the walls of Syracuse, who were able from their respective positions to overlook the whole battle and watch the manœuvres of each ship. The Athenians were placed at a great disadvantage by having all their ships collected into one mass, where they were attacked from all sides by the lighter and more manageable vessels of the enemy. The Syracusans also used stones as missiles, which strike with equal effect, however they are thrown, while the Athenians replied with volleys of arrows and javelins, whose aim was often spoiled by the motion of the vessels, and which are useless unless they fly with the point foremost. All these details had been foreseen and taught to the Syracusans by Aristion the Corinthian steersman, who fell in the moment of victory. The Athenians were finally routed and driven ashore with great slaughter, and their retreat by sea completely cut off. Knowing how difficult it would be to make their way to any place of safety by land, they allowed themselves to be so paralyzed by despair, that they let the Syracusans tow away their ships as prizes, without making an effort to save them, and actually neglected to ask for a truce for the burial of their dead. They seemed to think that the case of the sick and wounded whom they saw amongst them, and whom they must perforce abandon when they left their camp, was even more pitiable than that of the floating corpses, and they actually envied the lot of the slain, knowing well that after a few more days of suffering they themselves were all destined to share their fate.
XXVI. They were all eager to depart during the night which followed this disastrous day; but Gylippus, perceiving that the people of Syracuse were so given up to feasting and merry-making, celebrating both their victory and the festival of their national hero Herakles, to whom the day was sacred, that they could not be either forced or persuaded into attempting to harass the enemy's retreat, sent some of those men who had formerly been in correspondence with Nikias to tell him not to attempt to retreat that night, as all the roads were occupied by Syracusans lying in wait to attack him. Deceived by this intelligence, Nikias waited to find what he feared in the night turned into a reality on the following day. At daybreak the passes were occupied by the Syracusans, who also threw up entrenchments at all the places where rivers had to be forded, and broke all the bridges, stationing their cavalry upon the level ground, so that the Athenians could not advance a step without fighting. The Athenians remained for all that day and the following night in their camp, and then set out, with such weeping and lamentation that it seemed rather as if they were leaving their native country than a hostile one, so distressed were they to see the miseries of their friends and relatives, and of the sick and wounded who were unable to accompany their march and had to be left to their fate, while they themselves had a presentiment that their present sufferings were nothing in comparison with those which awaited them. Among all these piteous sights, Nikias himself offered a glorious example. Worn out by disease, compelled by the exigencies of the retreat to forego the medicines and treatment which his condition required, he nevertheless, weak as he was, did more than many strong men could do, while all his men knew well that he made those efforts, not from any wish or hope to save his own life, but that it was solely on their behalf that he did not give way to despair. The tears and lamentations of the rest were prompted by their own private sorrows and fears, but the only grief shown by Nikias was that so splendid an expedition should have ended in such miserable failure. Those who watched his noble bearing and remembered how earnestly he had opposed the whole scheme, were filled with compassion for his undeserved sufferings. They began to despair of the favour of Heaven being shown to themselves, when they reflected that this man, careful as he had always been to perform every religious duty, was now no better off than the humblest or the most wicked soldier in his army.
XXVII. Nikias made heroic efforts by cheerful looks, encouraging speeches, and personal appeals to his followers, to show himself superior to fortune. Throughout the retreat, although for eight days in succession he was constantly harassed by the attacks of the enemy, he nevertheless kept the division under his command unbroken and undefeated, until the other part of the army under Demosthenes was forced to surrender, being completely surrounded in an enclosed olive-ground, the property of Polyzelus, brother of the despot Gelon. Demosthenes himself drew his sword and stabbed himself, but not mortally, for the Syracusans quickly interposed and forced him to desist. When the Syracusans told Nikias of this disaster, and allowed him to send horsemen to convince him of its truth, he proposed terms to Gylippus, which were that the Athenians should be allowed to leave Sicily, on condition of the repayment of the whole expenses of the war, for which he offered to give hostages. These terms were refused, and the enemy with insulting cries and threats proceeded to shoot with missiles of all kinds at the Athenians, who were now completely without food or drink. Yet Nikias prevailed upon them to hold out during that night, and on the following day he led them, still under fire from the enemy, across the plain leading to the river Asinarus. There some were forced into the stream by the enemy, while others cast themselves in to quench their thirst. A most dreadful slaughter now took place, the Athenians being wild with thirst, and the Syracusans killing them as they drank, until Nikias surrendered himself to Gylippus, saying, "I beseech you, now that you are victorious, to show some mercy, not to me, but to the Athenian troops. Consider how changeful is the fortune of war, and how gently the Athenians dealt with your men in their hour of victory."
Gylippus was visibly affected by the words, and by the sight of Nikias; for he knew how well the Spartan prisoners had been treated by him, when the peace was made with Athens; moreover, he thought that it would be a great honour to him if he could carry home the enemy's commander-in-chief as a prisoner. He received Nikias with kindness, and gave orders to take the rest of the Athenians alive. It was long, however, before these orders were understood and obeyed, so that more Athenians were slain than survived, although many were spared by the Syracusans in order that they might be sold for slaves.
The prisoners were now assembled together, and their arms and armour hung upon the trees by the river side, as a trophy of the victory. The victors next crowned themselves with garlands, decorated their horses, cut off the manes and tails of the captured horses, and marched back into their own city, having by their courage and skill won the most complete victory ever gained by one Greek state over another.
XXVIII. At a public assembly of the Syracusans and their allies which was shortly afterwards held, the orator Eurykles proposed that the day on which Nikias was taken should be kept as a festival for ever, upon which no work should be done, and sacrifice should be offered to the gods, and that the feast should be called the Asinaria, from the name of the river where the victory was won. The day was the twenty-sixth of the Dorian month Karneius, which the Athenians call Metageitnion (September 21st). Furthermore, he proposed that the Athenian slaves and allies should be sold, that the Athenians themselves, with what native Sicilians had joined them, should be confined in the stone quarries within the city of Syracuse, and that their generals should be put to death.
These propositions wore accepted by the Syracusans, who treated Hermokrates with contempt when he urged that to be merciful in victory would be more honourable to them than the victory itself. Gylippus too, when he begged that he might carry the Athenian generals alive to Sparta, was shamefully insulted by the excited Syracusans, who had long disliked the irritating Spartan airs of superiority natural to Gylippus, and now, flushed with victory, no longer cared to conceal their feelings. Timæus tells us that they accused him of avarice and peculation, a hereditary vice, it appears, in his family since his father Kleandrides was banished from Sparta for taking bribes, while he himself afterwards stole thirty of the hundred talents which Lysander sent home to Sparta, and hid them under the roof of his house, but was informed against, and exiled in disgrace. This will be found described at greater length in the Life of Lysander.
In his account of the death of Nikias and Demosthenes, Timæus does not exactly follow the narrative of Thucydides and Philistus, as he informs us that while the assembly was still sitting, Hermokrates sent to their prison to inform them that they were condemned to death, and to afford them the means of dying by their own hands, while the other historians state that the Syracusans put them to death.[4] Be this as it may, their dead bodies were exposed before the gates of Syracuse as a spectacle for the citizens. I have heard also that at the present day a shield is shown in one of the temples at Syracuse, which is said to be that of Nikias, and which is beautifully adorned with woven coverings of purple and gold.
XXIX. Of the Athenians, the most part perished in the stone quarries of disease and insufficient food, for they received only a pint of barley-meal and half-a-pint of water each day. Not a few, however, were sold into slavery, being stolen for that purpose by Syracusans, or having escaped disguised as slaves. The rest were at length branded upon their foreheads with the figure of a horse, and sold into slavery. Yet even in this extremity their well-bred and dignified behaviour came to their aid; for they soon either obtained their freedom, or gained the confidence and respect of their masters. Some gained their freedom by their knowledge of Euripides. It appears that the dramas of Euripides were especially popular in Sicily, but that only a few fragments of his works had hitherto reached the Greek cities in that island. We are told that many of these captives on their return to Athens affectionately embraced Euripides, and told him how some of them had been sold into slavery, but had been set free after they had taught their masters as much of his poetry as they could remember, while others, when wandering about the country as fugitives after the battle, had obtained food and drink by reciting passages from his plays. We need not then wonder at the tale of the people of Kaunus, who, when a ship pursued by pirates was making for their harbour at first refused to admit it, but afterwards enquired whether any on board knew the plays of Euripides; and on hearing that they did, allowed them to enter the harbour and save themselves.
XXX. At Athens the news of the catastrophe was at first disbelieved, because of the unsatisfactory way in which it reached the city. A stranger, it is said, disembarked at Peiræus, went into a barber's shop, and began to converse about what had happened as upon a theme which must be uppermost in every man's mind. The astonished barber, hearing for the first time such fearful tidings, ran up to Athens to communicate it to the archons, and to the public in the market-place. All were shocked and astonished at hearing this, and the archons immediately convoked the public assembly, and brought the barber before it. When he was asked to explain from whom he had heard this intelligence, as he could give no satisfactory account, he was regarded as a disturber of the public tranquillity by fabricating idle tales, and was even put to the torture. Soon, however, men arrived who confirmed his tale, and described all the details of the catastrophe as far as they had witnessed them. Then at last the countrymen of Nikias believed, after his death, what he had so often foretold to them during his life.
[1] In North Africa, the modern oasis of Siwah.
[2] Plemmyrium on one side, and the city of Syracuse on the other, command the entrance of the gulf known as the Great Harbour, inside of which lay the Athenian fleet and camp.
[3] Grote.
[4] Grote, Part II. ch. lx, points out that there is no real contradiction between the statement cited from Timæus, and the accounts gives of the transaction by Thucydides and Philistus.
I. Marcus Crassus[5] was the son of a father who had been censor, and enjoyed a triumph; but he was brought up with his two brothers in a small house. His brothers were married in the lifetime of their parents, and all had a common table, which seems to have been the chief reason that Crassus was a temperate and moderate man in his way of living. Upon the death of one of his brothers, Crassus married the widow,[6] and she became the mother of his children; for in these matters also he lived as regular a life as any Roman. However, as he grew older, he was charged with criminal intercourse with Licinia,[7] one of the Vestal Virgins, who was brought to trial; the prosecutor was one Plotinus. Licinia had a pleasant estate in the suburbs, which Crassus wished to get at a small price, and with this view he was continually about the woman and paying his court to her, which brought on him the suspicion of a criminal intercourse; but he was acquitted by the judices, being indebted in some degree to his love of money for his acquittal from the charge of debauching the vestal. But he never remitted his attentions to Licinia till he got possession of the property.
II. Now, the Romans say that the many good qualities of Crassus were obscured by one vice, avarice; but the fact appears to be that one vice, which was more predominant in his character than all the rest hid his other vices. They allege, as the chief proof of his avarice, the mode in which he got his money and the amount of his property. Though he did not at first possess above three hundred talents, and during his first consulship he dedicated the tenth part of his property to Hercules,[8] and feasted the people, and gave every Roman out of his own means enough to maintain him for three months; yet, before the Parthian expedition, upon making an estimate of his property, he found it amount to seven thousand one hundred talents. The greatest part of this, if one must tell the truth, though it be a scandalous story, he got together out of the fire and the war, making the public misfortunes the source of his wealth; for, when Sulla took the city, and sold the property of those whom he put to death, considering it and calling it spoil, and wishing to attach the infamy of the deed to as many of the most powerful men as he could, Crassus was never tired of receiving or buying. Besides this, observing the accidents that were indigenous and familiar at Rome, conflagrations, and tumbling down of houses owing to their weight and crowded state, he bought slaves, who were architects and builders. Having got these slaves to the number of more than five hundred, it was his practice to buy up houses on fire, and the houses which were adjoining to those on fire; for the owners, owing to fear and uncertainty, would sell them at a low price; and thus the greatest part of Rome fell into the hands of Crassus: but, though he had so many artizans, he built no house except his own; for he used to say that those who were fond of building were ruined by themselves, without the aid of any opponent. Though he had many silver mines, and much valuable land, and many labourers on it, still one would suppose that all this was of little value, compared with the value of his slaves: so many excellent slaves he possessed,—readers, clerks, assayers of silver,[9] house-managers, and table-servants; and he himself superintended their education, and paid attention to it and taught them, and, in short, he considered that a master was mainly concerned in looking after his slaves, who were the living implements of domestic economy. And here Crassus was right, if, as he used to say, it was his opinion that he ought to effect everything by the instrumentality of slaves, and that he himself should direct the slaves; for, we observe, that what is economical with respect to things lifeless is political with respect to men. But he was not right in thinking and saying that nobody was rich who could not maintain an army out of his substance; for war feeds not by a fixed allowance, according to Archidamus;[10] and, consequently, the wealth that is required for war is unlimited; and this opinion of Crassus was very different from the opinion of Marius; for when Marius, after giving to each man fourteen jugera of land, found that they wanted more, he said, "May there never be a Roman who thinks that too little which is enough to maintain him."
III. Besides this, Crassus was hospitable to strangers, for his house was open to all, and he used to lend money to his friends without interest; but he would demand it back immediately on the expiration of the time of the borrower, which made the gratuitous loan more burdensome than heavy interest. In his entertainments the invitation was usually to persons of the plebeian class, and general: and the frugality of the banquet, which was accompanied with neatness and a friendly welcome, made it more agreeable than a sumptuous feast. In his literary pursuits he mainly studied oratory,[11] and that kind which was of practical use; and, having attained an ability in speaking equal to the first among the Romans, he surpassed in care and labour those who had the greatest talents; for they say, there was no case, however mean and contemptible, which he approached without preparation; and often, when Pompeius, and Cæsar, and Cicero, were unwilling to get up to speak, he would perform all the duties of an advocate: and for this reason he became more popular, being considered a careful man, and always ready to give his help. He pleased people, also, by his friendly and affable manner in taking them by the hand, and addressing them; for Crassus never met a Roman, however low and humble his condition might be, without returning his salute,[12] and addressing him by his name. He is also said to have been well versed in history, and to have paid some attention to philosophy by studying the writings of Aristoteles, in which he had for his teacher Alexander, a man who gave a proof of his moderation and easy temper in his intercourse with Crassus; for it was not easy to say whether he was poorer when he became acquainted with Crassus, or after the acquaintance was made. He was, indeed, the only friend of Crassus, who always accompanied him when he travelled abroad; and he used to wear a cloak,[13] lent him for the purpose, which on his return he was asked to give back. Oh, the submission[14] of the man! for the poor fellow did not consider poverty among the things that are indifferent. But this belongs to a later period.
IV. When Marius and Cinna had got the upper hand, and it was soon apparent that they would reinstate themselves in Rome, not for the benefit of their country, but plainly for the destruction and ruin of the nobles, those who were caught in the city were put to death: among whom were the father and brother of Crassus. Crassus, being very young, escaped immediate danger; but, seeing that he was hemmed in on all sides, and hunted by the tyrants, he took with him three friends and ten slaves; and, using wonderful expedition, made his escape to Iberia, having been there before, when his father was Prætor,[15] and having made himself friends. Finding all in great alarm and trembling at the cruelty of Marius, as if he were close at hand, he did not venture to make himself known, but sought refuge in a tract bordering on the sea, belonging to Vibius Pacianus,[16] where he hid himself in a large cave. He sent a slave to Vibius to sound his disposition; for the provisions that Crassus brought with him were now exhausted. On hearing the news, Vibius was pleased that Crassus had escaped; and inquiring about the number of persons with him, and where the place was, he did not go himself to see them, but he took his villicus near the spot, and ordered him to have food daily prepared, and to carry it and place it near the rock, and to go away without speaking a word, and not to be curious about the matter, or make any inquiries; and he gave him notice, that if he did meddle at all he should be put to death, but if he faithfully helped in the matter he should have his freedom. The cave is not far from the sea, and the precipices which shut it in leave a small and hardly perceptible path[17] which leads into the cave; but when you have entered, it opens to a wonderful height, and spreads out wide, with recesses which open into one another, and are of a large circuit. It is also neither without water nor light: for a spring of the purest water oozes out at the base of the precipice; and there are natural clefts about that part where the rock closes, by which the external light is admitted, and in the daytime the spot is fully illuminated. The air within is free from all moisture caused by dropping, and is quite pure, owing to the compactness of the rock, which diverts all the wet and droppings to the spring.
V. While Crassus stayed in the cave, the slave came daily to bring provisions; but he did not see the persons who were concealed, or know who they were; though he was seen by them, inasmuch as they knew, and watched the times of his coming. Now, the provision that was made for their meals was ample enough even for luxury, and not merely sufficient for their necessities. But Vibius determined to show Crassus every kind of friendly attention; and it occurred to him to consider the youth of Crassus, that he was a very young man, and that provision should be made in some degree also for the pleasures suitable to his age, and that merely to supply his wants would argue that he was serving Crassus as little as he could, rather than with hearty zeal; accordingly, he took with him two handsome female slaves, and went down to the sea-coast. When he came to the place, he pointed to the road that led up to it, and told them to go in boldly. Crassus, seeing them approach, was afraid that the spot was known, and had been discovered; and, accordingly, he asked them what they wanted, and who they were. The women replied, as they had been instructed, that they were looking for their master, who was concealed there; on which Crassus perceived the joke which Vibius was playing off upon him, and his kind attentions, and received the women; and they stayed with him for the rest of the time, telling and reporting to Vibius what he requested them. Fenestella[18] says, that he saw one of these slaves when she was an old woman, and that he had often heard her mention this, and tell the story with pleasure.
VI. In this way Crassus spent eight months in concealment; but as soon as he heard of Cinna's end, he showed himself, and out of the numbers that flocked to him he selected two thousand five hundred, with whom he went round to the cities; and one city, Malaca,[19] he plundered, according to the testimony of many authors, though they say that he denied the fact, and contradicted those who affirmed it. After this he got together some vessels, and crossed over to Libya, to Metellus Pius,[20] a man of reputation who had collected a force by no means contemptible. But he stayed no long time there; for he quarrelled with Metellus, and then set out to join Sulla, by whom he was treated with particular respect. When Sulla had passed over the sea to Italy, he wished all the young men who were with him to aid him actively, and he appointed them to different duties. Crassus, on being sent into the country of the Marsi to raise troops, asked for a guard, because the road lay through a tract which was occupied by the enemy; Sulla replied to him in passion and with vehemence, "I give thee as guards thy father, thy brother, thy friends, thy kinsmen, who were cut off illegally and wrongfully, and whose murderers I am now pursuing." Stung by these words, and pricked on to the undertaking, Crassus immediately set out, and, vigorously making his way through the enemy, he got together a strong force, and showed himself active in the battles of Sulla. The events of that war, it is said, first excited him to rivalry and competition with Pompeius for distinction. Pompeius was younger than Crassus, and his father had a bad repute at Rome, and had been bitterly hated by the citizens; but still Pompeius shone conspicuous in the events of that period and proved himself to be a great man, so that Sulla showed him marks of respect which he did not very often show to others of more advanced years and of his own rank, by rising from his seat when Pompeius approached, and uncovering his head, and addressing him by the title of Imperator. All this set Crassus in a flame, and goaded him, inasmuch as he was thus slighted in comparison with Pompeius; and with good reason; Crassus was deficient in experience, and the credit that he got by his military exploits was lost by his innate vices,—love of gain and meanness; for, upon taking Tudertia,[21] a city of the Umbri, it was suspected that he appropriated to himself most of the spoil, and this was made a matter of charge against him to Sulla. However, in the battle near Rome,[22] which was the greatest in all the war, and the last, Sulla was defeated, the soldiers under his command being put to flight, and some of them trampled down in the pursuit: Crassus, who commanded the right wing, was victorious, and, after continuing the pursuit till nightfall, he sent to Sulla to ask for something for his soldiers to eat, and to report his success. But, during the proscriptions and confiscations, on the other hand, he got a bad name, by buying at low prices large properties, and asking for grants. It is said that, in the country of the Bruttii, he also proscribed a person, not pursuant to Sulla's orders, but merely to enrich himself thereby, and that, on this account, Sulla, who disapproved of his conduct, never employed him again in any public business. However, Crassus was most expert in gaining over everybody by flattery; and, on the other hand, he was easily taken in by flattery from any person. It is further mentioned as a peculiarity in his character, that, though very greedy of gain,[23] he hated and abused those most who were like himself.
VII. But Crassus was most annoyed at the military success of Pompeius, and his enjoying a triumph before he became a senator, and being called by the citizens Magnus, which means Great. On one occasion, when somebody observed that Pompeius the Great was approaching, Crassus smiled, and asked, How great he was? But, as Crassus despaired of equalling Pompeius in military reputation, he entered upon a political career, and, by his activity, by pleading in the courts, and lending money, and by canvassing for candidates, and subjecting himself to all kinds of scrutiny in conjunction with those who wanted anything of the people, he acquired a power and reputation equal to what Pompeius had got by his many and great military services. And the result to each of them was something unusual; for, when Pompeius was absent from Rome, his name and his influence in the State, by reason of his military exploits, was superior to that of Crassus; but when Pompeius was at Rome, he often fell short of Crassus in influence, for his haughty temper and habitual pride made him avoid crowds and retire from the Forum, and seldom give his aid to those who sought it, and then not readily; his object being to keep his power at a higher pitch, by exercising it only on his own behalf. But Crassus was always ready to make himself useful, and he did not keep himself retired, nor was he difficult of access, but he was always busy in everything that was going on, and by the general kindness of his behaviour he got the advantage over the proud bearing of Pompeius. In personal dignity, in persuasive speech, and attractive expression of countenance it is said they were both equally fortunate. However, this rivalry did not hurry Crassus into any personal enmity or ill-will, and though, he was annoyed at Pompeius and Cæsar receiving greater honour than himself, he never allowed this jealous feeling to be associated with any hostility or ill disposition. It is true that when Cæsar was taken and detained by the pirates, he cried out, "What pleasure you will have, Crassus, when you hear of my capture!" But afterwards, at least, they were on friendly terms, and, when Cæsar was going to Iberia, as prætor,[24] and had no money in consequence of his creditors having come upon him and seizing all his outfit, Crassus did not leave him in this difficulty, but got him released, by becoming security for him to the amount of eight hundred and thirty talents. When all Rome became divided into three parties,—that of Pompeius, Cæsar and Crassus,—(for Cato[25] had more reputation than power, and was more admired than followed), the sober and conservative part of the citizens adhered to Pompeius; the violent and those who were lightly moved, were led by the hopes that they had from Cæsar; Crassus, by keeping a middle position, used both parties for his purposes, and, as he very often changed in his political views, he was neither a firm friend nor an irreconcilable enemy, but he would readily give up either his friendship or his enmity on calculation of interest; so that within a short interval, he often came forward to speak both for and against the same men and the same measures. He had also great influence, both because he was liked and feared, but mainly because he was feared. Accordingly Sicinius,[26] who was the most violent in his attacks on the magistrates and popular leaders of the day, in reply to one who asked, "Why Crassus was the only person whom he did not worry, and why he let him alone?" said, "That he had hay on his horn:" now, the Romans were accustomed to tie some hay round the horn of an ox that butted, as a warning to those who might meet it.
VIII. The insurrection of the gladiators and their devastation of Italy, which is generally called the war of Spartacus,[27] originated as follows:—One Lentulus Batiates kept gladiators in Capua, of whom the majority, who were Gauls and Thracians, had been closely confined, not for any misbehaviour on their part, but through the villainy of their purchaser, for the purpose of fighting in the games. Two hundred of these resolved to make their escape; but their design being betrayed, those who had notice of the discovery, and succeeded in getting away, to the number of seventy-eight, took knives and spits out of a cook's shop, and sallied out. Meeting on the way with some waggons that were conveying gladiators' arms to another city, they plundered the waggons, and armed themselves. Seizing on a strong position, they chose three leaders, of whom the first was Spartacus, a Thracian of nomadic race, a man not only of great courage and strength, but, in judgment and mildness of character, superior to his condition, and more like a Greek than one would expect from his nation. They say that when Spartacus was first taken to Rome to be sold, a snake was seen folded over his face while he was sleeping, and a woman, of the same tribe with Spartacus, who was skilled in divination, and possessed by the mysterious rites of Dionysus, declared that this was a sign of a great and formidable power which would attend him to a happy termination. This woman was at that time cohabiting with Spartacus, and she made her escape with him.
IX. The gladiators began by repelling those who came against them from Capua and getting a stock of military weapons, for which they gladly exchanged their gladiators' arms, which they threw away as a badge of dishonour, and as barbaric. Clodius[28] the prætor was next sent against them from Rome, with three thousand men, and he blockaded them on a mountain which had only one ascent, and that was difficult and narrow, and Clodius had possession of it; on all other sides there were steep smooth-faced precipices. On the top of the hill there grew a great quantity of wild vines, and the men of Spartacus cutting off all the shoots that were adapted to their purpose, and, intertwining them, made strong and long ladders, so that when fastened above, they reached along the face of the precipice to the level ground, and they all safely descended by them except one man, who stayed to take care of the arms; and, when all the rest had descended, he let the arms down, and, having done this, he got down safe himself. The Romans did not know what was going on; and accordingly, when the gladiators surrounded them, they were put in alarm by the surprise, and fled, on which the enemy took their camp. Many of the herdsmen and shepherds in those parts also joined the gladiators, men ever ready for a quarrel, and light of foot, some of whom the gladiators armed, and others they employed as scouts and light troops. Publius Barinus[29] the prætor was next sent against them, whose legatus, one Furius, at the head of two thousand soldiers, the gladiators engaged and put to flight. Cossinus was then despatched, with a large force, to advise with Barinus, and to be associated in the command; but Spartacus, watching his opportunity, while Cossinus was bathing at Salenæ,[30] was very near seizing him. Cossinus made his escape with great difficulty, and Spartacus, seizing the baggage, closely followed up the pursuit, with great slaughter of the Romans, and he took the camp. Cossinus also fell. Spartacus, after defeating the prætor himself in many other battles, and at last seizing his lictors and his horse, now became great and formidable: but still he formed a just judgment of the state of affairs and, not expecting to get the advantage over the power of the Romans, he designed to lead his forces to the Alps; thinking that it was advisable for them to cross the mountains and to go to their several homes, some to Thrace and some to Gaul. But the gladiators being strong in numbers, and confident, would not listen to him, and they went about ravaging Italy. The Senate were now no longer troubled merely at the humiliation and disgrace that they suffered by the revolt; but, moved by fear and the danger, they sent out both the consuls[31] as to a war of the utmost difficulty and importance. Gellius, suddenly falling on the Germans, who, by reason of their arrogance and self-confidence, had separated from the troops of Spartacus, destroyed the whole body; and after Lentulus had hemmed in Spartacus with large armies, Spartacus, rushing upon them and joining battle, defeated the legates and got all the baggage. Spartacus now attempted to force his way towards the Alps; and Cassius[32] who "was the governor of Gaul upon the Padus, met him with ten thousand men, and a battle was fought, in which Cassius was defeated with great lose, and with difficulty made his escape.
X. The Senate, on receiving this news, angrily bade the consuls keep quiet, and they appointed Crassus to the command of the war, whose reputation and popularity induced many of the nobles to serve under him. Crassus took his station on the frontiers of Picenum, with the view of waiting for Spartacus, who was moving in that direction; and he sent Mummius, his legatus, at the head of two legions, to make a circuit, and with orders to follow the enemy, but not to engage with them, nor come to close quarters. But Mummius, as soon as he got what he thought a favourable opportunity, fought a battle, and was defeated; many of his men fell, and many, flying without their arms, made their escape. Crassus received Mummius himself roughly, and arming the soldiers again, he required of them security for their arms, that they would keep them; and five hundred, who had been the first to run, and had shown most cowardice, he distributed into fifty decades,[33] and out of each decade he took one man, by lot, and put him to death; thus inflicting on the soldiers this ancient mode of punishment which had long fallen into disuse; for disgrace also is added to the manner of death, and many things horrible and dreadful to see accompany the punishment, in the presence of all the spectators. After inflicting this punishment, he made his men again face about and march against the enemy. Spartacus, however, avoided Crassus, and made his way through Lucania to the sea, and, falling in with some Cilician piratical vessels, in the Straits, he formed a design to seize Sicily, and by throwing two thousand men into the island, to kindle again the servile war there, the flames of which had not long since been quenched, and required only a few sparks to set it again in a blaze. The Cilicians[34] came to terms with Spartacus, and received his presents; but they deceived him, and sailed off. Under these circumstances, he marched back from the coast, and fixed his army in the peninsula of the Rhegine territory. Crassus now came up, and observing that the nature of the ground suggested what was to be done, he resolved to build a wall across the isthmus, for the purpose of keeping his soldiers employed, and cutting off the supplies of the enemy. Though the undertaking was great and difficult, he accomplished it, and completed the work, contrary to all expectation, in a short time, by digging a ditch[35] from sea to sea, through the neck of land, three hundred stadia in length, fifteen feet deep, and as many wide; and above the ditch he raised a rampart of surprising height and strength. At first Spartacus paid no attention to what was going on, and treated it with contempt; but when forage began to fail, and he wanted to advance further into the interior, he discovered the lines of Crassus; and as there was nothing to be got in the peninsula, taking advantage of a night when there was a fall of snow and a wintry storm, he filled up a small part of the ditch with earth, and wood, and the branches of trees, and so carried over a third part of his army.
XI. Now Crassus was afraid that Spartacus might form a design to march against Rome; but he was encouraged by many of the followers of Spartacus quitting their leader, in consequence of some disputes, and encamping by themselves upon the banks of the lake Lucanis,[36] which they say is subject to changes, at certain intervals becoming sweet, and then again salt, and not potable. Crassus coming upon this band, drove them from the lake; but he was prevented from cutting them to pieces and pursuing them, by the sudden appearance of Spartacus, who checked the flight. Crassus had, before this, written to the Senate, to say that they ought to summon Lucullus[37] from Thrace, and Pompeius from Iberia; but he now changed his mind, and made every effort to put an end to the war before they arrived, knowing that the success would be attributed to him who came last, and brought help, and not to himself. Accordingly, he determined to attack first those who had separated from the main body, and were carrying on the campaign by themselves, under the command of Caius Cannicius and Castus; and he dispatched six thousand men, with orders to occupy a certain hill, and keep themselves concealed. The men of Crassus endeavoured to escape notice by covering their helmets; but, being seen by two women, who were sacrificing for the enemy, they would have been in danger, if Crassus had not quickly appeared, and fought a battle, the most severely contested of all in this war, in which he destroyed twelve thousand three hundred men, of whom he found only two wounded in the back: all the rest died in the ranks, fighting against the Romans. After the defeat of this body, Spartacus retired to the mountains of Petilia,[38] followed by Quintius,[39] one of the generals of Crassus, and Scrofas, his quæstor, who hung close on his rear. But, upon Spartacus facing about, the Romans were thrown into disorderly flight, and made their escape, after having with difficulty rescued their quæstor, who was wounded. This success was the ruin of Spartacus, in consequence of the self-confidence which it infused into the slaves: they would not now consent to avoid a battle, nor yet would they obey their commanders, whom they surrounded, with arms in their hands, on the march, and compelled to lead them back through Lucania against the Romans, wherein they did the very thing that Crassus desired; for it was reported that Pompeius was now approaching, and there were not a few who openly said that the victory in this war belonged to him; for he would fight as soon as he arrived, and put an end to the campaign. While Crassus, therefore, who was eager to decide the affair by a battle, and to fix his camp near the enemy, was engaged in digging his trenches, the slaves came up to them and attacked the men who were at work. As fresh men from both sides kept coming up to help their comrades, Spartacus, seeing that he must fight, arranged all his army in order of battle. When his horse was brought to him, he drew his sword and said, that if he won the battle he should have plenty of fine horses from the enemy, and if he was defeated he should not want one; upon which he killed his horse, and then he made his way towards Crassus himself, through many men, and inflicting many wounds; but he did not succeed in reaching Crassus, though he engaged with and killed two centurions. At last, after those about him had fled, he kept his ground, and, being surrounded by a great number, he fought till he was cut down. But, though Crassus had been successful, and had displayed the skill of a great general, and had exposed his person to danger, yet the credit of the victory did not escape being appropriated to Pompeius; for those who fled from the battle were destroyed by him, and Pompeius wrote to the Senate that Crassus had defeated the slaves in the open field, but he had cut up the war by the roots.[40] Now Pompeius had a splendid triumph for his victory over Sertorius and his exploits in Iberia; but Crassus did not venture to ask for the greater triumph; and even as to the foot triumph called the ovation, which he did enjoy, it was considered but a mean thing, and below his dignity that he had a triumph for a servile war. But how the ovation differs from the other triumph, and about the name, I have spoken in the 'Life of Marcellus.'[41]
XII. After these events, Pompeius was forthwith invited to the consulship,[42] and, though Crassus had hopes of becoming his colleague, still he did not hesitate to solicit the assistance of Pompeius. Pompeius gladly listened to his proposal, for he was desirous in any way always to have Crassus his debtor for some obligation, and he actively exerted himself on behalf of Crassus; and finally he said, in his address to the public assembly, that he should feel no less grateful for the return of Crassus as his colleague than for his own election. They did not, however, continue in this harmony after entering on their office, but they differed on almost every subject, and quarrelled about everything, and by their disputes rendered their consulship unfruitful in all political measures, and ineffectual: however, Crassus made a great festival in honour of Hercules, and feasted the people at ten thousand tables, and gave them an allowance of corn for three months. It was at the close of their consulship, when Pompeius and Crassus happened to be addressing the public assembly, that a man, not of any distinction, a Roman eques, a rustic in his mode of life, and one who did not meddle with public affairs, Onatius Aurelius,[43] got up on the rostra, and, coming forward, told a dream which he had had. "Jupiter," he said, "appeared to me, and bade me tell the citizens not to let the consuls lay down their office before they have become friends." Upon the man saying this, and the assembly bidding the consuls be reconciled, Pompeius stood silent; but Crassus offering his right hand first, said, "Citizens, I do not consider that I am humbling myself or doing anything unworthy of me when I make the advance towards good-will and friendship to Pompeius, to whom you gave the name of Magnus before he had a beard, and voted a triumph before he was a senator."
XIII. These were the things worthy of commemoration in the consulship of Crassus. But his censorship[44] passed over altogether without results, and without any active measures; for he neither revised the senate, nor inspected the equites, nor made a census of the citizens, though he had for his colleague Lutatius Catulus, the mildest of the Romans. But it is said that Crassus designed a shameful and violent measure, to make Egypt tributary to the Romans, and that Catulus opposed him vigorously, on which a difference arising between them, they voluntarily laid down their office. In the affair of Catiline,[45] which was a serious matter, and one that came near overthrowing Rome, some suspicion, it is true, attached to Crassus, and a man came forward to name him as implicated in the conspiracy, but nobody believed him. However, Cicero, in one of his orations, evidently imputed to Crassus and Cæsar participation in the plot; but this oration was not published till after the death of both of them. But in the oration on his consulship, Cicero says that Crassus came to him by night and brought a letter[46] which contained information on the affair of Catiline, as if his object was to establish the truth of the conspiracy. Now Crassus always hated Cicero for this, but his son stood in the way of his doing Cicero any open injury. For Publius,[47] who was fond of oratory and of improving himself, was much attached to Cicero, and went so far as to change his dress when Cicero did at the time of his trial, and he induced the other young men to do the same. At last he prevailed upon his father, and reconciled him to Cicero.
XIV. When Cæsar returned from his province,[48] he made preparations to be a candidate for the consulship; but, observing that Crassus and Pompeius were again at enmity, he did not choose by applying to one of them for his help to have the other for his enemy, and he did not think that he could succeed if neither of them assisted him. Accordingly, he set about reconciling them, by continually urging upon them, and showing that by their attempts to ruin one another they would increase the power of the Ciceros, and Catuli, and Catos, who would lose all their influence if they would unite their friends and adherents, and so direct the administration with combined strength, and one purpose. By persuasion and effecting a reconciliation, he brought them together, and he formed out of the union of all three an irresistible power by which he put down the Roman senate and the people, though he did not make Pompeius and Crassus more powerful, one through the other, but by means of the two he made himself most powerful; for immediately on being supported by Pompeius and Crassus, he was elected consul by a great majority. While Cæsar was ably discharging the business of the consulship, Crassus and Pompeius, by procuring for him the command of armies, and by delivering Gaul into his hands, fixed him in a kind of acropolis, thinking that they should administer the rest of the State as they mutually agreed, after securing to Cæsar the authority which the lot had given him. Now Pompeius did all this through unbounded love of power; but to the old vice of Crassus, his avarice, there was now added a new passion, ambition for trophies and triumphs excited by the great exploits of Cæsar, since it was in this alone that he was Cæsar's inferior; for he had the superiority in everything else; and his passion remitted not nor diminished till it resulted in an inglorious death and public misfortunes. Cæsar had come down from Gaul to the city of Luca, and many of the Romans went to him there, and Pompeius and Crassus had private conferences with him, in which they agreed to take affairs in hand more vigorously, and to hold the whole power of the State at their disposal, to which end Cæsar was to remain in his military command, and Pompeius and Crassus were to have other provinces and armies. To this object there was only one road, which was to ask for a second consulship, and Cæsar was to assist them in their canvass by writing to his friends and sending many of his soldiers to support them at the comitia.