CHAPTER III

Lord Lansdowne—to whom, whatever may be thought of some recent utterances, the country owes a debt of gratitude too little recognised, especially for his conduct of foreign affairs at a most difficult period during the Boer War—stated his opinion that "in a league pronouncing a sentence of international outlawry upon any one country that broke away from its obligations you would have a material guarantee for the maintenance of peace." He pointed out how "the existence of such a league might perhaps have prevented the War in July of 1914, as it was impossible in that time of clamour and confusion when one suggestion after another made by those who, like Sir Edward Grey, were working for peace was rejected, to put forward a definite proposal for dealing with the dispute in a manner provided for by previous agreement." Lord Parker, whose authority carries the greatest weight with jurists everywhere, having the true lawyer's instinct for putting vague proposals into definite shape, actually presented a draft of heads of agreement for the establishment of a League.^[1] These heads would, to say the least, form the basis for discussion leading to practical results. One or two of his proposed clauses may be quoted as expressing in definite language the fundamental principles which must be the basis of any such League. The first may appear perhaps only a "pious opinion." It is really very much more. Assent to it means the complete repudiation of the ideas which have guided German policy—the ideas which made world war inevitable, and which will inevitably lead to war in the future unless they are abandoned. Any nation which assents to the clause tells the world that it expressly rejects those ideas and agrees that its action shall be guided by principles diametrically opposed to them. Assent to a declaration of the kind suggested would certainly affect the spirit in which international questions are approached in future, and probably the resulting action also. It runs:

"The League to recognise that war from whatever cause is a danger to our common civilisation, and that international disputes ought to be settled on principles of right and justice and not by force of arms." The last clause dealing with the admission of new members of the League is the complement of this. There is to be power "to admit a nation as a member of the League, if satisfied in each case that the nation bona fide accepts the principle on which the League is founded, and bona fide intends that international disputes shall thereafter be settled by peaceful means." It is contemplated, and rightly contemplated, that there should be a possibility for the Central Empires to join the League sooner or later, but it can only be on terms of their rulers at the time saying expressly, "We abjure in the sight of the world and of our own people those principles of action which German rulers and leaders of thought have been inculcating for two generations." The choice for Germany would be either to stand excommunicated from the brotherhood of nations for ever, or to say plainly, "I declare what my professors and schoolmasters have for half a century had to teach to be false; the doctrines of Treitschke and of his disciple von Bernhardi are anathema; it is infamous to adopt the statement of the German writer that 'It is of no importance to me whether an action is just or unjust,' or that 'If I am powerful enough to perform any deed, then I am justified in doing it.' I renounce such leaders and teachers and all their words and works, so that I will not follow or be led by them." It may be urged that the recantation might not be sincere, but it would discredit the authority of those who attempt to revive the damnable doctrines.^[2]

The great difficulty, of course, arises as to the means of enforcing the agreement against war, of finding some proper and effective sanction to secure its observance. It may be well to note that throughout this discussion the word sanction is used in the strict legal sense, meaning some definite penalty or punishment to be inflicted on a wrong-doer. It is the existence of such a "sanction" which is the clearest way of enforcing obedience, and gives a rule of conduct the force of law.

Two definite proposals are made in Lord Parker's scheme. (1) "If an act of war be committed against any member of the League, the Council is to notify it, and thereupon every member should (a) break off diplomatic relations with the nation guilty of such act; (b) prohibit and take effective steps to prevent all trade and commerce between itself and the guilty party; (c) place an embargo upon all ships and property of the guilty nation found in its territorial waters or within its territories."

A very similar suggestion, though not quite so definite, was made by the present writer in an article on "Sanction in International Law," which appeared in the Italian Journal "Scientia" in 1916. "The nations might agree that any belligerent which wilfully violates or invades neutral territory shall be treated as a moral leper. Without actually going to war they should cease to have dealings with the invader, forbid all intercourse of their subjects with the country which violates the neutral territory."

For the sake of brevity this may be called the "economic boycott," but it is really very much more than simply economic pressure. It is a common habit in political discussions to confuse very different things, to which the same name is given, and the term "economic boycott" is being used to cover three proposals of very different character. (a) It may mean a permanent exclusion of Germany from the markets of the world to punish its people for supporting the crimes of its rulers and incidentally to secure for ourselves a valuable extension of trade by reason of the exclusion of a rival. (b) It may mean a temporary measure to insure that agreed terms of peace are observed by those who disregard "mere scraps of paper," to act as a guarantee that restitution shall be made for wrongs done, to check the revival and extension of the enemy's armaments, to make the German people feel the disadvantages and loss caused by their action, and the desirability of joining with others in repudiating war as a means of settling disputes or asserting national claims. (c) It may mean a sanction for breach of the stipulations contained in the agreement on which the League of Nations is founded, i.e., a punishment to be inflicted on anyone who infringes the agreement he has made—a means of insuring performance of its terms. It is in this last sense that it is used in the present discussion.

(2) The second sanction proposed in the scheme is of a still more serious character. The clause to embody it runs as follows:

"Certain members of the League specified in a schedule and to consist of the chief military and naval powers, should agree, if required to do so by a resolution of the League, to commence war against the guilty nation, and to prosecute such war by land and sea until the guilty nation shall have accepted terms which shall be approved by the League."

This proposal might more effectually prevent wrong-doing, but, even if carefully guarded as Lord Parker proposes, appears open to serious objections. There seems grave reason to fear that while intended to prevent war, it might really be the cause of disputes, and possibly of war of the most deadly kind. Such a stipulation might cast a terrible burden on a strong naval power like Great Britain, and have most disastrous consequences. We are bound to maintain a strong navy to keep open communication between the different parts of the Empire and also to protect our food supplies. Without sea power Britain could in a few months be starved into submission to any terms in case of war, but to maintain a large navy to be at the beck and call of a Council representing all the nations who cared to join the proposed League would be intolerable. Suppose, for example, the United States demanded satisfaction for some outrage on American subjects, or suppose American subjects were threatened with massacre in some unsettled country such as Mexico, and in order to obtain satisfaction or to protect its subjects sent some warships to a Mexican port and landed an armed force, not with any object of aggression, but to prevent irreparable injuries. Suppose Great Britain was of opinion that the American demand was amply justified, but that a majority of representatives of the League, or even, as Lord Parker's scheme suggests, a majority of the powers named in the Schedule, took a contrary view and called on Great Britain to fulfil the agreement to use her naval force and commence and prosecute to the bitter end a war against the United States because its Government had acted at once instead of waiting while the representatives of a score of other nations were discussing whether any action was permissible. Would not the alternative between breaking the engagement and undertaking a bitter and ruinous war against a powerful and friendly nation put us in an intolerable position? Half a dozen States in the League might for one reason or another wish to resist the claim of the United States for redress. Names of States which might possibly so combine could be given, but it is better to refrain. It is not inconceivable that German penetration and intrigue at some future time might promote a combination of the kind. All sorts of influences might be brought to bear on certain of the States and on their representatives. Dynastic claims might even affect them.

Unless it be with some country which she can trust and whose Government and its aims she can thoroughly rely upon, and then only for some limited and specific purpose, Great Britain, or any other naval or military power, ought not to bind itself to go to war and employ its forces. We must be free to reduce those forces or to refrain from employing them in making war. An engagement which might in circumstances, the real character of which no one can foresee at present, compel us to undertake a war at the bidding of others is a thing to which we ought never to consent. Engagements to make war are not a safe way of promoting peace. They may possibly be justified where there is some clearly specified object, some defined case in which nations ally themselves to prevent some particular wrong, such, for example, as guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium. Even for a single specific agreement of this kind a very strong case is required, but that is a totally different thing from agreeing to provide a kind of world police to enforce and execute the orders of a Council of heterogeneous States under conditions the nature of which no one can predict now. We cannot tell beforehand with any certainty what will be the real character of the proposed League Council, nor what motives may inspire its members at some future time, nor whom the majority of them will in fact represent. It does not necessarily follow that there can be no sanction of any kind to enforce the rules of International Law or the decisions of a League of Nations to prevent a breach of international peace, no penalty attaching to those who disregard those rules or are guilty of breaking that peace. As already stated, the economic boycott, every member of the League agreeing to treat an aggressor as an outlaw, and without actually going to war ceasing to have any dealings with him, and forbidding all intercourse of its subjects with the peace-breaker, is likely to be really effective. Lord Shaw, whose interest in the subject is no new thing, and who has devoted long and careful consideration to it, later in the debate gave the weight of his authority as to the efficacy of such measures. "Let it," he said, "be known once and for all that from the moment a nation becomes a traitor to the League it becomes, ipso facto, an economic outlaw, then the motive both for being included within and for remaining within the League will be increased a hundredfold, and wholly for the benefit of mankind."

Of course, logically many of the objections which can be urged against an agreement to make war might also be urged against an agreement for a boycott of this kind, but in practice the risks in the case of the boycott would be far less serious. Members of a club might well agree to expel and to cut a member who assaults another, but it would be a different matter to agree that, they should be able to order the strongest man in the club to go to his house and thrash the offender until he makes such compensation as may seem satisfactory to them. A man who objected to be put on a "schedule" of members liable to be deputed for such a mission would not necessarily be a coward. He might possibly think that the member assaulted did in fact deserve a horse-whipping, though he might deprecate such a proceeding, and consider that the affair, or the dispute between the parties, ought to have been dealt with by the club committee as a case for expulsion. A hatred of injustice, resentment against wrong, if it really exists in nations and individuals, will make itself felt. Without it, formal agreements will be found to be of little use. The objections to a League of Nations having power practically to order certain of its members to make war do not in any way prevent the establishment of international tribunals being followed by useful results. Without any express sanctions to enforce them as above suggested, their decisions will usually be obeyed in practice. There is and will be plenty of scope for the action of such tribunals. A nation may hate war, may recognise its perils and the inevitable losses involved, but may feel that an unwarrantable claim is being made against it which it is bound to resist. It may, however, be perfectly willing to submit the point to any tribunal which even purports to be impartial, and abide by its decision. In this way some systems of law have grown up. They began by regulating procedure. Each of two parties claimed something as his property, was ready to fight to maintain his right; but such contests might result in injustice, and were certainly injurious to the peace of the State. In early Roman Law each party who claimed the object in dispute touched it with his spear, showing his readiness to fight for it; then some respected citizen—vir pietate gravis—stepped in, and each party, without fear that his refraining from fighting would expose him to future encroachments on his rights, could agree to abide by his decision. As time goes on, what was merely the casual intervention of an arbitrator becomes an habitual rule, and eventually the fixed law of the land. Custom develops by general consent into law. Trial by combat may become obsolete in practice even long before it becomes illegal. There are many cases in which a man (or a nation) dare not give way, though he knows that it will cost him more to fight the case. A rough Lancashire manufacturer was once advised against fighting a difficult case on the ground that the result was uncertain, and the costs would in any event be very heavy, more than the value of the matter in dispute. He said afterwards to his solicitor with some force, "If I give in in this, that —— will come into my kitchen, kick me, and ask what business I have there. No, I'll fight him now." He brought his action and won, and found the prediction as to costs was only too fully borne out, even though judgment in the Court of Appeal was finally given in his favour. The man who says he will not fight in any circumstances invites injuries, though the man who fights when he could honourably avoid it is pretty sure to rue his decision.

Where two high-spirited persons are engaged in a dispute, and each is ready to maintain his cause with the sword, the intervention of a third may save both from the disasters of a battle. The words of the Douglas when intervening in a heated contest, "The first who strikes shall be my foe," may sometimes be a model for the real peacemaker. But he would certainly have resented the idea of agreeing to keep prepared, ready armed to fight at the bidding of a number of other chiefs, anyone who used force to prevent or punish some injury to himself.

FOOTNOTES:

CHAPTER IV

After an adjourned debate on June 27th, 1918, in which Lord Curzon pointed out several practical difficulties that would have to be faced, the House of Lords, surely not a body to be carried away by any ephemeral current of popular feeling^[3] or captivated by a vague phrase, passed with practical unanimity a resolution in these terms, "That this House approves of the principle of a League of Nations, and commends to His Majesty's Government a study of the conditions required for its realisation." It in effect declared the "preamble proved," and proposed that "the clauses" should be considered. At the suggestion of Lord Bryce—a true friend of peace, if ever there was one—certain words contained in the original resolution proposing that there should be a tribunal constituted "whose orders shall be enforceable by adequate sanction" were omitted. The question of sanction is, no doubt, a crucial one, but it seemed better to substitute the more general words urging an inquiry into the conditions necessary for the establishment of a League, in fact to see generally—looking at the question as a whole—what definite and practical steps should be taken to bring the League into existence and define its constitution, aims and powers. In passing such a resolution the House of Lords was expressing the feeling of the nation. Its great importance was that by an assembly so critical, containing men of such varied experience and-with special knowledge both of law and of foreign affairs, a resolution supporting the idea of a League was accepted with real unanimity.

It would be most unfortunate if the approval of the proposal to give the League powers to direct the use of the naval and military forces of certain of its members were to be made a condition precedent to approval of the principle of a League and as necessarily implied in it. Earnest advocates of that principle may dissent entirely from Viscount Grey's statement in his pamphlet, published about the time when the debate took place, that "those States that have power must be ready to use all the force, economic, military or naval, that they possess." "Anything less than this is of no value." They may hold, on the contrary, that a League might be of great value without any agreement binding certain of its members to employ—which implies an obligation to maintain—naval and military forces and armaments at the bidding of the League Council on a scale and in the manner which would either be settled from time to time by representatives of other nations or be the subject of some preliminary agreement. Settling the terms of such an agreement might involve serious disputes and delay the establishment of the League indefinitely. The moral influence due to the existence of a League embracing all nations which regard war as an evil to be stopped if possible, would be great. A Declaration of Faith, in which those who hold a common belief give expression to it, has its effect. An agreement between nations or individuals, even where there is no legal sanction, would be regarded as something that they will try to carry out. The breach of such an agreement would excite the "resentment which is the life-blood of law." Still the risk of disregard of the obligations is great unless there is a definite material sanction, an evil imposed by force on a wrong-doer, and no doubt it will be urged that some objections to employ military and naval power to enforce the obligations imposed by the League may be raised against the less drastic proposal for an economic boycott, but in actual working the two things, as already pointed out, differ enormously. The suggested economic boycott imposes a similar obligation on all members of the League; all alike can immediately forbid all intercourse by their subjects with the aggressor, instead of imposing on certain members the duty of going to war. Secondly, it does not imply the maintenance of great armaments by any State.

It is constantly found that a penalty of smaller amount, a less severe punishment, is more likely to prevent a wrong than a heavier one, provided that it is prompt and certain. Had Germany known a few months sooner that Britain would assuredly go to war and put into such war her whole resources if Belgium were invaded, it is not improbable that that outrage would never have been committed; but had Germany also known that the moment her troops crossed the Belgian frontier every German ship in the United States would be interned, every American citizen punished as a criminal by the United States Government if he traded with Germany, that "intercourse" with the aggressor would be at once forbidden, and that these restraints would be continued until complete restitution had been made, is it not morally certain that Belgium would not have been invaded? War might have been prevented. In fear of such an injury to German trade and commerce, the bankers of Berlin and Frankfort would have denounced war; the merchants of Hamburg and Bremen would have been the strongest advocates of peace. A like test might be applied to other cases of aggression. The effects of breaking off diplomatic—and, still more, commercial—relationships, although no shot is fired and no regiment mobilised, and of mere neutrality differ toto coelo. The very people who are least influenced by moral restraints, who scorn justice, will be most influenced by the financial losses and the destruction of their trade.

It was, no doubt, right "to commend a study of the question" to His Majesty's Government, but it is also well to commend to the Government the desirability of consultation with those outside the Government departments who have given study to it already. Like other problems, it should be considered in advance during the War. As Lord Shaw forcibly pointed out, "The project does not mean the slackening of our efforts or a weakening of our forces or timidity in our policy in the present War. If it did I would not be associated with it for one hour."

To quote Lord Grey's words, Germany has to be convinced that force does not pay, that the aims and policy of her military rulers inflict intolerable and also unnecessary suffering upon her. The regeneration of Germany, a real new birth, is necessary if the peace of the world is to be secured; and surely by now we might have learned that such regeneration will never come unless Germany is beaten in this War. As Lord Grey says, "Recent military success and the ascendancy of Prussian militarism have reduced the advocates of anything but force to silence" in Germany. As these words are written comes the report of the sinking of the hospital ship Llandovery Castle, followed by cold-blooded and deliberate murder. The mass of German crime grows daily.

The "economic boycott" above referred to differs absolutely in its aim and character from the proposal to impose a permanent and continuous boycott on German commerce to maintain and extend British or other trade at the expense of Germany. Phrases are sometimes used here which seem to be almost a repetition of those so dear to the Pan-German party. "Destroy British commerce that German may replace it," is echoed back as "Destroy German commerce that British may replace it." The whole idea that the progress and extension of the trade and industry of one country is an injury to another is radically false. A spirit of jealousy, regarding the prosperity of others as involving injury to ourselves, is a curse to the individual, to the class, or to the nation which is imbued with it.

To put these questions on the highest moral basis—on a true religious basis, if you will—is not cant, but only a recognition of the real facts. The world will without doubt everlastingly perish unless this true faith is maintained and acted upon. Self-interest and self-aggrandisement as dominant motives inevitably lead to destruction, hastened by every advance in the knowledge and in the efficiency of those who take them as their guides.

FOOTNOTES:

CHAPTER V

Second, it must be clear that we do not desire the destruction of Germany—a futile desire, even if not wicked—but its regeneration. No doubt for a time, whatever happens in Germany, it will be impossible to forget the crimes that have been committed. British sailors will naturally refuse all association with those who have been guilty of the series of murders at sea. Any attempt, however, to exclude Germany from the markets of the world, permanently to destroy German commerce for all time, would make permanent peace impossible. To make that a war aim would be to strengthen every evil influence in Germany, and if done with the object of securing gain to ourselves by forcible means, would degrade us almost to the level of those who forced this War upon the world. It was the purity of our aims that united all the best elements of the nation in entering upon and in prosecuting the War, and in facing its losses. It was that which has confirmed the stability of the alliance, and from the beginning of the War made the best and most enlightened Americans earnest supporters of our cause, and has finally brought in the whole American nation, sworn to see the accomplishment of those aims. The aims with which Britain entered on the War appealed irresistibly to the people of the whole Empire, and not least to the imagination of the Indian races. An Indian friend of wide experience and calm and independent judgment wrote to me at the time, saying he had never seen anything like the spirit of intense loyalty called out by the belief of Indians that Britain was taking up a heavy burden to protect weaker nations from aggression and to maintain justice.^[4] Let us keep those aims pure to the end. It would, of course, be affectation to suggest that our object in the War is now simply a chivalrous desire to protect the weak or maintain justice. We now know that it is also to preserve our own existence as a nation, and that it would be better for us and our children that Britain should be sunk beneath the sea than that Germany should achieve a complete victory.

It must be reiterated that until Germans and Austrians can be admitted to free intercourse with other nations we can have no complete world peace. For such admission the conditions precedent above stated are essential. But if these are complied with, we must make our choice between the possibility of general peace with a League of Nations embracing all and a state of "veiled and suspended warfare." This pregnant phrase caught my eye after the foregoing paragraphs were written. It is one to be remembered.

Although there is no sign at present of a changed spirit in the German rulers, or in the party which is now dominant in Germany, the prospect of an alteration in the spirit of the German people is not hopeless, unless they emerge from the War victorious. A significant passage from a German paper is quoted by Sir Dugald Clerk in the most valuable and encouraging address on the "Stability of Britain," delivered by him to the Royal Society of Arts in 1916. "So the Germans are awakening to a consciousness of the futility of their dream of domination founded upon the idea of might, irrespective of the rights of other nations, and they will ultimately be forced to accept the idea, so strange to them hitherto, that honesty between nations is as necessary as between man and man." The whole address should be read as an antidote by any who take a "gloomy joy in depreciation," as a tonic by those who are depressed by our failures and apprehensive of our future.

To maintain a real peace based on goodwill, we want to get rid of the jealous spirit which regards the prosperity of one nation as an injury to others. "The economic and financial strength of this country is founded upon the welfare not merely of the British people, but practically of all countries." "Commerce is not a war. It will be found that wealth increases simultaneously in industrious nations." "We must not even forget that a poverty-stricken Germany and Austria would react on the whole world." "Punish the Germans and Austrians by all means—they thoroughly deserve it—but do not imagine that by cutting those nations out of the world's commerce the other nations can be rendered more wealthy." These general statements do not exclude, of course, the possibility that it may be found necessary for a time by "economic pressure" to secure performance by the enemy of certain terms, nor that, during a period of reconstruction and readjustment, the conditions affecting certain industries may not demand some special temporary protection for them. There may for a time have to be restrictions on certain imports from the enemy countries, and on certain exports to them, but all such proposals ought to be very jealously scrutinised, not only in regard to their effect on the particular trades directly affected, but on the country as a whole. The use of such weapons often injures those who use them more than those against whom they are used. Would not a German Minister of Propaganda, or a German Committee on War Aims, wishing to stimulate active support for the War among the German masses, be well advised to circulate some of the resolutions that have been passed by certain bodies in England and scatter them broadcast in Central Europe, with a few careful glosses and comments to point the moral? They would be a valuable asset for a German "ginger group." The open door into and out of this country for commodities generally has made it an emporium for world trade, and been one of the main causes why, in spite of deficient home production of necessaries, we have been able to stand the economic strain of the War. Striking off the fetters that it has been found necessary to impose—sometimes with undue strictness and pedantic minuteness—on British commerce and industry will be one of the first things to be hoped for from peace. It is impossible to give detailed examples here. Ask any merchant, he will give you specific instances of the need for a recovered freedom. Questions are so closely involved with each other that we may seem to be mixing up national trade interests with the ideal striving for peace and goodwill. Yet, after all, self-interest rightly understood and regard for the interests of others, with an honest wish for their welfare, are not feelings mutually exclusive. There is high authority for saying that "serving the Lord" is not incompatible with "diligence in business."

It is quite possible to lay too much stress on the necessity for definite and formal sanctions to enforce agreements. There are cases in which the enforcement of a definite penalty for a wrongful act or for breach of an agreement is very difficult, but in which the "sense of moral obligation," "respect for public opinion," and "reliance on principles of mutual consent" do regularly operate so strongly that the rules of conduct laid down are in fact observed. On the Manchester Exchange thousands of agreements involving millions of money are made, the breach of which could not be made the ground of a successful action at law. The number of cases of repudiation of such agreements is almost negligible. To plead the Statute of Frauds in an action for non-delivery or non-acceptance of goods under such informal agreements might be a defence in the law courts, but would not save the defendant from the indeterminate but effective penalties due to the feeling of his fellows that he was acting dishonourably. It is instructive to notice that in dealing with the question of industrial disputes, which are in many ways analogous to international, at least where they arise between organised bodies of employers and of workpeople, the Whitley Committee, in a supplemental report issued in January, 1918, expressed the opinion: (1) that no attempt should be made to establish compulsory arbitration or compulsory legislation to prevent strikes and lock-outs; (2) that there should be standing arbitration councils or panels of arbitrators to whom disputes arising could be voluntarily referred; (3) that provision should be made for independent inquiry and report as to the merits of trade disputes; (4) that legal penalties for breach of an award or of an agreement made to settle a trade dispute should not be imposed; (5) that the decisions of industrial tribunals and arbitrators should be co-ordinated as far as possible, and that there should be opportunity for interchange of opinion between the arbitrators whose awards should be circulated. A body of customary law on the subject would thus grow up without legal sanction, but of great value in promoting uniformity and preventing the ill-feeling which would arise from conflicting decisions in different cases involving similar questions. Those who have taken any part in deciding questions affecting wages or trade conditions have found the need of some standard to appeal to, and felt the danger likely to arise from giving decisions either less or more favourable to either party than had been given in other districts in similar circumstances. In an analogous way, decisions of the prize court of one country are quoted in the courts of other countries, although they are not binding on them. International Law did exist, and had an important practical influence. Diplomatists did appeal to it, and the prize tribunals, in administering the law, stated distinctly that they would be guided by and would apply the principles of that law, even if the orders issued by the administrative Government of their own country were at variance with it. The decision of the Privy Council in the case of the Zamora establishes the principle that the law which prize courts will follow is International Law, and that they will do so though some Order in Council may conflict with it.

FOOTNOTES:

CHAPTER VI