REFORM COMMITTEE.
NOTICE.
The Government have handed us a written reply this afternoon (January 1), stating they have agreed to accept the offer of the High Commissioner to go to Pretoria to assist the Government in preventing bloodshed, and then the representations of the Committee will be taken into serious consideration. The communication referred to is as follows:
'The Government of the South African Republic have accepted the offer of the High Commissioner to come to Pretoria.
Desirous as the Committee has always been to obtain its objects without the shedding of blood and incurring the horrors of civil war, the opportunity of achieving its aims by peaceful means is welcome.
The Reform Committee desires that the public will aid them with the loyalty and enthusiasm which they have shown so far in the maintenance of its organization, and will stand firm in the cause of law and order and the establishment of their rights.
This notice was published in the local press, and also distributed as a leaflet in Johannesburg.
More than this! At one o'clock on Wednesday President Kruger had sent for Sir Jacobus de Wet and requested him to transmit to the Reform Committee the following message: 'I desire again to invite your serious attention to the fact that negotiations are going on between Mr. Chamberlain and His Honour the President. I am convinced the Government is prepared to meet any committee or deputation at any time to discuss matters. In view of this and of negotiations with Mr. Chamberlain I advise you to follow a constitutional course.' That telegram was framed at President Kruger's request and approved by him before being transmitted.
A great deal has been said about the impolicy, and even the bad faith, of the Johannesburg people in concluding an armistice which did not include Dr. Jameson. From the above account it is clear in the first place that every effort was made to provide for his safety, and in the next place that no armistice was concluded. Certain terms were offered by the Government which it was open to the Committee to either accept or reject or ignore, as they might decide later on. In plain English, the Committee were as free after the negotiations as they had been before. They gave no undertaking to abstain from hostile action; they simply received the offer of the Government. Whether they complied with those conditions as a matter of cold-blooded selfish policy, whether they simply selected an easy way out of a difficult position, or whether they complied with the conditions solely because they were not in a position to do anything else, it is open to every man to decide for himself; but it does not seem fair, in face of the fact that they were not able to do anything else, to impute the worst motives of all for the course which they eventually took.
On the return of the deputation to Johannesburg a report of what had taken place was given to a full meeting of the Reform Committee. Divers opinions were expressed as to what was the right course to take, but eventually all were agreed that, as the first duty of the Committee was undoubtedly to protect the town and the unarmed section of the community, as they could not afford to send a single man out of the place, as there was no reason to suppose that Dr. Jameson required or would welcome any assistance, and as it seemed certain that he would be stopped by the High Commissioner's proclamation and turned back, it would be nothing short of criminal madness to adopt any aggressive measures at that stage.
It does not appear to have occurred to many of the hostile critics of the Reform Committee to consider what might have happened when they are judging what actually took place. Dr. Jameson had invaded the country with less than 500 men. It must be clear from this that it was not his intention to conquer the Transvaal. It must have been and indeed it was his idea that it would be impossible for the Imperial Government to stand passively by and witness the struggle between its own subjects preferring legitimate and moderate claims and a corrupt and incompetent Boer Government. Intervention of one sort or another he certainly expected—either material help in the shape of British troops, or the intervention of the High Commissioner to effect a peaceful settlement. By the false step which evoked the High Commissioner's proclamation he had forfeited all claim to the support on which he reckoned. It was reasonable to suppose therefore that, on the receipt of the proclamation ordering him to return and calling on all British subjects to abstain from assisting him, he would realize the consequences of his mistake. He would also learn from the Reform Committee's messengers (that is, assuming that he did not know it already) that the Johannesburg people neither required nor wished for his intervention, and he would elect to leave the country in accordance with the High Commissioner's mandate rather than continue a course which, with the opposition of the British Government added to that of the Boer Government, must inevitably end in disgrace and disaster. This was the conclusion arrived at in the Reform Committee room; and it was then considered what would be the position of the Johannesburg people if, in defiance of the High Commissioner's proclamation and in violation of the terms offered by the Transvaal Government, they should adopt aggressive and wholly futile measures in aid of Dr. Jameson, only to find that he himself had obeyed the proclamation and had turned back.
No man in his senses would have anticipated Dr. Jameson's continuing his march after receipt of the proclamation and full information as to the wishes and position of the Johannesburg people. But, apart from this, it was the opinion of military men, such as Colonel Heyman, who had been sent in by Dr. Jameson, and who were present at the meetings of the Reform Committee, that it would not be possible for the Boers to stop him, and that it would require a very large force indeed to cope with a body of men so well trained, well equipped, and well led as his were thought to be. It would moreover need extraordinary luck and management on the Boers' side to get together any considerable force in time to intercept him before he should reach Johannesburg. It may be added that the opinion expressed by these gentlemen is still adhered to. They say that, properly led, Jameson's force should have got in without firing a shot, and that, properly handled, they should not have been stopped by a much greater number of Boers. However this is as it may be.
It has been stated, and the statement has gained considerable credence, that the very train which brought the deputation back to Johannesburg after their negotiations with the Government also brought a detachment of the State artillery with field-pieces and a plentiful supply of ammunition to reinforce the Boers, who were then in position to intercept Dr. Jameson, and it has further been suggested that the obvious course for the Reform Committee to have taken was to break up the line and to stop trains passing out towards Krugersdorp, also to seize the telegraph and railway offices. Such action would have been perfectly futile. As a matter of fact the artillery and ammunition were sent direct from Pretoria by waggon, and not through Johannesburg at all.{23} Any such action as the seizing of the telegraph and railway offices would have been useless in itself, if intended to aid Jameson's force, and would of course have been a declaration of war on the part of the Committee against the Transvaal Government, a declaration which they were not able to back up by any effective measures. A partially successful attempt was made to blow up the line between Johannesburg and Krugersdorp by individuals who thought that they would be rendering a service to the cause, and who did not stop to calculate the full effects of their action.
During the afternoon of Wednesday, while the deputation were still engaged in negotiation with the Government Commission, the messenger despatched by Sir Jacobus de Wet, British Agent in Pretoria, to deliver the High Commissioner's proclamation to Dr. Jameson, arrived in Johannesburg, and applied at the Reform Committee rooms for an escort through the lines of defence, showing at the same time the passport given him by the Commandant-General to pass him through the Boer lines. It was immediately decided to take advantage of the opportunity in order to bring further pressure to bear upon Dr. Jameson to induce him to leave the country peacefully, and to make finally and absolutely sure that he should realize the true position of affairs. Mr. J. J. Lace, a member of the Reform Committee, volunteered to accompany the messenger to explain to Dr. Jameson the state of affairs in Johannesburg and to induce him to return while there was yet a chance of retrieving the position. On the return of the deputation this action of the rest of the Committee was cordially approved and was found to be in entire accord with the attitude taken up by them in their dealings with the Government.
If any evidence were needed as to the sincerity and singleness of purpose of the Committee, the action taken by the deputation in Pretoria and the rest of the Committee in Johannesburg, whilst acting independently of each other and without any opportunity of discussing matters and deciding upon a common line, should be sufficient. If the Committee as a whole had not been following an honest and clearly-defined policy they would have inevitably come to grief under such trying circumstances. As a matter of fact, the steps taken during Wednesday by the two sections acting independently were wholly in accord.
In the course of the day it became known that Dr. Jameson had caused to be published the letter of invitation quoted in another chapter, and from this it was clear to those who knew the circumstances under which the letter was given that he had deliberately started in violation of the agreement entered into, that he had thrown discretion to the winds, and decided to force the hands of the Johannesburg people. The result of this was that among the leaders it was realized that Dr. Jameson was playing his own hand with complete indifference to the consequences for others; but the vast majority of the Rand community could not possibly realize this, and were firmly convinced that the invading force had come in in good faith, believing the community to be in extreme peril.
In sensational matters of this kind it is very often the case that a single phrase will illustrate the position more aptly than chapters of description. It is unfortunately also the case that phrases are used and catch the ear and survive the circumstances of the time, carrying with them meanings which they were never intended to convey. In the course of the events which took place in the early part of the year many such expressions were seized on and continually quoted. Among them, and belonging to the second description above referred to, is the phrase 'Stand by Jameson.' It was never used in the sense of sending out an armed force to the assistance of Dr. Jameson, because it was recognized from the beginning that such a course was not within the range of possibility. The phrase was first used in the Executive Council Chamber when the deputation from the Reform Committee met the Government Commission and Mr. Lionel Phillips explained the nature of the connection between the Johannesburg people and the invading force. After showing that the Rand community were not responsible for his immediate action, and after acknowledging that he was on the border with the intention of rendering assistance if it should be necessary, he said that the Uitlanders nevertheless believed that, owing to circumstances of which they were ignorant, Dr. Jameson had started in absolute good faith to come to their assistance, and for that reason they were determined to stand by him. For that reason they offered their persons as security for his peaceful evacuation of the country—a course which was then, and is still, deemed to be 'standing by him' in as effective and practical a manner as it was possible for men in their position to do.
The reproach levelled at the Reform Committee by members of the Transvaal Government ever since the surrender of Dr. Jameson is that, whilst professing not to support hostile action against the State, and whilst avowing loyalty to the Republic, the people of Johannesburg did not give the logical and practical proof of such loyalty that the Government were entitled to expect; that is, they did not take up arms to fight against the invaders. It is scarcely necessary to say that such a preposterous idea never entered the minds of any of the Uitlanders. When all is said and done, blood is thicker than water, alike with the Uitlanders as with the Boers. The Boers have shown on many occasions that they elect to side with their kin on the promptings of their heart rather than support those whom their judgment shows them to be worthy of their assistance. Had the Uitlanders been sufficiently armed there can be no question that rightly or wrongly they would have sided with Jameson, and would have given him effective support had they known that he needed it. Had he ever reached Johannesburg the enthusiasm would have been wild and unbounded, and, however much the cooler heads among the community might realize that such a partial success might have proved a more serious misfortune than the total failure has been, no such considerations would have weighed with the community in general; and the men who were aiming at practical and lasting good results, rather than cultivating popular enthusiasm, would have been swept aside, and others, more in accord with the humour of the moment, would have taken their places.
It is useless to speculate as to what would have happened had Dr. Jameson reached Johannesburg. The prestige of success might have enabled him, as it has enabled many others, to achieve the apparently impossible and compel the acceptance of terms which would have insured a lasting peace; but as Johannesburg had neither arms nor ammunition, especially the latter, commensurate with the requirements of anything like severe fighting, even for a single day, and as the invading force had not more than enough for its own requirements, it is difficult to conceive that anything but disaster could have followed.
Throughout the troubles which followed the invasion it was not the personal suffering or loss which fell to the lot of the Johannesburg people that touched them so nearly as the taunts which were unjustly levelled at them for not rendering assistance to Dr. Jameson. The terms, 'cowards,' 'poltroons,' and 'traitors,' and the name of 'Judasburg,' absolutely undeserved as they were known to be, rankled in the hearts of all, and it was only by the exercise of much self-denial and restraint that it was possible for men to remain silent during the period preceding Dr. Jameson's trial. Extremely bitter feeling was roused by the tacit approval given to these censures by the officers of the invading force, for their continued silence was naturally construed to be tacit approval. 'Not once,' said one of the Reformers, 'has a single member of Dr. Jameson's party come forward and stated that the imputations on the Reformers were undeserved; yet we gave them the benefit of every doubt, and tried throughout to screen them, whilst all the time the Doctor and at least three of his companions knew that they had started to "make their own flotation." That is not cricket.'
It has been urged on behalf of Dr. Jameson that he could not have been asked to state prior to his trial that he never expected or arranged for help from Johannesburg—that his case was already a sufficiently difficult one without embarrassing it with other people's affairs. Yet it was noted in Johannesburg that, when a report was circulated to the effect that he had started the invasion on the instructions of Mr. Cecil Rhodes, he and another officer of his force wrote jointly to the English papers to say that there was no truth whatever in the statement. The consequences of taking upon himself the responsibility for initiative in this way, while he had yet to undergo his trial, were far more serious than would have followed a simple statement to the effect that injustice was being done to the Rand community in the charges of cowardice laid against it. It was felt then, and the feeling has not in any way abated, that Dr. Jameson regarded the fate and interests of the people of Johannesburg with indifference, looking upon them merely as pawns in a game that he was playing. It was only Mr. Rhodes who took an opportunity to say that 'the Johannesburg people are not cowards; they were rushed.'
The general public did not know the circumstances under which Dr. Jameson had agreed to remain on the frontier. They did not know that telegrams and messengers had been despatched to stop him, nor was it felt advisable to inform them of these steps at a time when matters had seemingly gone too far to be stopped. It was considered that any statement of that kind put forth at that particular juncture would simply tend to create a panic from which no good results could accrue, and that, as Dr Jameson had cast the die and crossed his Rubicon, as little as possible should be done needlessly to embarrass him. Suggestions were continually being made, and have been and are still being frequently quoted, to the effect that a force should be sent out to create a diversion among the Boer commandoes in Jameson's favour. Suggestions were made by men who had not the remotest idea of the resources at the command of the Committee, or who did not stop to think of what might have happened had Johannesburg been depleted of its armed force, and so left at the mercy of a few hundred Boers. There were always, as there will always be, men prepared for any reckless gamble, but this course was most earnestly considered time after time by the Committee when some fresh suggestion or development seemed to warrant a reconsideration of the decision already arrived at not to attempt any aggressive measures. Finally the matter was by common consent left in the hands of Colonel Heyman, an officer who has rendered distinguished service in South Africa, and whose reputation and judgment were acknowledged by all. This course was the more readily agreed to since Colonel Heyman was by none more highly thought of than by Dr. Jameson himself. The decision given by him was that the invading force, properly led, drilled and equipped as it was, was a far stronger body than the entire force enrolled under the Reform Committee, and that it would require a very large force indeed of burghers to stop it. If Dr. Jameson had thought that he would need help there had been ample time for him to send a fast mounted messenger to Johannesburg. He had not done so; and it was therefore to be presumed that as he had taken upon himself the responsibility of invasion he was prepared for all contingencies; but, apart from this, the force available in Johannesburg, which would be in a few days a very good one behind earthworks, was at that moment utterly unfit to march out in the open. It would in its then condition, and with no equipment of field-pieces, be liable to be annihilated by a relatively small number of Boers before it should reach Dr. Jameson. It was decided, however, that, should fighting take place within such distance from the town that men could be taken from the defences without endangering the safety of the town, a force should be taken out at once.
Fault has repeatedly been found with the military organization in Johannesburg for not having been well served by an Intelligence Department, and for not knowing from day to day what the whereabouts and position of Dr. Jameson's forces were.
The reply to this is that the Johannesburg people had only two days in which to look after themselves and protect themselves in the crisis in which Dr. Jameson's action had plunged them; that as a matter of fact strenuous efforts were made to establish communication with the invading force; that the Intelligence Department—which, considering how short a time was available for its organization, was by no means unsatisfactory—was employed in many directions besides that in which Dr. Jameson was moving; that some success was achieved in communicating with him, but that the risks to be taken, owing to the imperative necessity of saving time at almost any cost, were greater than usual and resulted in the capture of eight or ten of the men employed in the endeavour to communicate with Dr. Jameson alone; and finally, that since he had seen fit to violate all the arrangements entered into and dash into the country in defiance of the expressed wishes of the people, whom he was bent on rescuing whether they wished to be rescued or not, the least that could be expected of him and of his force was that they should acquaint themselves with the road which they proposed to travel and take the necessary steps to keep the Johannesburg people posted as to their movements.
It has been urged by a prominent member of the invading force—not Dr. Jameson—that since the force had been kept on the border for some weeks with the sole object of assisting Johannesburg people when they should require assistance, the very least that they were entitled to expect was that someone should be sent out to show them the road and not leave them to go astray for want of a guide. To this it was replied that a force which had been, as they stated, on the border for several weeks with the sole object of invading the country by a certain road, had ample time, and might certainly have been expected to know the road; and as for relieving Johannesburg in its necessity, the argument might have applied had this 'necessity' ever arisen; but since the idea was to force the hands of the Reformers, the latter might fairly regard themselves as absolved from every undertaking, specific or implied, which might ever have been made in connection with the business. But at that time the excuse had not been devised that there had ever been an undertaking to assist Jameson, on the contrary it was readily admitted that such an idea was never entertained for a moment; nor can one understand how anyone cognizant of the telegram from Dr. Jameson to Dr. Rutherfoord Harris—'We will make our own flotation by the aid of the letter which I shall publish'—can set up any defence at the expense of others.
By Wednesday night it was known that Major Heany had passed through Mafeking in time to join Dr. Jameson's force, and that, bar some extraordinary accident, Captain Holden must have met Dr. Jameson on his way, since he had been despatched along the road which Dr. Jameson would take in marching on Johannesburg; and if all other reasons did not suffice to assure the Committee that Dr. Jameson would not be relying on any assistance from Johannesburg the presence of one or other of the two officers above mentioned would enable him to know that he should not count upon Johannesburg to give him active support. Both were thoroughly well acquainted with the position and were able to inform him, and have since admitted that they did inform him, that he should not count upon a single man going out to meet him. Captain Holden—who prior to the trial of Dr. Jameson and his comrades, prompted by loyalty to his chief, abstained from making any statement which could possibly embarrass him—immediately after the trial expressed his regret at the unjust censure upon the Johannesburg people and the charges of cowardice and bad faith which had been levelled against them, and stated that he reached Pitsani the night before Dr. Jameson started, and that he faithfully and fully delivered the messages which he was charged to deliver and earnestly impressed upon Dr. Jameson the position in which the Johannesburg people were placed, and their desire that he should not embarrass them by any precipitate action.
Before daybreak on Thursday, January 2, Bugler Vallé, of Dr. Jameson's force, arrived in the Reform Committee room and reported himself as having been sent by the Doctor at about midnight after the battle at Krugersdorp on Wednesday. He stated that the Doctor had supplied him with the best horse in the troop and sent him on to inform Colonel Rhodes where he was. He described the battle at the Queen's Mine, Krugersdorp, and stated that the force had been obliged to retreat from the position in which they had fought in order to take up a better one on higher ground, but that the position in which they had camped for the night was not a very good one. When questioned as to the exact message that he had been told to deliver he replied, 'The Doctor says, "Tell them that I am getting along all right, but they must send out to meet me."' He was asked what was meant by 'sending out to meet him.' Did it mean to send a force out? Did he want help? His reply was, 'No; the Doctor says he is getting along all right, but you must send out to meet him.' The messenger was keenly questioned upon this point, but adhered to the statement that the force was getting along all right and would be in early in the morning. Colonel Rhodes, who was the first to see the messenger, was however dissatisfied with the grudging admissions and the ambiguous message, and expressed the belief that 'the Doctor wants help, but is ashamed to say so.' Acting promptly on this conviction, he despatched all the mounted men available (about 100) under command of Colonel Bettington, with instructions to ascertain the whereabouts of Dr. Jameson's force, and if possible to join them.
This was done without the authority of the Committee and in direct opposition to the line already decided upon. It was moreover considered to be taking a wholly unnecessary risk, in view of the fact that an attack upon the town was threatened by burgher forces on the north-west side, and it was immediately decided by a number of members who heard of Colonel Rhodes' action to despatch a messenger ordering the troop not to proceed more than ten miles from the town, but to reconnoitre and ascertain what Dr. Jameson's position was, with the reservation that, should it be found that he actually needed help, such assistance as was possible should of course be given him. As a matter of hard fact it would not have been possible for the troop to reach Dr. Jameson before his surrender, so that the action taken upon the only message received from the invading force had no practical bearing upon the results.
At daybreak on Thursday morning Mr. Lace and the despatch rider sent by the British Agent to deliver the High Commissioner's proclamation and the covering despatch were passed through the Dutch lines under the authority of the Commandant-General, and they delivered the documents to Dr. Jameson in person. In reply to Sir Jacobus de Wet's appeal Dr. Jameson said, 'Tell Sir Jacobus de Wet that I have received his despatch; and that I shall see him in Pretoria to-morrow.' Mr. Lace briefly informed him of the position, as he had undertaken to do. The presence of a Boer escort and the shortness of the time allowed for the delivery of the messages prevented any lengthy conversation. Dr. Jameson made no comment further than to say, 'It is too late now,' and then asked the question, 'Where are the troops?' to which Mr. Lace replied, 'What troops do you mean? We know nothing about troops.' It did not occur to Mr. Lace or to anyone else that he could have meant 'troops' from Johannesburg. With the receipt of Dr. Jameson's verbal reply to the British Agent's despatch-carrier the business was concluded, and the escort from the Boer lines insisted on leaving, taking with them Mr. Lace and the despatch-rider. He offered no further remark.
{22} The telegram originally read 'within twenty-four hours,' but it was considered impossible to guarantee the time exactly, and the alteration as above given was made, the word 'within' being inadvertently left standing instead of 'with.'
{23} Captain Ferreira, at one time in command of the guard over the Reformers, informed the writer that he had formed one of the cavalry escort. 'It is a good story,' he said, 'but what fools we would have been to send our guns shut up in trucks through a hostile camp of 20,000 armed men—as we thought—round two sides of a triangle instead of going by the shorter and safe road.'
From the evidence on the trial at bar of Dr. Jameson and his comrades, it appears that about 20th October, 1895, orders were given to the Matabeleland Border Police to move southward. After this, further mobilization of other bodies took place and during the first week in December there collected at Pitsani Potlogo the body of men from whom Dr. Jameson's invading column was afterwards selected. For three weeks the men were continuously drilled and practised in all warlike exercises and thoroughly prepared for the enterprise which their leaders had in view. On Sunday, December 29, at about three in the afternoon, the little force was paraded and Dr. Jameson read to them the letter of invitation quoted in a previous chapter. He is alleged by certain witnesses to have said that he had just received this and that they could not refuse to go to the assistance of their countrymen in distress, and he confidently appealed to the men to support him. He said that he did not anticipate any bloodshed at all. They would proceed by forced marching straight through to Johannesburg, and would reach that town before the Boers were aware of his movements, and certainly before they could concentrate to stop him. It has been alleged by some witnesses that the men of the Bechuanaland Border Police who advanced from Mafeking under the command of Colonel Grey and Major Coventry were not so fully informed as to their destination and the reasons for the movement until they were actually in marching order to start. It would appear however from the general summary of the evidence and from the reports of the men who took part in the expedition, that they were informed that the destination of the force was Johannesburg, that the object was to render assistance to their countrymen in that town who were being grossly misruled by the Transvaal Government and were at that time in grievous straits and peril through having endeavoured to assert their rights and obtain the reforms for which they had so long been agitating, and that the immediate reason for marching was the receipt of an urgent appeal from Johannesburg citizens, which appeal (the letter of invitation) was duly read to them. In reply to questions as to whether they were fighting under the Queen's orders, they were informed that they were going to fight for the supremacy of the British flag in South Africa. A considerable proportion of the men declined to take part in the enterprise, and it is probably largely due to defections at the last moment that the statement was made that 700 men had started with Dr. Jameson, whereas it appears that only 480 ever left the Protectorate.
The following is a portion of the Majority Report of the Select Committee on the Jameson Raid appointed by the Cape House of Assembly:
On the 26th December there was a sudden check. On the afternoon of that day Colonel Rhodes telegraphs to Charter, Capetown, 'It is absolutely necessary to postpone flotation. Charles Leonard left last night for Capetown.' Messages to the same effect were sent from Mr. S.W. Jameson to his brother, and from Dr. Harris for the Chartered Company to Dr. Jameson, the latter concluding: 'So you must not move till you hear from us again. Too awful. Very sorry.'
As to the nature of the hitch that occurred, there is some light thrown on it by the statement from Mr. S.W. Jameson to his brother that any movement must be postponed 'until we have C.J. Rhodes' absolute pledge that authority of Imperial Government will not be insisted on,' a point that is further alluded to in Telegram No. 6,537 of Appendix QQ of the 28th December.
Whatever the exact nature of the obstacle was, there can be no doubt that some at least of the Johannesburg confederates were much alarmed and took all possible steps to stay proceedings.
In addition to urgent telegrams special messengers were sent to impress on Dr. Jameson the necessity for delay. One of these, Captain Holden, made his way across country.
According to Mr. Hammond's evidence Holden arrived at Mafeking on the 28th December, and went in with the column.
The other messenger was Captain Maurice Heany, who left Johannesburg on the 26th December, and on the 27th telegraphed from Bloemfontein to Charter, Capetown, informing them that 'Zebrawood' (Colonel Rhodes) had asked him to 'stop "Zahlbar" (Dr. Jameson) till Heany sees him,' and asking that a special train might be arranged for him. Dr. Harris replied to Kimberley on the 28th informing him that a special train was arranged, and added, 'lose no time or you will be late.'
It is in evidence that this special train was provided by the Chartered Company, that Heany left by it, caught up the ordinary train at Vryburg, and that he reached Mafeking at 4.30 a.m. on Sunday, the 29th.
The evidence is that he was coming with an urgent message to stop Dr. Jameson; that on his arrival at Mafeking he waked up Mr. Isaacs, a local storekeeper, and purchased a pair of field boots and a kit-bag, and proceeded by special cart to Pitsani; and that he subsequently on the same evening accompanied Dr. Jameson on his inroad and was captured at Doornkop.{24}
On the 27th, after receiving the discouraging telegrams mentioned above from Johannesburg, Dr. Jameson telegraphed to Harris, Charter, Capetown, 'I am afraid of Bechuanaland Police for cutting wire. They have now all gone forward, but will endeavour to put a stop to it. Therefore expect to receive telegram from you nine to-morrow morning authorizing movements. Surely Col. F.W. Rhodes advisable to come to terms at once. Give guarantee, or you can telegraph before Charles Leonard arrived.' This doubtless alludes to the necessity for guarantee mentioned in the message from S.W. Jameson, and the alternative suggestion was that authority to proceed should be given before the arrival of the Johannesburg delegate at Capetown.
Two hours later on the same day he sends another message of the utmost importance. He informs Harris, Charter, Capetown, as follows: 'If I cannot, as I expect, communicate with Bechuanaland Border Police cutting, then we must carry into effect original plans. They have then two days for flotation. If they do not, we will make our own flotation with help of letter, which I will publish.'
On the same day Dr. Jameson telegraphed to his brother in Johannesburg as follows: 'Guarantee already given, therefore let J.H. Hammond telegraph instantly all right.'
To this Mr. Hammond sent a most positive reply absolutely condemning his proposed action.
As bearing upon the attitude of the force at Pitsani, it may be noted that on the same day that the foregoing correspondence was taking place, Mr. A. Bates was despatched from Mafeking into the Transvaal with instructions from Major Raleigh Grey to collect information and meet Dr. Jameson en route. He was supplied with a horse and money, and seems to have done his best to carry out instructions.
Early the next day Dr. Jameson telegraphed to Harris, Charter, Capetown: 'There will be no flotation if left to themselves; first delay was races, which did not exist; second policies, already arranged. All mean fear.{25} You had better go as quickly as possible and report fully, or tell Hon. C.J. Rhodes to allow me.'
The reply to this was: 'It is all right if you will only wait. Captain Maurice Heany comes to you from Col. F.W. Rhodes by special train to-day.' And, again, two hours later, Dr. Harris for the Chartered Company telegraphs: 'Goold Adams arrives Mafeking Monday, and Heany, I think, arrives to-night; after seeing him, you and we must judge regarding flotation, but all our foreign friends are now dead against it and say public will not subscribe one penny towards even with you as a director—Ichabod.'
Still on the same day two further telegrams to Dr. Jameson were sent from Capetown, almost together, of a strongly discouraging tenour. One of them concludes by saying 'we cannot have fiasco,' and the other informs Dr. Jameson that Lionel Phillips anticipates complete failure of any premature action.
On the same day Dr. Harris informs Colonel Rhodes at Johannesburg that, 'Have arranged for Captain Maurice Heany; Dr. Jameson awaiting Capt. Maurice Heany's arrival. Keep market firm.'
And later:
'Charles Leonard says flotation not popular, and England's bunting will be resisted by public. Is it true? Consult all our friends and let me know, as Dr. Jameson is quite ready to move resolution and is only waiting for Captain Heany's arrival.'
A few hours later Dr. Jameson telegraphs to Harris, Charter, Capetown: 'Received your telegram Ichabod re Capt. Maurice Heany. Have no further news. I require to know. Unless I hear definitely to the contrary, shall leave to-morrow evening and carry into effect my second telegram (Appendix QQ, No. 06365) of yesterday to you, and it will be all right.'
On the next morning, Sunday the 29th, Heany arrived at Mafeking, and after making the purchases detailed above, left by special cart for the camp at Pitsani, where he probably arrived about eight o'clock a.m. At five minutes past nine Dr. Jameson telegraphed to Harris, Charter, Capetown: 'Shall leave to-night for the Transvaal. My reason is the final arrangement with writers of letter was that, without further reference to them, in case I should hear at some future time that suspicions have been aroused as to their intention among the Transvaal authorities, I was to start immediately to prevent loss of lives, as letter states. Reuter only just received. Even without my own information of meeting in the Transvaal, compel immediate move to fulfil promise made. We are simply going to protect everybody while they change the present dishonest Government and take vote from the whole country as to form of Government required by the whole.'
The force took with them provisions for one day only, relying on the commissariat arrangements made on their behalf by Dr. Wolff en route. They were well mounted and armed with Lee-Metford carbines, and took with them eight Maxims, two seven-pounders and one twelve-pounder. In order to facilitate quick movement no heavy equipment was taken, and but little spare ammunition. The vehicles attending the column were six Scotch carts and one Cape cart. The total distance to be covered was about 170 miles to Johannesburg, or 150 miles to Krugersdorp. The start was made from Pitsani shortly after 5 p.m., and marching was continued throughout the night. The force consisted of about 350 of the Chartered forces under Colonel Sir John Willoughby, Major in the Royal Horse Guards; the Hon. H. F. White, Major 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards; Hon. R. White, Captain Royal Welsh Fusiliers; Major J. B. Tracey, 2nd Battalion Scots Guards; Captain C. H. Villiers, Royal Horse Guards; and 120 of the Bechuanaland Border Police under Major Raleigh Grey, Captain 6th Inniskillen Dragoons, and the Hon. C. J. Coventry, Captain 3rd Militia Battalion Worcester Regiment. The two contingents met at Malmani at about sunrise on Monday morning, December 30. They marched throughout that day and night and the following day, Tuesday. There were half-hour rests about every twenty miles for rationing the men and feeding and watering the horses, the fodder being ready for the horses at various stores. Provisions for the men consisted of tinned meats and biscuits. There was no lack of provisions at all; but the men complained afterwards that they were so overcome with fatigue from continuous marching that when they reached the resting-places they generally lay down where they dismounted, and slept, instead of taking the food which was ready for them. A serious fault in the conduct of the expedition appears to have been the lack of opportunity for rest and food afforded the men. It was contended that the same or a higher average of speed might have been attained by pressing on faster for spells of a few hours and allowing reasonable intervals for rest and refreshment. Only about 130 miles had been covered by the column during the seventy hours that they were on the march before they were first checked by any serious opposition from the Boers.
On Monday, December 30, at about 1 p.m., Mr. F.J. Newton, Resident Commissioner at Mafeking, received the following telegram from the High Commissioner, Capetown, dated the same day:
It is rumoured here that Dr. Jameson has entered the Transvaal with an armed force. Is this so? If so, send special messenger on fast horse directing him to return immediately. A copy of this telegram should be sent to the officers with him, and they should be told that this violation of the territory of a friendly State is repudiated by Her Majesty's Government, and that they are rendering themselves liable to severe penalties.
Mr. Newton at once addressed to Dr. Jameson and each of the chief officers with him the following letter:
I have the honour to enclose copy of a telegram which I have received from His Excellency the High Commissioner, and I have accordingly to request that you will immediately comply with His Excellency's instructions.
Trooper J.T. White was despatched as soon as possible with the five letters, enclosed in waterproof, with instructions to ride until he caught up to Dr. Jameson and delivered the letters. He was stopped by a party of armed Boers and taken before Landdrost Marais at Malmani, where the despatches were opened and read. He was delayed for four hours, and then allowed to proceed with an escort. On Tuesday morning he crossed the Elands River and caught up the column at about 11 a.m. He had ridden all night, covering about eighty miles. He alleges that at first the officers would not take the letters, but eventually Sir John Willoughby accepted and read his and the others followed suit. He stated that he had been instructed to deliver the letters personally, and to get a reply. Sir John Willoughby sent a message by him stating that the despatches would be attended to. Shortly after this Dr. Jameson also received a protest from the Commandant of the Marico district against his invasion of the State, to which he sent the following reply:
I am in receipt of your protest of the above date, and have to inform you that I intend proceeding with my original plans, which have no hostile intention against the people of the Transvaal; but we are here in reply to an invitation from the principal residents of the Rand to assist them in their demand for justice and the ordinary rights of every citizen of a civilized State.
White states that this was about noon, and 'then the bugle sounded and the column moved off.' The force continued advancing in much the same way throughout Tuesday, and at 6 p.m. a skirmisher of the advanced guard met Lieutenant Eloff of the Krugersdorp District Police, who had been instructed by his Government to ride to Mafeking, presumably for the purpose of getting information. He had come with a guard of nine men, whom he had left some distance off; advancing alone to meet the column. He states that when released after two hours' delay he left the forces, and passing along the Rustenburg road met a commando of some 300 Boers with whom he made a circuit to avoid the column, and reached Krugersdorp before it did. From this it is clear that the Boers were collecting in considerable numbers to meet the invading force, and were moving with much greater rapidity than their enemies.
On Wednesday morning, at about 5.30, Messrs. Theron and Bouwer (despatch riders), who had been sent by Sir Jacobus de Wet, British Agent at Pretoria, at 1.30 p.m. on the previous day with a despatch for Dr. Jameson, reached the column and delivered their letters, and stated that they had been instructed to take back a reply as soon as possible. Dr. Jameson said, 'All right; I'll give you a reply,' and within a few minutes he handed to them the following letter:
I am in receipt of the message you sent from His Excellency the High Commissioner, and beg to reply, for His Excellency's information, that I should, of course, desire to obey his instructions, but, as I have a very large force of both men and horses to feed, and having finished all my supplies in the rear, must perforce proceed to Krugersdorp or Johannesburg this morning for this purpose. At the same time I must acknowledge I am anxious to fulfil my promise on the petition of the principal residents of the Rand, to come to the aid of my fellow-men in their extremity. I have molested no one, and have explained to all Dutchmen met that the above is my sole object, and that I shall desire to return at once to the Protectorate. I am, etc.,
At about 10.30 a.m. on the same day (January 1) two cyclists, Messrs. Celliers and Rowland, carrying despatches from members of the Reform Committee, met the column. The letters were received by Dr. Jameson, and taken with him as far as Doornkop, where, upon surrender of the force, they appear to have been torn up. With that good fortune which seems to have followed the Boers throughout this business, these torn fragments were picked up on the battle-field by a Boer official four months later, having remained undisturbed during the severe rain and wind storms of the wet season. Some portions were missing, but the others were pieced together and produced in evidence against the Reform prisoners. The letters are printed hereunder as they were written, as testified by the writers, and, in the case of the first one, by others who read it before it was despatched. The italics represent the fragments of the letters which were never found:{26}
The rumour of massacre in Johannesburg that started you to our
relief was not true. We are all right, feeling intense. We have
armed a lot of men. Shall be very glad to see you. We are not in
possession of the town. I shall send out some men to
You are a fine fellow. Yours ever
F.R.{27}
We will all drink a glass along o' you.
L.P.{28}
31st, 11.30. Kruger has asked for some of us to go over and treat: armistice for 24 hours agreed to. My view is that they are in a funk at Pretoria, and they were wrong to agree from here.
F.R.{27}
DR. JAMESON.