[30] On the 5th day of September, to the martial strains of "Maryland, My Maryland" from every band in the army, and with his men cheering and shouting with delight, Jackson forded the Potomac at Edwards' Ferry (Loudoun County), where the river was broad but shallow, near the scene of Evan's victory over the Federals in the previous October, and where Wayne had crossed his Pennsylvania brigade in marching to the field of Yorktown, in 1781.

General Early, after the short and bloody battle of Monocacy, and following his invasion of Maryland and demonstration against Washington, recrossed the Potomac at White's Ford, July 14, 1864, and, resting near Leesburg, on the 16th marched to the Shenandoah valley by way of Leesburg and Purcellville, through Snicker's Gap of the Blue Ridge, with Jackson's Cavalry in advance.

Pitched battles and lesser engagements were fought at Edwards' Ferry, Balls Bluff, Snickersville (now Bluemont), Leesburg, Middleburg, Aldie, Hamilton, Waterford, Union, Ashby's Gap, and other points in the County.

During Stonewall Jackson's investment of Harper's Ferry in September, 1862, guns were put in position on Loudoun Heights, supported by two regiments of infantry, and a portion of Jackson's own immediate command was placed with artillery on a bluffy shoulder of that mountain.

The following military organizations were recruited wholly or in part in Loudoun County and mustered into the Confederate service: 8th Virginia Regiment (a part of Pickett's famous fighting division), Loudoun Guard (Company C, 17th Virginia Regiment), Loudoun Cavalry ("Laurel Brigade"), and White's Battalion of Cavalry (the "Comanches," 25th Virginia Battalion). Mosby's command, the "Partisan Rangers," also attracted several score of her patriotic citizenry.

The sons of Loudoun, serving in these and other organizations, bore a distinguished part on every crimsoned field from Pennsylvania to the coast of Florida.

Garnett's Brigade, to which the 8th Virginia regiment was attached, was led into action during the memorable charge on the third day of the battle of Gettysburg. The brigade moved forward in the front line, and gained the enemy's strongest position, where the fighting became hand to hand and of the most desperate character. It went into action with 1,287 men and 140 officers, and after the struggle, of this number, only about 300 came back slowly and sadly from the scene of carnage. General Garnett, himself, was shot from his horse while near the center of the advancing brigade, within about twenty-five paces of the "stone fence," from behind which the Federals poured forth their murderous fire.

The Loudoun Rangers (Federal).

This volunteer organization consisted of two companies of disaffected Virginians, all of whom were recruited in the German settlements northwest of Leesburg. Company A, at the outset, was commanded by Captain Daniel M. Keyes, of Lovettsville, who later resigned on account of wounds received in action. He was succeeded by Captain Samuel C. Means, of Waterford. Company B's commander was Captain James W. Grubb. The total enlistment of each company was 120 and 67, respectively. All the officers and privates were of either German, Quaker, or Scotch-Irish lineage, the first-named class predominating.

The command was mustered into the Federal service at Lovettsville, the 20th day of June, 1862. Its historian, Briscoe Goodhart, a member of Company A, in his History of the Loudoun (Virginia) Rangers, has said that it "was an independent command, organized in obedience to a special order of the Honorable Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War, and was at first subject to his orders only, but subsequently merged into the Eighth Corps, commanded at that time by the venerable Major General John Ellis Wool...."

The "Rangers," as the name implies, were scouts and, in this highly useful capacity, served the enemies of their State with shameless ardor. But, as a body, they fought few engagements and none of a decisive nature. Their first and, perhaps, sharpest encounter happened in and around the old Baptist Church at Waterford.

The following absolution or justification is offered in the preface to the above-quoted work:

"As the name of their organization indicates, they came from a State which was arrayed in arms against the authority of the National Government. No Governor, or Senator, or Member of Congress guarded their interests; nor was any State or local bounty held forth to them as an allurement. Their enlistment in the Union Army—their country's army—was the spontaneous outgrowth of a spirit of lofty patriotism.

"As they saw their duty they were not lacking in moral courage to perform that duty; and with no lapse of years shall we ever fail to insist that the principles for which the Rangers contended were eternally right, and that their opponents were eternally wrong."

Far from being a well-ordered command with a clearly defined modus operandi, the two companies were poorly drilled, imperfectly accoutred, only aimlessly and periodically active, and, moreover, were on the point of dissolution at the outset.

Operating, for the most part, independently and in detached parties the command offered no serious menace to citizens or soldiery, though the latter were sometimes harassed and annoyed by them.

Mosby, who had greatly desired and often essayed their capture, was finally given the opportunity for which he had eagerly waited. Learning that the Rangers were encamped near Millville, W. Va. (Keyes' Switch, as it was then called), he dispatched Captain Baylor with a detachment of horse to that point.

Major Scott who, in 1867, wrote Partisan Life With Mosby, has this to say of the fight which followed: "He (Baylor) took the precaution to pass in between Halltown (where there was a brigade of infantry) and the camp. When within fifty yards of the Loudoun Rangers the order to charge was given. Two of them were killed, four wounded, and 65 taken prisoners, together with 81 horses with their equipments. The rest of the command sought refuge in the bushes. The only loss which Baylor sustained was Frank Helm, of Warrenton, who was wounded as he charged among the foremost into the camp."

The day of the capture General Stevenson, commanding at Harper's Ferry, and under whose orders the Rangers had been acting, sent the following message to General Hancock at Winchester:

Harper's Ferry, April 6, 1865.

Mosby surprised the camp of the Loudoun Rangers near Keyes' Ford and cleaned them out. He made the attack about 10 a.m....

John D. Stevenson,
Brigadier-General.

When Major-General Hancock, so distinguished in the Federal Army, heard of Baylor's exploit he laughed heartily and exclaimed: "Well, that is the last of the Loudoun Rangers."

As indeed it proved to be!

Mosby's Command in its Relationship to Loudoun County.

From January, 1863, until the close of the war Colonel Mosby's partisan operations were mostly confined to the counties of Loudoun and Fauquier, this rich, pastoral country affording subsistence for his command and the Blue Ridge a haven to which to retreat when hard pressed by the superior numbers that, from time to time, were sent against him. Here he planned and executed most of the daring coups that were to win for him international fame.[31] Here also his men were dispersed and reassembled with marvelous facility—one of countless manifestations of his great original genius. "They would scatter for safety, and gather at my call like the Children of the Mist," was what he wrote in after years. Of all his methods this has been the least clearly understood. The explanation that he has offered in his War Reminiscences can be only partially complete; for he could not, with propriety, point to his personal magnetism and daring as the dominant influences, though he must have known that to an extraordinary extent they were responsible for this almost unparalleled devotion. "The true secret," he says, "was that it was a fascinating life, and its attractions far more than counterbalanced its hardships and dangers. They had no camp duty to do, which, however necessary, is disgusting to soldiers of high spirit. To put them to such routine work is pretty much like hitching a race horse to a plow."

[31] In alluding to the famous "greenback raid" (October 14, 1864), in which a party of Rangers entered a train of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, near Kearneysville, capturing, among other officers, Majors Moore and Ruggles, Federal paymasters, with their funds, Lieutenant Grogan, of the Rangers, has said that the command, the next day, "met at Bloomfield, in Loudoun County, and examined into the condition of our sub-U.S. Treasury, and finding there a net surplus of $168,000, the same was divided among our stockholders ($2,000 each) and circulated so freely in Loudoun that never afterwards was there a pie or blooded horse sold in that section for Confederate money."

Many of his followers were recruited in Loudoun County. A few before the advent of Mosby had pursued peaceable vocations; but the command consisted in the main of men who had seen active service in the cavalry and infantry regiments, but tiring of the routine and discipline of the camp had returned to their homes in Loudoun and adjoining counties. At times he had with him dauntless spirits who had been incapacitated for infantry duty by reason of wounds received in action, some of these carrying crutches along with them tied to their saddle bows. At another time he enrolled several experienced fighters who had been absent from their regiments without leave ever since the first battle of Bull Run—a period of nearly two years.

With this promiscuous following, which at no time exceeded one hundred men, he instituted a long unbroken series of successful strategems, surprises, and night attacks, harassing the communications of the Federal armies, confusing their plans by capturing dispatches, destroying supply trains, subjecting their outposts to the wear and tear of a perpetual skirmish, in short, inflicting all the mischief possible for a small body of cavalry moving rapidly from point to point on the communications of an army.

He believed that by incessant attacks he could compel the enemy either greatly to contract his lines or to reinforce them, both of which would have been of great advantage to the Southern cause. By assuming the aggressive, a rule from which he not once departed, he could force the enemy to guard a hundred points, leaving himself free to select any one of them for attack.

But the theories, purposes, and methods of this peer of partisan leaders is best explained by himself. Simply and unostentatiously, but withal convincingly, expressed, they give to the man and his deeds the unmistakable semblance of fairness and legitimacy. These, together with his masterly defense of partisan warfare, follow in modified and disconnected form:

"The military value of a partisan's work is not measured by the amount of property destroyed, or the number of men killed or captured, but by the number he keeps watching. Every soldier withdrawn from the front to guard the rear of an army is so much taken from its fighting strength.

"I endeavored, as far as I was able, to diminish this aggressive power of the army of the Potomac, by compelling it to keep a large force on the defensive. I assailed its rear, for there was its most vulnerable point. My men had no camps. If they had gone into camp, they would soon have all been captured.... A blow would be struck at a weak or unguarded point, and then a quick retreat. The alarm would spread through the sleeping camp, the long roll would be beaten or the bugles would sound to horse, there would be mounting in hot haste and a rapid pursuit. But the partisans generally got off with their prey. Their pursuers were striking at an invisible foe. I often sent small squads at night to attack and run in the pickets along a line of several miles. Of course, these alarms were very annoying, for no human being knows how sweet sleep is but a soldier. I wanted to use and consume the Northern cavalry in hard work. I have often thought that their fierce hostility to me was more on account of the sleep I made them lose than the number we killed and captured."


"My purpose was to weaken the armies invading Virginia, by harassing their rear. As a line is only as strong as its weakest point, it was necessary for it to be stronger than I was at every point, in order to resist my attacks.... It is just as legitimate to fight an enemy in the rear as in front. The only difference is in the danger. Now, to prevent all these things from being done, heavy detachments must be made to guard against them."


"The line that connects an army with its base of supplies is the heel of Achilles—its most vital and vulnerable point. It is a great achievement in war to compel an enemy to make heavy detachments to guard it...."


"Having no fixed lines to guard or defined territory to hold, it was always my policy to elude the enemy when they came in search of me, and carry the war into their own camps."


"These operations were erratic simply in not being in accordance with the fixed rules taught by the academies; but in all that I did there was a unity of purpose, and a plan which my commanding general understood and approved."


" ... while I conducted war on the theory that the end of it is to secure peace by the destruction of the resources of the enemy, with as small a loss as possible to my own side, there is no authenticated act of mine which is not perfectly in accordance with approved military usage. Grant, Sherman, and Stonewall Jackson had about the same ideas that I had on the subject of war."

Though all his engagements were reported to Stuart till the death of that great cavalry leader, in May, 1864, and afterward to General Robert E. Lee, Mosby was allowed the freedom of untrammeled action in the sense that the operations of his command were left to his individual discretion.

The following militant verses were published in a Southern magazine, soon after the war, and won immediate popularity:

Mosby at Hamilton.

By Madison Cawein.

Down Loudoun lanes, with swinging reins
And clash of spur and sabre,
And bugling of battle horn,
Six score and eight we rode at morn
Six score and eight of Southern born,
All tried in love and labor.
Full in the sun at Hamilton,
We met the South's invaders;
Who, over fifteen hundred strong,
'Mid blazing homes had marched along
All night, with Northern shout and song,
To crush the rebel raiders.
Down Loudoun lanes with streaming manes
We spurred in wild March weather;
And all along our war-scarred way
The graves of Southern heroes lay,
Our guide posts to revenge that day,
As we rode grim together.
Old tales still tell some miracle
Of saints in holy writing—
But who shall say why hundreds fled
Before the few that Mosby led,
Unless the noblest of our dead
Charged with us then when fighting.
While Yankee cheers still stunned our ears,
Of troops at Harper's Ferry,
While Sheridan led on his Huns,
And Richmond rocked to roaring guns,
We felt the South still had some sons,
She would not scorn to bury.

Battle of Leesburg[32] ("Ball's Bluff"[33]).

"After the first battle of Manassas, Col. Eppa Hunton had been ordered to reoccupy Leesburg with his regiment, the Eighth Virginia. A little later Col. William Barksdale's Thirteenth Mississippi, Col. W.S. Featherstone's Seventeenth Mississippi, a battery, and four companies of cavalry under Col. W.H. Jenifer were sent to the same place, and these were organized into the Seventh Brigade of the Confederate Army of the Potomac, which, early in August, was put under command of Brig.-Gen. Nathan G. Evans, who had been promoted for his brave conduct July 21st. General Beauregard's object in locating this strong force at Leesburg was to guard his left flank from a Federal attack by way of several good roads that led from the fords of the upper Potomac, near that town, directly to his Bull Run encampment; to watch the large Federal force that McClellan had located on the opposite side of the Potomac; to keep up a connection with the Confederate force in the lower Shenandoah Valley by a good turnpike that led from Leesburg across the Blue Ridge, and to save for his army the abundant supplies of the fertile County of Loudoun.

"On the 15th of October (1861) General Banks' division of the Federal army was located at Darnestown, Md., about fifteen miles due east from Leesburg, with detachments at Point of Rocks, Sandy Hook, Williamsport, etc.; while the division of Brig.-Gen. C.P. Stone, composed of six companies of cavalry, three of artillery, and the infantry brigades of Gens. W.A. Gorman and F.W. Lander and Col. E.D. Baker, was located at Poolesville, eight miles north of east from Leesburg. The object in this disposition of so large a force was, not only to guard the right of the big Federal army that General McClellan was gathering at Washington, but especially to cover the important approaches from the northwest to Baltimore and the Federal city, particularly those from the lower Shenandoah Valley and northeastern Piedmont, Virginia.

[32] Virginia Military History, by Jedediah Hotchkiss.

[33] Also called "Battle of Harrison's Island" and "Battle of Conrad's Ferry."

"On October 19th, McCall's Federal division advanced to Dranesville, on the road to Leesburg and about 15 miles from that place, 'in order to cover the reconnoissance made in all directions the next day;' and later, Smith's Federal division advanced along a parallel road to the west, acting in concert with General McCall, and pushed forward strong parties in the same direction and for the same purpose. About 7 p.m. of the 19th, Stone's advance opened a heavy cannonade on the Confederate positions at Fort Evans, on the Leesburg pike, and at Edwards' Ferry, and at the same time General Evans heard heavy firing in the direction of Dranesville. At midnight General Evans ordered his whole brigade to the front, along the line of Goose Creek, 3 miles southeast of Leesburg, where he had a line of intrenchments, to there await an expected attack from General McCall, the next morning, Sunday, October 20th, as it had been reported that the Federal advance was moving in force from Dranesville toward Leesburg. Evans' scouts captured McCall's courier bearing dispatches to General Meade, directing him to examine the roads leading to Leesburg. The Federal batteries kept up a deliberate fire during the day, but no assault was made.

"On the morning of the 20th the Federal signal officer on Sugar Loaf Mountain, in Maryland, reported 'the enemy have moved away from Leesburg.' This Banks wired to McClellan, whereupon the latter wired to Stone, at Poolesville, that a heavy reconnoissance would be sent out that day, in all directions, from Dranesville, concluding: 'You will keep a good lookout upon Leesburg, to see if this movement has the effect to drive them away. Perhaps a slight demonstration on your part would have the effect to move them.' McClellan desired Stone to make demonstrations from his picket line along the Potomac, but did not intend that he should cross the river, in force, for the purpose of fighting. Late in the day Stone reported that he had made a feint of crossing, and at the same time had started a reconnoissance from Harrison's Island toward Leesburg, when the enemy's pickets retired to intrenchments. That 'slight demonstration' brought on the battle of Ball's Bluff on Monday, October 21st. On the morning of the 21st, McCall retired from Evan's front to his camp at Prospect Hill, 4 miles up the river from the Chain bridge. From his point of observation, at the earthworks called 'Fort Evans,' to the eastward of Leesburg, overlooking the fords at Conrad's and Edwards' ferries and Ball's Bluff, Evans, at 6 a.m. on the 21st, found that the enemy of Stone's division had effected a crossing at Edwards' Ferry and at Ball's Bluff, 4 miles above. He promptly sent four companies from his Mississippi regiments and two companies of cavalry, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel W.H. Jenifer to the assistance of Captain Duff, to hold the enemy in check until his plan of attack should be developed. Colonel Jenifer immediately engaged the Federal advance and drove it back toward Ball's Bluff.

"The force that had crossed at Harrison's Island, about midnight of the 20th, was part of the command of Colonel Baker, some 300 men under Col. Charles Devens, of the Fifteenth Massachusetts. Its object was to capture a Confederate camp that had been reported to be about a mile from the river. This force advanced to an open field surrounded by woods, where it halted until it could be joined by a company from the Twentieth Massachusetts, which had been left on the bluff, on the Virginia side, to protect the Federal return. Devens, at daybreak, pushed forward with a few men to reconnoiter, and, in person, went to within sight of Leesburg. Thinking he had not been discovered Devens determined to remain and sent back to his brigade commander, Colonel Baker, for reinforcements. The latter consulted his division commander, General Stone, and obtained permission to either withdraw Devens or to send over reinforcements to him. He promptly directed Devens to hold his position and said that he would support him in person with the rest of his brigade. The boats and flats that had been provided for crossing the Potomac from the Maryland shore to Harrison's Island and from the latter to the Virginia shore were entirely inadequate, and it was nearly noon before Devens' regiment of 625 men was closed up on the Virginia shore.

"Convinced at about 10 a.m. that the main Federal attack would be at Ball's Bluff, four miles northeast of Leesburg, Evans ordered Colonel Hunton with the Eighth Virginia[34] to the support of Colonel Jenifer, directing him to form the line of battle immediately in the rear of Jenifer's command, and that the combined force should then drive the enemy to the river, while he, General Evans, supported the right of the movement with artillery. This movement was made soon after noon and the opposing forces at once became hotly engaged, the Confederates advancing on the Federals, who held a strong position in front of the woods. Learning, at about this time, that an opposing force was gathering on his left and that he would soon be vigorously attacked by a body of infantry that appeared in that direction and by a body of dismounted cavalry that had deployed in his front, and apprehensive of being flanked, Devens retired his regiment to an open space in the woods, in front of the bluff, and prepared to receive an attack. To ascertain about reinforcements Devens went back to the bluff about 2 p.m., where he found Colonel Baker, who directed him to form his regiment on the right of the position that he proposed to occupy, while Baker placed 300 of the Twentieth Massachusetts on the left and advanced in front of these his California regiment, with two guns, supported by two companies of the Fifteenth Massachusetts. At about the same hour General Stone ferried a strong force across the river at Edwards' Ferry to make a demonstration on Evans' right, leaving Colonel Baker in command at Ball's Bluff. Stone then telegraphed to McClellan: 'There has been a sharp firing on the right of our line, and our troops appear to be advancing there under Baker. The left, under Gorman, has advanced its skirmishers nearly one mile, and, if the movement continues successful, will turn the enemy's right.'

[34] The regiment in which were several companies of Loudoun soldiers.

"At about 2.30 p.m., General Evans, having the advantage of a concealed, shorter, and inner line, seeing that the enemy was being constantly reinforced, ordered Colonel Burt, with the Eighteenth Mississippi, to attack the Federal left, while Hunton and Jenifer attacked his front, holding the attack at Edwards' Ferry in check by batteries from his intrenchments. As Colonel Burt reached his position, the enemy, concealed in a ravine, opened on him a furious fire, which compelled him to divide his regiment and stop the flank movement that had already begun. At about 3 p.m., Featherstone, with the Seventeenth Mississippi, was sent at a double-quick to support Burt's movement. Evans reports: 'He arrived in twenty minutes and the action became general along my whole line, and was very hot and brisk for more than two hours, the enemy keeping up a constant fire with his batteries on both sides of the river. At about 6 p.m. I saw that my command had driven the enemy to near the banks of the river. I ordered my entire force to charge and drive him into the river. The charge was immediately made by the whole command, and the forces of the enemy were completely routed, and cried out for quarter along his whole line. In this charge the enemy was driven back at the point of the bayonet, and many were killed and wounded by this formidable weapon. In the precipitate retreat of the enemy on the bluffs of the river, many of his troops rushed into the water and were drowned, while many others, in overloading the boats, sunk them and shared the same fate. The rout now, about 7 o'clock, became complete, and the enemy commenced throwing his arms into the river.... At 8 p.m. the enemy surrendered his forces at Ball's Bluff, and the prisoners were marched to Leesburg.'

"During this action, Colonel Barksdale, with nine companies of the Thirteenth Mississippi and six pieces of artillery, was held to oppose Stone's movement from Edwards' Ferry and also as a reserve. After the engagement, Evans withdrew all his brigade to Leesburg, except Barksdale's regiment, which he left in front of Edwards' Ferry.

"Each of the combatants had about 1,700 men engaged in this action. The Confederates had no artillery in the fight, while the Federals had three light guns. Shortly after the action became general, Colonel Baker, passing in front of his command, was killed by a sharpshooter, which so demoralized the Federals that the surviving officers conferred and decided to retreat. This was opposed by Colonel Milton Cogswell, of the Forty-second New York, who had succeeded Colonel Baker in command. He said a retreat down the bluff and across the river was now impossible, and that they must cut their way through the Confederate right to Edwards' Ferry. He promptly gave orders to that effect, and moved to the front, followed by the remnants of his own two companies and a portion of the California regiment, but not by the others. He was quickly driven back and the whole Federal command was forced to the river bluff in great disorder. Just then two companies of the Forty-second New York landed on the Virginia shore. These Colonel Cogswell ordered up the bluff and deployed as skirmishers to cover the Federal retreat, while he advanced to the left with a small party, and was almost immediately captured. Colonel Devens escaped by swimming the river.

"On the morning of the 22nd, Colonel Barksdale informed General Evans that the enemy was still in force at Edwards' Ferry. He was ordered to carefully reconnoiter the Federal position, learn its strength and make attack. This he did, at about 2 p.m., and drove a superior force from an intrenched position to the bank of the river, killing and wounding quite a number of men. At about sundown, the Federals, having been reinforced and holding rifle-pits, Barksdale withdrew to Fort Evans, leaving two companies to watch his front. The enemy recrossed the Potomac during the night. Evans reported his loss, in the thirteen hours of fight, on the 21st, as 36 killed,[35] 117 wounded, and 2 missing, from a force of 1,709. Among the killed was the brave Colonel Burt. The Federal losses were returned at 49 killed, 158 wounded, and 694 missing. General Evans claimed the capture of 710 prisoners, 1,500 stands of arms, 3 cannon and 1 flag.

[35] The Confederate soldiers who fell in the battle of Ball's Bluff are buried in Union Cemetery, on the northern border of Leesburg. Their resting place is marked by an imposing marble shaft, in honor of the comrades of "the lost cause," "wherever they lie." Many of the Union soldiers who perished at Ball's Bluff lie buried where they fell. Their mournful little cemetery was recently acquired by the Federal government and its approaches and environs greatly improved. The battlefield is still one of the chief points of interest to visitors to central Loudoun.

"Evans called on Longstreet for reinforcements when he reported his battle of the 21st, thinking that 20,000 Federals were in his front. Colonel Jenkins, with the Eighteenth South Carolina cavalry and artillery was dispatched from Centreville in the afternoon of the 22d, and marched toward Leesburg, through mud and a driving rain, until midnight, when the infantry went into bivouac; but Captain C.M. Blackford's cavalry and four guns of the Washington artillery hurried forward all night and came in sight of Leesburg about daylight of the 23d. That morning, finding his men much exhausted, General Evans ordered three of his regiments to fall back to Carter's mill, a strong position on Goose Creek, about 7 miles southwest from Leesburg, and join Jenkins, who had been halted at that place, leaving Barksdale with his regiment, two pieces of artillery and some cavalry, as a rear guard near Leesburg, and Hunton, with his Eighth Virginia and two pieces of artillery, on the south bank of Sycoline Creek, 3 miles from Leesburg, and sending his cavalry well to the front toward Alexandria."

Munford's Fight at Leesburg.[36]

"Having driven Pope's army to a secure position behind the defences of Washington, General Lee turned northward to the Potomac and began the first Maryland campaign.

"While this movement was in progress Stuart covered the front toward Washington. He had learned that an irregular body of cavalry under a certain Captain Means was harassing the citizens in the vicinity of Leesburg, and on the 2d of September (1862) he sent Colonel Munford, with the Second Virginia Cavalry, to that point. On approaching Leesburg, Munford learned that it was occupied by Means' company and that he was supported by about two hundred men under Major Cole, of Maryland. Munford's regiment numbered only about one hundred and sixty men, but, approaching Leesburg by an unexpected direction, he effected a surprise, and after a heavy skirmish completely routed Means' party and pursued him to Waterford, a distance of seven miles. He captured forty-seven prisoners, and killed or wounded twenty."

[36] Life and Campaigns of Maj.-Gen. J. E. B. Stuart.

Battle at Aldie.[37]

"Early on the morning of the 17th of June, 1863, Colonel Munford, with the 2d and 3rd Virginia Cavalry, moved from Upperville through Middleburg, and having established his picket posts east of Aldie, crossed over to Snicker's Gap road and proceeded with these two regiments to procure corn at the house of Franklin Carter, about a mile distant. He expected to encamp that night in the vicinity of Aldie.

"Colonel Williams C. Wickham, with the 1st, 4th, and 5th Virginia Cavalry, the remaining regiments of the brigade, had moved from Piedmont through Middleburg, and was about to place his men in camp at Dover Mills, near Aldie.

"The 5th regiment, Col. Thomas L. Rosser, which arrived some little time after the 1st and 4th, was directed by Colonel Wickham to pass beyond Dover Mills, and select a camp nearer Aldie. In so doing Colonel Rosser encountered the enemy, who was rapidly driving back the pickets established by Colonel Munford.

"The force of the enemy making this attack was the 2d cavalry division, commanded by Gen. D.M. Gregg, and accompanied by Major-General Pleasonton. General Kilpatrick's brigade, consisting of the 2d New York, 1st Massachusetts, 6th Ohio, and 4th New York regiments, supported by the 1st Maine Cavalry from Col. J.J. Gregg's brigade, and by Randol's battery, appears to have done all the fighting. The two other brigades of General Gregg's division were closed up within supporting distance.

[37] Life and Campaigns of Maj.-Gen. J. E. B. Stuart.

"The arrival of Rosser's regiment was most opportune. By an immediate sabre charge he drove back the enemy's advance upon their main body in the town of Aldie. Having relieved the pressure on the pickets, Rosser stationed his sharpshooters, under Capt. R.B. Boston, on the right of the Snickersville road, where a number of haystacks afforded some protection, and held the remainder of his small regiment ready for their support. Colonel Munford, in the meantime, arrived in person and stationed Lieut. William Walton, of the 2d Virginia Cavalry, with the reserve picket, fifteen men, behind a stone wall on the left of the Snickersville road with orders to hold his position against any odds until the 2d and 3d regiments could come to his assistance. In the meantime, and while Colonel Wickham was stationing the 1st and 4th regiments and Breathed's battery to dispute any advance on the Middleburg road, Rosser, single-handed, had met and repulsed two charges which were made upon Captain Boston's squadron; and believing that he could be maintained there with advantage, had ordered Boston to hold his position at all hazards. The result proved that this disposition was unfortunate, for during the subsequent heavy fighting Boston was so far advanced as to be beyond the reach of support and he and his squadron were captured.

"During all this time there was no force on the left of the Snickersville road, except the picket posted by Munford behind the stone wall. Munford, therefore, moved Rosser's regiment and the 4th Virginia Cavalry, with one gun from Breathed's battery, so as to command this road, leaving Colonel Wickham with the rest of the guns and the 1st Virginia Cavalry on the Middleburg road.

"In the meantime the enemy pressed heavily on Lieutenant Walton. He had repulsed two mounted charges, but being outflanked by dismounted men, had been withdrawn about fifty yards behind a house and orchard, in which position he commanded the only opening through which the enemy could attack. Here three distinct charges were met and repulsed in counter-charges by the 5th Virginia Cavalry, by the 3d squadron of the 4th regiment, led by Lieut. A.D. Payne, and by the 2d and 5th squadrons of the same regiment, led by Capt. W.B. Newton. These were the only squadrons of this regiment present at this battle, the 1st and 4th squadrons having been detailed early in the day to accompany General Stuart. In each of these charges the enemy had suffered severely at the hands of Lieutenant Walton's sharpshooters, who poured volleys into their flanks as they passed him in advancing and retiring.

"As Walton's party was, however, evidently small, the enemy determined to dislodge him, and was preparing a considerable force for another attack, when the 2d and 3d Virginia Cavalry reached the field. Two squadrons of sharpshooters were at once dismounted and placed on the left of the road—the squadron from the 2d regiment under Captains Breckinridge and Graves, that from the 3d regiment under Capt. George D. White. Their line was advanced to the stone wall from which Lieutenant Walton had been withdrawn. Colonel Munford now felt that his position was secure against an attack of cavalry, and there was nothing he more desired than that the enemy should wear himself out against it. His flanks were secured by Little River and its tributaries. The enemy must necessarily attack his front. The road by which it was approached was worn, as it ascended the hill, into deep gullies, which compelled an attack in column of fours and prevented the enemy from spreading out his front. Munford's strong party of sharpshooters commanded the road. They were stationed in an enclosed field, with a stone wall in their front, a post and rail fence on their right, and another fence on their left. The fences to the rear were thrown down, so as to give the cavalry access to the field. Munford felt that unless his cavalry failed in their duty, his dismounted men were perfectly secure.

"The 2d Virginia Cavalry, led by Lieut.-Col. J.W. Watts, now charged the advancing enemy, who had penetrated beyond the position of the sharpshooters. The heads of the columns met in the narrow road in a hand-to-hand sabre fight. While this was in progress, Capt. Jesse Irving threw down the fence on the right of the road, and, bringing his squadron to the front, opened fire on the enemy's left flank. Capt. W.W. Tebbs executed a similar movement on the left of the road, while the sharpshooters were all the time firing into the enemy's rear. Their attack was completely broken, and their leading squadron almost destroyed. Another support moved up during the confusion, but was met and repulsed by Colonel Rosser. In this fight Lieutenant-Colonel Watts was wounded and permanently disabled. The command of the 2d regiment devolved on Major Cary Breckinridge, who moved the regiment off to the right to reform, carrying with him Col. Louis P. De Cesnola and the colors of his regiment, the 4th New York Cavalry.

"During all this time Captain Boston, of the 5th Virginia Cavalry, had been holding the haystacks far in advance of his friends, where Colonel Rosser had placed him with such stringent orders. He was beyond the reach even of a recall, but had been doing his utmost to aid in the fight. He was now charged by the 6th Ohio Cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel William Stedman; and after losing three of his officers, including his junior captain, and a third of his men killed and wounded, he surrendered to the odds brought against him.

"The Federal cavalry were determined to carry the position if possible, and another charge was speedily organized. This was met by the 3d Virginia Cavalry, led by Col. T.H. Owens, who took the road, supported on his right by the 2d regiment and on his left by the 5th. The sabre was the weapon used, and the enemy was again driven back. Colonel Munford pronounced this the most spirited charge of the day. Colonel Owens, however, pressed his success too far. He drove the enemy almost to the village of Aldie, where he was charged by a fresh regiment and driven back, losing many of the prisoners he had taken and some of his own men. Major Henry Carrington, of the 3d regiment, was captured at this point. Colonel Munford says in his report:

"'Captain Newton, having rallied his small command and a good many men from other commands, was again ready to relieve Colonel Owens as he fell back, and by a timely charge repelled another effort to flank him. As the enemy came up again the sharpshooters opened upon him with terrible effect from the stone wall, which they had regained, and checked him completely. I do not hesitate to say that I have never seen as many Yankees killed in the same space of ground in any fight I have ever seen or on any battlefield in Virginia that I have been over. We held our ground until ordered by the major-general commanding to retire, and the Yankees had been so severely punished that they did not follow. The sharpshooters of the 5th were mostly captured, this regiment suffering more than any other.'

"Colonel Munford reported the capture of 138 prisoners. The number of killed and wounded is unknown. His own total loss was 119, of which the 5th Virginia Cavalry lost 58, mostly from Captain Boston's squadron."

Duffie at Middleburg.[38]

"On this same afternoon (June 17, 1863) events of considerable importance occurred at Middleburg, where Stuart had established his headquarters for the day.

"Early in the morning Col. A.N. Duffie, with the 1st Rhode Island Cavalry, had crossed the Bull Run Mountain at Thoroughfare Gap. His orders directed him to encamp at Middleburg on the night of the 17th and to proceed the next day toward Noland's Ferry, extending his march to the west as far as Snickersville. These orders seem to have contemplated a somewhat extended scout by this regiment on the left flank of General Gregg's division—-a hazardous movement in the presence of an enterprising enemy. Colonel Duffie reached Thoroughfare Gap at 9.30 a.m. and was somewhat delayed in crossing the mountain by the picket from Chambliss' command. By 11 o'clock, however, he was fairly on his way to Middleburg. At 4 o'clock p.m. he struck the pickets which Stuart had established for his own safety outside the town and drove them in so quickly that Stuart and his staff were compelled to make a retreat more rapid than was consistent with dignity and comfort. Having with him no force adequate to contest the ground with Duffie's regiment, Stuart retired toward Rector's Cross Roads. Munford was notified of his danger, and directed to withdraw from Aldie and Robertson and Chambliss were ordered to move immediately upon Middleburg.

[38] Life and Campaigns of Maj.-Gen. J. E. B. Stuart.

"The only hope for Duffie's regiment now lay in an immediate advance upon Aldie, where he might have created considerable commotion by attacking the rear of the 1st Virginia Cavalry on the Middleburg road. But he did not know this and his orders were positive, requiring him to encamp for the night at Middleburg. He therefore made the best of his situation by dismounting one-half of his regiment behind stone walls and barricades, hoping that he might be able to hold his position until reinforced from Aldie, whither he sent Capt. Frank Allen to make known his situation at brigade headquarters. Captain Allen reached Aldie, after encountering many difficulties, at 9 o'clock p.m. He says in his report:

"'General Kilpatrick informed me that his brigade was so worn out that he could not send any reinforcements to Middleburg, but that he would report the situation of our regiment to General Gregg. Returning, he said that General Gregg had gone to state the facts to General Pleasonton, and directed me to remain at Aldie until he heard from General Pleasonton. I remained, but received no further orders.'"


"Thus Colonel Duffie was left to meet his fate. At 7 o'clock in the evening he was attacked by Robertson's brigade. His men fought bravely and repelled more than one charge before they were driven from the town, retiring by the same road upon which they had advanced. Unfortunately for Duffie this road was now closed by Chambliss' brigade, which surrounded him during the night and captured, early the next morning, the greater part of those who had escaped from Robertson on the previous evening. Colonel Duffie himself escaped capture and reached Centreville early in the afternoon with four of his officers and twenty-seven men. He reports the loss in his regiment at 20 officers and 248 men. This, however, was an exaggeration of the calamity, for other officers besides himself had taken to the woods and succeeded in making their way back to the Federal lines, on the 18th and 19th."

The Sacking of Loudoun.

FEDERAL OPERATIONS AGAINST MOSBY IN LOUDOUN COUNTY.

Mosby's unrelenting aggressiveness caused the Northern generals much annoyance and perplexity. Consequently many ingenious traps were laid for him, but to no purpose. Into some he walked with unsuspecting boldness, though contriving to fight his way to safety again, and usually, in so doing, inflicting greater loss on the enemy than would be sustained by his own command.

These reiterated and, at times, disastrous failures having demonstrated the futility of all covert attempts, General Grant, and later, General Sheridan, felt driven to the adoption of measures that were destined to entail much suffering and loss on the guiltless and non-combatant element of Loudoun's population. Under date of August 16, 1864, Grant despatched the following arbitrary order to General Sheridan: