Now, in English, the plural form is the same for all three persons. Hence we say I and you are friends, you and I are friends, I and he are friends, &c., so that for the practice of language, the question as to the relative dignity of the three persons is a matter of indifference.

Nevertheless, it may occur even in English. Whenever two or more pronouns of different persons, and of the singular number, follow each other disjunctively, the question of concord arises. I or you,—you or he,—he or I. I believe that, in these cases, the rule is as follows:—

1. Whenever the words either or neither precede the pronouns, the verb is in the third person. Either you or I is in the wrong; neither you nor I is in the wrong.

2. Whenever the disjunctive is simple (i.e. unaccompanied with the word either or neither) the verb agrees with the first of the two pronouns.

Now, provided that they are correct, it is clear that the English language knows nothing about the relative degrees of dignity between these three pronouns; since its habit is to make the verb agree with the one which is placed first—whatever may be the person. I am strongly inclined to believe that the same is the case in Latin; in which case (in the sentence ego et Balbus sustulimus manus) sustulimus agrees, in person, with ego, not because the first person is the worthiest, but because it comes first in the proposition,

§ 489. In the Chapter on the Impersonal Verbs, it is stated that the construction of me-thinks is peculiar.

This is because in Anglo-Saxon the word þincan = seem. Hence me-thinks is φαίνεταί μοι, or mihi videtur, and me is a dative case, not an accusative.

The þencan = think, was, in Anglo-Saxon, a different word.

CHAPTER XXII.

ON THE VOICES OF VERBS.

§ 490. In English there is neither a passive nor a middle voice.

The following couplet from Dryden's "Mac Flecnoe" exhibits a construction which requires explanation:—

Here the word hight = was called, and seems to present an instance of the participle being used in a passive sense without the so-called verb substantive. Yet it does no such thing. The word is no participle at all; but a simple preterite. Certain verbs are naturally either passive or active, as one of two allied meanings may predominate. To be called is passive; so is, to be beaten. But, to bear as a name is active; so is, to take a beating. The word, hight, is of the same class of verbs with the Latin vapulo; and it is the same as the Latin word, cluo.—Barbican cluit = Barbican audivit = Barbican it hight.

CHAPTER XXIII.

ON THE AUXILIARY VERBS.

§ 491. The auxiliary verbs, in English, play a most important part in the syntax of the language. They may be classified upon a variety of principles. The following, however, are all that need here be applied.

A. Classification of auxiliaries according to their inflection or non-inflectional powers.—Inflectional auxiliaries are those that may either replace or be replaced by an inflection. Thus—I am struck = the Latin ferior, and the Greek τύπτομαι. These auxiliaries are in the same relation to verbs that prepositions are to nouns. The inflectional auxiliaries are,—

1. Have; equivalent to an inflection in the way of tense—I have bitten = mo-mordi.

2. Shall; ditto. I shall call = voc-abo.

3. Will; ditto. I will call = voc-abo.

4. May; equivalent to an inflection in the way of mood. I am come that I may see = venio ut vid-eam.

5. Be; equivalent to an inflection in the way of voice. To be beaten = verberari, τύπτεσθαι.

6. Am, art, is, are; ditto. Also equivalent to an inflection in the way of tense. I am moving = move-o.

7. Was, were; ditto, ditto. I was beaten = ἐ-τύφθην. I was moving = move-bam.

Do, can, must, and let, are non-inflectional auxiliaries.

B. Classification of auxiliaries according to their non-auxiliary significations.—The power of the word have in the combination of I have a horse is clear enough. It means possession. The power of the same word in the combination I have been is not so clear; nevertheless it is a power which has grown out of the idea of possession. This shows that the power of a verb as an auxiliary may be a modification of its original power; i.e., of the power it has in non-auxiliary constructions. Sometimes the difference is very little: the word let, in let us go, has its natural sense of permission unimpaired. Sometimes it is lost altogether. Can and may exist only as auxiliaries.

1. Auxiliary derived from the idea of possession—have.

2. Auxiliaries derived from the idea of existence—be, is, was.

3. Auxiliary derived from the idea of future destination, dependent upon circumstances external to the agent—shall. There are etymological reasons for believing that shall is no present tense, but a perfect.

4. Auxiliary derived from the idea of future destination, dependent upon the volition of the agent—will. Shall is simply predictive; will is predictive and promissive as well.

5. Auxiliary derived from the idea of power, dependent upon circumstances external to the agent—may.

6. Auxiliary derived from the idea of power, dependent upon circumstances internal to the agent—can. May is simply permissive; can is potential. In respect to the idea of power residing in the agent being the cause which determines a contingent action, can is in the same relation to may as will is to shall.

"May et can, cum eorum præteritis imperfectis, might et could, potentiam innuunt: cum hoc tamen discrimine: may et might vel de jure vel saltem de rei possibilitate, dicuntur, at can et could de viribus agentis."—Wallis, p. 107.

7. Auxiliary derived from the idea of sufferance—let.

8. Auxiliary derived from the idea of necessity—must.

"Must necessitatem innuit. Debeo, oportet, necesse est urere, I must burn. Aliquando sed rarius in præterito dicitur must (quasi ex must'd seu must't contractum). Sic, si de præterito dicatur, he must (seu must't) be burnt, oportebat uri seu necesse habuit ut ureretur."—Wallis, 107.

9. Auxiliary derived from the idea of action—do.

C. Classification of auxiliary verbs in respect to their mode of construction.—Auxiliary verbs combine with others in three ways.

1. With participles.—a) With the present, or active, participle—I am speaking: b) With the past, or passive, participle—I am beaten, I have beaten.

2. With infinitives.—a) With the objective infinitive—I can speak: b) With the gerundial infinitive—I have to speak.

3. With both infinitives and participles.—I shall have done, I mean to have done.

D. Auxiliary verbs may be classified according to their effect.—Thus—have makes the combination in which it appears equivalent to a tense; be to a passive form; may to a sign of mood, &c.

This sketch of the different lights under which auxiliary verbs may be viewed, has been written for the sake of illustrating, rather than exhausting, the subject.

§ 492. The combination of the auxiliary, have, with the past participle requires notice. It is, here, advisable to make the following classifications.

1. The combination with the participle of a transitive verb.—I have ridden the horse; thou hast broken the sword; he has smitten the enemy.

2. The combination with the participle of an intransitive verb,—I have waited; thou hast hungered; he has slept.

3. The combination with the participle of the verb substantive, I have been; thou hast been; he has been.

It is by examples of the first of these three divisions that the true construction is to be shown.

For an object of any sort to be in the possession of a person, it must previously have existed. If I possess a horse, that horse must have had a previous existence.

Hence, in all expressions like I have ridden a horse, there are two ideas, a past idea in the participle, and a present idea in the word denoting possession.

For an object of any sort, affected in a particular manner, to be in the possession of a person, it must previously have been affected in the manner required. If I possess a horse that has been ridden, the riding must have taken place before I mention the fact of the ridden horse being in my possession; inasmuch as I speak of it as a thing already done,—the participle, ridden, being in the past tense.

I have ridden a horse = I have a horse ridden = I have a horse as a ridden horse, or (changing the gender and dealing with the word horse as a thing) I have a horse as a ridden thing.

In this case the syntax is of the usual sort. (1) Have = own = habeo = teneo; (2) horse is the accusative case equum; (3) ridden is a past participle agreeing either with horse, or with a word in apposition with it understood.

Mark the words in italics. The word ridden does not agree with horse, since it is of the neuter gender. Neither if we said I have ridden the horses, would it agree with horses; since it is of the singular number.

The true construction is arrived at by supplying the word thing. I have a horse as a ridden thing = habeo equum equitatum (neuter). Here the construction is the same as triste lupus stabulis.

I have horses as a ridden thing = habeo equos equitatum (singular, neuter). Here the construction is—

or in Greek—

The classical writers supply instances of this use of have. Compertum habeo, milites, verba viris virtutem non addere = I have discovered = I am in possession of the discovery. Quæ cum ita sint, satis de Cæsare hoc dictum habeo.

The combination of have with an intransitive verb is irreducible to the idea of possession: indeed, it is illogical. In I have waited, we cannot make the idea expressed by the word waited the object of the verb have or possess. The expression has become a part of language by means of the extension of a false analogy. It is an instance of an illegitimate imitation.

The combination of have with been is more illogical still, and is a stronger instance of the influence of an illegitimate imitation. In German and Italian, where even intransitive verbs are combined with the equivalents to the English have (haben, and avere), the verb substantive is not so combined; on the contrary, the combinations are

which is logical.

§ 493. I am to speak.—Three facts explain this idiom.

1. The idea of direction towards an object conveyed by the dative case, and by combinations equivalent to it.

2. The extent to which the ideas of necessity, obligation, or intention are connected with the idea of something that has to be done, or something towards which some action has a tendency.

3. The fact that expressions like the one in question historically represent an original dative case, or its equivalent; since to speak grows out of the Anglo-Saxon form to sprecanne, which, although called a gerund, is really a dative case of the infinitive mood.

When Johnson thought that, in the phrase he is to blame, the word blame was a noun, if he meant a noun in the way that culpa is a noun, his view was wrong. But if he meant a noun in the way that culpare, ad culpandum, are nouns, it was right.

§ 494. I am to blame.—This idiom is one degree more complex than the previous one; since I am to blame = I am to be blamed. As early, however, as the Anglo-Saxon period the gerunds were liable to be used in a passive sense: he is to lufigenne = not he is to love, but he is to be loved.

The principle of this confusion may be discovered by considering that an object to be blamed, is an object for some one to blame, an object to be loved is an object for some one to love.

§ 495. I am beaten.—This is a present combination, and it is present on the strength of the verb am, not on the strength of the participle beaten, which is præterite.

The following table exhibits the expedients on the part of the different languages of the Gothic stock, since the loss of the proper passive form of the Mœso-Gothic.

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE SYNTAX OF ADVERBS.

§ 496. The syntax of the adverb is simpler than that of any other part of speech, excepting, perhaps, that of the adjective.

Adverbs have no concord.

Neither have they any government. They seem, indeed, to have it, when they are in the comparative or superlative degree; but it is merely apparent. In this is better than that, the word that is governed neither by better nor by than. It is not governed at all. It is a nominative case; the subject of a separate proposition. This is better (i.e., more good) than that is good. Even if we admit such an expression as he is stronger than me to be good English, there is no adverbial government. Than, if it govern me at all, governs it as a preposition.

The position of an adverb is, in respect to matters of syntax, pre-eminently parenthetic; i.e., it may be omitted without injuring the construction. He is fighting—now; he was fighting—then; he fights—bravely; I am almost—tired, &c.

§ 497. By referring to the Chapter on the Adverbs, we shall find that the neuter adjective is frequently converted into an adverb by deflection. As any neuter adjective may be so deflected, we may justify such expressions as full (for fully) as conspicuous (for conspicuously), and peculiar (for peculiarly) bad grace, &c. We are not, however, bound to imitate everything that we can justify.

§ 498. The termination -ly was originally adjectival. At present it is a derivational syllable by which we can convert an adjective into an adverb: brave, brave-ly. When, however, the adjective ends in -ly already, the formation is awkward. I eat my daily bread is unexceptionable English; I eat my bread daily is exceptionable. One of two things must here take place: the two syllables ly are packed into one (the full expression being dai-li-ly), or else the construction is that of a neuter adjective deflected.

Adverbs are convertible. The then men = οἱ νῦν βρότοι, &c. This will be seen more clearly in the Chapter on Conjunctions.

§ 499. It has been remarked that in expressions like he sleeps the sleep of the righteous, the construction is adverbial. So it is in expressions like he walked a mile, it weighs a pound. The ideas expressed by mile and pound are not the names of anything that serves as either object or instrument to the verb. They only denote the manner of the action, and define the meaning of the verb.

§ 500. From whence, from thence.—This is an expression which, if it have not taken root in our language, is likely to do so. It is an instance of excess of expression in the way of syntax; the -ce denoting direction from a place, and the preposition doing the same. It is not so important to determine what this construction is, as to suggest what it is not. It is not an instance of an adverb governed by a preposition. If the two words be dealt with as logically separate, whence (or thence) must be a noun = which place (or that place); just as from then till now = from that time to this. But if (which is the better view) the two words be dealt with as one (i.e., as an improper compound) the preposition from has lost its natural power, and become the element of an adverb.

CHAPTER XXV.

ON PREPOSITIONS.

§ 501. All prepositions govern an oblique case. If a word ceases to do this, it ceases to be a preposition. In the first of the two following sentences the word up is a preposition, in the second an adverb.

All prepositions in English, precede the noun which they govern. I climbed up the tree, never I climbed the tree up. This is a matter not of government, but of collocation. It is the case in most languages; and, from the frequency of its occurrence, the term pre-position (or pre-fix) has originated. Nevertheless, it is by no means a philological necessity. In many languages the prepositions are post-positive, following their noun.

§ 502. No preposition, in the present English, governs a genitive case. This remark is made, because expressions like the part of the body = pars corporis,—a piece of the bread = portio panis, make it appear as if the preposition of did so. The true expression is, that the preposition of followed by an objective case is equivalent in many instances, to the genitive case of the classical languages.

CHAPTER XXVI.

ON CONJUNCTIONS.

§ 503. A conjunction is a part of speech which connects propositions,—the day is bright, is one proposition. The sun shines, is another. The day is bright because the sun shines is a pair of propositions connected by the conjunction, because.

From this it follows, that whenever there is a conjunction, there are two subjects, two copulas, and two predicates: i.e., two propositions in all their parts.

But this may be expressed compendiously. The sun shines, and the moon shines may be expressed by the sun and moon shine.

Nevertheless, however compendious may be the expression, there are always two propositions wherever there is one conjunction. A part of speech that merely combines two words is a preposition,—the sun along with the moon shines.

It is highly important to remember that conjunctions connect propositions.

It is also highly important to remember that many double propositions may be expressed so compendiously as to look like one. When this takes place, and any question arises as to the construction, they must be exhibited in their fully expanded form, i.e., the second subject, the second predicate, and the second copula must be supplied. This can always be done from the first proposition,—he likes you better than me = he likes you better than he likes me. The compendious expression of the second proposition is the first point of note in the syntax of conjunctions.

§ 504. The second point in the syntax of conjunctions is the fact of their great convertibility. Most conjunctions have been developed out of some other part of speech.

The conjunction of comparison, than, is derived from the adverb of time, then: which is derived from the accusative singular of the demonstrative pronoun.

The conjunction, that, is derived also from a demonstrative pronoun.

The conjunction, therefore, is a demonstrative pronoun + a preposition.

The conjunction, because, is a substantive governed by a preposition.

One and the same word, in one and the same sentence, may be a conjunction or preposition, as the case may be.

All fled but John.—If this mean all fled except John, the word but is a preposition, the word John is an accusative case, and the proposition is single. If instead of John, we had a personal pronoun, we should say all fled but him.

All fled but John.—If this mean all fled but John did not fly, the word but is a conjunction, the word John is a nominative case, and the propositions are two in number. If, instead of John, we had a personal pronoun, we should say, all fled but he.

From the fact of the great convertibility of conjunctions it is often necessary to determine whether a word be a conjunction or not. If it be a conjunction, it cannot govern a case. If it govern a case it is no conjunction but a preposition. A conjunction cannot govern a case, for the following reasons,—the word that follows it must be the subject of the second proposition, and as such, a nominative case.

§ 505. The third point to determine in the syntax of conjunctions is the certainty or uncertainty in the mind of the speaker as to the facts expressed by the propositions which they serve to connect.

1. Each proposition may contain a certain, definite, absolute fact—the day is clear because the sun shines. Here there is neither doubt nor contingency of either the day being clear, or of the sun shining.

Of two propositions one may be the condition of the other—the day will be clear if the sun shine. Here, although it is certain that if the sun shine the day will be clear, there is no certainty of the sun shining. Of the two propositions one only embodies a certain fact, and that is certain only conditionally.

Now an action, wherein there enters any notion of uncertainty, or indefinitude, and is at the same time connected with another action, is expressed, not by the indicative mood, but by the subjunctive. If the sun shine (not shines) the day will be clear.

Simple uncertainty will not constitute a subjunctive construction,—I am, perhaps, in the wrong.

Neither will simple connection.—I am wrong, because you are right.

But, the two combined constitute the construction in question,—if I be wrong, you are right.

Now, a conjunction that connects two certain propositions may be said to govern an indicative mood.

And a conjunction that connects an uncertain proposition with a certain one, may be said to govern a subjunctive mood.

The government of mood is the only form of government of which conjunctions are capable.

§ 506. Previous to the question of the government of conjunctions in the way of mood, it is necessary to notice certain points of agreement between them and the relative pronouns; inasmuch as, in many cases, the relative pronoun exerts the same government, in the way of determining the mood of the verb, as the conjunction.

Between the relative pronouns and conjunctions in general there is this point of connection,—both join propositions. Wherever there is a relative, there is a second proposition. So there is wherever there is a conjunction.

Between certain relative pronouns and those particular conjunctions that govern a subjunctive mood there is also a point of connection. Both suggest an element of uncertainty or indefinitude. This the relative pronouns do, through the logical elements common to them and to the interrogatives: these latter essentially suggesting the idea of doubt. Wherever the person, or thing, connected with an action, and expressed by a relative is indefinite, there is room for the use of a subjunctive mood. Thus—"he that troubled you shall bear his judgment, whosoever he be."

§ 507. By considering the nature of such words as when, their origin as relatives on the one hand, and their conjunctional character on the other hand, we are prepared for finding a relative element in words like till, until, before, as long as, &c. These can all be expanded into expressions like until the time when, during the time when, &c. Hence, in an expression like seek out his wickedness till thou find (not findest) none, the principle of the construction is nearly the same as in he that troubled you, &c., or vice versâ.^[64]

§ 508. In most conditional expressions the subjunctive mood should follow the conjunction. All the following expressions are conditional.

2. Let us go and sacrifice to the Lord our God, lest he fall upon us with pestilence.—Old Testament.

5. Although my house be not so with God.—Old Testament.

6. He shall not eat of the holy thing unless he wash his flesh with water.—Old Testament.

Expressions like except and unless are equally conditional with words like if and provided that, since they are equivalent to if—not.

Expressions like though and although are peculiar. They join propositions, of which the one is a primâ facie reason against the existence of the other: and this is the conditional element. In the sentence, if the children be so badly brought-up, they are not to be trusted, the bad bringing-up is the reason for their being unfit to be trusted; and, as far as the expression is concerned, is admitted to be so. The only uncertainty lies in the question as to the degree of the badness of the education. The inference from it is unequivocal.

But if, instead of saying if, we say although, and omit the word not, so that the sentence run although the children be so badly brought-up they are to be trusted, we do two things: we indicate the general relation of cause and effect that exists between bad bringing-up and unfitness for being trusted, but we also, at the same time, take an exception to it in the particular instance before us. These remarks have been made for the sake of showing the extent to which words like though, &c., are conditional.

It must be remembered, however, that conjunctions, like the ones lately quoted, do not govern subjunctive moods because they are conditional, but because, in the particular condition which they accompany, there is an element of uncertainty.

§ 509. This introduces a fresh question. Conditional conjunctions are of two sorts:—

1. Those which express a condition as an actual fact, and one admitted as such by the speaker.

2. Those which express a condition as a possible fact, and one which the speaker either does not admit, or admits only in a qualified manner.

Since the children are so badly brought-up, &c.—This is an instance of the first construction. The speaker admits as an actual fact the bad bringing-up of the children.

If the children be so badly brought-up, &c.—This is an instance of the second construction. The speaker admits as a possible (perhaps, as a probable) fact the bad bringing-up of the children: but he does not adopt it as an indubitable one.

§ 510. Now, if every conjunction had a fixed unvariable meaning, there would be no difficulty in determining whether a condition was absolute, and beyond doubt, or possible, and liable to doubt. But such is not the case.

Although may precede a proposition which is admitted as well as one which is doubted.

If, too, may precede propositions wherein there is no doubt whatever implied: in other words it may be used instead of since.

In some languages this interchange goes farther than in others; in the Greek, for instance, such is the case with εἰ, to a very great extent indeed.

Hence we must look to the meaning of the sentence in general, rather than to the particular conjunction used.

It is a philological fact that if may stand instead of since.

It is also a philological fact that when it does so it should be followed by the indicative mood.

This is written in the way of illustration. What applies to if applies to other conjunctions as well.

§ 511. As a point of practice, the following method of determining the amount of doubt expressed in a conditional proposition is useful:—

Insert, immediately after the conjunction, one of the two following phrases,—(1.) as is the case; (2.) as may or may not be the case. By ascertaining which of these two supplements expresses the meaning of the speaker, we ascertain the mood of the verb which follows.

When the first formula is the one required, there is no element of doubt, and the verb should be in the indicative mood. If (as is the case), he is gone, I must follow him.

When the second formula is the one required, there is an element of doubt, and the verb should be in the subjunctive mood. If (as may or may not be the case) he be gone, I must follow him.

§ 512. The use of the word that in expressions like I eat that I may live, &c., is a modification of the subjunctive construction, that is conveniently called potential. It denotes that one act is done for the sake of supplying the power or opportunity for the performance of another.

The most important point connected with the powers of that is the so-called succession of tenses.

§ 513. The succession of tenses.—Whenever the conjunction that expresses intention, and consequently connects two verbs, the second of which takes place after the first, the verbs in question must be in the same tense.

In the Greek language this is expressed by a difference of mood; the subjunctive being the construction equivalent to may, the optative to might. The Latin idiom coincides with the English.

A little consideration will show that this rule is absolute. For a man to be doing one action (in present time) in order that some other action may follow it (in past time) is to reverse the order of cause and effect. To do anything in A.D. 1851, that something may result from it in 1850 is a contradiction; and so it is to say I do this that I might gain by it.

The reasons against the converse construction are nearly, if not equally cogent. To have done anything at any previous time in order that a present effect may follow, is, ipso facto, to convert a past act into a present one, or, to speak in the language of the grammarian, to convert an aorist into a perfect. To say I did this that I may gain by it, is to make, by the very effect of the expression, either may equivalent to might, or did equivalent to have done.

§ 514. Disjunctives.—Disjunctives (or, nor) are of two sorts, real and nominal.

A king or queen always rules in England. Here the disjunction is real; king or queen being different names for different objects. In all real disjunctions the inference is, that if one out of two (or more) individuals (or classes) do not perform a certain action, the other does.

A sovereign or supreme ruler always rules in England. Here the disjunction is nominal; sovereign and supreme governor being different names for the same object. In all nominal disjunctives the inference is, that if an agent (or agents) do not perform a certain action under one name, he does (or they do) it under another.

Nominal disjunctives are called by Harris subdisjunctives.

In the English language there is no separate word to distinguish the nominal from the real disjunctive. In Latin, vel is considered by Harris to be disjunctive, sive subdisjunctive. As a periphrasis, the combination in other words is subdisjunctive.

Both nominal and real disjunctives agree in this,—whatever may be the number of nouns which they connect, the construction of the verb is the same as if there were but one—Henry, or John, or Thomas, walks (not walk); the sun, or solar luminary, shines (not shine). The disjunctive isolates the subject, however much it may be placed in juxtaposition with other nouns.

CHAPTER XXVII.

THE SYNTAX OF THE NEGATIVE.

§ 515. When the verb is in the infinitive mood, the negative precedes it.—Not to advance is to retreat.

When the verb is not in the infinitive mood, the negative follows it.—He advanced not. I cannot.

This rule is absolute. It only seems to precede the verb in such expressions as I do not advance, I cannot advance, I have not advanced, &c. However, the words do, can, and have, are no infinitives; and it consequently follows them. The word advance is an infinitive, and it consequently precedes it. Wallis's rule makes an equivalent statement, although differently. "Adverbium negandi not (non) verbo postponitur (nempe auxiliari primo si adsit; aut si non adsit auxiliare, verbo principali): aliis tamen orationis partibus præfigi solet."—P. 113.

That the negative is rarely used, except with an auxiliary, in other words, that the presence of a negative converts a simple form like it burneth not into the circumlocution it does not burn, is a fact in the practice of the English language. The syntax is the same in either expression.

§ 516. What may be called the distribution of the negative is pretty regular in English. Thus, when the word not comes between an indicative, imperative, or subjunctive mood and an infinitive verb, it almost always is taken with the word which it follows—I can not eat may mean either I can—not eat (i.e., I can abstain), or I can not—eat (i.e., I am unable to eat); but, as stated above, it almost always has the latter signification.

But not always. In Byron's "Deformed Transformed" we find the following lines:—