Section 1. The Existence Of Merit

1. Heretical Errors and the Teaching of the Church.—a) The medieval Beguins and Beghards held that man is able to attain such a perfect state of holiness here below as no longer to require an increase of grace or good works.1226 Luther, holding that justification consists in the covering up of sin and the external imputation of the justice of Christ, consistently though falsely asserted that “the just man sins in every good work,”1227 that “a good work, no matter how well performed, is a venial sin,”1228 and that “every work of the just deserves damnation and is mortally sinful, if it be considered as it really is in the judgment of God.”1229 Calvin rejected good works as “impurities and defilements,”1230 which God covers with the cloak of the merits of Jesus Christ and which He sometimes rewards with temporal blessings but never [pg 400] with eternal life. Modern Protestantism has given up or at least attenuated these harsh doctrines.1231

b) The Church had defined her teaching on this point centuries before the time of the “Reformers.” Thus the Second Council of Orange declared as early as 529: “Good works, when performed, deserve a reward; but grace, which is a free gift, precedes good works and is a necessary condition of them.”1232 The Fourth Lateran Council reiterated this doctrine: “Not only virgins and those who practice continence, but the married also, who please God by having the right faith and performing good works, deserve to obtain eternal happiness.”1233 The Tridentine Council goes into the matter at length in the sixteenth Chapter of its Sixth Session, where we read inter alia: “And for this reason life eternal is to be proposed to those working well unto the end and hoping in God, both as a grace mercifully promised to the sons of God through Jesus Christ, and as a reward which is according to the promise of God Himself to be faithfully rendered to their good works and merits.”1234

[pg 401]

The same Council formally condemned the Lutheran position as heretical: “If anyone saith that in every good work the just man sins at least venially, or, which is more intolerable still, mortally, and consequently deserves eternal punishments; and that for this cause only he is not damned that God does not impute those works unto salvation; let him be anathema.”1235 The positive teaching of the Church may be gathered from the following condemnation: “If anyone saith that the just ought not, for their good works done in God, to expect and hope for eternal recompense from God through His mercy and the merit of Jesus Christ, if so be that they persevere to the end in well-doing and in keeping the commandments; let him be anathema.”1236 The existence of merit in the true and proper sense of the term is specially emphasized as follows: “If anyone saith that ... the justified, by the good works which he performs through the grace of God and the merit of Jesus Christ, whose living member he is, does not truly merit increase of grace...; let him be anathema.”1237 The quietistic errors of Michael de Molinos [pg 402] were condemned by Pope Innocent XI, Nov. 20, 1687.1238

2. The Meritoriousness of Good Works Demonstrated from Scripture and Tradition.—Both Holy Scripture and Tradition employ opus bonum and meritum as reciprocal or correlative terms.

a) In the Old Testament the good deeds of the just are often declared to be meritorious in the sight of God. Cfr. Wisd. V, 16: “But the just shall live for evermore, and their reward is with the Lord.”1239 Ecclus. XVIII, 22: “Be not afraid to be justified even to death, for the reward of God continueth for ever.”1240 The New Testament teaching culminates in the “eight beatitudes,” each of which is accompanied by a special reward. After enumerating them all, with the promises attached to each, our Divine Saviour significantly adds: “Be glad and rejoice, for your reward is very great in heaven.”1241

St. Paul, who so strongly insists on the absolute gratuitousness of Christian grace, nevertheless acknowledges the existence of merits to which a reward is due from God. Cfr. Rom. II, 6 sq.: “[God] will render to every man according to his works, to them indeed who according [pg 403] to patience in good work, seek glory and honor and incorruption, eternal life.”1242 2 Tim. IV, 7 sq.: “I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith. As to the rest, there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord the just judge will render to me in that day, and not only to me, but to them also that love his coming.”1243 1 Cor. III, 8: “Every man shall receive his own reward, according to his own labor.”1244 Col. III, 23 sq.: “Whatsoever you do, do it from the heart, as to the Lord, and not to men, knowing that you shall receive of the Lord the reward of inheritance.”1245 The most eloquent exponent of the necessity of good works is St. James, who also insists on their meritoriousness: “Blessed is the man that endureth temptation; for when he hath been proved, he shall receive the crown of life, which God hath promised to them that love him.”1246 In the Apocalypse Jesus says: “Be thou faithful until death, and I will give thee the crown of life.”1247

b) The teaching of the Fathers is an effective commentary on the Scriptural doctrine just expounded, [pg 404] as may be seen from their homilies reproduced in the Roman Breviary.

St. Ignatius of Antioch says: “Suffer me to be eaten by the beasts, through whom I can attain to God.”1248 St. Irenæus: “Precious should be to us the crown which we gain in battle, ... and the more we obtain it by combat, the more precious it is.”1249 St. Ambrose: “Is it not evident that the reward and punishment of merits endure after death?”1250 St. Augustine: “Eternal life contains the whole reward in the promise of which we rejoice; nor can the reward precede desert, nor be given to a man before he is worthy of it. What can be more unjust than this, and what is more just than God? We should not then demand the reward before we deserve to get it.”1251 And again: “As death is given, so to speak, to reward the merit of sin, so eternal life is given to reward the merit of justice, ... and hence it is also called reward in many Scriptural passages.”1252

c) Theologically the meritoriousness of good works is based on the providence of God. There must be some sort of sanction to enforce the divine laws,—not only the natural law (lex naturae), [pg 405] but, a fortiori, the “law of grace” (lex gratiae), as the supernatural order is so much more important than the natural.

α) By the good works which he performs in the state of sanctifying grace, and with the aid of actual graces (in gratia et ex gratia), man acquires a twofold merit,—he helps to execute the divine plan of governance in regard to his fellow-creatures and assists in furthering the external glory of God, which is the ultimate purpose of creation. For this he is entitled to a double reward, just as the sinner is deserving of a double punishment for the injury he does to his fellowmen and the dishonor he reflects upon his Creator.1253

It is objected against this argument that our supernatural merits, being finite, are in no proportion to the possession and enjoyment of an Infinite Good. This objection vanishes in the light of the following considerations: (1) Sanctifying grace is a kind of deificatio, which raises man above himself to a quasi-divine dignity that colors all his actions.1254 (2) The ability of the justified to perform supernaturally good works is based entirely upon the infinite merits of Jesus Christ.1255 (3) The Infinite Good is possessed by the creature, not in an infinite but in a merely finite manner. Hence there is a due proportion between good works and merit.1256

[pg 406]

One difficulty still remains, viz.: By what title do infants who die in the state of baptismal innocence attain to eternal beatitude, which they have been unable to merit? We answer: The just man has two distinct claims to Heaven, one as a child of God,1257 and another as a laborer in His vineyard. Baptized infants who have not yet arrived at the use of reason, possess only the first claim, while adult Christians who lead a good life enjoy also the titulus mercedis and consequently are entitled to a richer reward. Both claims ultimately rest on the merits of Jesus Christ.1258

β) What we have said is sufficient to disprove the groundless assertion that the Catholic doctrine concerning the meritoriousness of good works derogates from the merits of Christ and fosters “self-righteousness.” Would it not be far more derogatory to the honor of our Saviour to assume that He failed to obtain for those for whom He suffered and died, a limited capacity for gaining merits? Does it in any way impair the dignity of God as the causa prima to assume that He communicates to His creatures a limited causality, by which they are enabled to act as true causae secundae, instead of being mere causae occasionales, as the Occasionalists assert?1259 As regards the other charge, no true Catholic is guilty of “self-righteousness” because he regards his good works [pg 407] as “fruits of justification,” owing purely to grace. The “self-righteousness” of which Luther speaks is incompatible with the virtue of humility. The faithful Christian, according to St. Paul, may safely rejoice over his merits, because the uncertainty of justification and the consciousness that his good works are but limited at best, are a sufficient protection against self-righteousness and presumption.1260

3. Explanation of the Catholic Doctrine.—Though the Tridentine Council merely defined in general terms that all good works performed in the state of sanctifying grace are meritorious,1261 it is theologically certain that the merit due to good works is the merit of condignity.

a) According to Pallavicini1262 the Fathers of Trent without exception were convinced that the merit inherent in good works is a meritum de condigno, based upon divine justice, and they purposely employed the term vere to exclude that quasi-merit which in the technical terminology of the Schools is called meritum de congruo.1263 They refrained from expressly employing the term meritum de condigno, because meritum verum is a plain and adequate term, and for this additional reason that they wished to avoid certain theological controversies [pg 408] regarding the nature of the meritum de condigno and its requisites.1264

b) We need not enter into these controversies to understand that condign merit supposes an equality between service and reward. The proposition can be proved from Sacred Scripture by an indirect argument. The meritum de condigno is based on a strict claim of justice, not on mere equity. Now the Bible leaves no doubt that God meant to make himself a debtor to man in strict justice. Cfr. Heb. VI, 10: “For God is not unjust, that he should forget your work.”1265 2 Tim. IV, 8: “... there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord the just judge will render to me in that day: and not only to me, but to them also that love his coming.”1266 James I, 12: “Blessed is the man that endureth temptation; for when he hath been proved, he shall receive the crown of life, which God hath promised to them that love him.”1267 That there must be a condignitas between service and reward is clearly apparent from such texts as these:—Wis. III, 5: “... God hath tried them and found them worthy of himself.”1268 2 Thess. I, 4 sq.: “... in all your persecutions and tribulations, which you endure, for an example [as a token] of the just judgment of God, that you may be counted worthy of the kingdom of God, for which also you suffer.”1269 Apoc. III, 4: “... they shall walk with me in white, because they are worthy.”1270 Not merely as their benefactor but as the just judge, Christ will say [pg 409] to the elect on judgment day: “Come, ye blessed of my Father, possess you the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world. For I was hungry, and you gave me to eat....”1271 Justly therefore is sanctifying grace, as the principium dignificativum operum, called the “seed of God,”1272 because it contains a celestial reward even as an acorn contains the oak. True, St. Thomas, to whom we are indebted for this simile,1273 in another part of the Summa1274 defends the theological axiom: “Deus punit circa condignum et remunerat ultra condignum,” but he does not mean to deny the equality between service and reward, but merely to exalt the generosity that prompts God to bestow upon creatures what is due to them more bountifully than they deserve. Cfr. Luke VI, 38: “Give, and it shall be given to you: good measure and pressed down and shaken together and running over shall they give into your bosom.”1275

Section 2. The Requisites Of Merit

As we are dealing with the “fruits of justification,” it becomes necessary to ascertain the requisites or conditions of true merit. There are seven such; four have reference to the meritorious work itself, two to the agent who performs it, and one to God who gives the reward.

1. Requisites of Merit on the Part of the Meritorious Work.—A work, to be meritorious, must be morally good, free, performed with the assistance of actual grace, and inspired by a supernatural motive.

a) As every evil deed implies demerit and is deserving of punishment, so the notion of merit supposes a morally good work (opus honestum).

Cfr. Eph. VI, 8: “Knowing that whatsoever good thing any man shall do, the same shall he receive from the Lord.”1276 2 Cor. V, 10: “We must all be manifested before the judgment-seat of Christ, that every one may receive the proper things of the body, according as he hath done, whether it be good or evil.”1277 There are no morally indifferent works in individuo, i.e. practically; and if there were, they could be neither meritorious nor [pg 411] demeritorious, but would become meritorious in proportion as they are made morally good by means of a “good intention.” It would be absolutely wrong to ascribe merit only to the more perfect works of supererogation (opera supererogatoria), such as the vow of perpetual chastity, excluding all works of mere obligation, such as the faithful observance of the commandments. Being morally good, the works of obligation are also meritorious, because goodness and meritoriousness are correlative terms.1278 Whether the mere omission of an evil act is in itself meritorious, is doubtful.1279 But most theologians are agreed in holding that the external work, as such, adds no merit to the internal act, except in so far as it reacts on the will and sustains and intensifies its operation. This and similar questions properly belong to moral theology.

b) The second requisite of merit is moral liberty (libertas indifferens ad actum), that is to say, freedom from both external and internal compulsion. This has been dogmatically defined against Jansenius.1280

That there can be no merit without liberty is clearly inculcated by Sacred Scripture. Cfr. 1 Cor. IX, 17: “For if I do this willingly, I have a reward.”1281 Matth. XIX, 17: “If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments.”1282 [pg 412] “Where there is compulsion,” says St. Jerome, “there is neither a crown nor damnation.”1283 The morality of an act depends entirely on its being an actus humanus. Now no act is truly “human” unless it be freely performed. Consequently, freedom of choice is an indispensable condition of moral goodness and therefore also of merit.

What kind of liberty is necessary to enable the will to acquire merit? Theologians answer by saying that it is libertas contradictionis sive exercitii. If I do a good deed which I am free to do or not to do, I perform a morally good and therefore meritorious work. As regards the libertas specificationis, (that freedom by which a person may act thus or otherwise, e.g. give alms to one applicant in preference to another, or mortify himself in this or that particular manner), there can be no doubt that, whatever the choice made, the action is always good and meritorious. However, theologians have excogitated a hypothetical case in which an action may be physically free without being meritorious. It is when one is compelled to do a certain thing and is free only in so far as he is able to choose between two actions exactly equal in moral worth. This would be the case, for instance, if he had to pay a debt of ten dollars and were left free to pay it either in [pg 413] coin or in currency. The more common opinion is that in a case of this kind there would be a lack of that liberty which is necessary to render an act morally good and therefore meritorious.1284

c) The third requisite of merit is actual grace. Its necessity is evident from the fact that, to be meritorious, an act must be supernatural and consequently cannot be performed without the aid of prevenient and coöperating grace.1285

d) Merit further requires a supernatural motive, for the reason that every good work must be supernatural, both as regards object and circumstances (ex obiecto et circumstantiis), and the end for which it is performed (ex fine). In determining the necessary qualities of this motive, however, theologians differ widely.

α) A considerable number, mostly of the Thomist persuasion, demand the motive of theological charity, and consequently regard the state of charity (caritas habitualis sive status caritatis et gratiae) as essential for the meritoriousness of all good works performed in the state of grace, even if they are performed from some other, truly supernatural though inferior motive, such as obedience, the fear of God, etc. This rigorous school is constrained to raise the question whether every single good work, to be supernaturally meritorious, must proceed from an act of divine charity (toties quoties), or [pg 414] whether the virtual influence of one act is sufficient to endow a series of subsequent acts with meritoriousness. Only a few Thomist theologians1286 defend the first-mentioned theory. The majority1287 hold that the influxus virtualis caritatis is sufficient. This view is vigorously defended by Cardinal Bellarmine, who says: “It is not enough to make a general good intention at the beginning of a year, or month, or day, by which all future actions are referred to God; but it is necessary to refer each particular act to God before it is performed.”1288 The advocates of this theory base their opinion on certain Scriptural and Patristic texts, and especially on St. Thomas, whose teaching they misunderstand.1289

The dogmatic question whether good works can be meritorious without being inspired by supernatural charity, has nothing to do with the moral problem whether there is an obligation to make an act of charity from time to time, except in so far as habitual charity,—i.e. the state of charity, which is always required for merit, nay even for the preservation of sanctifying grace,—cannot be permanently sustained unless renewed from time to time and effectuated by a fresh act of that virtue.1290 St. [pg 415] Alphonsus teaches that every man is obliged to make an act of charity at least once a month, but he is contradicted by other eminent moralists. In practice it is well to insist on frequent acts of charity because such acts not only confirm and preserve the state of grace, but render our good works incomparably more meritorious in the sight of God. Hence, too, the importance of making a “good intention” every morning before beginning the day's work.1291

β) There is a second group of very eminent theologians, including Suarez,1292 Vasquez,1293 De Lugo, and Ballerini, who hold that, to be meritorious, the good works of a just man, who has habitual charity, need only conform to the divine law, no special motive being required. These writers base their teaching on the Tridentine decree which says: “For this is that crown of justice which the Apostle declared was, after his fight and course, laid up for him, to be rendered to him by the Just Judge, and not only to him, but also to all that love His coming. For, whereas Jesus Christ Himself continually infuses His virtue into the said justified,—as the head into the members and the vine into the branches,—and this virtue always precedes, and accompanies, and follows their good works, which without it could not in any wise be pleasing and meritorious before God (can. 2), we must believe that nothing further is wanting to the justified to prevent their being accounted to have, by those very works which have been done in God, fully satisfied the divine law according to the state of this life, and to have truly merited eternal life, [pg 416] to be obtained also in its [due] time, if so be, however, that they depart in grace.”1294 This teaching is in harmony with Scripture. The Bible nowhere requires an act of charity to make good works meritorious for Heaven. In the “eight beatitudes”1295 our Lord Himself promises eternal glory for works which are not all works of charity, nor even dictated by charity, either formal or virtual. When He was asked: “Master, what good shall I do that I may have life everlasting?”1296 he did not answer with Bellarmine: “Steep all thy works in the motive of charity,” but declared: “If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments.”1297 And when requested to specify, He simply cited the ordinary precepts of the Decalogue.1298 We also know that at the Last Judgment He will receive the elect into the “kingdom of His Father” solely in consideration of the works of mercy they have done.1299

Theological reasoning lends its support to this view. If good works performed without the motive of charity were not supernaturally meritorious, this would be attributable to one of three causes. Either the just would [pg 417] sin by doing good; or good works performed without charity would not be deserving of eternal beatitude; or, finally, there would be no strict equality between service and reward. All three of these suppositions are untenable. The first would lead to Bajanism or Jansenism.1300 The second and third overlook the fact that the requisite proportion (condignitas) between service and reward is furnished by sanctifying grace or habitual charity, which, as deificatio, adoptive sonship, and union with the Holy Ghost, actually supplies that for which the motivum caritatis is demanded.

We might ask the advocates of the more rigorous opinion, whence the act of charity which they demand for every meritorious work, derives its peculiar proportionality or condignitas with the beatific vision. Surely not from itself, because as an act it is merely primus inter pares, without in any essential respect excelling other motives. There is no alternative but to attribute it to that quasi-divine dignity which is imparted to the just man and his works by sanctifying grace.

For these reasons present-day theology regards the second theory as sufficiently well established and the faithful are largely guided by it in practice.1301

2. Requisites of Merit on the Part of the Agent who Merits.—The agent who merits must be a wayfarer and in the state of sanctifying grace.

a) The wayfaring state (status viae) is merely another name for life on earth. Death as the [pg 418] natural, though not essentially necessary limit of life, closes the time of meriting. Nothing is more clearly taught in Holy Scripture than that we must sow in this world if we desire to reap in the next.1302

b) The second requisite is the state of sanctifying grace. Only the just can be “sons of God” and “heirs of heaven.”1303 Cfr. John XV, 4: “As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, unless it abide in the vine, so neither can you, unless you abide in me.”1304 Rom. VIII, 17: “And if sons, heirs also; heirs indeed of God, and joint heirs with Christ.”1305

Does the degree of sanctifying grace existing in the soul exert a decisive influence on the amount of merit due to the good works performed? This question can be easily solved on the theological principle that the supernatural dignity of the soul increases in proportion to its growth in sanctifying grace. Vasquez holds that, other things being equal, one who is holier gains no greater merit by performing a given work than one who is less [pg 419] holy.1306 All other theologians1307 hold with St. Thomas1308 that the meritoriousness of a good deed is larger in proportion to the godlike dignity of the agent, which in turn is measured by the degree of sanctifying grace in the soul. This explains why God, in consideration of the greater holiness of some saints who are especially dear to Him, often deigns through their intercession to grant favors which He refuses to others.1309

3. The Requisites of Merit on the Part of God.—Merit requires but one thing on the part of God, viz.: that He accept the good work in actu secundo as deserving of reward. Since, however, theologians are not agreed on this point, we are dealing merely with a more or less well-founded opinion.

Though the good works of the just derive a special intrinsic value from the godlike dignity of adoptive sonship, and, consequently, in actu primo, are truly meritorious prior to and apart from their acceptance by God, yet human service and divine remuneration are separated by such a wide gulf that, in order to make a good deed meritorious in actu secundo, the divine acceptance and promise of reward must be expressly superadded.

In regard to the relation between service and reward Catholic theologians are divided into three schools.

The Scotists1310 hold that the condignitas of a good work [pg 420] rests entirely on God's gratuitous promise and free acceptance, without which even the most heroic act would be utterly devoid of merit, whereas with it even naturally good works may become meritorious. This rather shallow theory almost completely loses sight of the godlike dignity peculiar to the just in their capacity of “adopted children of God” and “temples of the Holy Ghost,” and is unable to account for such important Biblical terms as “crown of justice,” “prize of victory,” “just judge,” etc.

Suarez and his school contend that there is such a perfectly balanced equality between merit and reward that God is obliged in strict justice (ex obligatione iustitiae), prior to and apart from any formal act of acceptance or promise on His part, to reward good works by the beatific vision. This view is scarcely tenable because there is no common basis on which to construe a relation of strict justice between the Creator and His creatures,1311 and moreover St. Paul expressly teaches that “The sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come.”1312

Hence we prefer to hold with Lessius,1313 Vasquez,1314 and De Lugo1315 that the condignitas or equality existing between merit and reward, owes its origin both to the intrinsic value of the good work itself and to the free acceptance and gratuitous promise of God. This solution duly respects the intrinsic value of merit in actu primo, without derogating from the sublime dignity of God, who rewards good works not because He is obliged to do so [pg 421] by the merits of a mere creature, but solely because He is bound by His own truthfulness and fidelity. Thus God's justice towards His creatures is placed upon a free basis, and there is no violation of justice (iniuria) on His part. “From the fact that our actions have no merit except on the supposition that God so ordained,” says St. Thomas, “it does not follow that God is simply our debtor; He is His own debtor, i.e. He owes it to Himself to see that His commands are obeyed.”1316 This teaching can be proved from Sacred Scripture. Cfr. James I, 12: “He shall receive the crown of life, which God hath promised to them that love him.”1317 It is reechoed by St. Augustine: “God is made our debtor, not by receiving anything from us, but because it pleased Him to promise us something. For it is in a different sense that we say to a man: You are indebted to me because I have given you something, and: You owe this to me because you have promised it. To God we never say: Give back to me because I have given to Thee. What have we given to God, since it is from Him that we have received whatever we are and whatever good we possess? We have therefore given Him nothing.... In this manner, therefore, may we demand of God, by saying: Give me what Thou hast promised, because we have done what Thou didst command, and it is Thyself that hast done it because Thou hast aided our labors.”1318 The Tridentine [pg 422] Council seems to endorse this view when it says: “Life eternal is to be proposed to those ... hoping in God ... as a reward which is, according to the promise of God Himself, to be faithfully rendered to their good works and merits.”1319