On the subject, method, and purpose of the course of Lectures.
The subject stated to be the struggle of the human mind against the Christian revelation, in whole or in part. (p. 1.) Explanation of the points which form the occasion of the conflict. (pp. 1-3.)
The mode of treatment, being that of a critical history, includes (p. 3) the discovery of (1) the facts, (2) the causes, and (3) the moral.
The main part of this first lecture is occupied in explaining the second of these divisions.
Importance, if the investigation were to be fully conducted, of carrying out a comparative study of religions and of the attitude of the mind in reference to all doctrine that rests on authority. (pp. 4-6.)
The idea of causes implies,
I. The law of the operation of the causes.
II. The enumeration of the causes which act according to this assumed law.
The empirical law, or formula descriptive of the action of reason on religion, is explained to be one form of the principle of progress by antagonism, the conservation or discovery of truth by means of inquiry and controversy; a merciful Providence leaving men responsible for their errors, but ultimately overruling evil for good. (p. 7.)
This great fact illustrated in the four Crises of the Christian faith in Europe, viz. In the struggle
(1) With heathen philosophy, about A.D. 160-360. (p. 8.)
(2) With sceptical tendencies in Scholasticism, in the middle ages (1100-1400). (p. 8.)
(3) With literature, at the Renaissance, in Italy (1400-1625). (p. 9.)
[pg xxxii](4) With modern philosophy in three forms (p. 11): viz. English Deism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (p. 11); French Infidelity in the eighteenth century; German Rationalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth.
Proposal to study the natural as well as literary history of these forms of doubt.—The investigation separated from inquiries into heresy as distinct from scepticism. (p. 13.)
The causes, seen to act according to the law just described, which make free thought develope into unbelief, stated to be twofold. (p. 13.)
1. Emotional causes.—Necessity for showing the relation of the intellectual causes to the emotional, both per se, and because the idea of a history of thought, together with the comparative rarity of the process here undertaken, implies the restriction of the attention mainly to the intellectual. (p. 13.)
Influence of the emotional causes shown, both from psychology and from the analysis of the nature of the evidence offered in religion (pp. 14, 15).—Historical illustrations of their influence. (pp. 15-17.)
Other instances where the doubt is in origin purely intellectual (p. 17), but where nevertheless opportunity is seen for the latent operation of the emotional. (p. 18.)
Explanation how far religious doubt is sin. (pp. 19, 20.)
2. Intellectual causes, which are the chief subject of these lectures; the conjoint influence however of the emotional being always presupposed.
The intellectual causes shown to be (p. 20):
(α) the new material of knowledge which arises from the advance of the various sciences; viz. Criticism; Physical, Moral, and Ontological science. (p. 21.)
(β) the various metaphysical tests of truth or grounds of certitude employed. (p. 22.)
An illustration of the meaning (pp. 22, 23), drawn from literature, in a brief comparison of the types of thought shown in Milton, Pope, and Tennyson.
Statement of the exact position of this inquiry in the subdivisions of metaphysical science (pp. 24, 25), and detailed explanation of the advantages and disadvantages of applying to religion the tests of Sense, subjective Forms of Thought, Intuition, and Feeling, respectively; as the standard of appeal. (pp. 25-32.)
Advantage of a biographic mode of treatment in the investigation of the operation of these causes in the history of doubt. (pp. 32-34.)
[pg xxxiii]Statement of the utility of the inquiry:
(1) Intellectually, (α) in a didactic and polemical point of view, in that it refers the origin of the intellectual elements in error to false philosophy and faulty modes of judging, and thus refutes error by analysing it into the causes which produce it; and also (β) in an indirect contribution to the Christian evidences by the historic study of former contests. (p. 36.)
(2) Morally, in creating deep pity for the sinner, united with hatred for the sin. (p. 36.)
Concluding remarks on the spirit which has influenced the writer in these lectures. (pp. 37, 38.)
The literary opposition of Heathens against Christianity in the early ages.
The first of the four crises of the faith. (pp. 39-74.) Agreement and difference of this crisis with the modern. (p. 40.) Sources for ascertaining its nature, the original writings of unbelievers being lost. (pp. 41, 42.)
Preliminary explanation of four states of belief among the heathens in reference to religion, from which opposition to Christianity would arise: (pp. 43-118) viz.
(1) the tendency to absolute disbelief of religion, as seen in Lucian and the Epicurean school. (p. 43.) (2) a reactionary attachment to the national creed,—the effect of prejudice in the lower orders, and of policy in the educated. (pp. 45, 46.) (3) the philosophical tendency, in the Stoics, (p. 44) and Neo-Platonists. (pp. 45, 46.) (4) the mystic inclination for magic rites. (p. 47.)
Detailed critical history of the successive literary attacks on Christianity. (p. 48 seq.)
1. that of Lucian, about A.D. 170, in the Peregrinus Proteus. (pp. 48-50.) 2. that of Celsus, about the same date. (pp. 50-55.) 3. that of Porphyry, about 270. (pp. 56-61.) 4. that of Hierocles about 303, founded on the earlier work of Philostratus respecting the life of Apollonius of Tyana. (pp. 62-64.) 5. that of Julian, A.D. 363; an example of the struggle in deeds as well as in ideas. (pp. 65-68.)
(Account of the Philopatris of the Pseudo-Lucian. (p. 67.))
Conclusion; showing the relation of these attacks to the intellectual [pg xxxiv] tendencies before mentioned (p. 69), and to the general intellectual causes sketched in Lect. I. (p. 69.)—Insufficiency of these causes to explain the whole phenomenon of unbelief, unless the conjoint action of emotional causes be supposed. (pp. 71, 72.)
Analogy of this early conflict to the modern. Lessons from consideration of the means by which the early Church repelled it. (pp. 72-74.)
Free Thought during the middle ages, and at the Renaissance; together with its rise in modern times.
This period embraces the second and third of the four epochs of doubt, and the commencement of the fourth. Brief outline of the events which it includes. (pp. 75, 76.)
Second crisis, from A.D. 1100-1400. (pp. 76-92.) It is a struggle political as well as intellectual, Ghibellinism as well as scepticism. (p. 76.)
The intellectual tendencies in this period are four:
1. The scepticism developed in the scholastic philosophy, as seen in the Nominalism of Abélard in the twelfth century. Account of the scholastic philosophy, pp. 77-80; and of Abélard as a sceptic in his treatise Sic et Non. (pp. 81-85.) 2. The mot of progress in religion in the Franciscan book called The Everlasting Gospel in the thirteenth century. (pp. 86, 87.) 3. The idea of the comparative study of religion, as seen in the legend of the book De Tribus Impostoribus in the thirteenth century; and in the poetry of the period. (pp. 88, 89.) 4. The influence of the Mahometan philosophy of Averroes in creating a pantheistic disbelief of immortality. (pp. 90, 91.)
Remarks on the mode used to oppose these movements; and critical estimate of the period. (pp. 91, 92.)
Third crisis, from 1400-1625. (pp. 93-105.) Peculiarity of this period as the era of the Renaissance and of “Humanism,” and as the transition from mediæval society to modern. (p. 93.)
Two chief sceptical tendencies in it:
(1) The literary tendency in Tuscany and Rome in the fifteenth century; the dissolution of faith being indicated by (a) the poetry of the romantic epic. (p. 94.) (b) the revival of heathen tastes. (p. 95.)
Estimate of the political and social causes likely to generate doubt, which were then acting. (pp. 97, 98.) the unbelief was confined to Italy.—Reasons why so vast a movement as the Reformation passed without fostering unbelief. (p. 99.)
[pg xxxv]2. The philosophical tendency in the university of Padua in the sixteenth century. (p. 99 seq.) The spirit of it, pantheism (p. 100), in two forms; one arising from the doctrines of Averroes; the other seen in Pomponatius, from Alexander of Aphrodisias. (p. 101.) The relation of other philosophers, such as Bruno and Vanini, to this twofold tendency. (pp. 102-104.)
Remarks on the mode used to oppose doubt (p. 104); and estimate of the crisis. (p. 105.)
Fourth crisis; (pp. 105-339) commencing in the seventeenth century, through the effects of the philosophy of Bacon and Descartes. (p. 106.)
The remainder of the lecture is occupied with the treatment of the influence of Cartesianism, as seen in Spinoza.
Examination of Spinoza's philosophy (pp. 106-110); of his criticism in the Theologico-Politicus (pp. 109-113); and of his indirect influence. (p. 113, 114.)
Concluding remarks on the government of Providence, as witnessed in the history of large periods of time, such as that comprised in this lecture. (p. 115.)
Deism in England previous to A.D. 1760.
This lecture contains the first of the three forms which doubt has taken in the fourth crisis. (p. 116.)—Sketch of the chief events, political and intellectual, which influenced the mind of England during the seventeenth century (p. 117); especial mention of the systems of Bacon and Descartes, as exhibiting the peculiarity that they were philosophies of method. (pp. 117, 118.)
The history of Deism studied:
I. Its rise traced, 1640-1700. (pp. 119-125.) In this period the religious inquiry has a political aspect, as seen (1) in Lord Herbert of Cherbury (De Veritate and Religio Laici) in the reign of Charles I. (pp. 119, 120.) (2) In Hobbes's Leviathan. (pp. 121, 122.) (3) In Blount (Oracles of Reason, and Life of Apollonius), in the reign of Charles II., in whom a deeper political antipathy to religion is seen. (pp. 123, 124.)
II. The maturity of Deism (1700-1740), pp. 125-144. This period includes (p. 127):
1. The examination of the first principles of religion, on its doctrinal side, in Toland's Christianity not Mysterious, &c. (pp. 126-130.) 2. Ditto, on its ethical side, in Lord Shaftesbury. (pp. 130, 131.) 3. An attack on the external evidences, viz. On prophecy, by Collins, Scheme of Literal Prophecy, &c. (pp. 132-136). [pg xxxvi] On Miracles, by Woolston, Discourses on Miracles. (pp. 136-138); and by Arnobius. (p. 143.) 4. The substitution of natural religion for revealed, in Tindal, Christianity as old as the Creation. (pp. 138-140.), in Morgan, Moral Philosopher. (pp. 140, 141.), and in Chubb, Miscellaneous Works. (pp. 142, 143.)
III. The decline of Deism, 1740-1760. (pp. 144-153): 1. in Bolingbroke, a combined view of deist objections. (pp. 143-147.) 2. in Hume, an assault on the evidence of testimony, which substantiates miracles. (pp. 147-153.)
Remarks on the peculiarities of Deism, the intellectual causes which contributed to produce it (pp. 154, 155); and a comparison of it with the unbelief of other periods. (p. 156.)
Estimate of the whole period; and consideration of the intellectual and spiritual means used for repelling unbelief in it (pp. 157-161); the former in the school of evidences, of which Butler is the type, the mention of whom leads to remarks on his Analogy (pp. 157-159); and the latter in spiritual labours like those of Wesley. (pp. 160, 161.)
Infidelity in France in the eighteenth century; and unbelief in England subsequent to 1760.
Infidelity in France (pp. 163-194).—This is the second phase of unbelief in the fourth crisis of faith.
Sketch of the state of France, ecclesiastical, political (pp. 164, 165,) and intellectual (partly through the philosophy of Condillac, pp. 166, 167), which created such a mental and moral condition as to allow unbelief to gain a power there unknown elsewhere.—The unbelief stated to be caused chiefly by the influence of English Deism, transplanted into the soil thus prepared. (p. 203.)
The history studied (1) in its assault on the Church; as seen in Voltaire; the analysis of whose character is necessary, because his influence was mainly due to the teacher, not the doctrine taught. (pp. 169-176.) (2) in the transition to an assault on the State, in Diderot, (pp. 179, 180); the philosophy of the Encyclopædists (p. 177); Helvetius (p. 180); and D'Holbach. (p. 181.) (3) in the attack on the State, in Rousseau (pp. 183-187).—Analysis of the Emile for his views on religion, (p. 185), and comparison with Voltaire. (p. 188.) [pg xxxvii] (4) in the Revolution, both the political movement and blasphemous irreligion (pp. 188, 189); and the intellectual movement in Volney (Analysis of the Ruines, pp. 191, 192).
Estimate of the period (pp. 193, 194).
Unbelief in England, from 1760 to a date a little later than the end of the century (pp. 194-209), continued from Lecture IV.
These later forms of it stated to differ slightly from the former, by being partially influenced by French thought. (p. 195.)
The following instances of it examined:
(1) Gibbon viewed as a writer and a critic on religion (pp. 196-199). (2) T. Paine: account of his Age of Reason (pp. 199-201). (3) The socialist philosophy of R. Owen (p. 202). (4) The scepticism in the poetry of Byron and Shelley (pp. 203-207).
The last two forms of unbelief, though occurring in the present century, really embody the spirit of the last.
Statement of the mode used to meet the doubt in England during this period. Office of the Evidences (pp. 207-209).
Free Thought in the Theology of Germany, from 1750-1835.
This is the third phase of free thought in that which was called the fourth crisis of faith.—Importance of the movement, which is called “rationalism,” as the theological phase of the literary movement of Germany (p. 210).—Deviation from the plan previously adopted, in that a sketch is here given of German theological inquiry generally, and not merely of unbelief (p. 211).
Brief preliminary sketch of German theology since the Reformation. Two great tendencies shown in it during the seventeenth century (p. 211).
(1) The dogmatic and scholastic, science without earnestness (p. 212). (2) The pietistic, earnestness without science (p. 213).
In the first half of the eighteenth century, three new influences are introduced (pp. 213, 214), which are the means of creating rationalism in the latter half: viz.
(α) The philosophy of Wolff, explained to be a formal expression of Leibnitz's principles; and the evil effect of it, accidental and indirect (pp. 214-216). (β) The works of the English deists (p. 216). (γ) The influence of the colony of French infidels at the court of Frederick II. of Prussia (p. 217).
[pg xxxviii]The subsequent history is studied in three periods (p. 218); viz.
Period I. (1750-1810).—Destructive in character, inaugurated by Semler (pp. 218-234). Period II. (1810-1835).—Reconstructive in character, inaugurated by Schleiermacher (pp. 239-261). Period III. (1835 to present time)—Exhibiting definite and final tendencies, inaugurated by Strauss (Lect. VII).
Period I. (1750-1810), is studied under two Sub-periods:
Sub-period I. (1750-1790, pp. 219-228), which includes three movements; (1) Within the church (p. 219 seq.); dogmatic; literary in Michaelis and Ernesti; and freethinking in Semler (pp. 221-224), the author of the historic method of interpretation. (2) External to the church (pp. 224-226); literary deism in Lessing, and in the Wolfenbüttel fragments of Reimarus (p. 225). (3) External to the church; practical deism, in the educational institutions of Basedow (p. 227).
Sub-period II. (1790-1810, pp. 227-234); the difference caused by the introduction of two new influences; viz,
(α) The literary, of the court of Weimar and of the great men gathered there (p. 228). (β) The philosophy of Kant, (the effect of which is explained, pp. 229, 230); the home of both of which was at Jena.
As the result of these new influences, three movements are visible in the Church (p. 230); viz,
(1) The critical “rationalism” of Eichhorn and Paulus, the intellectual successors of Semler (pp. 231, 232). (2) The dogmatic, more or less varying from orthodoxy, seen towards the end of this period in Bretschneider, Röhr, and Wegscheider (pp. 233, 234). (3) The supernaturalism of Reinhardt and Storr (p. 231).
Period II. (1810-1835.)—Introduction of four new influences (p. 235), which completely altered the theological tone; viz. (α) New systems of speculative philosophy; of Jacobi, who followed out the material element of Kant's philosophy (p. 235); and of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, who followed out the formal (p. 238). (β) The “romantic” school of poetry (p. 239). (γ) The moral tone, generated by the liberation wars of 1813. (p. 240.) (δ) The excitement caused by the theses of Harms at the tercentenary of the Reformation in 1817. (pp. 240, 241.)
[pg xxxix]The result of these is seen (p. 241) in
(1) An improved doctrinal school under Schleiermacher (pp. 241-250), (description of his Glaubenslehre, p. 245 seq.); and under his successors, Neander, &c. (pp. 250-252.) (2) An improved critical tone (p. 252 seq.) as seen in De Wette and Ewald, which is illustrated by an explanation of the Pentateuch controversy (pp. 254-258).
Concluding notice of two other movements to be treated in the next lecture (p. 259); viz.
(1) an attempt, different from that of Schleiermacher, in the school of Hegel, to find a new philosophical basis for Christianity; and (2) the return to the biblical orthodoxy of the Lutheran church.
Remarks on the benevolence of Providence in overruling free inquiry to the discovery of truth. (pp. 259-261).
Free Thought in Germany subsequently to 1835; and in France during the present century.
Free Thought in Germany (continued).—History of the transition from Period II. named in the last lecture, to Period III. (pp. 262-274.)
Explanation of the attempt, noticed pp. 242, 259, of the Hegelian school to find a philosophy of Christianity. Critical remarks on Hegel's system, (pp. 263-267-267); its tendency to create an “ideological” spirit in religion (p. 264):—the school which it at first formed is seen best in Marheinecke. (p. 265.)
The circumstance which created an epoch in German theology was the publication of Strauss's Leben Jesu in 1835 (p. 266). Description of it (α) in its critical aspect (pp. 267, 270), which leads to an explanation of the previous discussions in Germany concerning the origin and credibility of the Gospels (pp. 268, 269); and (β) in its philosophical, as related to Hegel (p. 270); together with an analysis of the work (p. 271). Statement of the effects produced by it on the various theological parties. (pp. 272, 273.)
Period III. As the result of the agitation caused by Strauss's work, four theological tendencies are seen; viz.
(1) One external to the church, thoroughly antichristian, as in Bruno Bauer, Feuerbach, and Stirner. (pp. 274-276.) (2) The historico-critical school of Tübingen, founded by Chr. Bauer. (pp. 277-279.) (3) The “mediation” school, seen in Dorner and Rothe, (pp. 279-282.) (4) A return to the Lutheran orthodoxy, (pp. 282-285,) at first partly created by an attempt to unite the Lutheran and Reformed churches, (p. 282); seen in the “Neo-Lutheranism” of Hengstenberg and Hävernick, (p. 282), and the “Hyper-Lutheranism” [pg xl] of Stahl and the younger members of the school. (pp. 283, 285.)
Mention of the contemporaneous increase of spiritual life in Germany. (p. 285.)
Concluding estimate of the whole movement, (pp. 286, 287); and lessons for students in reference to it. (pp. 288, 289.)
Free Thought in France during the present century (pp. 290-305), (continued from Lect. IV. p. 194.)
In its tone it is constructive of belief, if compared with that of the eighteenth century.
From 1800-1852.
The speculative thought has exhibited four distinct forms. (p. 290.)
(1) The ideology of De Tracy, in the early part of the century. (2) The theological school of De Maistre, &c. to re-establish the dogmatic authority of the Romish church. (3) Socialist philosophy, St. Simon, Fourier, Comte. (4) The Eclectic school (Cousin, &c.)
Remarks on the first school.—The recovery of French philosophy and thought from the ideas of this school, partly due to the literary tone of Chateaubriand. (pp. 290, 291.)
Influence of the Revolution of 1830 in giving a stimulus to thought. (p. 291.)
Remarks on the third school.—Explanation of socialism as taught by St. Simon (pp. 292, 293); as taught by Fourier (pp. 293, 294); and difference from English socialism. (p. 294.)
Positivism, both as an offshoot of the last school, and in itself as a religion and a philosophy. (pp. 295, 296.)
Remarks on the fourth school.—Eclecticism as taught by Cousin, viewed as a philosophy and a religion. (pp. 297-299.)
Remarks on the second school; viewed as an attempt to refute the preceding schools. (p. 300.)
From 1852-1862.
New form of eclecticism under the empire (p. 302), viz. the historic method, based on Hegel, as Cousin's was based on Schelling.—E. Renan the type. (pp. 302-304.)
Free thought in the Protestant church (pp. 304, 305) regarded as an attempt to meet by concession doubts of contemporaries.
Free Thought in England in the present century: Summary of the Course of Lectures: and Inferences in reference to present dangers and duties.
Modern unbelief in England (continued from Lect V.):—Introductory remarks on the alteration of its tone. (pp. 306, 307.)—The cause of [pg xli] which is stated to be a general one, the subjective tone created (p. 308) by such influences as, (1) the modern poetry (p. 309), and (2) the two great attempts by Bentham and Coleridge to reconstruct philosophy. (pp. 309, 310.)
The doubt and unbelief treated in the following order (p. 311):
(1) That which appeals to Sensational experience and to Physical science as the test of truth; viz. (α) Positivism among the educated (p. 312). (β) Secularism or Naturalism among the masses (p. 313); and in a minor degree, (γ) The doubts created by Physical science (p. 314). (2) That which appeals to the faculty of Intuition (p. 315);—expressed in literature, by Carlyle, (pp. 316, 317); and by the American, Emerson. (p. 317.) Influence also of the modern literature of romance, (p. 318.) (3) Direct attacks on Christianity, critical rather than philosophical: viz. (α) The examination of the historic problem of the development of religious ideas among the Hebrews, by R. W. Mackay (pp. 319, 320). (β) A summary of objections to revelation, by Mr. Greg, The Creed of Christendom (p. 321). (γ) The examination of the psychical origin of religion and Christianity, by Miss S. Hennell, Thoughts in aid of Faith, (p. 323.) (4) The deism, and appeal to the Intuitional consciousness, expressed by Mr. Theodore Parker (pp. 325, 326), and Mr. F. Newman (pp. 326-329). (5) The traces of free thought within the Christian church (p. 330); viz.: (α) The philosophical tendency which originates with Coleridge. (pp. 330-333.) (β) The critical tendency, investigating the facts of revelation. (pp. 334-336.) (γ) The critical tendency, the literature which contains it. (pp. 336, 337.)
This completes the history of the fourth crisis of faith (p. 339), the history of which began near the end of Lect. III. at p. 105.
Summary of the course of lectures. (pp. 339-41.)—Recapitulation of the original purpose, which is stated to have been, while assuming the potency of the moral, to analyse the intellectual causes of doubt, which have been generally left uninvestigated.
Refutation of objections which might be made; such as
(1) One directed against the utility of the inquiry. (p. 342.) (2) One directed against its uncontroversial character.
A critical history shown to be useful in the present age, (1) in an educational point of view for those who are to be clergymen, and to encounter [pg xlii] current forms of doubt by word or by writing (pp. 342-345); and (2) in a controversial point of view, by resolving the intellectual element in many cases of unbelief into incorrect metaphysical philosophy; the value of which inquiry is real, even if such intellectual causes be regarded only as the conditions, and not the causes, of unbelief. (p. 345.)
Further objections anticipated and refuted in reference (3) to the candour of the mode of inquiry, and the absence of vituperation which is stated not to be due to indifference to Christian truth, but wholly to the demands of a scientific mode of treatment (p. 346); (4) to the absence of an eager advocacy of any particular metaphysical theory; which is due to the circumstance that the purpose was to exhibit errors as logical corollaries from certain theories, without assuming the necessary existence of these corollaries in actual life (p. 347); (5) to the insufficiency of the causes enumerated to produce doubt without taking account of the moral causes; which objection is not only admitted, but shown to be at once the peculiar property which belongs to the analysis of intellectual phenomena, and also a witness to the instinctive conviction that the ultimate cause of belief and unbelief is moral, not intellectual; which had been constantly assumed. (p. 347.)
The Lessons derived from the whole historical survey. (p. 348 seq.)
I. What has been the office of doubt in history? (p. 348.)
Opposite opinions on this subject stated. (p. 348.) Examination of the ordinary Christian opinion on the one hand, which regards it as a mischief (p. 348), and of Mr. Buckle's on the other, which regards it as a good. (p. 349.)
1. The office is shown to be, to bring all truths to the test. (p. 349.) Historical instances of its value in destroying the Roman catholic errors. (p. 350.)
2. Free inquiry also shown in some cases to be forced on man by the presentation of new knowledge, which demands consideration. (p. 350.) Denial of the statement that the doubts thus created are an entire imitation of older doubt. (p. 352.)
3. The office of it in the hands of Providence to elicit truth by the very controversies which it creates (p. 352); the responsibility of the inquirer not being destroyed, but the overruling providence of God made visible. (p. 353.)
II. What does the history teach, as to the doubts most likely to present themselves at this time, and the best modes of meeting them? (p. 353.)
The materials shown to be presented for a final answer to these questions. (p. 354.)
The probability shown from consideration of the state of the various sciences, mechanical, physiological (p. 355), and mental (p. 355), that no new difficulties can be suggested hereafter, distinct in kind from the present; nor any unknown kinds of evidence presented on behalf of Christianity.
Analogy of the present age as a whole, in disintegration of belief, to the declining age of Roman civilization. (p. 356.)
[pg xliii]The doubts which beset us in the present age stated to be chiefly three (p. 357), viz.:
1. The relation of the natural to the supernatural. This doubt is sometimes expressed in a spirit of utter unbelief; sometimes in a tone of sadness (p. 358), arising from mental struggles, of which some are enumerated (p. 358). The intellectual and moral means of meeting these doubts. (p. 359.)
2. The relation of the atoning work of Christ to the human race. (p. 360.) Explanation of the defective view which would regard it only as reconciling man to God, and would destroy the priestly work of Christ; and statement of the modes in which its advocates reconcile it with Christianity. (p. 361.)
The importance that such doubts be answered by reason, not merely silenced by force. (p. 362.)
An answer sought by studying the various modes used in other ages of the church (p. 362); especially by those who have had to encounter the like difficulties, e.g. the Alexandrian fathers in the third century, and the faithful in Germany in the present. (p. 363.)
This method shown to have been to present the philosophical prior to the historical evidence, in order to create the sense of religious want, before exhibiting Christianity as the divine supply for it. (p. 364.)
In regard to the historic evidence, three misgivings of the doubter require to be met for his full satisfaction (p. 366); viz.
(α) The literary question of the trustworthiness of the books of the New Testament.
The mode of meeting this explained, with the possibility of establishing Christian dogmas, even if the most extravagant rationalism were for argument's sake conceded. (p. 367.)
(β) The doubt whether the Christian dogmas, and especially the atonement, are really taught in the New Testament. The value of the fathers, and the progress of the doctrine in church history, shown in reference to this question. (p. 368.)
(γ) The final difficulty which the doubter may put, whether even apostolic and miraculous teaching is to overrule the moral sense. (p. 369.)
The possibility shown of independent corroboration of the apostolic teaching, in the testimony of the living church, and the experience of religious men. (p. 371.)
The utter improbability of error in this part of scriptural teaching, even if the existence of error elsewhere were for argument's sake conceded. (p. 370.)
Difference of this appeal from that of Schleiermacher to the Christian consciousness.
[pg xliv]3. The relation of the Bible to the church, whether it is a record or an authority. (p. 372.)
Statement of the modes of viewing the question in different ages. (p. 373.)
The Bible an authority; but the importance shown of using wisdom in not pressing the difficulties of scripture on an inquirer, so as to quench incipient faith. (p. 374.)
The mention of the emotional causes of doubt conjoined with the intellectual, a warning that, in addition to all arguments, the help of the divine Spirit to hallow the emotions must be sought and expected. (p. 375.)
Final lesson to Christian students, that in all ages of peril, earnest men have found the truth by the method of study united to prayer. (pp. 376-379.)