11. The constitution of Byzantium was at first royal,784 afterwards aristocratical,785 and the oligarchy, which soon succeeded, was, in 390 B.C., changed by Thrasybulus the Athenian into democracy.786 Equal privileges were at the same time probably granted to the new citizens, who, on account of their demands, had been driven from the city by the ancient colonists.787 After this, the democracy appears to have continued for a long time;788 but on account of the duration of this form of government, and the habit of passing their [pg 175] time in the market-place and the harbour, which the people had contracted from the situation of the town, a great dissoluteness of manners existed; and this was also transferred to the neighbouring city of Chalcedon, which had adopted the Byzantine democracy, and, together with its ancient constitution, had lost the temperance and regularity for which it had been distinguished. In these times the Byzantians were frequently in great financial difficulties, from which they often endeavoured to extricate themselves by violent measures.789 In the document quoted by Demosthenes, the senate (βωλὰ) transfers a decree in its first stage, called ῥήτρα,790 to an individual, in order to bring it before the people in the assembly (ἁλία), nearly in the same manner as was customary at Athens; the existing constitution is called in this document ἁ πάτριος πολιτεία. The office of archon was perhaps introduced together with the democracy;791 the civil authority of the generals existed in many states in later times. The hundreds (ἑκατοστῦς) occur apparently as a subdivision of the tribes,792 and therefore as a species of phratriæ;793 they were probably common to all the colonies of Megara, since we find them in Heraclea on the Pontus. In this city we know to a certainty that the hundreds were divisions of the tribes, of which there were three;794 the rich (i.e., the [pg 176] possessors of the original lots) were all in the same hundred; but the demagogues, intending to destroy the aristocracy, divided the people into sixty new hundreds, independent of the tribes, in which rich and poor were entered without distinction: nearly the same measure as that by which Cleisthenes had so greatly raised the democracy at Athens.

This Heraclea Pontica, a settlement in part of Bœotians, but chiefly from Megara,795 had doubtless originally possessed the same constitution as other Doric colonies; and the different classes were, first, the possessors of the original lots; secondly, a demus, or popular party, who had settled either at the same time or subsequently; and, thirdly, the bondslaves, the Mariandynians.796 Although we are not able to give any detailed account of the changes in the government of this state, it may be observed, that for a time the citizens alone had political power (the πολίτευμα); but that the people had the privilege of judging (that is, probably in civil cases), which occasioned a change in the constitution.797 Before 364 B.C. the popular party demanded with violence an abolition of debts, and a new division of the territory; the senate, which at that time was not a body selected from the people, but from the aristocracy,798 at length, being unable to act for itself, knew no other means than to call in the assistance of Clearchus, an exile, who immediately [pg 177] marched with a body of soldiers into the city. But, instead of protecting the dignity of those who had called him in, he became a leader of the people, and, what in fact he is already, who sets the blind fury and physical force of the multitude in action against justice and good order—a tyrant.799 Clearchus put to death sixty of the members of the senate, whom he had seized,800 liberated their slaves, i.e., the Mariandynians; and compelled their wives and daughters to marry these bondsmen, unquestionably the best means of extirpating an hereditary aristocracy; but the pride of noble descent was so strong in the breasts of these women, that the greater number freed themselves from the disgrace by suicide. It must be supposed, that a tyranny administered in so violent a spirit, and continued through several generations, destroyed every vestige of the ancient constitution.801

12. In the Spartan colony of Cnidos the government was a close aristocracy. At the head of the state was a council of sixty members, who were chosen from among the nobles. Its powers were precisely the same as those of the Spartan gerusia, from which its number is also copied. It debated concerning all [pg 178] public affairs, previously to their being laid before the assembly of the people, and had the superintendence of manners. The office lasted for life, and was subject to no responsibility.802 The members were styled ἀμνήμονες, and the president was called ἀφεστὴρ, who inquired the opinion of each councillor. Only one person from each family was eligible to the council and public offices, younger brothers being excluded. This occasioned dissensions between members of the same family; those who were not admitted joined the popular party, and the oligarchy was overthrown.803 This event probably took place a short time before the life of Aristotle. Eudoxus the philosopher, and Archias, a person of whom little is known, are mentioned as legislators of the Cnidians.804

In the Spartan island of Melos we find nothing remarkable, except that the power of the magistrates was at least greater than at Athens,805 Of the ancient constitution of Thera, and of its ephors, we have already spoken.806

13. The changes in the government of Cyrene we pointed out when speaking of the Periœci. Originally the constitution was perhaps nearly similar to that of Sparta. Afterwards the ancient rights of the colonists came into collision with the claims of the later settlers, and at the same time the kings obtained an unconstitutional and nearly tyrannical power. It appears that they were stimulated by their connexion, both by friendship and marriage, with the sovereigns of Egypt, to change the ancient [pg 179] royalty into an oriental despotism. Hence, in the reign of Battus III., Demonax the Mantinean, who was called in to frame a constitution for this city, restored the supremacy of the community; he likewise gave to the new colonists equal rights of citizenship with the ancient citizens, although the latter doubtless still retained many privileges. The power of the kings was limited within the narrowest bounds; and they were only permitted to enjoy the revenues flowing from the sacerdotal office and their own lands,807 whereas they had before claimed possession of the whole property of the state;808 they had, like the Spartan kings, a seat and vote in the council, and probably presided over it, which duties were performed by Pheretime, the mother of Arcesilaus III., during the absence of her son.809 These restrictions were, however, violently opposed by the princes just mentioned, as well as by their successors, who thus drew upon themselves their own ruin. Arcesilaus also, to whom Pindar addressed an ode, the fourth of the name, ruled with harshness, and protected his power by foreign mercenaries:810 and the poet doubtless advised him with good reason, although without success, “not to destroy with sharp axe the branches of the great oak (the nobles of the state), and disfigure its beautiful form; for that, even when deprived of its vigour, it gives proof of its power, when the destructive [pg 180] fire of winter (of insurrection) snatches it; or, having left its own place desolate, serves a wretched servitude, supporting with the other columns the roof of the royal palace” (i.e., if the people in despair throws itself under the dominion of a foreign king).811 But the soothing hand with which the poet advises that the wounds of the state should be treated was not that of Arcesilaus, celebrated only for his boldness and valour. For these reasons he was the last in the line of the princes of Cyrene (after 457 B.C.), and a democratical government succeeded. His son Battus took refuge in the islands of the Hesperides, where he died; and the head of his corpse was thrown by these republicans into the sea.812 The new form of government obtained stability and duration by an entire change; the number of the tribes and phratrias was increased, the political union of the houses destroyed, the family rites were incorporated in the public worship,813 &c. Some element of disturbance and revolution must, however, have been still left in the constitution,814 if the Cyrenæans requested Plato to contrive for them a temperate and well-ordered government, which the philosopher is said to have declined, on the ground that they seemed too prosperous to themselves. At a later period, Lucullus the Roman [pg 181] is said to have restored the city to tranquillity, after many wars and tyrannies.815

14. In the constitution of the Lacedæmonian colony of Tarentum there were two chief periods. In the first we must infer, from the analogy of the other Doric colonies, that there was the same division of ranks, viz., noble citizens, governing the state under a king;816 the people, to whom few and limited powers were allowed; and aboriginal bondsmen, chiefly residing upon the lands of the highest class.817 This constitution must, however, have been gradually relaxed; for Aristotle calls it a politeia in the limited sense, which, as he informs us, lasted over the Persian war, and did not pass into a democracy until a large part of the nobles had been slain in a bloody battle against the Iapygians (474 B.C.)818 The transition was introduced without any violent revolution, by some measures, in which the aristocracy submitted to the claims of the people. First of all, according to Aristotle,819 they [pg 182] divided the public property among the poorer classes; but only gave them the use of it; i.e., apparently the public lands were apportioned out to them; but at the payment of a small rent, in token that they had not the absolute property in the soil. Besides this popular measure, the number of all the public offices was doubled; and one half was filled by election, the other by lot; in order, by the latter mode of nomination, to open a way to their attainment by the lower orders. This democracy at first promoted to a great degree the prosperity and power of the state,820 while persons of character and dignity were at the head of the government; for example, one of the first men of the time, Archytas the Pythagorean, a man of singular vigour and wisdom, who, as well as all adherents of the Pythagorean league (of which he could not then have been a member), was of an aristocratical disposition.821 He was general seven times, although it was prohibited by law that the same person should hold this office more than once,822 and never suffered a defeat:823 the people with a noble confidence entrusted to him for a [pg 183] considerable time the entire management of public affairs.824 At a subsequent period, however, as there were no longer any men of this stamp to carry on the government, and the corruption of manners, caused by the natural fruitfulness of the country, and restrained by no strict laws, was continually on the increase, the state of Tarentum was so entirely changed, that every trace of the ancient Doric character, and particularly of the mother-country, disappeared; hence, although externally powerful and wealthy, it was from its real internal debility, in the end, necessarily overthrown, particularly when the insolent violence of the people became a fresh source of weakness.825

15. On the constitution of the Tarentine colony Heraclea (433 B.C.) the monuments extant, although important in other respects, afford little information. In the well-known inscription of this city, an ephor gives his name to the year, five chosen surveyors (ὁρισταὶ) are to value the sacred lands of Bacchus, and to measure it according to the rules of Etruscan agrimensores, upon the decree of the public assembly,826 in order to ascertain what had been lost in the course of time, and to secure the remainder. After this, the state, two polianomi, and the horistæ, let the sacred land according to a decree of the Heracleans, and state the conditions; in which certain officers named σιταγερταὶ [pg 184] are mentioned as inspectors of the public corn-magazine. The annual polianomi are bound to take care that the contracts of lease shall be observed; they carry on inquiries upon this subject jointly with ten sworn colleagues, elected by the people, in case of any breach of contract, collect the appointed fines, and refer, in cases of singular importance, to the public assembly, they themselves being subject to the responsibility.

16. To these we may add Croton, since this city, founded under the authority of Sparta by a Heraclide, and therefore revering Hercules himself as its founder,827 must be considered as belonging to the Doric race, although at a later period the more numerous Achæan portion of the population appears to have preponderated. Croton was the soil upon which Pythagoras endeavoured to realise his notions of a true aristocracy, an endeavour in which he succeeded. This, however, we cannot comprehend, unless we consider his ideal state as no airy project or phantom of the brain, but rather as founded upon national feelings, and as being even the foundation of the governments of Sparta, Crete, and the cities of Lower Italy, in which Pythagoras first appeared: and for this reason he is described as in part merely to have restored and renewed; for example, to have destroyed tyrannies, quieted the claims of the people, and re-established ancient rights,828 &c. Croton, however, he selected as the centre of his operations, as being under the protection of Apollo, his household god;829 and, secondly, as being the “city of the healthy,” an advantage [pg 185] which it owed to its climate, to gymnastic exercises, and to purer morals than were prevalent at least in the neighbouring cities of Tarentum and Sybaris. The government of this city was, when the philosopher came forward, in the hands of the senate of a thousand,830 which formed a synedrion; the Crotoniats are reported to have offered to Pythagoras the presidency of this senate,831 probably as prytanis.832 A similar senate of a thousand existed at Agrigentum in the time of Empedocles; the same number of persons, elected according to their property, were sole governors at Rhegium.833 This council of a thousand members also existed at Locri.834 From this we may infer that the thousand of Croton were the most wealthy citizens: who in states of which the power is derived from the possession of land are, before the government is disturbed by revolutions, generally identical with the noble families. At Croton they had power to decide in most affairs without the ratification of the popular assembly,835 and also possessed a judicial authority.836 Now the council instituted by Pythagoras (which appears not to have been formed of members elected according to property, but to have been chosen on purely aristocratical principles) only contained three hundred members,837 a number which frequently occurs under similar circumstances;838 at the head of this council was Pythagoras himself. One of the most remarkable phenomena in the political history [pg 186] of the Greeks is, that the philosophy of order, of unison, of κόσμος, expressing, and consequently enlisting on its side, the combined endeavours of the better part of the people, obtained the management of public affairs, and held possession of it for a considerable time; so that the nature and destination of the political elements in existence being understood, and each having assigned to it its proper place, those who were qualified both by their rank and talents were placed at the head of the state; a strict self-education having in the first place been made one of their chief obligations (as it was of the φύλακες of Plato), in order by this means to prepare the way for the education of the other members of the community. At present it is generally acknowledged that the Pythagorean league was in great part of a political nature, that its object was to obtain a formal share in the administration of states, and that its influence upon them was of the most beneficial kind, which continued for many generations in Magna Græcia after the dissolution of the league itself.839 This dissolution was caused by the natural opposers of an aristocracy of this description, the popular party and its leaders; for in this character alone could Cylon have been the author of the catastrophe which he occasioned; it is recorded, that the opposition of this order to an agrarian law, which referred to the division of the territory of the conquered Sybaris among the people, served to inflame [pg 187] their minds.840 The opposite party demanded that the whole people should have admittance to the public assemblies and to public offices, that all magistrates at the expiration of their offices should render an account to a tribunal composed of members elected by lot,841 that all existing debts should be cancelled, and that the lands should be newly divided:842 from which we must infer, that the highest officers of the Pythagoreans were, according to the Spartan and Cretan principle, irresponsible, and that they considered election by vote as necessary for all such situations. How fatal to the quiet of Lower Italy were the convulsions which followed the destruction of this league (about 500 B.C.), is proved by the large share which the whole of Greece took in their pacification. This was at length effected by the Italian cities entirely giving up the Doric customs, and adopting an Achæan government and institutions;843 which they were afterwards, first by the power of Dionysius of Syracuse, and then of the neighbouring Barbarians, compelled to surrender. Now the Achæan constitution, according to Polybius,844 had become a democracy immediately after the overthrow of the last king Ogyges; and retained the same general character, though some subordinate parts experienced very great alterations: we also know that it was very unlike the Spartan government.845 I cannot, however, refrain from doubting whether it could properly be termed democracy at so early a period, since Xenophon states, that in Sicyon, in 368-365 B.C., timocracy was the [pg 188] prevailing form of government, “according to the laws of the Achæans,”846 which words cannot be referred to a mere transitory condition of that race. There also was always among the Achæans an equestrian order (ἱππεῖς), of greater consideration and influence on the government than can be reconciled with complete democracy.847 So also at Croton, in the year of the city 637 (117 B.C.), there was a complete democracy; but (as in all the cities of the Italian Greeks at this period) a senate of nobles existed, which was frequently at open war with the people.848

17. Lastly, it is proper to mention the constitution of Delphi, if our supposition is admitted to be correct, that the most distinguished Delphian families were of Doric origin.849 It was also shown that these families composed at an early period a close aristocracy; the priests were chosen from among the nobles, to whom the management of the oracle belonged; from their body was taken the Pythian court of justice (which may be compared with the Spartan gerusia, and the Athenian court of the ephetæ), as well as the chief magistrates, among whom in early times a king,850 and afterwards a prytanis, was supreme.851 At a later period we find mention of archons who gave their name to the year.852 At the same time a popular party was formed (perhaps from the subjects of the temple), which in a later age at least exercised its authority in [pg 189] a public assembly.853 The senate (βουλὴ) of Delphi was at this period, as in Gela and Rhodes (according to the hypothesis before advanced), renewed every half year; but it appears to have consisted of very few members, for only one senator (βουλεύων), or at most a few, in addition to the archon, are named in the donatory decrees of Delphi.854 Many particulars which belong to a later date we pass over, as our only object is to point out the characteristic points of the ancient constitution.

18. From these various accounts it follows, that although there was no one form of government common to the Doric race in historic times, yet in many of these states we find a constitution of nearly the same character, which preceded and caused the subsequent changes and developments; and was of unequal duration in different states. This constitution, which we, with Pindar, consider as most strongly marked in the Spartan form of government, was of a strictly aristocratic character;855 hence Sparta was the basis and corner-stone of the Greek aristocracies, and in this country alone the nobility ever retained their original dignity and power. Hence also Sparta, during the flourishing period of her history, never had a large number of exiles on political grounds, while in the other Grecian states the constant revolutions to which they were subject generally kept one party or other of the citizens in banishment; nor did she ever experience [pg 190] any violent disturbances or changes in her constitution,856 until the number of the genuine Spartans had nearly become extinct, and the conditions necessary for the permanence of the ancient government had in part been removed. Now I call the Spartan constitution an aristocracy, without the least hesitation, on account of its continued and predominant tendency towards governing the community by a few, who were presumed to be the best, and as it inculcated in the citizens far less independent confidence than obedience and fear of those persons whose worth was guaranteed by their family, their education, and the public voice which had called them to the offices of state. The ancients,857 however, remark, that it might also be called a democracy, since the supreme power was always considered as residing in the people, and an entire equality of manners prevailed; that it might be called a monarchy on account of the kings;858 and that in the power of the ephors there was even an appearance of tyranny: so that in this one constitution all forms of government were united.859 But the animating soul of all these forms was the Doric spirit of fear and respect for ancient and established laws, and the judgment of older men, the spirit of implicit [pg 191] obedience towards the state and the constituted authorities (πειθαρχία);860 and, lastly, the conviction that strict discipline and a wise restriction of actions are surer guides to safety, than a superabundance of strength and activity directed to no certain end.

The relation which, according to these Doric principles, existed between an inferior and a superior, between the private citizen and the magistrate, also extended to the Spartans and other states, as the former were for a long time considered as aristocrats when compared with the other Greeks. This superiority was not caused by external preponderance and compulsion, but by the internal acknowledgment that strict laws and a well-ordered discipline belonged to them above all. It is often curious to remark how great was the power of a Lacedæmonian cloak and stick (σκυτάλη καὶ τρίβων, as Plutarch says) among the other races of the Greeks:861 how, as it were by magic, the single Gylippus, although by no means the best of his nation, brings union and stability into the people at Syracuse, and first gives all their undertakings force and effect; on more than one occasion a single Spartan was enough to unite squadrons of Æolians and Ionians of Asia, and make them act in common; and even at the times of the dissolution of the Grecian name, we see Spartans acting as the generals of mercenaries [pg 192] bound by no other law than the firm and decided will of their leaders.

Many of the noblest and best of the Athenians always considered the Spartan state nearly as an ideal theory realised in practice; and, like Cimon and Xenophon (whose decided preference for Sparta, though perhaps sometimes prejudicial to his own country, must not be called folly), joined themselves to this state with zeal and eagerness, even to the prejudice of their own interests. The preference of all the followers of Socrates for Sparta is well known;862 and Lycurgus, the most just of financiers, united to an aristocratical disposition an admiration for the laws of Lacedæmon.863 It is singular that men of such eminence, both in a practical and theoretical view, should express their admiration of a state,864 which modern writers865 have often represented to us as a horde of half savages. Nor must the judgment of the persons above mentioned, who were without doubt sufficiently acquainted with the object of it, be attributed to a morbid craving after a state of nature which the Athenians had for ever lost.

We moderns, on the other hand, on account of our preconceived notions with respect to the advancement of civilization, do not read without partiality the lessons which history affords us; we refuse to recognise the [pg 193] most profound political wisdom in an age which we believe to have been occupied in rude attempts after the formation of a settled form of government. Far otherwise the political speculators of antiquity, such as the Pythagoreans and Plato, who considered the Spartan and Cretan form of government, i.e., the ancient Dorian, as a general model of all governments; and, in fact, the ideal constitution which was realized in Sparta approaches most nearly to that which Pythagoras attempted to establish in Lower Italy, and which Plato brought forward as capable of being put in practice, viz., a close communion, nearly similar to that of a family, having for its object mutual instruction. For the regulations of Pythagoras have many things besides their aristocratic spirit in common with the Spartan form of government, such as the public tables, and in general the perpetual living in public, with the number of laws for the maintenance of public morality (disciplina morum); and the community of goods, which existed among the Pythagoreans, is nearly allied to the Doric system of equalizing the landed estates. And Plato, although he at times criticises the Spartan and Cretan constitution in a somewhat unfair manner, has evidently derived his political notions, mediately or immediately, from the consideration of that form of government:866 for it is hardly possible that any person should speculate upon government, without proceeding upon some chosen historical basis, however he may endeavour to conceal it. But the Athenian and Ionic democracy he altogether despises, because that appeared on his principles to be an annihilation of government rather than a [pg 194] government, in which every person, striving to act as much as possible for himself, destroyed that unison and harmony in which each individual exists only as a part of the whole.

It would be interesting to know what were the opinions and judgments of Spartans of the better time concerning these relaxed forms of government. We may well suppose that they did not view them in a favourable light. The people of Athens must indeed have appeared to them in general, as a Lacedæmonian in Aristophanes867 expresses himself, as a lawless and turbulent rabble. For this reason they refused in the Peloponnesian war to negociate with the whole community; and would only treat with a few selected individuals.868 Upon the whole, the state of Sparta, being, in comparison with the general mutability of the Greeks after the Persian war, like the magnet, which always pointed to the pole of ancient national customs, became dissimilar, both in political and domestic usages, to the rest of Greece;869 and for this reason the Spartans who were sent into foreign parts either gave affront by their strangeness and peculiarity, or, by their want of consistency and firmness, forfeited that confidence with which they were everywhere met.