Of these 1040 Officers the Reader will observe, that only 89 (exclusive of the thirty-two extra officers in the City of London; and the sixty-eight patroles at Bow-street; making in the whole no more than 189,) are Stipendiary Officers, particularly pledged to devote their whole time to the service of the Public:—and hence a question arises, Whether so small a number are sufficient for the purpose of watching and detecting the hordes of villains who infest the Metropolis, and who must be considerably increased on the return of peace?

Little assistance can be expected under the present System from parochial officers; who, depending on their daily labour principally for their support, can afford to devote no more time than is absolutely necessary for their indispensable duties, during the 12 months they are in office: and more especially since Magistrates have no power, or funds, to remunerate such parochial officers for extraordinary exertions in the Public service, however meritorious they may be;—hence it is, that their zeal and activity are checked in many instances; when under proper regulations (such as are hereafter suggested) and subject to a certain degree of control and discipline, and properly remunerated for their services they might be rendered extremely useful. These facts, joined to the further elucidation of this particular branch of the subject, it is earnestly to be hoped, may produce an arrangement of more energy and effect than exists under the present system.

Officers of Justice, who are subjected not only to considerable risks, but also to want of rest, and to the inconvenience of being exposed much in the night-time, ought certainly to be liberally paid; so as to make it an object to good and able men even to look up to such situations.

It having been thus shewn that the Stipendiary Constables are so inconsiderable in point of numbers, and their duty confined to particular objects, it follows that on the parochial officers the Public ought, in a considerable degree, to depend for the general prevention of offences, and particularly for defeating the crafty and iniquitous devices which are resorted to for the purpose of evading the operation of justice.—These men also from their local knowledge are, or ought to be, best qualified to procure accurate information, and to supply what may be necessary to enable Magistrates to discharge their duty with advantage to the Community, and by this means they might be rendered useful auxiliaries to the existing Police.

It would seem, therefore, of the highest importance that arrangements should be formed, calculated to give to these constitutional safe-guards of the peaceful subject, that utility, energy, and effect, which originally resulted from the exercise of their functions,—which the present state of Society imperiously calls for, and without which the preventive System of Police can never be effectual.

On looking accurately into the nature and effect of the institution of Constables, it will be found that the vigor and efficacy of the Civil Power, the security of innocence,—the preservation of good order, and the attainment of justice, depend in a great measure on the accuracy of the System, with respect to these Officers assigned to keep the peace in the respective parishes of the Metropolis; and it is because the original spirit of the design has been, in so many instances, abandoned that crimes have multiplied, and that the public are so insecure.

The evil, however, admits of practicable remedies, which the Superintending Board of Police, recommended by the Select Committee of the House of Commons, might considerably facilitate, by methodizing the general design, and giving strength, intelligence, and uniformity to the whole.

Preparatory to this object, however, the System in the respective parishes must be greatly improved, before a co-operation can be expected that will prove extensively beneficial to the Public.

The first step to be pursued, is to establish a fund for the remuneration of Constables of every description. It will not be difficult to demonstrate that a resource may be found for this purpose, which will not impose any new burden on the Country, provided these Officers do their duty.

The enormous expence at present incurred, and which is either defrayed from the County Rates, or the general Revenue of the Country, arises chiefly after offenders are detected and punished. Out of 234,153l. a year stated by the Committee on Finance, to be the annual amount of the Police expences, only 26,183l. is incurred previous to detection.—By diminishing crimes, therefore, the chief part of the burden upon the Country will be taken away; and hence in this saving will be established a resource for the remuneration of those who may contribute to so important an object.

The present expenditure of the County Rates for criminal offences, is estimated to amount to 50,000l. a year. In proportion as offences diminish, through the medium of a well-organized and energetic Police, will this burden upon the Poor Rates also be diminished.

Independent, therefore, of the policy of improving the system with respect to parochial Constables, by attaching a greater degree of responsibility to their situation, and introducing that discipline and systematic activity, which can alone render their services effectual—the plan may even be recommended as a proper arrangement in point of œconomy.

It is in vain to expect energy or attention in the execution of any Public duty, unless there be that personal responsibility which is not to be obtained without emolument. To render Officers of Justice, therefore, useful to the Public, they must be stimulated by interest:—they must, in fact, be paid for devoting a portion of their time to the comfort and security of others. The Law may inflict, and, indeed, has inflicted, penalties for the neglect of specific duties; but this will not establish that sort of Police which the present state of Society requires.—This is strongly exemplified in what may not be improperly called the Mockery of Police, which is exhibited in the periodical presentments by Constables, of public grievances and nuisances, before the Grand Inquest, four times a year at Westminster-hall, and twice before the Magistrates of the Sessions held at Guildhall in the City of Westminster. These presentments, although in themselves of the highest importance, have degenerated into what may now be considered as an useless and burdensome formality; at best it is a tedious, expensive, and circuitous, mode of removing nuisances and inconveniences, and so ill-suited to the present state of Society, that several modern parochial Acts have given relief in a summary way before Magistrates.

The fact is, that in a great majority of instances where presentments are made, the evils they describe, though often highly prejudicial, are suffered to accumulate with increasing malignity, at the same time frequently generating other mischiefs and pressures of a tendency equally pernicious to the Community.

It is admitted, that the proper Officer of the Crown notifies to the parties implicated in the presentment, the determination of the Inquest; but a prosecution seldom ensues. The Constable has neither money nor time to follow it up; and the matter is discharged when the customary term expires, on the payment of a Fee of 16s. 9d. or more, according to the length of the presentment; and thus the business terminates in the emolument of an individual, and in the continuance of the abuse.

The same system prevails at the Sessions at Westminster. When Juries make presentments of nuisances or evils in their respective districts, the Constables have general orders to prosecute, which is not done; and, indeed, to compel an Officer serving gratuitously, to incur an expence for the Public interest which he cannot afford, would be an act of manifest injustice; and unless a fund be provided in numerous cases, he must be under the necessity of declining such prosecutions.

But would it not be far better to bring such minor offences at once under the cognizance of Magistrates, with the power of appeal to the Quarter Sessions?—This is already the case in Spitalfields, under a parochial Act, where nuisances and annoyances are in consequence instantly removed. Matters of much greater importance are submitted to the same authority. The advantage in this case would be, that justice would be promptly administered at a small expence, and the evil would be put an end to, instead of remaining as at present a reproach to the Police, arming at the same time every noxious and bad member of Society, with a kind of licence to do offensive acts to the neighbourhood, and the Public at large, with impunity.

To render parochial Constables useful, rules must be established to compel every qualified person to serve in his turn, or pay a fine. No person should be empowered to offer a Substitute.—It is of the highest importance that an Office invested with so much power should be executed by reputable men, if possible of pure morals, and not with hands open to receive bribes.—This important office in the Metropolis at least, has too long been degraded by the introduction, in many instances, of men of loose principles, undeserving of public confidence. The reason is obvious:—A man in the more reputable classes on whom the lot may fall, surrenders his functions to a Substitute who probably makes the office a trade;—performs the service of the year for four or five Guineas, trusting to other emoluments, many of which are obtained by corruption, to enable him to subsist.

To render this branch of Police pure and efficient, an Act of Parliament should enforce the following or similar regulations:

It might be expedient that the Stipend of the petty Constables should be very moderate, and that their remunerations should, partly at least, arise from premiums and gratuities, granted by the Judges and Magistrates, for meritorious services to the Public, actually performed; for which there would so many opportunities occur, that no fit man, acting as a Constable under such a system, and doing his duty conscientiously, need be under any apprehension of obtaining a very comfortable livelihood.

The invariable rule of rewarding, in every case where it can be made appear that any useful Public service has been performed, would have a most wonderful effect in preventing crimes: The expence, if judiciously and œconomically managed, need not exceed, in any material degree, the present aggregate of what is disbursed in different ways, in all the branches of the Police and Criminal Establishment; it might, in fact, be defrayed, as well as every other charge, by the Police itself, under the direction of the Central Board, hereafter more particularly alluded to, from the produce of the Licences proposed to be granted for regulating particular classes of Dealers, by whose aid and assistance, in supporting Thieves and Pilferers, such a system is rendered necessary.

Nor should the rewards be wholly confined to Officers of Justice, either parochial or stipendiary. The Public Good requires, that they should extend also to Watchmen and Patroles, who should have every reasonable encouragement held out to them to be honest and vigilant, by small premiums paid down immediately, for every service they may render the Public; either in detecting or apprehending persons who are guilty of felonies, or other offences against the public peace.

At present, the watchmen destined to guard the lives and properties of the inhabitants residing in near eight thousand streets, lanes, courts, and alleys, and about 160,000 houses, composing the whole of the Metropolis and its environs, are under the direction of no less than above seventy different Trusts; regulated by perhaps double the number of local acts of Parliament, (varying in many particulars from one another,) under which the directors, guardians, governors, trustees, or vestries, according to the title they assume, are authorised to act,—each attending only to their own particular Ward, Parish, Hamlet, Liberty, or Precinct; and varying the payment according to local circumstances, and the opulence of the particular district, from 8½d. up to 2s. each night.[117]

The encouragement being, in many instances, so small, few candidates appear for such situations, who are really, in point of character and age, fit for the duty which ought to be performed; the managers have therefore no alternative but to accept of such aged, and often superannuated, men, living in their respective districts, as may offer their services; this they are frequently induced to do from motives of humanity, to assist old inhabitants who are unable to labour at any mechanical employment, or perhaps with a view to keep them out of the workhouse, and to save the expence of maintaining them.

Thus circumstanced, and thus encouraged, what can be expected from such watchmen?—

Aged in general;—often feeble:—and almost, on every occasion, half starved, from the limited allowance they receive; without any claim upon the Public, or the least hope of reward held out, even if they perform any meritorious service, by the detection of Thieves and Receivers of stolen Goods, or idle and disorderly persons: and above all, making so many separate parts of an immense system, without any general superintendance, disjointed from the nature of its organization, it is only a matter of wonder, that the protection afforded is what it really is.[118]—Not only is there small encouragement offered for the purpose of insuring fidelity, but as has been already shewn innumerable temptations are held out to dishonesty, by Receivers of stolen Goods, to the watchmen and patroles in their vicinity; as well as by thieves and housebreakers in all situations where they contemplate the commission of a burglary.

Money is also received from disorderly persons in the night, to permit them to escape from the just punishment of the Laws; while on the other hand, unfortunate females are often cruelly oppressed and laid under contribution, for permission to infringe the very laws, which it is the duty of these nocturnal guardians of the Police to put in execution.

Excepting in the city of London, under the jurisdiction of the Lord Mayor and Aldermen, (where there are, in the 25 wards, 765 watchmen, and 38 patroles) and the parishes and liberties combined by the act of the 14th Geo. III. cap. 90, it will not be easy to ascertain the exact number of watchmen, &c. employed by the great variety of different Trusts, in every part of the Metropolis; more especially, as in several instances they vary in their numbers according to the season of the year, and other circumstances; but the following statement is believed to be very near truth:—

Nothing can certainly be better calculated for complete protection against acts of violence in the streets, than the System of a well-regulated Stationary Watch; composed of fit and able-bodied men, properly controlled and superintended: and from the number of persons already employed, independent of private Watchmen, it would seem only to be necessary to lay down apposite legislative rules, with respect to age or ability, character, wages, rewards for useful services, and general superintendance, in order to establish that species of additional security, which would operate as a more effectual means of preventing crimes within the Metropolis.

Let the same system of moderate rewards also be extended to beadles,[120] for useful Public service actually performed, as is proposed with regard to officers of justice, watchmen, and patroles; and much good will arise to the community, without any great additional expence.

It is in vain to expect that the Public can be well served, unless the emolument becomes an object to good and able men; but these extraordinary rewards (as has already been observed) should always depend upon the vigilance and exertion of the parties themselves, in detecting offenders of every description: and should be paid, on its appearing to the Magistrate, that no impropriety or indiscretion has marked their conduct. If, on the contrary, they should be proved to have acted oppressively or improperly, a power of immediate dismission and punishment should, in all instances, be lodged in Justices of the Peace, to be exercised according to the nature of the offence.

Having thus stated the civil force of the Metropolis, in peace-officers, watchmen and patroles, making an aggregate of 3084 men—it may be necessary and useful to give such information relative to the Magistracy, as may tend to shew the present state of the Police, and to illustrate what remains to be further suggested on the subject of its improvement; for the preservation of the Public peace, and the detection and apprehension of every class of offenders.

There exist at present no less than five separate jurisdictions within the limits of the Metropolis—namely,—

But, notwithstanding the great number of respectable names, which are in the different commissions in and near the Metropolis; and although all who have qualified have equal jurisdiction with the Police Justices, within their respective districts; yet the efficient duty for the whole of the Metropolis, so far as it relates to the detection of offenders, is principally limited to two classes of Magistrates—namely,—

The jurisdiction of the Magistrates presiding at the seven Public Offices, not only extends to Westminster and Middlesex; (and, in most instances, lately, to the liberty of the Tower:) but also to the counties of Surry, Kent, and Essex, from which considerable advantages in the prompt detection and apprehension of offenders have accrued to the Public: The only difficulty that now remains to be removed, with respect to the clashing of jurisdictions, is that which regards the city of London; where, from its contiguity, and immediate and close connection with every other part of the Metropolis, considerable inconveniences and injuries to the public are felt, not only from the circumstance of the jurisdiction of the City Magistrates not being extended over the whole of the Metropolis, as well as the four adjoining counties; but also from the Police Magistrates having no authority quickly to follow up informations, by issuing warrants to search for property, and to apprehend persons charged with offences in the City. The whole difficulty resolves itself into a mere matter of punctilio, founded perhaps on ill-grounded jealousy, or misapprehension, which a little explanation would probably remove.

Where the object is to do good;—and where not even the shadow of harm can arise, no limits should be set to local jurisdictions; especially where privileges are proposed to be given; (as in this case, to the city of London;)—and where none are to be taken away.

For the purpose of establishing a complete and well-connected System of detection, some means ought certainly to be adopted, more closely to unite the City and Police Magistrates,[121] that they may, in a greater degree, go hand in hand in all matters regarding the general interest of the Metropolis and its environs; making the suppression of crimes one common cause, and permitting no punctilio, regarding jurisdiction, to prevent the operation of their united energy in the prompt detection of offenders; This, from the extended state of Commerce and Society, and the great increase of property, is now rendered a measure in which the inhabitants of the whole Metropolis, as well as the adjacent villages, have a common interest. It is an evil, which affects all ranks, and calls aloud for the speedy adoption of some effectual remedy.

CHAP. XV.

ARRIVING at that point in the progress of this Work, where persons accused of offences are detected and brought before Magistrates for examination, ultimately to be committed for trial, if the evidence shall be sufficient:—It is proper to explain the prevailing practice under such circumstances.

The task, in this case imposed upon the Magistrate, is arduous and important; requiring not only great purity of conduct, a profound knowledge of mankind, and of the common affairs of life; but in a more peculiar manner those powers of discrimination which may enable him to discover how far criminality attaches to the party accused; and whether there are grounds sufficient to abridge for a time, or ultimately to deprive the prisoner of his liberty, until a Jury of his country shall decide upon his fate.

It frequently happens that persons accused of crimes are apprehended under circumstances where no doubt can rest on the mind of the Magistrates as to the guilt of the prisoner; but where the legal evidence is nevertheless insufficient to authorize an immediate commitment for trial.

In these instances, (while he commits pro tempore,) he is called upon in a particular manner to exert the whole powers of his mind, by adopting such judicious measures as shall be the means of detecting the offenders; by discovering the goods or property stolen, or by admitting such evidence for the Crown as may, with other corroborating testimony, prevent the ends of justice from being defeated.

Where a Magistrate proceeds with indefatigable zeal and attention, and at the same time exercises good judgment, he will seldom fail of success; for in this case a similar spirit will animate the officers under his controul, whose activity and industry are generally in proportion to that manifested by their superiors.

Much as every active Magistrate must regret that deficiency of pecuniary resource, which, under the present system, prevents him from rewarding those who must occasionally be employed to detect notorious offenders, this circumstance ought not to abate this zeal in any respect; since by perseverance it generally happens, that every good and proper arrangement for the immediate advantage of the Public, may be ultimately obtained.

The Magistrate having done his duty by committing an offender for trial, satisfied of his guilt and the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him: and having also bound over the prosecutor and the witnesses as the Law directs, to attend the Grand Jury, and (if a bill be found) to prosecute and give evidence upon the indictment; it might appear to the common observer, that the culprit's case becomes hopeless and forlorn.

This, however, is by no means a stage in the progress that intimidates a professed thief; he feels and knows that, although guilty of the crime laid to his charge, he has many chances of escaping; and these chances unquestionably operate as encouragements to the commission of crimes.

His first hope is, that he shall intimidate the Prosecutor and Witnesses, by the threatenings of the gang with whom he is connected;—his next that he may compound the matter; or bribe or frighten material witnesses, so as to keep back evidence; or induce them to speak doubtfully at the trial, though positive evidence was given before the Magistrate; or if all should fail, recourse is had to perjury, by bringing the Receiver, or some other associate, to swear an alibi.

Various other considerations also operate in strengthening the hopes of acquittal; partly arising from the vast numbers who are discharged or acquitted at every Session of gaol-delivery; and partly from the carelessness and inattention of Prosecutors, who are either unable or unwilling to sustain the expence of Counsel to oppose the arguments and objections which will be offered in behalf of the prisoner: or are soured by loss of valuable time, experienced, perhaps in former prosecutions;[122]—or ultimately from a dread entertained by timid persons, who foolishly and weakly consider themselves as taking away the life of a fellow-creature, merely because they prosecute or give evidence; not reflecting that it is the Law only that can punish offenders, and not the individual prosecutor or witnesses.

False Humanity, exercised in this manner, is always cruelty to the public, and not seldom to the prisoners themselves.—All depredations upon property are public wrongs, in the suppression and punishment of which it is the duty of every good man to lend his assistance; a duty more particularly incumbent upon those who are the immediate sufferers: through their means only can Public Justice operate in punishing those miscreants, by whom the innocent are put in fear, alarmed and threatened with horrid imprecations—with loss of life by means of loaded pistols; or bodily injury, from being hacked with cutlasses, or beaten with bludgeons—under circumstances where neither age nor sex is spared.—

Yet experience has shewn that these arguments, powerful as they are, are insufficient to awaken in the mind of men that species of Public spirit which shall induce sufferers in general, by robberies of different kinds, to become willing prosecutors, under the various trying delays of Courts of Justice; and frequently with the trouble of bringing a number of witnesses from the country, who are kept in attendance on the court perhaps several days together, at a very considerable expence.

Such a burden imposed upon the subject, in addition to the losses already sustained, in a case too where the offence is of a public nature, is certainly not easily reconcileable with that spirit of justice, and attention to the rights of individuals, which forms so strong a general feature in the Jurisprudence of the Country.

From all these circumstances it happens that innumerable felonies are concealed, and the loss is suffered in silence as the least of two evils; by which means thieves are allowed to reign with impunity, undisturbed, and encouraged to persevere in their evil practices.

Nothing, it is to be feared, can cure this evil, and establish a general system of protection, but a vigorous Police; strengthened and improved by the appointment of Deputy-Prosecutors for the Crown, acting under the Attorney-General for the time being. An establishment of this sort, even at a very small salary, would be considered as an honourable entré to many young Counsel; who, in protecting the Public against the frauds, tricks, and devices of old and professed thieves, by which at present they escape punishment, might keep the stream of justice pure, and yet allow no advantage to be taken of the prisoner.[123]

As it must be admitted on all hands, that it is the interest of the Public that no guilty offender should escape punishment;—it seems to be a position equally clear and incontrovertible, that wherever, from a defect in the system of prosecutions, or any other cause, a prisoner escapes the punishment due to his crimes, substantial justice is wounded, and public wrongs are increased.

It has been already stated in the preceding Chapter, that there are five separate Jurisdictions in the Metropolis, where Magistrates exercise limited authority.—Of course, there are five inferior Courts of Justice, where lesser offences, committed in London and its vicinity, are tried by Justices of the Peace.

These five inferior Courts of Justice take cognizance of Petty Larcenies, Frauds, Assaults, Misdemeanors, and other offences punishable by fine, imprisonment, whipping, and the pillory:—and in certain cases, the power of the Justices extends to transportation.

The higher and more atrocious offences committed in London and Middlesex, are tried at the Justice-Hall, in the Old Bailey; by a special commission of Oyer and Terminer to the Lord Mayor, and a certain number of the Judges, with the Recorder and Common Serjeant of the City of London.

Offences of this latter degree of atrocity, perpetrated in that part of the Metropolis which is situated in the Borough of Southwark and County of Surry, are tried at the assizes, held twice a year at Kingston-upon-Thames, Croydon, or Guildford.[124]

Thus it appears, that five inferior and two superior Tribunals of Justice are established for trying the different crimes committed in the Metropolis.

As it may be useful, for the purpose of elucidating the suggestions already offered upon this branch of the subject, that a connected view of the result of these Trials should make a part of this Work;—the following Abstract, (including the discharges of Prisoners by Magistrates) has been made up for this immediate purpose: from authentic documents obtained from the keepers of the eight different prisons and houses of correction in the city of London, and in the counties of Middlesex and Surry.

It applies to the period, from September, 1794, till September, 1795, which is chosen as a sort of medium between Peace and War.

It is impossible to contemplate this collected aggregate of the prisoners annually discharged upon the Public, without feeling a strong anxiety to remedy an evil rendered extremely alarming, from the number which composes the dismal catalogue of Human Depravity.

Every inquiry in the progress of this Work proves a radical defect somewhere.

While the public tribunals are filled with Judges, the purity of whose conduct adds lustre to their own and the national character, why should not every subordinate part of the Criminal Jurisprudence of the Country be so organized, as to co-operate, in the greatest possible degree, with the efforts of those higher orders of the Magistracy in accomplishing the purposes of substantial justice?

Nothing could tend more to promote this object, than the appointment already proposed of a Public Prosecutor for the Crown.

An institution of this kind would terrify the hordes of miscreants now at open war with the peaceable and useful part of the Community, in a greater degree than any one measure that could possibly be adopted.

It would be the means of destroying those hopes and chances which encourage criminal people to persevere in their depredations upon the Public.

A Summary View of the Prisoners committed, tried, punished, disposed of, and discharged in the Metropolis, in One Year, ending in October, 1795.