While the invaluable A-ling was negotiating for the rice, I took a trip as far as the walled city of Yang-chow-foo with my friend P——. This town and the district has long been famous for its women, who, the natives say, are the handsomest in China. Although our experience was limited to a couple of days, from what we saw in the country and town during daylight, and in the sing-songs at night, we were able to form the same opinion. The women, though darker than those of the Honan province, are quite as straight-featured and much more rosy and robust. They also appeared taller than is usual in south and central China, and their eyes seemed larger and not quite so oblique.
When within a few li of Yang-chow, a turn of the creek placed our boat close to a pair of damsels on the bank, but they no sooner espied the strange faces of myself and P——, than they rushed towards a neighbouring farm-house, screaming "Yang-quitzo-li" (foreign devils are coming) at the top of their shrill voices. We had just that moment been talking of the reputed loveliness of the Yang-chow ladies, and P——, with his head full of the subject, jumped ashore and ran after the two fugitives in order to have a nearer opportunity to satisfy himself as to their superior charms. With my boy As-sam I followed my friend on shore. The girls, terrified by the pursuit of the "foreign devil," were headed by that individual just before they managed to hobble up to the house. Their crippled feet sadly interfered with what would otherwise have been their very graceful figures. Their faces were certainly very pretty, and the excitement added not a little to their interesting appearance. At first, when P—— appeared between themselves and their home, they clung to each other and continued to yell, while several Chinamen came running towards them armed with hoes and spades, and the dogs of the farm joined chorus with a tremendous barking. But when the ladies found my friend did not attempt to carry them off, but continued in front of them bowing and scraping like a French dancing master (although this, of course, they did not know), and when the advancing Chinamen observed my fowling-piece and one of the snapping curs had been saluted with a large stone between its eyes, which changed the baying into howling, the commotion gradually subsided, although paterfamilias, and materfamilias, who now put in her appearance, seemed by no means satisfied.
When the farmer's men, carrying hoes and other agricultural instruments, for the nonce converted into warlike weapons, arrived upon the scene, P—— suddenly thrust a hand into an inside breast pocket of his coat, and winding up a small musical-box he carried there, changed the combative feeling of the natives into the greatest surprise and curiosity. Taking advantage of the pause, while the astounded people seemed to look upon my friend, with "the British Grenadiers" issuing from the region of his heart, as a "Joss" man, I told As-sam to inform the head of the family that we had landed to inquire the way to Yang-chow. This seemed to brighten the old fellow's dingy countenance without the aid of water, although he still seemed dubious as to whether we were "Joss" men, robbers, or honest travellers. One of his sons at this moment displayed a remarkable genius by guessing the cause of my friend's music, and it afterwards transpired that the clever youth had an old musical-box in a forgotten corner of the paternal dwelling, which had been obtained from the foreign-frequented city of Chin-kiang a year or two ago, but had been broken by over-winding just when it began to play.
The two pretty daughters having been conveyed to the inner apartments by their watchful mother, who, I believe, penetrated the real cause of our visit, and did not seem very much inclined to dazzle the vision of the strangers from afar with their celestial charms, we were invited to tea by their father, and the musical-box was produced for the general delight of the company.
After tea and rice-cakes had been despatched, the musical-box nearly worn out, and the girls peeping through the bamboo screen fairly propitiated by our gentle manner and extraordinary tales, the old farmer discovered that he had in former days been acquainted with As-sam's father in Canton; at once we were pressed to remain and partake of dinner, and the already genial humour of the old man became redoubled.
The day passed over very comfortably, except that at dinner the Chinese yeoman would persist in being polite, and as this involved the fishing-up of pieces of meat from the dinner bowls with his own chop-sticks and the careful depositing of the same morsels in his visitors' basins, it was not exactly pleasant.
Towards evening we were gratified by the presence of the young women to perform various duties in the principal room, in which we were established. Whether the small cups of rice-spirit at dinner had made their father unusually relaxed in domestic régime I do not pretend to say, but he certainly called his daughters up to him, and actually permitted them to be gazed upon by strangers and to gaze in return, and to listen to their marvellous tales of other lands, these latter singularly improved upon by As-sam whenever my knowledge of the Chinese language was at fault.
To my unqualified surprise, when upon the point of taking our departure, As-sam asked me to let him have fifty dollars and stop it from his wages, as he wished to buy our host's youngest daughter! It appeared that the old gentleman, warmed with the recollection of his friendship for our servant's father, or impressed with As-sam's importance and wealth through the eloquence of that cunning individual himself, and seeing him in connection with Europeans, whom the Chinese always look upon as overburdened with dollars, had offered him his daughter in marriage for the sum of fifty dollars. I refused to be a party to the transaction, so As-sam had to leave without a bride, although he promised to return and claim her whenever he had saved her value. I bade the farmer and his household farewell, wishing more than ever for the success of my Ti-ping friends, who had abolished this buying and slavery of women among themselves, and intended, God willing, to do so throughout the land.
Upon reaching Sin-ya-meu I found the faithful A-ling had obtained the cargo of rice and loaded our craft with it. We therefore at once set out upon our return to Nankin, choosing the route by the Grand Canal, which would bring us into the Yang-tze river at Kwa-chow, some few miles above Chin-kiang.
Placing the crew on to the yu-lo's (which, working in a figure of eight motion, urge a vessel along upon the same principle as the screw propeller), by these large oars our vessel was soon impelled beyond Sin-ya-meu and into the Grand Canal. This magnificent work of olden time is artificial for an extent of some 550 miles. Originally throughout nearly the whole of this length, its sides were built of marble, with an uniform breadth of more than 150 feet, and a depth of not less than 25. Since the conquest of China by the Manchoos, however, this great work has been sadly neglected, and at many parts the marble sides are no longer visible. At frequent intervals between Hang-chow (the capital of the Che-kiang province, where the canal terminates in the waters of Hang-chow bay) and the city of Lin-tsing (where it joins a branch of the Pei-ho river and continues on for about 180 miles up to Pekin, the capital of China), the canal is no longer navigable, while the sluices, having become neglected, have broken down the raised embankment and flooded the surrounding country. This vast work was executed about 600 years ago by Koblai Khan, the first Emperor of the Yuen or Mongol dynasty, as a means of supplying the sterile province of Chi-le (in which the capital is situated) from the rich and fertile provinces of Keang-su, Shang-tung, and Che-kiang, through which the canal is constructed.
Not only the Grand Canal, but every other work of art, antiquity, and manufacture, has been injured and allowed to fall into decay by the Manchoo dynasty. Although the latter claim descent from the refugee Mongol Princes, who were expelled from China by the first of the native dynasty of Ming, A.D. 1366, they have done far less towards any advancement of the physical or moral prosperity of China. During the Mongol era many great works of public benefit and improvement were preserved and others created, but since the epoch of the Manchoo China has seriously deteriorated in every phase of her antique civilization. The Manchoo conquerors are self-evidently preying upon the nation at the present day, even although they have been in possession two hundred years, and exhibit not the slightest wish to improve or benefit the people, whom they only plunder. They seem to be actuated by the knowledge that their reign is but for a time, and consequently rule against freedom or improvement in order to make that time as long as possible. They have proved themselves to be unequalled destroyers, and have produced absolutely nothing. All Chinese of mind and education declare that the Manchoo dynasty cannot last; even the highest officials of the very Government itself have made the same observation to members of the last British Embassy to China. Had the Ti-pings not possessed Christianity, China would have risen to their standard as one man; had the revolution not seemed likely to interfere with British "indemnities" and opium trading, it would have succeeded; and had not England interfered, the wretchedness of China would have been relieved by the change of dynasty, the necessity for which becomes more apparent daily.
The only advancement China has undergone during the Manchoo rule has been her rapid increase of population within the last century. For more than one hundred years after the conquest the depopulating effect continued in full force. Thousands of the Chinese emigrated to Formosa, Hae-nan, Thibet, Cochin-China, Ava, Siam, the territories of the Miau-tze, and other independent tribes; while many thousands fell by the sword, and a greater number perished by famine, the inevitable and most deadly companion of war in that densely populated and closely cultivated country. But since the Chinese have become used to the Tartar yoke, about the middle of the eighteenth century, the population has continued increasing at the Malthusian ratio of doubling every twenty-five years. Still this enormous increase is estimated to have simply restored to the land the number of people it maintained before the Manchoo invasion. This conclusion is formed from the most moderate data, but, as Malthus himself observes, "The more difficult as well as the more interesting part of the inquiry is to trace the immediate causes which stop its further progress." The loss of life by the Ti-ping revolution may be one cause, for it is a moot question whether war be not one of the ordained methods to arrest the pro-creative power. This, however, is a consideration for those who have made such theories their study. At all events it is certain that the great increase of the population of China has ceased, and it is palpable that, with already more than three hundred inhabitants on a square mile, the soil is unable to support any further multiplication of its children.
The increase of the population of China seems another likely enemy of the continuance of the Manchoo dynasty. The ranks of the people having become full again, all the old hatred of the Tartar, his tail-wearing badge of servitude, extortion, monopoly of office, oppression, &c., naturally assume a more formidable aspect. The means of livelihood are also more precarious, and the famine riots have become more frequent and threatening, the impoverished people of course turning against the Government whose extortion not a little helps to create their misery. The number of malcontents become continually increased, while the impotence and corruption of the Government, or rather the Manchoo subjugators, is daily more apparent to them.
It is a singular fact that the Tartars have never amalgamated with the Chinese, and that at the present day, by their organization of the eight tribes of "Bannermen," they are as distinct as during the reign of their first Emperor. Manchoo troops of the "eight banners" garrison every important city in China, Manchoo officers hold every military command, but I never found a Chinaman who would admit relationship to one, or that did not feel himself insulted by the supposition.
Whether the cause may be patriotism, famine, increase of population, or the extortion and oppression of the Government, certain it is that at this period[42] the Chinese are unusually disaffected towards their rulers, and that, besides the Ti-ping movement, there are distinct rebellions progressing in each of the eighteen provinces.
The Manchoo Government is generally admitted to be hopelessly oppressive, cruel, and totally corrupt; it is also believed that they have, and by their system are compelled, to oppose Christianity and modern civilization. In the face of all these facts he must indeed be a very wise or a very foolish man who will either venture to believe that the Manchoo-Tartar dynasty can endure, or will wilfully criminate himself by upholding their cause. Most probably the British Government thought only of their own interests during their late interference, and it is at least doubtful whether a sincere mercenary motive or a sincere desire to perpetuate the Manchoo dynasty would have been the most wicked.
[40] The coffee of the morning watch (4 a.m. to 8 a.m.) has become so inveterate and cherished a custom that I have had a main-yard carried away in a sudden squall while rousing the men from the galley-fire and their hook-pots.
[41] The immense volume of water composing the Yang-tze in the middle of summer must be incredible to those who have not seen it. In consequence of its great rise (some 35 feet) and strong current, villages and towns are always built upon high ground throughout the whole length of its course.
[42] Commencement of the year 1865.
Ti-ping Revolution in 1861.—Official Correspondence.—Its Review.—Professions of Neutrality.—How carried out.—Captain Dew's Interpretation.—Ti-ping Remonstrance.—Cause of British Hostility.—Mr. Bruce's Assertions.—Mr. Bruce's Second Despatch.—Mr. Bruce's Difficulty.—His Inconsistency.—Despatch No. 3.—Inconsistent Statements.—Ti-pings approach Ningpo.—Interview with Ti-ping Chiefs.—Mr. Hewlett's Interview with "Fang."—General Hwang's Despatch.—General "Fang's" Despatch.—Capture of Ningpo.—British Intervention.—Ti-ping Moderation.—Open Hostilities commenced.—Commander Bingham's Despatch.—Taeping Reply.—Commander Bingham's Rejoinder.
In order to form a just appreciation of the position of the Ti-ping revolution at the close of the year 1861, it becomes necessary to review briefly the political relations of each party engaged in it from the period of ratification of the Yang-tze expedition treaty of neutrality with the Ti-pings (by Admiral Hope), and the commencement of actual hostilities against them at the opening of the year 1862.
By the following review of the official correspondence (as given in Blue Book form of "Papers relating to the Rebellion in China" for 1861) men of every party, partial or impartial, may form an opinion as to British policy in China.
Exactly thirty-six days after his solemn pledges of non-intervention—given in accordance with his instructions from Lord Elgin—to the Ti-ping authorities, at their capital, Admiral Hope, upon hearing of the capture of Chapoo, penned the following orders, dated H.M.S. Scout, Nagasaki, May 8, to Captain Dew, H.M.S. Encounter:—
"You are further to put yourself in communication with the leader of the rebel forces, and to point out to him that the capture and destruction of the town of Ningpo would be extremely injurious to British trade, and that of foreigners generally, and, therefore, that you require him to desist from all hostile proceedings against the town, and, without committing yourself to the necessity of having recourse to force, you will remind him of what took place last year at Shanghae, and the impossibility of his capturing the place should you find yourself compelled to assist in its defence, a course, you will add, you are unwilling to adopt, as placing you in a hostile position in regard to the Taepings generally, with whom we have no wish to quarrel."
In this despatch the Admiral states he has no "wish to quarrel" with the Ti-pings, yet, in violation of his own pledges, and his orders to "maintain an attitude of strict neutrality," he constitutes himself dictator over their operations—operations unavoidable during their expulsion of the Manchoos, and essential to their self-preservation, general interests, and military honour—and interferes between the belligerents and their natural rights; and then continues as follows:—
"You will further, immediately on your arrival at Ningpo, place yourself in communication with the Chinese authorities for the purpose of ascertaining what their means of resistance are, and the probabilities of their proving successful; and should you find them amenable to advice, you will point out to them such measures as circumstances may render expedient, and you will place every obstruction in the way of the capture of the town by the rebels...."
At this time not only was British national faith pledged to a neutral course, but the Admiral's actions were diametrically opposed to his instructions.
Mr. Bruce, writing some time previously to Lord Russell upon this subject, in a despatch dated Tien-tsin, January 3, 1861, states:—
"But I have directed Mr. Sinclair" (Consul at Ningpo) "not to undertake the defence of the city, and to confine his efforts, should it be attacked, to a mediation, which may save the place from being the scene of pillage and massacre."
In a despatch to Admiral Hope, upon the same affair, Mr. Bruce writes:—
"I do not consider myself authorized to protect the town of Ningpo from the insurgents...."
In his instructions to the consul at Ningpo, Mr. Bruce stated:—
"But I do not consider myself authorized to afford any military protection to the town of Ningpo, or to take any active measures against the insurgents.... Your language should be, that we take no part in this civil contest, but that we claim exemption from injury and annoyance at the hands of both parties...."
These professions of neutrality received the following sanction from the British Government:—
"Sir,—Her Majesty's Government approve the instructions which you gave to Mr. Consul Sinclair, as reported in your dispatch of the 3rd of January last, with reference to the probability of the rebel forces attacking Ningpo.
How, then, can Admiral Hope's offering "every obstruction in the way of the capture" of Ningpo by the Ti-pings be accounted for, otherwise than as the result of secret instructions from the British Government; for it would indeed be preposterous to imagine that the Admiral dared act in direct opposition to the public orders, or that, having done so, his disobedience would have received the unqualified approval his "every obstruction" policy did.
Admiral Hope, in a despatch to Mr. Bruce, of the same date as the "every obstruction" one, in detailing his plan, wrote:—
"There can be no doubt of the importance of Ningpo to our trade under existing circumstances, and should you therefore find it expedient to sanction forcible interference for its security, I request you will communicate with Captain Dew direct...."
By this it appears that a British Admiral would have felt himself justified in considering his Government's orders, his own pledges, and the national honour, secondary in consequence to the temporary advantages arising from "our trade." Lord Russell, upon receipt of the Admiral's "every obstruction" despatch, instructed Mr. Bruce as follows:—
"I have received ... a copy of Vice-Admiral Hope's letter to you of the 8th May, respecting the measures adopted by him for the defence of Ningpo.... I have caused the Admiralty to be informed, in reply, that I am of opinion that Vice-Admiral Hope's measures should be approved.... You will understand, however, that Her Majesty's Government do not wish force to be used against the rebels in any case except for the actual protection of the lives and property of British subjects."
Professions of neutrality are here reiterated, although at the same time the Admiral's hostile policy is approved of. Meanwhile, in the face of these plain orders to "observe neutrality," Admiral Hope thus addressed the Ti-ping chief in command of Chapoo:—
"The following communication from Vice-Admiral Sir James Hope, K.C.B., commanding the naval forces of Great Britain in China, is made to the General commanding the Taeping troops at Chapoo:—
"1. I have been informed that the troops under your orders have lately captured the town of Chapoo, and that there is an intention on their part of advancing on Ningpo.
"2. As the capture of Ningpo would be extremely injurious to British trade, and that of foreigners generally, I beg you to desist from advancing on that town within a distance of two marches.
"3. Should these my wishes be disregarded, and I sincerely trust they may not be, as it would be with deep regret that I should place my forces in a hostile position towards the Taepings, with whom we wish to maintain amicable relations, I may be compelled to assist in the defence of Ningpo, and in that case I need hardly point out to you the hopelessness of success on your part, whilst what occurred at Shanghae last year is still fresh in your memories.
"Encounter, June 11, 1861."
In this despatch the Ti-ping general is insulted by menace; an unmanly reference is made to Shanghae; a hostile attitude is threatened if the Ti-pings capture cities the possession of which is most essential to the success of their cause—and yet, withal, a wish "to maintain amicable relations" is professed!
Upon the 8th August, 1861, after the singular interpretation of neutrality by his subordinates and Admiral Hope, Earl Russell indited the following order to Mr. Bruce:—
"Her Majesty's Government desire to maintain, as they have done hitherto, neutrality between the two contending parties in China. If British subjects are taken prisoners by either party, you should do your utmost to save them from torture or capital punishment, but otherwise you should abstain from all interference in the civil war."[43]
When the massacre before Shanghae, in 1860, is remembered, when the subsequent approval of Admiral Hope's hostile intentions is considered, and when the various modes in which our pledges of neutrality were indirectly violated are counted, this despatch will require no comment.
In fulfilment of the desire (to maintain neutrality, "as they have done hitherto," upon the part) of his Government, Captain Dew gave all the assistance he possibly could to the Manchoo defenders of Ningpo; besides framing eight plans[44] for the defence of the city against the Ti-pings; according to Mr. Bruce:—
"He fitted twelve heavy guns with carriages, &c., to mount on the walls."
Again, in the same despatch,[45] Mr. Bruce states:—
"Captain Dew had gone farther, than he was strictly warranted in doing, in his desire to save the city of Ningpo...."
We are forced to believe this fitting of heavy guns, and defence of Chinese cities, a part of the neutrality Her Majesty's Government had "hitherto" maintained, and in their opinion a true interpretation of this order, "that excepting intercession for British prisoners our authorities should abstain from all interference in the civil war!"
Captain Dew's next interpretation of this order took the form of a buccaneering exploit against the Ti-ping custom-houses. Upon the occupation of the country between the silk districts and Shanghae by the Ti-pings, Europeans were sent in charge of the silk boats plying on the inland waters, one being placed with each valuable boat load, in order to pass it through the Ti-ping territory as foreign property. Consul Medhurst, in a despatch to Captain Dew,[46] writes:—
"The consequence is, that foreign escorts go inland without passports, and a number of irresponsible seamen are introduced into the country ... the result of this state of things cannot be good.... The principal danger to be feared by persons sending up country arises, not so much from the acts of the rebels themselves, as from the squeezing and plundering propensities of the Imperialist forces, and from the pilfering attacks of lawless peasantry.... Both kinds of marauders might be kept in good check through visits made periodically by Her Majesty's gun-boats.... If you approve of this scheme, I would suggest your sending a gun-boat up in the course of the next few days...."
Captain Dew having approved the "scheme," we will proceed to notice what he did. Instead of paying attention to "both kinds of marauders" pointed out by Consul Medhurst as the "principal danger," the Captain, towards the middle of June, as stated in The Friend of China, employed himself about the following piratical outrage:—
"Sixteen boats freighted with bales of silks and cocoons, with some Europeans in charge of them, and belonging to European firms in Shanghae, were passing a Taeping custom-house at Loo-chee, some distance up the Shanghae or Wong-poo river. They were brought to, and a small duty of four dollars per bale of silk was demanded. The boats belonging to two of the firms paid the duty and proceeded on their voyage, but the person in charge of the boats belonging to Messrs. Adamson & Co., of Shanghae, refused to pay it, and he was then told he could not proceed until the duty was paid, and the boat and bales of silk were consequently taken possession of. This was construed into an act of 'atrocious piracy,' and the Flamer and Captain Dew went to Loo-chee to demand restitution. Explanations were given by the Taeping Governor of the district, but they were unavailing; the unqualified restoration of the silk was insisted on under a threat of bombardment; the boats and bales of silk were therefore surrendered to Captain Dew, but as some small arms were missing, Captain Dew took possession of the guns of the custom-house, and seized some customs' police, and took them away with him to be detained until the arms missing from the boat should have been returned. The letter written by the Governor of the district, named Wan, to the authorities of Shanghae, consequent upon this outrage, is dignified and forbearing, and it were well for us to act in the spirit it manifests. The above are only examples of our professed neutrality; many others, however, have occurred."
The following are extracts from the letter written upon the subject by the Ti-ping chief, Wan:—
"I find on inquiry, that the silk, &c., lost by your merchant, was seized in lieu of duties, in consequence of an attempt on his part to get by the custom-house and evade payment of duties, on which he was arrested, and your charge, therefore, that he was plundered, is utterly without foundation.
"The Truly Sacred Lord who has established the Divine Dynasty, has also established custom-houses wherever the country is quiet, and by his law all merchants who pass these must pay the regular duties, and your merchant in daring to force his way through and evade the payment of customs, and you in coming here and making a disturbance and squeezing the money back, have behaved in a manner at utter variance with propriety....
"A special communication."
Meanwhile, Mr. Bruce, the chief diplomatist, unable to justify this increasing aggression otherwise, fiercely assailed the Ti-ping theology and civil administration. In a despatch to Lord Russell, dated at "Pekin, June 23, 1861,"[47] he takes upon himself to state (supremely indifferent to, or rather ignoring, the valuable testimony of the Revs. Griffith, John, Edkins, Medhurst, Muirhead, Legge, &c.):—
"The evidence of all classes of observers seems unanimous, both as to the destructive nature of the insurrection, and as to the blasphemous and immoral character of the superstition on which it is based."
Does Mr. Bruce and those who agree with him, venture to term our Bible the so-called "blasphemous and immoral superstition?"—for on that, and that alone, is the Ti-ping faith established. The following extracts from the same dispatch, and two others, having been approved by Her Majesty's Government, contain a complete key to the course taken against the Ti-pings, and lay bare a policy deduced from false premises, and founded upon utter violation of principle. The three despatches under consideration consist of—1. Mr. Bruce to Lord Russell, June 23, 1861; 2. Mr. Bruce to Vice-Admiral Sir J. Hope, Pekin, June 16; 3. Vice-Admiral Sir J. Hope's reply to Mr. Bruce, dated, Impérieuse, Hong-kong, July 11.—Dispatch No. 1 states:—
"In the enclosed letter to Sir James Hope, to which I beg to draw your Lordship's attention, I have stated at length the dangers to which the progress of the insurrection exposes British interests in China.... Our permanent interests are those of trade, the prosperity of which is linked with order and tranquillity. We have, in addition, a temporary interest arising out of the indemnities payable from the custom-house revenue, which is, however, intimately linked with the former.
"What is to become of these interests if the ports fall into the hands of the rebels?"
Here we have the true cause of British hostility to the Ti-pings. Not that our Government feared the trading "interests" would suffer if the Ti-pings captured the treaty ports—by no means; but they dreaded the certain loss of the "temporary interest arising out of the indemnities." They knew full well, as a quotation from dispatch No. 3 will prove, the Ti-pings had never injured our trade; that although the capture of the ports might cause a temporary stagnation, those who would take them came as their "brothers" in Christ, and ultimately would have established a free and general commerce throughout the country; but they also knew that the success of the Ti-pings would imperil their existence, by stopping the indemnification for the last unnecessary and aggressive war with China, and by sweeping away the immense revenue derived from the vile opium traffic.
In the same despatch, Mr. Bruce, with his usual acumen, winds up his syllogism of fallacious assertions—"The nature of the insurrection is destructive" and its religion "blasphemous and immoral;" the insurrectionists are able to capture the Imperial cities, therefore, the "commercial prosperity" of the treaty ports and the "temporary interests" would be destroyed by the success of the Ti-pings—in the following words:—
"The motives of the far larger part of the force are, I apprehend, a desire to live on the spoils of the rich and industrious, to carry off women, and to lead a life of alternate adventure and licence, with little feeling for the Taeping cause.... I see, therefore, little hopes of communities like those of Shanghae and Ningpo escaping destruction.... The commercial prosperity of the ports would receive a fatal blow.... The proceeds of the custom-houses would fall off, and nothing but force would enable us to receive the proportion of duties we are entitled to" (the indemnities) "under the convention of Pekin, out of their diminished receipts."
Now, I submit, these forebodings with regard to the indemnity having been verified by the capture of Ningpo and the rapid success of the Ti-pings, led to the participation of England in the Chinese internecine war. If Mr. Bruce, by the above-quoted statements, intended to advise his Government to assist the Imperialists—and they cannot admit of any other interpretation—how can that distinguished and consistent statesman reconcile them with his strong disapproval of any such policy expressed only a few months before, and which I have already quoted in a previous chapter:—
"No course could be so well calculated to lower our national reputation, as to lend our material support to a Government the corruption of whose authorities is only checked by its weakness."
Mr. Bruce first states, the worst possible policy England could choose would be to interfere against the Ti-pings; and then he declares, if we do not interfere, "that nothing but force would enable us to receive" indemnities and enjoy trade. The present British Government has thought fit to adopt the suicidal course pointed out by Mr. Bruce, and now it has experienced the fact that "no course could be so well calculated to lower our national reputation." The last testimony of Mr., or rather, Sir F. Bruce; of Mr. Lay, C.B., late Inspector-General of Chinese Customs; of Captain Sherrard Osborne, R.N., late Admiral of the so-called Anglo-Chinese flotilla; and of all who have the least opportunity of knowing anything about the subject, unite in confessing the evil of the past policy exercised towards the Ti-pings, and state that the Manchoo Government, despite the fact that it owes its very existence to the help of the British, has thoroughly returned to its exclusiveness, its evasion of treaty obligations, and its hatred of the "outer-barbarians" who have saved it from extinction.
We will now proceed to notice despatch No. 2, addressed by Mr. Bruce to Admiral Hope, which affords further proof of the false principles on which British interference was founded:—
"The Government will soon be in possession of the accounts ... of the agreement entered into by the rebels not to attack Shanghae for a twelvemonth, and of the corresponding assurance that, if we are not molested in trading up the river, our desire and intention are to remain neutral in the civil contest now in progress in China....
"Her Majesty's Government will probably abstain from rendering active assistance at present to the Imperial Government, both on account of the assurances of neutrality we have given to the insurgents, and on account of the serious and indefinite consequences to which any such intervention would in all probability lead."
The signification of the "at present" will be seen upon perusal of the following paragraph, which exactly describes the plan very shortly adopted by the British Government, in direct violation of those "assurances of neutrality we have given to the insurgents":—
"Another course is open to consideration, namely, that of taking the open ports or the principal ones under our protection and safeguard, and declaring that we will repel by force any attack upon them by the insurgents. Considering that by treaty we have an interest in the revenue derived at these ports from trade, and that this, the only source of our indemnities, would be materially diminished, if not altogether destroyed, should they be assaulted and captured ... I think it may be urged, with truth, in justification of such a course, that it affords the best means of protecting our interests.... But this course is not unattended with difficulty. The insurgents would naturally object, that in leaving the revenue and administration of these places in Imperial hands, we do in reality assist the Imperialists."
This conclusion is correct; for, so impossible was it to usurp the treaty ports and not "in reality assist the Imperialists," that the mask was thrown off by openly making war upon the Ti-pings. The only "difficulty" to allude to, which indeed is really almost creditable to the conscience of Mr. Bruce, was the fact that England was pledged to the opposite policy; but it must be remembered that the only tie which bound her to carry out that policy was one of justice and honour, while strong temptations to its violation were in existence; also, that it is not the lot of every minister to be able to discern how the commercial interests of his country may be best provided for.
"To this we should reply that we exercise the legitimate right of self-defence in protecting our own interests, and that if in doing so we are obliged to limit the belligerent rights of the insurgents, the cause is to be found in the ruthless nature of the war they wage."
This excuse is the principal one given by the British Ministry to justify its breach of faith; but "the cause" must, from what has already been stated, be regarded as utterly false.
But, should we for a moment admit the hypothetical "ruthless nature of the war they wage," by what right were we "obliged to limit the belligerent rights of the insurgents," when it is universally admitted that the Imperialists are quite as ruthless, if not more so? Moreover, did the British Government attempt to limit the belligerent rights of either North or South in America? yet the one was ruthless enough, and the cotton trade was injured. Unscrupulous persons who would justify the destruction of semi-civilized people, when it can be done with impunity, may say these cases are not parallel; nevertheless, the only difference is, that with America we have treaties allowing Englishmen to settle and trade everywhere, while in China the treaty limits the settling and trading to certain parts. The principle of non-intervention applies quite as strongly to the one nation as the other; moreover, the Ti-pings never did, or would have attempted to, blockade the trade of any port at which Europeans were settled. Did either belligerent so far study foreign interests in America?
To resume our review of despatch No. 2, Mr. Bruce continues:—
"The Government would, no doubt, wish to hear from you whether Nankin could be attacked with success by a purely naval force." ...
After deprecating any partial hostilities against the Ti-pings, the despatch continues:—
"And on the other hand, we should lose a favourable opportunity of placing our relations with the Emperor on a satisfactory footing, if we were deprived by some incidental event of the power of making our aid a matter of bargain with the Imperial Government.... The longer we are able to preserve an indifferent attitude between the two parties, the more inclined they will be to bid higher for our friendship and support."
What an accomplished frequenter of the Rialto the author of these creditable sentences would have made! This despatch was written on the 16th June, 1861; within seven months open hostilities were initiated against the Ti-pings by Admiral Hope, in direct violation of his Government's existing orders to maintain neutrality; and within nine months the British Government adopted the policy "of taking the open ports under our protection," and violated all pledges of neutrality by prosecuting a regular, though never openly declared, war upon the insurgents.
The following are the most important passages from despatch No. 3. They plainly state that our "commercial interests" would not suffer from the acts of the rebels, and that trade was not injured by them, although completely in their power.
After disapproving of any attack upon Nankin, Admiral Hope states:—
"The Taeping authorities will be open to easy access by us so long as Nankin remains the seat of Government; and from such experience as our short intercourse has afforded, I see a fair prospect of our acquiring sufficient influence with them to enable us to carry all points which are essential to our commercial interests, even to that of eventual abstinence from molesting the consular ports.
"It is further clear that we cannot afford to quarrel with them, as at any moment they might stop the whole trade of Shanghae, at this time by far the largest portion of that from China."
Nothing can be more to the point than this admission that the Ti-pings did not injuriously affect our trading interests; but the opium traffic and indemnities were threatened, and to save them the treaty ports were held against the victorious patriots.
In his reply to the three despatches quoted from, Earl Russell wrote:—
"I have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government agree with Admiral Hope in regarding an attack on Nankin as highly impolitic, but it might be expedient to defend the treaty ports if the Chinese" (Manchoos) "would consent not to use those ports for purposes of aggression."
It will thus be seen Lord Russell did not authorize the defence of the treaty ports even "if the Chinese (Manchoos) would consent not to use those ports for purposes of aggression," as he indefinitely states that in event of such action upon the part of the Manchoo Government, "it might be expedient to defend" them. Yet, although even this ambiguous suggestion could not become an absolute order in the absence of the fulfilment of the condition precedent, the British authorities in China acted as though Lord Russell had imperatively ordered the military occupation of the ports, upon the proviso having been agreed to by the Imperial belligerent; and it was not till after the open violation of the oft-guaranteed neutrality by the commencement of systematic hostilities against the Ti-pings, that the Foreign Secretary publicly authorized the proceedings.
Admiral Hope declared "all points" could be carried with the Ti-pings, even regarding their avoidance of the treaty ports, "essential to our commercial interests." Most undoubtedly he was correct. The Ti-pings never injured the trade, and would have abstained from molesting the treaty ports had they been made neutral; but the ports having become the principal depôts of the enemy, naturally compelled them to endeavour to obtain possession of them.
When the agreement or treaty of neutrality was made with the Ti-ping authorities by the leaders of the British expedition opening up the Yang-tze to trade, Mr. Parkes reported:—