182 Diogen. Laert. ix. 52. The danger incurred by Diogenes the Apolloniate at Athens is well authenticated, on the evidence of Demetrius the Phalerean, who had good means of knowing. And the fact may probably be referred to some time after the year B.C. 440, when Athens was at the height of her power and of her attraction for foreign visitors — when the visits of philosophers to the city had been multiplied by the countenance of Perikles — and when the political rivals of that great man had set the fashion of assailing them in order to injure him. This seems to me one probable reason for determining the chronology of the Apolloniate Diogenes: another is, that his description of the veins in the human body is so minute and detailed as to betoken an advanced period of philosophy between B.C. 440-410. See the point discussed in Panzerbieter, Fragment. Diogen. Apoll. c. 12-18 (Leipsic, 1830).
Simplikius (ad Aristot. Phys. fol. 6 A) describes Diogenes as having been σχεδὸν νεώτατος in the series of physical theorists.
Diogenes the Apolloniate, the latest in the series of Ionic philosophers or physiologists, adopted, with modifications and enlargements, the fundamental tenet of Anaximenes. There was but one primordial element — and that element was air. He laid it down as indisputable that all the different objects in this Kosmos must be at the bottom one and the same thing: unless this were the fact, they would not act upon each other, nor mix together, nor do good and harm to each other, as we see that they do. Plants would not grow out of the earth, nor would animals live and grow by nutrition, unless there existed as a basis this universal sameness of nature. No one thing therefore has a peculiar nature of its own: there is in all the same nature, but very changeable and diversified.183
183 Diogen. Ap. Fragm. ii. c. 29 Panzerb.; Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 39.
εἰ γὰρ τὰ ἐν τῷδε τῷ κόσμῳ ἐόντα νῦν γῆ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ τἄλλα, ὅσα φαινεται ἐν τῷδε τῷ κόσμῳ ἐόντα, εἰ τουτέων τι ἦν τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου ἕτερον ἐὸν τῇ ἰδίῃ φύσει, καὶ μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐὸν μετέπιπτε πολλαχῶς καὶ ἡτεροιοῦτο· οὐδαμῆ οὔτε μίσγεσθαι ἀλλήλοις ἠδύνατο οὔτε ὠφέλησις τῷ ἑτέρῳ οὔτε βλάβη, &c.
Aristotle approves this fundamental tenet of Diogenes, the conclusion that there must be one common Something out of which all things came — ἐξ ἑνὸς ἅπαντα (Gen. et Corrupt. i. 6-7, p. 322, a. 14), inferred from the fact that they acted upon each other.
Air was the primordial, universal element.
Now the fundamental substance, common to all, was air. Air was infinite, eternal, powerful; it was, besides, full of intelligence and knowledge. This latter property Diogenes proved by the succession of climatic and atmospheric phenomena of winter and summer, night and day, rain, wind, and fine weather. All these successions were disposed in the best possible manner by the air: which could not have laid out things in such regular order and measure, unless it had been endowed with intelligence. Moreover, air was the source of life, soul, and intelligence, to men and animals: who inhaled all these by respiration, and lost all of them as soon as they ceased to respire.184
184 Diog. Apoll. Fr. iv.-vi. c. 36-42, Panz. — Οὐ γὰρ ἂν οὕτω δέδασθαι οἷόν τε ἦν ἄνευ νοήσιος, ὥστε πάντων μέτρα ἔχειν, χειμῶνός τε καὶ θέρεος και νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρης καὶ ὑετῶν καὶ ἀνέμων καὶ εὐδιῶν. καὶ τὰ ἄλλα εἴ τις βούλεται ἐννοέεσθαι, εὕρισκοι ἂν οὕτω διακείμενα, ὡς ἀνυστὸν κάλλιστα. Ἔτι δε πρὸς τούτοις καὶ τάδε μεγάλα σημεῖα· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα ἀναπνέοντα ζώει τῷ ἀέρι. Καὶ τοῦτο αὐτοῖς καὶ ψυχή ἐστι καὶ νόησις ——
— Καὶ μοὶ δοκέει τὸ τὴν νόησιν ἔχον εἶναι ὁ ἀὴρ καλεόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, &c.
Schleiermacher has an instructive commentary upon these fragments of the Apolloniate Diogenes (Vermischte Schriften, vol. ii. p. 157-162; Ueber Diogenes von Apollonia).
Air possessed numerous and diverse properties; was eminently modifiable.
Air, life-giving and intelligent, existed everywhere, formed the essence of everything, comprehended and governed everything. Nothing in nature could be without it: yet at the same time all things in nature partook of it in a different manner.185 For it was distinguished by great diversity of properties and by many gradations of intelligence. It was hotter or colder — moister or drier — denser or rarer — more or less active and movable — exhibiting differences of colour and taste. All these diversities were found in objects, though all at the bottom were air. Reason and intelligence resided in the warm air. So also to all animals as well as to men, the common source of vitality, whereby they lived, saw, heard, and understood, was air; hotter than the atmosphere generally, though much colder than that near the sun.186 Nevertheless, in spite of this common characteristic, the air was in other respects so indefinitely modifiable, that animals were of all degrees of diversity, in form, habits, and intelligence. Men were doubtless more alike among themselves: yet no two of them could be found exactly alike, furnished with the same dose of aerial heat or vitality. All other things, animate and inanimate, were generated and perished, beginning from air and ending in air: which alone continued immortal and indestructible.187
185 Diog. Ap. Fr. vi. καὶ ἐστι μηδὲ ἓν ὅ, τι μὴ μετέχει τούτου (air). Μετέχει δὲ οὐδὲ ἓν ὁμοίως τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ· ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ τρόποὶ καὶ αὐτοὺ τοῦ ἀέρος καὶ τῆς νοήσιός εἰσιν.
Aristotel. De Animâ, i. 2, p. 405, a. 21. Διογένης δ’, ὥσπερ καὶ ἑτεροί τινες, ἀέρα [ὑπέλαβε τὴν ψυχήν], &c.
186 Diog. Ap. Fr. vi. καὶ πάντων ζώων δὴ ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν, ἀὴρ θερμότερος μὲν τοῦ ἔξω ἐν ᾧ ἐσμέν, τοῦ μέντοι παρὰ τῷ ἡελίῳ πολλὸν ψυχρότερος.
187 Diogen. Apoll. Fr. v. ch. 38, Panz.
Physiology of Diogenes — his description of the veins in the human body.
The intelligence of men and animals, very unequal in character and degree, was imbibed by respiration, the inspired air passing by means of the veins and along the blood into all parts of the body. Of the veins Diogenes gave a description remarkable for its minuteness of detail, in an age when philosophers dwelt almost exclusively in loose general analogies.188 He conceived the principal seat of intelligence in man to be in the thoracic cavity, or in the ventricle of the heart, where a quantity of air was accumulated ready for distribution.189 The warm and dry air concentrated round the brain, and reached by veins from the organs of sense, was the centre of sensation. Taste was explained by the soft and porous nature of the tongue, and by the number of veins communicating with it. The juices of sapid bodies were sucked up by it as by a sponge: the odorous stream of air penetrated from without through the nostrils: both were thus brought into conjunction with the sympathising cerebral air. To this air also the image impressed upon the eye was transmitted, thereby causing vision:190 while pulsations and vibrations of the air without, entering through the ears and impinging upon the same centre, generated the sensation of sound. If the veins connecting the eye with the brain were inflamed, no visual sensation could take place;191 moreover if our minds or attention were absorbed in other things, we were often altogether insensible to sensations either of sight or of sound: which proved that the central air within us was the real seat of sensation.192 Thought and intelligence, as well as sensation, was an attribute of the same central air within us, depending especially upon its purity, dryness, and heat, and impeded or deadened by moisture or cold. Both children and animals had less intelligence than men: because they had more moisture in their bodies, so that the veins were choked up, and the air could not get along them freely to all parts. Plants had no intelligence; having no apertures or ducts whereby the air could pervade their internal structure. Our sensations were pleasurable when there was much air mingled with the blood, so as to lighten the flow of it, and to carry it easily to all parts: they were painful when there was little air, and when the blood was torpid and thick.193
188 Diogen. Apoll. Fr. vii. ch. 48, Panz. The description of the veins given by Diogenes is preserved in Aristotel. Hist. Animal, iii. 2: yet seemingly only in a defective abstract, for Theophrastus alludes to various opinions of Diogenes on the veins, which are not contained in Aristotle. See Philippson, Ὕλη ἀνθρωπίνη, p. 203.
189 Plutarch, Placit. Philos. iv. 5. Ἐν τῇ ἀρτηριακῇ κοιλίᾳ τῆς καρδίας, ἥτις ἐστὶ καὶ πνευματική. See Panzerbieter’s commentary upon these words, which are not very clear (c. 50), nor easy to reconcile with the description given by Diogenes himself of the veins.
190 Plutarch, Placit. Philosoph. iv. 18. Theophrast. De Sensu, s. 39-41-43. Κριτικώτατον δὲ ἡδονῆς τὴν γλῶτταν· ἁπαλώτατον γὰρ εἶναι καὶ μανὸν καὶ τὰς φλέβας ἁπάσας ἀνήκειν εἰς αὐτήν.
191 Plutarch, Placit. Philosoph. iv. 16; Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 40.
192 Theophrast. De Sensu, s. 42. Ὅτι δὲ ὁ ἐντὸς ἀὴρ αἰσθάνεται, μικρὸν ὢν μόριον τοῦ θεοῦ, σημεῖον εἶναι, ὅτι πολλάκις πρὸς ἄλλα τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντες οὔθ’ ὁρῶμεν οὔτ’ ἀκούομεν. The same opinion — that sensation, like thought, is a mental process, depending on physical conditions — is ascribed to Strato (the disciple and successor of Theophrastus) by Porphyry, De Abstinentiâ, iii. 21. Στράτωνος τοῦ φυσικοῦ λόγος ἐστὶν ἀποδεικνύων, ὡς οὐδὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι το παράπαν ἄνευ τοῦ νοεῖν ὑπάρχει. καὶ γὰρ γράμματα πολλάκις ἐπιπορευομένους τῇ ὄψει καὶ λόγοι προσπίπτοντες τῇ ἀκοῇ διαλανθάνουσιν ἡμᾶς καὶ διαφεύγουσι πρὸς ἑτέρους τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντας — ᾗ καὶ λέλεκται, νοῦς ὁρῆ καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει, τἄλλα κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά.
The expression ascribed to Diogenes by Theophrastus — ὁ ἐντὸς ἀὴρ, μικρὸν ὢν μόριον τοῦ θεοῦ — is so printed by Philippson; but the word θεοῦ seems not well avouched as to the text, and Schneider prints θυμοῦ. It is not impossible that Diogenes may have called the air God, without departing from his physical theory; but this requires proof.
193 Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 43-46; Plutarch, Placit. Philos. v. 20. That moisture is the cause of dulness, and that the dry soul is the best and most intelligent — is cited among the doctrines of Herakleitus, with whom Diogenes of Apollonia is often in harmony. Αὔη ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη. See Schleiermach. Herakleitos, sect. 59-64.
The structure of the Kosmos Diogenes supposed to have been effected by portions of the infinite air, taking upon them new qualities and undergoing various transformations. Some air, becoming cold, dense, and heavy, sunk down to the centre, and there remained stationary as earth and water: while the hotter, rarer, and lighter air ascended and formed the heavens, assuming through the intelligence included in it a rapid rotatory movement round the earth, and shaping itself into sun, moon, and stars, which were light and porous bodies like pumice stone. The heat of this celestial matter acted continually upon the earth and water beneath, so that the earth became comparatively drier, and the water was more and more drawn up as vapour, to serve for nourishment to the heavenly bodies. The stars also acted as breathing-holes to the Kosmos, supplying the heated celestial mass with fresh air from the infinite mass without.194 Like Anaxagoras, Diogenes conceived the figure of the earth as flat and round, like a drum; and the rotation of the heavens as lateral, with the axis perpendicular to the surface of the earth, and the north pole always at the zenith. This he supposed to have been the original arrangement; but after a certain time, the earth tilted over spontaneously towards the south — the northern half was elevated and the southern half depressed — so that the north pole was no longer at the zenith, and the axis of rotation of the heavens became apparently oblique.195 He thought, moreover, that the existing Kosmos was only of temporary duration; that it would perish and be succeeded by future analogous systems, generated from the same common substance of the infinite and indestructible air.196 Respecting animal generation — and to some extent respecting meteorological phenomena197 — Diogenes also propounded several opinions, which are imperfectly known, but which appear to have resembled those of Anaxagoras.
194 Plutarch ap. Eusebium Præp. Evang. i. 8; Aristotel. De Animâ, i. 2; Diogen. Laert. ix. 53. Διογένης κισσηροειδῆ τὰ ἄστρα, διαπνοίας δὲ αὐτὰ νομίζει τοῦ κόσμου, εἶναι δὲ διάπυρα· συμπεριφέρεσθαι δὲ τοῖς φανεροῖς ἄστροις ἀφανεῖς λίθους καὶ παρ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτ’ ἀνωνύμους· πίπτοντα δὲ πολλάκις ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς σβέννυσθαι· καθάπερ τὸν ἐν Αἰγὸς ποταμοῖς πυρωδῶς κατενεχθέντα ἀστέρα πέτρινον. This remarkable anticipation of modern astronomy — the recognition of aerolithes as a class of non-luminous earthy bodies revolving round the sun, but occasionally coming within the sphere of the earth’s attraction, becoming luminous in our atmosphere, falling on the earth, and there being extinguished — is noticed by Alex. von Humboldt in his Kosmos, vol. i. p. 98-104, Eng. trans. He says — “The opinion of Diogenes of Apollonia entirely accords with that of the present day,” p. 110. The charm and value of that interesting book is greatly enhanced by his frequent reference to the ancient points of view on astronomical subjects.
195 Plutarch, Placit. Philos. ii. 8; Panzerbieter ad Diog. Ap. c. 76-78; Schaubach ad Anaxagor. Fr. p. 175.
196 Plut. Ap. Euseb. Præp. Evang. i. 8.
197 Preller, Hist. Philosoph. Græc.-Rom. ex Font. Loc. Contexta, sect. 68. Preller thinks that Diogenes employed his chief attention “in animantium naturâ ex aeris principio repetendâ”; and that he was less full “in cognitione τῶν μετεώρων”. But the fragments scarcely justify this.
Leukippus and Demokritus — Atomic theory.
Nearly contemporary with Anaxagoras and Empedokles, two other enquirers propounded a new physical theory very different from those already noticed — usually known under the name of the atomic theory. This Atomic theory, though originating with the Eleate Leukippus, obtained celebrity chiefly from his pupil Demokritus of Abdera, its expositor and improver. Demokritus (born seemingly in B.C. 460, and reported to have reached extreme old age) was nine years younger than Sokrates, thirty-three years older than Plato, and forty years younger than Anaxagoras.198 The age of Leukippus is not known, but he can hardly have been much younger than Anaxagoras.
198 Diogen. Laert. ix. 41. See the chronology of Demokritus discussed in Mullach, Frag. Dem. p. 12-25; and in Zeller, Phil. der Griech., vol. i. p. 576-681, 2nd edit. The statement of Apollodorus as to the date of his birth, appears more trustworthy than the earlier date assigned by Thrasyllus (B.C. 470). Demokritus declared himself to be forty years younger than Anaxagoras.
Long life, varied travels, and numerous compositions of Demokritus.
Of Leukippus we know nothing: of Demokritus, very little — yet enough to exhibit a life, like that of Anaxagoras, consecrated to philosophical investigation, and neglectful not merely of politics, but even of inherited patrimony.199 His attention was chiefly turned towards the study of Nature, with conceptions less vague, and a more enlarged observation of facts, than any of his contemporaries had ever bestowed. He was enabled to boast that no one had surpassed him in extent of travelling over foreign lands, in intelligent research and converse with enlightened natives, or in following out the geometrical relations of lines.200 He spent several years in visiting Egypt, Asia Minor, and Persia. His writings were numerous, and on many different subjects, including ethics, as well as physics, astronomy, and anthropology. None of them have been preserved. But we read, even from critics like Dionysius of Halikarnassus and Cicero, that they were composed in an impressive and semi-poetical style, not unworthy to be mentioned in analogy with Plato; while in range and diversity of subjects they are hardly inferior to Aristotle.201
199 Dionys. ix. 36-39.
200 Demokrit. Fragm. 6, p. 238, ed. Mullach. Compare ib. p. 41; Diogen. Laert. ix. 35; Strabo, xv. p. 703.
Pliny, Hist. Natur. “Democritus — vitam inter experimenta consumpsit,” &c.
201 Cicero, Orat. c. 20; Dionys. De Comp. Verbor. c. 24; Sextus Empir. adv. Mathem. vii. 265. Δημόκριτος, ὁ τῇ Διὸς φώνῃ παρεικαζόμενος, &c.
Diogenes (ix. 46-48) enumerates the titles of the treatises of Demokritus, as edited in the days of Tiberius by the rhetor Thrasyllus: who distributed them into tetralogies, as he also distributed the dialogues of Plato. It was probably the charm of style, common to Demokritus with Plato, which induced the rhetor thus to edit them both. In regard to scope and spirit of philosophy, the difference between the two was so marked, that Plato is said to have had a positive antipathy to the works of Demokritus, and a desire to burn them (Aristoxenus ap. Diog. Laert. ix. 40). It could hardly be from congeniality of doctrine that the same editor attached himself to both. It has been remarked that Plato never once names Demokritus, while Aristotle cites him very frequently, sometimes with marked praise.
Relation between the theory of Demokritus and that of Parmenides.
The theory of Leukippus and Demokritus (we have no means of distinguishing the two) appears to have grown out the Eleatic theory.202 Parmenides the Eleate (as I have already stated) in distinguishing Ens, the self-existent, real, or absolute, on one side — from the phenomenal and relative on the other — conceived the former in such a way that its connection with the latter was dissolved. The real and absolute, according to him, was One, extended, enduring, continuous, unchangeable, immovable: the conception of Ens included these affirmations, and at the same time excluded peremptorily Non-Ens, or the contrary of Ens. Now the plural, unextended, transient, discontinuous, changeable, and moving, implied a mixture of Ens and Non-Ens, or a partial transition from one to the other. Hence (since Non-Ens was inadmissible) such plurality, &c., could not belong to the real or absolute (ultra-phenomenal), and could only be affirmed as phenomenal or relative. In the latter sense, Parmenides did affirm it, and even tried to explain it: he explained the phenomenal facts from phenomenal assumptions, apart from and independent of the absolute. While thus breaking down the bridge between the phenomenal on one side and the absolute on the other, he nevertheless recognised each in a sphere of its own.
202 Simplikius, in Aristotel. Physic. fol. 7 A. Λεύκιππος … κοινωνήσας Παρμενίδῃ τῆς φιλοσοφίας, οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐβάδισε Παρμενίδῃ καὶ Ξενοφάνει περὶ τῶν ὄντων δόξαν, ἀλλ’, ὡς δοκεῖ, τὴν ἐναντίαν. Aristotel. De Gener. et Corr. i. 8, p. 251, a. 31. Diogen. Laert. ix. 30.
Demokritean theory — Atoms — Plena and Vacua — Ens and Non-Ens.
This bridge the atomists undertook to re-establish. They admitted that Ens could not really change — that there could be no real generation, or destruction — no transformation of qualities — no transition of many into one, or of one into many. But they denied the unity and continuity and immobility of Ens: they affirmed that it was essentially discontinuous, plural, and moving. They distinguished the extended, which Parmenides had treated as an Unum continuum, into extension with body, and extension without body: into plenum and vacuum, matter and space. They conceived themselves to have thus found positive meanings both for Ens and Non-Ens. That which Parmenides called Non-Ens or nothing, was in their judgment the vacuum; not less self-existent than that which he called Something. They established their point by showing that Ens, thus interpreted, would become reconcilable to the phenomena of sense: which latter they assumed as their basis to start from. Assuming motion as a phenomenal fact, obvious and incontestable, they asserted that it could not even appear to be a fact, without supposing vacuum as well as body to be real: and the proof that both of them were real was, that only in this manner could sense and reason be reconciled. Farther, they proved the existence of a vacuum by appeal to direct physical observation, which showed that bodies were porous, compressible, and capable of receiving into themselves new matter in the way of nutrition. Instead of the Parmenidean Ens, one and continuous, we have a Demokritean Ens, essentially many and discontinuous: plena and vacua, spaces full and spaces empty, being infinitely intermingled.203 There existed atoms innumerable, each one in itself essentially a plenum, admitting no vacant space within it, and therefore indivisible as well as indestructible: but each severed from the rest by surrounding vacant space. The atom could undergo no change: but by means of the empty space around, it could freely move. Each atom was too small to be visible: yet all atoms were not equally small; there were fundamental differences between them in figure and magnitude: and they had no other qualities except figure and magnitude. As no atom could be divided into two, so no two atoms could merge into one. Yet though two or more atoms could not so merge together as to lose their real separate individuality, they might nevertheless come into such close approximation as to appear one, and to act on our senses as a phenomenal combination manifesting itself by new sensible properties.204
203 It is chiefly in the eighth chapter of the treatise De Gener. et Corr. (i. 8) that Aristotle traces the doctrine of Leukippus as having grown out of that of the Eleates. Λεύκιππος δ’ ἔχειν ᾠήθη λόγους, οἵτινες πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν ὁμολογούμενα λέγοντες οὐκ ἀναιρήσουσιν οὔτε γένεσιν οὔτε φθορὰν οὔτε κίνησιν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ὄντων, &c.
Compare also Aristotel. De Cœlo, iii. 4, p. 303, a. 6; Metaphys. A. 4, p. 985, b. 5; Physic. iv. 6: λέγουσι δὲ (Demokritus, &c., in proving a vacuum) ἓν μὲν ὅτι ἡ κίνησις ἡ κατὰ τόπον οὐκ ἂν εἴη, οὐ γὰρ ἂν δοκεῖν εἶναι κίνησιν εἰ μὴ εἴη κενόν· τὸ γὰρ πλῆρες ἀδύνατον εἶναι δέξασθαί τι, &c.
Plutarch adv. Kolot. p. 1108. Οἷς οὐδ’ ὄναρ ἐντυχὼν ὁ Κολώτης, ἐσφάλη περὶ λέξιν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς (Demokritus) ἐν ᾖ διορίζεται, μὴ μᾶλλον τὸ δὲν, ἢ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι· δὲν μὲν ὀνομάζων τὸ σῶμα μηδὲν δὲ τὸ κενόν, ὡς καὶ τούτου φύσιν τινὰ καὶ ὑπόστασιν ἰδίαν ἔχοντος.
The affirmation of Demokritus — That Nothing existed, just as much as Something — appears a paradox which we must probably understand as implying that he here adopted, for the sake of argument, the language of the Eleates, his opponents. They called the vacuum Nothing, but Demokritus did not so call it. If (said Demokritus) you call vacuum Nothing, then I say that Nothing exists as well as Something.
The direct observations by which Demokritus showed the existence of a vacuum were — 1. A vessel with ashes in it will hold as much water as if it were empty: hence we know that there are pores in the ashes, into which the water is received. 2. Wine can be compressed in skins. 3. The growth of organised bodies proves that they have pores, through which new matter in the form of nourishment is admitted. (Aristot. Physic. iv. 6, p. 213, b.)
Besides this, Demokritus set forth motion as an indisputable fact, ascertained by the evidence of sense: and affirmed that motion was impossible, except on the assumption that vacuum existed. Melissus, the disciple of Parmenides, inverted the reasoning, in arguing against the reality of motion. If it be real (he said), then there must exist a vacuum: but no vacuum does or can exist: therefore there is no real motion. (Aristot. Physic. iv. 6.)
Since Demokritus started from these facts of sense, as the base of his hypothesis of atoms and vacua, so Aristotle (Gen. et Corr. i. 2; De Animâ, i. 2) might reasonably say that he took sensible appearances as truth. But we find Demokritus also describing reason as an improvement and enlightenment of sense, and complaining how little of truth was discoverable by man. See Mullach, Demokritus (pp. 414, 415). Compare Philippson — Ὗλη ἀνθρωπίνη — Berlin, 1831.
204 Aristotel. Gen. et Corr. i. 8, p. 325, a. 25, τὰ πρῶτα μεγέθη τὰ ἀδιαίρετα στερεά. Diogen. Laert. ix. 44; Plutarch, adv. Koloten, p. 1110 seq.
Zeller, Philos. der Griech., vol. i. p. 583-588, ed. 2nd; Aristotel. Metaphys. Z. 13, p. 1039, a. 10, ἀδύνατον εἶναί φησι Δημόκριτος ἐκ δύο ἓν ᾒ ἐξ ἑνὸς δύο γενέσθαι· τὰ γὰρ μεγέθη τὰ ἄτομα τὰς οὐσίας ποιεῖ.
Primordial atoms differed only in magnitude, figure, position, and arrangement — they had no qualities, but their movements and combinations generated qualities.
The bridge, broken down by Parmenides, between the real and the phenomenal world, was thus in theory re-established. For the real world, as described by Demokritus, differed entirely from the sameness and barrenness of the Parmenidean Ens, and presented sufficient movement and variety to supply a basis of explanatory hypothesis, accommodated to more or less of the varieties in the phenomenal world. In respect of quality, indeed, all the atoms were alike, not less than all the vacua: such likeness was (according to Demokritus) the condition of their being able to act upon each other, or to combine as phenomenal aggregates.205 But in respect to quantity or magnitude as well as in respect to figure, they differed very greatly: moreover, besides all these diversities, the ordination and position of each atom with regard to the rest were variable in every way. As all objects of sense were atomic compounds, so, from such fundamental differences — partly in the constituent atoms themselves, partly in the manner of their arrangement when thrown into combination — arose all the diverse qualities and manifestations of the compounds. When atoms passed into new combination, then there was generation of a new substance: when they passed out of an old combination there was destruction: when the atoms remained the same, but were merely arranged anew in order and relative position, then the phenomenon was simply change. Hence all qualities and manifestations of such compounds were not original, but derivative: they had no “nature of their own,” or law peculiar to them, but followed from the atomic composition of the body to which they belonged. They were not real and absolute, like the magnitude and figure of the constituent atoms, but phenomenal and relative — i.e. they were powers of acting upon correlative organs of sentient beings, and nullities in the absence of such organs.206 Such were the colour, sonorousness, taste, smell, heat, cold, &c., of the bodies around us: they were relative, implying correlative percipients. Moreover they were not merely relative, but perpetually fluctuating; since the compounds were frequently changing either in arrangement or in diversity of atoms, and every such atomic change, even to a small extent, caused it to work differently upon our organs.207
205 Aristotel. Gener. et Corr. i. 7, p. 323, b. 12. It was the opinion of Demokritus, that there could be no action except where agent and patient were alike. Φησὶ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὅμοιον εἶναι τό τε ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον· οὐ γὰρ ἐγχωρεῖν τὰ ἕτερα καὶ διαφέροντα πάσχειν ὑπ’ ἀλλήλων· ἀλλὰ κἂν ἕτερα ὄντα ποιῇ τι εἰς ἄλληλα, οὐχ ᾗ ἕτερα, ἀλλ’ ᾗ ταὐτόν τι ὑπάρχει, ταύτῃ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν αὐτοῖς. Many contemporary philosophers affirmed distinctly the opposite. Τὸ ὅμοιον ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου πᾶν ἀπαθές, &c. Diogenes the Apolloniate agreed on this point generally with Demokritus; see above, p. 61, note 1. The facility with which these philosophers laid down general maxims is constantly observable.
206 Aristot. Gen. et Corr. i. 2, p. 316, a. 1; Theophrast. De Sensu, s. 63, 64. Περὶ μὲν οὖν βαρέος καὶ κούφου καὶ σκληροῦ καὶ μαλακοῦ ἐν τούτοις ἀφορίζει· τῶν δὲ ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν οὐδενὸς εἶναι φύσιν, ἀλλὰ πάντα πάθη τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀλλοιουμένης, ἐξ ἧς γίνεσθαι τὴν φαντασίαν, &c.
Stobæus, Eclog. Physic. i. c. 16. Φύσιν μὲν μηδὲν εἶναι χρῶμα, τὰ μὲν γὰρ στοιχεῖα ἄποια, τά τε μεστὰ καὶ τὸ κενόν· τὰ δ’ ἐξ αὐτῶν συγκρίματα κέχρῶσθαι διαταγῇ τε καὶ ῥυθμῷ καὶ προτροπῇ, &c.
Demokritus restricted the term Φύσις — Nature — to the primordial atoms and vacua (Simplikius ad Aristot. Physic. p. 310 A.).
207 Aristotel. Gener. et Corr. i. 2, p. 315, b. 10. Ὥστε ταῖς μεταβολαῖς τοῦ συγκειμένου τὸ αὐτὸ ἐναντίον δοκεῖν ἄλλῳ καὶ ἄλλῳ, καὶ μετακινεῖσθαι μικροῦ ἐμμιγνυμένου, καὶ ὅλως ἕτερον φαίνεσθαι ἑνὸς μετακινηθέντος.
Combinations of atoms — generating different qualities in the compounds.
Among the various properties of bodies, however, there were two which Demokritus recognised as not merely relative to the observer, but also as absolute and belonging to the body in itself. These were weight and hardness — primary qualities (to use the phraseology of Locke and Reid), as contrasted with the secondary qualities of colour, taste, and the like. Weight, or tendency downward, belonged (according to Demokritus) to each individual atom separately, in proportion to its magnitude: the specific gravity of all atoms was supposed to be equal. In compound bodies one body was heavier than another, in proportion as its bulk was more filled with atoms and less with vacant space.208 The hardness and softness of bodies Demokritus explained by the peculiar size and peculiar junction of their component atoms. Thus, comparing lead with iron, the former is heavier and softer, the latter is lighter and harder. Bulk for bulk, the lead contained a larger proportion of solid, and a smaller proportion of interstices, than the iron: hence it was heavier. But its structure was equable throughout; it had a greater multitude of minute atoms diffused through its bulk, equally close to and coherent with each other on every side, but not more close and coherent on one side than on another. The structure of the iron, on the contrary, was unequal and irregular, including larger spaces of vacuum in one part, and closer approach of its atoms in other parts: moreover these atoms were in themselves larger, hence there was a greater force of cohesion between them on one particular side, rendering the whole mass harder and more unyielding than the lead.209