169 Plato, Phædrus, pp. 249 C, 265 D-E.
170 This remark is made by Stallbaum in his Prolegg. ad Politicum, p. 81; and it is just, though I do not at all concur in his general view of the Politikus, wherein he represents the dialogue as intended to deride the Megaric philosophers.
171 See the Republic, v. pp. 476-479, vi. pp. 508-510-511, and especially the memorable simile about the cave and the shadows within it, in Book vii. pp. 518-519, together with the περιαγωγὴ which he there prescribes — ἀπὸ τοῦ γιγνομένου εἰς τὸ ὄν — and the remarks respecting observations in astronomy and acoustics, p. 529.
172 Compare the passage of the Phædrus (p. 263 A-C) where Plato distinguishes the sensible particulars on which men mostly agree, from the abstractions (Just and Unjust, &c., corresponding with the ἀσώματα, κάλλιστα, μέγιστα, τιμιώτατα, Politikus, p. 286 A) on which they are perpetually dissenting.
173 Plato, Phædrus, p. 266 B. τούτων δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτός τε ἐραστὴς τῶν διαιρέσεων καὶ συναγωγῶν … τοὺς δυναμένους αὐτὸ δρᾷν … καλῶ διαλεκτικούς. The reason which Sokrates gives in the Phædrus for his attachment to dialectics, that he may become competent in discourse and in wisdom (ἵν’ οἷός τε ὦ λέγειν καὶ φρονεῖν), is the same as that which the Eleate assigns in recommendation of the logical exercises in the Politikus.
174 Plato, Phædrus, pp. 271 D, 277 B. ὁρισάμενός τε πάλιν κατ’ εἴδη μέχρι τοῦ ἀτμήτου τέμνειν ἐπιστήθῃ.
175 Plato, Phædrus, pp. 265 E, 270 E. ἐοίκοι ἂν ὥσπερ τυφλοῦ πορείᾳ.
What distinguishes the Sophistês and Politikus from most other dialogues of Plato, is, that the method of logical classification is illustrated by setting the classifier to work upon one or a few given subjects, some in themselves trivial, some important. Though the principles of the method are enunciated in general terms, yet their application to the special example is kept constantly before us; so that we are never permitted, much less required, to divorce the Universal from its Particulars.
Comparison of the Politikus with the Parmenidês.
As a dialogue illustrative of this method, the Politikus (as I have already pointed out) may be compared to the Phædrus: in another point of view, we shall find instruction in comparing it to the Parmenidês. This last too is a dialogue illustrative of method, but of a different variety of method.
Variety of method in dialectic research — Diversity of Plato.
What the Sophistês and Politikus are for the enforcement of logical classification, the Parmenidês is for another part of the philosophising process — laborious evolution of all the consequences deducible from the affirmative as well as from the negative of every hypothesis bearing upon the problem. And we note the fact, that both in the Politikus and Parmenidês, Plato manifests the consciousness that readers will complain of him as prolix, tiresome, and wasting ingenuity upon unprofitable matters.176 In the Parmenidês, he even goes the length of saying that the method ought only to be applied before a small and select audience; to most people it would be repulsive, since they cannot be made to comprehend the necessity for such circuitous preparation in order to reach truth.177
176 Plato, Politikus, p. 283 B. πρὸς δὴ τὸ νόσημα τὸ τοιοῦτον, and the long series of questions and answers which follows to show that the prolixity is unavoidable, pp. 285 C, 286 B-E.
177 Plato, Parmenid. p. 136 D-E.
The Politikus by itself, apart from the Sophistês.
I have examined in the preceding sections both that which the Sophistês and Politikus present in common — (viz. a lesson, as well as a partial theory, of the logical processes called Definition and Division) — and that which Sophistês presents apart from the Politikus. I now advert to two matters which we find in the Politikus, but not in the Sophistês. Both of them will be found to illustrate the Platonic mode of philosophising.
Views of Plato on mensuration. Objects measured against each other. Objects compared with a common standard. In each Art, the purpose to be attained is the standard.
I. Plato assumes, that there will be critics who blame the two dialogues as too long and circuitous; excessive in respect of prolixity. In replying to those objectors,1 he enquires, What is meant by long or short — excessive or deficient — great or little? Such expressions denote mensuration or comparison. But there are two varieties of mensuration. We may measure two objects one against the other: the first will be called great or greater, in relation to the second — the second will be called little or less in relation to the first. But we may also proceed in a different way. We may assume some third object as a standard, and then measure both the two against it: declaring the first to be great, greater, excessive, &c., because it exceeds the standard — and the second to be little, less, deficient, &c., because it falls short of the standard. Here then are two judgments or estimations altogether different from each other, and yet both denoted by the same words great and little: two distinct essences (in Platonic phrase) of great and little, or of greatness and littleness.2 The art of mensuration has thus two varieties. One includes arithmetic and geometry, where we simply compare numbers and magnitudes with each other, determining the proportions between them: the other assumes some independent standard; above which is excess, and below which is deficiency. This standard passes by different names according to circumstances: the Moderate, Becoming, Seasonable, Proper, Obligatory, &c.3 Such a standard is assumed in every art — in every artistic or scientific course of procedure. Every art has an end to be attained, a result to be produced; which serves as the standard whereby each preparatory step of the artist is measured, and pronounced to be either excessive or deficient, as the case may be.4 Unless such a standard be assumed, you cannot have regular art or science of any kind; neither in grave matters, nor in vulgar matters — neither in the government of society, nor in the weaving of cloth.5
1 The treatment of this subject begins, Politik. p. 283 C, where Plato intimates that the coming remarks are of wide application.
2 Plato, Politik. p. 283 E. δίττας ἄρα ταύτας οὐσίας καὶ κρίσεις τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ τοῦ σμικροῦ θετέον.
3 Plato, Politik. p. 284 E. τὸ μέτριον, τὸ πρέπον, τὸν καιρόν, τὸ δέον, &c.
The reader will find these two varieties of mensuration, here distinguished by Plato, illustrated in the “two distinct modes of appreciating weight” (the Absolute and the Relative), described and explained by Professor Alexander Bain in his work on The Senses and The Intellect, 3rd edition, p. 93. This explanation forms an item in the copious enumeration given by Mr. Bain of the fundamental sensations of our nature.
4 Plato, Politik. p. 283 D. κατὰ τὴν τῆς γενέσεως ἀναγκαίαν οὐσίαν. — 284 A-C. πρὸς τὴν τοῦ μετρίου γένεσιν.
5 Plato, Politik. p. 284 C.
Purpose in the Sophistês and Politikus is — To attain dialectic aptitude. This is the standard of comparison whereby to judge whether the means employed are suitable.
Now what is the end to be attained, by this our enquiry into the definition of a Statesman? It is not so much to solve the particular question started, as to create in ourselves dialectic talent and aptitude, applicable to every thing. This is the standard with reference to which our enquiry must be criticised — not by regard to the easy solution of the particular problem, or to the immediate pleasure of the hearer. And if an objector complains, that our exposition is too long or our subject-matters too vulgar — we shall require him to show that the proposed end might have been attained with fewer words and with more solemn illustrations. If he cannot show this, we shall disregard his censure as inapplicable.6
6 Plato, Politik. pp. 286 D, 287 A. Compare Plato, Philêbus, p. 36 D.
Plato’s defence of the Politikus against critics. Necessity that the critic shall declare explicitly what his standard of comparison is.
The above-mentioned distinction between the two varieties of mensuration or comparison, is here given by Plato, simply to serve as a defence against critics who censured the peculiarities of the Politikus. It is not pursued into farther applications. But it deserves notice, not merely as being in itself just and useful, but as illustrating one of the many phases of Plato’s philosophy. It is an exhibition of the relative side of Plato’s character, as contra-distinguished from the absolute or dogmatical: for both the two, opposed as they are to each other, co-exist in him and manifest themselves alternately. It conveys a valuable lesson as to the apportionment of praise and blame. “When you blame me” (he says to his critics), “you must have in your mind some standard of comparison upon which the blame turns. Declare what that standard is:— what you mean by the Proper, Becoming, Moderate, &c. There is such a standard, and a different one, in every different Art. What is it here? You must choose this standard, explain what it is, and adhere to it when you undertake to praise or blame.” Such an enunciation (thoroughly Sokratic7) of the principle of relativity, brings before critics the fact — which is very apt to be forgotten — that there must exist in the mind of each some standard of comparison, varying or unvarying, well or ill understood: while at the same time it enforces upon them the necessity of determining clearly for themselves, and announcing explicitly to others, what that standard is. Otherwise the propositions, affirming comparison, can have no uniform meaning with any two debaters, nor even with the same man at different times.
7 Xenophon, Memorab. iii. 8, 7, iii. 10, 12.
Comparison of Politikus with Protagoras, Phædon, Philêbus, &c.
To this relative side of Plato’s mind belong his frequent commendations of measurement, numbering, computation, comparison, &c. In the Protagoras,8 he describes the art of measurement as the main guide and protector of human life: it is there treated as applicable to the correct estimation of pleasures and pains. In the Phædon,9 it is again extolled: though the elements to be calculated are there specified differently. In the Philêbus, the antithesis of Πέρας and Ἄπειρον (the Determinant or Limit, and the Indeterminate or Infinite) is one of the leading points of the dialogue. We read in it moreover a bipartite division of Mensuration or Arithmetic,10 which is quite different from the bipartite division just cited out of the Politikus. Plato divides it there (in the Philêbus) into arithmetic for theorists, and arithmetic for practical life: besides which, he distinguishes the various practical arts as being more or less accurate, according as they have more or less of measurement and sensible comparison in them. Thus the art of the carpenter, who employs measuring instruments such as the line and rule — is more accurate than that of the physician, general, pilot, husbandman, &c., who have no similar means of measuring. This is a classification quite different from what we find in the Politikus; yet tending in like manner to illustrate the relative point of view, and its frequent manifestation in Plato. In the Politikus, he seeks to refer praise and blame to a standard of measurement, instead of suffering them to be mere outbursts of sentiment unsystematic and unanalysed.
8 Plato, Protagor. p. 357 B.
9 Plato, Phædon, p. 69 B.
10 Plato, Philêbus, pp. 25 C, 27 D, 57. δύο ἀριθμητικαὶ καὶ δύο μετρητικαί … τὴν διδυμότητα ἔχουσαι ταύτην, ὀνόματος δὲ ἑνὸς κεκοινωμέναι.
This same bipartition, however, is noticed in another passage of the Politikus, p. 258 D-E.
Definition of the statesman, or Governor. Scientific competence. Sokratic point of departure. Procedure of Plato in subdividing.
II. The second peculiarity to which I call attention in the Politikus, is the definition or description there furnished of the character so-called: that is, the Statesman, the King, Governor, Director, or Manager, of human society. At the outset of the dialogue, this person is declared to belong to the Genus — Men of Science or of Art (the two words are faintly distinguished in Plato). It is possession of the proper amount of scientific competence which constitutes a man a Governor: and which entitles him to be so named, whether he actually governs any society or not.11 (This point of departure is purely Sokratic: for in the Memorabilia of Xenophon,12 Sokrates makes the same express declaration.) The King knows, but does not act: yet he is not a simple critic or spectator — he gives orders: and those orders are not suggested to him by any one else (as in the case of the Herald, the Keleustês, and others),13 but spring from his own bosom and his own knowledge. From thence Plato carries us through a series of descending logical subdivisions, until we come to define the King as the shepherd and feeder of the flock of human beings.14 But many other persons, besides the King, are concerned in feeding the human flock, and will therefore be included in this definition: which is thus proved to be too large, and to require farther qualification and restriction.15 Moreover the feeding of the human flock belongs to others rather than to the King. He tends and takes care of the flock, but does not feed it: hence the definition is, in this way also, unsuitable.16
11 Plato, Politikus, pp. 258 B, 259 B.
12 Xenophon, Memorab. iii. 9, 10.
13 Plato, Politik. p. 260 C-E. τὸ μὲν τῶν βασιλέων γένος εἰς τὴν αὐτεπιτακτικὴν θέντες, &c.
14 Plato, Politik. pp. 267 B, 268 C.
15 Plato, Politik. p. 268.
16 Plato, Politik. p. 275 D-E.
King during the Saturnian period, was of a breed superior to the people — not so any longer.
Our mistake (says Plato) was of this kind. In describing the King or Governor, we have unconsciously fallen upon the description of the King, such as he was in the Saturnian period or under the presidency of Kronus; and not such as he is in the present period. Under the presidency of Kronus, each human flock was tended and governed by a divine King or God, who managed every thing for it, keeping it happy and comfortable by his own unassisted agency: the entire Kosmos too, with its revolutions, was at that time under the immediate guidance of a divine mover. But in the present period this divine superintendance is withdrawn: both the entire Kosmos, and each separate portion of it, is left to its own movement, full of imperfection and irregularity. Each human flock is now tended not by a divine King, as it was then; but by a human King, much less perfect, less effective, less exalted above the constituent members. Now the definition which we fell upon (says Plato) suited the King of the Saturnian period; but does not suit the King of the present or human period.17 At the first commencement of the present period, the human flock, left to themselves without superintendance from the Gods, suffered great misery: but various presents from some Gods (fire from Prometheus, arts from Hephæstus and Athênê, plants and seeds from Dêmêtêr) rendered their condition more endurable, though still full of difficulty and hardship.18
17 Plato, Politik. pp. 274 A-275 B.
18 Plato, Politik. p. 274 C.
Plato embodies these last-mentioned comparisons in an elaborate and remarkable mythe — theological, cosmical, zoological, social — which occupies six pages of the Politikus (268 D — 274 E). Meiners and Socher (Ueber Platon’s Schriften, pp. 273-275) point out that the theology of Plato in this fable differs much from what we read in the Phædon, Republic, &c.: and Socher insists upon such discrepancy as one of his arguments against the genuineness of the Politikus. I have already observed that I do not concur in his inference. I do not expect uniformity of doctrine in the various Platonic dialogues: more especially on a subject so much beyond experience, and so completely open to the conjectures of a rich imagination, as theology and cosmogony. In the Sophistês, pp. 242-243, Plato had talked in a sort of contemptuous tone about those who dealt with philosophical doctrine in the way of mythe, as a proceeding fit only for boys: (not unlike the manner of Aristotle, when he speaks of οἱ μυθικῶς σοφιζόμενοι — τὰ ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς, Metaphys. B. 1000, a. 15-18, Λ. 1071, b. 27): while here, in the Politikus, he dilates upon what he admits to be a boyish mythe, partly because a certain portion of it may be made available in illustration of his philosophical purpose, partly because he wishes to enliven the monotony of a long-continued classification. Again, in the Phædrus (p. 229 C), the Platonic Sokrates is made to censure as futile any attempt to find rational explanations for the popular legends (σοφίζεσθαι): but here, in the Politikus, the Eleate expressly adapts his theory about the backward and forward rotation of the Kosmos to the explanation of the popular legends — about earthborn men, and about Helios turning back his chariot, in order to escape the shocking spectacle of the Thyestean banquet: which legends, when so explained, Plato declares that people would be wrong to disbelieve (οἱ νῦν ὑπὸ πολλῶν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπιστοῦνται, pp. 271 B, 268 A, B, C).
The differences of doctrine and handling, between the various Platonic dialogues, are facts not less worthy to be noted than the similarities. Here, in the mythe of the Politikus, we find a peculiar theological view, and a very remarkable cosmical doctrine — the rotation and counter-rotation of the Kosmos. The Kosmos is here declared (as in the Timæus) to be a living and intelligent Subject; having received these mental gifts from its Demiurgus. But the Kosmos is also Body as well as Mind; so that it is incapable of that constant sameness or uniformity which belongs to the Divine: Body having in itself an incurable principle of disorder (p. 269 D). The Kosmos is perpetually in movement; but its movement is only rotatory or circular in the same place: which is the nearest approximation to uniformity of movement. It does not always revolve by itself; nor is it always made to revolve by the Divine Steersman (κυβερνήτης, p. 272 E), but alternately the one and the other. This Divine Steersman presides over its rotation for a certain time, and along with him many subordinate Deities or Dæmons; until an epoch fixed by some unassigned destiny has been reached (p. 272 E). Then the Steersman withdraws from the process to his own watch-tower (εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ περιωπὴν), and the other Deities along with him. The Kosmos, being left to itself, ceases to revolve in the same direction, and begins its counter rotation; revolving by itself backwards, or in the contrary direction. By such violent revulsion many of the living inhabitants of the Kosmos are destroyed. The past phenomena are successively reproduced, but in an inverse direction — the old men go back to maturity, boyhood, infancy, death: the dead are born again, and pass through their lives backwards from age to infancy. Yet the counter-rotation brings about not simply an inverted reproduction of past phenomena, but new phenomena also: for we are told that the Kosmos, when left to itself, did tolerably well as long as it remembered the Steersman’s direction, but after a certain interval became forgetful and went wrong, generating mischief and evil: so that the Steersman was at last forced to put his hand again to the work, and to impart to it a fresh rotation in his own direction (p. 273 B-D). The Kosmos never goes satisfactorily, except when the hand of the Steersman is upon it. But we are informed that there are varieties of this divine administration: one named the period of Kronus or Saturn; another that of Zeus, &c. The present is the period of Zeus (p. 272 B). The period of Kronus was one of spontaneous and universal abundance, under the immediate superintendence of the Deity. This Divine Ruler was infinitely superior to the subjects whom he ruled, and left nothing to be desired. But now, in the present period of Zeus, men are under human rule, and not divine: there is no such marked superiority of the Ruler to his subjects. The human race has been on the point of becoming extinct; and has only been saved by beneficent presents from various Gods — fire from Prometheus, handicraft from Hephæstus and Athênê (pp. 272 C, 274 C).
All this prodigious bulk of mythical invention (θαυμαστὸς ὄγκος, p. 277 B) seems to be introduced here for the purpose of illustrating the comparative ratio between the Ruler and his subjects; and the material difference in this respect between King and Shepherd — between the government of mankind by kings, and that of flocks and herds by the herdsman. In attempting to define the True and Genuine Ruler (he lays it down), we can expect nothing better than a man among other men; but distinguished above his fellows, so far as wisdom, dialectic, and artistic accomplishment, can confer superiority.
There is much in this copious mythe which I cannot clearly understand or put together: nor do I derive much profit from the long exposition of it given by Stallbaum (Proleg. ad Polit. pp. 100-128). We cannot fairly demand either harmonious consistency or profound meaning in the different features of an ingenious fiction. The hypothesis of a counter-rotation of the Kosmos (spinning like a top, ἐπὶ σμικροτάτου βαῖνον ποδὸς ἰέναι, p. 270 A), with an inverted reproduction of past phenomena, appears to me one of the most singular fancies in the Greek mythology. I cannot tell how far it may have been suggested by any such statement as that of the Egyptian priests (Herodot. ii. 142). I can only repeat the observation made by Phædrus to the Platonic Sokrates, in the dialogue Phædrus (p. 275 A): “You, Sokrates, construct easily enough Egyptian tales, or any other tales that you please”.
Distinction of causes Principal and Causes Auxiliary. The King is the only Principal Cause, but his auxiliaries pretend to be principal also.
The human King, whom we shall now attempt to define, tends the human flock; but there are other persons also who assist in doing so, and without whose concurrent agency he could not attain his purpose. We may illustrate this by comparing with him the weaver of woollen garments: who requires many subsidiary and preparatory processes, performed by agents different from himself (such as the carder of wool, the spinner, and the manufacturer of the instruments for working the loom) to enable him to finish his work. In all matters, important as well as vulgar, two separate processes or arts, or contributory persons, are to be distinguished: Causes and Co-Causes, i.e., Principal Causes, and Concurrent, Auxiliary, Co-efficient, Subordinate, Causes.19 The King, like the Weaver, is distinguishable, from other agents helping towards the same end, as a Principal Cause from Auxiliary Causes.20 The Causes auxiliary to the King, in so far as they are inanimate, may be distributed roughly under seven heads (bipartition being here impracticable) — Implements, Vessels, Vehicles, Protections surrounding the Body, Recreative Objects, Raw Material of every variety, Nutritive Substances, &c.21 Other auxiliary Causes are, the domestic cattle, bought slaves, and all descriptions of serving persons; being often freemen who undertake, for hire, servile occupations and low trades. There are moreover ministerial officers of a higher grade: heralds, scribes, interpreters, prophets, priests, Sophists, rhetors; and a great diversity of other functionaries, military, judicial, forensic, dramatic, &c., who manage different departments of public affairs, often changing from one post to another.22 But these higher ministerial functionaries differ from the lower in this — That they pretend to be themselves the directors and managers of the government, not recognising the genuine King: whereas the truth is, that they are only ministerial and subordinate to him:— they are Concurrent Causes, while he is the only real or principal Cause.23
19 Plato, Politik. p. 281 D-E.
20 Plato, Politik. p. 287 D.
21 Plato, Politik. pp. 288-289.
22 Plato, Politik. pp. 290-291 B. Plato describes these men by comparing them to lions, centaurs, satyrs, wild beasts, feeble and crafty. This is not very intelligible, but I presume that it alludes to the variety of functions, and the frequent alternation of functions. I cannot think that such an obscure jest deserves Stallbaum’s compliment:— “Ceterum lepidissima hæc est istorum hominum irrisio, qui cum leonibus, Centauris, Satyris, aliisque monstris comparantur”. Plato repeats it p. 303 C.
23 Plato, Politik. p. 291 C.
Plato does not admit the received classification of government. It does not touch the point upon which all true distinction ought to be founded — Scientific or Unscientific.
Our main object now (says the Eleate) is to distinguish this Real Cause from the subordinate Causes which are mistaken for its partners and equals:— the genuine and intelligent Governor, from those who pretend falsely to be governors, and are supposed often to be such.24 We cannot admit the lines of distinction, which are commonly drawn between different governments, as truly logical: at least they are only subordinate to ours. Most men distinguish the government of one, or a few, or the many: government of the poor or of the rich: government according to law, or without law:— by consent, or by force. The different names current, monarchy or despotism, aristocracy, or oligarchy, &c., correspond to these definitions. But we hold that these definitions do not touch the true characteristic: which is to be found in Science, Knowledge, Intelligence, Art or scientific procedure, &c., and in nothing else. The true government of mankind is, the scientific or artistic: whether it be carried on by one, or a few, or many — whether by poor or rich, by force or consent — whether according to law, or without law.25 This is the right and essential characteristic of genuine government:— it is government conducted according to science or art. All governments not conforming to this type are only spurious counterfeits and approaches to it, more or less defective or objectionable.26
24 Plato, Politik. p. 292 D.
25 Plato, Politik. pp. 292 C, 293 B.
26 Plato, Politik. p. 293 E. ταύτην τότε καὶ κατὰ τοὺς τοιούτους ὅρους ἡμῖν μόνην ὀρθὴν πολιτείαν εἶναι ῥητέον, ὅσας δὲ ἄλλας λέγομεν, οὐ γνησίας οὐδ’ ὄντως οὔσας λεκτέον.
Unscientific governments are counterfeits. Government by any numerous body must be counterfeit. Government by the one scientific man is the true government.
Looking to the characteristic here suggested, the Eleate pronounces that all numerous and popular governments must be counterfeits. There can be no genuine government except by One man, or by a very small number at most. True science or art is not attainable by many persons, whether rich or poor: scarcely even by a few, and probably by One alone; since the science or art of governing men is more difficult than any other science or art.27 But the government of this One is the only true and right government, whether he proclaims laws or governs without law, whether he employs severity or mildness — provided only he adheres to his art, and achieves its purpose, the good and improvement of the governed.28 He is like the true physician, who cuts and burns patients, when his art commands, for the purpose of curing them. He will not be disposed to fetter himself by fixed general laws: for the variety of situations and the fluctuation of circumstances, is so perpetual, that no law can possibly fit all cases. He will recognise no other law but his art.29 If he lays down any general formula or law, it will only be from necessity, because he cannot be always at hand to watch and direct each individual case: but he will not hesitate to depart from his own formula whenever Art enjoins it.30 That alone is base, evil, unjust, which he with his political Science or Art declares to be so. If in any particular case he departs from his own declaration, and orders such a thing to be done — the public have no right to complain that he does injustice. No patient can complain of his physician, if the latter, acting upon the counsels of his art, disregards a therapeutic formula.31 All the acts of the true Governor are right, whether according or contrary to law, so long as he conducts himself with Art and Intelligence — aiming exclusively to preserve the people, and to render them better instead of worse.32