The intense pleasures belong to a state of sickness; but there is more pleasure, on the whole, enjoyed in a state of health.

Recollect (observes Sokrates) that the question here is not whether more pleasure is enjoyed, on the whole, in a state of health than in a state of sickness — by violent rather than by sober men. The question is, about the intense modes of pleasure. Respecting these, I have endeavoured to show that they belong to a distempered, rather than to a healthy, state both of state of body and mind:— and that they cannot be enjoyed pure, without a countervailing or preponderant accompaniment of pain.57 This is equally true, whether they be pleasures of body alone, of mind alone, or of body and mind together. They are false and delusive pleasures: in fact, they are pleasures only in seeming, but not in truth and reality. To-morrow I will give you fuller proofs on the subject.58

Sokrates acknowledges some pleasures to be true. Pleasures of beautiful colours, odours, sounds, smells, &c. Pleasures of acquiring knowledge.

Thus far (continues Sokrates) I have set forth the case on behalf of the pleasure-haters. Though I deny their full doctrine, — that there is no pleasure except cessation from pain — I nevertheless agree with them and cite them as witnesses on my behalf, to the extent of affirming that a large proportion of our so-called pleasures, and those precisely the most intense, are false and unreal: being poisoned and drenched in accompaniments of pain.59 But there are some pleasures, true, genuine, and untainted. Such are those produced by beautiful colours and figures — by many odours — by various sounds: none of which are preceded by any painful want requiring to be satisfied. The sensation when it comes is therefore one of pure and unmixed pleasure. The figures here meant are the perfect triangle, cube, circle, &c.: the colours and sounds are such as are clear and simple. All these are beautiful and pleasurable absolutely and in themselves — not simply in relation to (or relatively to) some special antecedent condition. Smells too, though less divine than the others, are in common with them unalloyed by accompanying pain.60 To these must be added the pleasure of acquiring knowledge, which supposes neither any painful want before it, nor any subsequent pain even if the knowledge acquired be lost. This too is one of the unmixed or pure pleasures; though it is not attainable by most men, but only by a select few.61

Pure and moderate pleasures admit of measure and proportion.

Having thus distinguished the pure and moderate class of pleasures, from the mixed and vehement — we may remark that the former class admit of measure and proportion, while the latter belong to the immeasurable and the infinite. Moreover, look where we will, we shall find truth on the side of the select, small, unmixed specimens — rather than among the large and mixed masses. A small patch of white colour, free from all trace of any other colour, is truer, purer, and more beautiful, than a large mass of clouded and troubled white. In like manner, gentle pleasure, free from all pain, is more pleasurable, truer, and more beautiful, than intense pleasure coupled with pain.62

Pleasure is generation, not substance or essence: it cannot therefore be an End, because all generation is only a means towards substance — Pleasure therefore cannot be the Good.

There are yet other arguments remaining (continues Sokrates) which show that pleasure cannot be the Summum Bonum. If it be so, it must be an End, not a Means: it must be something for the sake of which other things exist or are done — not something which itself exists or is done for the sake of something else. But pleasure is not an End: it is essentially a means, as we may infer from the reasonings of its own advocates. They themselves tell us that it is generation, not substance:— essentially a process of transition or change, never attaining essence or permanence.63 But generation or transition is always for the sake of the thing to be generated, or for Substance — not substance for the sake of generation: the transitory serves as a road to the permanent, not vice versà. Pleasure is thus a means, not an End. It cannot therefore partake of the essential nature and dignity of Good: it belongs to a subordinate and imperfect category.64

Other reasons why pleasure is not the Good.

Indeed we cannot reasonably admit that there is no Good in bodies and in the universe generally, nor anywhere except in the mind:— nor that, within the mind, pleasure alone is good, while courage, temperance, &c., are not good:— nor that a man is good only while he is enjoying pleasure, and bad while suffering pain, whatever may be his character and merits.65

Distinction and classification of the varieties of Knowledge or Intelligence. Some are more true and exact than others, according as they admit more or less of measuring and computation.

Having thus (continues Sokrates) gone through the analysis of pleasures, distinguishing such as are true and pure, from such as are false and troubled — we must apply the like distinctive analysis to the various modes of knowledge and intelligence. Which varieties of knowledge, science, or art, are the purest from heterogeneous elements, and bear most closely upon truth? Some sciences and arts (we know) are intended for special professional practice: others are taught as subjects for improving the intellect of youth. As specimens of the former variety, we may notice music, medicine, husbandry, navigation, generalship, joinery, ship-building, &c. Now in all these, the guiding and directing elements are computation, mensuration, and statics — the sciences or arts of computing, measuring, weighing. Take away these three — and little would be left worth having, in any of the sciences or arts before named. There would be no exact assignable rules, no definite proportions: everything would be left to vague conjecture, depending upon each artisan’s knack and practice which some erroneously call Art. In proportion as each of these professional occupations has in it more or less of computation and mensuration, in the same proportion is it exact and true. There is little of computation or mensuration in music, medicine, husbandry, &c.: there is more of them in joinery and ship-building, which employ the line, plummet, and other instruments: accordingly these latter are more true and exact, less dependent upon knack and conjecture, than the three former.66 They approach nearer to the purity of science, and include less of the non-scientific, variable, conjectural, elements.

Arithmetic and Geometry are twofold: As studied by the philosopher and teacher: As applied by the artisan.

But a farther distinction must here be taken (Sokrates goes on). Even in such practical arts as ship-building, which include most of computation and mensuration — these two latter do not appear pure, but diversified and embodied in a multitude of variable particulars. Arithmetic and geometry, as applied by the ship-builder and other practical men, are very different from arithmetic and geometry as studied and taught by the philosopher.67 Though called by the same name, they are very different; and the latter alone are pure and true. The philosopher assumes in his arithmetic the exact equality of all units, and in his geometry the exact ratios of lines and spaces: the practical man adds together units very unlike each other — two armies, two bulls, things little or great as the case may be: his measurement too, always falls short of accuracy.68 There are in short two arithmetics and two geometries69 — very different from each other, though bearing a common name.

Dialectic is the truest and purest of all Cognitions. Analogy between Cognition and Pleasure: in each, there are gradations of truth and purity.

We thus make out (continues Sokrates) that there is a difference between one variety and another variety of science or knowledge, analogous to that which we have traced between the varieties of pleasure. One pleasure is true and pure; another is not so, or is inseparably connected with pain and non-pleasurable elements — there being in each case a difference in degree. So too one variety of science, cognition, or art, is more true and pure than another: that is, it is less intermingled with fluctuating particulars and indefinite accompaniments. A science, bearing one and the same name, is different according as it is handled by the practical man or by the philosopher. Only as handled by the philosopher, does science attain purity: dealing with eternal and invariable essences. Among all sciences, Dialectic is the truest and purest, because it takes comprehensive cognizance of the eternal and invariable — Ens semper Idem — presiding over those subordinate sciences which bear upon the like matter in partial and separate departments.70

Difference with Gorgias, who claims superiority for Rhetoric. Sokrates admits that Rhetoric is superior in usefulness and celebrity: but he claims superiority for Dialectic, as satisfying the lover of truth.

There is no real contradiction between us (replies Sokrates). You may concede to Gorgias that his art or cognition is the greatest and best of all — the most in repute, as well as the most useful to mankind. I do not claim any superiority of that kind, on behalf of my cognition.71 I claim for it superiority in truth and purity. I remarked before, that a small patch of unmixed white colour was superior in truth and purity to a large mass of white tarnished with other colours — a gentle and unmixed pleasure, in like manner, to one that is more intense but alloyed with pains. It is this superiority that I assert for Dialectic and the other sister cognitions. They are of little positive advantage to mankind: yet they, and only they, will satisfy both the demands of intelligence, and the impulse within us, in so far as we have an impulse to love and strain after truth.72

As far as straining after truth is concerned (says Protarchus), Dialectic and the kindred sciences have an incontestable superiority.

Most men look to opinions only, or study the phenomenal manifestations of the Kosmos. They neglect the unchangeable essences, respecting which alone pure truth can be obtained.

You must see (rejoins Sokrates) that Rhetoric, and most other arts or sciences, employ all their study, and seek all their standard, in opinions alone: while of those who study Nature, the greater number confine their investigations to this Kosmos, to its generation and its phenomenal operations — its manifestations past, present, and future.73 Now all these manifestations are in perpetual flux, admitting of no true or certain cognition. Pure truth, corresponding to those highest mental endowments, Reason and Intelligence — can be found only in essences, eternal and unchangeable, or in matters most akin to them.74

Application. Neither Intelligence nor Pleasure separately, is the Good, but a mixture of the two — Intelligence being the most important. How are they to be mixed?

We have now (continues Sokrates) examined pleasure separately and intelligence separately. We have agreed that neither of them, apart and by itself, comes up to the conception of Good; the attribute of which is, to be all sufficient, and to give plenary satisfaction, so that any animal possessing it desires nothing besides.75 We must therefore seek Good in a certain mixture or combination of the two — Pleasure and Intelligence: and we must determine, what sort of combination of these two contains the Good we seek. Now, to mix all pleasures, with all cognitions, at once and indiscriminately, will hardly be safe. We will first mix the truest and purest pleasures (those which include pleasure in its purest form), with the truest or purest cognitions (those which deal altogether with eternal and unchangeable essence, not with fluctuating particulars). Will such a combination suffice to constitute Good, or an all-sufficient and all-satisfactory existence? Or do we want anything more besides?76 Suppose a man cognizant of the Form or Idea of Justice, and of all other essential Ideas: and able to render account of his cognition, in proper words: Will this be sufficient?77 Suppose him to be cognizant of the divine Ideas of Circle, Sphere, and other figures; and to employ them in architecture, not knowing anything of human circles and figures as they exist in practical life?78

We must include all Cognitions, not merely the truest, but the others also. Life cannot be carried on without both.

Certainly (says Protarchus), we all must have this farther cognition, if we are to find our way from hence to our own homes.79

Must we then admit (says Sokrates) those cognitions also in music, which we declared to be full of conjecture and imitation, without any pure truth or certainty?

We must admit them (says Protarchus), if life is to be worth anything at all. No harm can come from admitting all the other cognitions, provided a man possesses the first and most perfect.

But we must include no pleasures except the true, pure, and necessary. The others are not compatible with Cognition or Intelligence — especially the intense sexual pleasures.

Well then (continues Sokrates), we will admit them all. We have now to consider whether we can in like manner admit all pleasures without distinction. The true and pure must first be let in: next, such as are necessary and indispensable: and all the rest also, if any one can show that there is advantage without mischief in our enjoying every variety of pleasure.80 We must put the question first to pleasures, next to cognitions — whether they can consent respectively to live in company with each other. Now pleasures will readily consent to the companionship of cognitions: but cognitions (or Reason, upon whom they depend) will not tolerate the companionship of all pleasures indiscriminately. Reason will welcome the true and pure pleasures: she will also accept such as are indispensable, and such as consist with health, and with a sober and virtuous disposition. But Reason will not tolerate those most intense, violent, insane, pleasures, which extinguish correct memory, disturb sound reflection, and consist only with folly and bad conduct. Excluding these violent pleasures, but retaining the others in company with Reason and Truth — we shall secure that perfect and harmonious mixture which makes the nearest approximation to Good.81

What causes the excellence of this mixture? It is Measure, Proportion, Symmetry. To these Reason is more akin than Pleasure.

This mixture as Good (continues Sokrates) will be acceptable to all.82 But what is the cause that it is so? and is that cause more akin to Reason or to Pleasure? The answer is, that this mixture and combination, like every other that is excellent, derives its excellence from Measure and Proportion. Thus the Good becomes merged in the Beautiful: for measure and proportion (Moderation and Symmetry) constitute in every case beauty and excellence.83 In this case, Truth has been recognised as a third element of the mixture: the three together coalesce into Good, forming a Quasi-Unum, which serves instead of a Real Unum or Idea of Good.84 We must examine these three elements separately — Truth — Moderation — Symmetry (Measure — Proportion) to find whether each of them is most akin to Reason or to Pleasure. There can be no doubt that to all the three, Reason is more akin than Pleasure: and that the intense pleasures are in strong repugnance and antipathy to all the three.85

Quintuple gradation in the Constituents of the Good. 1. Measure. 2. Symmetry. 3. Intelligence. 4. Practical Arts and Right Opinions. 5. True and Pure Pleasures.

We thus see (says Sokrates in conclusion), in reference to the debate with Philêbus, that Pleasure stands neither first nor second in the scale of approximation to Good. First comes Measure — the Moderate — the Seasonable — and all those eternal Forms and Ideas which are analogous to these.86 Secondly, come the Symmetrical — the Beautiful — the Perfect — the Sufficient — and other such like Forms and Ideas.87 Thirdly, come Reason and Intelligence. Fourthly, the various sciences, cognitions, arts, and right opinions — acquirements embodied in the mind itself. Fifthly, those pleasures which we have discriminated as pure pleasures without admixture of pain; belonging to the mind itself but consequent on the sensations of sight, hearing, smell.88

It is not necessary to trace the descending scale farther. It has been shown, against Philêbus — That though neither Intelligence separately, nor Pleasure separately, is an adequate embodiment of Good, which requires both of them conjointly — yet Intelligence is more akin to Good, and stands nearer to it in nature, than Pleasure.

Dionysius of Halikarnassus, while blaming the highflown metaphor and poetry of the Phædrus and other Platonic dialogues, speaks with great admiration of Plato in his appropriate walk of the Sokratic dialogues; and selects specially the Philêbus, as his example of these latter. I confess that this selection surprises me: for the Philêbus, while it explicitly renounces the peculiar Sokratic vein, and becomes didactic — cannot be said to possess high merit as a didactic composition. It is neither clear, nor orderly, nor comparable in animation to the expository books of the Republic.89 Every commentator of Plato, from Galen downwards, has complained of the obscurity of the Philêbus.