November 18th.—- Last week at the Grove to meet the Duc d'Aumale, who is one of the most enlightened and agreeable Princes I ever met, very simple and natural, and full of information and knowledge of all sorts.

I do not remember to have gathered anything particularly interesting from Clarendon in our various conversations, except that in the event of our consenting to join the Congress he would not be unwilling to go to it, and that he thinks he might be able to effect an arrangement. This confidence has in great measure been produced by a letter from Cowley which he showed me, containing an account of his visit to Biarritz and his communications with the Emperor. He said he had resolved not to say a word to His Majesty of Italian affairs, thinking the Emperor would abstain from talking of them to him, but as soon as they met he began to talk, and went at length into the whole subject. The upshot was that he found the Emperor in such a state of perplexity and embarrassment, and so fully conscious of the scrape into which he had got himself, that he did not know what to do or which way to turn; his object evidently is to get us to help him out of his difficulty, and Clarendon thinks that he should be able to draw him into such measures as we could support if the matter was well managed.

A day or two ago the Duke of Bedford, whom I have not seen or communicated with for a long time, called on me. He told me one curious anecdote, which he had heard from his brother. Persigny called on Lord John one day, and told him he was come in strict confidence to show him the letter which the Emperor had written to the King of Sardinia, but which he must not mention even to his own colleagues, except of course to Palmerston. Lord John promised he would not, and a day or two after he read the letter in the 'Times.' He sent for Persigny and asked for an explanation. Persigny said he could not explain it, but would write to Walewski. John Russell also wrote to Cowley, who spoke to Walewski about it. Walewski declared he could not account for it, and that it must have been sent from Turin, and he would write to that Court to complain of the indiscretion and would also speak to the Emperor. He went to the Emperor, told him what had passed, and showed him what he proposed to write to Turin, when the Emperor said: 'No, don't write at all, take no notice of the publication. The fact is, I sent the letter myself to the "Times" Correspondent.' It was Mocquard who took it to him. A most extraordinary proceeding, and showing the extreme difficulty of all diplomatic dealing between the two Governments. The Emperor is by way of being indignant with the 'Times,' and never fails to pour forth complaints and abuse of the paper to whomever he converses with. He did so, for instance, to Cobden, to whom he gave an audience at Paris. But who can tell whether this is not a pretence and a deceit, and whether he may not all the time have a secret understanding with the 'Times'? Such a supposition would seem to be inconsistent with their articles and his conduct, and the comments of the former upon the latter; but how difficult it is to form any certain judgement upon a policy so tortuous as his, and upon designs so close and councils so crooked!

CHAPTER XIX.

Prospects of the Government and of the Opposition—Mr. Disraeli's commanding Position—Preparation of a Reform Bill—A Congress—Death of Macaulay—The Affairs of Italy—Policy of the Emperor Napoleon—The Commercial Treaty with France—M. de Cavour resumes Office—Opening of Parliament—Negotiation of the Commercial Treaty—The Emperor a Free Trader—Perplexity of Italian Affairs—Moderation of Lord Derby—Opposition to the Commercial Treaty—The Reform Bill of 1860—Tory Opposition to Reform—Mr. Gladstone's great Budget Speech—Opposition to the Treaty and the Budget—Triumph of Mr. Gladstone—The Italian Correspondence—Democratic Opinions of Mr. Gladstone—Introduction of the Reform Bill—The Annexation of Savoy and Nice—Annexation of Tuscany to Piedmont—The D�nouement of the Plot—Complete Apathy of the Country as to Reform—Lord Derby declines to interfere—Lord John's adverse Declaration to France—Consequences of Lord John's Speech against France—Our Position in Europe—Anecdote of the Crimean War—Designs of the Emperor Napoleon in 1858—Lord Palmerston's Distrust of Napoleon III.—Lord John's Indifference to his own Reform Bill—Mr. Gladstone's Ascendency—Designs of the Emperor and Cavour—Unpopularity of the Reform Bill—Correspondence of Lord Grey and Lord John Russell—Reaction against Mr. Gladstone's Measures—Opposition to the Repeal of the Paper Duties—Coolness with France—Garibaldi's Expedition—Lord Palmerston attacks the Neapolitan Minister—The Paper Duties Bill rejected by the Lords—The Reform Bill withdrawn—Lord Palmerston adjusts the Difference between the two Houses—Mr. Gladstone supported by the Radicals—Mr. Senior's Conversations in Paris—A Letter from the Speaker—Mr. Cobden's Faith in the Emperor Napoleon—Conclusion of these Journals.

London, December 25th, 1859.—The Government are getting ready for the session which is near at hand, Palmerston with his usual confidence, but Granville, who is not naturally desponding, and who I dare say represents the feeling of his colleagues, is conscious of the want of that strength and security which a commanding majority alone can give, and, without thinking the danger great or imminent, anticipates the possibility of their being defeated on some vital question. The Opposition, conscious of their numerical force, but anything but united, profess the most moderate views and intentions. Derby professed at Liverpool to have no wish to turn out the Government or to come into office himself. Disraeli himself told me that he and all his party desired the Reform question to be settled quietly, and that if the Government only offered them such a Bill as they could possibly accept, they should be ready to give them every assistance in carrying it through. Since this, Walpole has made a formal communication to Granville (through Henry Lennox) of his and Henley's disposition to the above mentioned end. We are told, moreover, that a great number of the Conservative party will not only support a fair and moderate Reform Bill, but support the Government generally, not so much, however, from wishing well to the Government as from their antipathy to Disraeli and their reluctance to see him in power again. That they will join in carrying through a safe and moderate Reform Bill is no doubt true, but it is not probable that the division amongst them and the hostility to Disraeli will last long, or continue a moment after the appearance of any prospect of the return of the Conservative party to power.

Disraeli raised himself immensely last year, more, perhaps, with his opponents and the House of Commons generally than with his own party, but it is universally acknowledged that he led the House with a tact, judgement, and ability of which he was not before thought capable. While he has thus risen, no rival has sprung up to dispute his pre-eminence. Walpole and Henley are null, and it is evident that the party cannot do without Disraeli, and whenever Parliament meets he will find means of reconciling them to a necessity of which none of them can be unconscious, and I have no doubt that whenever any good opportunities for showing fight may occur the whole party will be found united under Disraeli's orders.

With regard to the Reform Bill, it is being proposed by a large committee of the Cabinet, but George Lewis has the chief management of it. The state of public opinion admits, indeed compels, the utmost moderation, but hitherto the anticipated difficulty has been the sort of pledge which John Russell foolishly gave last year with reference to the franchise, to which it has been supposed he must consider himself bound. But there is reason to believe that he is not taking any active part in the concoction of this Bill, probably on account of his being so absorbed in foreign affairs, and under these circumstances we may not unreasonably expect that a fair Bill will be produced, and the question eventually settled.

The question of still greater and more pressing interest is that of the Congress. The nomination of Hudson met with such opposition in the Cabinet that it was not pressed, and Lord Wodehouse was named instead. He is a clever man, well informed, speaks French fluently, and has plenty of courage and aplomb; his opinions are liberal, but not extravagant. Clarendon, who had him down at the Grove, was pleased and satisfied with him. Granville is much contrari� that Clarendon himself has not been asked to go, thinking justly that he would have much more weight than any other man, and would be far more likely to conduct our affairs in the Congress with credit and success; but Clarendon now tells me he certainly would not have gone if it had been proposed to him. My own conviction was that he would have accepted a proposal, and though for many reasons he would not have liked such a mission, I think he is somewhat mortified that it was not offered to him.

The recent appearance of the pamphlet of 'Le Pape et le Congr�s,'[1] which has produced such a sensation and so much astonishment, has no doubt been a great thing for us, and rendered our diplomatic course much more easy and promising. Clarendon writes to me: 'This last pamphlet of the Emperor's is important and I am sure authentic, as it is simply a developement of what I have heard twenty times from his own lips. It ought of course to have been reserved for the Congress, but as far as we are concerned it is well timed.' It was a bold, but a clever stroke of policy to give notice to the whole world of the sentiments and intentions with which the Emperor enters the Congress, and it renders a good understanding and joint action between France and England feasible and perhaps easy, unless Palmerston spoils everything by some obstinate and extravagant pretensions which he may insist on his plenipotentiaries bringing forward. But if he should be so ill advised, I believe that he would meet with an insuperable resistance in his own Cabinet and at Court, and that Cowley certainly, perhaps Wodehouse also, would decline being made the instruments of such a vicious and mischievous policy.

January 2nd, 1860.—The death of Macaulay is the extinction of a great light, and although every expectation of the completion of his great work had long ago vanished, the sudden close of his career, and the certainty that we shall have no more of his History, or at most only the remaining portion of King William's reign (which it is understood he had nearly prepared for publication), is a serious disappointment to the world. His health was so broken that his death can hardly create any surprise, but there had been no reason lately to apprehend that the end was so near. I have mentioned the circumstance of my first meeting him, after which we became rather intimate in a general way, and he used frequently to invite me to those breakfasts in the Albany at which he used to collect small miscellaneous parties, generally including some remarkable people, and at which he loved to pour forth all those stores of his mind and accumulations of his memory to which his humbler guests, like myself, used to listen with delighted admiration, and enjoy as the choicest of intellectual feasts. I don't think he was ever so entirely agreeable as at his own breakfast table, though I shall remember as long as I live the pleasant days I have spent in his society at Bowood, Holland House, and elsewhere. Nothing was more remarkable in Macaulay than the natural way in which he talked, never for the sake of display or to manifest his superior powers and knowledge. On the contrary, he was free from any assumption of superiority over others, and seemed to be impressed with the notion that those he conversed with knew as much as himself, and he was always quite as ready to listen as to talk. 'Don't you remember?' he was in the habit of saying when he quoted some book or alluded to some fact to listeners who could not remember, because in nineteen cases out of twenty they had never known or heard of whatever it was he alluded to. I do not believe anybody ever left his society with any feeling of mortification, except that which an involuntary comparison between his knowledge and their own ignorance could not fail to engender. For some years past I had seen little or nothing of Macaulay. His own health compelled him to abstain in great measure from going into the world. He bought a house at Campden Hill, from which he rarely stirred, and to which he never invited me, nor did I ever call upon him there. I have often regretted the total cessation of our intercourse, but what else could be expected from the difference of our habits, pursuits, and characters? I have only recently read over again the whole of his 'History of England' with undiminished pleasure and admiration, though with a confirmed opinion that his style is not the very best, and that he is not the writer whom I should be most desirous to imitate; but what appears to me most admirable and most worthy of imitation in Macaulay is the sound moral constitution of his mind, and his fearless independence of thought, never sacrificing truth to any prejudice, interest, or preconceived opinion whatever. Above all he was no hero worshipper, who felt it incumbent on him to minister to vulgar prejudices or predilections, to exalt the merits and palliate the defects of great reputations, and to consider the commission of great crimes, or the detection of mean and base motives, as atoned for and neutralised by the possession of shining abilities and the performance of great actions. Macaulay excited much indignation in some quarters by the severity with which he criticised the conduct and character of the Duke of Marlborough, and the Quakers bitterly resented his attacks upon Penn. He was seldom disposed to admit that he had been mistaken or misinformed, and I thought he was to blame in clinging so tenaciously to his severe estimate of Penn's conduct after the vindication of it which was brought forward, and the production of evidence in Penn's favour, which might have satisfied him that he had been in error, and which probably would have done so in any case in which his judgement had been really unbiassed. I always regretted, not for the sake of Penn's memory, but for the honour of Macaulay himself, that he would not admit the value and force of the exculpatory evidence, and acknowledge, as he very gracefully might, the probability at least of his having been in error. But the case of the Duke of Marlborough is very different, and reflects the highest honour on his literary integrity and independence. Undazzled by the splendour of that great man's career and the halo of admiration which had long surrounded his name, he demonstrated to the whole world of what base clay the idol was made and how he had abused for unworthy ends the choice gifts which Nature had bestowed upon him. Macaulay no doubt held that in proportion to the excellence of his natural endowments was his moral responsibility for the use or abuse of them, and he would not allow Blenheim and Ramillies to be taken as a set-off against his hypocrisy, perfidy, and treason. Macaulay's History is the best ethical study for forming the mind and character of a young man, for it is replete with maxims of the highest practical value. It holds up in every page to hatred and scorn all the vices which can stain, and to admiration and emulation all the virtues which can adorn, a public career. It is impossible for anyone to study that great work without sentiments of profound admiration for the lessons it inculcates, and they who become thoroughly imbued with its spirit, no matter whether they coincide or not with his opinions, will be strengthened in a profound veneration for truth and justice, for public and private integrity and honour, and in a genuine patriotism and desire for the freedom, prosperity, and glory of their country.

January 7th.—In a letter from Clarendon yesterday from the Grove he says: 'Cowley came over here last night. I had a long talk with him; he is low and unhappy, and does not see his way out of the labyrinth; he is not for the Congress meeting now, but still does not think we should abandon the Emperor altogether in his Italian policy. The fact is, we are in a great difficulty. If we had from the first taken the wise part of saying that as we had had nothing to do with the war or the peace, and should therefore not interfere with the arrangements the Emperor thought proper to make, we should now be on velvet; but from the moment we knew of the Villafranca arrangement we have been thwarting the Emperor, and goading him on further than he wished to go, and encouraging the Italians to persist in their own ideas, till at last when he does what we want, and is prepared to throw over the Pope and asks to be backed by us, it is rather awkward to break away and declare we only wanted the credit of recommending a fine liberal policy, but that we don't mean to be at any trouble or expense about it.' All this is undoubtedly true, but it is the old inveterate habit of Palmerston's policy, united with John Russell's crotchets, which has brought it to this pass. Palmerston has always been Conservative at home and Revolutionary abroad, and the gratification of a silly spite against Austria has always been paramount to any other consideration and object. While the enemies of the late Government accused them, very unjustly as the documentary evidence has shown, of having unduly favoured Austria during the recent conflict, and therefore having been neutral only in name, it is true that the present Government, i.e. Palmerston and John Russell, have gone out of their way to interfere in an underhand manner, and have been constantly patting on the back the insurgent Italians, and, as Clarendon says, urging the Emperor to go further than he wishes, or than he can do consistently with the engagement he has entered into. When Cowley was here some months ago, I remember his telling me that one day when he met Cavour, either at Compi�gne or Paris, I forget which, when it was the question of the Congress before the war, Cavour said to him, 'So you are going to have a Congress.' 'Yes,' said Cowley, 'thanks to you and all you have been doing in Italy.' 'Thanks to me!' cried Cavour, 'I like that; why don't you say thanks to your own Minister at Turin, to Sir James Hudson, who has done ten times more than ever I did?'

Hatchford, January 12th.—Clarendon writes to me (on the 10th): 'Cowley dined here on Saturday and did the same at Pembroke Lodge on Sunday. He is on very good terms with John Russell, but hardly understands what he would be at, and for the good reason probably that Johnny does not know himself. There is a Ministerial crisis going on at this moment about Italy, the three confederates wanting of course to do more than the sober-minded majority can agree to. I suppose it will be decided at the Cabinet to-day, and that some middle course will be discovered, as I shall not believe, till it is a fait accompli, that Palmerston will allow the Government to break up on a question which will not carry the country with him. The people dislike Austria and wish well to the Italians, but they want not to interfere in the affairs of either, and I doubt if they would give a man or a shilling to help Palmerston in blotting Austria out of the map of Europe and giving Sardinia a much larger slice of the map. That twofold object amounts to monomania now with Palmerston, and I believe he would sacrifice office to attain it, which is the highest test of his sincerity. The three confederates are Palmerston, John Russell, and Gladstone.

London, January 22nd.—For the last three weeks the sayings and doings of the Emperor Napoleon have occupied all thoughts in every part of Europe, and he has wellnigh recovered in this country the confidence and popularity which had been exchanged for distrust, suspicion, and alarm. It would really look as if the sole or at least the main object of his policy was to conciliate English opinion and to ingratiate himself with the present Government; and he certainly has exhibited great courage and above all a boundless confidence in his own power and authority in his own country. There was a time when he paid great court to the Catholic clergy in France, and it was supposed that his motive in retaining the French troops in Rome (which it was known he very much disliked) was his apprehension lest their withdrawal should expose the Pope's person or Government to danger, which the clergy in France would not readily forgive him for doing. When he made peace with Austria he still evinced a desire to uphold the dignity and authority of the Pope, and therefore nobody was the least prepared for the pamphlet of 'The Pope and the Congress.' It fell like a thunderbolt, striking terror into the minds of all the Papal supporters and adherents, and filling with joy all revolted Italy, and with a more sober satisfaction all the Liberals and ultra-Protestants here.

We had hardly recovered from our amazement at this great change in the foreign policy of France, when we were still more astonished and pleased by the publication of the Emperor's letter to Fould, in which he announced his intention to change the whole commercial policy of France, and to make her a country of Free Trade. In thus confronting at once the Clerical body and the Protectionist interest in France, he has certainly acted with enormous boldness and reliance on his own influence and power, and it will be very interesting to see whether the success of his policy corresponds with its audacity. The Commercial Treaty has been in great measure the work of Cobden, who went over to Paris under the wing of Michel Chevalier and with letters to Cowley, who introduced him to everybody who could be of use to him in his endeavours to forward a Free Trade policy. The scheme seems to have been arranged between the Emperor and Fould without the knowledge or participation of any of the other Ministers. Cobden had no mission, but he reported his progress home, and as an acknowledgement of his exertions he is to be made joint Plenipotentiary with Cowley in signing the Commercial Treaty.

The return of Cavour to power looks as if there was a secret understanding between France and England that the King of Sardinia should be permitted to consummate the annexation of all the revolted provinces to his dominions; for this object, which Palmerston has so much at heart, he would gladly consent to the transference of Savoy to France, which most people think will take place; but everything is still and must be for some time in the greatest uncertainty in North Italy, the only thing apparently certain being that the Dukes will not recover their Duchies, and still less the Pope his Romagna.

January 24th.—To-day Parliament opens, and everything promises a prosperous session for the Government. So little spirit is there in the Opposition, that very few of them are expected to make their appearance, and Disraeli, under the pretext of a family affliction, gives no dinner; but the probable cause of this is not the death of his sister, which happened two months ago, but his own uncertainty as to whom he should invite, and who would be disposed to own political allegiance by accepting his invitation. Such is the disorganised state of that party.

Clarendon called on me yesterday, and told me various things more or less interesting about passing events, about Cobden and the Commercial Treaty. Cobden went over to Paris with letters from Palmerston to Cowley, begging Cowley would give him all the aid he could in carrying out his object of persuading the leading people there to adopt Free Trade principles, saying he went without any mission and as 'a free lance.' Cowley did what he could for him, and he went about his object with great zeal, meanwhile putting himself in correspondence with Gladstone, who eagerly backed him up, but all this time nothing was said to the Cabinet on the subject. At length one day Walewski sent for Cowley, and asked him whether he was to understand that Cobden was an agent of the British Government, and authorised by it to say all he was saying in various quarters. Cowley denied all knowledge of Cobden's proceedings, but wrote a despatch to John Russell stating what had occurred, and at the same time a private letter, saying he did not know whether he would wish such a despatch to be recorded, and therefore to number it and place it in the Foreign Office, or put it in the fire as he thought fit. John Russell accepted the despatch, and at the same time told him he might endorse whatever Cobden did in the matter of commercial engagements.

Clarendon said that when he was at Paris four years ago for the Congress, the Emperor one day said to him, 'I know you are a great Free Trader, and I suppose you mean to take this opportunity of advancing Free Trade principles here as far as you can.' Clarendon said certainly such was his intention, when the Emperor said he was happy to be able to take the initiative with him on this subject, and that he would tell him that it had just been settled in the Council of State that a great change in their commercial and prohibitive system should be proposed to the Chambers, which it was his intention to carry out as soon as possible. But not long after the Emperor renewed the subject, and told him he found the opposition so strong to his contemplated measures and the difficulties so great, that he had been obliged to abandon them for the present, and as there is no reason to doubt that the elements of opposition will be found as strong now as they were then, it is by no means certain that His Majesty will be able now to do all he wishes and has announced. It has already been stated in the French papers that something is to be done to meet the objection or allay the apprehensions of the French Protectionists, and Clarendon thinks it very doubtful whether the Commercial Treaty, which will confer advantages on France immediately without any reciprocal ones to us for eighteen months to come, will be received with much favour here, especially as the loss to our revenue will require the imposition of fresh taxes to a considerable amount.

We discussed the Italian question, and he said the Emperor is in a constant state of doubt and perplexity, one while inclining to the Congress, and another to leaving affairs to be settled without one. Granville told me last night there appears a chance of the Pope's consenting to enter the Congress with the expectation of being supported there by a majority of the Powers, and deriving considerable benefit from such support. The Emperor Napoleon, too, now shows some signs of drawing closer to Austria again, while Austria is quite determined never to consent to any of the schemes of revolution and annexation which France and England are intent upon carrying out. Apponyi told Clarendon, with tears in his eyes, that they were ruined, and quite unable to take any active part, but that in the way of passive resistance they might still do a great deal, and that they should not only refuse with the greatest perseverance to set their hands to any paper acknowledging the new state of things, but that they should solemnly protest against it on every occasion and in every way in their power. Austria therefore never will consent to the annexation of Central Italy to Piedmont, and if it takes place in spite of her remonstrances and in direct violation of the conditions of Villafranca and Zurich, she will not only refuse her recognition, but proclaim her intention of biding her time, with a view to avail herself of future possible contingencies to redress the wrongs of which she may justly complain. I asked Clarendon if he did not think it possible a mezzo termine might be effected by which France and Austria might again be put d'accord, France saying, 'I would carry out the stipulations of Zurich if I could, but you see it is impossible. Still I will not consent to arrangements obnoxious to you and in direct violation of them, such as the annexations to Piedmont; let us recur to the formation of a Central Italian independent State.' Clarendon said this had been his own idea, and he still thought it was not impossible that such a compromise should be effected. It is hardly possible to doubt that if Cavour succeeds in annexing to Piedmont all the Central Italian States, a very short time will elapse before war will break out again between Sardinia and Austria, and that Austria will have to relinquish her Venetian possessions or fight for their retention.

January 27th.—The session opened with great appearance of quiet and prosperity for the Ministers, which nothing that passed the first night in either House threatened to disturb. Derby made a very good and moderate speech. When he left office the Queen entreated him not to use the power he seemed to have from the nearly balanced state of parties to upset this Government, urging the great objections there were to eternal changes, and she repeated the same thing to him when he was at Windsor on a visit not long ago. Derby expressed his entire concurrence with her, and he promised to act in conformity with her wishes, and he has entirely done so. Nothing could be more temperate and harmless than the few remarks he made on Tuesday night, but leaving himself quite unfettered on every point.

In the meantime there is apparently a strong feeling of doubt and quasi-hostility getting up against the Commercial Treaty, and it looks as if the English and French Governments would both have great difficulties in the matter. Public opinion here remains suspended till the Treaty is produced, and till we are informed what the immediate sacrifices may be that we shall have to make for it, and what are the prospective advantages we obtain in return. The French Protectionists are more impatient and have begun to pour out their complaints and indignation without waiting to see the obnoxious Convention. Thiers is said to be furious. So far from any Commercial Treaty like this cementing the alliance, and rendering war between the two countries more difficult, it is much more likely to inflame the popular antipathy in France, to make the alliance itself odious, and render the chances of war between the two countries more probable. In maturing his scheme Louis Napoleon has given it all the appearance of a conspiracy, which is in accordance with his character and his tastes. The whole thing was carried on with the most profound secrecy, and the secret was confined to a very few people, viz. the Emperor himself, Fould, Rouher (Minister of Commerce), Michel Chevalier, and Cobden. All the documents were copied by Madame Rouher, and Rouher was so afraid that some guesses might be made if he was known to be consulting books and returns that were preserved in the Library of the Council of State, that he never would look at any of them, and made Chevalier borrow all that he had occasion to refer to. Now the Emperor springs this Treaty upon his reluctant Chambers and the indignant Protectionist interest. His manner of doing the thing, which he thinks is the only way by which it can be done at all, naturally adds to the resentment the measure excites. They feel themselves in a manner taken in. The objections here are of a different kind and on other grounds, but Gladstone kept his design nearly as close as the Emperor did, never having imparted it to the Cabinet till the last moment before Parliament met. I do not know how the Cabinet looked at it, only that they were not unanimous.

While, however, it seems at least doubtful how the Government will fare when they produce this Treaty, it appears certain that they will get into a scrape with their Reform Bill. I had imagined from all I heard that the Government were certain to bring forward a measure so moderate as to insure the support or at least prevent the opposition of the Conservatives, or certainly of a large proportion of them. Everything rendered this probable. The assurances conveyed to the Government by Walpole, the professions of Disraeli, the apathy of the country, and the total failure of Bright's attempts to get up the steam, all encouraged them to take this course, and the Duke of Bedford told me Lord John was not so tied and bound by his declarations last year that he would not concur in any moderate measure that the Cabinet might frame. A few days ago, however, I asked Clarendon what the Bill would be, and he alarmed me by his reply that 'it would be as bad as possible,' John Russell having insisted upon the franchise being in accordance with his pledges, and upon his consistency being entirely preserved. This meant of course a 6l. franchise, which everybody denounces as full of mischief and danger.

Just now Henry Lennox came to me and told me that all the dissensions and jealousies of the Conservative party and the Carlton Club had been suddenly appeased, and that from being split into little sections and coteries, squabbling among themselves and forming plots to oust Disraeli, and elevate one man or another in his place, they were suddenly reunited as one man in opposition to the Bill that they hear is to be offered to them, and that Disraeli will be higher than ever in their confidence and support. The Government estimate their majority at four, leaving out of calculation the Irish Catholics, who will probably all vote against them on every question, and the Conservatives boast of having 320 men who will cling together with immoveable constancy in opposition to the 6l. clause. That they will be able to carry it under these circumstances seems impossible. Lord John is himself to bring on the Reform Bill. The best thing that could happen (unless they are warned in time and alter their measure) would be that he should be beaten on the 6l. franchise, go out upon it and the rest stay in; but whether they would think themselves bound to stand or fall with him and break up the Government for his sake, I have at present no idea. The Queen would no doubt do all in her power to induce Palmerston to let him go, replace him, and carry on the Government without him. His loss would be a gain in every possible way, and the Government would be strengthened instead of being weakened by his absence, even though he should throw himself into the arms of Bright and join him in a Radical opposition to his former colleagues.

Bath, February 15th.—When I left London a fortnight ago the world was anxiously expecting Gladstone's speech in which he was to put the Commercial Treaty and the Budget before the world. His own confidence and that of most of his colleagues in his success was unbounded, but many inveighed bitterly against the Treaty, and looked forward with great alarm and aversion to the Budget. Clarendon shook his head, Overstone pronounced against the Treaty, the 'Times' thundered against it, and there is little doubt that it was unpopular, and becoming more so every day. Then came Gladstone's unlucky illness, which compelled him to put off his expos�, and made it doubtful whether he would not be physically disabled from doing justice to the subject. His doctor says he ought to have taken two months' rest instead of two days'. However, at the end of his two days' delay he came forth, and consensu omnium achieved one of the greatest triumphs that the House of Commons ever witnessed. Everybody I have heard from admits that it was a magnificent display, not to be surpassed in ability of execution, and that he carried the House of Commons completely with him. I can well believe it, for when I read the report of it the next day (a report I take to have given the speech verbatim) it carried me along with it likewise. For the moment opposition and criticism were silenced, and nothing was heard but the sound of praise and admiration. In a day or two, however, men began to disengage their minds from the bewitching influence of this great oratorical power, to examine calmly the different parts of the wonderful piece of machinery which Gladstone had constructed, and to detect and expose the weak points and objectionable provisions which it contained. I say it, for, as the Speaker writes to me, it must be taken as a whole or rejected as a whole, and he adds the first will be its fate.

Clarendon, who has all along disapproved of the Treaty, wrote to me that Gladstone's success was complete, and public opinion in his favour. He says: 'I expect that the London feeling will be reflected from the country, so that there will be no danger of rejection, though I think that the more the whole thing is considered, the less popular it will become. The no-provision for the enormous deficit that will exist next year will strike people, as well as the fact that the Budget is made up of expedients for the present year. The non-payment of the Exchequer bonds is to all intents and purposes a loan; the war tax on tea and sugar, the windfall of the Spanish payment, the making the maltsters and hopgrowers pay in advance, &c., are all stopgaps. If anybody proposes it, I shall not be surprised if an additional 1d. Income Tax in place of the war duties was accepted by Gladstone. He has a fervent imagination, which furnishes facts and arguments in support of them; he is an audacious innovator, because he has an insatiable desire for popularity, and in his notions of government he is a far more sincere Republican than Bright, for his ungratified personal vanity makes him wish to subvert the institutions and the classes that stand in the way of his ambition. The two are converging from different points to the same end, and if Gladstone remains in office long enough and is not more opposed by his colleagues than he has been hitherto, we shall see him propose a graduated Income Tax.' These are only objections to the Budget, and speculations (curious ones) as to the character and futurity of Gladstone.

In another letter he says: 'Gladstone made a fair defence of the Treaty, though there are things in it which deserve the severest criticism and will get it, such as tying ourselves down about the exportation of coal (which is a munition of war), letting in French silks free while ours are to pay thirty per cent., and establishing a differential duty of nearly fifty per cent. in favour of light French wines against the stronger wines of Spain and Portugal, for that will be the operation of the Treaty.' Since all this was written there has been a meeting of the Conservative party, and I hear this morning that Derby has decided to take the field with all his forces with a Resolution against the condition about the exportation of coal, and confining himself to that, which will very likely be carried. On the other hand, the publicans and licensed victuallers appear to be in arms against that part of the Budget which more immediately interests them, and are waging a fierce war in the Press by their paper, the 'Morning Advertiser,' so that in spite of his great triumph and all the admiration his eloquence and skill elicited, it is not all sunshine and plain sailing with his measures. Delane writes to me that Gladstone will find it hard work to get his Budget through, that Peel when he brought forward his Budget had a majority of ninety, all of which he required to do it, whereas Palmerston cannot command a majority of nine.

London, February 22nd.—I returned to town on Monday. The same night a battle took place in the House of Commons, in which Gladstone signally defeated Disraeli, and Government got so good a majority that it looks like the harbinger of complete success for their Treaty and their Budget. Everybody agrees that nothing could be more brilliant and complete than Gladstone's triumph, which did not seem to be matter of much grief to many of the Conservative party, for I hear that however they may still act together on a great field-day, the hatred and distrust of Disraeli is greater than ever in the Conservative ranks, and Derby himself, when he heard how his colleague had been demolished, did not seem to care much about it. They say that he betrays in the House of Commons a sort of consciousness of his inferiority to Gladstone, and of fear of encountering him in debate.

February 26th.—On Friday night Gladstone had another great triumph. He made a splendid speech, and obtained a majority of 116, which puts an end to the contest. He is now the great man of the day, but these recent proceedings have strikingly displayed the disorganised condition of the Conservative party and their undisguised dislike of their leader. A great many of them voted with Government on Friday night, and more expressed satisfaction at the result being a defeat of Disraeli. The Treaty and Budget, though many parts of both are obnoxious to criticism more or less well founded, seem on the whole not unpopular, and since their first introduction to have undoubtedly gained in public favour. This fact and the state of the Opposition prove the impossibility of any change of Government. Gladstone too, as he is strong, seems disposed to be merciful, and has expressed his intention of taking fairly into consideration the various objections that may be brought forward, and to consent to reasonable alterations when good cases are made out for them. There seems no doubt that his great measures were not approved of by the majority of the Cabinet, but the malcontents do not seem to have been disposed to fight much of a battle against the minority, which included both Palmerston and Lord John.

It is curious how this great question has thrown into the background all the questions about Italy and foreign policy, in regard to which public interest seems to be for the moment suspended, while Italian affairs are at a dead lock. It would be very inconsistent with the Emperor's character if he had given up his design of appropriating Savoy, but he has certainly postponed it, and will probably employ his versatile imagination in weaving some fresh web by means of which he may get it into his power. I have been reading the Italian Blue Book, which is a creditable compilation. John Russell's positions are not unsound, but he is too controversial in his tone, and though he treats Austria with a decent consideration, and in no unfriendly spirit, he might as well have avoided arguing with Count Rechberg upon points and principles on which it was impossible they should ever agree. Throughout this compilation the embarrassment and perplexity of the Emperor Napoleon are conspicuous, and the difficulties into which he got himself by his vacillations and incompatible objects and obligations. His desire to adhere to the engagements he contracted at Villafranca is obvious throughout, and the advice he gave the Pope seems to have been the best possible, and given in all sincerity.[1]

February 27th.—Gladstone is said to have become subject to much excitement, and more bitter in controversy in the House of Commons than was his wont. The severe working of his brain and the wonderful success he has obtained may account for this, and having had his own way and triumphed over all opposition in the Cabinet, it is not strange that he should brook none anywhere else. He has not failed to show a little of the cloven foot, and to alarm people as to his future designs. Clarendon, who watches him, and has means of knowing his disposition, thinks that he is moving towards a Democratic union with Bright, the effect of which will be increased Income Tax and lowering the estimates by giving up the defences of the country, to which Sidney Herbert will never consent, and already these old friends and colleagues appear to be fast getting into a state of antagonism. Aberdeen told Clarendon that they would never go on together, and he thought Sidney Herbert would retire from the Cabinet before the end of the session. This of course implies that Gladstone's policy is to be in the ascendant, and that he is to override the Cabinet.

There has been a dispute about the introduction of the Reform Bill. Lord John's colleagues wished him to defer bringing it on, till more progress had been made in the fiscal and commercial measures, and represented the inconvenience of having the two discussions going on at the same time, but nothing would induce him to postpone it, and for the absurd reason that he wanted to bring in this Bill on the same day on which he had introduced the great Reform Bill in 1831, and to this fanciful object he insisted on sacrificing all others.

Hatchford, March 7th.—Lord John Russell brought in his Reform Bill last week without exciting the smallest interest, or even curiosity, amidst profound indifference in the House and in the country. His measure was very moderate, and his speech temperate. It produces no enthusiasm, or satisfaction, or alarm. It will probably pass without any violent debates, and perhaps with very slight alterations. If the opponents should succeed in making some, Lord John is not prepared to adhere obstinately to his measure, but will come to terms. It was settled that no discussion should take place at the time, and nobody was inclined for any. It hardly delayed the progress of Gladstone's measures, so we heard no more complaints of Lord John's pertinacity in bringing it on upon March 1st.