The former Papal States.
§ 104. When the Law of Nations began to grow up among the States of Christendom, the Pope was the monarch of one of those States—namely, the so-called Papal States. This State owed its existence to Pepin-le-Bref and his son Charlemagne, who established it in gratitude to the Popes Stephen III. and Adrian I., who crowned them as Kings of the Franks. It remained in the hands of the Popes till 1798, when it became a republic for about three years. In 1801 the former order of things was re-established, but in 1809 it became a part of the Napoleonic Empire. In 1814 it was re-established, and remained in existence till 1870, when it was annexed to the Kingdom of Italy. Throughout the existence of the Papal States, the Popes were monarchs and, as such, equals of all other monarchs. Their position was, however, even then anomalous, as their influence and the privileges granted to them by the different States were due, not alone to their being monarchs of a State, but to their being the head of the Roman Catholic Church. But this anomaly did not create any real difficulty, since the privileges granted to the Popes existed within the province of precedence only.
The Italian Law of Guaranty.
§ 105. When, in 1870, Italy annexed the Papal States and made Rome her capital, she had to undertake the task of creating a position for the Holy See and the Pope which was consonant with the importance of the latter to the Roman Catholic Church. It seemed impossible that the Pope should become an ordinary Italian subject and that the Holy See should be an institution under the territorial supremacy of Italy. For many reasons no alteration was desirable in the administration by the Holy See of the affairs of the Roman Catholic Church or in the position of the Pope as the inviolable head of that Church. To meet the case the Italian Parliament passed an Act regarding the guaranties granted to the Pope and the Holy See, which is commonly called the "Law of Guaranty." According to this the position of the Pope and the Holy See is in Italy as follows:—
The person of the Pope is sacred and inviolable (article 1), although he is subjected to the Civil Courts of Italy.[173] An offence against his person is to be punished in the same way as an offence against the King of Italy (article 2). He enjoys all the honours of a sovereign, retains the privileges of precedence conceded to him by Roman Catholic monarchs, has the right to keep an armed body-guard of the same strength as before the annexation for the safety of his person and of his palaces (article 3), and receives an allowance of 3,225,000 francs (article 4). The Vatican, the seat of the Holy See, and the palaces where a conclave for the election of a new Pope or where an Oecumenical Council meets, are inviolable, and no Italian official is allowed to enter them without consent of the Holy See (articles 5-8). The Pope is absolutely free in performing all the functions connected with his mission as head of the Roman Catholic Church, and so are his officials (articles 9 and 10). The Pope has the right to send and to receive envoys, who enjoy all the privileges of the diplomatic envoys sent and received by Italy (article 11). The freedom of communication between the Pope and the entire Roman Catholic world is recognised, and the Pope has therefore the right to a post and telegraph office of his own in the Vatican or any other place of residence and to appoint his own post-office clerks (article 12). And, lastly, the colleges and other institutions of the Pope for the education of priests in Rome and the environments remain under his exclusive supervision, without any interference on the part of the Italian authorities.
[173] See Bonfils, No. 379.
No Pope has as yet recognised this Italian Law of Guaranty, nor had foreign States an opportunity of giving their express consent to the position of the Pope in Italy created by that law. But practically foreign States as well as the Popes themselves, although the latter have never ceased to protest against the condition of things created by the annexation of the Papal States, have made use of the provisions[174] of that law. Several foreign States send side by side with their diplomatic envoys accredited to Italy special envoys to the Pope, and the latter sends envoys to several foreign States.
[174] But the Popes have hitherto never accepted the allowance provided by the Law of Guaranty.
International position of the Holy See and the Pope.
§ 106. The Law of Guaranty is not International but Italian Municipal Law, and the members of the Family of Nations have hitherto not made any special arrangements with regard to the International position of the Holy See and the Pope. And, further, there can be no doubt that since the extinction of the Papal States the Pope is no longer a monarch whose sovereignty is derived from his position as the head of a State. For these reasons many writers[175] maintain that the Holy See and the Pope have no longer any international position whatever according to the Law of Nations, since States only and exclusively are International Persons. But if the facts of international life and the actual condition of things in every-day practice are taken into consideration, this opinion has no basis to stand upon. Although the Holy See is not a State, the envoys sent by her to foreign States are treated by the latter on the same footing with diplomatic envoys as regards exterritoriality, inviolability, and ceremonial privileges, and those foreign States which send envoys to the Holy See claim for them from Italy all the privileges and the position of diplomatic envoys. Further, although the Pope is no longer the head of a State, the privileges due to the head of a monarchical State are still granted to him by foreign States. Of course, through this treatment the Holy See does not acquire the character of an International Person, nor does the Pope thereby acquire the character of a head of a monarchical State. But for some points the Holy See is actually treated as though she were an International Person, and the Pope is treated actually in every point as though he were the head of a monarchical State. It must therefore be maintained that by custom, by tacit consent of the members of the Family of Nations, the Holy See has a quasi international position. This position allows her to claim against all the States treatment on some points as though she were an International Person, and further to claim treatment of the Pope in every point as though he were the head of a monarchical State. But it must be emphasised that, although the envoys sent and received by the Holy See must be treated as diplomatic envoys,[176] they are not such in fact, for they are not agents for international affairs of States, but exclusively agents for the affairs of the Roman Catholic Church. And it must further be emphasised that the Holy See cannot conclude international treaties or claim a vote at international congresses and conferences. The so-called Concordats—that is, treaties between the Holy See and States with regard to matters of the Roman Catholic Church—are not international treaties, although analogous treatment is usually given to them. Even formerly, when the Pope was the head of a State, such Concordats were not concluded with the Papal States, but with the Holy See and the Pope as representatives of the Roman Catholic Church.
[175] Westlake, I. p. 38, now joins the ranks of these writers.
[176] The case of Montagnini, which occurred in December 1906, cannot be quoted against this assertion, for Montagnini was not at the time a person enjoying diplomatic privileges. Diplomatic relations between France and the Holy See had come to an end in 1905 by France recalling her envoy at the Vatican and at the same time sending the passports to Lorenzelli, the Papal Nuncio in Paris. Montagnini, who remained at the nunciature in Paris, did not possess any diplomatic character after the departure of the Nuncio. Neither his arrest and his expulsion in December 1906, nor the seizure of his papers at the nunciature amounted therefore to an international delinquency on the part of the French Government. The papers left by the former Papal Nuncio Lorenzelli were not touched and remained in the archives of the former nunciature until the Austrian ambassador in Paris, in February 1907, asked the French Foreign Office to transfer them to him for the purpose of handing them on to the Holy See. It must be specially mentioned that the seizure of his papers and the arrest and expulsion of Montagnini took place because he conspired against the French Government by encouraging the clergy to refuse obedience to French laws. And it must further be mentioned that Lorenzelli, when he left the nunciature, did not, contrary to all precedent, place the archives of the nunciature under seals and confide them to the protection of another diplomatic envoy in Paris. Details of the case are to be found in R.I. 2nd Ser. IX. (1907), pp. 60-66, and R.G. XIV. (1907), pp. 175-186.
Violation of the Holy See and the Pope.
§ 107. Since the Holy See has no power whatever to protect herself and the person of the Pope against violations, the question as to the protection of the Holy See and the person of the Pope arises. I believe that, since the present international position of the Holy See rests on the tacit consent of the members of the Family of Nations, many a Roman Catholic Power would raise its voice in case Italy or any other State should violate the Holy See or the person of the Pope, and an intervention for the purpose of protecting either of them would have the character of an intervention by right. Italy herself would certainly make such a violation by a foreign Power her own affair, although she has no more than any other Power the legal duty to do so, and although she is not responsible to other Powers for violations of the Personality of the latter by the Holy See and the Pope.
European States.
§ 108. All the seventy-four European States are, of course, members of the Family of Nations. They are the following:
Great Powers are:
Austria-Hungary.
Great Britain.
France.
Italy.
Germany.
Russia.
Smaller States are:
Bulgaria.
Denmark.
Greece.
Holland.
Montenegro.
Norway.
Portugal.
Roumania.
Servia.
Spain.
Sweden.
Turkey.
Very small, but nevertheless full-Sovereign, States are:
Monaco and Lichtenstein.
Neutralised States are:
Switzerland, Belgium, and Luxemburg.
Half-Sovereign States are:
Andorra (under the protectorate of France and Spain).
San Marino (under the protectorate of Italy).
Crete (under the suzerainty of Turkey).
(a) Member-States of Germany:
Kingdoms: Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, Würtemberg.
Grand-Duchies: Baden, Hesse, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Oldenburg.
Dukedoms: Anhalt, Brunswick, Saxe-Altenburg, Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, Saxe-Meiningen, Saxe-Weimar.
Principalities: Reuss Elder Line, Reuss Younger Line, Lippe, Schaumburg-Lippe, Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, Schwarzburg-Sondershausen Waldeck.
Free Towns are: Bremen, Lübeck, Hamburg.
(b) Member-States of Switzerland:
Zurich, Berne, Lucerne, Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden (ob und nid dem Wald), Glarus, Zug, Fribourg, Soleure, Basle (Stadt und Landschaft), Schaffhausen, Appenzell (beider Rhoden), St. Gall, Grisons, Aargau, Thurgau, Tessin, Vaud, Valais, Neuchâtel, Geneva.
American States.
§ 109. In America there are twenty-one States which are members of the Family of Nations, but it must be emphasised that the member-States of the five Federal States on the American continent, although they are part-Sovereign, have no footing within the Family of Nations, because the American Federal States, in contradistinction to Switzerland and Germany, absorb all possible international relations of their member-States.
In North America there are:
In Central America there are:
Costa Rica.
Cuba.
San Domingo.
Guatemala.
Hayti.
Honduras.
Nicaragua.
Panama (since 1903).
San Salvador.
In South America there are:
The United States of Argentina.
Bolivia.
The United States of Brazil.
Chili.
Colombia.
Ecuador.
Paraguay.
Peru.
Uruguay.
The United States of Venezuela.
African States.
§ 110. In Africa the Negro Republic of Liberia is the only real and full member of the Family of Nations. Egypt and Tunis are half-Sovereign, the one under Turkish suzerainty, the other under French protectorate. Morocco and Abyssinia are both full-Sovereign States, but for some parts only within the Family of Nations. The Soudan has an exceptional position; being under the condominium of Great Britain and Egypt, a footing of its own within the Family of Nations the Soudan certainly has not.
Asiatic States.
§ 111. In Asia only Japan is a full and real member of the Family of Nations. Persia, China, Siam, Tibet, and Afghanistan are for some parts only within that family.
Vattel, I. §§ 13-25—Hall, § 7—Westlake, I. pp. 293-296—Lawrence, § 57—Phillimore, I. §§ 144-147—Twiss, I. § 106—Wharton, § 60—Moore, I. § 23—Bluntschli, §§ 64-81—Hartmann, § 15—Heffter, § 26—Holtzendorff in Holtzendorff, II. pp. 47-51—Gareis, §§ 24-25—Liszt, § 7—Ullmann, § 38—Bonfils, Nos. 235-241—Despagnet, Nos. 165-166—Nys, II. pp. 176-181—Pradier-Fodéré, I. Nos. 165-195—Mérignhac, I. pp. 233-238—Rivier, I. § 19—Fiore, I. Nos. 367-371—Martens, I. § 72—Fontenay, "Des droits et des devoirs des États entre eux" (1888)—Pillet in R.G. V. (1898), pp. 66 and 236, VI. (1899), p. 503—Cavaglieri, "I diritti fondamentali degli Stati nella Società Internazionale" (1906).
The so-called Fundamental Rights.
§ 112. Until the last two decades of the nineteenth century all jurists agreed that the membership of the Family of Nations includes so-called fundamental rights for States. Such rights are chiefly enumerated as the right of existence, of self-preservation, of equality, of independence, of territorial supremacy, of holding and acquiring territory, of intercourse, and of good name and reputation. It was and is maintained that these fundamental rights are a matter of course and self-evident, since the Family of Nations consists of Sovereign States. But no unanimity exists with regard to the number, the names, and the contents of these alleged fundamental rights. A great confusion exists in this matter, and hardly two text-book writers agree in details with regard to it. This condition of things has led to a searching criticism of the whole matter, and several writers[177] have in consequence thereof asked that the fundamental rights of States should totally disappear from the treatises on the Law of Nations. I certainly agree with this. Yet it must be taken into consideration that under the wrong heading of fundamental rights a good many correct statements have been made for hundreds of years, and that numerous real rights and duties are customarily recognised which are derived from the very membership of the Family of Nations. They are rights and duties which do not rise from international treaties between a multitude of States, but which the States customarily hold as International Persons, and which they grant and receive reciprocally as members of the Family of Nations. They are rights and duties connected with the position of the States within the Family of Nations, and it is therefore only adequate to their importance to discuss them in a special chapter under that heading.
[177] See Stoerk in Holtzendorff's "Encyklopädie der Rechtswissenschaft," 2nd ed. (1890), p. 1291; Jellinek, "System der subjectiven öffentlichen Rechte" (1892), p. 302; Heilborn, "System," p. 279; and others. The arguments of these writers have met, however, considerable resistance, and the existence of fundamental rights of States is emphatically defended by other writers. See, for instance, Pillet, l.c., Liszt, § 7, and Gareis, §§ 24 and 25. Westlake, I. p. 293, now joins the ranks of those writers who deny the existence of fundamental rights.
International Personality a Body of Qualities.
§ 113. International Personality is the term which characterises fitly the position of the States within the Family of Nations, since a State acquires International Personality through its recognition as a member. What it really means can be ascertained by going back to the basis[178] of the Law of Nations. Such basis is the common consent of the States that a body of legal rules shall regulate their intercourse with one another. Now a legally regulated intercourse between Sovereign States is only possible under the condition that a certain liberty of action is granted to every State, and that, on the other hand, every State consents to a certain restriction of action in the interest of the liberty of action granted to every other State. A State that enters into the Family of Nations retains the natural liberty of action due to it in consequence of its sovereignty, but at the same time takes over the obligation to exercise self-restraint and to restrict its liberty of action in the interest of that of other States. In entering into the Family of Nations a State comes as an equal to equals[179]; it demands that certain consideration be paid to its dignity, the retention of its independence, of its territorial and its personal supremacy. Recognition of a State as a member of the Family of Nations contains recognition of such State's equality, dignity, independence, and territorial and personal supremacy. But the recognised State recognises in turn the same qualities in other members of that family, and thereby it undertakes responsibility for violations committed by it. All these qualities constitute as a body the International Personality of a State, and International Personality may therefore be said to be the fact, given by the very membership of the Family of Nations, that equality, dignity, independence, territorial and personal supremacy, and the responsibility of every State are recognised by every other State. The States are International Persons because they recognise these qualities in one another and recognise their responsibility for violations of these qualities.
Other Characteristics of the position of the States within the Family of Nations.
§ 114. But the position of the States within the Family of Nations is not exclusively characterised by these qualities. The States make a community because there is constant intercourse between them. Intercourse is therefore a condition without which the Family of Nations would not and could not exist. Again, there are exceptions to the protection of the qualities which constitute the International Personality of the States, and these exceptions are likewise characteristic of the position of the States within the Family of Nations. Thus, in time of war belligerents have a right to violate one another's Personality in many ways; even annihilation of the vanquished State, through subjugation after conquest, is allowed. Thus, further, in time of peace as well as in time of war, such violations of the Personality of other States are excused as are committed in self-preservation or through justified intervention. And, finally, jurisdiction is also important for the position of the States within the Family of Nations. Intercourse, self-preservation, intervention, and jurisdiction must, therefore, likewise be discussed in this chapter.
Vattel, II. §§ 35-48—Westlake, I. pp. 308-312—Lawrence, §§ 112-119—Phillimore, I. § 147, II. §§ 27-43—Twiss, I. § 12—Halleck, I. pp. 116-140 —Taylor, § 160—Wheaton, §§ 152-159—Moore, I. § 24—Bluntschli, §§ 81-94—Hartmann, § 14—Heffter, §§ 27-28—Holtzendorff in Holtzendorff, II. pp. 11-14—Ullmann, §§ 36 and 37—Bonfils, Nos. 272-278—Despagnet, Nos. 167-171—Pradier-Fodéré, II. Nos. 484-594—Mérignhac, I. pp. 310-320—Rivier, I. § 9—Nys, II. pp. 194-199, 208-218—Calvo, I. §§ 210-259—Fiore, I. Nos. 428-451, and Code, Nos. 388-421—Martens, I. §§ 70-71—Lawrence, Essays, pp. 191-213—Westlake, Chapters, pp. 86-109—Huber, "Die Gleichheit der Staaten" (1909)—Streit in R.I. 2nd Ser. II. pp. 5-27—Hicks in A.J. II. (1908), pp. 530-561.
Legal Equality of States.
§ 115. The equality before International Law of all member-States of the Family of Nations is an invariable quality derived from their International Personality.[180] Whatever inequality may exist between States as regards their size, population, power, degree of civilisation, wealth, and other qualities, they are nevertheless equals as International Persons. This legal equality has three important consequences:
The first is that, whenever a question arises which has to be settled by the consent of the members of the Family of Nations, every State has a right to a vote, but to one vote only.
The second consequence is that legally—although not politically—the vote of the weakest and smallest State has quite as much weight as the vote of the largest and most powerful. Therefore any alteration of an existing rule or creation of a new rule of International Law by a law-making treaty has legal validity for the signatory Powers and those only who later on accede expressly or submit to it tacitly through custom.
The third consequence is that—according to the rule par in parem non habet imperium—no State can claim jurisdiction over another full-Sovereign State. Therefore, although foreign States can sue in foreign Courts,[181] they cannot as a rule be sued[182] there, unless they voluntarily accept[183] the jurisdiction of the Court concerned, or have submitted themselves to such jurisdiction by suing in such foreign Court.[184]
[181] See Phillimore, II. § 113 A; Nys, II. pp. 288-296; Loening, "Die Gerichtsbarkeit über fremde Staaten und Souveräne" (1903); and the following cases:—The United States v. Wagner (1867), L.R. 2 Ch. App. 582; The Republic of Mexico v. Francisco de Arrangoiz, and others, 11 Howard's Practice Reports 1 (quoted by Scott, "Cases on International Law," 1902, p. 170); The Sapphire (1870), 11 Wallace, 164. See also below, § 348.
[182] See De Haber v. the Queen of Portugal (1851), 17 Ch. D. 171, and Vavasseur v. Krupp (1878), L.R. 9 Ch. D. 351.
[183] See Prioleau v. United States, &c. (1866), L.R. 2 Equity, 656.
[184] Provided the cross-suit is really connected with the claim in the action. As regards the German case of Hellfeld v. the Russian Government, see Köhler in Z.V. IV. (1910), pp. 309-333; the opinions of Laband, Meili, and Seuffert, ibidem, pp. 334-448; Baty in The Law Magazine and Review, XXV. (1909-1910), p. 207; Wolfman in A.J. IV. (1910), pp. 373-383.
To the rule of equality there are three exceptions:—
First, such States as can for some parts[185] only be considered International Persons, are not equals of the full members of the Family of Nations.
Secondly, States under suzerainty and under protectorate which are half-Sovereign and under the guardianship[186] of other States with regard to the management of external affairs, are not equals of States which enjoy full sovereignty.
Thirdly, the part-sovereign member-States of a Federal State are not equals of full-Sovereign States.
It is, however, quite impossible to lay down a hard and fast general rule concerning the amount of inequality between the equal and the unequal States, as everything depends upon the circumstances and conditions of the special case.
Political Hegemony of Great Powers.
§ 116. Legal equality must not be confounded with political equality. The enormous differences between States as regards their strength are the result of a natural inequality which, apart from rank and titles, finds its expression in the province of policy. Politically, States are in no manner equals, as there is a difference between the Great Powers and others. Eight States must at present be considered as Great Powers—namely, Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia in Europe, the United States in America, and Japan in Asia. All arrangements made by the body of the Great Powers naturally gain the consent of the minor States, and the body of the six Great Powers in Europe is therefore called the European Concert. The Great Powers are the leaders of the Family of Nations, and every progress of the Law of Nations during the past is the result of their political hegemony, although the initiative towards the progress was frequently taken by a minor Power.
But, however important the position and the influence of the Great Powers may be, they are by no means derived from a legal basis or rule.[187] It is nothing else than powerful example which makes the smaller States agree to the arrangements of the Great Powers. Nor has a State the character of a Great Power by law. It is nothing else than its actual size and strength which makes a State a Great Power. Changes, therefore, often take place. Whereas at the time of the Vienna Congress in 1815 eight States—namely, Great Britain, Austria, France, Portugal, Prussia, Spain, Sweden, and Russia—were still considered Great Powers, their number decreased soon to five, when Portugal, Spain, and Sweden lost that character. But the so-called Pentarchy of the remaining Great Powers turned into a Hexarchy after the unification of Italy, because the latter became at once a Great Power. The United States rose as a Great Power out of the civil war in 1865, and Japan did the same out of the war with China in 1895. Any day a change may take place and one of the present Great Powers may lose its position, or one of the weaker States may become a Great Power. It is a question of political influence, and not of law, whether a State is or is not a Great Power. Whatever large-sized State with a large population gains such strength that its political influence must be reckoned with by the other Great Powers, becomes a Great Power itself.[188]
[187] This is, however, maintained by a few writers. See, for instance, Lorimer, I. p. 170; Lawrence, §§ 113 and 114; Westlake, I. pp. 308, 309; and Pitt Cobbett, "Cases and Opinions on International Law," 2nd ed. vol. I. (1909), p. 50.
[188] In contradistinction to the generally recognised political hegemony of the Great Powers, Lawrence (§§ 113 and 114) and Taylor (§ 69) maintain that the position of the Great Powers is legally superior to that of the smaller States, being a "Primacy" or "Overlordship." This doctrine, which professedly seeks to abolish the universally recognised rule of the equality of States, has no sound basis, and confounds political with legal inequality. I cannot agree with Lawrence when he says (§ 114, p. 276):—"... in a system of rules depending, like International Law, for their validity on general consent, what is political is legal also, if it is generally accepted and acted on." The Great Powers are de facto, by the smaller States, recognised as political leaders, but this recognition does not involve recognition of legal superiority.
Rank of States.
§ 117. Although the States are equals as International Persons, they are nevertheless not equals as regards rank. The differences as regards rank are recognised by International Law, but the legal equality of States within the Family of Nations is thereby as little affected as the legal equality of the citizens is within a modern State where differences in rank and titles of the citizens are recognised by Municipal Law. The vote of a State of lower rank has legally as much weight as that of a State of higher rank. And the difference in rank nowadays no longer plays such an important part as in the past, when questions of etiquette gave occasion for much dispute. It was in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that the rank of the different States was zealously discussed under the heading of droit de préséance or questions de préséance. The Congress at Vienna of 1815 intended to establish an order of precedence within the Family of Nations, but dropped this scheme on account of practical difficulties. Thus the matter is entirely based on custom, which recognises the following three rules:
(1) The States are divided into two classes—namely, States with and States without royal honours. To the first class belong Empires, Kingdoms, Grand Duchies, and the great Republics such as France, the United States of America, Switzerland, the South American Republics, and others. All other States belong to the second class. The Holy See is treated as though it were a State with royal honours. States with royal honours have exclusively the right to send and receive diplomatic envoys of the first class[189]—namely, ambassadors; and their monarchs address one another as "brothers" in their official letters. States with royal honours always precede other States.
(2) Full-Sovereign States always precede those under suzerainty or protectorate.
(3) Among themselves States of the same rank do not precede one another. Empires do not precede kingdoms, and since the time of Cromwell and the first French Republic monarchies do not precede republics. But the Roman Catholic States always concede precedence to the Holy See, and the monarchs recognise among themselves a difference with regard to ceremonials between emperors and kings on the one hand, and, on the other, grand dukes and other monarchs.
The "Alternat."
§ 118. To avoid questions of precedence, on signing a treaty, States of the same rank observe a conventional usage which is called the "Alternat." According to that usage the signatures of the signatory States of a treaty alternate in a regular order or in one determined by lot, the representative of each State signing first the copy which belongs to his State. But sometimes that order is not observed, and the States sign either in the alphabetical order of their names in French or in no order at all (pêle-mêle).
Titles of States.
§ 119. At the present time, States, save in a few exceptional instances, have no titles, although formerly such titles did exist. Thus the former Republic of Venice as well as that of Genoa was addressed as "Serene Republic," and up to the present day the Republic of San Marino[190] is addressed as "Most Serene Republic." Nowadays the titles of the heads of monarchical States are in so far of importance to International Law as they are connected with the rank of the respective States. Since States are Sovereign, they can bestow any titles they like on their heads. Thus, according to the German Constitution of 1871, the Kings of Prussia have the title "German Emperor"; the Kings of England have since 1877 borne the title "Emperor of India"; the Prince of Servia assumed in 1881, that of Roumania in 1882, that of Bulgaria in 1908, and that of Montenegro in 1910, the title "King." But no foreign State is obliged to recognise such a new title, especially when a higher rank would accrue to the respective State in consequence of such a new title of its head. In practice such recognition will regularly be given when the new title really corresponds with the size and the importance of the respective State.[191] Servia, Roumania, Bulgaria, and Montenegro had therefore no difficulty in obtaining recognition as kingdoms.
[190] See Treaty Series, 1900, No. 9.
[191] History, however, reports several cases where recognition was withheld for a long time. Thus the title "Emperor of Russia," assumed by Peter the Great in 1701, was not recognised by France till 1745, by Spain till 1759, nor by Poland till 1764. And the Pope did not recognise the kingly title of Prussia, assumed in 1701, till 1786.
With the titles of the heads of States are connected predicates. Emperors and Kings have the predicate "Majesty," Grand Dukes "Royal Highness," Dukes "Highness," other monarchs "Serene Highness." The Pope is addressed as "Holiness" (Sanctitas). Not to be confounded with these predicates, which are recognised by the Law of Nations, are predicates which originally were bestowed on monarchs by the Pope and which have no importance for the Law of Nations. Thus the Kings of France called themselves Rex Christianissimus or "First-born Son of the Church," the Kings of Spain have called themselves since 1496 Rex Catholicus, the Kings of England since 1521 Defensor Fidei, the Kings of Portugal since 1748 Rex Fidelissimus, the Kings of Hungary since 1758 Rex Apostolicus.
Vattel, II. §§ 35-48—Lawrence, § 120—Phillimore, II. §§ 27-43—Halleck, I. pp. 124-142—Taylor, § 162—Wheaton, § 160—Bluntschli, §§ 82-83—Hartmann, § 15—Heffter, §§ 32, 102, 103—Holtzendorff in Holtzendorff, II. pp. 64-69—Ullmann, § 38—Bonfils, Nos. 279-284—Despagnet, Nos. 184-186—Moore, I. pp. 310-320—Pradier-Fodéré, II. Nos. 451-483—Rivier, I. pp. 260-262—Nys, II. pp. 212-214—Calvo, III. §§ 1300-1302—Fiore, I. Nos. 439-451—Martens, I. § 78.
Dignity a Quality.
§ 120. The majority of text-book writers maintain that there is a fundamental right of reputation and of good name belonging to every State. Such a right, however, does not exist, because no duty corresponding to it can be traced within the Law of Nations. Indeed, the reputation of a State depends just as much upon behaviour as that of every citizen within its boundaries. A State which has a corrupt government and behaves unfairly and perfidiously in its intercourse with other States will be looked down upon and despised, whereas a State which has an uncorrupt government and behaves fairly and justly in its international dealings will be highly esteemed. No law can give a good name and reputation to a rogue, and the Law of Nations does not and cannot give a right to reputation and good name to such a State as has not acquired them through its attitude. There are some States—nomina sunt odiosa!—which indeed justly possess a bad reputation.
On the other hand, a State as a member of the Family of Nations possesses dignity as an International Person. Dignity is a quality recognised by other States, and it adheres to a State from the moment of its recognition till the moment of its extinction, whatever behaviour it displays. Just as the dignity of every citizen within a State commands a certain amount of consideration on the part of fellow-citizens, so the dignity of a State commands a certain amount of consideration on the part of other States, since otherwise the different States could not live peaceably in the community which is called the Family of Nations.