[81] See Annuaire, V. pp. 157-174.

The Second Peace Conference of 1907 has revised this Convention, and its place is now taken by Convention IV. of the Second Peace Conference. The Convention,[82] as the preamble expressly states, does not aim at giving a complete code of the Laws of War on Land, and cases beyond its scope still remain the subject of customary rules and usages. Further, it does not create universal International Law, as article 2 of the Convention expressly stipulates that the Regulations shall be binding upon the contracting Powers only in case of war between two or more of them, and shall cease to be binding in case a non-contracting Power takes part in the war. But, in spite of this express stipulation, there can be no doubt that in time the Regulations will become universal International Law. For all the Powers represented at the Second Peace Conference signed the Convention, except China, Spain, and Nicaragua, although some States made certain reservations. Nicaragua has since acceded, and it is certain that the outstanding States will in time also accede.

[82] For brevity's sake the Hague Convention enacting Regulations regarding the laws and customs of war on land will be referred to in the following pages as the Hague Regulations. It is, however, of importance to observe that the Hague Regulations, although they are intended to be binding upon the belligerents, are only the basis upon which the signatory Powers have to frame instructions for their forces. Article 1 declares: "The high contracting parties shall issue instructions to their armed land forces, which shall be in conformity with the Regulations respecting the Laws of War on Land annexed to the present Convention." The British War Office, therefore, published in 1912, a guide, Land Warfare: an Exposition of the Laws and Usages of War on Land for the Guidance of Officers of His Majesty's Army, written by order of His Majesty's Secretary of War by Colonel Edmonds and Professor Oppenheim, in which the Hague Regulations are systematically set out; their full text is published in Appendix 6 of the guide. But it should be mentioned that the British War Office had already in 1903 published a manual, drafted with great precision and clearness by Professor Holland, for the information of the British forces, comprising "The Laws and Customs of War on Land, as defined by the Hague Convention of 1899." See also Holland, The Laws of War on Land (Written and Unwritten), Oxford, 1908.

(5) The Declaration concerning expanding (dumdum) bullets; see below, § 112.

(6) The Declaration concerning projectiles and explosives launched from balloons; see below, § 114.

(7) The Declaration concerning projectiles diffusing asphyxiating or deleterious gases; see below, § 113.

(8) The Convention for the adaptation to sea warfare of the principles of the Geneva Convention, produced by the First and revised by the Second Peace Conference.

(9) The Convention of 1907 concerning the opening of hostilities (Second Peace Conference).

(10) The Convention of 1907 concerning the status of enemy merchantmen at the outbreak of hostilities (Second Peace Conference).

(11) The Convention of 1907 concerning the conversion of merchantmen into men-of-war (Second Peace Conference).

(12) The Convention of 1907 concerning the laying of automatic submarine contact mines (Second Peace Conference).

(13) The Convention of 1907 concerning bombardment by naval forces in time of war (Second Peace Conference).

(14) The Convention of 1907 concerning certain restrictions on the exercise of the right of capture in maritime war (Second Peace Conference).

(15) The two Conventions of 1907 concerning the rights and duties of neutral Powers and persons in land warfare and in sea warfare (Second Peace Conference).

(16) The Declaration of London of February 26, 1909, concerning the Laws of Naval War, which was signed at the Conference of London by Great Britain, Germany, the United States of America, Austria-Hungary, Spain, France, Italy, Japan, Holland, and Russia, but is not yet ratified. This Declaration enacts rules concerning blockade, contraband, unneutral service, destruction of neutral prizes, transfer of vessels to a neutral flag, enemy character, convoy, and resistance to search.[83]

[83] The United States of America (see above, vol. I. § 32), published on June 27, 1900, a body of rules for the use of her navy under the title The Laws and Usages of War on Sea—the so-called "United States Naval War Code." This code, although withdrawn on February 4, 1904, will undoubtedly be the starting-point of a movement for a Naval War Code to be generally agreed upon by the Powers. See below, § 179.

Binding force of the Laws of War

§ 69. As soon as usages of warfare have by custom or treaty evolved into laws of war, they are binding upon belligerents under all circumstances and conditions, except in the case of reprisals[84] as retaliation against a belligerent for illegitimate acts of warfare by the members of his armed forces or his other subjects. In accordance with the German proverb, Kriegsraeson geht vor Kriegsmanier (necessity in war overrules the manner of warfare), many German authors[85] and the Swiss-Belgian Rivier[86] maintain that the laws of war lose their binding force in case of extreme necessity. Such case of extreme necessity is said to have arisen when violation of the laws of war alone offers either a means of escape from extreme danger or the realisation of the purpose of war—namely, the overpowering of the opponent. This alleged exception to the binding force of the Laws of War, is, however, not at all generally accepted by German writers, for instance, Bluntschli does not mention it. English, American, French, and Italian writers do not, so far as I am aware, acknowledge it. The protest of Westlake,[87] therefore, against such an exception is the more justified, as a great danger would be involved by its admission.

[84] See below, § 248.

[85] See, for instance, Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 254-257; Ullmann, § 170; Meurer, II. pp. 7-15. Liszt, who in former editions agreed with these writers, deserts their ranks in the sixth edition (§ 24, IV. 3), and correctly takes the other side. See also Nys, III. p. 202, and Holland, War, § 2, where the older literature is quoted.

[86] See Rivier, II. p. 242.

[87] See Westlake, II. pp. 115-117, and Westlake, Chapters, p. 238.

The proverb dates very far back in the history of warfare. It originated and found recognition in those times when warfare was not regulated by laws of war—that is universally binding customs and international treaties, but only by usages (Manier, i.e. Brauch), and it says that necessity in war overrules usages of warfare. In our days, however, warfare is no longer regulated by usages only, but to a greater extent by laws, firm rules recognised either by international treaties or by universal custom.[88] These conventional and customary rules cannot be overruled by necessity, unless they are framed in such a way as not to apply to a case of necessity in self-preservation. Thus, for instance, the rules that poisoned arms and poison are forbidden, and that it is not allowed treacherously to kill or wound individuals belonging to the hostile army, do not lose their binding force even if escape from extreme danger or the realisation of the purpose of war would result from an act of this kind. Article 22 of the Hague Rules stipulates distinctly that the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited, and this rule does not lose its binding force in a case of necessity. What may be ignored in case of military necessity are not the laws of war, but only the usages of war. Kriegsraeson geht vor Kriegsmanier, but not vor Kriegsrecht!

[88] Concerning the distinction between usage and custom, see above, vol. I. § 17.

IV THE REGION OF WAR

Taylor, §§ 471 and 498—Heffter, § 118—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 362-364—Klüber, § 242—Liszt, § 40, I.—Ullmann, § 174—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. No. 2733, and VIII. Nos. 3104-3106—Rivier, II. pp. 216-219—Boeck, Nos. 214-230—Longuet, §§ 18-25—Perels, § 33—Rettich, Zur Theorie und Geschichte des Rechts zum Kriege (1888), pp. 174-213.

Region of War in contradistinction to Theatre of War.

§ 70. Region of war is that part of the surface of the earth in which the belligerents may prepare and execute hostilities against each other. In this meaning region of war ought[89] to be distinguished from theatre of war. The latter is that part of a territory or the Open Sea on which hostilities actually take place. Legally no part of the earth which is not region of war may be made the theatre of war, but not every section of the whole region of war is necessarily theatre of war. Thus, in the war between Great Britain and the two South African Republics the whole of the territory of the British Empire and the Open Sea, as well as the territory of the Republics, was the region of war, but the theatre of war was in South Africa only. On the other hand, in a war between Great Britain and another great naval Power it might well happen that the region of war is in many of its sections made the theatre of war.

[89] This distinction, although of considerable importance, does not appear to have been made by any other publicist.

Particular Region of every War.

§ 71. The region of war depends upon the belligerents. For this reason every war has its particular region, so far at any rate as territorial region is concerned. For besides the Open Sea[90] and all such territories as are as yet not occupied by any State, which are always within the region of war, the particular region of every war is the whole of the territories and territorial waters of the belligerents. It must, however, be specially observed that any part of the globe which is permanently neutralised,[91] is always exempt from the region of war.

[90] See above, vol. I. § 256.

[91] See below, § 72.

Since colonies are a part of the territory of the mother country, they fall within the region of war in the case of a war between the mother country and another State, whatever their position may be within the colonial empire they belong to. Thus in a war between Great Britain and France the whole of Australia, of Canada, of India, and so on, would be included with the British Islands as region of war. And, further, as States under the suzerainty of another State are internationally in several respects considered to be a portion of the latter's territory,[92] they fall within the region of war in case of war between the suzerain and another Power. Again, such parts of the territory of a State as are under the condominium or under the administration of another State[93] fall within the region of war in case of war between one of the condomini and another Power and in case of war between the administrating State and another State. Thus, in a war between Great Britain and another Power, Cyprus would fall within the region of war; and the Soudan, which is in the condominium of England and Egypt, would likewise do so. On the other hand, Cyprus would not fall within the region of war in the case of war between Turkey and another Power, Great Britain excepted.

[92] See above, vol. I. §§ 91 and 169.

[93] See above, vol. I. § 171.

Although as a rule the territories of both belligerents, together with the Open Sea, fall within the region of war, and neutral territories do not, exceptions to the rule may occur:—

(1) A belligerent can deliberately treat certain territories which legally fall within the region of war, as well as parts of the Open Sea, as though they were not parts of the region of war, provided that such territories on their part fulfil the duties incumbent upon neutrals. Thus during the Turco-Italian War in 1911 and 1912, Italy treated Crete and Egypt as though they were not parts of the region of war.[94]

(2) Cases are possible in which a part or the whole of the territory of a neutral State falls within the region of war. These cases arise in wars in which such neutral territories are the very objects of the war, as Korea, which was at that time an independent State, and the Chinese province of Manchuria[95] were in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 and 1905. Such a case may also occur if an army of one of the belligerents crosses the frontier of a neutral State, but is not at once disarmed and interned, and is, therefore, able at any moment to recross the frontier and attack the other belligerent.[96] Since necessity of self-preservation can compel the latter on his part also to cross the neutral frontier and pursue and attack the enemy on neutral territory, the part of such neutral territory concerned would for this reason become part of the region of war.

[94] There is no doubt that this attitude of Italy is explained by the fact that Egypt, although legally under Turkish suzerainty, is actually under British occupation, and that Crete is forcibly kept by the Powers under Turkish suzerainty.

[95] See below, § 320.

[96] See below, § 339.

Exclusion from region of war through neutralisation.

§ 72. Although the Open Sea in its whole extent and the whole of the territories of the belligerents are as a rule within the region of war, certain parts can be excluded through neutralisation. Such neutralisation can take place permanently through a general treaty of the Powers or temporarily through a special treaty of the belligerents. At present no part of the Open Sea is neutralised, as the neutralisation of the Black Sea was abolished[97] in 1871. But the following are some important instances[98] of permanent neutralisation of parts of territories:—

(1) The former Sardinian, but since 1860 French, provinces of Chablais and Faucigny[99] are permanently neutralised through article 92 of the Act of the Vienna Congress, 1815.

(2) The Ionian Islands through article 2 of the Treaty of London of November 14, 1863, are permanently neutralised since they merged in the kingdom of Greece. But this neutralisation was restricted[100] to the islands of Corfu and Paxo only by article 2 of the treaty of London of March 24, 1864.

(3) The Suez Canal is permanently neutralised[101] since 1888.

(4) The Straits of Magellan[102] are permanently neutralised through article 5 of the boundary treaty of Buenos Ayres of July 23, 1881. But this treaty is not a general treaty of the Powers, since it is concluded between Argentina and Chili only.

(5) The Panama[103] Canal is permanently neutralised through article 3 of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty of November 18, 1901. But this treaty is not a general treaty of the Powers either, being concluded between only Great Britain and the United States.

(6) A piece of territory along the frontier between Sweden and Norway is neutralised by the Convention of Stockholm of October 26, 1905, which includes rules concerning a neutral zone.[104] But this is a neutralisation agreed upon between Sweden and Norway only, no third Power has anything to do with it, and even the contracting Powers stipulate—see article 1, last paragraph—that the neutralisation shall not be valid in the case of a war against a common enemy.

[97] See above, vol. I. §§ 181 and 256.

[98] The matter is thoroughly treated in Rettich, Zur Theorie und Geschichte des Rechtes zum Kriege (1888), pp. 174-213, where also the neutralisation of some so-called international rivers, especially the Danube, Congo, and Niger, is discussed.

[99] See above, vol. I. § 207.

[100] See Martens, N.R.G. XVIII. p. 63.

[101] See above, vol. I. § 183.

[102] See Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. XII. p. 491, and above, vol. I. § 195, p. 267, note 2, and § 568, p. 592, note 2.

[103] See above, vol. I. § 184.

[104] See Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. XXXIV. (1907), p. 703.

As regards temporary neutralisation, it is possible for parts of the territories of belligerents and certain parts of the Open Sea to become neutralised through a treaty of the belligerents for the time of a particular war only. Thus, when in 1870 war broke out between France and Germany, the commander of the French man-of-war[105] Dupleix arranged with the commander of the German man-of-war Hertha—both stationed in the Japanese and Chinese waters—that they should, through their embassies in Yokohama, propose to their respective Governments the neutralisation of the Japanese and Chinese waters for the time of the war. Germany consented, but France refused the neutralisation. Again, at the commencement of the Turco-Italian War in 1911, Turkey proposed the neutralisation of the Red Sea, but Italy refused to agree to it.

[105] See Perels, § 33, p. 160, note 2.

Asserted exclusion of the Baltic Sea from the Region of War.

§ 73. That there is at present no part of the Open Sea neutralised is universally recognised, and this applies to the Baltic Sea, which is admittedly part of the Open Sea. Some writers,[106] however, maintain that the littoral States of the Baltic have a right to forbid all hostilities within the Baltic in case of a war between other States than themselves, and could thereby neutralise the Baltic without the consent and even against the will of the belligerents. This opinion is based on the fact that during the eighteenth century the littoral States of the Baltic claimed that right in several conventions, but it appears untenable, because it is opposed to the universally recognised principle of the freedom of the Open Sea. As no State has territorial supremacy over parts of the Open Sea, I cannot see how such a right of the littoral States of the Baltic could be justified.[107]

[106] See Perels, pp. 160-163, who discusses the question at some length and answers it in the affirmative.

[107] See Rivier, II. p. 218; Bonfils, § 504; Nys, I. pp. 448-450.

V THE BELLIGERENTS

Vattel, III. § 4—Phillimore, III. §§ 92-93—Taylor, §§ 458-460—Wheaton, § 294—Bluntschli, §§ 511-514—Heffter, §§ 114-117—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 237-248—Klüber, § 236—G. F. Martens, II. § 264—Gareis, § 83—Liszt, § 39, II.—Ullmann, §§ 168-169—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. Nos. 2656-2660—Rivier, II. pp. 207-216—Nys. III. pp. 114-118—Calvo, IV. §§ 2004-2038—Martens, II. § 108—Heilborn, System, pp. 333-335.

Qualification to become a Belligerent (facultas bellandi).

§ 74. As the Law of Nations recognises the status of war and its effects as regards rights and duties between the two or more belligerents on the one hand, and, on the other, between the belligerents and neutral States, the question arises what kind of States are legally qualified to make war and to become thereby belligerents. Publicists who discuss this question at all speak mostly of a right of States to make war, a jus belli. But if this so-called right is examined, it turns out to be no right at all, as there is no corresponding duty in those against whom the right is said to exist.[108] A State which makes war against another exercises one of its natural functions, and the only question is whether such State is or is not legally qualified to exercise such function. Now, according to the Law of Nations full-Sovereign States alone possess the legal qualification to become belligerents; half-and part-Sovereign States are not legally qualified to become belligerents. Since neutralised States, as Switzerland, Belgium, and Luxemburg, are full-Sovereign States, they are legally qualified to become belligerents, although their neutralisation binds them not to make use of their qualification except for defence. If they become belligerents because they are attacked, they do not lose their character as neutralised States, but if they become belligerents for offensive purposes they ipso facto lose this character.

[108] See Heilborn, System, p. 333.

Possibility in contradistinction to qualification to become a Belligerent.

§ 75. Such States as do not possess the legal qualification to become belligerents are by law prohibited from offensive or defensive warfare. But the possession of armed forces makes it possible for them in fact to enter into war and to become belligerents. History records instances enough of such States having actually made war. Thus in 1876 Servia and Montenegro, although at that time vassal States under Turkish suzerainty, declared war against Turkey, and in March 1877, peace was concluded between Turkey and Servia.[109] And when in April 1877 war broke out between Russia and Turkey, the then Turkish vassal State Roumania joined Russia, and Servia declared war anew against Turkey in December 1877. Further in November 1885 a war was waged between Servia, which had become a full-Sovereign State, and Bulgaria, which was at the time still a vassal State under Turkish suzerainty; the war lasted actually only a fortnight, but the formal treaty of peace was not signed until March 3, 1886, at Bukarest.[110] And although Turkey is a party to this treaty, Bulgaria appears as a party thereto independently and on its own behalf.

[109] See Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. IV. pp. 12, 14, 172.

[110] See Martens, N.R.G. 2nd Ser. IV. p. 284.

Whenever a case arises in which a State lacking the legal qualification to make war nevertheless actually makes war, such State is a belligerent, the contention is real war and all the rules of International Law respecting warfare apply to it.[111] Therefore, an armed contention between the suzerain and the vassal, between a full-Sovereign State and a vassal State under the suzerainty of another State, and, lastly, between a Federal State and one or more of its members, is war[112] in the technical sense of the term according to the Law of Nations.

[111] This is quite apparent through the fact that Bulgaria by accession became a party to the Geneva Convention at a time when she was still a vassal State under Turkish suzerainty.

[112] See above, § 56, and Baty, International Law in South Africa (1900), pp. 66-68.

Insurgents as a Belligerent Power.

§ 76. The distinction between legal qualification and actual power to make war explains the fact that insurgents may become a belligerent Power. It is a customary rule of the Law of Nations that any State may recognise insurgents as a belligerent Power, provided (1) they are in possession of a certain part of the territory of the legitimate Government; (2) they have set up a Government of their own; and (3) they conduct their armed contention with the legitimate Government according to the laws and usages of war.[113] Such insurgents in fact, although not in law, form a State-like community, and practically they are making war, although their contention is by International Law not considered as war in the technical sense of the term as long as they have not received recognition as a belligerent Power.

[113] See above, § 59. See also Rougier, Les guerres civiles, &c. (1903), pp. 372-447, and Westlake, I. pp. 50-57. The Institute of International Law, at its meeting at Neuchatel in 1900, adopted a body of nine articles concerning the rights and duties of foreign States in case of an insurrection; articles 4-9 deal with the recognition of the belligerency of insurgents. See Annuaire, XVIII. p. 227.

Principal and accessory Belligerent Parties.

§ 77. War occurs usually between two States, one belligerent party being on each side. But there are cases in which there are on one or on both sides several parties, and in some of such cases principal and accessory belligerent parties are to be distinguished.

Principal belligerent parties are those parties to a war who wage it on the basis of a treaty of alliance, whether such treaty was concluded before or during the war. On the other hand, accessory belligerent parties are such States as provide help and succour only in a limited way to a principal belligerent party at war with another State; for instance, by paying subsidies, sending a certain number of troops or men-of-war to take part in the contention, granting a coaling station to the men-of-war of the principal party, allowing the latter's troops a passage through their territory, and the like. Such accessory party becomes a belligerent through rendering help.

The matter need hardly be mentioned at all were it not for the fact that the question was formerly discussed by publicists whether or not it involved a violation of neutrality on the part of a neutral State in case it fulfilled in time of war a treaty concluded in time of peace, by the terms of which it had to grant a coaling station, the passage of troops through its territory, and the like, to one of the belligerents. This question is identical with the question, to be treated below in § 305, whether a qualified neutrality, in contradistinction to a perfect neutrality, is admissible. Since the answer to this question is in the negative, such State as fulfils a treaty obligation of this kind in time of war may be considered by the other side an accessory belligerent party to the war, and all doubt in the matter ought now to be removed since article 2 of Convention V. of the Second Peace Conference[114] categorically enacts that "belligerents are forbidden to move across the territory of a neutral Power troops or convoys either of munitions of war or of supplies."

[114] See also article 3 of Convention V.

VI THE ARMED FORCES OF THE BELLIGERENTS

Vattel, III. §§ 223-231—Hall, §§ 177-179, 181—Lawrence, §§ 148-150—Westlake, II. pp. 60-63—Manning, pp. 206-210—Phillimore, III. § 94—Twiss, II. § 45—Halleck, I. pp. 555-562—Taylor, §§ 471-476—Moore, VII. § 1109—Wheaton, §§ 356-358—Bluntschli, §§ 569-572—Heffter, §§ 124-124A—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 371-385—Klüber, 267—G. F. Martens, II. § 271—Gareis, § 83—Ullmann, § 175—Liszt, § 40, II.—Bonfils, Nos. 1088-1098—Despagnet, Nos. 520-523—Pradier-Fodéré, VI. Nos. 2721-2732, and VIII. Nos. 3091-3102—Nys, III. pp. 155-202—Rivier, II. pp. 242-259—Calvo, IV. §§ 2044-2065—Fiore, III. Nos. 1303-1316, and Code, Nos. 1455-1475—Martens, II. § 112—Longuet, §§ 26-36—Pillet, pp. 35-59—Kriegsbrauch, pp. 4-8—Perels, § 34—Boeck, Nos. 209-213—Dupuis, Nos. 74-91—Lawrence, War, pp. 195-218—Zorn, pp. 36-73—Bordwell, pp. 228-236—Land Warfare, § 17-38—Meurer, II. §§ 11-20—Spaight, pp. 34-72—Ariga, pp. 74-91—Takahashi, pp. 89-93.

Regular Armies and Navies.

§ 78. The chief part of the armed forces of the belligerents are their regular armies and navies. What kinds of forces constitute a regular army and a regular navy is not for International Law to determine, but a matter of Municipal Law exclusively. Whether or not so-called Militia and Volunteer corps belong to armies rests entirely with the Municipal Law of the belligerents. There are several States whose armies consist of Militia and Volunteer Corps exclusively, no standing army being provided for. The Hague Regulations expressly stipulate in article 1 that in countries where Militia or Volunteer Corps constitute the army or form part of it they are included under the denomination "Army." It is likewise irrelevant to consider the composition of a regular army, whether it is based on conscription or not, whether natives only or foreigners also are enrolled, and the like.

Non-combatant Members of Armed Forces.

§ 79. In the main, armed forces consist of combatants, but no army in the field consists of combatants exclusively, as there are always several kinds of other individuals, such as couriers, aeronauts, doctors, farriers, veterinary surgeons, chaplains, nurses, official and voluntary ambulance men, contractors, canteen-caterers, newspaper correspondents,[115] civil servants, diplomatists, and foreign military attachés[116] in the suite of the Commander-in-Chief.

[115] See Rey in R.G. XVII. (1910), pp. 73-102, and Higgins, War and the Private Citizen (1912), pp. 91-114.

[116] See Rey in R.G. XVII. (1910), pp. 63-73.

Writers on the Law of Nations do not agree as regards the position of such individuals; they are not mere private individuals, but, on the other hand, are certainly not combatants, although they may—as, for instance, couriers, doctors, farriers, and veterinary surgeons—have the character of soldiers. They may correctly be said to belong indirectly to the armed forces. Article 3 of the Hague Regulations expressly stipulates that the armed forces of the belligerents may consist of combatants and non-combatants, and that both in case of capture must be treated as prisoners of war, provided[117] they produce a certificate of identification from the military authorities of the army they are accompanying. However, when one speaks of armed forces generally, combatants only are in consideration.