During the fight, we found, in the room adjoining the engine-house, some thirty or forty prisoners, who had been captured and confined by the outlaws. The windows were broken open by our party and these men escaped. The whole of the outlaws were now driven into the engine-house, and owing to the great number of wounded requiring our care, and not being supported by the other companies, as we expected, we were obliged to return.... Immediately after we drew off, there was a flag of truce sent out to propose terms, which were that they were to be permitted to retire with their arms, and, I think, proceed as far as some lock on the canal, there to release their prisoners. The terms were not acceded to.

There were troops enough on the ground at this time to have carried Brown's position by assault; and it is probable that an attack upon the armory would have been ordered, had such extreme measures been deemed necessary, which was not the case. Besides, if an assault had been made by these undisciplined men, it would have been attended with the loss of many lives, which, under the circumstances, would have been without justification. Brown and his party were in a position from which they could not escape; neither could his surrender be long deferred. A prevailing report, too, that a detachment of United States troops—marines—would soon arrive, under the command of an experienced officer of the regular army, may have had some influence in determining what should be done. However, before nightfall, a Mr. Samuel Strider delivered a summons to Brown, demanding his surrender, to which Brown replied as follows:

Capt. John Brown Answers:

In consideration of all my men, whether living or dead, or wounded, being soon safely in and delivered up to me at this point with all their arms and ammunition, we will then take our prisoners and cross the Potomac bridge, a little beyond which we will set them at liberty; after which we can negotiate about the Government property as may be best. Also we require the delivery of our horse and harness at the hotel.[384]

The terms of the note were promptly declined by Colonel Robert W. Baylor, of the Virginia Cavalry, who seems to have been the ranking officer present. He said that "under no conditions would he consent to a removal of the citizen prisoners across the river." Still later in the evening the three companies, in uniform, arrived from Frederick, Maryland. One of these was under the command of Captain Sinn. This officer proceeded to the engine-house and entered into a lengthy conversation with Brown. During this interview Brown renewed his proposal to leave the place, and complained of the treatment his men, bearing a flag of truce, had received; that they "had been shot down like dogs." Being told that men in his position must expect such treatment, Brown replied that before coming there "he had weighed the responsibility and should not shrink from it." He thought, however, that he was entitled to better treatment from the people because of what he had not done to them; that he "had had full possession of the town and could have massacred all the inhabitants had he thought proper to do so."

During afternoon of the 17th, President Buchanan ordered three companies of artillery, from Fortress Monroe, to the scene of the trouble; also the detachment of marines, at the Washington Navy Yard. The latter were under the command of Lieutenant Israel Green, U. S. M. C. He also ordered Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Lee, Second United States Cavalry, brevet colonel United States army, to proceed to Harper's Ferry and assume command of all the United States troops concentrating there. General J. E. B. Stuart, at that time a first lieutenant in the First United States Cavalry accompanied Lee as a volunteer aide. The artillery from Fortress Monroe was detained at Baltimore by order of Colonel Lee. With two howitzers and ninety men Green left Washington for Harper's Ferry, at 3:30 p. m. En route he received orders from Colonel Lee to stop at Sandy Hook, a station within a mile, nearly, of his destination. At 10 o'clock Lee arrived at Sandy Hook on a special train. The marines were then formed, and marched to Harper's Ferry, leaving the howitzers aboard the cars. Arriving at the town, after consultation with the volunteer commanders present, Lee ordered the militia to vacate the armory grounds, and put the control, or care of the situation, in the hands of Lieutenant Green.

Before ordering the assault upon the engine-house, which, to save the lives of Brown's prisoners, was to be executed with the bayonet, Lee offered the honor of commanding the action to the regimental commanders of the volunteers: Colonel Shriver of the Maryland troops and Colonel Baylor of the Virginians; an offer which both of these officers, in behalf of their men, had the moral courage to wisely and properly decline. Colonel Shriver said, in effect, that they had come to help the people of Harper's Ferry in an emergency: that the emergency, in view of the United States troops present, was now passed; that his men had wives and children at home, and since it was not necessary to expose them to such risk as this attack involved, he would not voluntarily do so. Colonel Baylor expressed similar views. But, later, there was trouble over the matter. The pride of the Governor of Virginia, Henry E. Wise, was hurt because the Virginia troops had not done on the 17th what Lee, Stuart, Green, and the marines did so creditably on the morning of the 18th. As a result, charges of misconduct were preferred against Colonel Baylor, by Mr. O. Jennings Wise, a son of the Governor; and a court of inquiry was convened in June, 1860, to investigate the case. Mr. Villard states that in a letter addressed to the court, by Mr. Wise, the latter charged that Colonel Baylor had assumed command on the 17th, "contrary to his grade and the nature of his commission." That he had acted without orders; that he was guilty of cowardice in not storming the engine-house, and of "unofficer-like conduct in assigning a false, cowardly and insulting reason for not leading the attack on the engine-house when the service was offered to him by Colonel Lee: to-wit—that it was a duty which belonged to the mercenaries of the regular service—meaning the marines—who were paid for it"; and, finally for using "violent and ungentlemanly language about his Commander-in-Chief (Governor Wise)."

After the militia officers had declined the command of the storming party, it was offered to Lieutenant Green, who, of course, accepted it, and, taking off his cap, thanked his commander for the honor, with soldierly courtesy.

Early on the morning of the 18th, Colonel Lee sent a demand upon Brown to surrender, which was read to him at the door of the engine-house by Lieutenant Stuart. The order read as follows:[385]

Headquarters Harper's Ferry,
October 18, 1859.

Colonel Lee, United States Army, commanding the troops, sent by the United States to suppress the insurrection at this place, demands the surrender of the persons in the armory buildings.

If they will peaceably surrender themselves and restore the pillaged property, they shall be kept in safety to await the orders of the President. Colonel Lee represents to them, in all frankness, that it is impossible for them to escape; that the armory is surrounded on all sides by troops; and that if he is compelled to take them by force, he cannot answer for their safety.

R. E. Lee,
Colonel Commanding United States Troops.

It had been agreed upon between Stuart and Green, that, after having read the order to Brown, if he should refuse to surrender, as they supposed he would, Stuart would then signal by a wave of his cap, at the sight of which Green would order his company forward to the assault. His plan of attack was to advance with twelve men, holding another twelve in reserve to support them, if they should be disabled, and with a heavy sledge-hammer break down the door of the engine-house, and if successful, then, with the full command rush the insurgents with fixed bayonets. Upon seeing the signal agreed upon, Green ordered the attack. While being fired upon from within the engine-house, the marines, armed with the sledge, attempted to beat down the doors, but without success; then seeing a heavy ladder lying nearby, Green ordered some of the men to take it up and use it against the doors as a battering-ram. This expedient was successful. Two blows by the improvised engine of war sufficed to break a ragged hole, low down, in the right-hand door. Through the opening thus made, Green, and Major Russell, pay-master, United States Marine Corps, sprang, followed by the enlisted men.[386] Rising to his feet, Green ran back of the engine to the rear of the room, where he saw Colonel Washington, who, pointing to Brown said, "this is Osawatomie." Lieutenant Green states:

When Colonel Washington said to me, "This is Osawatomie," Brown turned his head to see who it was to whom Colonel Washington was speaking. Quicker than thought, I brought my sabre down with all my strength, upon his head. He was moving as the blow fell, and I suppose I did not strike him where I intended, for he received a deep sabre cut on the back of his neck. He fell senseless on his side, then rolled over on his back. He had in his hand a short Sharp's Cavalry carbine. I think he had just fired as I reached Colonel Washington, for the marine who followed me into the aperture made by the ladder, received a bullet in the abdomen from which he died in a few minutes. The shot might have been fired by some one else in the party, but I think it came from Brown. Instantly, as Brown fell, I gave him a sabre thrust in the left breast. The sword I carried was a light uniform weapon and either not having a point, or striking something hard in Brown's accouterments, did not penetrate. The blade bent double. By that time three or four of my men were inside. They came rushing in like tigers, as a storming assault is not a play-day sport. They bayoneted one man, skulking under the engine, and pinned another fellow up against the rear wall, both being killed instantly. I ordered the men to spill no more blood. The other insurgents were at once taken under arrest, and the contest ended. The whole fight had not lasted over three minutes.[387]

Of Brown's eleven prisoners, whom he was holding as hostages, Lieutenant Green says:

They were the sorriest lot of people I ever saw. They had been without food for over sixty hours, in constant dread of being shot, and were huddled up in the corner where lay the body of Brown's son and one or two others of the insurgents who had been killed.

The scrimmage being over, Green and Coppoc were taken into custody, and the dead and wounded were carried from the engine-house and laid upon the armory lawn, where they were protected from violence by a guard detailed from the company of marines. Later, Mr. Villard states, Brown was carried to the office of the pay-master of the armory and there given medical attention, when it was found that his wounds were far less serious than they were at first supposed to be.

Of the twenty-two ambitious men who courageously undertook to organize the "Provisional Army," ten had been killed: Kagi, Oliver Brown, Watson Brown, William Thompson, Dauphin Thompson, Jeremiah G. Anderson, Leeman, Newby, Leary, and Taylor. Five were prisoners: Brown, Stevens, E. Coppoc, Green, and Copeland. Seven had got away: Cook, Hazlett, Tidd, Owen Brown, Barclay Coppoc, Osborn P. Anderson, and Merriam.

Those killed and wounded by the insurgents were as follows: Killed: G. W. Turner, Thomas Boerley, Fontane Beckham, Heywood Shepherd, and Private Quinn. Wounded: Mr. Murphy, Mr. Young, Mr. Richardson, Mr. Hammond, Mr. McCabe, Mr. Dorsey, Mr. Hooper, Mr. Woolet, and Private Rupert.[388]

About noon, on the 18th, some notable persons of that period arrived at Harper's Ferry, anxious to know the facts relating to the alarming events which had taken place. An interview with Brown was accordingly arranged, which was held at the office of the armory pay-master. The wounded Stevens had, in the meantime, been carried into the office and laid upon a mattress on the floor beside Brown. Those present were Governor Wise, of Virginia, Colonel Robert E. Lee, Lieutenant Stuart, Senator Mason of Virginia, Congressmen Vallandigham of Ohio and Faulkner of Virginia, Colonel Lewis Washington, Andrew Hunter, special counsel for the State of Virginia, and a half dozen citizens of the town and vicinity. Brown was able to answer freely, and seemed anxious for an opportunity to present his version of the situation to the public. He was "glad," he said, "to make himself and his motives clearly understood." Extracts from this interview are as follows:[389]

Senator Mason. Can you tell us who furnished money for your expedition?

John Brown. I furnished most of it myself; I cannot implicate others. It is my own folly that I have been taken. I could easily have saved myself from it, had I exercised my own better judgment rather than yielded to my feelings.

Mason. You mean if you had escaped immediately?

Brown. No. I had the means to make myself secure without any escape; but I allowed myself to be surrounded by a force by being too tardy. I should have gone away; but I had thirty odd prisoners, whose wives and daughters were in tears for their safety, and I felt for them. Besides, I wanted to allay the fears of those who believed we came here to burn and kill. For this reason I allowed the train to cross the bridge, and gave them full liberty to pass on. I did it only to spare the feelings of those passengers and their families, and to allay the apprehensions that you had got here in your vicinity a band of men who had no regard for life and property, nor any feelings of humanity.

Mason. But you killed some people passing along the streets quietly.

Brown. Well, sir, if there was anything of that kind done, it was without my knowledge. Your own citizens who were my prisoners will tell you that every possible means was taken to prevent it. I did not allow my men to fire when there was danger of killing those we regarded as innocent persons, if I could help it. They will tell you that we allowed ourselves to be fired at repeatedly, and did not return it.

A Bystander. That is not so. You killed an unarmed man at the corner of the house over there at the water-tank, and another besides.

Brown. See here, my friend; it is useless to dispute or contradict the report of your own neighbors who were my prisoners.


Mr. Vallandigham (who had just entered.) Mr. Brown, who sent you here?

Brown. No man sent me here; it was my own prompting and that of my Maker, or that of the Devil—whichever you please to ascribe it to. I acknowledge no master in human form.


Vallandigham. Did you get up this document that is called a Constitution?

Brown. I did. They are a constitution and ordinance of my own striving and getting up.

Vallandigham. How long have you been engaged in this business?

Brown. From the breaking out of the difficulties in Kansas. Four of my sons had gone there to settle, and they induced me to go. I did not go there to settle, but because of the difficulties.


Mason. What was your object in coming?

Brown. We came to free the slaves, and only that.


A Volunteer. What in the world did you suppose you could do here in Virginia with that amount of men?

Brown. Young man, I do not wish to discuss that question here.

Volunteer. You could not do anything.

Brown. Well, perhaps your ideas and mine on military subjects would differ materially.


Mason. Did you consider this a military organization in this Constitution? I have not yet read it.

Brown. I did in some sense. I wish you would give that paper close attention.

Mason. You consider yourself the commander-in-chief of these "provisional" military forces?

Brown. I was chosen, agreeably to the ordinance of a certain document, commander-in-chief of that force.

Mason. What wages did you offer?

Brown. None.

Stuart. "The wages of sin is death."

Brown. I would not have made such a remark to you if you had been a prisoner, and wounded, in my hands.


A Bystander. Do you consider this a religious movement?

Brown. It is, in my opinion, the greatest service man can render to God.

Bystander. Do you consider yourself an instrument in the hands of Providence?

Brown. I do.

Bystander. Upon what principle do you justify your acts?

Brown. Upon the Golden Rule. I pity the poor in bondage that have none to help them: that is why I am here; not to gratify any personal animosity, revenge, or vindictive spirit. It is my sympathy with the oppressed and the wronged, that are as good as you and as precious in the sight of God.

Bystander. Certainly. But why take the slaves against their will?

Brown. I never did.

Bystander. You did in one instance, at least.

Stephens, the other wounded prisoner, here said, "You are right. In one case I know the negro wanted to go back."


Vallandigham. How far did you live from Jefferson?

Brown. Be cautious, Stephens, about any answers that would commit any friend. I would not answer that.

(Stephens turned partially over with a groan of pain, and was silent.)

Vallandigham. Who are your advisers in this movement?

Brown. I cannot answer that. I have numerous sympathizers throughout the entire North.

Vallandigham. In northern Ohio?

Brown. No more there than anywhere else; in all the free States.


Bystander. Why did you do it secretly?

Brown. Because I thought that necessary to success; no other reason.

Bystander. Have you read Gerrit Smith's last letter?

Brown. What letter do you mean?

Bystander. The "New York Herald" of yesterday, in speaking of this affair, mentions a letter in this way:

"Apropos of this exciting news, we recollect a very significant passage in one of Gerrit Smith's letters, published a month or two ago, in which he speaks of the folly of attempting to strike the shackles off the slaves by the force of moral suasion or legal agitation, and predicts that the next movement made in the direction of negro emancipation would be an insurrection in the South."

Brown. I have not seen the "New York Herald" for some days past; but I presume, from your remark about the gist of the letter, that I should concur with it. I agree with Mr. Smith that moral suasion is hopeless. I don't think the people of the slave States will ever consider the subject of slavery in its true light till some other argument is resorted to than moral suasion.

Vallandigham. Did you expect a general rising of the slaves in case of your success?

Brown. No, sir; nor did I wish it. I expected to gather them up from time to time, and set them free.

Vallandigham. Did you expect to hold possession here till then?

Brown. Well, probably I had quite a different idea. I do not know that I ought to reveal my plans. I am here a prisoner and wounded, because I foolishly allowed myself to be so. You overrate your strength in supposing I could have been taken if I had not allowed it. I was too tardy after commencing the open attack—in delaying my movements through Monday night, and up to the time I was attacked by the Government troops. It was all occasioned by my desire to spare the feelings of my prisoners and their families and the community at large. I had no knowledge of the shooting of the negro Heywood.


Dr. Biggs. Were you in the party at Dr. Kennedy's house?

Brown. I was at the head of that party. I occupied the house to mature my plans. I have not been in Baltimore to purchase caps.


Q. Where did you get arms? A. I bought them.

Q. In what State? A. That I will not state.

Q. How many guns? A. Two hundred Sharpe's rifles and two hundred revolvers,—what is called the Massachusetts Arms Company's revolvers, a little under navy size.

Q. Why did you not take that swivel you left in the house? A. I had no occasion for it. It was given to me a year or two ago.

Q. In Kansas? A. No. I had nothing given to me in Kansas.

Q. By whom, and in what State? A. I decline to answer; it is not properly a swivel; it is a very large rifle with a pivot. The ball is larger than a musket ball; it is intended for a slug.

Reporter. I do not wish to annoy you; but if you have anything further you would like to say, I will report it.

Brown. I have nothing to say, only that I claim to be here in carrying out a measure I believe perfectly justifiable, and not to act the part of an incendiary or ruffian, but to aid those suffering great wrong. I wish to say, furthermore, that you had better—all you people at the South—prepare yourselves for a settlement of this question, that must come up for settlement sooner than you are prepared for it. The sooner you are prepared the better. You may dispose of me very easily,—I am nearly disposed of now; but this question is still to be settled,—this negro question I mean; the end of that is not yet. These wounds were inflicted upon me—both sabre cuts on my head and bayonet stabs in different parts of my body—some minutes after I had ceased fighting and had consented to surrender, for the benefit of others, not for my own. I believe the Major would not have been alive; I could have killed him just as easy as a mosquito when he came in to receive our surrender. There had been loud and long calls of "surrender" from us,—as loud as men could yell; but in the confusion and excitement I suppose we were not heard. I do not think the Major, or any one, meant to butcher us after we had surrendered.

An Officer. Why did you not surrender before the attack?

Brown. I did not think it was my duty or interest to do so. We assured the prisoners that we did not wish to harm them, and they should be set at liberty. I exercised my best judgment, not believing the people would wantonly sacrifice their own fellow-citizens, when we offered to let them go on condition of being allowed to change our position about a quarter of a mile. The prisoners agreed by a vote among themselves to pass across the bridge with us. We wanted them only as a sort of guarantee of our own safety,—that we should not be fired into. We took them, in the first place, as hostages and to keep them from doing any harm. We did kill some men in defending ourselves, but I saw no one fire except directly in self-defense. Our orders were strict not to harm any one not in arms against us.

Q. Brown, suppose you had every nigger in the United States, what would you do with them? A. Set them free.

Q. Your intention was to carry them off and free them? A. Not at all.

A Bystander. To set them free would sacrifice the life of every man in this community.

Brown. I do not think so.

Bystander. I know it. I think you are fanatical.

Brown. And I think you are fanatical. "Whom the gods would destroy they first made mad," and you are mad.

Q. Was your only object to free the negroes? A. Absolutely our only object.

Q. But you demanded and took Colonel Washington's silver and watch? A. Yes; we intended freely to appropriate the property of slave-holders to carry out our object. It was for that, and only that, and with no design to enrich ourselves with any plunder whatever.

Bystander. Did you know Sherrod in Kansas? I understand you killed him.

Brown. I killed no man except in fair fight. I fought at Black Jack Point and at Osawatomie; and if I killed anybody, it was at one of these places.

Mr. Sanborn publishes a conversation that Brown had with his jailer concerning his interview with Governor Wise.[390]

"'A Virginian,'" he says, "gives me this addition to Brown's conversation with Wise":

Jailer. I see in the papers that you told Governor Wise you had promises of aid from Virginia, Tennessee, and the Carolinas. Is that true, or did you make it up to "rile" the old Governor?

Brown. No; I did not tell Wise that.

Jailer. What did you tell him that could have made that impression on his mind?

Brown. Wise said something about fanaticism, and intimated that no man in full possession of his senses could have expected to overcome a State with such a handful of men as I had, backed only by struggling negroes; and I replied that I had promises of ample assistance, and would have received it too if I could only have set the ball in motion. He then asked suddenly in a harsh voice, as you've seen lawyers snap up a witness: "Assistance! From what State, sir?" I was not thrown off my guard, and replied: "From more than you'd believe if I should name them all; but I expected more from Virginia, Tennessee, and the Carolinas than from any others."

Jailer. You "expected" it. You did not say it was promised from the States named?

Brown. No; I knew, of course, that the negroes would rally to my standard. If I had only got the thing fairly started, you Virginians would have seen sights that would have opened your eyes; and I tell you if I was free this moment, and had five hundred negroes around me, I would put these irons on Wise himself before Saturday night.

Jailer. Then it was true about aid being promised? What States promised it?

Brown (with a laugh). Well, you are about as smart a man as Wise, and I'll give you the same answer I gave him.

A reporter for the New York Herald who was present said of Brown:[391] "He converses freely, fluently and cheerfully, without the slightest manifestation of fear or uneasiness, evidently weighing well his words, and possessing a good command of language. His manner is courteous and affable, while he appears to be making a favorable impression upon his auditory."

A reporter for the Baltimore American who was present at the interview said:[392] "No sign of weakness was exhibited by John Brown. In the midst of his enemies, whose homes he had invaded; wounded and a prisoner, surrounded by a small army of officials, and a more desperate army of angry men; with the gallows staring him full in the face, he lay on the floor, and, in reply to every question, gave answers that betokened the spirit that animated him. The language of Gov. Wise well expresses his boldness when he said, 'He is the gamest man I ever saw.'"

During the afternoon of the 18th, while the interview with Brown was in progress, Mr. John C. Unseld accompanied Lieutenant Green, with a detachment of marines, to Brown's recent headquarters at the Kennedy farm, where a quantity of war material was found, including bed clothing, canvas for tents, some axes, two cast-iron hominy mills, a good deal of clothing boxed up—new clothing for men, and some boots. Here also they found Brown's trunk containing his official papers and correspondence; copies of the constitution for the Provisional Government and other important documents; also maps of Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, South Carolina, Florida, and Georgia. Each map had a slip pasted on the side, evidently cut from the census report of 1850, showing the number and kind of inhabitants (whether free or slave, white or black, male or female) in each county of the State or States which it represented. On the maps of South Carolina, Alabama, Mississippi, and Georgia, there were various ink-marks in the shape of crosses at different points.[393] With the consent of Brown, John E. Cook had taken a similar census of the inhabitants living in the vicinity of Harper's Ferry.[394]

On the morning of the 19th the military stores that had been transferred to the school-house, on Monday, from the Kennedy farm, were taken possession of by the "Baltimore Greys," a company belonging to the Maryland regiment present, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Mills. Among them were the following articles:[395]

102 Sharp's Rifles3 Gross Steel Pens
10 Kegs Gunpowder5 Ink Stands
23000 Percussion Rifle Caps21 Lead Pencils
100000 Percussion Pistol Caps34 Pen Holders
13000 Sharp's Rifle Cartridges2 Boxes Wafers
483 Pikes47 Small Blank Books
16 Picks
40 Shovels (The railroad waybill called for several dozen, showing that more were to come)

On Wednesday morning, October 19th, the prisoners were safely transferred to Charlestown, under an escort of marines commanded by Lieutenant Green. Upon their arrival there they were delivered into the custody of the sheriff of Jefferson County and the United States marshal for the Western District of Virginia, and by them placed in the county jail. Brown and Stevens, being unable to walk, were transferred to and from the train, in a wagon.

The comments of the press of the country, upon the occurrences herein, however interesting they may be, are not especially valuable. The writers of the time had but little correct information upon which to base their opinion as to the scope of the undertaking. Even at the present time, after the lapse of more than fifty years, opinion is divided as to whether this incident in our history was just an altruistic "Foray into Virginia"; or whether it was, practically, a harmless and utterly senseless "raid," or whether it was an organized reality—an invasion of the State of Virginia by Brown and his captains, having for their object, the conquest of the Southern States.


CHAPTER XIV

A PERVERSION OF HISTORY

But many a man has committed his greatest blunder when
attempting to write a book.


John Brown, Jr.

Concerning the things which Brown intended to do, and the plans which he made in pursuance thereof Mr. Redpath says:[396]

It was the original intention of Captain Brown to seize the Arsenal at Harpers Ferry on the night of the 24th of October, and to take the arms there deposited to the neighboring mountains, with a number of the wealthier citizens of the vicinity, as hostages, until they should redeem themselves by liberating an equal number of their slaves. When at Baltimore, for satisfactory reasons, he determined to strike the blow that was to shake the Slave System to its foundations, on the night of the 17th.

... Harper's Ferry, by the admission of military men, was admirably chosen as the spot at which to begin a war of liberation. The neighboring mountains, with their inaccessible fastnesses, with every one of which, and every turning of their valleys, John Brown had been familiar for seventeen years, would afford to guerrilla forces a protection the most favorable, and a thousand opportunities for a desperate defense or rapid retreats before overwhelming numbers of an enemy.

This is the conception of the Harper's Ferry episode that Brown's family, and his partisans, decided should be put forth concerning an incident which was to have been written in streams of blood, such as never flowed upon the continent. That anything so irrational should have been published, or should have been seriously considered by any one, is beyond the comprehension of thoughtful persons; and yet, the foolish fictions therein suggested were accepted as the truth in the Northern States, and, with some modifications of the more grotesque absurdities therein contained, have been approved by subsequent writers and biographers and have been incorporated with the history of our country.

Why Brown should have intended to abandon Harper's Ferry without a struggle to retain it after having taken formal possession of the place and of the war material stored there, if the position was admirably chosen as the spot at which to begin a war of liberation; or how a voluntary retreat into the mountains by a band of twenty-two men could be regarded as a "blow" of any kind; or where the inaccessible fastness which he intended to retreat to was located: or how he intended to shelter and subsist his men and prisoners in an inaccessible fastness that had not been supplied with subsistence stores or with camp and garrison equipage of any description; or how he would be able to find his way, if the night happened to be a dark night, up and through the tangled obstructions upon which the fastness relied for its inaccessibility; or how he intended to transport the military equipment stored at Harper's Perry, to the fastness, without means of transportation, or roads to travel on; or how he intended to prevent his fastness from being surrounded and his communications with the world cut off while the altruistic negotiations for the "exchange of the wealthier citizen prisoners for an equal number of slaves," were progressing, appear to have been matters of no concern to this biographer. It was sufficient for his purpose to assume that these things, however inconsistent they might be, were the things which Brown intended to do, and that they constituted the blow which he had promised to strike. Mr. Redpath, personally, knew what Brown intended to do. He knew that Brown, pursuant to his pledges, planned to strike a blow that would shake the center of the slave system; that he planned to precipitate a war of surpassing atrocity; a war that was to begin with a carnival of assassinations; that he intended "to assail slavery with the only weapon that it fears":[397] a servile insurrection.

Mr. Sanborn had been a valuable instrument in Brown's hands for the practice of his Eastern impositions. Taking his cue from Mr. Redpath, after describing what occurred on the night of the 16th of October, he rises to the full height of his conception of the occasion to inquire:

Why then did Brown attack Harper's Ferry, or having captured it, why did he not leave it at once and push into the mountains of Virginia, according to his original plan?[398]

It was to this Mr. Sanborn, that Brown first suggested his scheme to raise $30,000 cash, to arm and equip a company of "fifty volunteer-regulars" for the defense of Kansas settlers. Mr. Sanborn was impressed, deeply so, and undertook to promote the proposition. Also, he undertook to promote Brown's scheme to have the Legislatures of Massachusetts and New York appropriate $100,000 each, to reimburse the Brown family for losses its members had sustained while "fighting" in Kansas; and ever thereafter had been Brown's faithful and efficient servant. He was a member of the "Secret War Committee" of six, and had reason to think, and probably did think, that Brown had taken him into his full confidence. He says:

Although Brown communicated freely to the four persons just named,—Theodore Parker, Dr. Howe, Mr. Stearns and Col. Higginson,—his plans of attack and defense in Virginia, it is not known that he spoke to any but me of his purpose to surprise the Arsenal and town of Harper's Ferry.... It is probable that in 1858 Brown had not definitely resolved to seize Harper's Ferry; yet he spoke of it to me beside his coal fire in the American House, putting it as a question, rather, without expressing his own purpose. I questioned him a little about it; but it then passed from my mind, and I did not think of it again until the attack had been made a year and a half afterwards.[399]

Thus Mr. Sanborn acknowledges that Brown had not entrusted to him the secret of his intentions, and thereby disqualifies himself as an authority upon Brown's plans, or as having correct information concerning what he intended to do in Virginia. It is more than probable that upon the occasion to which Mr. Sanborn refers, Brown contemplated confiding to him his plans for the conquest of the South by means of an insurrection of the slaves and the massacre of the slave-holding population, and intended to offer him a position upon his staff. Brown and Forbes had laid plans for their campaign, with Harper's Ferry as the base of operations, as early as January, 1857, and in pursuance thereof had ordered the thousand spears with which to arm the blacks for the opening horror.

Sitting beside his coal fire in the American House, his thoughts upon his plans, and the hopes of his mighty conquest surging in his brain, John Brown, the grim Soldier of Fortune, drew out his young companion by indirection, and took the measure of his capacity for heroic undertakings. Had the young man, at the close of that interview, appealed for an omen "from that shrine whose oracles may destroy but can never deceive," he might, in a spiritual vision, have seen upon the invisible tablets, where Brown's mental records were kept, an inscription, or word, similar to that which Belshazzar saw traced upon the wall by the finger of an invisible hand. The man of "blood and iron" had invited the interview in his letter to Mr. Sanborn of February 24th.[400] Brown's decision was adverse to Mr. Sanborn. The latter did not suspect that he had passed through the fire of an examination, and had been found deficient. The subject was never again taken up; the door of opportunity closed against Mr. Sanborn.

Following the trail blazed by a discredited predecessor, the writer of Fifty Years After abandons the teachings which the record discloses concerning this episode, and, concurring with Mr. Redpath, tries to confirm in our history that author's perversion of the facts relating to it. He assumes to believe, and seeks to teach the public to believe, that Brown's plans were, comparatively, crude, and that his movement in execution of them was of a harmless nature: that he merely intended to attempt to carry on a guerrilla warfare from some point in the nearby mountains, and that his entrance to Harper's Ferry was not an occupation of the place but a "raid" upon it, undertaken for the purpose of advertising, in a spectacular way, the guerrilla warfare which he intended to engage in. He says:[401]

As for their general, he not only was the sole member of the attacking force to believe in the assault on the property of the United States at Harper's Ferry, but he was, as they neared the all-unsuspecting town, without any clear and definite plan of campaign. The general order detailed the men who were to garrison various parts of the town and hold the bridges, but beyond that, little had been mapped out. It was all to depend upon the orders of the commander-in-chief, who seemed bent on violating every military principle. Thus, he had appointed no definite place for the men to retreat to, and fixed no hour for the withdrawal from the town. He, moreover, proceeded at once to defy the canons by placing a river between himself and his base of supplies,—the Kennedy Farm,—and then left no adequate force on the river-bank to insure his being able to fall back to that base. Hardly had he entered the town when, by dispersing his men here and there, he made his defeat as easy as possible. Moreover, he had in mind no well-defined purpose in attacking Harpers Ferry, save to begin his revolution in a spectacular way, capture a few slave-holders and release some slaves. So far as he had thought anything out, he expected to alarm the town and then, with the slaves that had rallied to him, to march back to the school-house near the Kennedy Farm, arm his recruits and take to the hills. Another general, with the same purpose in view would have established his mountain camp first, swooped down upon the town in order to spread terror throughout the State, and in an hour or two, at most, have started back to his hill-top fastness.... Hence, he confidently hoped to retire to the mountains before catching sight of a soldier of the regular army or of the militia,—by no means an unjustifiable expectation....

The danger to any raiding force would come from losing possession of these bridges, in which case the sole means of escape would be by swimming the rivers or climbing up through the town toward Bolivar Heights, in the direction of Charlestown, eight miles away.

By the gratuitous and irrelevant assumptions herein, this biographer discredits Brown's intelligence; and by unjust, unfair, and illogical criticisms of his conduct, seeks to conceal and to emasculate his intentions. Authenticated facts place limitations upon the presumptions of historians, which challenge the consistency of reckless statements, and the logic of their conclusions concerning them. There is not an authenticated line in this history which justifies a belief that Brown contemplated doing the things which this author assumes that he intended to do. His theory that the occupation of Harper's Ferry was merely an incident in a raid, the first one of a series of undertakings in guerrilla warfare, which he represents Brown as intending to execute from a location within walking distance of the town, is a reflection upon the sanity of every person connected with the movement. It is an assumption that Brown and his men believed that they could maintain a headquarters for such warfare in the Maryland hills—at a "hill-top fastness," if you please—and not be "run to earth at once," as the author states Cook would have been, if he had attempted to hide in these inhospitable hills.[402] It is also a general denial of the historical truth that Brown intended to invade Virginia and the Southern States, and to establish over them the jurisdiction of a provisional government. Moreover, it is so divergent from the lessons taught by the vast accumulation of authenticated facts which relate to the matter, that it constitutes a contradiction of the facts, and raises a question as to the integrity of the author's purpose in putting it forth.

There is no room in historical literature for the indulgence of poetic license. If Brown was a man of "blood and iron" and his men "hard-headed Americans" one day, they must be regarded as being such the next day, and every day. It may be said, upon the authority of this author, that Brown and his men were not the stupids which they are, in this instance, represented as being. "Captains John H. Kagi and A. D. Stevens, bravest of the brave"[403] were not words idly spoken. "The hard-headed able Americans like Stevens, Kagi, Cook, and Gill, who lived with John Brown month in and month out worshipped no lunatic."[404] Grafter! Hypocrite! Fiend! Monster! Brown was, but never a trifler. If he ever engaged in a trifling enterprise or attempted to do anything in a trifling manner or upon a trifling scale, it has not been recorded. First, last, and all the time he played the limit of his resources. And in the execution of this venture—the climax of all his undertakings—he was neither trifling nor juggling with its details, as his biographers have persisted in doing with his motives, and with what his intentions and his plans were, in these premises.

Brown was not advertising his revolution when he secretly entered Harper's Ferry. These men were not baiting Death for spectacular effect. They had a well defined purpose in view, but it was not to "capture a few slave-holders and release some slaves." To Daniel Wheelan, Brown stated the purpose of his coming: "I want to free all the Negroes in this State; I have possession now of the United States Armory, and if the citizens interfere with me I must only burn the town and have blood." Conductor Phelps said: "They say they have come to free the slaves and intend to do it at all hazards." Mr. W. H. Seibert states that Kagi told him personally, that their purpose was "not the expatriation of one slave or a thousand slaves, but their liberation in the states wherein they were born and were now held in bondage."[405]

To Governor Wise and others, on the afternoon of October 18th, Brown stated that his purpose in being at Harper's Ferry Would be found in the constitution for the Provisional Government. A copy of the document being produced, he requested Governor Wise to read it, and said that "within a fortnight he intended to have it published at large and distributed": an act which he could not have intended to execute from a location in any "hill-top fastness." In reply to questions, he stated that he intended to put the Provisional Government into operation "here, in Virginia, where I commenced operations": that he expected to have "three or five thousand" men or as many as he wanted to assist him. He stated "distinctly" that he did not intend to run off any slaves, but that he "designed to put arms in their hands to defend themselves against their masters, and to maintain their position in Virginia and in the South." That in the first instance he expected they and non-slave holding whites would flock to his standard as soon as he got a footing there at Harper's Ferry: and, as his strength increased, he would gradually enlarge the area under his control, "furnishing a refuge for the slaves and a rendezvous for all whites who were disposed to aid him, until eventually he over-ran the whole South."[406]

January 5, 1860, Mr. John C. Unseld, one of Brown's prisoners testified: