As the date fixed for the great advance of the Army in Palestine drew near, certain parts of the Jordan Valley began to look very comical. Here and there would be seen a battery of artillery parked, or a cavalry regiment, with its horses tethered in neat and orderly array, in the most approved army style, but on closer inspection both horses and guns were found to be merely dummies! Great camps were pitched, but there was not a soldier in them; fires were lighted all over the place at dusk, as if a mighty army were bivouacked round about, and every conceivable kind of bluff was put up in order to deceive the Turks and make them think that the long expected attack was to be made through Gilead, to effect a junction with the Arab Army of the Hedjaz. The Jewish Battalion was even ordered to march and counter march from Jericho to the Dead Sea by some wight at G.H.Q. who still remembered us, but General Chaytor scotched this stunt, for of course he knew it was quite impossible for us to guard our front throughout the night and march some forty miles by day as well in that terrific heat.
There were really very few troops in the Valley, if one considers the enemy force that could have been concentrated against us. According to General Allenby's despatch, there were some 6,000 rifles, 2,000 sabres, and 74 guns facing us in the Jordan Valley.
General Allenby in his despatch of the 31st October, 1918, writes:—
"By reducing the strength of the troops in the Jordan Valley to a minimum," etc., and "To prevent the decrease in strength in the Jordan Valley being discovered by the enemy I ordered Major General Sir Edward Chaytor, K.C.M.G., C.B., A.D.C., to carry out with the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division, the 20th Indian (Imperial Service) Infantry Brigade, the 38th and 39th Battalions of the Royal Fusiliers, and the 1st and 2nd Battalions British West Indies Regiment a series of demonstrations with the object of inducing the enemy to believe that an attack East of the Jordan was intended, either in the direction of Madeba or Amman.
"The enemy was thought to be anticipating an attack in these directions and every possible step was taken to strengthen his suspicions."
On the 15th September the 39th Battalion Royal Fusiliers, under the command of Colonel Margolin, D.S.O., arrived in the Jordan Valley, and took up its position on the Auja in support of the 38th Battalion in the line.
A couple of days before the big offensive which began on the 18th September, General Allenby visited my Headquarters, where I presented to him all the officers not on duty. He took me a little apart and asked me if I was sure I could trust the men to fight, and I assured him that he need have no anxiety on that score, for the men were all right and would respond to any call when it was made.
He then asked me if there was any other point I should like to bring to his notice: I told him that malaria was daily becoming more prevalent and I was losing 200 men a week from this cause alone: I also pointed out that I did not think that the medical arrangements for the evacuation and care of the men were all that they should be. The General made a note of this in his book.
The only result was that I got an irate letter from the Deputy Adjutant-General asking me for a full report as to why I had misinformed the Commander-in-Chief about my sick, and about medical matters generally, so that on the morning of the 23rd September, the day we were ordered to pursue the enemy, when I should have been solely devoted to the leading of my men and all the problems pertaining thereto, I had to sit down and smooth the ruffled feathers of the Deputy Adjutant-General.
I not only proved my case to the hilt, but emphasized it by giving further evidence which I had not troubled the Commander-in-Chief by recounting.
General Chaytor specially warned us that, during the offensive on our left, we were to increase our patrols and harry the enemy as much as possible, to keep him in his lines and to prevent, if possible, any large force of Turks crossing from the East of the Jordan to reinforce their armies holding the line from the Jordan to the sea.
This is how the official report runs:—"Chaytor's force in the Jordan Valley had so far confined itself to vigorous patrolling to insure that the enemy could make no move without their knowledge. The rôle of this composite force was to secure the right flank of the army and the Jordan crossings, to keep in close touch with the enemy and take advantage of any withdrawal on their part, but to run no risk of being involved with a more powerful foe too early in the battle. This difficult task was admirably carried out."
During the nights of the 18th, 19th, 20th and 21st September we made demonstrations against the Turkish positions along our front. Parties would crawl out into favourable positions, such as a fold in the ground, and open fire all down the line. This always made the Turks nervy, and their trenches would be manned and every individual would blaze away for all he was worth.
On the 19th and 20th they got so "windy" that they called on their artillery to put down a barrage to prevent us from making an assault. Each time the barrage was put down our men were well clear, and lay snug and safe until the enemy had uselessly expended hundreds of rounds, when they quietly returned to camp, not a whit the worse for all the cannonading. There was very little sleep on these nights for anyone, and the Jewish Battalion certainly did all that in it lay to further the intentions of the Commander-in-Chief by holding every Turk in the neighbourhood of the Jordan closely to his lines.
On the 20th we pushed well up against the Turkish trenches, found them all manned, and again drew heavy rifle, machine-gun and artillery fire. We had a few men wounded in this affair. Why we had not a heavy casualty list on these occasions is a mystery to me, for the men had to advance in the open over a stretch of ground as level as a billiard table.
Number 6 Trench Mortar Battery R.A. was under my command in the Mellahah, and I ordered this battery to open fire on the Turkish position round Umm esh Shert, if we should find difficulty in ousting the enemy from this important place.
I had arranged to attack this position on the 22nd September, but at midnight on the 21st my Intelligence Officer sent me news that the enemy's resistance in the trenches opposite Umm esh Shert Ford was weakening.
I immediately ordered out my reserve, and sent them under Lieutenant Cross to reinforce Major Neill, whose duty it was to push in the Turks and take the Ford at the earliest possible moment. I got favourable news by telephone of the steady advance of the men; trench after trench was occupied, and when I left my Headquarters at 4 a.m. for the scene of the fight, I was able to report to General Chaytor's Staff Officer that we were almost in possession of the crossing.
I galloped off as dawn was breaking, scrambled up the cliffs and across the ground from which the Turks had fled, and arrived in time to go down with Major Neill, Captain Julian, and Lieutenants Jabotinsky and Cross, to take possession of this coveted passage over the Jordan. I may mention here that Jabotinsky had been attached to G.H.Q. for special work, but, as soon as the battalion went into the line, he requested to be returned to duty in order to share in all our dangers and hardships.
The moment we had secured the Umm esh Shert Ford I signalled the news to General Chaytor, who immediately took advantage of our capture by pushing mounted troops across the Jordan, thus outflanking the Turks who held the foothills of Shunat Nimrin, which barred the way to Es Salt.
The 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade crossed while we covered the Ford with our rifles and machine-guns, and they never drew rein until Es Salt was reached that evening, where a large force of the enemy with guns, etc., was captured by the Anzac Mounted Division.
That same afternoon, two companies of the 39th Battalion Royal Fusiliers moved up to our support and took up position in the posts which we had vacated in the Mellahah.
It is a curious fact that the whole movement of the British Army in Palestine, which swept the Turks out of the country, was actually pivoted on the sons of Israel, who were once again fighting the enemy, not far from the spot where their forefathers had crossed the Jordan under Joshua.
Meanwhile I was ordered to clear away the enemy believed to be still holding the ground to the north of our trenches round Red Hill. I detailed Captain H. H. Harris and his Company for this duty, the remainder of the battalion taking up position in the vacated Turkish trenches overlooking the Jordan. Lieutenant Jabotinsky, with his platoon, took possession of Umm esh Shert and put the captured ford in a state of defence, making machine-gun emplacements, etc., to cover the crossing.
I myself with Captain Julian, Lieutenant Cross, and a platoon reconnoitred up the river, for I had heard that there was a bridge in existence, which had been thrown across by the Turks in the neighbourhood of the ford, and I was anxious to find it if possible. After going some little way I found it was nearly 8 o'clock a.m., and time to be getting back to my Battalion Headquarters, so I left Julian, Cross, and the patrol to push on and make what discoveries they could along the river. When I got back to my tent I found a telegram awaiting me from General Chaytor which informed me that I had been given command of a body of troops to be known officially as "Patterson's Column." It was composed of the 38th and 39th Battalions Royal Fusiliers, and was ordered to concentrate on the Auja bridgehead.
I handed over command of the 38th to Major Ripley, who was the next Senior Officer, and issued the necessary concentration orders.
Later on I rode out to view the position which we had wrested from the Turks on the Jordan and, on the way, I was surprised to meet Captain Julian being brought in wounded on a camel. He was in considerable pain, but quite cheery and able to give me a full account of what had happened. It seems that soon after I had left them the party was ambushed by the Turks, who caught them, in the neighbourhood of Red Hill, with machine-gun and rifle fire. Julian, Cross, and Private Mildemer fell; the remainder of the patrol melted into a fold of the ground and made their escape. Julian, although severely wounded in the foot, also managed to get away, aided by Corporal Elfman, who gallantly helped him to safety, although under heavy fire from the enemy.
Reinforcements had been sent out as quickly as possible to the scene of the fight by the nearest Company, but by the time they arrived the Turks had gone. No trace could be found of Lieutenant Cross's body, but Private Mildemer was found lying dead where he fell.
On receipt of this news I sent another party under Lieutenant Bullock to give burial according to Jewish rites to the gallant man who had fallen, and to make a thorough search of the locality for Lieutenant Cross's body, but no trace of the missing officer could be found. Telegrams were dispatched to the hospitals at Amman, Deraa, and to Damascus after we had captured that city, but nothing was known of him at any of these places, and in the end we all came to the sad conclusion that we had seen the last of poor Cross and that the Turks must have thrown his body into the Jordan after he had died from his wounds. His loss cast a gloom over the battalion.
I was also exceedingly sorry to be deprived of Captain Julian's services with the transport, just at the moment when we were ordered to start off in pursuit of the enemy, for he was an ideal Transport Officer, and never once let the battalion down while he served in that capacity, and he had held this important position from the day he joined us.
It was not long until we had a sharp reminder of his loss, for that same evening our transport trekked off and could not be found anywhere. Someone (I never could discover who) gave the Transport Sergeant orders to leave his lines on the Auja and report, with all wagons, etc., to Major Ripley in the Mellahah. In the darkness he failed to find the Major, and on the morning of the 23rd not a single soul in the battalion knew anything about where the Transport had gone, or how it could be found. They had completely vanished from the ken of everybody, taking with them our food, forage, cooking pots, and spare ammunition. The new Transport Officer, Captain Cunningham, who had been detailed to take Captain Julian's place, was unable to find any trace of them when he went to take over charge. They had mysteriously disappeared from their bivouac and gone off into the blue.
This was a very disturbing factor in the situation, for we had orders to start off in pursuit of the enemy at 2 o'clock a.m. next morning. Cunningham, Quartermaster Smythe, and all available men who could be pressed into the service, were sent in every direction to run the Transport to earth.
Eventually Smythe came back to say that he had been tracking wagon wheels for at least five miles, but they could not be ours, for the tracks led steadily in a northerly direction towards the Turkish lines.
After duly strafing Major Ripley for having, this early in his command, lost his transport, I set off in quest of the rovers.
Luckily my charger Betty was in splendid condition, and I certainly put her on her mettle that morning. I took up the trail that Smythe had abandoned, followed it for seven or eight miles at a steady canter, and then lost all trace on hard ground. I had to cast round in a big circle before I found it once more, then I went on again for another three or four miles when I met some Australians. On asking them if they had seen a column of wagons going northward they said, "No, we have been along here for a couple of miles, but we have seen nothing."
This was very disheartening news, and I almost felt inclined to give up the quest in this direction and turn back; but having come so far, I made up my mind to go on, even to the Turkish lines themselves, before I gave up the hunt.
I was then about eight miles short of the Turkish position, or what had been the Turkish position at the foot of the hills towards which the tracks still led.
When I had covered another few miles, to my inexpressible relief, I at last caught sight of the Transport, steadily pursuing its way northward!
I made Betty put on an extra spurt and soon caught them up. It is lucky that there was no grass about, or the prairie itself would have caught fire when I at last overtook the Transport Sergeant. The language addressed to the jackdaw by the Cardinal Lord Archbishop of Rheims was angel talk compared to mine.
When I ordered him sharply to get back at once to where he came from, he was so confused that he promptly turned his horse round and began to ride off towards camp—leaving his baggage wagons still calmly proceeding in the opposite direction.
I called the dazed sergeant back and told him very forcibly to halt the column and take the wagons back as quickly as possible to his original camp. I was never able to get any satisfactory information from the sergeant (who by the way was a Welshman and a Christian) as to what induced him to trek off into the unknown in such a mad fashion. I can only imagine that the devil, who lives in the Jordan Valley, had impersonated Major Ripley and had ordered the sergeant to push for all he was worth for the Turkish lines, leaving us without food, water, cooking pots, or ammunition—in fact leaving us "beggars by the wayside."
My chase of the transport wasted some precious hours, but I was back in camp soon after 10 a.m., where I found the battalion full of bustle and activity, preparing for concentration on the Auja bridgehead.
On my return to Headquarters I found that Major Ripley was ill and only fit for hospital. He had had a most nerve-shattering time while commanding his section; for his posts were very much exposed and there was always the dread and anxiety of an attack in overwhelming numbers. Sleep rarely comes to soothe a man's nerves in such trying circumstances, especially in the awful heat we endured in the Mellahah; in fact, Major Ripley's features had wasted away so much owing to the worry and anxiety of all he had undergone that he reminded me of nothing so much as one of the mummified birds I had once seen in a cave of Upper Egypt. I never saw Major Ripley again in the battalion, but I am glad to say he made an excellent recovery, and was eventually given a good staff job in Alexandria.
I gave the command of the battalion to Major Neill, and from that moment I had no further anxieties, outside my own province, with which to contend.
When I took command of the Column I chose Captain Douglas Leadley as my Staff Officer, and a better man it would be almost impossible to find. I never knew Leadley to forget anything, and it was a great relief to feel that when once I had given him any instructions, I need have no further anxiety about them, for he was absolutely reliable and competent in every way.
When Leadley came to me, Major Neill selected Captain T. B. Brown to replace him as Adjutant of the 38th Battalion, and an excellent staff officer he made, as far as I could judge.
The concentration on the Auja bridgehead proceeded as rapidly as possible, for the Column had to move soon after midnight.
I found that the 38th Battalion could not possibly concentrate in time, for Captain H.H. Harris's Company was many miles to the north, where it had been sent in pursuit of the enemy. I therefore ordered Major Neill to follow me as quickly as possible to Shunat Nimrin, a position on the Moab foothills, some ten miles to the eastward of the Auja.
At 2 a.m. on the 24th, Column Headquarters and the 39th Battalion crossed the Jordan at the Auja bridgehead, scrambled up the steep Jordan cliffs, and marched on towards Nimrin.
General Chaytor had meanwhile ordered an advance upon Es Salt (the ancient Ramoth Gilead) and Amman, with his whole force, which consisted of the Anzac Mounted Division (less one squadron), a field battery, a heavy battery, two mountain batteries, Patterson's Column, the 20th Indian Infantry Brigade, and the 1st and 2nd Battalions British West Indies Regiment.
The mounted troops pushed forward rapidly, and soon out-distanced the infantry and guns. The Anzacs were such gluttons for battle that they broke down every resistance and completely destroyed and broke up the enemy before the Infantry could come into action.
The 20th Indian Infantry and the guns followed the horsemen, for, from their position on the Jericho-Es Salt road, they were much better situated to take the lead than any other dismounted troops.
My Column struck the advancing troops at Nimrin, where I was just in time to see General Chaytor fly past in a motor car. The General always believed in being well to the front when there was a fight on, and has been known on more than one occasion to be mixed up in the fray itself.
My orders were to form the rearguard to Chaytor's Force, and all day long the main Column wound its way slowly past Nimrin until 3 o'clock in the afternoon of the 24th. I then gave the order for the 39th to advance, and left orders for the 38th, on arrival at Nimrin, to follow on to Es Salt.
It was interesting to observe the strong positions from which we had driven the Turks, and to see overturned cannon, limbers, wagons, ammunition carts strewing the road; "Jericho Jane," an enormous gun that used to fire into Jericho, the Divisional Headquarters, and generally rake us all round, was lying ignominiously on her back in a ditch; dead bodies of men, horses, and draught bullocks made the world unpleasant in their vicinity; Bedouins flocked around like locusts, looting machine guns, rifles, ammunition and stores of all kinds which had been abandoned by the Turks in their hasty flight. The Arabs in these parts had the time of their lives, for loot is to them as honey to the bee.
General Chaytor had left word at Nimrin that he wished to see me, so I was anxious to get on to Es Salt as quickly as possible, where I hoped to find him. I therefore gave all necessary instructions to Colonel Margolin, and, leaving Captain Leadley with him in case anything unforeseen should crop up, and he should require the assistance of my Staff Officer, I rode on as fast as possible to Es Salt, taking my groom with me.
After great difficulty and much squeezing we forced our way through the miles and miles of wagons, baggage, guns, etc., which were slowly and painfully crawling up the steep mountain side towards Es Salt. I arrived there at about 9 p.m., but failed to find the General, who had already pushed further ahead. I was hospitably entertained by the Indian Infantry Brigade, and afterwards turned aside, and, tethering my horse, lay down a little way off the road, with my saddle for my pillow, glad to have a blanket to wrap round me on these heights, which felt decidedly chilly after the suffocating heat of the Mellahah. I woke up in the middle of the night just in time to recover Betty, who had broken loose and was straying off towards a forage cart. Having tied her up, I settled down again and slept until dawn. I wondered during the night how it was that my bed was so warm, and as soon as daylight came I discovered the reason—I had been sleeping on a bed of dry stable litter!
After an early cup of tea with the Indians, I pushed on through Es Salt to General Chaytor's Headquarters, which were just beyond. Here I found that the General had gone on to direct the operations which were then in progress round Amman. Major Anderson of his Staff provided me with an excellent breakfast, and soon afterwards we were joined by my friend, Colonel Bruxner, who had had a strenuous night marshalling the guns and transport on their toilsome journey up from the Valley.
I received telegraphic instruction from General Chaytor to make Es Salt my Headquarters and put it into a state of all-round defence.
I put up my "bivvy" a little way out of the town, under an enormous fig tree then laden with delicious fruit, close to the Nimrin, which flowed swiftly by, almost at the edge of our bivouac.
Colonel Margolin and the 39th took over Es Salt and at once occupied the commanding hills round about, where he was soon entrenched and ready to give the enemy a very warm reception in case of attack.
The Turks had left a number of sick and wounded soldiers at this place in a dreadful state. Captain Redcliffe Salaman took these poor wretches in hand and soon brought about a wonderful improvement in their condition. The town itself was in a state of indescribable filth, and had it not been for the unceasing efforts of Captain Salaman and the Sanitary Department which he organised, an outbreak of typhoid or other dreadful disease must have ensued. No praise is too high for the work which Salaman did during the period he was in Medical charge at Es Salt.
Soon after we had established ourselves here I found that the Bedouins were looting the abandoned Turkish munitions, stores, etc., right and left; as they were our allies, I did not want to interfere without orders, so I reported the matter to General Chaytor.
The General promptly wired me to stop all looting by these marauders—a proceeding which annoyed them intensely. I had to send out strong parties from the 39th Battalion to patrol that part of the country towards Amman, and the whole of the road from Es Salt back to Nimrin had, in addition, to be watched and guarded. The 39th patrolled the country from Es Salt as far as the El Howeij Bridge, some six miles south of Es Salt, while the 38th took up guard duty from this point to Nimrin. This was rather hard luck on the 38th, for they had almost reached Es Salt when the order to counter-march came. They had to turn and go back all that long weary way, practically without rest or food.
It was a march and counter-march that would have reflected credit on the best marching Regiment in the British Army, and no better testimonial could be given than that of Lieut. Cameron, a regular Highlander of the old school, who freely admitted that this was the very worst he had ever experienced in all his eighteen years of soldiering.
Cameron won the Military Cross, and also a bar thereto, while serving with the 38th Battalion.
Major Neill afterwards told me that he received the greatest assistance in getting the men along on this trying march from Captain H.H. Harris, who had the arduous task of shepherding the weary ones along with the rearguard.
No doubt if was one of these laggards who, some weeks afterwards, wrote me a letter full of reproaches, which made me laugh heartily, and helped to brighten the gloomy days through which I was then passing. I give an extract from a very lengthy episode:—
"You kept us in torture for six and a half weeks at Nablus. Then we left Nablus and thought after this torture you will send us for a rest, but no, you make us march to the Jordan in full marching order. You also gave us a bomb each man to put in our pocket so as to lighten the burden of the transport. You had consideration for horses, but not for humans. We travelled like pedlars to the Jordan, living on fresh air. When we reached the Jordan, it was a grand place, was it not? It surprises me you could not pick out a worse place to send us. Is there any worse place than the Mellalah in this God-forsaken country? (Evidently a non-Zionist, this fellow!) You kept us in this hot hole for another six-and-a-half weeks, no other troops ever being known to stay there for more than two or three weeks—but of course anywhere was good enough for the Jews."
From the above it will be seen that at least some of the men were of the opinion that I was responsible for their troubles, while all the time I was getting into the bad books of authority in my endeavours to get them better treatment.
The moment things were satisfactorily settled in the neighbourhood of Es Salt I hurried on to Amman. Jumping into a passing motor, I discovered that the name of the officer in the car was Lowe, and on asking him whether he was, by chance, any relation of a man I knew named Harry Lowe, he replied, "I am his brother."
On our arrival at Amman I found that General Chaytor's camp was some distance beyond the town and close to the Hedjaz Railway Station. Seeing the divisional flag flying over his tent, I made for it, and was delighted at last to run him to earth.
I heartily congratulated him on the great victory he had won in such record time. In four days his troops had covered over 60 miles; he had forced his way through the hills and mountains of Moab, a most difficult country, in the face of a superior force; he had captured the two ancient cities of Es Salt and Amman, got astride of the Hedjaz Railway, and had completely routed the 4th Turkish Army. He had captured altogether some 11,000 prisoners, some 60 guns, about 150 machine-guns, hundreds of tons of ammunition of all kinds, millions of rounds of small arms ammunition, large quantities of railway rolling-stock, and all kinds of other material, foodstuffs, horses, mules, transport wagons, motor lorries, etc.—altogether as brilliant a piece of work as was done in this or any other theatre of the Great War.
I would have those who pin their faith to the sword make a special note of the fact that not a single sabre or lance was carried by the mounted men. The hefty Anzac was able to do all that was wanted by the combination of man, horse, and rifle.
Of course Chaytor's Force lacked one great weapon, and that was a war correspondent to write up its deeds!
While I was in General Chaytor's camp a sad accident happened. A Signalling Sergeant quite close to us was examining a "dud" aerial bomb when it exploded in his hands, killing him and wounding several others.
I found Amman (the Philadelphia of the Romans) rich in old Græco-Roman architectural remains. A mighty amphitheatre, still in a fairly good state of preservation, stands out boldly amidst the ruins. Judging by the number of shattered columns and broken arches strewn about over a wide area, it must have been a very important city in the days when Rome was mistress of the world. Little or nothing of the old Rabbah Ammon is left. The walls of a very ancient citadel still crown a hill-top close by the Roman city, but whether it is the citadel which so long resisted Joab, or a later structure, I cannot say.
I remained at Amman all night, in the shadow of the great ruined amphitheatre. Once it must have rocked to the roar of the multitude encircling its spacious arena. Now all was silent. Only bats and owls circled through its broken arches or flew from its tilted columns, alarmed perchance by the curse of an Australian trooper sleeping uneasily amidst its ruins. While the bivouac fires yet flickered on this hoary pile I sought the shelter of a motor lorry, in which, rolled in a blanket, I lay snug and warm throughout the night.
From my own observation I can testify that the words of the Prophet Ezekiel were literally fulfilled when he wrote: "And I will make Rabbah (Ammon) a stable for camels, and the Ammonites a couching place for flocks."—(Ezekiel, Chap. XXV. verse 5.)
It must have been a very pleasant city in the old days, and I see no reason why its glories should not be revived under a stable form of Government. The country all round is fruitful and its waters sweet and abundant.
In the present straggling town there is a large colony of Circassians, and in the two previous raids made by the British on this place these people had in each case made a treacherous attack on our rearguard. The New Zealand Mounted Rifles suffered somewhat severely in the raid made on March 30th, 1918.
I left the ancient capital of the Ammonites soon after daybreak and, as I journeyed towards Es Salt, I had a magnificent view of the snow-capped Lebanons away in the far distance, while Gilead and Bashan lay spread out before me to the foot of Mount Hermon.
Es Salt and the hills surrounding it form the gateway to a vast rich hinterland. I have never seen grapes as large as those that grow in Gilead, or tasted any to compare with them in flavour. Figs, too, were delicious and abundant in and about Es Salt.
Rumours now began to get about that the Turkish force, still on the Hedjaz Railway to the south of Amman, would attempt to break through and try to escape northwards to Damascus by way of Nimrin.
General Chaytor ordered me to take steps to meet such an emergency, so I wired to Major Neill to put the place in a state of defence, and on September 28th I proceeded there myself and resumed command of the battalion.
While Chaytor's Force was holding the enemy on the Jordan and, later, chasing him through the Moab hills, the C.-in-C. was using the bulk of his forces in destroying the enemy holding the country to the West of the Jordan, and a very brief account of the operations may prove interesting to the reader.
In the neighbourhood of Jaffa a Franco-British force was assembled consisting of five Divisions of Infantry, a French detachment about 4,000 strong, the 5th Australian Light Horse Brigade, two brigades of mountain artillery, and eighteen batteries of heavy and siege artillery.
Carefully concealed in the orange and olive groves round about Jaffa and Ludd lay the 4th and 5th Cavalry Divisions, the Australian Mounted Division (less one Brigade), and four squadrons of French Colonial Cavalry (Spahis and Chasseurs d'Afrique).
All these were ready to dash north the moment the infantry and artillery had broken a gap in the enemy's line to the North of Jaffa.
With this highly mobile force a brilliant victory was achieved, but of course the historian will not give to the E.E.F. campaign the extravagant praise which has been lavished upon it by an ill-informed public, ignorant as yet of the fact that in the field of operations the strength of the British to that of the Turk was as that of a tiger to a tom-cat.
The bulk of the Turkish forces were on or south of a line drawn from Jisr ed Damie, on the Jordan, through Nablus and Tul Keram to the Mediterranean. His fighting strength on this front was, roughly, 17,000 Infantry, 1,000 Cavalry, and 266 guns. His line of communication was long and bad. He was about 1,200 miles from his base at Constantinople, and, owing to incomplete tunnels at Amanus and Taurus and a change of gauge at Ryak, there were no less than three bad breaks in the single line of railway which had to carry his reinforcements, munitions, equipment, and food both to the Palestinian and Mesopotamian fronts.
His troops were badly fed and badly led; medical arrangements were very poor; there was considerable friction between the Turks and Germans, and the Turkish Army was composed of a mixture of races, many of them hating their masters with a fierce hatred.
Here were all the elements of a débâcle on a grand scale.
On the morning of September 19th one of the most triumphant cavalry marches ever recorded in the world's history began at Jaffa, and before the troops engaged in it drew rein in far-off Aleppo, five weeks later, they had covered some 500 miles through an enemy's country, captured or destroyed over 50,000 Turks, seized Damascus, Beyrout, and Aleppo, and brought to an inglorious end the Ottoman Empire.
This was no mean record for a mere handful of mounted men to accomplish. We must not forget, however, that without the lavish help of the other arms—infantry, artillery, and especially the Air Force, victory on such a colossal scale could not have been achieved.
It almost seems as if this crowning victory had been pre-ordained to take place in the year 1918. Everybody knows that the Jewish era differs from the Christian era, but perhaps not so many are aware that the Jewish year 5679 corresponds to the year 1918 of our era. A peculiarity of the Hebrew language is that every numeral has a special meaning other than that connected with time or figures. In the dim and distant past, when seers, sages, and scribes were devoutly engaged in evolving such things, was it even then pre-ordained that this crowning victory—this victory which will surely hasten the restoration of Israel—should take place in the year 5679? However that may be, it is certainly extraordinary that the figures 5, 6, 7, 9, being interpreted, should mean Ha-atereth—"Crown of Victory."
When Turkey, unfortunately for herself, ranged her forces on the side of our enemies in the Great War she severed a friendship which had lasted for the greater part of a century. Our policy had for many years been to uphold the integrity of the Ottoman Empire because, with that Power holding Palestine, our Egyptian interests were quite safe. Now that the Turkish Empire has practically ceased to exist, Palestine becomes of cardinal importance to our Eastern interests.
Situated as it is at the Gate of the three Continents of Europe, Asia, and Africa, its strategical, political, and economic importance is beyond computation and out of all proportion to the size of this diminutive country.
Students of strategy and military history will agree that Palestine, although some distance from the Suez Canal region, dominates that main artery of our trade and commerce.
The eastern boundary of Egypt, running from Rafa on the Mediterranean to Akaba on the Gulf of that name in the Red Sea, is, from a military point of view, worthless. History tells us that all down the ages armies have crossed the Sinai Desert and worked their will on the dwellers by the Nile. Early in the War we ourselves were unable to hold this Egyptian Frontier and were forced to retire to the line of the Suez Canal. It is true we defeated the Turks there and drove them out of Egypt, but the risk to our communications was very grave. It is a risk that should never again be taken, and for the future the Suez Canal must be defended, at all events on the Eastern side, from its strategical frontier—Palestine. With a friendly people established in the Judæan strongholds, and with sea power in our hands, the invasion of Egypt from the East or North would be a well-nigh impossible enterprise. It was always a cause of surprise to me that we did not very early in the War seize and fortify the harbours of Haifa and Jaffa. This might easily have been done, as they were practically undefended, and the people were in their hearts pro-British. Even Gaza could have been occupied and fortified in the early days. With these three towns in our hands no Turkish force could have been organised in Palestine or used against Egypt. No army could possibly march down the maritime plain with these occupied towns menacing their flank, while the other route to Egypt by the eastward of the Jordan Valley is almost impossible for a large army.
Some eighty years ago Ibrahim Pasha was forced to retire to Egypt from Damascus by this eastern route because we held the coast ports. He left the ancient capital of Syria with some eighty thousand men, and, although he fought no battle on the way, his losses from sickness, hunger, thirst, and fatigue amounted to over sixty-five thousand men.
This gives one some little idea of the chance we missed in not making adequate use of our sea power by seizing the coast towns in the Levant during the Great War.
The physical conformation of Palestine adds enormously to its strategical strength.
The country is divided into four longitudinal belts running practically throughout the length of the country from North to South. Along the sea coast run the narrow maritime plains of Philistia, Sharon, and Acre. These narrow plains stretch from the borders of Egypt to the mountains of Lebanon.
The next belt of country consists of the continuation of the Lebanon range, which runs down practically unbroken through central Palestine, losing itself in the Southern Desert.
This hilly range constitutes the heart of the Holy Land and comprises the provinces of Galilee, Samaria, and Judæa. The only complete break in this range occurs between Galilee and Samaria, where the Plain of Esdraelon and the Valley of Jezreel cut right across and leave an open doorway from East to West. Through this gap from time immemorial armies have marched and counter-marched to and from Egypt.
The next belt of country is the great depression of the Jordan Valley, the deepest known in the world. It runs from "the waters of Merom," near the foothills of Hermon, where it is on a level with the Mediterranean, to the Dead Sea, where it is nearly 1,300 ft. below sea-level.
To the eastward of the Jordan Valley runs the table-land of the Hauran, Gilead, and Moab. This rich belt of territory is from twenty to sixty miles wide and ranges from 2,000 ft. to 4,000 ft. above sea-level. It loses itself to the South and East in the Arabian and Syrian Deserts.
The natural frontiers of Palestine are the Mediterranean on the West, the Syrian Desert to the East, the Arabian and Sinai Deserts to the South, and the difficult mountain passes of the Lebanon to the North. Next to the sea no better frontiers can be found than mountain passes and deserts.
It will therefore be seen that if Palestine is given anything like her Biblical frontiers, troops could readily be placed on any threatened point and practically make the invasion of the country an impossibility.
As a matter of fact, a small national army in Palestine would make that country almost as impregnable as are the Cantons of Switzerland.
It is of the first importance to British interests to further the creation of a friendly State in Palestine which would act as a buffer between herself and any aggressive neighbour to the North or East.
The greatest soldiers and statesmen of the past realised that in order to obtain dominion over the East it was first of all necessary to secure the friendly co-operation of the people of Palestine.
Alexander the Great knew what a help to his Greek Empire of the East the Jews would be. He therefore showed them the greatest friendship, and allowed them every possible civil and religious liberty.
Later on, when Palestine came under the dominion of Rome, Julius Cæsar, the first and greatest of the Roman Emperors, realized so fully that without a friendly Palestine he could not hope to overthrow the Parthians and Persians to the eastward that in order to obtain the friendship of the Jews he freed Palestine from tribute, withdrew his legions from the country, exempted Jews from serving in the army, and allowed them full liberty of conscience, not only in Palestine but throughout the entire Empire.
Coming down to more modern times, we find Napoleon following as far as possible the policy of his two great predecessors. At one time, early in his career, he made an effort to restore the Jews to Palestine, and he would probably have been successful in his scheme, and made himself ruler of a French Empire in the East, only, unfortunately for him, Nelson, at the battle of the Nile, deprived him of the command of the sea. Nothing daunted by this, however, he marched his soldiers through the Sinai Desert and subdued practically all Palestine, but, owing to British sea-power, we were able to throw troops into Acre, and by his defeat at the famous siege of that place, Napoleon's eastern ambitions came to an end.
Great as was the importance of a friendly Palestine to the Greek and Roman Empires, a friendly Palestine to-day is of immensely more importance to the peace and prosperity of the British Empire. Our statesmen were, therefore, but following in the footsteps of the greatest men of the past when they issued the world-famous Balfour Declaration pledging England to use her best endeavours to establish a National Home in Palestine for the Jewish people.
It is useless to deny the fact that England is not nearly so popular in the Near East as she was thirty or forty years ago. The Egyptians have shown us pretty clearly that they have no love for us, while it is very evident that the Arab kingdoms have ambitions of their own in those regions, which might prove a very grave menace to our eastern communications. Naturally, Turkey—or what is left of that once great Empire—realises that it is to England that she owes her downfall, while the policy of Greece, at the moment at all events, also runs counter to our own.
It is very necessary, therefore, that Palestine should be colonised by a people whose interests will go hand in hand with those of England and who will readily grasp at union with the British Empire.
The Jews are the only people who fulfil these conditions. They have ever looked upon Palestine as their natural heritage, and although they were ruthlessly torn from it some two thousand years ago, yet through all the terrible years of their exile they have never lost the imperishable hope of a return to the Land of Promise. They have always had a friendly feeling for this country, and if England now deals justly with Israel, this friendly feeling will be increased tenfold. They would be quite unable to stand alone in Palestine for some time, and therefore their one aim and object would be to co-operate wholeheartedly with the Power that had not only reinstated them in their own land, but whose strong arm was adequate to protect them from the encroachments and aggressions of neighbouring states.
It will undoubtedly be their policy to walk hand in hand with England. British and Jewish interests are so similar and so interwoven that they fit into each other as the hand does the glove.
In short, when the long-expected Restoration of the Jewish people to the Promised Land becomes an accomplished fact, then the vital interests of the British Empire in those regions will be unassailable.