III.

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES TO THE MORMONS ARISING FROM THE ENLISTMENT OF THE BATTALION.

A Sacrifice Nevertheless.—But notwithstanding the government service was asked for by the representative of the Mormon people, and the granting of it was regarded by the Mormon leaders at the time as a great advantage to their people, it brought to the volunteers and to the people generally much of sacrifice. For one thing the opportunity to avail themselves of their tendered service to the government came at an unexpected and a most inconvenient time. As explained afterwards by Col. Kane, "The young and those who could best have been spared, were then away from the main body, either with pioneer companies in the van, or, their faith unannounced, seeking work and food about the northwest settlements, to support them till the return of the season for commencing emigration. The force was therefore to be recruited from among the fathers of families, and others whose presence it was most desirable to retain."[21:a] Practically five hundred wagons were left without teamsters, and as many families were left without their natural protectors and providers. The families of the Battalion, with the families of their friends, in whose care they must leave their loved ones, and upon whom they must depend for succor, were then scattered in a string of camps for some hundreds of miles between Nauvoo and Council Bluffs, with no certain abiding place designated, and no immediate prospect of being permanently settled. To volunteer for a "war-march" of two thousand miles, much of which was desert, under such circumstances, was doubly hard. Moreover the Mormon people, from their then point of view, had little to be grateful for to the government of the United States. Their appeals from what to them was the injustice of Missouri and Illinois had met with but cold reception at Washington. They did not and could not be expected to understand, much less sympathize with, the refinements employed by the national legislators in drawing nice distinctions about the division of sovereignty between the states and the general government. They were self-conscious of wrongs inflicted upon their community in the two states in which they had settled—Missouri and Illinois. They had appealed to the general government for a redress of those grievances without avail; and now they were asked by their leaders to go into the service of that government which might mean the sacrifice of life, and surely meant the abandonment of their families to the care of others under circumstances the most trying. To respond to the call made upon them—both as to the volunteers and the camped community whence they were mustered—was a manifestation of unselfishness not often paralleled in history.

Advantages of the Enlistment.—Notwithstanding all the sacrifices involved, Brigham Young and those associated with him were too astute as leaders not to appreciate the advantages of having a considerable number of their people to enter the service of the United States. The charge of disloyalty to the American government had often been made against the Mormons, which not all their protests and denials could overcome. But to enter the service of the government in a time of war, involving such inconveniences as must be theirs, would be an evidence of loyalty that would stand forever, both unimpeached and unimpeachable. That such was the understanding of Brigham Young is specifically expressed by him about a month after the departure of the Battalion. "Let every one distinctly understand," said he, "that the Mormon Battalion was organized from our camp to allay the prejudices of the people, prove our loyalty to the government of the United States, and for the present and temporal salvation of Israel; that this act left near five hundred teams destitute of drivers and provisions for the winter, and nearly as many families without protection and help."[23:b]

The Right to Settle on Indian Lands Secured.—Another advantage appealed to the leaders: It had become evident before the call was made for the Battalion, that while it might be possible for a specially organized pioneer company to go over the mountains that season—preparations for which were being rapidly made—the very great majority of the camps would be under the necessity of spending a year or more in southern Iowa, principally on Indian lands. The prospects of remaining upon such lands in peace would be much enhanced if it could be pleaded that five hundred of their men were in the service of the government of the United States; and subsequent events demonstrated the validity of such a plea; also it was the advantage sought to be secured by Brigham Young in his first conference with Captain Allen on the subject of the enlistment of the Battalion. Under these arrangements of occupancy, as the Indian titles in lands in Iowa expired, the Mormon occupants acquired valuable pre-emption rights up and down the Missouri river from Council Bluffs for a distance of between fifty and sixty miles, stretching back on the east side of said river some thirty or forty miles.[24:c]

Money Value of the Enlistment.—Another consideration of importance was the remuneration of these soldiers. A year's pay for their clothing in advance at the rate of $3.50 per man per month, would amount to $42.00 each; and to $21,000 for the Battalion. Deciding to make their march in the clothing they had when enlisting, part of their money for clothing was sent back from Fort Leavenworth to be used for the benefit of the families of the Battalion, and part of it to assist the Mormon leaders. Subsequently agents were secretly sent to Santa Fe to bring back to the camps the pay of the soldiers that had accrued by the time they had arrived there. This amounted to three months' pay at the following rates: captain, $50.00 per month—rations 20 cents per day; first lieutenant, $30.00 per month—rations 20 cents per day; second lieutenant, $25.00 per month—rations 20 cents per day; first sergeant, $16.00 per month; sergeants, $13.00 per month; corporals, $9.00 per month; musicians, $8.00 per month; and privates, $7.00 per month.

The payment at Santa Fe was made in government checks—"not very available at Santa Fe"—i. e. not easily negotiable—writes Col. Cooke.[25:d] It has often been claimed that the Battalion was paid a bounty—$42.00 per man—on entering the service. This was not the case. The payment for clothing, one year in advance, at the rate of $3.50 per month has been mistaken for bounty.[25:e] It was only by foregoing the purchase of clothing that the Battalion could send the payment for it to their families and to the Mormon leaders. This source of revenue to the camps was accounted a very great blessing at the time. In official letters to the Battalion from the Mormon leaders, under date of August 16th and 21st, respectively, it was said, in the first, that the Battalion had been placed in circumstances which enabled them to control more means than all the rest of the Mormon people in the wilderness; in the second Brigham Young said: "We consider the money you have received, as compensation for your clothing, a peculiar manifestation of the kind providence of our Heavenly Father at this particular time, which is just the time for the purchasing of provisions and goods for the winter supply of the Camp."[25:f]

The Equipment of the Battalion to be Retained.—In addition to this payment for clothing, and the monthly pay, there was the five hundred stand of arms and camp equipment which were to become the personal property of the men when discharged in California. These several considerations led John Taylor—who became the successor to Brigham Young in Mormon leadership—in an address to the Mormons in England—to say:

"The President of the United States is favorably disposed to us. He has sent out orders to have five hundred of our brethren employed for one year in an expedition that was fitting out against California, with orders for them to be employed for one year, and when to be discharged in California, and to have their arms and implements of war given to them at the expiration of the term, and as there is no prospect of any opposition, it amounts to the same as paying them for going to the place where they were destined to go without."[26:g]

Appreciation of Mormon Leaders.—In a letter to President Polk, under date of August 9th, 1846, after reminding the President of the disadvantages the Mormon camps experienced in raising the Battalion, Brigham Young said:

"But in the midst of this we were cheered with the presence of our friend, Mr. Little, of New Hampshire, who assures us of the personal friendship of the President in the act before us; and this assurance, though not doubted by us in the least, was soon made doubly sure by the testimony of Col. Kane, of Philadelphia."

FOOTNOTES:

IV.

THE MARCH OF THE BATTALION FROM FORT LEAVENWORTH.

On the death of Col. Allen the question of succession in command was considered. It appears that this subject was mooted at the time the companies of the Battalion were enlisted; and "Col. Allen repeatedly stated to us," says Brigham Young, "that there would be no officer in the Battalion, except himself, only from among our people; that if he fell in battle, or was sick, or disabled by any means, the command would devolve on the ranking officer, which would be the Captain of Company 'A' and 'B', and so on according to letter." The Battalion appears to have had the same understanding, for at a council meeting of the officers it was agreed by them that Captain Jefferson Hunt, of Company "A", should assume command, which decision was afterwards sustained by the unanimous vote of the men. Meantime, however, Major Horton, in command at Fort Leavenworth, sent Lieutenant A. J. Smith, of the regular army, to take command of the Battalion. This led to a threatened complication; for an appeal to such written military authorities as were available to the officers of the Battalion, left them hopelessly divided in their conclusions. On the arrival of Lieutenant Smith a council of officers was held in which the Battalion officers demanded to know what reasons existed for their acceptance of him as commander rather than Captain Hunt. To which it was answered that the government property in possession of the Battalion was not yet receipted for, but that Lieutenant Smith could receipt for it, and being a commissioned officer of the regular army, he would be known at Washington, and his actions and orders recognized; whereas the officers of the Battalion had not yet received their commissions, and it would be doubtful if their selection of a commander would be approved. After this discussion Captain Hunt submitted the matter to the officers, and all but three voted in favor of accepting Lieutenant Smith as the commander of the Battalion.

Complaints of the Volunteers.—With Lieutenant Smith had come Dr. George B. Sanderson, whom Col. Allen, at Leavenworth, had appointed a surgeon in the U. S. army, to serve with the Mormon Battalion. According to the historian of the Battalion,[29:a] the volunteers suffered much because of the "arrogance, inefficiency and petty oppressions" of these two officers. This view of these officers, however, is to be accounted for by the Volunteers being suddenly brought under the enforced discipline of the U. S. army regulations. The heat of the season was excessive, the men had been already much exhausted by the strenuous labor and exposure during the journey through Iowa with their people earlier in the season, and as a result many of them fell a prey to the malaria prevalent in the country and at this season of the year. For this Dr. Sanderson prescribed calomel and arsenic, and as the men were averse to taking medicine, pleading even religious scruples against the drugs, the matter gave rise to much unpleasantness between the Battalion physician and the command, involving therein Lieutenant Smith, who, in the interest of what he no doubt regarded as discipline, sided with the physician.

The Line of March.—The Battalion's line of march, from Fort Leavenworth, after crossing the Kaw or Kansas river, followed that of the first Missouri Dragoons, led over the route that same year by Col. Doniphan, via Council Grove, thence some distance up the Arkansas River to a little beyond Fort Mann, where they crossed that river in order to take what was known as the "Cimmeron Route"—because it crossed Cimmeron river and followed some distance up the south branch of the stream, called Cimmeron Creek. The last crossing of the Arkansas they reached on the 16th of September, and here the commanding officer insisted that most of the families—about twelve or fifteen in number, which had so far accompanied the Battalion—should be detached and sent under a guard of ten men up the Arkansas to Pueblo, which nestles at the east base of the Rocky mountain range. There were stout protests against this "division of the Battalion;" as it was held to be a violation of the promise that the Battalion would not be divided, also that these families should be permitted to travel with the Battalion to California. Unquestionably, however, the arrangement was in the best interests both of the families and of the Battalion, and accordingly the detachment was made up as proposed, and marched to Pueblo under command of Captain Nelson Higgins.

Arrival at Santa Fe; Condition of the Command.—The main body of the command continued its march south-westward to San Miguel, thence turning the point of a mountain range marched north westward to Santa Fe, where they arrived in two detachments on the 9th and 12th of October, respectively. Upon the arrival of the first detachment the Battalion was received by a salute of one hundred guns by order of Col. Doniphan,[30:b] then in command both as civil and military head of the department of New Mexico; but making ready for what was to be his great and historic march upon Chihuahua.

On the arrival of the Battalion at Santa Fe it was learned that General Kearny, previous to his departure for the west, had designated Col. P. St. George Cooke[31:c] to take command of the Battalion and to follow on his trail with wagons to California.

Speaking of the condition of the Battalion, on its arrival in Santa Fe, and remarking on its physical unfitness to undertake the march to California, Col. Cooke, in his "Conquest of New Mexico," says:

"Everything conspired to discourage the extraordinary undertaking of marching this Battalion eleven hundred miles, for the much greater part through an unknown wilderness, without road or trail, and with a wagon train.

"It was enlisted too much by families; some were too old and feeble, and some too young; it was embarrassed by many women; it was undisciplined; it was much worn by traveling on foot, and marching from Nauvoo, Illinois; their clothing was very scant; there was no money to pay them, or clothing to issue; their mules were utterly broken down; the quartermaster department was without funds, and its credit bad; and animals were scarce. Those procured were very inferior, and were deteriorating every hour for lack of forage or grazing."[31:d] "So every preparation must be pushed—hurried. A small party with families had been sent from Arkansas crossing up the river, to winter at a small settlement close to the mountains, called Pueblo. The Battalion was now inspected, and eighty-six men found inefficient were ordered, under two officers, with nearly all the women, to go to the same point; five wives of officers were reluctantly allowed to accompany the march, but furnished their own transportation. By special arrangement and consent, the Battalion was paid in checks—not very available at Santa Fe (i. e. negotiable).

"With every effort, the quartermaster could only undertake to furnish rations for sixty days; and, in fact, full rations, of only flour, sugar, coffee and salt; salt pork only for thirty days, and soap for twenty. To venture without pack-saddles would be grossly imprudent, and so that burden was added."[32:e]

Invalided Detachment Sent to Pueblo.—It was understood that the men invalided and their escort, together with the women and children belonging to the Battalion, would have the privilege in the spring of intercepting the main body of their people moving to the west, and going with them "at government expense."[32:f] The above arrangement was the result of a council of the officers of the Battalion with Colonel Doniphan of Missouri, then in charge of military and civil affairs at Santa Fe, and with Col. Cooke who had been designated by Gen. Kearny to take command of the Battalion in its march to the Pacific, on his own departure from Santa Fe to California. Captain James Brown, of Company C., and St. Elam Luddington, of Company B, were the two officers above referred to as being placed in charge of the detachment. This company arrived at Pueblo on the 17th of November, and went into winter quarters near the encampment of Captain Higgins, who had preceded them to that point; and the next spring, according to the above arrangement, joined in the westward movement of their people, following so closely the pioneer company led by Brigham Young, that they entered Salt Lake Valley on the 29th of July, five days after the arrival of the first pioneer company. To the wife of one of the members of the Battalion, Mrs. Catherine Campbell Steele, wife of John Steele, Company D, was born the first white child in "Utah," August 9th, 1847.

FOOTNOTES:

V.

THE MARCH OF THE BATTALION FROM SANTA FE TO THE MOUTH OF THE GILA.

More Invaliding.—The course of the march for some time was southward down the valley of the Rio Grande. On the 10th of November, fifty-five more men were declared physically unable through sickness to continue the march, and accordingly were detached, and under Lieutenant W. W. Willis were ordered back to Pueblo to join the other detachments that had been sent there. After much suffering from the hardships of the journey—weak teams, scant supplies of food, illy clad, general sickness among the men, the fall of December snows in the mountain ranges north of Santa Fe, excessive cold, and several deaths occurring, this detachment finally arrived at Pueblo between the 20th and 24th of December, in a most pitiable condition; but they were warmly received by members of the Battalion already quartered there,[35:a] numbering, now, all told, about one hundred and fifty.

Hardship of Excessive Toil.—One cause of so many men breaking down in health was the excessive toil at the wagons through the sand stretches of the road, began early in the march from Santa Fe—while yet in the valley of the Rio del Norte, in fact, and continuing along the whole route to and through the California desert lying between the Colorado and the coast range of mountains. "Our course now lay down the Rio del Norte [The Rio Grande]," says Sergeant Tyler. "We found the roads extremely sandy in many places, and the men while carrying blankets, knapsacks, cartridge boxes (each containing thirty-six rounds of ammunition), and muskets on their backs, and living on short rations, had to pull at long ropes to aid the teams. The deep sand alone, without any load was enough to wear out both man and beast." Later he remarks: "We had to leave the river for a time, and have twenty men to each wagon with long ropes to help the teams pull the wagons over the sand hills. The commander perched himself on one of the hills, like a hawk on a fence post, sending down his orders with the sharpness of—well, to the Battalion, it is enough to say—Colonel Cooke."

One of the Battalion celebrates this incident of the march in doggerel verse of which two stanzas follow:

In the trackless part of the Battalion's march through the sand stretches, in addition to pulling at the wagons, companies marched in double-single file, in each other's footsteps, to make tracks for the wagon wheels.

Irrigation in New Mexico.—It was while at Santa Fe, and while passing down the Rio del Norte, that the Battalion saw, for the first time, irrigation in operation. Tyler thus describes it: "Canals for irrigation purposes were found all along the banks of the river. Some of them several miles in length. They conveyed water to the farms, or as they were called in that country, ranchos. There being little or no rain during the growing season, the water was made to flow over the ground until it was sufficiently saturated, and then shut off until needed again for the same purpose."

March Down the Rio Grande.—As the command in its southward movement down the Rio Grande reached the point where General Kearny left the valley for a direct march westward—228 miles south of Santa Fe—and where, too, Kearny had abandoned his wagons; the guides declared it impossible to follow the Gila route proper with the wagons; and hence a circuit to the south through Sonora via Janos and Fronteras was proposed and determined upon at a council of officers.

In the first stages of this changed course, however, the road bore to the southeast, and this was not to the liking of Col. Cooke, because it would carry his command within hailing distance of General Wool, who might incorporate it in the "Army of the Centre,"—as the General's division of the invading forces against Mexico was called—to operate against Chihuahua. In that event, as the Colonel himself expressed it, he would lose his trip to California. To bear to the southeast was not to the liking of the Battalion, as that was not in the direction of California, but one which might lead them within the sphere of the "Army of the Centre," and they would find themselves discharged in Old Mexico instead of California, at the end of their term of enlistment. The entire command was thrown into gloom by this change in the line of march: "All of our hopes, conversations and songs," says the historian of the Battalion—Tyler—"were centered on California. Somewhere on that broad domain we expected to join our families and friends."

"Blow the Right!" The Westward Turn.—"On the morning of the 21st," says Tyler, "the command resumed its journey, marching in a southern direction for about two miles, when it was found that the road began to bear southeast instead of southwest, as stated by the guides. The Colonel looked in the direction of the road, then to the southwest, then to the west, saying, 'I don't want to get under General Wool, and lose my trip to California.' He arose in his saddle and ordered a halt. He then said with firmness: 'This is not my course. I was ordered to California,' 'and,' he added with an oath, 'I will go there or die in the attempt.' Then turning to the bugler, he said, 'Blow the right!'

"Turning westward at this point, 32° 41´ north latitude, and but a short distance—some thirty miles—north of the present city of El Paso—the course of march was westward to San Bernardino rancho, thence to Yanos and so to the San Pedro river where the command arrived on the 9th of December.

"The Fight with Wild Bulls.—Here occurred the only fighting the Battalion engaged in on its expedition, a battle with wild bulls. This section of the country seemed to abound with herds of wild cattle, and the males among them were much more bold and ferocious than among the buffalos. Attracted by curiosity these herds gathered along the line of march, alternately scampering away and approaching; and some of the bolder ones, as if in resentment of the Battalion's invasion, attacked the column. Several mules were gored to death by them, both in the teams and among the pack animals; and Colonel Cooke records how some of the wagons were thrown about by the mad charge of these furious beasts. The troops had been ordered to march with guns unloaded, but in the presence of such a danger the men loaded their muskets without waiting for an order to that effect, and when attacked would fire upon the charging beasts, so that the rattle of musketry was for once heard all along the line. The bulls were very tenacious of life, however, and more desperate and dangerous when wounded than before."

Tyler speaks of one fight between Dr. William Spencer and a bull which was shot five times, twice through the lungs, twice through the heart, and once through the head, and yet would alternately rise and fall and rush upon the doctor until a sixth ball between the eyes, and near the curl of the pate, proved fatal.[38:c] Colonel Cooke confirms Tyler's narrative about the bull continuing to rush on after being twice shot through the heart, and adds: "I have seen the heart." Cooke also relates the feat of Corporal Frost in bringing down one of these ferocious animals: "I was very near Corporal Frost, when an immense coal-black bull came charging upon us, a hundred yards distant. Frost aimed his musket, a flintlock, very deliberately and only fired when the beast was within six paces; it fell headlong, almost at our feet."[39:d] Tyler adds: "The Corporal was on foot while, of course, the Colonel and staff were mounted. On the first appearance of the bull, the Colonel, with his usual firm manner of speech, ordered the corporal to load his gun, supposing, of course, that he had observed the previous order of prohibition. To this command he (the corporal) paid no attention. Thinking him either stupified or, dumbfounded, with much warmth and a foul epithet he next ordered him to run, but this mandate was as little heeded as the other. Doubtless Cooke thought one man's 'ignorance with some stubborness' was about to receive a terrible retribution, but when he saw the monster lifeless at his feet, through the well-directed aim of the brave and fearless corporal, how changed must have been his feelings!"[39:e] The number of the wild bovine enemy killed in the engagement is variously reported as from twenty to sixty, and by one writer as high as eighty-one.

Mexican Opposition at Tucson.—Leaving the San Pedro the command marched northeasterly to Tucson, a Mexican town of between four and five hundred inhabitants. It was garrisoned at the time by a Mexican force two hundred strong, according to Cooke, commanded by Captain Comaduran, who was under order from the Governor of Sonora, Don Manuel Gandara, not to allow an armed force to pass through the town without resistance. The guides furnished the Battalion by General Kearny, however, declared it was for the command either to march through Tucson, or make a detour which would mean a hundred miles out of the way over a trackless wilderness and mountains. Cooke determined to march through Tucson. Foster, the interpreter, went into the town in advance and was put under guard; a corporal, son of the Mexican commander, with three Mexican soldiers was met by the command and questioned about Foster, and on admitting that he was under guard, the corporal and his escort were immediately placed under arrest by Cooke, to be held as hostages for the safety of the interpreter. One Mexican, however, was released, who, with two of the Battalion guides, carried a note demanding Foster's release. This was complied with, and about midnight Foster was brought to camp, attended by two officers authorized "to make a special armistice." Cooke proposed that the Mexican command deliver up a few arms as a guarantee of surrender, and a token that the inhabitants of Tucson would not fight against the United States unless they were exchanged as prisoners of war; the Mexican prisoners were also released.[40:f] These events occurred while the Battalion was about sixteen miles from Tucson.

The next day, when on the march, Cooke received a message from Captain Comaduran declining the proposition to surrender. The Battalion were ordered to load their guns with ball. Before reaching the town, however, another message was received saying that the garrison had retreated taking two brass cannons and forcing most of the inhabitants to accompany them. About a dozen armed Mexicans met the American force to escort them into the town. Before passing through the gates, the commander of the Battalion addressed the soldiers saying, in effect, that the garrison and citizens had fled leaving their property behind; but they had not come to make war upon Sonora, and there must be no interference with the private property of the citizens.[41:g] The Battalion marched through Tucson and went into camp about half a mile beyond on a small stream.

Before leaving the vicinity Cooke with a party of fifty reconnoitered the country above the town towards a village and church, where, it was supposed, the garrison and main body of the people had taken refuge. As the nature of the country, however, afforded excellent opportunities for ambush, if the Mexicans should choose to make resistance, the company of fifty returned. However the movement was not without its value since, according to Col. Cooke, and as was afterwards ascertained, it caused the Mexicans who had fled to the aforesaid village to still further retreat, and the reinforcements which had come from the presidios of Fronteras, Santa Cruz and Tubac, to return to their posts.[42:h]

Junction With Kearny's Trail.—Renewing its journey the command in the course of three days, by hard marching, reached the Gila river and intersected the route followed by General Kearny, four hundred and seventy-four miles from the point at which they left it in the valley of the Rio Grande.

The Southern Pacific Railroad traverses practically the route of the Battalion between these two points. Colonel Cooke made a map of this part of the Battalion's journey—published in his book, (see map fold) and referring to it, in connection with the Southern Pacific Railroad, he says: "A new administration, in which Southern interests prevailed, with the great problem of the practicability and best location of a Pacific Railroad under investigation, had the map of this wagon route before them with its continuance to the west, and perceived that it gave exactly the solution of its unknown element, that a southern route would avoid both the Rocky Mountains and Sierra Nevada, with their snows, and would meet no obstacle in this great interval. The new 'Gadsden Treaty' was the result; it was signed, December 30, 1853."[42:i]

The March Down the Gila.—Following more or less the windings of the Gila, the way made difficult from alternating stretches of deep sand and miry clay, the command arrived at the junction of the Gila with the Colorado on the 8th of January.

An attempt at the shipment of part of the command's provisions down the river on a flat boat proved a sad failure, and ended in considerable loss. The scheme was Col. Cooke's. The "boat" was constructed by placing two wagon beds end to end and lashing them to two dry cottonwood logs. On this improvised boat two thousand five hundred pounds of provision and corn were placed. At places the river spread out over sand bars with but three or four inches of water covering them; the boat was repeatedly lodged on these, and the precious stores of food had to be landed in several places. The most of it was never recovered, though repeated efforts were made to regain it.

At the Mouth of the Gila.—Speaking of the Gila at its junction with the Colorado, and of the conditions obtaining in the command at that stage of the march, Col. Cooke writes: "A vast bottom; the country about the two rivers is a picture of desolation; nothing like vegetation beyond the alluvium of the two rivers; bleak mountains, wild looking peaks, stony hills and plains, fill the view. We are encamped in the midst of wild hemp. The mules are in mezquit thickets, with a little bunch grass, a half a mile off. The mules are weak, and their failing, or flagging to-day in ten miles, is very unpromising for the hundred mile stretch, dry and barren, before them. There is no grass, and only scanty cottonwood boughs for them to-night, but I sent out forty men to gather the fruit, called tornia, a variety of the mezquit. They have gathered twelve or fifteen bushels, which has been spread out to be eaten on a hard part of the sand-bar.

"Francisco was sent across the river to fire the thickets beyond—this to clear the way for the pioneer party in the morning. He says the river is deeper than usual; it is wider than the Missouri, and of the same muddy color. * * * It is said to be sixty miles to the mouth of the river."—the Colorado.[44:j]

FOOTNOTES: