Camp near Plattsburg [N. Y.], Oct. 12th, 1812.
Sir:
However incompatible it may be with the character and profession of a soldier, to enter into the party politics of the day, yet when the honor of the government, the corps he commands, and his personal fame are wantonly attacked, and attempted to be sacrificed to satiate the malignant venom of party purposes, it becomes his duty as a man, a patriot, to come forward and boldly contradict the base calumniator. The following piece "from the Connecticut Herald" and republished in the New York Herald of October 3d, is not only calculated to bring disrepute on the government, but to hold up our army as a mob wanting in discipline as well as in patriotism. The piece alluded to is as follows, viz.:
"The multiplied proof of folly, or of madness, or some worse cause, that have driven the nation into a ruinous, offensive war, are accumulating with every day's experience. Barely to enumerate the evidence would occupy columns. Two or three facts of recent occurrence, which have come to my knowledge, are in point and worthy of record. It is then a fact (for I state it on the best authority) that either the national treasury is so miserably empty, or the proper department so deficient in duty, that the army under General Dearborn, which has so long been idling away their time near Albany, was not only unpaid, but unprovided with the common necessaries of a camp; and when, a few days since, a part of these troops were ordered to the frontiers, one whole regiment (Colonel Pike's) absolutely refused, and deliberately stacked their arms, declaring they would not move until paid. In this refusal they were justified by their colonel, and an old soldier, who admitted they ought not to march unless the government would first pay the arrears due them. It fortunately happened that Mr. Secretary Gallatin was then at Albany, and on learning the state of affairs at the encampment, he borrowed $20,000 from one of the banks on his private credit, by which means the troops were paid, and cheerfully followed their commander."
In contradiction to this statement it will be sufficient to give the following facts:
[Firstly]—That the regimental paymaster had in his hands funds to pay the whole regiment up to the 31st. And [that] within three days of the period when the troops moved, three companies were paid previous to the march and the balance so soon as the troops halted a sufficient time to give the officers an opportunity to adjust the rolls and prepare the accounts of the recruits.
Secondly—That those funds were received by the regimental paymaster from the district paymaster, Mr. Eakins, who was then at Albany, and not from Mr. Gallatin whom, it is believed, did not arrive till after the regiment moved from Greenbush.
These facts can be corroborated by every officer of the 15th Infantry, who one and all deem the paragraph published in the Herald a base calumny, a direct attack on their honor as soldiers, and declare that the author, whoever he may be, has asserted gross untruths. As for myself, I have had the honor to serve in the army from the rank of volunteer to the station I now hold, during the Administration of Gen. Washington, Mr. Adams, Mr. Jefferson, and Mr. Madison, and can affirm that I have known some troops under the three first to have been upward of a year without a payment, and under the latter for eight months. This was owing to the dispersed state of our troops on the western frontiers. But never did I hear of a corps shewing a disposition to refuse to do their duty, because they had not received their pay; nor do I believe the American army has been disgraced by an instance of the kind since the Revolutionary War. But ask any man of consideration, what time it requires to organize an army, or a corps of new recruits—if, owing to the want of a knowledge of the officers to forms of returns, accounts, etc., it will not be some time before a new corps can be as well equipt, or appear as much like soldiers, as an old one? Every soldier will reply that it will require two years at least to teach both officers and men to reap the same benefit from the same supplies as old soldiers. And although at this time the 15th regiment has been as regularly supplied as any other corps with clothing, pay, arms, and accoutrements, even to watch coats to protect the centinel against the winter storms, yet were there an old regiment laying by their side, who had received the same supplies, they would most indubitably be better equipped and make themselves more comfortable, having the saving of two or more years' supplies on hand. But whether ill or well supplied, the soldiers and officers have too just a sense of the duty they owe their country and their own honor, ever to refuse to march against the enemy. And the colonel begs leave to assure the author of the above paragraph, that he hopes he will forbear any future attempt to injure his reputation by praising an action which, if true, must have forever tarnished the small claim he now has to a military character.
[Signed] Z. M. Pike,
Colonel 15th U. S. Infantry.
Colonel Pike seldom had occasion to make proclamations of a politico-military character. But one such which he issued while he was in command of a district may be here cited. It is not dated, in the printed form before me, but was no doubt given out in Jan., 1813, as it appears in Niles' Register for the week ending Jan. 30th, III. No. 22, p. 344:
To all whom it may concern. The state of hostility which exists between the Kingdom of Great Britain and the United States makes it necessary that the intercourse which may take place between this country and the adjacent province of Canada should be regulated on the principles which govern belligerent nations. I have had it in charge from the commanding general, Chandler [John Chandler, of New Hampshire, d. 1841] that no person should be permitted to pass in or out of Canada without his permission, or, in his absence, the permission of the commandant of the district of Champlain. This order has been communicated to the commanding officer on the lines, and will be strenuously enforced.
Some members of the community have been found so void of all sense of honor, love of country, or any other principle which has governed the virtuous of all nations and ages, as to hold correspondence with and give intelligence to our enemies. It therefore becomes my duty to put the laws in full force. The two following sections of the rules and articles of war, which are equally binding on the citizen and the soldier, are published for the information of the public, that no one may plead ignorance, as from this time henceforward they shall be enforced with the greatest severity.
"Art. 56. Whosoever shall relieve the enemy with money, victuals, or ammunition, or shall knowingly harbor or protect an enemy shall suffer death, or such other punishment as shall be ordered by the sentence of a court-martial.
"Art. 57. Whosoever shall be convicted of holding correspondence with, or giving intelligence to, the enemy, either directly or indirectly, shall suffer death, or such other punishment as shall be ordered by the sentence of a court-martial."
[Signed] Z. M. Pike, Col. 15th Regt. Inf.
Commanding West Lake Champlain.
During the winter of 1812-13, when the 15th regiment was stationed on the northern frontier, in view of the operations to be undertaken against the posts of the enemy on the lakes, great confidence in this well-disciplined and zealous body of troops was felt by General Henry Dearborn, formerly secretary of war, and then the senior major-general of the army, in immediate command. As we have just seen, General Pike was in charge of a military district on Lake Champlain; his command was then of about 2,500 men. Various desultory demonstrations against the enemy had proved futile, in some cases fatuous and disgraceful. The War Department determined upon a more consistent and apparently feasible plan of concerted operations, which had in view the reduction of all the British posts on the St. Lawrence river and Lake Ontario. The capture of Kingston (site of old Fort Frontenac) was a measure of first importance. The garrison was supposed to be small, and lulled in a sense of security, owing to the rigors of the season and the numerical insignificance of our troops at Sackett's Harbor; nor was Kingston likely to be re-enforced from below, as the British forces were menaced on the Lower St. Lawrence by Pike's troops on Lake Champlain. It was proposed to transport these in sleighs to the foot of Lake Ontario with such promptitude that the movement could not be counteracted. General Dearborn also proposed to concentrate other forces at Sackett's Harbor, to which place his headquarters at Albany were to be moved at once. This was in Feb., 1813. But while these measures were pending, Sir George Prevost, Governor-General of the Canadas, prorogued the Parliament then in session, and moved to Kingston with re-enforcements for that place. According to General Dearborn's dispatches of Mar. 3d from Sackett's Harbor, this demonstration seemed so alarming that operations against Kingston were suspended in favor of others which had regard to the safety of Sackett's Harbor; though it appears in General Armstrong's History of the War that Sir George Prevost had executed a clever ruse with few troops, and "countervailed his antagonist only by dexterous and well-timed reports," Whiting's Pike, p. 290 seq.
The proposed attack on Kingston over the ice having been abandoned, the Secretary of War's alternative plan of reducing in succession the several posts on and about Lake Ontario engaged General Dearborn's attention. The Secretary indicated the order in which the successive attacks were to be made, viz.: Kingston and York on Lake Ontario; George and Erie on the Niagara river. But this sequence was not strictly regarded by General Dearborn, who determined to attack Kingston last instead of first; considering the rotation of the assaults to be of minor consequence, in view of the main features of a campaign which had for its object the reduction of all the posts named in the order of the Secretary. The general commanding, on consultation with Commodore Isaac Chauncey, concluded to make York the initial point of attack; George to come next, and then Kingston.
The prospect held out by this plan of the campaign was certainly very promising. It had all such probabilities in its favor as could be commanded by those who control only one side of the current of events. The force that could and would be brought to bear on each point of attack was ample, and left as little to hazard as prudence would suggest. The plan was founded on the best principles of strategy, and highly creditable to the generalship which dictated it. Had it been carried out with the spirit and perseverance with which it was commenced, there was every reasonable prospect of a successful issue. The causes of its failure were obvious: delays, without proper objects, after the capture of Fort George; and a change of command, wholly unnecessary and inexpedient, which led to the waste of nearly an entire season of inactivity (Whiting, p. 297).
As noted by this military critic and historian, General Dearborn was relieved from command early in July, 1813, his successor being enjoined to rest on his arms, except in the event of certain improbable contingencies which never arose, until the arrival of General Wilkinson, who did not reach Fort George until September, or resume operations until Oct. 1st; so that "nearly three months were utterly wasted by a body of 4,000 troops."
But I have digressed from the attack on Fort York, with which alone are we here concerned.
In the latter part of April, 1813, the navigation of Lake Ontario was open, and no molestation was apprehended, as it was known that Sir James Yeo's fleet was not operative. Agreeably with the plan of the campaign above briefly noted, therefore, General Dearborn embarked on board Commodore Chauncey's fleet, with about 1,700 troops, under the immediate command of Brigadier-General Pike, Apr. 25th. On the morning of the 27th the fleet reached York harbor, where it was intended to debark for the assault on Fort York. This military post defended the place which had been known as Toronto till 1793, and was then called York till 1834, when it resumed its aboriginal name.
The true signification of the Iroquois word which has settled in the form Toronto, after long fluctuation of all its vowels, is uncertain, or at any rate, is still questioned. It is now most frequently translated "trees in the water," or by some equivalent phrase, with reference to the formerly wooded, long, low spit of land which still encompasses the harbor of Ontario's metropolis. Irrespective of its etymology, the various connotations of Toronto in successive historical periods are to be carefully discriminated. If we turn to old maps, we see that the present Georgian bay of Lake Huron was Toronto bay; the present Lake Simcoe was Toronto lake; present Severn river and the Humber were each of them Toronto river. In the seventeenth century, Toronto was the official designation of a region between Lake Simcoe and the Georgian bay—the country of the Hurons, on the large peninsula which intervenes between Lake Huron and Lake Ontario. The comparatively narrow neck of this peninsula offered, by means of Humber river and certain portages, a convenient way to pass between these two great lakes—it was, in fact, an Indian thoroughfare. The mouth of the Humber consequently became an Indian rendezvous, and the name of the whole region thus became best known in connection with the locality of the present city. As the southern terminus of this highway, on Lake Ontario, offered an eligible site for a trading-post, advantage was taken of such an opportunity to cut off trade from Chouagen (Oswego) by planting the original establishment of the Whites near the mouth of the Humber. Such was the French Fort Rouillé, built in 1749, and named in compliment to Antoine Louis Rouillé, Comte de Jouy, then colonial minister. This post was destroyed in 1756, to prevent it from falling into the hands of the English. It became better known as Fort Toronto than it had been by its proper French name, and later on passed into history as Old Fort Toronto, in distinction from the two other establishments to which the name was successively bequeathed. Fort Rouillé, by whatever name called, was never lost sight of entirely. Lossing's Field Book of the War of 1812, New York, 1868, p. 593, has a cut which shows its appearance when it had been to some extent renovated in 1812-13. The exact site is now marked by a monument, lying alongside which is an inscribed stone. These memorials are pointed out to visitors, on the lake shore, in the southwest corner of the present Exposition grounds, on the western side of the city of Toronto. After the abandonment of old Fort Rouillé the region round about remained for nearly half a century a wild whose solitude may have been only relieved by the lodges of a few Misisagas—those Indians of Ojibwa affinities who had become members of the Iroquois confederation in 1746, three years before the fort was built. In 1791, Upper and Lower Canada were instituted by parliamentary measures which Pitt guided to success; the latter was practically the province of Quebec; the former became the province of Ontario, the refuge and future home of the United Empire Loyalists. For the capital of Ontario, a site was to be chosen in then unbroken wilds. The first provincial Parliament of the new province of Upper Canada was held in May, 1793, at Newark, the present town of Niagara, where the river of that name enters Lake Ontario. But this place was ineligible; the river became an international boundary; the guns of the United States Fort Niagara could be trained upon Newark; and in August of the same year the seat of government of the new province was transferred to the new site which had been surveyed to that end by Bouchette, and selected for the purpose by General and Governor John Graves Simcoe (b. Feb. 25th, 1752, d. Oct. 6th, 1806). To this place Simcoe gave the name of York, after the duke, second son of George III. The evolution of this embryo of future greatness was slow; for many years "Little York," or "Muddy York," as it was styled by some in derision, had but a few hundred inhabitants; its maintenance was mainly due to the United Loyalists already mentioned. In April, 1813, the works by which York was defended, and which General Pike carried by assault, were those called Fort York; later they were known as Fort Toronto, or "the Fort at Toronto." The town which Simcoe had christened York did not resume the original designation of the locality till 1834, when it was incorporated as the city of Toronto.
This magnificent metropolis, which so admirably illustrates the effect of American momentum upon English stability, is situated upon the north side of Lake Ontario, 39 miles northeast of Hamilton (which occupies the fond du lac) and 310 miles west-southwest of Montreal; at the observatory the position is calculated to be in latitude 43° 39´ 35´´ N. and longitude 79° 23´ 39´´ W. of the Greenwich meridian. The city extends westward from the vicinity of the Don in the direction of the Humber, across the small stream known as Garrison creek. It thus has several miles of lake front on the south, at the bay or harbor of Toronto, partly shut off from the lake by low land which was once a peninsula, and some small islands, with an entrance only from the west; but the peninsula has been artificially cut off from the mainland. At its end stood a blockhouse, in a position known as Gibraltar point; another blockhouse stood at the mouth of the Don, on the left or east bank of that river. One now drives a few blocks from any hotel in the heart of the city to "old" Fort York, at present dismantled, but very much in evidence still of the scene of General Pike's victory and mortal hurt. The visitor will be warned off the premises by the functionary who has these disjecta membra in charge, as Lossing had been before I was; but may nevertheless keep on the main street or road through the frowning earthworks, and will presently find himself on Garrison Common. This is the large level piece of ground, the middle of the lake front of which is occupied by the present barracks, or "new fort." At points included within the present garrison and parade ground were the positions of two outer defenses of old Fort York, respectively called at that time the Western and the Half Moon battery; these were the first and second obstacles for Pike to surmount in advancing upon the main defenses of York. Crossing Garrison Common in a few minutes we enter the Exposition grounds, at the further corner of which, to the left, and directly upon the lake shore, stand the Rouillé monument and inscribed cairn already mentioned, together with a historical cabin; a pier juts into the lake close by these objects. The direct distance between the Rouillé monument and old Fort York is about 6,000 feet—little over a mile by the road; the present barracks are nearly midway between those two places. Old Fort York occupies a position about the mouth of Garrison creek, between Front Street and the water's edge, at the foot of Tecumseh Street, and close to Queen's Wharf, in the midst of railroad tracks, freight houses, and depots. The magazine, which was exploded at the cost of many American and some British lives, stood in a depression at or near the mouth of the creek, with its top nearly on a level with higher ground on either hand; it is said that its existence was not suspected by the enemy. It was a comparatively large structure of its kind, solidly built of heavy stone masonry, and contained a great quantity of powder, shot, and shell. All the positions here in mention may be inspected in a leisurely drive of an hour. Those who have not been over the ground, or have not a city map at hand, will be helped to a clear understanding of the situation by the diagram given in Lossing, p. 590; together with the sketches there given of York, of Fort York, of the magazine which was blown up by General Sheaffe's order, and of the Western battery whose explosion was accidental. Of the latter, the picture represents the remains as they were in 1860.
The conflicting accounts of uninformed, unconsciously biased, or willfully mendacious writers have shrouded in obscurity the clear and intelligible relation which can be given of the battle of York. Especially have the two explosions which occurred during the assault been confounded and falsified in history. It is necessary, at the outset, to dissociate in mind these two catastrophes, namely: (1) The accidental explosion of a portable magazine at the Western battery during the advance of the Americans upon the main works. (2) The intentional explosion of the fixed magazine during the retreat of the British from the main works. The latter was somewhat premature, owing to overmuch zeal of the soldier who had been ordered to fire the train; but it was premeditated.
A diligent comparison of many different descriptions of the battle of York has satisfied me that the account in Whiting, Pike's most formal biographer, leaves much to be desired, and that Lossing's relation is decidedly preferable in most particulars. The latter gives, on the whole, the clearest and truest picture which any modern historian has painted. Lossing consulted the official reports of the commanders, both British and American; the accounts given by Thompson, Perkins, James, Auchinleck, Armstrong, Christy, Ingersoll, and others; Whiting's Biography of Pike; Hough's County histories; Roger's Canadian History; Smith's Canada; Cooper's Naval History; Niles' Register; the Portfolio; the Analectic Magazine; he had some manuscripts of actors in the scene, besides various verbal relations; and he went over the ground in person. In the following sketch I shall lean more heavily upon Lossing than upon Whiting; but for numerous particulars shall refer back of both to contemporaneous records and official reports, on both sides. I shall also adduce a certain obscure author, P. Finan, who is among those who witnessed the fight, and who describes what he saw in his little-known Journal of a Voyage to Quebec in the Year 1825, with Recollections of Canada during the late American War in the Years 1812-13, Newry, printed by Alexander Peacock, 1828. H. A. Fay's Collection of Official Documents, etc., 1 vol., 8vo, New York, 1817, gives General Dearborn's and Commodore Chauncey's reports to the Secretary of War and of the Navy, respectively, and the terms of the capitulation after the capture. Brannan's Official Letters, etc., 1 vol., 8vo, Washington, 1823, gives in full Pike's vigorous and rigorous brigade order, pp. 144-146; the reports said of Dearborn and of Chauncey; and various other items. These and many other materials are also contained in earlier form in Niles' Weekly Register, IV. Mar.-Sept., 1813. What here follows is derived mainly from the sources I have thus indicated, but also includes a certified copy of the most important one of the original Sheaffe documents in the Archives of Ontario at Ottawa.
General Pike's brigade order for the attack on York appears as follows in Niles' Register, IV. pp. 229, 230:
Sackett's Harbor, April 25, 1813.
Brigade Order. When the debarkation shall take place on the enemy's shore, Major Forsyth's light troops, formed in four platoons, shall be first landed. They will advance a small distance from the shore, and form the chain to cover the landing of the troops. They will not fire unless they discover the approach of a body of the enemy, but will make prisoners of every person who may be passing, and send them to the general. They will be followed by the regimental platoons of the first brigade, with two pieces of Brooks' artillery, one on the right and one on the left flank, covered by their musketry, and the small detachments of riflemen of the 15th and 16th Infantry. Then will be landed the three platoons of the reserve of the first brigade, under Major Swan.[M-17] Then Major Eustis, with his train of artillery, covered by his own musketry. Then Colonel M'Clure's volunteers, in four platoons, followed by the 21st regiment, in six platoons. When the troops shall move in column, either to meet the enemy or take a position, it will be in the following order, viz.: First, Forsyth's riflemen, with proper front and flank guards; the regiments of the first brigade, with their pieces; then three platoons of reserve; Major Eustis' train of artillery; volunteer corps; 21st regiment; each corps sending out proper flank guards. When the enemy shall be discovered in front, the riflemen will form the chain, and maintain their ground until they have the signal (the preparative) or receive orders to retire, at which they will retreat with the greatest velocity, and form equally on the two flanks of the regiments of the first brigade, and then renew their fire. The three reserve platoons of this line under the orders of Major Swan, 100 yards in the rear of the colors, ready to support any part which may show an unsteady countenance. Major Eustis and his train will form in the rear of this reserve, ready to act where circumstances may dictate.
The second line will be composed of the 21st Infantry in six platoons, flanked by Colonel M'Clure's volunteers, equally divided as light troops. The whole under the orders of Colonel Ripley.[M-18]
It is expected that every corps will be mindful of the honor of the American arms, and the disgraces which have recently tarnished our arms; and endeavor, by a cool and determined discharge of their duty, to support the one and wipe off the other. The riflemen in front will maintain their ground at all hazards, until ordered to retire, as will every corps of the army. With an assurance of being duly supported, should the commanding general find it prudent to withdraw the front line, he will give orders to retire by the heads of platoons, covered by the riflemen; and the second line will advance by the heads of platoons, pass the intervals, and form the line, call in the light troops, and renew the action. But the general may find it proper to bring up the second line on one or both flanks, to charge in columns, or perform a variety of manœuvres which it would be impossible to foresee. But as a general rule, whatever may be the directions of lines at the commencement of the action, the corps will form as before directed. If they then advance in line, it may be in parallel eschelons of platoons, or otherwise, as the ground or circumstances may dictate.
No man will load until ordered, except the light troops in front until within a short distance of the enemy, and then charge bayonets; thus letting the enemy see that we can meet them in their own weapons. Any man firing or quitting his post without orders, must be put to instant death, as an example may be necessary. Platoon officers will pay the greatest attention to the coolness and aim of their men in the fire; their regularity and dressing in the charge. Courage and bravery in the field do not more distinguish the soldier than humanity after victory; and whatever examples the savage allies of our enemies may have given us, the general confidently hopes that the blood of an unresisting or yielding enemy will never stain the weapons of the soldiers of his column.
The unoffending citizens of Canada are many of them our own countrymen, and the poor Canadians have been forced into the war. Their property must therefore be held sacred, and any soldier who shall so far neglect the honor of his profession as to be guilty of plundering the inhabitants, shall, if convicted, be punished with death. But the commanding general assures the troops that, should they capture a large quantity of public stores, he will use his best endeavors to procure them a reward from his government.
This order shall be read at the head of each corps and every field officer shall carry a copy, in order that he may at any moment refer to it; and give explanations to his subordinates.
All those found in arms in the enemy's country, shall be treated as enemies; but those who are peaceably following the pursuits of their various avocations, friends—and their property respected.
By order of Brigadier-general Z. M. Pike.
Charles G. Jones,[M-19]
Assistant aid-de-camp.
Of quite another character than the foregoing order is the next word which reaches us from General Pike—probably from the last letter he ever wrote. It is always the soldier, but now the son and not the officer who speaks, in this letter addressed to his father. The extract is undated and unsigned, but was penned at Brownsville, near Sackett's Harbor, on the day before the expedition sailed from the latter place. I cite from Niles' Register of Saturday, July 10th, 1813, p. 304, these affecting passages:
"I embark to-morrow in the fleet at Sackett's Harbor, at the head of a column of 1,500 choice troops, on a secret expedition. If success attends my steps, honor and glory await my name—if defeat, still shall it be said we died like brave men, and conferred honor, even in death, on the American name.
"Should I be the happy mortal destined to turn the scale of war, will you not rejoice, O my father? May Heaven be propitious, and smile on the cause of my country. But if we are destined to fall, may my fall be like Wolfe's—to sleep in the arms of victory."
His aspiration was answered, for he turned the scale of war; his dream of glory came true, for he fell asleep, like Wolfe, in the arms of victory!
Commodore Isaac Chauncey's fleet, which conveyed the American troops from Sackett's Harbor to York, consisted of 14 vessels: the Madison, flagship; Oneida, Fair American, Hamilton, Governor Tompkins, Conquest, Asp, Pert, Julia, Growler, Ontario, Scourge, Lady of the Lake, and the transport Raven.
On that fateful 27th of April, 1813, about seven o'clock in the morning, when this fleet had reached York, the intention was to land the troops at old Fort Rouillé, whence the advance to the assault of Fort York would have been only about a mile, along the lake front, over the level ground of present Garrison Common. But a strong east wind drove the boats "a considerable distance" leeward, to some wooded point in the direction of the Humber. Exactly how far this was does not appear; but there is evidence that it was not more than some fraction of a mile—probably not as far west of Fort Rouillé as the latter was west of Fort York. General Dearborn says, "about a mile and a half" from Fort York, which would be about half a mile west of Fort Rouillé; and the place called Grenadier Point has been named in this connection. Doubtless the whole of the troops were not landed at precisely the same spot. General Dearborn remained with the fleet, which was to bombard York after landing the troops under the command of General Pike. The former's official report to Hon. John Armstrong, Secretary of War, dated Headquarters, York, Upper Canada, Apr. 28th, 1813, includes this passage (Brannan, p. 149):
I had been induced to confide the immediate command of the troops in action to General Pike, from a conviction that he fully expected it, and would be much mortified at being deprived of the honor, which he highly appreciated.
As rendered in Niles' Register, IV. p. 179, it is to the same effect, but somewhat differently worded:
To the general I had been induced to confide the immediate attack, from a knowledge that it was his wish and that he would have been mortified had it not been given to him.
We will hear from Pike himself once more before he falls. It is before any landing has been effected. Forsyth's boats are nearing the shore; they are fired upon from the woods, but have not yet answered a shot. Pike is standing on the deck of the flagship, surrounded by his staff, straining his eager eyes impatiently at the boats, which he sees have been driven beyond the intended point of debarkation. "'By God! I can't stay here any longer!' and addressing himself to his staff—'Come, jump into the boat!' which we immediately did, the commodore having reserved a boat specially for him and his suite; the little coxswain was ordered immediately to steer for the middle of the fray, and the balls whistled gloriously around; probably their number was owing to seeing so many officers in one boat; but we laughed at their clumsy efforts as we pressed forward with well-pulled oars."[M-20]
The first troops which effected a landing were Forsyth's[M-21] Rifles, conveyed in two boats. Their debarkation was promptly resisted by a choice body of light troops from Fort York, consisting of a company of Glengary Fencibles, with some Indians, under Major Givens. From an advantageous position in the woods which had been taken up, the enemy opened a galling fire as our troops left the boats. Concerning this opening engagement I cite Whiting, pp. 300-303:
The riflemen were formed on the bank as promptly as possible, when the boats returned to the fleet for other troops. In the meantime, this gallant little band, assisted by some few other troops that were thrown on shore in other boats, sustained the brunt of the combat. The numbers in this initial struggle were about equal, and it became a fair and close fight, to be turned either way as re-enforcements should happen to arrive. The British light troops were choice men, and commanded by a brave officer.
Forsyth's men were undisciplined, but had seen some desultory service on the Ogdensburg frontier, and had unbounded confidence in their leader, who was rather an extraordinary man, and regarded as a most promising partisan officer. He had peculiar notions as to the manner of training men. The common rules of discipline were looked upon by him with the utmost contempt. All he seemed to require of those under him was, that they should be good marksmen, and ready to follow him....
At the time of this expedition, Major Forsyth was a fat man, probably weighing some 200 pounds. The uniform of his men was green, and, at the time he landed, he wore a broad-skirted coat of that color, which was unbuttoned and thrown back, displaying a white vest spread over his ample chest, that afforded a mark for an enemy equal to the chalked circle of a common infantry target. He had on his head a broad-brimmed black hat. Soon after the landing, the armorer of his regiment, a favorite of both himself and his men, was killed. The skill of this man was such as enabled him to give the rifle its most deadly character; and the efficiency of the regiment was consequently supposed, both by officers and men, to depend much upon him. When he fell, every man felt as if a deed had been perpetrated by the enemy that demanded revenge; and the whole detachment, from Major Forsyth down to the most indifferent marksman, entered into the combat with a fierce spirit of retaliation that, no doubt, contributed much to the obstinacy of the stand they made, and the unusual loss sustained by the enemy immediately opposed to them.
Taking to the woods in which the British light troops were posted, the riflemen, after their loose manner, placed themselves behind trees, and thus carried on the contest with their more concentrated, better ordered, and, therefore, more exposed opponents. It is said that Major Forsyth continued, throughout the action, to move to and fro, armed only with a light sword, immediately in the rear of his men, pointing out with an earnest solemnity that partook both of sorrow and anger, to one rifleman and another, some one of the enemy, and exclaiming that he was the man who had killed the favorite armorer. This suggestion was almost sure to be fatal to the enemy thus specially branded with the guilt of having taken off the best man of the corps. The British light troops were nearly all left on the ground they first occupied, being too strong to retreat while the landing was only partially made, and too much exposed to stand before such expertness of aim, rendered so fierce and unyielding by one of the chance shots of an opening fight.
The force under Forsyth was soon supported by Major King's[M-22] battalion of the 15th Infantry, consisting of three companies—Captain John Scott's, Captain White Youngs', and that of Captain John Lambert Hoppock, who had been mortally wounded in the boats. When General Pike had landed with the whole body of his troops, the attacking force was represented by the 6th, 15th, 16th, and 21st Infantry, Colonel Maclure's 3d regiment of New York Militia, and several pieces of artillery.
At the first sharp collision, as we have seen, the British were defeated, not without much loss on both sides. On their retreat, the bugles sounded the advance, and the troops pressed forward along the lake shore toward Fort York, which was meanwhile bombarded from the fleet. One of General Pike's staff says: "Our march was by the lake road in sections, but the route was so much intersected by streams and rivulets, the bridges over which had been destroyed by the enemy as they retreated, that we were considerably retarded in our progress. We collected logs, and by severe efforts at length contrived to pass over one field piece and a howitzer, which were placed at the head of our column, in charge of Captain Fanning[M-23] of the 3d Artillery; and thus we proceeded through a spacious wood, as we emerged from which we were saluted by a battery of 24-pounders. The general then ordered one of his aids (Fraser) and a sergeant to proceed to the right of the battery, in order to discover how many men were in the works. We did so, and reported to him the number, and that they were spiking their own guns. The general immediately ordered Captain Walworth of the 16th [sic] with his company of grenadiers to make the assault. Walworth gallantly ordered his men to trail arms and advance at the accelerated pace; but at the moment when they were ordered to recover and charge the enemy, the enemy broke in the utmost confusion, leaving several men wounded on the ground which they abandoned."
This first serious obstacle to Pike's advance was the Western battery already described, p. lxxvii, where the explosion occurred before Captain Walworth[M-24] could carry out the order to charge this work. This accident caused some loss of life to the defenders, but none to the assaulters. Lossing has, concerning it:
The wooden magazine of the battery, that had been carelessly left open, blew up, killing some of the men, and seriously damaging the defences. The dismayed enemy spiked their cannon and fled to the next, or Half Moon battery. Walworth pressed forward, when that, too, was abandoned, and he found nothing within but spiked cannon. Sheaffe and his little army, deserted by the Indians, fled to the garrison near the governor's house, and there opened fire upon the Americans. Pike ordered his troops to halt, and lie flat upon the grass, while Major Eustis,[M-25] with his artillery battery, moved to the front, and soon silenced the great guns of the enemy.
Finan is more circumstantial in describing the casualty which did so much to decide the fate of the day:
While this part of our force was contending with the enemy in the woods, an unfortunate accident occurred in the battery opposed to the fleet which proved a death blow to the little hope that might have been entertained of a successful issue to the proceedings of the day. A gun was aimed at one of the vessels, and the officers, desirous of seeing if the ball would take effect, ascended the bastion: In the meantime the artilleryman, waiting for the word of command to fire, held the match behind him, as is usual under such circumstances; and the traveling magazine, a large wooden chest, containing cartridges for the great guns, being open just at his back, he unfortunately put the match into it and the consequence, as may be supposed, was dreadful indeed! Every man in the battery was blown into the air, and the dissection of the greater part of their bodies was inconceivably shocking! The officers were thrown from the bastion by the shock, but escaped with a few bruises; the cannons were dismounted, and consequently the battery was rendered completely useless.
I was standing at the gate of the garrison when the poor soldiers who escaped the explosion with a little life remaining, were brought in to the hospital, and a more afflicting sight could scarcely be witnessed. Their faces were completely black, resembling those of the blackest Africans; their hair frizzled like theirs, and their clothes scorched and emitting an effluvia so strong as to be perceived long before they reached one. One man in particular presented an awful spectacle: he was brought in a wheelbarrow, and from his appearance I should be inclined to suppose that almost every bone in his body was broken; he was lying in a powerless heap, shaking about with every motion of the barrow, from which his legs hung dangling down, as if only connected with his body by the skin, while his cries and groans were of the most heart-rending description.
Although Spartan valour was evinced by our little party, it proved unavailing against the numbers that pressed them upon all sides; and in consequence of the loss of the battery, and the reduction that had been made in the number of our troops, their ground was no longer tenable; but after nobly and desperately withstanding their enemies for several hours, a retreat towards the garrison became inevitable, although every inch of the ground was obstinately disputed.
It is remarkable that Whiting's relation of the attack has nothing about this marked affair; it is in fact impossible to follow the course of events in his narrative, between the conclusion of the opening engagement and the final explosion of the main magazine. Lossing, having brought our troops to a halt, when they were lying upon the grass, continues with the result of Major Eustis' operations:
The firing from the garrison ceased and the Americans expected every moment to see a white flag displayed from the blockhouse in token of surrender. Lieut. Riddle[M-26] was sent forward to reconnoitre. General Pike, who had just assisted, with his own hands, in removing a wounded soldier to a comfortable place, was sitting upon a stump conversing with a huge British sergeant[M-27] who had been taken prisoner, his staff standing around him. At that moment was felt a sudden tremor of the ground, followed by a tremendous explosion near the British garrison. The enemy, despairing of holding the place, had blown up their powder magazine, situated upon the edge of the water at the mouth of a ravine, near where the buildings of the Great Western Railway stand. The effect was terrible. Fragments of timber, and huge stones of which the magazine walls were built, were scattered in every direction over a space of several hundred yards. When the smoke floated away, the scene was appalling. Fifty-two Americans lay dead, and 180 were wounded. So badly had the affair been managed that 40 of the British also lost their lives by the explosion.[M-28]
General Armstrong states, in his History of the War of 1812, that General Sheaffe said this explosion was accidental, his own soldiers having been involved in its effects. General Whiting repeats this. But both Armstrong and Whiting are clearly in error. If General Sheaffe ever said this, he said what he knew was untrue. His words—such as they may have been—may have referred to the earlier explosion at the Western battery and been mistaken to apply to the main explosion. We have his own reiterated writings, that the magazine was exploded by his order. One of these statements is made in a hurried letter, whose almost illegible handwriting betrays the state of mind to which this gentleman had been reduced. It was written while he was on his retreat to Kingston, and is addressed to his superior officer, Sir George Prevost. The published text before me reads in part as follows (italics editorial):