13 In the mean time, the consul, not to lie inactive in the enemies’ country, sent Marcus Popilius, with five thousand men, to reduce the city of Melibœa. This city stands at the foot of the Mount Ossa, where it stretches out into Thessaly, and is very advantageously situated for commanding Demetrias. The first approach of the enemy struck terror into the inhabitants of the place; but soon recovering from the fright occasioned by the unexpectedness of the event, they ran hastily in arms to the gates and walls, where an entrance was apprehended, and at once put a stop to all hope of taking the place by the first assault. Preparations were therefore made for a siege, and the works commenced for making the approaches. When Perseus was informed that both Melibœa was being besieged by the consul’s army, and that the fleet at the same time was lying at Iolcos, intending to proceed thence to attack Demetrias, he sent Euphranor, one of his generals, with two thousand chosen men, to Melibœa. His orders were, that, if he could compel the Romans to retire from before Melibœa, he should then march secretly into Demetrias, before the enemy should bring up their troops from Iolcos to that city. As soon as he suddenly became visible on the high grounds to the besiegers of Melibœa, they abandoned their numerous works in great consternation, and set them on fire. Thus they withdrew from Melibœa, and Euphranor, having raised the siege of one city, marched instantly to Demetrias. Then the townsmen felt confident that they should be able, not only to defend their walls, but to protect their lands also from depredations; and they made several irruptions on the straggling parties of the plunderers, not without injury to the enemy. However, the prætor and the king rode round the walls to view the situation of the city, and try whether they might attempt it on any side, either by storm or works. It was reported, that some overtures of friendship between Eumenes and Perseus were here agitated, through Cydas, a Cretan, and Antimachus, governor of Demetrias. It is certain, that the armies retired from Demetrias. Eumenes sailed to the consul; and, after congratulating him on his success in penetrating into Macedonia, went home to Pergamus. Marcius Figulus, the prætor, having sent part of his fleet to winter at Sciathus, with the remainder repaired to Oreum in Eubœa; judging that the most convenient city from which he could send supplies to the armies in Macedonia and Thessaly. There are very different accounts given respecting king Eumenes: if Valerius Antias is to be believed, he neither gave any assistance with his fleet to the prætor, though often solicited by letters; nor did he depart from the consul for Asia in good humour, being offended at not being permitted to lie in the same camp with him; he says too, that he could not be prevailed on even to leave the Gallic horsemen that he had brought with him. But his brother Attalus remained with the consul, and in the constant tenor of his conduct evinced a sincere attachment, and an extraordinary degree of zeal and activity in the service.

14 While the war was being carried on in Macedonia, ambassadors came to Rome, from a chieftain of the Gauls beyond the Alps, whose name is said to have been Balanos, but of what tribe is not mentioned. They brought an offer of assistance towards the war in Macedonia. The senate returned him thanks, and sent him presents,—a golden chain of two pounds weight, golden bowls to the amount of four pounds, a horse completely caparisoned, and a suit of horseman’s armour. After the Gauls, ambassadors from Pamphylia, brought into the senate-house a golden crown, of the value of twenty thousand Philippeans, and requested permission to deposit it, as an offering, in the shrine of Jupiter supremely good and great, and to offer sacrifice in the Capitol, which was granted. The said ambassadors having expressed a wish to renew the treaty of friendship, a gracious answer was given, and a present was made to each of two thousand asses.89 Then audience was given to the ambassadors of king Prusias; and, a little after, to those of the Rhodians, who discoursed on the same subject, but in a widely different manner. The purpose of both embassies was, to effect a peace with king Perseus. The address of Prusias consisted of entreaties rather than demands; for he declared, that “he had hitherto supported the cause of the Romans, and would continue to support it as long as the war should continue. But, on Perseus sending ambassadors to him, on the subject of putting an end to the war with Rome, he had promised them to become a mediator with the senate:” and he requested that, “if they could prevail on themselves to lay aside their resentment, they would place him in the favourable position of mediator of the peace.” Such was the discourse of the king’s ambassadors. The Rhodians, after ostentatiously recounting their many services to the Roman people, and arrogating to themselves rather the greater share of its successes, particularly in the case of king Antiochus, proceeded in this manner; that, “at a time when peace subsisted between the Macedonians and Romans, they likewise commenced a friendship with king Perseus, which they had, since, unwillingly broken, without having any reason to complain of him, but merely because it was the desire of the Romans to draw them into a confederacy in the war, that for three years past they had felt many inconveniences from that war. In consequence of the interruption of commerce, and the loss of their port duties and provisions, their island was distressed by a general scarcity. When their countrymen could no longer suffer this, they had sent other ambassadors into Macedonia, to Perseus, to announce to him that it was the wish of the Rhodians that he should conclude a peace with the Romans, and had sent them to Rome with the same message. The Rhodians would afterwards consider what measures they should judge proper to be taken against either party that should prevent an end being put to the war.” I am convinced that no person, even at the present time, can hear or read such expressions without indignation; we may, then, easily judge what was the state of mind of the senators when they listened to them.

15 According to the account of Claudius, no answer was given; and a decree of the senate only was read, by which the Roman people ordered, that the Carians and Lycians should enjoy independence; and that a letter should be sent immediately to each of those nations, acquainting them therewith. On hearing which the principal ambassador, whose arrogant demeanour, just before, the senate could scarce contain, fell down insensible. Other writers say, that an answer was given to this effect: “That, at the commencement of the present war, the Roman people had learned, from unquestionable authority, that the Rhodians, in concert with king Perseus, had formed secret machinations against their commonwealth; and that, if that matter had been doubtful hitherto, the words of their ambassadors, just now, had reduced it to a certainty; as, in general, treachery, though at first sufficiently cautious, yet, in the end, betrays itself. Were the Rhodians now to act the part of arbiters of war and peace throughout the world? were the Romans at their nod to take up arms and lay them down? and henceforth to appeal, not to the gods, but to the Rhodians, for their sanction of treaties? And was this indeed the case, that, unless their orders were obeyed, and the armies withdrawn from Macedonia, they would consider what measures they should take? What the Rhodians might determine, they themselves knew best; but the Roman people, as soon as the conquest of Perseus should be completed, an event which they hoped was at no great distance, would most certainly consider how to make due retribution to each state, according to its deserts in the course of the war.” Nevertheless the usual presents of two thousand asses each were sent to the ambassadors, which they did not accept.

16 Then was read a letter from the consul, Quintus Marcius, informing the senate, that “he had passed the mountains, and penetrated into Macedonia; that the prætor had collected there, and procured from other places, stores of provisions for the approaching winter; and that he had brought from the Epirots twenty thousand measures of wheat, ten thousand of barley, the price of which he desired might be paid to their ambassadors in Rome: that clothing for the troops must be sent from Rome; and that he wanted about two hundred horses, above all Numidian horses; where he was, he could procure none.” The senate decreed, that every thing should be done in accordance with the consul’s letter. The prætor, Caius Sulpicius, agreed with contractors for conveying into Macedonia six thousand gowns, thirty thousand tunics, and the horses, all to be left to the approbation of the consul; and he paid the Epirot ambassadors the price of the corn. He then introduced to the senate, Onesimus, son of Pytho, a Macedonian of distinction. He had always advised the king to peaceable measures, and recommended to him, that, as his father Philip had, to the last day of his life, made it an established rule to read over twice every day the treaty concluded with the Romans, so he should, if not daily, yet frequently, observe the same practice. When he could not dissuade him from war, he at first began to absent himself on various pretences, that he might not be present at proceedings which he could not approve. But at last, having discovered that suspicions were harboured against him, and that he was tacitly accused of the crime of treason, he went over to the Romans, and was of great service to the consul. When he was introduced into the senate-house, he mentioned these circumstances, and the senate thereupon decreed that he should be enrolled in the number of their allies; that a house and accommodations should be provided for him; also a grant of two hundred acres of land, in that part of the Tarentine territory which was the public property of the Roman people; and a house in Tarentum to be bought for him; the charge of executing all which was committed to Caius Decimius, the prætor. On the ides of December, the censors performed the general survey with more severity than formerly. A great many were deprived of their horses, among whom was Publius Rutilius, who, when tribune of the people, had carried on a violent prosecution against them; he was, besides, degraded from his tribe, and disfranchised. In pursuance of a decree of the senate, one-half of the taxes of that year was paid by the quæstors into the hands of the censors, to defray the expenses of public works. Tiberius Sempronius, out of the money assigned to him, purchased for the public the house of Publius Africanus, behind the old house, near the statue of Vertumnus, with the butchers’ stalls and shops adjoining; where he built the public court-house, afterwards called the Sempronian.

17 The end of the year was now approaching, and people chiefly canvassed in their conversation, through their concern about the war in Macedonia, what consuls they should choose, to bring that war, at length, to a conclusion. The senate therefore passed an order, that Cneius Servilius should come home, at the very first opportunity, to hold the elections. Sulpicius, the prætor, sent the order of the senate to the consul; and, in a few days after, read his answer in public, wherein he promised to be in the city before the * * day of * * *. The consul came in due time, and the election was finished on the day appointed. The consuls chosen were, Lucius Æmilius Paullus, a second time, fourteen years after his first consulship, and Caius Licinius Crassus. Next day, the following were appointed prætors: Cneius Bæbius Tamphilus, Lucius Anicius Gallus, Cneius Octavius, Publius Fonteius Balbus, Marcus Æbutius Elva, and Caius Papirius Corbo. The senate’s anxiety about the Macedonian war stimulated them to more than ordinary expedition in all their proceedings; they therefore ordered, that the magistrates elect should immediately cast lots for their provinces, that it might be known which consul was to have the command in Macedonia, and which prætor that of the fleet; in order that they might, without loss of time, consider and prepare whatever was requisite for the service, and consult the senate on any point where their direction was necessary, they voted, that, “on the magistrates coming into office, the Latin festival should be celebrated as early as the rules of religion permitted; and that the consul who was to go into Macedonia should not be detained on account of it.” When these orders were passed, Italy and Macedonia were named as the provinces for the consuls; and for the prætors, besides the two jurisdictions in the city, the fleet, Spain, Sicily, and Sardinia. As to the consuls, Macedonia fell to Æmilius, Italy to Licinius. Of the prætors, Cneius Bæbius got the city jurisdiction; Lucius Anicius the foreign, under a rule to go wherever the senate should direct; Cneius Octavius, the fleet; Publius Fonteius, Spain; Marcus Æbutius, Sicily; and Caius Papirius, Sardinia.

18 It immediately became evident to all, that Lucius Æmilius would prosecute the war with vigour; for, besides that he was a different kind of man (from his predecessors), his thoughts were intently employed night and day solely on the business relative to that war. In the first place, he requested the senate to send commissioners into Macedonia, to review the armies and the fleet, and to bring authentic information as to what might be necessary both for the land and sea forces; to make what discoveries they could respecting the state of the king’s forces; and to learn how much of the country was in our power, how much in that of the enemy; whether the Romans were still encamped among the woods and mountains, or had got clear of all the difficult passes, and were come down into the plains; who appeared to be faithful allies to us, who were doubtful and suspended their fidelity on fortune, and who avowed enemies; what store of provisions was prepared, and whence new supplies might be brought by land-carriage, whence by the fleet; and what had been achieved during the last campaign, either on land or sea. For he thought that, by gaining a thorough knowledge of all these particulars, decisive plans might be taken for future proceedings. The senate directed the consul Cneius Servilius to send as commissioners, into Macedonia, such persons as should be approved of by Luciua Æmilius. Cneius Domitius Ahenobarbus, Aulus Licinius Nerva, and Lucius Bæbius, accordingly, began their journey two days after. Towards the close of this year it was reported that two showers of stones had fallen, one in the territory of Rome, the other in that of Veii; and the nine days’ solemnity was performed. Of the priests, died this year, Publius Quintilius Varus, flamen of Mars, and Marcus Claudius Marcellus, decemvir, in whose room was substituted Cneius Octavius. It has been remarked as an instance of the increasing munificence of the times, that in the Circensian games, exhibited by Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica and Publius Lentulus, curule ædiles, sixty-three panthers, with forty bears and elephants, made a part of the show.

19 At the beginning of the following year, Lucius Æmilius Paullus and Caius Licinius, the consuls, having commenced their administration on the ides of March, the senators were impatient to hear what propositions were to be laid before them, particularly with respect to Macedonia, by the consul to whose lot that province had fallen; but Paullus said, that he had as yet nothing to propose to them, the commissioners not being returned: that “they were then at Brundusium, after having been twice driven back to Dyrrachium in attempting the passage: that he intended, shortly, to propose something to their consideration, when he should have obtained the information which was previously necessary, and which he expected within very few days.” He added, that, “in order that nothing should delay his setting out, the day before the ides of April had been fixed for the Latin festival; after finishing which solemnity, he and Cneius Octavius would begin their journey as soon as the senate should direct: that, in his absence, his colleague Caius Licinius would take care that every thing necessary to be provided, or sent for the war, should be provided and sent; and that, in the mean time, audience might be given to the embassies of foreign nations.” The first introduced were ambassadors from Alexandria, sent by king Ptolemy and queen Cleopatra. They came into the senate-house dressed in mourning, with their hair and beard neglected, holding in their hands branches of olive; there they prostrated themselves, and their discourse was even more piteous than their dress. Antiochus, king of Syria, who had formerly been a hostage at Rome, had lately, under the honourable pretext of restoring the elder Ptolemy to the throne, made war on his younger brother, who was then in possession of Alexandria; and having gained the victory in a sea-fight off Pelusium, and thrown a temporary bridge across the Nile, he led over his army, and was terrifying Alexandria itself, by laying siege to it; so that he seemed almost on the point of taking possession of that very opulent kingdom. The ambassadors, after complaining of these proceedings, besought the senate to succour those princes, the faithful friends of their empire. They said, that “such had been the kindness of the Roman people to Antiochus, such its influence over all kings and nations, that if they only sent ambassadors, to give him notice that the senate were displeased at war being made with princes in alliance with them, he would instantly retire from the walls of Alexandria, and lead his army home into Syria. But if they hesitated to do this Ptolemy and Cleopatra would soon come to Rome as exiles from their kingdom, which must excite some degree of shame in the Roman people, for not having brought them assistance in their extreme distress.” The senate, affected by the supplications of the Alexandrians, immediately sent Caius Popilius Lænas, Caius Decimius, and Caius Hostilius, ambassadors, to put an end to the dispute between those kings. Their instructions were, to go first to Antiochus, then to Ptolemy; and to acquaint them, that, unless hostilities were stopped, whichever party persisted, must expect to be considered by the senate as neither a friend nor an ally.

20 These ambassadors set out, within three days, in company with those of Alexandria; and, on the last day of the feast of Minerva, the commissioners arrived from Macedonia. Their coming had been so impatiently wished for, that, if it had not been very late in the day, the consuls would have assembled the senate immediately. Next day the senate met, and the commissioners had an audience. They stated, that “the army had been led through pathless and difficult wilds into Macedonia, with more risk than advantage: that Pieria, to which its march had been directed, was then possessed by the king; and the two camps so close to each other, as to be separated only by the river Enipeus: that the king offered no opportunity to fight, nor were our men strong enough to compel him; and, besides, that the winter had unexpectedly interrupted all military operations: that the soldiers were maintained in idleness, and had not corn sufficient for more than six days: that the force of the Macedonians was said to amount to thirty thousand effective men: that if Appius Claudius had a sufficient force at Lychnidus, the king might be perplexed by a twofold hostile array; but that, as the case stood, both Appius, and the troops under his command, were in the utmost danger, unless either a regular army were speedily sent thither, or they were removed thence. “From the camp,” they stated that “they had gone to the fleet; where they learned, that part of the seamen had perished by sickness; that others, particularly such as came from Sicily, had gone off to their own homes; and that the ships were in want of men, while those who were on board had neither received pay nor had clothing: that Eumenes and his fleet, as if driven thither by the wind, had both come and gone away, without any apparent reason; nor did the intentions of that king seem to be thoroughly settled.” While they reported every particular in the conduct of Eumenes as suspicious, they represented the fidelity of Attalus as stedfast in the highest degree.

21 After the commissioners were heard, Lucius Æmilius said, that he then proposed for consideration the business of the war: and the senate decreed, that “tribunes for eight legions should be appointed, half by the consuls, and half by the people; but that none should be named for that year who had not held some magisterial office: that, out of all the military tribunes, Lucius Æmilius should select such as he chose for the two legions that were to serve in Macedonia; and that, as soon as the Latin festival should be finished, the said consul, with the prætor Cneius Octavius, to whose lot the fleet had fallen, should repair to that province.” To these was added a third, Lucius Anicius, the prætor who had the foreign jurisdiction; for it was resolved that he should succeed Appius Claudius in the province of Illyria, near Lychnidus. The charge of raising recruits was laid on the consul Caius Licinius, who was ordered to enlist, of Roman citizens, seven thousand foot and two hundred horse, and to demand, from the Latin confederates, seven thousand foot and four hundred horse; and also to write to Cneius Servilius, governor of Gaul, to raise there six hundred horse. This force he was ordered to send, with all expedition, into Macedonia, to his colleague. It was resolved, that there should be no more than two legions in that province, but that their numbers should be filled up so as that each should contain six thousand foot and three hundred horse; and that the rest of the foot and horse should be placed in the different garrisons; that such men as were unfit for service should be discharged, and that the allies should be obliged to raise another body of ten thousand foot and eight hundred horse. These were assigned as a reinforcement to Anicius, in addition to the two legions which he was ordered to carry into Illyria, consisting each of five thousand two hundred foot and three hundred horse; and five thousand seamen were raised for the fleet. The consul Licinius was ordered to employ two legions in the service of his province, and to add to them ten thousand foot and six hundred horse of the allies.

22 When the senate had passed these decrees, the consul Lucius Æmilius went out from the senate-house into the assembly of the people, whom he addressed in a discourse to this effect: “Romans, I think I have perceived that your congratulations, on my obtaining, by lot, the province of Macedonia, were warmer than either when I was saluted consul, or on the day when I entered on office; and that for no other reason, than your having conceived an opinion, that by me the war with Perseus, which has been long protracted, may be brought to a conclusion becoming the majesty of the Roman people. I trust that the gods also have favoured this disposal of the lots, and will give me their aid in the conduct of affairs. Some of these consequences I can prognosticate; others I can hope for. One thing I regard as certain, and venture to affirm; that I will endeavour, by every exertion in my power, that this hope which you have conceived of me may not be frustrated. Every thing necessary for the service, the senate has ordered; and as it has been resolved, that I am to go abroad immediately, and I do not wish to delay, my colleague, Caius Licinius, an admirable man, will make the preparations with as much zeal, as if he himself were to carry on that war. Do you give full credit to whatever I shall write to you, or to the senate; but do not by your credulity encourage mere rumours, of which no man shall appear as the responsible author. For, no man is so entirely regardless of reputation, as that his spirits cannot be damped; which I have observed has commonly occurred, especially in this war. In every circle, and, truly, at every table, there are people who lead armies into Macedonia; who know where the camp ought to be placed; what posts ought to be occupied by troops; when and through what pass Macedonia should be entered; where magazines should be formed; how provisions should be conveyed by land and sea; and when it is proper to engage the enemy, when to lie quiet. And they not only determine what is best to be done, but if any thing is done in any other manner than what they have pointed out, they arraign the consul, as if he were on his trial. These are great impediments to those who have the management of affairs; for every one cannot encounter injurious reports with the same constancy and firmness of mind as Fabius did, who chose to let his own authority be diminished through the folly of the people, rather than to mismanage the public business with a high reputation. I am not one of those who think that commanders ought never to receive advice; on the contrary, I should deem that man more proud than wise, who did every thing of his own single judgment. What then is my opinion? That commanders should be counselled, chiefly, by persons of known talent; by those, especially, who are skilled in the art of war, and who have been taught by experience; and next, by those who are present at the scene of action, who see the country, who see the enemy; who see the advantages that occasions offer, and who, embarked, as it were, in the same ship, are sharers of the danger. If, therefore, any one thinks himself qualified to give advice respecting the war which I am to conduct, which may prove advantageous to the public, let him not refuse his assistance to the state, but let him come with me into Macedonia. He shall be furnished by me with a ship, a horse, a tent; and even with his travelling charges. But if he thinks this too much trouble, and prefers the repose of a city life to the toils of war, let him not, on land, assume the office of a pilot. The city, in itself, furnishes abundance of topics for conversation; let it confine its passion for talking, and rest assured, that we shall be content with such councils as shall be framed within our camp.” Soon after this speech, the Latin festival having been celebrated on the day before the calends of April, and the sacrifice on the mount affording favourable omens, the consul, and Cneius Octavius, the prætor, set out directly for Macedonia. There is a tradition that the consul, at his departure, was escorted by multitudes unusually numerous; and that people, with confident hope, presaged a conclusion of the Macedonian war, and the speedy return of the consul, to a glorious triumph.

23 During these occurrences in Italy, Perseus, though he could not, at first, prevail on himself to complete the design which he had projected, of attaching to himself Gentius, king of Illyria, on account of the money which would be demanded for it; yet, when he found that the Romans had penetrated the passes, and that the final crisis of the war drew near, resolved to defer it no longer, and having, by his ambassador Hippias, consented to pay three thousand talents of silver,90 provided hostages were given on both sides; he now sent Pantauchus, one of his most trusty friends, to conclude the business. Pantauchus met the Illyrian king at Meteo, in the province of Labeas, and there received from the king his oath and the hostages. Gentius likewise sent an ambassador, named Olympio, to require an oath and hostages from Perseus. Together with him, were sent persons to receive the money; and by the advice of Pantauchus, to go to Rhodes with ambassadors from Macedonia. Parmenio and Morcus were appointed. Their instructions were, first, to receive the king’s oath, the hostages, and money; and then to proceed to Rhodes; and it was hoped, that, by the name of the two kings, the Rhodians might be incited to a war against Rome, and that the union of that state, which alone at that time possessed naval glory, would leave the Romans no prospect of success, either on land or sea. As the Illyrians approached, Perseus marched with all his cavalry, from his camp on the Enipeus, and met them at Dium. There the articles agreed on were executed; a body of cavalry having been drawn up around, whom the king chose should be witness to the treaty of alliance made with Gentius, supposing that this event would add greatly to their confidence. The hostages were given and taken in the sight of all; those who were to receive the money were sent to Pella, where the king’s treasure lay; and the persons who were to go to Rhodes, with the Illyrian ambassadors, were ordered to take ship at Thessalonica. There was present one Metrodorus, who had lately come from Rhodes, and who, on the authority of Dinon and Polyaratus, two principal members of that state, affirmed, that the Rhodians were prepared for the war; he was appointed head of the joint embassy with the Illyrians.

24 At this time Perseus sent to Eumenes and Antiochus, a common message, which the state of affairs seemed to suggest that “a free state, and a king, were, in their natures, hostile to each other. That the Roman people were accustomed to attack kings singly; and, what was more shameful, to conquer them, by the power of other kings. Thus, his father was overpowered by the aid of Attalus; and by the assistance of Eumenes, and of his father Philip, in part, Antiochus had been vanquished; and now, both Eumenes and Prusias were armed against himself. If the regal power should be abolished in Macedonia, the next, in their way, would be Asia, which they had already rendered, in part, their own, under the pretence of liberating the states; and next to that Syria. Already Prusias was honoured by them, far beyond Eumenes; and already Antiochus, though victorious, was debarred from Egypt, the prize of his arms.” He desired that each of them, “considering these matters seriously, should see that he either compelled the Romans to make peace with him, or, if they should persist in such an unjust war, he should regard them as the common enemies of all kings.” The message to Antiochus was sent openly; the ambassador to Eumenes went under the pretence of ransoming prisoners. But some more secret business was transacted between them, which, in addition to the jealousy and distrust already conceived by the Romans against Eumenes, brought on him charges of a heavier nature. For they considered him as a traitor, and nearly as an enemy, while the two kings laboured to overreach each other in schemes of fraud and avarice. There was a Cretan, called Cydas, an intimate of Eumenes; this man had formerly conferred, at Amphipolis, with one Chimarus, a countryman of his own, serving in the army of Perseus; and he, afterwards, had had one interview with Menecrates, and another with Archidamus, officers of the king, at Demetrias, close under the wall of the town. Herophon, too, who was sent on that business, had, before that, executed two embassies to the same Eumenes. These furtive conferences and embassies were notorious; but what the subject of them was, or what agreement had taken place between the kings, remained a secret.

25 Now the truth of the matter was this: Eumenes neither wished success to Perseus nor intended to make war upon him; and his ill-will arose not so much from the enmity which they inherited from their fathers, as from the personal quarrels which had broken out between themselves. The jealousy of the two kings was not so moderate, that Eumenes could, with patience, have seen Perseus acquiring such vast power and glory as awaited him, if he conquered the Romans. Besides which, he saw that Perseus, from the commencement of the war, by every mean, sought a prospect of peace; and that every day, as the danger approached nearer, he was contriving and contemplating no other object. He considered too, that as the war had been protracted beyond the expectations of the Romans, their commanders and senate would not be averse from putting an end to a contest so inconvenient and difficult. Having discovered this inclination in both parties, he concluded, that, from the disgust of the stronger party, and the fears of the weaker, this might take place spontaneously; and therefore he the more wished, for the sake of conciliating favour to himself, to make his own efforts available in the business. He therefore, sometimes, laboured to stipulate for a consideration for not affording assistance to the Romans, either on sea or land; at other times, for bringing about a peace with them. He demanded for not interfering in the war, one thousand talents;91 for effecting a peace, one thousand five hundred;92 and for his sincerity in either case, he professed himself prepared, not only to make oath, but to give hostages also. Perseus, stimulated by his fears, showed the greatest readiness in the beginning of the negotiation, and treated without delay about receiving the hostages; when it was agreed, that, on their being received, they should be sent to Crete. But when they came to the mention of money, there he hesitated; remarking that, in the case of kings of their high character, a pecuniary consideration was mean and sordid, both with respect to the giver, and still more so with respect to the receiver. He preferred not to decline the payment in the hope of a peace with Rome, but said that he would pay the money when the business should be concluded; and that he would lodge it in the mean time in the temple of Samothrace. As that island was under his own dominion, Eumenes said, that it was all the same as if the money were at Pella; and he struggled hard to obtain some part of it at the present. Thus, having manœuvred with each other to no purpose, they gained nothing but disgrace.

26 This was not the only business which Perseus left unfinished from motives of avarice, since for a small sum of money he might have procured, through Eumenes, a secure peace, well purchased even with half of his kingdom; while, if defrauded, he might have exposed him to public view, as an enemy laden with his pelf, and made the Romans deservedly his enemies. Through this avaricious spirit the prompt alliance of king Gentius, with the assistance of a large army of Gauls, who had spread themselves through Illyria, and offered themselves to him, was lost. There came ten thousand horsemen, and the same number of footmen, who themselves kept pace with the horses, and in place of the riders who had fallen, took on the horses to the fight. They had stipulated that each horseman should receive in immediate payment, ten golden Philippics, each footman five, and their commander one thousand. Perseus went from his camp on the Enipeus with half of his forces to meet them as they approached; and issued orders through the towns and villages near the road, to prepare provisions, so that they might have plenty of corn, wine, and cattle. He brought with him some horses, trappings, and cloaks, for presents to the chiefs; and a small quantity of gold to be divided among a few; for the multitude, he supposed, might be amused with hopes. He advanced as far as the city of Almana, and encamped on the bank of the river Axius, at which time the army of the Gauls lay near Desudaba, in Mædica, waiting for the promised hire. Thither he sent Antigonus, one of his nobles, with directions, that the said army should remove their camp to Bylazor, a place in Pæonia, and that their chiefs should come to him in a body. They were at this time seventy-five miles distant from the river Axius and the king’s camp. Antigonus, in his message, told them what great plenty of every thing was provided on the road by the king’s directions, and what presents of apparel, money, and horses he intended for them on their arrival. They answered, that they would judge of those things when they saw them; at the same time asking him, whether, according to their stipulation for immediate payment, he had brought with him the gold which was to be distributed to each footman and horseman? When to this no direct answer was given, Clondicus, their prince, said, “Go back, then, and tell your king, that, unless they should have received the gold and the hostages, the Gauls would never move one step farther.” When this message was brought to the king, he called a council: and, as it was very plain what advice all the members would give; he, being a better guardian of his money than of his kingdom, began to descant on the perfidy and savage behaviour of the Gauls. “The disasters,” he said, “of many states demonstrated, that it would be dangerous to admit such a multitude into Macedonia, lest they might feel such allies more troublesome than their Roman enemies. Five thousand horsemen would be enough for them to employ in the war, and that number they need not be afraid to receive.”

27 It was sufficiently clear to all that what he feared was the paying of such a multitude, and nothing else; but as none had the courage to declare their opinion, when asked, Antigonus was sent again, with a message, that the king chose to employ only five thousand horsemen, but that he could not receive the rest of their number. When the barbarians heard this, they began to murmur, and show a great deal of anger at being brought so far from home for no purpose; but Clondicus again asked him, whether he would pay even the five thousand the hire agreed on. When he perceived that an evasive answer was given to this question also, the Gauls, dismissing the insidious envoy unhurt, which was what he himself had scarcely hoped could be his fate, returned home to the Danube, after utterly wasting such lands of Thrace as lay near their road. Now had this body of troops, while the king lay quiet on the Enipeus, been led against the Romans through the passes of Perrhæbia, into Thessaly, it might not only have stripped that country so bare, that the Romans could not expect supplies from thence; but might even have destroyed the cities themselves, while Perseus, by detaining his enemy at the Enipeus, would have put it out of their power to succour their allies. The Romans, indeed, would have been obliged to look out for their own safety, since they could neither stay where they were, after losing Thessaly, whence their army drew sustenance, nor move forward, as the camp of the Macedonians stood in their way. By this error, Perseus enlivened the hopes of the Romans, and damped not a little those of the Macedonians,93 who had depended much on that project. Through the same avarice, he alienated from him king Gentius. When he paid, at Pella, three hundred talents to the persons sent by Gentius, he allowed them to seal up the money. He then ordered ten talents to be carried to Pantauchus, and these he desired should be given immediately to the king. He ordered his people, who were carrying the rest of the money, sealed with the seals of the Illyrians, to convey it by short journeys, and when they should come to the bounds of Macedonia, to halt there, and wait for a message from him. Gentius, having received this small portion of the money, and being incessantly urged by Pantauchus to provoke the Romans by some hostile act, threw into custody Marcus Perperna and Lucius Petilius, who happened to come at that time as ambassadors. Having heard this, Perseus, thinking that the Illyrian had now laid himself under a necessity of waging war with the Romans at least, sent to recall those who were conveying the money, as if for no other object, than that the greatest possible booty might be reserved for the Romans on his defeat. Herophon, too, returned from Eumenes, without any one knowing what had been secretly negotiated between them. The parties themselves had mentioned publicly that the business of the prisoners had been concluded, and Eumenes, for the sake of avoiding suspicion, acquainted the consul with it.

28 Upon the return of Herophon from Eumenes, Perseus, disappointed in his hope, sent Antenor and Callippus, the commanders of his fleet, with forty barks, to which were added five heavy galleys, to Tenedos, that they might protect the vessels sailing to Macedonia with corn, and scattered among the Cyclades. This squadron, setting sail from Cassandrea, steered, first, to the harbour at the foot of Mount Athos, and crossing over thence, with mild weather, to Tenedos, found lying in the harbour a number of Rhodian undecked ships, and their commander Eudamus; these they did not offer to molest, but, after having spoken them in a friendly manner, suffered them to pursue their course. Then, learning that, on the other side of the island, fifty transports of their own were shut up by a squadron of Eumenes, commanded by Damius, which lay in the mouth of the harbour, they sailed round with all haste; and the enemy’s ships retiring, through fear, they sent on the transports to Macedonia, ten barks having been appointed to accompany them, which were to return to Tenedos as soon as they had convoyed them to a place of safety. Accordingly, on the ninth day after, they rejoined the fleet, then lying at Sigeum. From thence they sailed over to Subota, an island between Elea and Athos. The next day after the fleet had reached Subota, it happened that thirty-five vessels, of the kind called horse-transports, sent by Eumenes to Attalus, and which had sailed from Elea, with Gallic horsemen and their horses, were steering towards Phanæ, a promontory of Chios, from whence they might cross over to Macedonia, A signal having been given to Antenor, from a post of observation, that these ships were passing along the main, he left Subota, and met them between Cape Erythræ and Chios, where the strait is narrowest. The officers of Eumenes believed nothing less probable than that a Macedonian fleet was cruising in that sea; they imagined that they were Romans, or that Attalus, or some people sent home by him from the Roman camp, were on their way to Pergamus. But when, on their nearer approach, the shape of the vessels was plainly perceived, and when the briskness of their rowing, and their prows being directed straight against themselves, proved that enemies were approaching, a panic was struck into them; for they had no hope of being able to make resistance, their ships being of an unwieldy kind, and the Gauls scarcely able to bear a state of quiet when at sea. Some, who were nearest to the shore of the continent, swam to Erythræ; some, crowding all their sail, ran the ships aground near Chios; and, leaving their horses behind, made for the city in disorderly flight. When the barks, however, had landed their troops nearer to the city, where the access was more convenient, the Macedonians overtook and put to the sword the flying Gauls, some on the road, and some who had been shut out before the gate, for the Chians had shut their gates, not knowing who they were that fled, or who that pursued. About eight hundred Gauls were killed, and two hundred made prisoners. Of the horses, some were lost in the sea, by the ships being wrecked, and others the Macedonians hamstrung on the shore. Antenor ordered the same ten barks, which he had employed before, to carry twenty horses of extraordinary beauty, with the prisoners, to Thessalonica, and to return to the fleet as speedily as possible; saying, that he would wait for them at Phanæ. The fleet staid about three days off the city, and then proceeded to Phanæ, and the ten barks having returned sooner than was expected, they set sail, and crossed the Ægean Sea to Delos.

29 While these things were taking place, the Roman ambassadors, Caius Popilius, Caius Decimius, and Caius Hostinus having sailed from Chalcis with three quinqueremes, arrived at Delos, and found there forty Macedonian barks, and five quinqueremes belonging to king Eumenes. The sacred character of the temple and the island secured all parties from injury; so that the Roman and Macedonian seamen, and those of Eumenes, used to meet promiscuously in the temple, a truce being imposed by the religious feeling which the place inspired. Antenor, the commander of Perseus’s fleet, having learned, by signals from his watch-posts, that several transport ships were passing by at sea, went himself in pursuit, with one half of his barks, (distributing the other half among the Cyclades,) and sunk or plundered every ship he met with, except such as were bound for Macedonia. Popilius and the ships of Eumenes assisted as many as they were able; but, in the night, the Macedonians sailing out, generally with two or three vessels, passed unseen. About this time, ambassadors from Macedonia and Illyria came together to Rhodes. Their influence was the greater, in consequence of their squadron cruising freely among the Cyclades, and over all the Ægean Sea, and likewise on account of the junction of Perseus and Gentius, and of the report of the Gauls approaching with a great force both of horse and foot. Dinon and Polyaratus, the partisans of Perseus, now took fresh courage, and the Rhodians not only gave a favourable answer to the ambassadors, but declared publicly, that “they would put an end to the war by their own influence; and therefore desired the kings to dispose themselves to accede to a peace.”

30 It was now the beginning of spring, and the new commanders had arrived in their provinces; the consul Æmilius in Macedonia, Octavius at Oreum, where the fleet lay, and Anicius in Illyria, to carry on the war against Gentius. This prince, who was the son of Pleuratus, king of Illyria, and his queen Eurydice, had two brothers, one called Plator, by both parents, the other Caravantius, by the same mother only. The latter, as descended of ignoble ancestors on his father’s side, was but little suspected; but, that his reign might be more secure, he had put to death Plator, and two active men his friends, Ettritus and Epicadus. It was rumoured, that he was actuated by jealousy towards his brother, who had engaged himself to Etuta, the daughter of Hononus, prince of the Dardanians, as if, by that match, engaging that nation in his interest; and this supposition was rendered the more probable by Gentius marrying her, after the death of Plator. From this time, when he was delivered from the fear of his brother, he began to be oppressive to his subjects, and the natural violence of his temper was inflamed by an immoderate use of wine. Having been incited, as was mentioned above, to a war with the Romans, he collected all his forces, amounting to fifteen thousand men, at Lissus. From thence, detaching his brother with one thousand foot and fifty horse, to reduce, either by force or terror, the nation of the Cavians, he marched himself to Bassania, a city five miles distant from Lissus. The inhabitants were in alliance with Rome. Therefore, having been first solicited by emissaries sent in advance, they determined rather to endure a siege than surrender themselves. In Cavia, the people of the town of Durnium cheerfully opened their gates to Caravantius, on his arrival; but another town, called Caravantis, refused him admittance; and whilst he was carelessly ravaging their lands, many of his straggling soldiers were killed by a muster of the peasants. By this time Appius Claudius, having joined to the army he had in command some bodies of auxiliaries, composed of Bulinians, Apollonians, and Dyrrhachians, had left his winter quarters, and was encamped near the river Genusus. Having heard of the treaty between Persius and Gentius, and being highly provoked at the ill-treatment of the outraged ambassadors, he was resolved to make war upon him. The prætor Anicius, who was now at Apollonia, being informed of what passed in Illyria, despatched a letter to Appius, desiring him to wait for him at the Genusus; and, in three days after, he arrived in the camp. Having added to the auxiliary troops which he then had, two thousand foot and two hundred horse of the Parthinians, (the foot commanded by Epicadus, and the horse by Agalsus,) he prepared to march into Illyria, chiefly that he might relieve the Bassanians from the siege. But an account brought him, of the sea-coast being ravaged by a number of the enemy’s barks, checked his efforts. These were eighty vessels, which, by the advice of Pantauchus, Gentius had sent to waste the lands of the Dyrrhachians and Apollonians. The Roman fleet was then lying near Apollonia. Anicius hastily repaired thither, soon overtook the Illyrian plunderers, brought them to an engagement, and, defeating them with very little trouble, took many of their ships, and compelled the rest to retire to Illyria. Returning thence to the camp at the Genusus, he hastened to the relief of Bassania. Gentius did not bear up against the rumour of the prætor’s coming; but, raising the siege, retired to Scodra with such precipitate haste, that he did not even take the whole of his army with him. There was a large body of forces, which, if their courage had been supported by the presence of their commander, might have given some check to the Romans; but, as he had withdrawn,94 they surrendered.

31 The cities of that country, one after another, followed the example; their own inclinations being encouraged by the justice and clemency which the Roman prætor showed to all. The army then advanced to Scodra, which was the chief seat of the war, not merely because Gentius had chosen it for the metropolis of his kingdom, but because it has by far the strongest fortifications of any in the territory of the Labeatians, and is of very difficult access. Two rivers enclose it; the Clausula flowing past the eastern side of the city, and by the western, the Barbanna, which rises out of the lake Labeatus. These two rivers, uniting their streams, fall into the river Oriuns, which, running down from mount Scordus, and being augmented by many other waters, empties itself into the Adriatic Sea. Mount Scordus is much the highest hill in all that country; at its foot, towards the east, lies Dardania; towards the south, Macedonia; and towards the west, Illyria. Notwithstanding that the town was so strong, from the nature of its situation, and was garrisoned by the whole force of the Illyrian nation, with the king himself at their head, yet the Roman prætor, encouraged by the happy success of his first enterprises, and hoping that the fortune of the whole undertaking would correspond to its commencement, and thinking also that a sudden alarm might have a powerful effect, advanced to the walls with his troops in order of battle. But, if the garrison had kept their gates shut, and manned the walls and the towers of the gates with soldiers, they might have repulsed the Romans from the walls with their efforts frustrated, instead of which they marched out from the gate, and, on equal ground, commenced a battle with more courage than they supported it: for, being forced to give way, and crowded together in their retreat, and above two hundred having fallen in the very entrance of the gate, the rest were so terrified, that Gentius immediately despatched Teuticus and Bellus, two of the first men of the nation, to the prætor, through whom he begged a truce, in order that he might be able to deliberate on the state of his affairs. He was allowed three days for the purpose, and, as the Roman camp was about five hundred paces from the city, he went on board a ship, and sailed up the river Barbanna, into the lake of Labeatus, as if in search of a retired place for consultation; but, as afterwards appeared, he was led by a groundless report, that his brother Caravantius was coming, with many thousands of soldiers collected in the country, to which he had been sent. This rumour dying away, on the third day he sailed down the river in the same ship to Scodra; and, after sending forward messengers, to request permission to call upon the prætor, and leave being given, came into the camp. He began his discourse with reproaches against himself, for the folly of his conduct; then descended to tears and prayers, and, falling at the prætor’s knees, gave himself up into his power. He was at first desired to keep up his spirits, and having been even invited to supper, he went back into the city to his people, and, for that day, was entertained by the prætor with every mark of respect. On the day following, he was delivered into custody, to Caius Cassius, a military tribune, having, though a king, received ten talents, scarcely the hire of a party of gladiators, and that from a king, to reduce himself to these circumstances.

32 The first thing Anicius did, after taking possession of Scodra, was, to order the ambassadors, Petilius and Perperna, to be sought for and brought to him; and having restored to them their former dignity, he immediately despatched Perperna to seize the king’s friends and relations, who, hastening to Medeo, a city of Labeatia, conducted to the camp at Scodra, Etleva, the king’s consort; his brother Caravantius; with his two sons, Scerdiletus and Pleuratus. Anicius, having brought the Illyrian war to a conclusion within thirty days, sent Perperna to Rome with the news of his success; and, in a few days after, king Gentius himself, with his mother, queen, children, and brother, and other Illyrians of distinction. This one war was announced at Rome as finished before it was known to have been begun. At the time when these things took place, Perseus laboured under dreadful apprehensions, on account of the approach, both of the new consul Æmilius, who, as he heard, was coming with formidable threats, and also of the prætor Octavius: nor did he less dread the Roman fleet, and the danger which threatened the sea-coast. Eumenes and Athenagoras commanded at Thessalonica, with a small garrison of two thousand targeteers. Thither he sent Androcles, as governor, and ordered him to keep the troops encamped close by the naval arsenals. He ordered one thousand horse, under Antigonus, to Ænia, to guard the sea-coast; directing them, whenever they should hear of the enemy’s fleet approaching the shore in any part, instantly to hasten thither, to protect the country people. Five thousand Macedonians were sent to garrison the mountains Pythium and Petra, commanded by Histiæus, Theogenes, and Medon. After making these detachments, he set about fortifying the bank of the river Enipeus, the channel being dry and fordable; and, in order that all the men might apply themselves to this work, the women were obliged to bring provisions from the neighbouring cities into the camp. He ordered the soldiers to fetch timber from the woods which were not far distant. Then a mound was formed and works thrown up strengthened with towers and with engines, disposed in various parts so that the enemy might not be able to force a way through without great opposition and danger. Thus he trusted that he should be secure against every attack of the Romans, and that, wearied out with inaction and slow delay, and drained by expenses, a disgust at so difficult a war would seize on the mind of the enemy. On the other side, the more diligence and caution Paullus saw the Macedonians use, the more assiduously did he study to devise some means of frustrating those hopes, which the enemy had not without reason conceived. But he suffered immediate distress from the scarcity of water, as the neighbouring river was almost dried up, except that a little stream, and that impure, flowed in the part contiguous to the sea.

33 The consul, when those who were sent to search the neighbourhood announced that no water could be found,95 at last ordered the water-carriers to attend him to the shore, which was not three hundred paces distant, and there to dig holes in several places, not far from each other. The great height of the mountains gave him reason to suppose that they contained hidden springs of water, the veins of which flowing through to the sea, mingled with its waves; and the more so, as they discharged no streams above ground. Scarcely was the surface of the sand removed, when springs began to boil up, small at first, and muddy, but in a little time they threw out clear water in great plenty, as if through the favourable interference of the gods. This circumstance added greatly to the reputation and influence of the general in the minds of the soldiers. He then ordered them to get ready their arms; and went himself, with the tribunes and first centurions, to examine the fords, in hopes of finding a passage, where the descent would be easy for the troops, and where the ascending the other bank would be least difficult. After taking a sufficient view of these matters, he made it his first care to provide, that, in the movements of the army, every thing should be done regularly, and without noise, at the first order and beck of the general. When notice was proclaimed of what was to be done to all at the same time, every one did not distinctly hear; and as the orders received were not clear, some making additions for themselves, did more than was ordered, while others did less; while dissonant shouts were raised in every quarter, insomuch that the enemy knew sooner than the soldiers themselves what was intended. He therefore directed, that the military tribune should communicate, secretly, to the first centurion of the legion, then he to the next, and that so on, in order that each should tell the next to him in rank what was requisite to be done, whether the instructions were to be conveyed from front to rear, or from rear to front. He likewise, by a new arrangement, forbade the sentinels to carry their shields when on duty; for as a sentinel did not go to fight, but to watch, he had no occasion for arms; it was his duty, when he perceived an enemy approaching, to retire, and to rouse the rest to arms. They used to stand with their helmets on, and their shields erected on the ground before them; when tired, they leaned on their spears; or laying their heads on the edge of their shields, stood dozing in such a manner, that from the glittering of their arms they could be seen afar off by the enemy, while themselves could see nothing. He likewise altered the practice of the advanced guards. Formerly, the guards were kept on duty through the whole day, all under arms, the horsemen with their horses bridled; and when this happened in summer, under a continual scorching sun, both men and horses were so much exhausted by the heat and the languor contracted in so many hours, that very often, when attacked by fresh troops, a few could get the better of a greater number. He therefore ordered, that they should retire from the morning-watch at noon, and that others should succeed to the duty for the rest of the day; by which means the enemy could never come fresh upon them when they were wearied.

34 Æmilius, after publishing, in a general assembly, his orders for these regulations, added a speech of similar purport to that which he had made in the city, that “it was the business of the commander alone to consider what was proper to be done, sometimes singly, sometimes in conjunction with those whom he should call to council; and that such as were not called, ought not to pronounce their opinions either in public or in private. That it was a soldier’s business to attend to these three things,—his body, that he may keep it in perfect strength and agility; his arms, in good order; and his provisions ready, in case of a sudden order; and to understand, that all other matters relating to him are under the care of the immortal gods and his captain. That in any army, where the soldiers formed plans, and that the chief was drawn, first one way, then another, by the rumours of the multitude, nothing was successful. For his part,” he declared, that “he would take care, as was the duty of a general, to afford them occasion of acting with success. On their part, they were to make no inquiries whatever as to what was about to take place; but, when the signal was given, to discharge the duty of a soldier.” After these precepts, he dismissed the assembly, while the veterans themselves acknowledged, that on that day, for the first time, they had, like recruits, been taught the business of a soldier. Nor did they, by such expressions only, demonstrate with what perfect conviction they had listened to the consul’s discourse; but the practical effect of it was immediate. In the whole camp, not one person was to be seen idle; some were sharpening their weapons; others scouring their helmets and cheek-pieces, their shields and breastplates; some fitted their armour to their bodies and tested the agility of their limbs under it; some brandished their spears, others flourished their swords, and tried the points; so that it could be easily perceived that their intention was, whenever they should come to battle, to finish the war at once, either by a splendid victory or a memorable death. On the other side, when Perseus saw that, in consequence of the arrival of the consul, and of the opening of the spring, all was motion and bustle among the Romans, as in a new war; and that the camp had been removed from Phila and pitched on the opposite bank, and that the Roman general employed himself busily, sometimes in going round and examining all his works, doubtless looking out for a place to pass the river; and sometimes in preparing every thing requisite for attack or defence of a camp, with the closest attention, and omitted nothing which could be attempted or achieved by a great general, whether against the enemy or for increasing the efficiency of his own men; he (Perseus) also exerted himself no less diligently on his part to rouse the courage of his soldiers, and add more and more strength to his defences, as if he were approaching the crisis of the whole business, and never considered all matters to be adequately provided for, or the bank sufficiently fortified and secured. Nevertheless, amidst this most vehement ardour on both sides, their camps were for some time in a state of tranquillity. Nor was it ever recorded that such powerful armies, with their camps pitched so near together, had ever lain so quiet.

35 In the mean time, a report announced that king Gentius had been defeated, in Illyria, by the prætor Anicius; and that himself, his family, and his whole kingdom, were in the hands of the Romans; which event greatly raised the spirits of the Romans, and struck no small degree of terror into the Macedonians and their king. At first, Perseus endeavoured to suppress the intelligence, and sent messengers to Pantauchus, who was on his way from that country, forbidding him to come near the camp; but some of his people had already seen certain boys, carried away among the Illyrian hostages; and it is certain that the more pains there are used to conceal any circumstances, the more readily they are divulged, through the gossiping disposition of the attendants of kings. About this time, ambassadors came to the camp from Rhodes, with the same message which had excited so much resentment in the Roman senate. They were now heard by the council in the camp with much greater indignation than at Rome; some even advised that they should be instantly driven out of the camp without any reply; but the consul said, that he would give them an answer in fifteen days. Meanwhile, to show how far the influence of the Rhodians as mediators extended, he began to consult on the plan of carrying forward the war. Some, particularly the older officers, advised to force their way across the Enipeus, and through the enemy’s works. “When they should advance in close order and make an assault, the Macedonians,” they said, “would never be able to withstand them. They had been, last year, beaten out of many fortresses much higher and better fortified, which they had occupied with much stronger garrisons.” Others recommended, that Octavius, with the fleet, should sail to Thessalonica; and, by committing depredations on the sea-coast, to divide the king’s forces; so that when, on the appearance of another enemy behind him, he should turn about to protect the interior part of the kingdom, he would be forced to leave a passage over the Enipeus open in some place or other. The consul himself was of opinion, that the nature of the bank, and the works erected on it, presented insuperable difficulties; and, besides its being every where furnished with engines, he had been informed, that the enemy were remarkable for using missile weapons with uncommon skill, and with a very certain aim. The consul’s full conviction leaned quite another way; as soon, therefore, as the council broke up, he sent for Schœnus and Menophilus, Perrhæbian merchants, whom he knew to be men of probity and good sense, and examined them in private about the nature of the passes leading into Perrhæbia. They told him, that the places themselves were not difficult; but that they were occupied by parties of the king’s troops; from which he conceived hopes of being able to beat off those parties, by making a sudden attack with a strong force in the night, when they were off their guard. For he considered that “javelins, and arrows, and other missile weapons, were useless in the dark, when one cannot see at distance what to aim at; but that, when combatants closed together in a throng, the business must depend on the sword, in which the Roman soldier was superior.” He resolved to employ those two men as guides; and, sending for the prætor Octavius, explained to him what he intended, ordering him to sail directly with the fleet to Heracleum, and to have in readiness, there, ten days’ provisions for one thousand men. He then sent Publius Scipio Nasica, and Quintus Fabius Maximus, his own son, with five thousand chosen men, to Heracleum, as if they were to embark in the fleet, to ravage the coast of the interior parts of Macedonia, as had been proposed in the council. He told them, in private, that there were provisions prepared for them on board, so that they should have no delay. He then ordered the guides to divide the road in such a manner that they might attack Pythium at the fourth watch on the third day. He himself, on the day following, in order to withdraw the king from the observation of other matters, attacked his advanced guards as soon as it was light in the middle of the channel of the river, where the fight was maintained by the light infantry on both sides, for the bottom was so uneven, that heavy arms could not be used. The slope of each bank was three hundred paces long, and the breadth of the channel, which was of various depths, somewhat more than a mile. In this middle space the fight was carried on, while the king on one side, and the consul with his legions on the other, stood spectators on the ramparts of their camps. At a distance, the king’s troops had the advantage in fighting with missile weapons; but in close fight the Roman soldier was more steady, and was better defended, either with a target or a Ligurian buckler. About noon, the consul ordered the signal of retreat to be given, and thus the battle ended for that day, after considerable numbers had fallen on both sides. Next morning at sun-rise, the fight was renewed with greater fury, as their passions had been irritated by the former contest; but the Romans were wounded, not only by those with whom they were immediately engaged, but much more by the multitudes that stood posted in the towers, with missiles of every sort, particularly stones; so that whenever they advanced towards the enemy’s bank, the weapons thrown from the engines reached even the hindmost of their men. The consul, having lost far more men on that day, somewhat later called off his men. On the third day he declined fighting, and moved down to the lowest side of the camp, as if intending to attempt a passage through an intrenchment which stretched down to the sea. Perseus, who did not extend his cares beyond the objects that lay before his eyes, bent all his thoughts and exertions to stop the progress of the enemy in the quarter where he lay, careful of nought beside. In the mean time, Publius Nasica, with the detachment assigned to him, having departed towards the sea to Heracleum, when he arrived there, waited for nightfall, ordering his soldiers to refresh themselves. He then explained to the principal of his officers the real directions of the consul, and when first the darkness spread itself, bending his course to the mountain, he led his troops in silence to Pythium, as he had been commanded. When they had arrived at the very summit, which rises to a height of more than ten stadia, some repose was given to the wearied soldiers. This height, as has been already stated, Medon, Histiæus, and Theogenes, who were sent by Perseus, were occupying with five thousand Macedonians, but so great was the negligence of the king’s generals, that no one perceived that the Romans were approaching. If we are to believe Polybius, Nasica, having attacked them while asleep, easily dislodged them from the height. Nasica himself however, narrates the affair very differently in a letter to one of the kings. He says, that the mountain was of steep ascent, but so unguarded that he could have taken possession of the pass with no trouble, had not a deserter from those Cretans, whom he was taking with him, fled to Perseus, and informed him what was being done. That the king himself remained in his camp, but sent two thousand Macedonians and ten thousand auxiliaries, with Medon as their leader, to take possession of the pass. That with these a most fierce engagement took place on the top of the hill, and, among other things, that he himself was thrust at with a sword by a Thracian soldier, whom he transfixed by driving his spear through his breast. That at length the Macedonians, being conquered, gave way, and that their leader himself, throwing away his arms, sought safety in a disgraceful flight. The Romans pursuing the fugitives had an easy descent, without any danger, to the plain. In this stale of things Perseus was in perplexity as to what was necessary to be done, as he feared lest, now that a way through the pass had been opened, he should be hemmed in by the Romans. It was absolutely necessary that he should either retire to Pydna, and await the enemy there, so as to fight with less danger under the walls of a fortified city; or that, dispersing his forces through the cities of Macedonia, conveying the corn and cattle into more fortified places, and devastating the fields, he, should leave the bare soil to the enemy. The mind of the king fluctuated irresolute between these two propositions: his friends, thinking that that which was the most honourable would also be the safer, advised him to try the fortune of a battle, alleging both that he was superior in the number of his soldiers, and that he ought surely to trust to that valour which, while it was natural to their minds, would be inflamed by the most powerful and sacred incitements to a valiant opposition which could act upon men;—their altars, their hearths, and their religious institutions, amidst which and for which they had to fight; their parents and their wives, and, lastly, their king himself observing them, and exposing himself to a share of the danger. Influenced by these suggestions, the king prepared himself for a battle, and when he had retired to Pydna, at once pitched his camp, drew up his army, and assigned to each of his leaders his position and duty, as if about to fight immediately after the march. The locality was of this hind; the plain was suited for the ranging of the phalanx, which requires an open and even space, not, however, such as that it could be easily moved forward; then there were continuous hills which afforded to the light-armed troops the means of retreating at one time, and at another of wheeling round. Two streams, the one of which the inhabitants called Œson, the other Leucus, though they flowed with but a scanty supply of water, yet seemed likely to occasion some trouble to the Romans. Æmilius, having united his forces with Nasica, set out directly against the enemy, but at the sight of their army, which was most effective both as to the number and the strength of the soldiers, and admirably drawn up and ranged for battle, he stopped, struck with awe, and revolving many considerations within himself.

36 The season of the year96 was a little after the summer solstice; the time of the day was approaching towards noon; and his march had been performed amidst great quantities of dust, and the increasing heat of the sun. Lassitude and thirst were already felt, and both would certainly be aggravated by mid-day coming on. He resolved, therefore, not to expose his men in that condition to an enemy, fresh and in full vigour; but so great was the ardour for battle in the minds of both parties, that the general had occasion for as much art to elude the wishes of his own men, as those of the enemy. He urged the military tribunes to hasten the forming of the troops, went himself round the ranks, and with exhortations inflamed their courage for the fight. At first, they called to him for the signal briskly; but afterwards, as the beat increased, their looks became less lively, and their voices fainter, while many stood resting on their shields, or leaning on their javelins. He then, at length, openly ordered the foremost ranks to measure out the front of a camp, and store the baggage; on seeing which, some undisguisedly rejoiced that he had not compelled them to fight when they were wearied with marching and with the scorching heat. Immediately about the general were the lieutenants-general, and the commanders of the foreign troops; among others Attalus, who, when they thought that the consul intended to fight, (for even to them he did not disclose his intention of delaying,) had all approved the measure. On this sudden alteration of his plan, while the rest were silent, Nasica alone of them all ventured to advise the consul, not to let slip from his hands an enemy, who, by shunning a battle, had baffled former commanders. “There was reason to fear,” he said, “that if he should march off in the night, he would have to be pursued with extreme toil and danger, into the heart of Macedonia; and the troops must be led about, as under former generals, wandering through the glens and forests of the Macedonian mountains. He therefore earnestly recommended to attack the enemy while he had him in an open plain, and not to lose the opportunity of obtaining a victory, which now presented itself.” The consul, not in the least offended at the frank advice of so illustrious a youth, answered: “Nasica, I once thought as you do now; hereafter you will come to think as I do. By the many chances of war, I have learned when it is proper to fight, when to abstain from fighting. It would not be right in me, at present, standing at the head of the troops to explain to you the causes that render it better to rest to-day. Ask my reasons some other time. At present you will acquiesce in the judgment of an old commander.” The youth was silent, concluding that the consul certainly saw some objections to fighting, which did not appear to him.