Rule XXV. The nullity of an oath ab initio, is quando realiter vel reputative non juravimus; when really or reputatively we did not swear. The sinfulness of an oath is when we did swear really but unlawfully as to the ground, or end, or matter, or manner, or circumstances. Really that man did not swear, 1. Who spake not (mentally nor orally) the words of an oath. 2. Who thought those words had signified no such thing, and so had no intent to swear either mentally or verbally. As if an Englishman be taught to use the words of an oath in French, and made believe that they have a contrary sense. 3. Who only narratively recited the words of an oath, as a reporter or historian, without a real or professed intent of swearing. Reputatively he did not swear, 1. Who spake the words of an oath in his sleep, or in a deliration, distraction, madness, or such prevalent melancholy as mastereth reason; when a man is not compos mentis, his act is not actus humanus. (2.) When a man's hand is forcibly moved by another against his will to subscribe the words of an oath or covenant; for if it be totally involuntary it is not a moral act. But words cannot be forced; for he that sweareth to save his life, doth do it voluntarily to save his life. The will may be moved by fear, but not forced. Yet the person that wrongfully frighteneth another into consent, or to swear, hath no right to any benefit which he thought to get by force or fraud; and so in foro civili such promises, or covenants, or oaths may quoad effectum be reputatively null; and he that by putting his sword to another man's breast doth compel him to swear or subscribe and seal a deed of gift, may be judged to have no right to it, but to be punishable for the force; but though this covenant or promise be null in foro humano, because the person cannot acquire a right by violence, yet the oath is not a nullity before God; for when God is made a party, he hath a right which is inviolable; and when he is appealed to or made a witness, his name must not be taken in vain. 3. It is a nullity reputatively when the person is naturally incapable of self-obligation, as in infancy, when reason is not come to so much maturity as to be naturally capable of such a work; I say naturally incapable, for the reasons following.

Rule XXVI. We must distinguish between a natural incapacity of vowing or swearing at all, and an incapacity of doing it lawfully; and between a true nullity, and when the oath is only quasi nullum, or as null quoad effectum, or such as I must not keep. There are many real oaths and vows which must not be kept, and so far are quasi nulla as to the effecting of the thing vowed; but they are not simply null; for they have the effect of making the man a sinner and perjured. They are sinful vows, and therefore vows. A natural incapacity proveth it no vow at all; but if I am naturally capable, and only forbidden, (by God or man,) this maketh it not no vow, but a sinful vow, of which some must be kept and some must not.

In these following cases a real vow is quasi nullum, or must not be kept.

1. In case the thing vowed (all things considered) be a thing which God hath forbidden to be done; that is, in case it be a thing in itself evil; but if the thing in itself be a duty, though there be some inseparable sins which we shall be guilty of in the performance, we must not therefore leave the duty itself undone which we have vowed: as if I vow to praise God, and yet am sure that I cannot praise him without a sinful defect of that love and delight in him which is due, I must not therefore forbear to praise him; else we must cast off all other duty, because we cannot do it without some sin. But yet, though in case of unwilling infirmity, we must thus do the duty though we are sure to sin in it, yet in case of any chosen, voluntary sin, which we have an immediate power to avoid, we must rather forbear the duty itself (vowed or not vowed) than commit such a sin; as if I vow to preach the gospel, and am forcibly hindered unless I would voluntarily tell one lie, or commit one sin wilfully for this liberty; I ought rather never to preach the gospel; nor is it then a duty, but become morally impossible to me; as if in France or Spain I may not preach unless I would take Pope Pius's Trent confession or oath. Nay, if those very defects of love, and wandering thoughts, which now inseparably cleave to my best performances, were morally and immediately in my power, and I could avoid them, I ought not electively and by consent to commit them, for any liberty of duty, but rather to forbear the duty itself as no duty to me when it cometh upon such conditions; for then it is supposed that I could serve God better without that duty, because I could love him more, &c.

Yet here is observable a great deal of difference between omissions and commissions. A man may never commit a sin that good may come by it, though he vowed the good; but a man may ofttimes omit that which else would have been his duty, to do some good which he hath vowed; for negative commands bind semper et ad semper; but the affirmative do not (at least as to outward duty); therefore in case of necessity a man may himself consent to the present omission of some good, for the escaping of greater, unavoidable omissions another time, or for the performing of a vow or greater duty which is to be preferred.

2. A vow is not to be kept, when the matter of it is unjust and injurious to another (unless you have his consent): as if you vow to give away another man's lands or goods, or to do him wrong by word or deed; or if you vow to forbear to pay him his due, or to do that which you owe him: as if a servant vow to forbear his master's work (unless it be so small an injury as he can otherwise repair); or a husband, or wife, or parents, or children, or prince, or subjects should vow to deny their necessary duties to each other. Here man's right together with God's law doth make it unjust to perform such vows.

3. A vow is as null or not to be kept, when the matter is something that is morally or civilly out of our power to do: as if a servant, or a child, or subject vow to do a thing, which he cannot do lawfully without the consent of his superior: this vow is not simply null, for it is a sinful vow (unless it was conditional). Every rational creature is so far sui juris, as that his soul being immediately subject to God, he is capable of obliging himself to God; and so his vow is a real sinful vow, when he is not so far sui juris as to be capable of a lawful vowing, or doing the thing which he voweth. Such a one is bound to endeavour to get his superior's consent, but not without it to perform his vow; no, though the thing in itself be lawful. For God having antecedently bound me to obey my superiors in all lawful things, I cannot disoblige myself by my own vows.

Yet here are very great difficulties in this case, which causeth difference among the learnedest, pious casuists. 1. If a governor have beforehand made a law for that which I vow against, it is supposed by many that my vow is not to be kept, (the thing being not against the law of God,) because the first obligation holdeth. 2. Yet some think that magistrates' penal laws binding but aut ad obedientiam aut ad pœnam, to obedience or punishment, I am therefore obliged in indifferent things to bear his penalty, and to keep my vow.[76] 3. But if I first make an absolute vow in a thing indifferent, (as to drink no wine, or to wear no silks, &c.) and the magistrate afterwards command it me, some think I am bound to keep my vow; because though I must obey the magistrate in all things lawful, yet my vow hath made this particular thing to be to me unlawful, before the magistrate made it a duty. 4. Though others think that even in this case the general obligation to obey my superiors preventeth my obliging myself to any particular which they may forbid in case I had not vowed it, or against any particular which they may command. 5. Others distinguish of things lawful or indifferent, and say that some of them are such as become accidentally so useful or needful to the common good, the end of government, that it is fit the magistrate make a law for it, and the breaking of that law will be so hurtful, that my vow cannot bind me to it, as being now no indifferent thing; but other indifferent things they say belong not to the magistrate to determine of (as what I shall eat or drink, whether I shall marry or not, what trade I shall be of, how each artificer, tradesman, or professor of arts and sciences shall do the business of his profession, &c.) And here the magistrate they think cannot bind them against their vows, because their power of themselves in such private cases is greater than his power over them in those cases. All these I leave as so many questions unfit for me to resolve in the midst of the contentions of the learned. The great reasons that move on both sides you may easily discern. 1. Those that think an oath in lawful things, obligeth not contrary to the magistrate's antecedent or subsequent command, are moved by this reason, That else subjects and children might by their vows exempt themselves from obedience, and null God's command of obeying our superiors. 2. Those that think a vow is obligatory against a magistrate's command, are moved by this reason, Because else, say they, a magistrate may at his pleasure dispense with all vows, except in things commanded before by God: for he may come after and cross our vows by his commands, which, against the pope's pretensions, protestants have denied to be in the power of any mortal man. And God, say they, hath the first right, which none can take away. I must not be forward in determining where rulers are concerned; only to those that may and must determine it, I add these further materials to be considered of.

1. It is most necessary to the decision of this case, to understand how far the inferior that voweth was sui juris, and had the power of himself when he made the vow, as to the making of it, and how far he is sui juris as to the act which he hath vowed; and to that end to know, in a case where there is some power over his act, both in his superior and in himself, whether his own power, or his superior's, as to that act, be the greater.

2. It is therefore needful to distinguish much between those acts that are of private use and signification only, and those that (antecedently to the ruler's command) are of public use and nature, or such as the ruler is as much concerned in as the inferior.

3. It is needful to understand the true intent and sense of the command of our superior; whether it be really his intent to bind inferiors to break their vows, or whether they intend only to bind those that are not so entangled and pre-engaged by a vow, with a tacit exception of those that are.[77] And what is most just must be presumed, unless the contrary be plain.

4. It must be discerned whether the commands of superiors intend any further penalty than that which is affixed in their laws: as in our penal laws about using bows and arrows, and about fishing, hunting, &c.; whether it be intended that the offender be guilty of damnation, or only that the threatened temporal penalty do satisfy the law; and whether God bind us to any further penalty than the superior intendeth.

5. The end of the laws of men must be distinguished from the words; and a great difference must be put between those forbidden acts that do no further harm than barely to cross the letter of the law, or will of a superior, and those that cross the just end of the command or law; and that either more or less, as it is more or less hurtful to others, or against the common good: for then the matter will become sinful in itself.

6. Whether perjury, or the unwilling violation of human laws, be the greater sin, and which in a doubtful case should be most feared and avoided, it is easy to discern.

Rule XXVII. A vow may be consequently made null or void, 1. By cessation of the matter, or any thing essential to it, (of which before,) or by a dispensation or dissolution of it by God to whom we are obliged. No doubt it is in God's power to disoblige a man from his vow; but how he ever doth such a thing is all the doubt: extraordinary revelations being ceased, there is this way yet ordinary, viz. by bringing the matter which I vowed to do, under some prohibition of a general law, by the changes of his providence.

Rule XXVIII. As to the power of man to dispense with oaths and vows, there is a great and most remarkable difference between those oaths and vows where man is the only party that we are primarily bound to, and God is only appealed to as witness or judge, as to the keeping of my word to man; and those oaths or vows where God is also made (either only or conjunct with man) the party to whom I primarily oblige myself. For in the first case man can dispense with my oath or vow, by remitting his own right, and releasing me from my promise; but in the second case no created power can do it. As e. g. if I promise to pay a man a sum of money, or to do him service, and swear that I will perform it faithfully; if upon some after bargain or consideration he release me of that promise, God releaseth me also, as the witnesses and judge have nothing against a man, whom the creditor hath discharged. But if I swear or vow that I will amend my life, or reform my family of some great abuse, or that I will give so much to the poor, or that I will give up myself to the work of the gospel, or that I will never marry, or never drink wine, or never consent to popery or error, &c.; no man can dispense with my vow, nor directly disoblige me in any such case; because no man can give away God's right: all that man can do in any such case is, to become an occasion of God's disobliging me: if he can so change the case, or my condition, as to bring me under some law of God, which commandeth me the contrary to my vow, then God disobligeth me, or maketh it unlawful to keep that vow. And here because a vow is commonly taken for such a promise to God, in which we directly bind ourselves to him, therefore we say, that a vow (thus strictly taken) cannot be dispensed with by man; though in the sense aforesaid, an oath sometimes may.

The papists deal most perversely in this point of dispensing with oaths and vows; for they give that power to the pope over all the christian world, who is a usurper, and none of our governor, which they deny to princes and parents that are our undoubted governors: the pope may disoblige vassals from their oaths of allegiance to their princes, (as the council of Lateran before cited,) but no king or parent may disoblige a man from his oath to the pope: nay, if a child vow a monastical life, and depart from his parents, they allow not the parents to disoblige him.

Rule XXIX. In the determining of controversies about the obligation of oaths and vows, it is safest to mark what Scripture saith, and not to presume, upon uncertain pretence of reason, to release ourselves, where we are not sure that God releaseth us.

Rule XXX. That observable chapter, Numb. xxx. about dispensations, hath many things in it that are plain for the decision of divers great and usual doubts; but many things which some do collect and conclude as consequential or implied, are doubtful and controverted among the most judicious expositors and casuists.

1. It is certain that this chapter speaketh not of a total nullity of vows ab initio, but of a relaxation, or disannulling of them by superiors. For, 1. Bare silence (which is no efficient cause) doth prove them to be in force. 2. It is not said, She is bound, or not bound; but, Her vow and bond shall stand, ver. 4, 7, 9, 11: or, shall not stand, ver. 5, 12: and, He shall make it of none effect, ver. 8. The Hebrew, ver. 5, signifieth, Quia annihilavit pater ejus illud. And ver. 8, Et si in die audire virum ejus, annihilaverit illud, et infregerit vitam ejus.[78]—3. It is expressly said, that she had bound her soul before the dissolution. 4. It is said, The Lord shall forgive her, ver. 5, 8, 12, which signifieth a relaxation of a former bond. Or at the most, the parent's silence is a confirmation, and his disowning it hindereth only the confirmation. So the Chaldee paraphrase; the Samaritan and Arabic, Non erunt confirmata; the Syriac, Rata vel irrita erunt.

2. It is certain that a father hath the power of relaxation here mentioned as to an unmarried daughter, in her youth living in his house, and a husband over his wife; for it is the express words of the text.

3. It is certain that this power extendeth to vows about all things in which the inferior is not sui juris, but is under the superior's care and oversight, and cannot perform it (in case there had been no vow) without the superior's consent.

4. It is certain that it extendeth not only to matters concerning the governors themselves, but concerning vows to God, as they are good or hurtful to the inferiors.

5. It is certain that there are some vows so necessary and clearly for the inferior's good, that in them he is sui juris, and no superior can suspend his vows: as to have the Lord for his God; and not to commit idolatry, murder, theft, &c. No superior can disoblige us here; for the power of superiors is only for the inferior's indemnity and good.

6. It is certain that the superior's recall must be speedy or in time, before silence can signify consent, and make a confirmation of the vow.

7. It is certain that if the superior have once ratified it by silence or consent, he cannot afterwards disannul it.

8. It is agreed, that if he awhile dissent and disannul it, and afterwards both inferior and superior consent again, that it remaineth ratified.

9. It is agreed that the superior that can discharge the vow of the inferior, cannot release himself from his own vows. If the pope could release all men, who shall release him?

But in these points following there is no such certainty or agreement of judgments, because the text seemeth silent about them, and men conjecture variously as they are prepared. 1. It is uncertain whether any but women may be released by virtue of this text: 1. Because the text expressly distinguishing between a man and a woman doth first say, Si vir——If a man vow a vow unto the Lord, or swear an oath to bind his soul with a bond, he shall not break his word; he shall do according to all that proceedeth out of his mouth. And 2. Because women are only instanced in, when Scripture usually speaketh of them in the masculine gender, when it includeth both sexes, or extendeth it to both. 3. And in the recapitulation in the end, it is said by way of recital of the contents, ver. 16, "These are the statutes which the Lord commanded Moses between a man and his wife; between the father and his daughter—in her youth in her father's house:" as if he would caution us against extending it any further. And though many good expositors think that it extendeth equally to sons as to daughters, in their minority, because there is a parity of reason, yet this is an uncertain conjecture: 1. Because God seemeth by the expression to bound the sense. 2. Because God acquainteth not man with all the reasons of his laws. 3. Because there may be special reasons for an indulgence to the weaker sex in such a weighty case. And though still there is a probability it may extend to sons, it is good keeping to certainties in matters of such dreadful importance as oaths and vows to God.

2. It is uncertain whether this power of disannulling vows do belong also to other superiors,[79] to princes, to inferior magistrates, to pastors, masters, to commanders, as to their soldiers, as well as to parents and husbands. Some think it doth, because there is, say they, a parity of reason. Others think it is dangerous disannulling oaths and vows upon pretences of parity of reason, when it is uncertain whether we know all God's reasons: and they think there is not a parity, and that it extendeth not to others. 1. Because parents and husbands are so emphatically named in the contents in the end, ver. 16. 2. Because it had been as easy to God to name the rest. 3. Because there is no instance in Scripture of the exercise of such a power, when there was much occasion for it. 4. Because else vows signify no more in a kingdom than the king please, and in an army than the general and officers please, and among servants than the master please; which is thought a dangerous doctrine. 5. Because there will be an utter uncertainty when a vow bindeth and when it doth not to almost all the people in the world; for one superior may contradict it, and another or a hundred may be silent: the king and most of the magistrates through distance will be silent, when a master, or a justice, or a captain that is at hand may disannul it: one officer may be for it, and another against it; a master or a pastor may be for it, and the magistrate against it: and so perjury will become the most controverted sin, and a matter of jest. 6. Because public magistrates, and commanders, and pastors, have not the near and natural interest in their inferiors as parents and husbands have in their children and wives; and therefore parents have not only a restraining power, (as husbands here also have,) but also a disposing power of the relation of their infant children, and may enter them in baptism into the vow and covenant of christianity, the will and act of the parents standing for the child's till he come to age; but if you say that, upon a parity of reason, all princes, and rulers, and pastors may do so with all that are their inferiors, it will seem incredible to most christians. 7. Because public magistrates are justly supposed to be so distant from almost all their individual subjects, as not to be capable of so speedy a disowning their personal vows. Whatever this text doth, it is certain that other texts enough forbid covenants and combinations against the persons, or power, or rights of our governors, and not only against them, but without them, in cases where our place and calling alloweth us not to act without them. But it is certain that God, who commanded all Israel to be entered successively into the covenant of circumcision with him, would not have held them guiltless for refusing that covenant, if the prince had been against it. And few divines think that a subject, or soldier, or servant, that hath vowed to forbear wine, or feasting, or marriage, is discharged, if his prince, or captain, or masters be against it. Jonathan and David were under an oath of friendship, (called the Lord's oath, 2 Sam. xxi. 7). Saul as a parent could not discharge Jonathan, as being a man at full age. Quære whether Saul as a king being against it, did null the oath to David and Jonathan? No; the Scripture showeth the contrary. 8. Because else that benefit which God extendeth only to a weaker sort, would extend to any, the wisest and most learned persons through the world, whose vows to God, even for the afflicting of their own souls, may be nulled by the king or other superiors. Many such reasons are urged in this case.

3. It is uncertain whether this chapter extend to assertory or testimonial oaths (if not certain that it doth not): it speaketh but of binding their souls to God, which is to offer or do something which by error may prove prejudicial to them. But if a parent or husband (much more a king or general) might nullify all the testimonial oaths of their inferiors that are given in judgment, or discharge all their subjects from the guilt of all the lies or false oaths which they shall take, it would make a great change in the morality of the world.

4. It is not past all controversy how far this law is yet in force: seeing the Mosaical law as such is abrogated; this can be now no further in force than as it is the law of nature, or some way confirmed or revived by Christ. The equity seemeth to be natural.

Rule XXXI. It is certain that whoever this power of disannulling vows belongeth to, and to whomsoever it may be given, that it extendeth not to discharge us from the promise or vow of that which is antecedently our necessary duty, by the law of God. Else they should dispense with the law of God, when none but the lawgiver can relax or dispense with his laws (unless it be one superior to the lawgiver): therefore none can dispense with the laws of God. But I speak this but of a duty necessary also as a means to our salvation, or the good of others, or the honouring of God: for otherwise as to some smaller things, the duty may be such as man cannot dispense with, and yet a vow to do that duty may be unnecessary and sinful: as if I swear to keep all the law of God, and never to sin, or never to think a sinful thought; to do this is good, but to vow it is bad, because I may foreknow that I shall break it.

Rule XXXII. In some cases a vow may oblige you against that which would have been your duty if you had not vowed, and to do that which would else have been your sin: viz. if it be such a thing as is sin or duty but by some lesser accident, which the accident of a vow may preponderate or prevail against. As if you swear to give a penny to a wandering beggar, or to one that needeth it not, which by all circumstances would have been an unlawful misemploying of that which should have been better used; yet it seemeth to me your duty to do it when you have moved it. To cast away a cup of drink is a sin, if it be causelessly; but if you vow to do it, it is hard to say that a man should rather be perjured than cast away a cup of drink, or a penny, or a pin. The Jesuits think it lawful to exercise the obedience of their novices by bidding them sometimes cast a cup of wine into the sink, or do some such action which causelessly done were sin: and shall not a vow require it more strongly? Suppose it would be your duty to pray or read at such or such an hour of the day (as being fittest to your body and occasions); yet if you have (foolishly) vowed against it, it seemeth to me to be your duty to put it off till another time. For perjury is too great a thing to be yielded to on every such small occasion. Dr. Sanderson[80] ubi supra giveth this instance: If there be a law that no citizen elected to it shall refuse the office of a prætor; and he that doth refuse it shall be fined: Caius sweareth that he will not bear the office: his oath is unlawful, (and disobedience would have been his sin if he were free,) yet it seems he is bound to pay his fine, and disobey the precept of the law, rather than break his vow.

Rule XXXIII. There are so great a number of sins and duties that are such by accidents and circumstantial alterations, and some of these greater and some less, that it is a matter of exceeding great difficulty in morality to discern when they are indeed sins and duties and when not, which must be by discerning the preponderancy of accidents; and therefore it must be exceeding difficult to discern when a vow shall weigh down any of these accidents, and when not.

Rule XXXIV. The exceeding difficulty and frequency of such cases maketh it necessary to those that have such entanglements of vows, to have a very wise and faithful counsellor to help them better to resolve their particular cases, upon the knowledge of every circumstance, than any book or general rules can do, or any that are not so perfectly acquainted with the case. And oh what great ability is necessary in divines that are employed in such works!

Rule XXXV. Thus also the case must be resolved whether an oath bind that hindereth a greater good which I might do if I had not taken it. In some cases it may bind: as if I swear to acquaint none with some excellent medicine which I could not have known myself unless I had so sworn; or in case that the breaking of the oath will do more hurt to me or others than the good comes to which I omit:[81] or in case, all things considered, the doing of that good hic et nunc is not my duty: see Dr. Sanderson of the difficulties here also, p. 78, 79.

Rule XXXVI. No personal hurt or temporal loss is any sufficient cause for the violation of an oath.[82] He that taketh a false oath, or breaketh a promissory oath, for the saving of his life, or a thousand men's lives, or for lands or riches, or crowns and kingdoms, hath no considerable excuse for his perfidiousness and perjury, all temporal things being such inconsiderable trifles in comparison of the will and pleasure of God, and life everlasting: that which will not justify a lie, will much less justify perjury.[83]

Rule XXXVII. If the matter of an oath prove only a temptation to sin, and not sin itself, it must be kept: but with the greater vigilancy and resolution. As if a man have married a froward wife that will be a temptation to him all his life, he is not disobliged from her.

Rule XXXVIII. If the matter of an oath be such as maketh me directly the tempter of myself or others, it is a sin, and not to be kept, unless some greater good preponderate that evil. For though it be no sin to be tempted, yet it is a sin to tempt: though it be no sin to tempt by a necessary trial, (as a master may lay money before a suspected servant to try whether he be a thief,) nor any sin to tempt accidentally by the performance of a duty (as a holy life doth accidentally tempt a malignant person to hatred and persecution); yet it is a sin to be directly and needlessly a tempter of ourselves or others unto sin; and therefore he that voweth it must not perform it. As if you had vowed to persuade any to unchastity, intemperance, error, rebellion, &c.

Rule XXXIX. If the matter of an oath be such as accidentally layeth so strong a temptation before men, (especially before a multitude,) as that we may foresee it is exceeding likely to draw them into sin, when there is no greater good to preponderate the evil of such a temptation, it is a sin to do that thing, though in performance of a vow. When actions are good or evil only by accident, then accidents must be put in the balance against each other, and the weightiest must preponderate. As in matter of temporal commodity or discommodity, it is lawful to do that action which accidentally bringeth a smaller hurt to one man, if it bring a greater good to many; or which hurteth a private person to the great good of the commonwealth; but it is not lawful to do that which clearly tendeth (though but by accident) to do more hurt than good: as to sell powder and arms, when we foresee it will be used against the king and kingdom; or to sell ratsbane, when you foresee it is like to be used to poison men. Much more should the salvation of many or one be preferred before our temporal commodity; and therefore for a lesser good, we may not tempt men to evil, though but accidentally: as he that liveth where there is but little need of taverns or ale-houses, and the common use of them is for drunkenness, it is unlawful for him there to sell ale or wine, unless he can keep men from being drunk with it (as if they take it home with them, or be unruly, he cannot). For thus to be a foreknowing tempter and occasion, unnecessarily, is to be a moral cause. Two things will warrant a man to do that which by accident tempteth or occasioneth other men to sin: one is a command of God, when it is a duty which we do: the other is a greater good to be attained by the action, which cannot be attained in a less dangerous way. As in a country where there is so great a necessity of ale-houses and taverns that the good that is done by them is greater than the hurt is like to be, though some will be drunk; it is lawful to use these trades, though some be hurt by it. It is lawful to sell flesh, though some will be gluttonous; it is lawful to use moderate, decent ornaments, though some vain minds will be tempted by the sight to lust; as it is lawful to go to sea though some be drowned. To act a comedy, or play at a lawful game, with all those cautions, which may secure you that the good of it is like to be greater than the hurt, is not unlawful: but to set up a common play-house, or gaming-house, where we may foresee that the mischief will be far greater than the good, (though the acts were lawful in themselves,) this is but to play the devil's part, in laying snares for souls: men are not thus to be ticed to hell and damned in sport, though but accidentally, and though you vowed the act.

Rule XL. Thus also must the case of scandal be resolved:[84] as scandal signifieth an action that occasioneth another to sin, or a stumblingblock at which we foresee he is like to fall to the hurt of his soul, (which is the sense that Christ and his apostles usually take it in,) so it is the same case with this last handled, and needs no other resolution: but as scandal signifieth (in the late abusive sense) the mere displeasing of another, or occasioning him to censure you for a sinner, so you must not break a vow to escape the censure or displeasure of all the world. Otherwise pride would be still producing perjury, and so two of the greatest sins would be maintained.

Rule XLI. Though in the question about the obligation of an oath that is taken ignorantly, or by deceit, there be great difficulties, yet this much seemeth clear: 1. That he that is culpably ignorant is more obliged by his vow or contract while he useth all the outward form, than he that is inculpably ignorant. 2. That though the deceit (as the force) of him that I swear to, do forfeit his right to what I promise him, yet my oath or vow obligeth me to do or to give the thing, having interested God himself in the cause. 3. That all such errors of the essentials of an oath or vow as nullify it, (of which I spake before,) or make the matter sinful, do infer a nullity in the obligation (or that it must not be kept). But no smaller error (though caused by deceit) doth disoblige.

The commonest doubt is, Whether an error about the very person that I swear to, and this caused by his own deceit, do disoblige me? All grant that I am obliged notwithstanding any circumstantial error (as if I think a woman rich whom I marry, and she prove poor; or wise and godly, and she prove foolish or ungodly: yea, if the error be about any integral part; as if I think she had two eyes or legs, and she have but one): and all grant that an error about an essential part, that is, which is essential to the relation or thing vowed, (if inculpable at least,) disobligeth: as if I took a man in marriage thinking he had been a woman; or if I took a person for a pastor, a physician, a counsellor, a pilot, that hath no tolerable ability or skill in the essentials of any of those professions. But whether I am bound if I swear to Thomas thinking it was John, or if I marry Leah thinking she is Rachel, is the great doubt. And most casuists say I am not: and therefore I dare not be bold to contradict them.[85] But I much suspect that they fetched their decision from the lawyers; who truly say, that in foro civili it inferreth no obligation: but whether it do not oblige me ethically, and in foro conscientiæ et cœli, I much doubt,[86] 1. Because it seemeth the very case of Joshua and the Israelites, who by the guile of the Gibeonites were deceived into an error personarum, taking them to be other persons than they were: and yet that this oath was obligatory, saith Dr. Sanderson, is apparent, (1.) In the text itself, Josh. ix. 19. (2.) In the miracle wrought for that victory which Joshua obtained in defending the Gibeonites when the sun stood still, Josh. x. 8, 13. (3.) In the severe revenge that was taken on the lives of Saul's posterity for offering to violate it, 2 Sam. xxi. 2. 2. And this seemeth to be the very case of Jacob, who took not himself disobliged from Leah notwithstanding the mistake of the person through deceit. And though the concubitus was added to the contract, that obliged most as it was the perfecting of the contract, which an oath doth as strongly. 3. And the nature of the thing doth confirm my doubt; because when I see the person before me there is the individuum determinatum, in the hæc homo, and so all that is essential to my vow is included in it: if I mistake the name, or the quality, or birth, or relations of the person, yet my covenant is with this determinate person that is present, though I be induced to it by a false supposition that she is another. But this I leave to the discussion of the judicious.

Rule XLII. The question also is weighty and of frequent use, if a man vow a thing as a duty in obedience to God and conscience, which he would not have done if he had taken it to be no duty, and if he afterwards find that it was no duty, is he obliged to keep this vow? And the true answer is, that the discovery of his error doth only discover the nullity of his obligation to make that vow, and to do the thing antecedently to the vow; but if the thing be lawful, he is bound to it by his vow notwithstanding the mistake which induced him to make it.

Rule XLIII. Vows about trifles (not unlawful) must be kept though they are sinfully made.[87] As if you vow to take up a straw, or to forbear such a bit or sort of meat, or garment, &c. But to make such is a great profanation of God's name, and a taking it in vain as common swearers do.

Rule XLIV. A general oath, though taken upon a particular occasion, must be generally or strictly interpreted (unless there be special reasons for a restraint, from the matter, end, or other evidence). As if you are afraid that your son should marry such a woman, and therefore swear him not to marry without your consent; he is bound thereby neither to marry that woman nor any other. Or if your servant haunt one particular ale-house, and you make him forswear all houses in general, he must avoid all other. So Dr. Sanderson instanceth in the oath of supremacy, p. 195.

Rule XLV. He that voweth absolutely or implicitly to obey another in all things, is bound to obey him in all lawful things, where neither God, nor other superior or other person is injured; unless the nature of the relation, or the ends or reasons of the oath, or something else, infer a limitation as implied.

Rule XLVI. Still distinguish between the falsehood in the words as disagreeing to the thing sworn, and the falsehood of them as disagreeing from the swearer's mind. The former is sometimes excusable, but the latter never.

There are many other questions about oaths that belong more to the chapter of contracts and justice between man and man; and thither I refer them.

CHAPTER VI.

DIRECTIONS TO THE PEOPLE CONCERNING THEIR INTERNAL AND PRIVATE DUTY TO THEIR PASTORS, AND THE IMPROVEMENT OF THEIR MINISTERIAL OFFICE AND GIFTS.

The people's internal and private duty to their pastors (which I may treat of without an appearance of encroachment upon the work of the canons, rubrics, and diocesans) I shall open to you in these directions following.

Direct. I. Understand first the true ground, and nature, and reasons of the ministerial office, or else you will not understand the grounds, and nature, and reasons of your duty to them. The nature and works of the ministerial office I have so plainly opened already that I shall refer you to it to avoid repetition.[88] Here are two sorts of reasons to be given you: 1. The reasons of the necessity of the ministerial work. 2. Why certain persons must be separated to this work, and it must not be left to all in common.

The necessity of the work itself appeareth in the very nature of it, and enumeration of the parts of it.[89] Two sorts of ministers Christ hath made use of for his church: the first sort was for the revelation of some new law or doctrine, to be the church's rule of faith or life; and these were to prove their authority and credibility by some divine attestation, which was especially by miracles; and so Moses revealed the law to the Jews, and (Christ and) the apostles revealed the gospel. The second sort of ministers are appointed to guide the church to salvation by opening and applying the rule thus already sealed and delivered: and these, as they are to bring no new revelations or doctrines of faith, or rule of life, so they need not bring any miracle to prove their call or authority to the church; for they have no power to deliver any new doctrine or gospel to the church, but only that which is confirmed by miracles already. And it is impudence to demand that the same gospel be proved by new miracles by every minister that shall expound or preach it: that would make miracles to be no miracles.