Scale, Diagram is about 16 miles square.

Battle of Diamond Hill—Position on 11th June[3]

Early the next day (the 12th) the Dutch overture began, the foe operating vigorously with their long-range guns. They were evidently unappeased, and meant a dogged resistance. General Ian Hamilton was among the first to be hit, but not dangerously. The incident caused not a little concern, for this remarkably energetic officer had become, as it were, almost hoary with fighting the Boers. From early days when he commanded the infantry at Elandslaagte to the splendid defence at Wagon Hill he had been eternally to the fore, brilliant in intellect and unfailing in dash and daring. After his entry to the Free State he had fought his way from Israel’s Poort, Thabanchu, Houtnek, and on through all the varied phases of the advance of the right wing of the army towards Pretoria. It was no marvel that the thought of his even temporary disablement caused consternation. Fortunately it was discovered that no bones were broken, and the gallant officer, though in some pain, refused to leave the field.

Battle of Diamond Hill—Position on 12th June

At midday General Bruce Hamilton’s Brigade made a brilliant attack on the Diamond Hill plateau. The Derbyshires to the right, the City Imperial Volunteers in the middle, the Sussex on their left, grandly advanced amid an enfilading fire of considerable warmth, which only ceased its horrible activity when the 82nd Field Battery, under Major Conolly, by a feat of herculean energy, was dragged to the rocky heights, and vomited vengeance at a distance of 1700 yards from the stubborn enemy. But though it ultimately had the effect of silencing the Boers, it did not accomplish its arduous task without grievous loss. Gunners were hit on all sides, and horses dropped in the moment of unlimbering, but the gallant work never ceased, and, though a scene of carnage reigned around, the guns with unflinching and heroic persistence continued to pour on the hills their cleansing fires for two mortal hours. In the late afternoon the Guards came into action, and more guns, the Boers having rapidly taken up a position near the railway, and to the drumming of mighty pieces and the whistling tune of musketry the twilight set in. Face to face the belligerents grew lost in mist. Preparations were then made for the complete rout of the Boers on the morrow, but when morning arrived it was found that the Dutch hordes had made themselves scarce. Pursuit was attempted, but the horses were too exhausted for more heavy work. The Westtralians, however—150 of them belonging to Colonel de Lisle’s Corps—were unappeased. They pushed on to a point whence the Boer army, a crowd of some 4000, with waggons, cattle, and guns, could be seen crossing Bronkher’s Spruit. That place of grievous memories, where Colonel Anstruther[4] fell victim to Boer perfidy, awoke its own ghosts, for scarcely had the Dutchmen reached the fatal area than an avenging sleet from the magazines of the Westtralians brought them to a state of panic. In an instant Dutchmen, waggons, guns, were scattering in all directions, while the Colonials, expending 20,000 rounds of ammunition, coolly plied their rifles in their coign of vantage till the numbers of the enemy were sensibly thinned by death, wounds, or flight. Thus was given the finishing touch to a battle which had a double purpose. It served to clear the way for forty miles to the east and relieve Pretoria of the too close attentions of the massed enemy, and it engaged many of the Boers who had fallen back from Laing’s Nek on the taking of Pretoria, thus assisting General Buller’s operations at Volksrust, which have yet to be described. Sir Redvers, in his turn, aided the main scheme by causing the Boers to feel that their rear would shortly be threatened, and that even retreat to the east must now have its geographical limits.

LIEUT.-COLONEL THE EARL OF AIRLIE (12th Lancers)
Killed at Battle of Diamond Hill, June 11th
Photo by Bassano, London

General French was unable to fulfil his part of the programme, firstly, because the Boers saw through his plan, and secondly, because his Division was merely the shadow of the goodly Division that had flown to Kimberley in February, and his operations were entirely handicapped, not only by the nature of the country, but by the nature of his tools. General Ian Hamilton was little better off. Broadwood’s Brigade, which once had numbered 1800, was now reduced to 400, while the Household Cavalry mustered only 63, the 12th Lancers 120, and the 10th Hussars 200. Not only were the regiments reduced in numbers, but their mounts were now of the most heterogeneous description, Basuto, Argentine, and Cape ponies doing duty for chargers, and in many cases utterly unequal to the exertion expected of them. Without this explanation it would be difficult to comprehend why so apparently large a force should have been unable to do more than rout the enemy. But when it is once understood that a considerable part of Lord Roberts’s army was now represented merely on paper, the difficulties of the latter part of the campaign may be better conceived.

The C.I.V.’s had two days of stiff battle. A private, giving an account of his experiences, declared that they were the heaviest days’ fighting he had seen. “The C.I.V.’s were in the firing line both days, and our casualties were about sixty. One of our lieutenants had a very sad death just in front of my company. I have heard two names given to the action, but I don’t know which is correct; they are Diamond Hill and Donkerskoek. Our General said it was a second Spion Kop, the Boer position being so fine, and the firing from the trenches so heavy. Our regiment had got to within about 400 yards of the position, and had fixed bayonets, but had to give up the idea of charging, for if we had half the regiment would have been swept away. One of the Boer doctors was down at our hospital after the first day’s fight, and he told us that the Boers had lost about 600 that day. They must have lost another 600 the next day, as our artillery was much nearer, and simply poured shells into them all day.”

The total losses were about 200, but most deeply deplored by all ranks was the gallant commander, the Earl of Airlie. He was as brave as he was popular, and, like all his famous fighting race, was a soldier born, not made. Besides his record of previous service, he had distinguished himself in the Modder River battle, and was twice mentioned in despatches by Lord Methuen. On one of these occasions he made himself notable for the splendid dash with which he dismounted a section of his men and drove back a party of Boers who were enfilading the British force. In May he was wounded in the fighting round Welkom, was nursed to health at Bloemfontein by Lady Airlie, and went again to the front just before the surrender of Pretoria. Two other distinguished officers fell: Major the Hon. L. Fortescue, and Lieutenant the Hon. C. Cavendish, 17th Lancers.

Besides those already noted the list of casualties during the various engagements contained the names of:—

Killed:—12th Lancers—Lieutenant G. C. de C. Wright. 82nd Battery Royal Field Artillery—Second Lieutenant W. S. Luce. New South Wales Mounted Infantry—Lieutenant Drage. 1st Royal Sussex Regiment—Captain C. J. K. Maguire. City Imperial Volunteers—Lieutenant W. B. L. Alt. Wounded:—12th Lancers—Second Lieutenant H. R. Milvain. F Battery Royal Horse Artillery—Captain R. England. Royal Lancaster Regiment Mounted Infantry—Captain J. M. Graham. Indian Staff Corps—Captain E. Barnes. New South Wales Mounted Infantry—Captain W. Holmes, Lieutenant W. R. Harrison. Kitchener’s Horse—Lieutenant J. S. Cape. 1st Royal Sussex Regiment—Second Lieutenant G. C. Morphett. 1st Derbyshire—Captain T. H. M. Green, Lieutenant A. S. Murray. 2nd Canadian Mounted Rifles—Captain A. C. Macdonald. 8th Hussars—Captain E. A. S. O’Brien. 1st Coldstream Guards—Lieutenant Brett. Royal Army Medical Corps—Major H. G. Hathaway. Missing:—12th Lancers—Captain F. Egerton Green.

GUARDING THE COMMUNICATIONS—LORDS METHUEN AND KITCHENER

While the battle for the Delagoa railway line was being planned, Lord Kitchener, with a small force, pushed south and joined Lord Methuen (whose force was at Heilbron) at Vredefort station on the evening of the 10th of June. Together they decided to hunt the marauders.

In passing, it is interesting to note that at this time the following militia corps were doing unostentatious but valuable and perilous service on the lines of communication:—

3rd Royal Scots; 3rd Royal West Surrey; 3rd East Kent; 3rd Royal Lancaster; 4th Royal Lancaster; 6th Royal Warwickshire; 3rd Norfolk; 4th Somerset Light Infantry; 4th West Yorkshire; 4th Bedfordshire; 3rd Yorkshire; 6th Lancashire Fusiliers; 4th Cheshire; 3rd South Wales Borderers; 3rd King’s Own Scottish Borderers; 4th Scottish Rifles; 3rd East Lancashire; 4th East Surrey; 4th South Staffordshire; 3rd South Lancashire; 3rd Welsh; 4th Derbyshire; 6th Middlesex; 9th King’s Royal Rifles (North Cork Militia); 4th North Staffordshire; 3rd Durham Light Infantry; 4th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders; 3rd Leinster; 5th Royal Munster Fusiliers; 5th Royal Dublin Fusiliers.

On the 11th Lord Methuen proceeded to scour the railway line, and found the enemy prowling within rifle range on either side of his route. Whereupon, at Rhenoster River, he overtook and engaged De Wet, over whom a temporary victory was gained. The British commander succeeded in capturing camp and etceteras, and scattering the Dutchmen in all directions, though De Wet himself, with his usual nimbleness, disappeared. During the day’s engagement Lieutenant Erle, 12th Battalion Imperial Yeomanry, was slightly wounded.

On Tuesday the 12th the force hurriedly advanced towards Kroonstad, owing to a report that that town, garrisoned by a single battalion of the Argyll and Sutherland Militia, had fallen a prey to the enemy. Fortunately it was discovered that the rumour was groundless, and Lord Methuen continued his southern march. On the 13th and 14th the Boers pursued their system of annoyance around the railway, and directed a storm of bullets on a construction train which had arrived under the personal direction of Colonel Girouard, R.E., for the purpose of repairing the depredations of the past few days. Luckily, thanks to the pluck of the construction party (they were short of rifles, owing to many having been left in the rear train), a very able defence was kept up all night, until a party of mounted infantry—who at the first sound of firing started to the rescue—arrived with their guns and routed the foe. They came none too soon, for the Boers had made a fairly big haul, and carried off some forty of the construction workers as prisoners. The mounted infantry scurried after the retiring Dutchmen, but, as usual, these had knowingly melted into twos and threes and were uncatchable. In the attack on the train one man was killed and eleven wounded, including Lieutenant Micklem, Royal Engineers, Second Lieutenant Bigge, Volunteer Royal Engineers.

Meanwhile, at Virginia the garrison had an exceedingly trying time; but owing to the energy of Colonels Capper and North and the troops under them, and the conspicuous coolness and valour of Lieutenant Mitchell, the Boers were repulsed. At daybreak on the 14th some 800 Boers, with one or two pom-poms, a Maxim, and a field gun, ensconced themselves in the dense scrub surrounding the Zand River post. The garrison consisted of four companies 3rd Battalion Royal Lancasters under Colonel North (about 250 fit for duty), four companies Railway Pioneer Regiment under Major Seymour (300 fit for duty), and some 25 men of the Royal Irish Regiment (16 fit for duty) under Lieutenant Davenport. The position was a somewhat extended one, the left being in advance trenches on broken and jungly ground. This point the Boers attacked with determination, and were as determinedly resisted by Lieutenant W. Mitchell and No. 3 Company Railway Pioneer Regiment. The enemy in the dense bush were practically surrounding the British party, but these fought doggedly, engaging their assailants at very close quarters and keeping them at bay till nearly noon, when the Dutchmen were ultimately driven out of their hiding-places by an advance through the scrub of a line of reserve Railway Pioneer Regiment, aided by half a company of Militia. Thus driven forth, they made haste to retire before the arrival of a body of 170 Yeomanry (under Lieutenant Crane), which had hastened to the rescue from the south. The losses were comparatively small, owing to the marvellous grit of young Mitchell, who, though wounded at the onset in both thighs, continued for six hours to encourage and direct his men (there were only 22 of them scattered in several small trenches), ordering them not to waste ammunition, cheering them, and concealing from them, till the worst was over, the fact that he himself was seriously wounded. Another gallant officer, Major Seymour, distinguished himself, but he paid for his valour with his life. He was killed while advancing with the extended line through the bush to clear out the snipers. Lieutenant Clement of No. 2 Company of the Railway Pioneer Regiment was mortally wounded.

On the 18th Lord Kitchener, having restored communications, returned to Pretoria, and Lord Methuen moved to Heilbron. Precautions to avert further interruptions on the railway had been taken by establishing posts within communicable distance of each other all along the line, connected by a continually perambulating military train carrying field and automatic guns.

A combined movement had again to be planned for the surrounding of De Wet, who, though defeated on the 13th by Lord Methuen, and subsequently by Lord Kitchener, was still displaying an elasticity of disposition greatly to his credit, if discomforting to his pursuers. He and his followers now rebounded in the direction of Heilbron, where on the 18th he endeavoured to arrest the entry of Lord Methuen and a large convoy which he was escorting. A smart engagement ensued, which, it was thought, would have the effect of clearing the air. But peace was short-lived, as we shall see.

The war at this time, though full of inspiriting events, was as hard, perhaps harder, for the soldier than ever. There were the same chances of being wiped out by shot, shell, or disease, but the honour and glory of laying down one’s life for one’s country was bereft of its glamour. Tommy Atkins now needed all his patience, all his pluck. There are men who can face hostile artillery, but will squirm before a dentist. In these days there were many seasoned fighters, who might be excused if they shrunk from the railway accident or promiscuous sniping from invisible farms, which was part and parcel of the guerilla form of warfare adopted by the remnant of the Boer army—the malcontents, who, subversive of discipline and hating the British race, had decided to fight to the bitter end. Comments regarding the attitude of some of our troops have been made by many who lack the large mind to look at the enormous army as a whole, and who find pleasure in examining only its flaws with the microscope and holding them up to public contempt. Such comments it is unnecessary to reproduce. The brilliant British army, like all great and brilliant things, must necessarily have the defects of its qualities, and it is with the immense qualities and not the infinitesimal defects of victors that the faithful recorder has to do. To return, then, to the nerve-trying ordeals that formed part of the almost daily programme of the soldier’s duty.

At Honing Spruit, situated on the rail twenty-one miles north of Kroonstad, an exciting affair took place on the 22nd of June, all the more exciting as those engaged had but a few days previously been rescued from durance vile in Pretoria prison. On the 14th a party of 16 released officers from various regiments, with some 400 men, was ordered to Elandsfontein, the station outside Johannesburg, which had been so admirably secured by Colonel Henry’s force.

On the 21st this party was moved on to Katbosh Camp, a mile or so beyond Honing Spruit, where were stationed two companies of the Shropshires and some mounted Canadians under the command of Colonel Evans. The officers of the composite force were: Colonel Bullock, of the Devonshires, commanding; Major Stock, of the Wiltshire Regiment; Major Carleton, Royal Lancasters; Captains Elmslie and Freeth, of the Lancashire Fusiliers; Lieutenants Bryant, Temple, Radice, Smith, Mackenzie, and Gray, of the Gloucestershire Regiment; Jones, of the Connaught Rangers; Best, of the Inniskilling Fusiliers; Prior, Engineer Militia; Colson, of the 5th Fusiliers; and Wood-Martin, of the Suffolk Regiment. These, all of them, had had sufficiently horrible experiences, both during the hardly fought engagements in which they had been taken prisoners, and in the period of incarceration at the Model School, and vowed never again to be caught alive in the trap of the Dutchmen. They then hardly realised how near that trap they were.

Lines Torn up by De Wet near Kroonstad.
(Photo by D. Barnett.)

The night was unusually cold, and travelling in coal trucks was scarcely an inspiriting beginning. In the gloom of early dawn the train reached Honing Spruit Station. Some of the officers alighted and exercised themselves to restore circulation—they were numb and weary—and in doing so espied, in the east, the dark outlines of mounted figures approaching. They promptly gave the alarm. Colonel Bullock proceeded in all haste to get the men out of the trucks, and speedily they were formed up round the station. An effort was then made with such picks and shovels as were at hand to dig trenches. But these were a mere apology for shelter. They made, however, according to an officer who scraped his little burrow for himself, a “moral” support. Of other support, it must be owned, they had little. A few officers were provided with Mausers, carbines, and bandoliers of ammunition, but the force for the most part were saddled with Martini-Henry rifles and black powder ammunition—rifles discarded by the Boers, and left by them in the arsenal at Pretoria. These venerable weapons were sighted at 1200 yards—the ordinary range of Lee-Mitford or Mauser may be taken at 1500 to 2000 yards—and were served out of necessity, owing to the insufficiency of ammunition for Mauser rifles. Thus handicapped at the outset in the way of weapons of defence, ragged and tattered, some in boots that were dropping to pieces, some partly in uniform, partly in mufti, garbed exactly as they had been in the prison, they found themselves once again in presence of the enemy. Colonel Bullock, stouthearted and truculent as ever, at once wired for help to Kroonstad, and with the line cut on both sides of him, and the Boers blowing up culverts as they came along, prepared to make a stand against the advancing foe. Meanwhile bang! bang! went a series of explosions on every side, voicing a vindictive tale and promising unthinkable horrors to come.

According to their slim tactics, and to find out the strength of the party most probably, the Boers now sent forward a man with a white flag, declaring by the messenger, that they had many men and guns, and that if the force refused to surrender they would be annihilated. But the Boers had got hold of the wrong man. The officer who had doggedly held firm in the blood-dyed donga at Colenso till the Dutchmen had threatened to murder the wounded unless he gave in, was not the man to surrender without a tussle. Colonel Bullock quickly sent the messenger and his white flag to the right about, and made preparations for stout resistance till help should arrive. But it was a sorry piece of “bluff.” They were gunless, the old muskets were of little use, and the black powder was objectionable, as it would have betrayed their positions and the smallness of the force. It was therefore necessary to tackle the Boers with extreme caution. “At first,” said an officer who was engaged, “they were only near the line to the north of us, covering the men who were destroying the culverts and telegraph lines, but they gradually worked round to the east, and about 8 or 8.30 down came the first shell—shrapnel—from about 2000 yards away. The train all this time was in the station, and I think they wanted to damage the engine, but their shooting wasn’t good enough. The engine went a little way up the line, but found it cut, and had to return. Shells were pretty frequent now, and bullets too numerous to be exactly pleasant, but Colonel Bullock and Major Hobbs, who was second in command, were walking about seeing to everything in the coolest possible way. No. 1 Company, under Captain Elmslie, of the Lancashire Fusiliers, had made some small trenches facing north, but when the Boers worked round to the east we were, of course, enfiladed, so we got into a ditch running along the side of the line north and south. They peppered us pretty well while we were getting there, but only one man was hit in the arm. Previous to this poor Major Hobbs, who, with the Colonel, had been sitting behind one of our small shelters which did not anything like cover them, was shot through the heart and killed.” (Major Hobbs, it may be remembered, was the gallant officer who was taken prisoner while tending a wounded man in the brilliant engagement at Willow Grange.) “Young Smith, of the Gloucesters, had been sent down the ditch near the line with seven men to try and get a bit nearer to the Boers who were damaging the culverts. They had rather a warm time, and Colonel Bullock sent Freeth, the adjutant, to bring them back. Poor Smith was shot through the groin, and the bullet went right through him. Two of his men were wounded and one killed out of the seven. Smith got back with Freeth’s help all right, and I found him afterwards sitting up in bed smoking cigarettes and as unconcerned as possible.”

A small tin house at the station was used as a hospital, and a Red Cross flag was improvised with difficulty. It was composed of a pillow-case with red bands made from strips of a Kaffir blanket discovered in the house. This was mounted on the shaft of an uptilted cart, but the Boers affected not to comprehend its meaning, and sent in a man under a white flag to ask an explanation. Here the wounded were tended by Mr. Cheatle who, by a stroke of luck, happened to occupy a saloon carriage in the “held up” train. There was no other doctor. This well-known surgeon who had gone out, con amore, as it were, with Sir William MacCormac, was on his way home, thinking his errand of mercy was over. He came quickly in action again, bringing his brilliant wits to meet a somewhat desperate situation. His bandages were made from ladies’ under garments found in a wardrobe, from the bed sheets in the train, and for antiseptic powder he had recourse to the carbolic tooth-powder in the possession of some of the officers. When this came to an end he utilised boiled rags, and persistently attended to the nerve-shaken wounded, who all the time were torn with bodily agony and horror-stricken by the continual howling of shells against walls and ground.

AUSTRALIAN BUSHMEN ON THE MARCH
Drawing by Allan Stewart, from details supplied by Surgeon Captain Watt, New Zealand Roughriders

Meanwhile the Boers plied their guns, shelling at the same time from north and east—an antiphonal duet of most appalling description. One shell broke through the saloon carriage, another buried itself in some bales of wool which luckily protected the verandah of the hospital. To this the only return that could be made was a persistent peppering with the ancient Martinis, a peppering which was carried on for several hours. The officers worked hard with their Mauser carbines. The one before quoted said he fired off fifty-five rounds, but did not know with what result, except that some Boers, exposing themselves on the sky line, very quickly got down flat on the grass after he had taken a “steady pot” at them at about 1400 yards’ distance. He went on to say: “The Boers must have known how we were armed, as it is quite against their custom to expose themselves at all. At last we saw some men coming over the hill to our right, and thought it was the relief force, but they turned out to be Boers in khaki, some of whom, I believe, had helmets, probably taken from the convoy they collared a week or two ago, somewhere in this neighbourhood.”

The telegram for help was despatched to Kroonstad about 7 A.M., but the reinforcements did not arrive till nearly 3.30 P.M. The Boers early became aware of their near approach, however, and began cautiously to remove their four guns, two of which—15-pounders—were part of their capture at Sanna’s Post. Meanwhile the small force, who had been straining every nerve and muscle for many hours, and meant to die in the last ditch rather than surrender, were anxiously looking towards the south for succour. Then, at last, the friendly scouts were seen coming over the hill. Oh! the relief of it! The welcome rumour of help gave energy to the men, who, after their long inactivity, had been suddenly thrown, vilely armed, into vigorous action, and were by now well-nigh exhausted. Away flew the hostile hordes, but not without having done a fair day’s work of destruction—line, telegraph, and culverts being wrecked, one officer and three men killed, and one officer and seventeen men wounded!

While this gang of Boers were worrying the Honing Spruit party, another had attacked the Shropshires and Canadians at Katbosh Camp, and thus deterred them from going to the assistance of their brothers in distress. But it was owing to the splendid fighting of the Canadians that the Dutchmen had found it impossible to close in round Honing Spruit, and the party at the railway station were enabled to hold out till the relieving force arrived. After the Boers left, the troops still remained in the trenches, and strengthened them as much as possible; but the Argyll and Sutherland Militia and some Mounted Infantry and a battery arrived from Kroonstad, and the battery shelled some kopjes three miles away, where the Boers—some 700 to 1000 of them, with three or four guns—were collecting. It was said that the Boer loss was six killed, and that they took away three waggons full of wounded, but this, of course, could not be verified.

Some circumstances attending the brilliant resistance of the Colonials are almost heroic. Lieutenant Inglis, with eight men of the Frontier Police on worn-out ponies, were sent from the Katbosh Camp to reconnoitre. They were suddenly surrounded by Boers, but fought furiously, with the result that they made their way through, with the loss of four, to an embankment which offered shelter. Fifty Boers then came within short range and fired on them. A response from the British remnant followed. There were presently only four of them, commanded by Corporal Morden, who, Lieutenant Inglis being disabled, took his place. Here, in the face of these terrible odds, the Corporal sent off Private Miles to inform Colonel Evans of his plight. The messenger executed his errand, and returned to assist his comrades. He was hit, but still persisted in “having a go at the enemy.” Then Corporal Morden dropped with a bullet through the brain. Miles, wet with his own gore—fainting—supported himself against a tussock and continued to direct the firing of his brother and Private Kerr. Eventually the Boers made off, but not before Kerr had been killed by a parting shot. Finally the relief party arrived, and carried the few remaining heroes back to camp. Among the day’s casualties were: Major H. T. de C. Hobbs, West Yorkshire Regiment, killed; Second Lieutenant H. H. Smith, 1st Gloucester Regiment, severely wounded; Lieutenant W. M. Inglis, 2nd Canadian Mounted Infantry, severely wounded. The total casualties amounted to thirty-one.

The programme of surprise parties, trapping of small forces, and abuse of the white flag, continued with little variety. Owing to the disposition of the British troops to east of the railway, and the scarcity of supplies and transport that militated against their mobility, the Boers were temporarily in the ascendant. It was no easy matter to have and to hold the arteries of the great army whose head was Pretoria, and yet to guard the railway lines and send reinforcements at a moment’s notice to points menaced by the agile commandos of the enemy, and consequently those who were responsible for the safety of the communications lived the life of Damocles—without that personage’s certainty of whence the fatal blow might be expected!

The maintenance of the safety of the line from Kroonstad to Pretoria was in the hands of General Smith-Dorrien, who placed at every post two companies with two or more guns. He himself eternally perambulated the line, now repairing, now mounting guns, now despatching patrols, in fact, playing with almost superhuman energy and vigilance the game of fox and geese—the fox De Wet, the geese the long tail of communications. In spite, however, of the surprising energy of the General, the dog fox—the wiliest reynard that ever challenged chase—redoubled his activities.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Lieutenant-Colonel A. Baird-Douglas was a militia officer whose first appointment was dated October 1, 1881. His name is to be found among the list of officers of the reserve, who have held commissions in the Hon. Artillery Company of London, Militia, Yeomanry, or Volunteers. He had been Major and Hon. Lieutenant-Colonel of the 3rd Battalion of the Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders since March 1898; was attached to the 4th (Militia) Battalion of the Derbyshire Regiment, which was embodied on the 4th of December 1899.

[2] The Earl of Airlie was born in 1856, and was the eldest son of the seventh Earl, whom he succeeded in 1881. He was educated at Eton, and entered the army in 1874. He served with the 10th Hussars in the Afghan War in 1878-79. In that war he distinguished himself on more than one occasion. He was present at the attack and capture of Ali Musjid, and in the engagement at Futtehabad. He next saw active service in the Soudan Expedition in 1884, and was present at the engagement at Temai. Then he joined the Nile Expedition as brigade-major under Sir Herbert Stewart, and was slightly wounded at Abu Klea, and in the reconnaissance to Metemmeh. He was frequently mentioned in despatches for conspicuous conduct, and for his distinguished services he received many medals, clasps, and orders. From 1889 to 1895 he was on staff service as an adjutant of the Hampshire Yeomanry Cavalry, and in 1897 he was appointed lieutenant-colonel in command of the 12th Lancers, with which regiment he went out to South Africa last year. He was a Scottish representative peer, and deputy-lieutenant of the County of Forfar.

[3] This block and that on p. 16 are from “Ian Hamilton’s March,” by permission of Mr. Winston Churchill and Messrs. Longmans.

[4] See vol. i. p. 71.

CHAPTER II

GENERAL BULLER’S OPERATIONS—ROUTING THE BOERS FROM LAING’S NEK[5]

The Natal Field Force, after the departure of Sir Charles Warren, was composed as follows:—

Second Division (Lieutenant-General Sir C. F. Clery).—2nd Brigade (Major-General Hamilton)—2nd East Surrey; 2nd West Yorks; 2nd Devons; 2nd West Surrey. 4th Brigade (Colonel C. D. Cooper)—1st Rifle Brigade; 1st Durham Light Infantry; 3rd King’s Royal Rifles; 2nd Scottish Rifles (Cameronians), 7th, 14th, and 66th Field Batteries.

Fourth Division (Lieutenant-General Lyttelton).—7th Brigade (Brigadier-General F. W. Kitchener)—1st Devon; 1st Gloucester; 1st Manchester; 2nd Gordon Highlanders. 8th Brigade (Major-General F. Howard)—1st Royal Irish Fusiliers; 1st Leicester; 1st King’s Royal Rifles; 2nd King’s Royal Rifles. Two Brigade Divisions Royal Artillery—13th, 67th, 69th Field Batteries; 21st, 42nd, 53rd Field Batteries.

Fifth Division (Lieutenant-General H. J. T. Hildyard).—10th Brigade (Major-General J. T. Coke)—2nd Dorset; 2nd Middlesex; 1st Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers. 11th Brigade (Major-General A. S. Wynne)—2nd Royal Lancaster; 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers; 1st South Lancashire; 1st York and Lancaster; 19th, 28th, and 78th Field Batteries. Corps Troops—1st Royal Dublin Fusiliers; 2nd Rifle Brigade; 1st King’s Liverpool; Imperial Light Infantry; 61st Field Battery (Howitzers); Two Nordenfeldts (taken from the Boers); Natal Battery 9-pounders; Fourteen naval 12-pounder quick-firers; 4th Mountain Battery; 10th Mountain Battery, two guns; Four 4.7 naval guns; Naval 6-in. gun; Part of Siege Train.

Cavalry Division.—1st Brigade (Major-General J. J. F. Burn Murdoch). 2nd Brigade (Major-General J. F. Brocklehurst). 3rd Brigade (Major-General the Earl of Dundonald)—5th Dragoon Guards; 1st Royal Dragoons; 5th Lancers; 13th Hussars; 18th Hussars; 19th Hussars; A Battery Royal Horse Artillery; South African Light Horse; Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry; Bethune’s Mounted Infantry; Natal Carabineers; Natal Mounted Rifles; Border Mounted Rifles; Umvoti Mounted Rifles; Natal Police; Colt Battery.

At the request of Sir Redvers Buller, on the 2nd of June, Christian Botha, brother of Commandant Louis Botha, accompanied by Fourie and Pretorius, met him near Majuba for the purpose of holding a conference regarding terms of surrender of Laing’s Nek. A proposition was made, of course involving unconditional surrender, and hostilities were suspended for three days in order that it might be digested by the Dutchmen. It was found unpalatable and rejected. Whereupon the belligerents resumed their warlike attitude. The interval had been utilised by the Boers, who had entrenched themselves for about ten miles from Pogwani east of the Buffalo, to the fringes of Majuba, and further westward still. The natural barriers of Natal—the historic barriers that had made the “grave of reputations”—were now terraced with trenches, and nodulous with gun-pits. Another Gibraltar, frowning with menace, was prepared to accommodate 5000 desperate Boers. But they had not calculated that a way round might be found, and that they in their fastnesses might be “turned” before they could utilise that cleverly arranged system of self-defence. Yet the unforeseen occurred, and we shall see.

The Last Battle of Majuba Hill—the Battle of Almond’s Nek.
(From a Sketch by Lieut. E. B. Knox, R.A.M.C.)

On the 6th of June Sir Redvers Buller began his new move. General Talbot Coke and the 10th Brigade and South African Light Horse, after some brisk skirmishing with the enemy, seized Van Wyk’s Hill, whereupon, during that day, and the following day, the 7th, two 4.7-in. guns and two 12-pounder naval guns were mounted on the eminence, while two 5-in. guns were perched on the south-western spur of Inkwelo. General Hildyard, who during the armistice had moved across from Utrecht to Ingogo, concentrated his Division for advance over Botha’s Pass, while General Clery kept an eye on Laing’s Nek, and beyond him General Lyttelton, co-operating, brushed the enemy away from the right flank, and kept clear the country between Utrecht and Wakkerstroom. Thus was prepared the way for General Hildyard’s brilliantly planned and admirably executed assault of the spur of the Berg between Botha’s Pass and Inkwelo, which took place on the 8th, with the result that the enemy, some 2000 strong, were outflanked and routed from their mountain strongholds, and the pass was captured without serious loss.

The 9th was spent in a general halt on the summit of the pass, getting the transport through the Drakensberg, hauling baggage up the steeps, and skirmishing with Boers who hovered on the outskirts of the hills. The labour entailed was prodigious, as the roads to the pass were intensely precipitous, the hill being over a mile long, and many of the transport waggons had to be double-spanned before they could make appreciable advance. The troops, too, were sorely tried, for at night they shivered in the crisp, frosty atmosphere, which appeared additionally numbing after the warm sunlight of midday. Still, with unquenchable zeal, they pursued their labours, climbing and clambering over boulder and slab, and looking down on the chasms below with genuine satisfaction at the thought of obstacles surmounted and decisive work to be accomplished. They had now secured a commanding position, which in a very short space of time they hoped to make unchallengeable.

On the 10th General Buller’s force, marching over the wide veldt, reached the junction of Gans Vlei, some ten miles north, while General Hildyard’s crossed the pass and concentrated on Klip River, situated some fifteen miles due west of Laing’s Nek, and in face of some rugged country on the way to Volksrust. The Dutchmen were there congregating, and preparing in the Almond’s Nek region to intercept the passage. The South African Light Horse, before the arrival of the main column, had captured a useful kopje, and they, and some squadrons of the Irregulars, made a dashing attack on the mass of Dutchmen who were barring the main road. A most animated engagement was fought, which cost the South African Light Horse six killed and eight wounded. The enemy after the encounter slowly retired, harassed by the 2nd Cavalry Brigade. The main column, frost-bitten and weary, bivouacked in the shadow of the captured kopje, the 11th Brigade immediately below, and further down, the 10th Brigade, while still lower down came the 2nd Brigade, commanded now by General Hamilton in place of General Hildyard, who, as we know, was raised to divisional rank.

On the 11th the advance was continued in the direction of Volksrust, and General Hildyard (Fifth Division) made a brilliant frontal attack against the Boers, who were now holding a formidable position with several guns at the east of Almond’s Nek, which place stands about seven miles north of Gans Vlei. After the artillery had been pounding a dangerous hoop of ridges for a considerable time, filling the whole atmosphere with reverberating roars, the 10th Brigade, the Dorsets in the firing line, the Middlesex in support, advanced on the right of the ridge beyond which were the Mounted Infantry, while the 2nd Brigade, the East Surreys and Queen’s leading, treading the open, made a bold dash for the foe. These, concealed among the steep boulders, proceeded to pour a thunderous and fiery welcome on all who approached. The stertorous rampage continued for hours. But, fortunately, in their fastnesses our big guns—two 4.7-in. monsters and six little “handy” 12-pounders—eventually searched them out, and subsequently a gallant charge—one of the most brilliant in the campaign—the charge of the Dorsets who, in a blizzard of lead, swarmed upon the position with fixed bayonets, decided the fortunes of the day. The superb manner in which those seasoned warriors launched themselves at miles and miles of entrenched positions—a veritable phalanx of church steeples—was beyond praise. Their great assault cost the valiant regiment ten killed and forty wounded. Some Boer prisoners were taken, and five or six Dutchmen bit the dust. But most of them had bolted before the gleam of the bayonets, and in their flight had set fire to the grass so as to render pursuit impossible. Simultaneously with the charge of the Dorsets, the 2nd Brigade was doing identical work, and doing it splendidly. They succeeded in capturing the whole of the position, in clearing the enemy entirely off the scene, and in rendering the formidable galleries of doom, the rows of trenches on Laing’s Nek, “full of emptiness.” The Irregulars under Colonel Gough, brave as ever and cool as cucumbers, had been also vigorously engaged on the right, so vigorously, so dauntlessly that two officers, Captain Mann (Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry), and Captain O’Brien (Composite Regiment) were mortally wounded. But, losses apart, the day’s work was in every way effective, as the Boers by evacuating Laing’s Nek left open the Volksrust Road, and virtually ceased from defacing British soil.

Thus in two marches Sir Redvers Buller had succeeded in effectively sweeping Northern Natal, a feat of which his army was very justly proud. There was no doubt that the Chief had now made himself master both of the tactics of the enemy and the peculiarities of the country over which he had to travel. He had bought his experience in a hard school, but in this march he applied it brilliantly, and exacted from all the applause that was his due. Through broken country and steep he had made a flank march of fifty miles with an immense force and tremendous transport, clearing the way before him with the loss of about 30 killed and 150 wounded. His strategy had been ingenious as masterly, for while he made a demonstration on their left and kept the Boers in expectation of attack in that quarter, he had wheeled his force to their right, and surprised them before they had time to gather themselves together sufficiently to frustrate the tactics of the advancing force.

Repairing Laing’s Nek Tunnel Blown up by the Boers.
(Drawing by J. J. Waugh, from a photo by Captain P. U. Vigors.)

The triumphant issue of the movement was a source of intense satisfaction to all concerned in it. The Natal Field Force had hitherto scarcely been fortunate, and there were many among its members who were inclined to envy those who, to use a popular word, had “processed” up the Free State figuratively to the tune of “See the Conquering Hero comes.” The Natal Force had had a prodigious number of kicks, and knew what hard fighting meant, and had felt sore to find themselves, so to speak, “on the unfashionable side.” It became a question with these much battered warriors whether the kicks would be productive of halfpence, and whether, when honours were ladled out, those who so richly deserved it would come in for a bare spoonful. The splendid “little battle that did a big thing”—that, on the 11th of June, left Almond’s Nek purged of Boers and enabled General Clery and his Division to occupy Laing’s Nek—settled all misgivings. Sir Redvers Buller’s flanking movement was full not only of political but sentimental importance, for the reconquest of Majuba and Laing’s Nek meant the sponging out of humiliating memories which had grown more painful with the passage of years.

In these operations the total casualties amounted to 153.

On the 7th Second Lieutenant Andrews, 6th Company Western Division Royal Garrison Artillery, was severely injured on the head, and on the following day Second Lieutenant E. F. Grant-Dalton, 2nd West Yorkshire Regiment, was wounded.

On the 11th, the casualties among officers were: Lieutenant Stafford, East Surrey Regiment, severely wounded; Captain Mansel, Second Lieutenant Herbert, 2nd Dorsets, slightly wounded; Lieut.-Colonel Mills, Lieutenant Seppings, 1st Royal Dublin Fusiliers, slightly wounded; Lieutenant Johnstone, 11th Hussars, killed; Captain Northey, 2nd Cameronians, slightly wounded; Captain O’Brien mortally wounded (since dead).

GENERAL BULLER’S ADVANCE FROM LAING’S NEK TO STANDERTON

The next stage in the proceedings was begun on the 20th, when Sir Redvers Buller moved to Paarde Kop, and from thence proceeded to Standerton, when he opened up communications with Lord Roberts. On the 15th of the month Lord Roberts, telegraphing to the War Office, said, “Buller, I hope, is at Standerton.” But this was not the case, the Natal Force being delayed at Laing’s Nek for various reasons connected with transport and the rearrangement and recuperation of the troops and the repair of the Laing’s Nek tunnel. Doubtless the inability of the General to proceed, had considerable effect upon the main war programme, and many imagine that if the force had been able to occupy Standerton, which lies directly between Machadodorp, where President Kruger had fled, and Reitz, where President Steyn had located himself, concerted action between the two Presidents might have been nipped in the bud. As it was, the Dutchmen continued to use the telegraph till the 22nd of June, when Sir Redvers Buller’s troops threw a formidable barrier between them, and spoilt the hatching of further elaborate plots for the continuance of organised warfare. Meanwhile, General Hildyard occupied Wakkerstroom, but marched thence to join General Buller on the 19th.