After the departure of Bolívar, Mariño was named general of the army at Güiria, with Bermudez as his second in command, but his authority did not extend beyond the peninsula of Paria.

After occupying the plains of Barcelona, MacGregor marched upon the city. A Royalist force, which, under the command of Colonel Lopez, occupied the town of Aragua, sallied out to meet him. The action was hotly contested, but was decided by desperate charges of the Llanero horse led by Saraza and Monagas, and by a bayonet charge led by MacGregor in person. The Royalists lost 500 killed, 300 prisoners, and one gun.

Barcelona was evacuated by the Royalists on the 12th September, after they had murdered many of the townsfolk and plundered many of the houses, but MacGregor was now threatened by Morales, who had advanced to Aragua with 3,000 men. He sent to Arismendi, Mariño, and Piar for assistance. Piar, who was then besieging Cumaná, came at once with all his troops and took the command. On the 27th September the two armies met at the Playon del Juncal, near to Barcelona. MacGregor, supported by the fire of Piar’s artillery, led a bayonet charge which decided the day. The Royalists were totally routed, with a loss of 300 killed and 400 prisoners. After this victory MacGregor, worn out with fatigue and unwilling to brook the domineering ways of Piar, withdrew to Margarita.

Paez, by skilful manœuvres, forced his old opponent, Colonel Lopez, to retreat to the line of the Apure in October. The town of San Fernando on this river was the key of the plains; he resolved to seize it, but had no boats in which to cross the river. The Royalists had a flotilla of four “flecheras”[18] and seven long-boats, manned by 400 men. An officer named Peña had committed some fault. Paez ordered him as a punishment to get himself killed by the enemy. He crossed the river in a canoe with eight men, at midday, and threw the Royalist camp into confusion. In the skirmishes which followed, Colonel Lopez was killed and the Patriots seized seven boats. Paez then crossed the river, and in December laid siege to San Fernando. There he received news that La Torre and Morillo were on the march from New Granada to the plains watered by the Arauca and Apure.

Mariño and Bermudez were engaged in the siege of Cumaná, aided by the flotilla from Margarita. The Spanish garrison was about to evacuate the city, when the Royalist force on the island abandoned it and came to their assistance. The Patriots were forced to raise the siege.

At the close of the year 1816 the Patriot armies had gained many advantages, but they felt the need of a head to give cohesion to their efforts. With the army of the centre were many of the partisans of Bolívar. Backed by Arismendi they induced the army to demand his recall. Assisted by Petión and by Brion he organized another expedition, sailed from Haití on the 21st December, and reached Barcelona at the same time as Arismendi, who brought a strong reinforcement from the island of Margarita.

But the Army of the Centre was no longer there. Piar had seen from the beginning that descents on the coasts and incursions on to the plains would lead to no satisfactory result, that the Orinoco was the true line of action, and that Guayana was the true base of operations. Bolívar, without any plan, had hovered round Caracas like a moth round a candle, and had burned his wings. Even Cedeño, the rude guerilla, had seen more clearly, as was shown by his success on the Upper Orinoco. Morillo himself had seen the same thing, and ere leaving New Granada had written to the Home Government, impressing upon them the importance of preserving the line of the Orinoco. Piar, after the victory of Juncal, found himself in command of an army, and at once proceeded to carry out his idea, thus saving the Patriot cause by forcing Bolívar to give up his pursuit of a phantom at Caracas. He left a small garrison at Barcelona, left the guerillas to defend the plains, and marched for Guayana.

The Royalists had a powerful flotilla on the Orinoco, and had fortified Angostura, which was the capital of Guayana. Piar cut down trees in the woods and made small boats, captured two boats from the enemy, and forced the passage of the Cauca in front of the Royalist camp. The guerillas, under Cedeño, swam the river on horseback, fighting with the crews of the Royalist gunboats as they passed, and on reaching the opposite shore charged upon the encampment, driving out the enemy before them.

Piar then marched upon Angostura, but was repulsed in every attempt to take the city by assault. Desisting for a time, he passed behind the city to the mission station at Coroní, where supplies were plentiful. One of his officers cut the throats of twenty-two friars who were given into his custody, and received no reprimand for his barbarity. In fact this cruel deed greatly increased the popularity of the Patriots in the country round about, as these friars were hated by their Indian neophytes.

At Coroní Piar established a regular administration, which was of great service to the Patriot cause, as the armies were by it afterwards regularly supplied with cattle and corn. By these successes Piar acquired great fame, which for a time eclipsed even that of Bolívar himself.

All the Patriot leaders had now done something except Bolívar, but when he assumed the command for the second time he was another man: more grave and more thoughtful than he had been. But he was not yet a true soldier; he still took audacity for inspiration, and launched forth on enterprises without first of all adapting the means to the end desired. Immediately on landing at Barcelona he issued a proclamation that he was about to liberate the Province of Caracas, and in twenty hours set forth on his expedition with a force of 600 men. A Royalist detachment lay in his way in an entrenched position on the river Unare. Without any reconnaissance Bolívar rushed at it. Forty horse fell upon his rear, threw his attacking column into confusion and totally destroyed it.

The Liberator was lost again. He was now in a worse plight than when he fled from Carúpano. He wrote to Piar and Cedeño to abandon their attempt on Guayana, and to Paez, Monagas, and Saraza that they should come to the protection of Barcelona. All this was utter folly, for Morillo, with 4,000 men, already covered the approach to Caracas, and La Torre, with Calzada, occupied the higher plains. Meantime he fortified himself in Barcelona, and mustered 600 more recruits. He turned the Franciscan convent into a regular citadel and sent for Mariño. Mariño, forgetting his jealousy, marched from Cumaná and joined him with 1,200 men. Bolívar then left 700 men in Barcelona, and naming Aragua as the point of concentration for the scattered forces of the Patriots, he went off to Guayana to persuade Piar to join him in an invasion of Caracas.

On the 7th April, 1817, Barcelona was attacked and taken by the Royalists, who cut the throats of the whole of the garrison, and in addition killed 300 old men, women, and sick. Mariño retreated to the peninsula of Paria and again declared himself independent, while Bermudez and other leaders got together 500 men and awaited orders from Bolívar on the plains.

The Liberator, attended by fifteen officers, met Piar near Angostura and found that he was already in possession of all the open country. The behaviour of the negro general was noble and patriotic. He showed no jealousy of his superior, who had come to seize the laurels which he had won in spite of him, and set to work to show him that Guayana must be the base of a successful campaign. The veil fell from the eyes of Bolívar; for the first time he saw before him the true theatre of the war. Leaving Monagas to hold the plains of Barcelona with his guerillas, he summoned Bermudez, Arismendi, and Saraza to join him, and the revolution was saved, thanks to Piar.

The Royalists held the coastline from Coro to Cumaná with the army of Caracas, 5,000 strong. The divisions of La Torre and Calzada, 4,000 picked troops, with 1,500 Llanero horse, had concentrated at Guadalito on the Apure, and in January had forced Paez to raise the siege of San Fernando. Paez sent a small force against them to draw them on. La Torre, who had no idea of his force, fell into the trap, and advanced with all his army on to a wide plain covered with dry reeds. Here the fugitives were joined by the main body, and facing about, charged furiously upon the Royalist cavalry, dispersed them completely, and then by repeated charges forced the infantry to form square. Then Paez, with fifty men whom he had detailed for the purpose, set fire to the reeds all round them. Fortunately for them they found a marsh, into which they plunged, with the mud up to their waists, until the fire burned itself out, when they hurriedly retreated, leaving Paez in possession of the whole country round.

This famous deed of arms confirmed the authority of Paez over the Llaneros, and put him into a position to overrun the Province of Barinas. He concluded his glorious campaign by placing himself voluntarily at the orders of Bolívar, on condition that he might still protect the province he had conquered. Morillo, who was well aware of the importance of the Province of Guayana, detached La Torre with a strong force to drive out the Patriots, while he marched with 3,000 men to reduce the island of Margarita.

La Torre embarked his force at San Fernando and descended the Apure and the Orinoco to Angostura, without meeting any resistance, and manœuvred to draw Piar from the Missions of Coroní, hoping then to capture them by crossing the river at Angostura. But Piar divined his intentions, and leaving a reserve of horses on the right bank, he marched by the left bank to the vicinity of Angostura, then, after nightfall, leaving his camp-fires burning, he rapidly countermarched to his former position.

La Torre crossed the river as he had proposed, but was met by Piar at San Felix on the 11th April, 1817. The Spanish infantry, advancing in three columns with cavalry on the flanks, were received by volleys of musketry and showers of arrows. The Patriots, among whom were 1,200 Indians from the Missions, armed with bows and pikes, then charged, and a furious hand to hand fight ensued, in which the Spaniards were totally routed. La Torre escaped with seventeen men, but all the rest of his Spanish troops were killed. Piar spared the lives of all the Creoles among the Royalists who would join his ranks.

Bolívar, on his return from an expedition to the plains, where he had a narrow escape from falling in with Morillo, then on the march for Margarita, found himself at the head of a respectable army. All the Patriot leaders now recognised his authority except Mariño, who summoned a Congress at Cariaco, of which Zea and Admiral Brion were members. This Congress appointed an executive Junta, of which Bolívar was named one, and gave Mariño the title of general-in-chief.

Morillo soon put an end to this farce; he overran the peninsula of Paria, sank the Patriot flotilla, and dispersed Mariño’s army, shooting all prisoners taken. Those who escaped, headed by Urdaneta and Colonel Sucre, a name soon to become famous, went to join Bolívar in Guayana, while Mariño, with a few followers, fled to Maturin.

Until the Patriots had the dominion of the Orinoco their tenure of Guayana was insecure. Bolívar armed and organized a flotilla of flecheras, but what was more to the purpose, Brion again came to assist him with five brigs, some schooners and more flecheras from Margarita. These vessels were commanded by a mulatto named Diaz.

One part of the Royalist flotilla was engaged in the defence of Angostura and Guayana Vieja, which still held out; the other guarded the mouth of the Orinoco under the protection of the forts. Diaz being sent by Brion to explore the position of this latter detachment, was attacked by sixteen Royalist flecheras, and lost two of his boats. With three flecheras which remained to him, he then attacked the Royalists, recovered his two boats, captured two of theirs, sank five, and compelled the rest to retreat in confusion. Brion then entered the river under full sail.

At the approach of Brion, La Torre evacuated Angostura and was soon afterwards obliged by hunger to abandon Guayana Vieja, the last position held by the Royalists in Guayana. The remnant of his army, which now numbered only 600 men, he embarked on 32 vessels and gained the open sea in safety.

Piar, though he had recognized the authority of Bolívar, was in his heart disaffected and entered into a conspiracy with Mariño to restrict his authority by the appointment of a Junta of War; he also gained over Arismendi to his views. Bolívar prudently quelled this attempt at sedition by counsels and threats conveyed privately to the conspirators. Piar, in alarm, asked leave to withdraw from the army on pretext of illness, and retired to Upata, where he continued his intrigues till Bolívar wrote a friendly letter to him asking him to desist. He then fled to Maturin and concerted with Mariño a plan of independent action.

The position of Bolívar was now one of great danger; the troops of the army of Guayana were for the most part men of colour, Piar was very popular with them, and was accused of an intention to produce among them a mutiny of race. Bolívar gave orders to Cedeño to arrest Piar. The negro chieftain made no resistance, and was brought to Angostura for trial by a court-martial, under the presidency of Brion. He was sentenced to death for disobedience, sedition, and desertion.

Bolívar confirmed the sentence and he was shot in the great square of Angostura on the 16th October, 1817, dying as bravely as he had lived. If not an act of justice, this execution was warranted by necessity. It was the only means of preventing a civil war, which would have ended in the destruction of the army.

Mariño was still in arms at Cumaná with 400 men. Bolívar sent Bermudez with his corps to arrest him. Bermudez being an old friend of Mariño’s, procured his banishment. Bolívar was now rid of opposition, but still his power was far from being well consolidated.

CHAPTER XLII.

THE REORGANIZATION OF VENEZUELA.

1817—1819.

The castles of Porlamar and Pampatar were evacuated by the Patriots after a slight resistance, but they spiked the guns and concentrated their forces in the city of Asuncion. Morillo marched inland to cut them off from the north of the island, and was met on the 31st July by a body of 500 Patriots who had entrenched themselves on very broken ground, covered with brushwood, at a place called Matasiete. It took Morillo eight hours of hard fighting to drive them from this position, but his losses were so heavy that he was forced to return the next day to Pampatar. He then occupied the town of San Juan, which is situate in a break in the range of hills which divides the island, and so cut off the communications of the main body of the Patriots with the port of Juan Griego, where their flotilla was stationed. On the 8th August the fort which protected the town was taken by assault after a desperate resistance. The garrison of this fort only consisted originally of 200 men, the survivors of whom fled to a lake near by, and refusing to surrender were massacred, Morillo killing eighteen of them with his own hand. The scene of this butchery is known to this day as “The Lake of the Martyrs.”

Had Morillo persevered there is no doubt that he would have conquered the whole island, but adverse intelligence recalled him to the mainland. After losing 1,000 men he re-embarked the rest, and on the 20th August, 1817, established his head-quarters at Caracas.

Morillo now adopted a more humane policy. He published a general amnesty, abolished the military tribunals, and re-established the Audiencia and the Civil Courts. The aspect of the war had changed greatly in his absence. Paez had invaded Barinas, taken the capital of that province, and had routed a strong Royalist division at San Carlos, sacking the town and shooting all his European prisoners. But the plains were now covered with water, so nothing could be done against him. Bolívar had possession of the line of the Orinoco. Saraza’s guerillas, strengthened by an infantry corps, protected the right flank of Paez. Monagas occupied the plains of Barcelona, and the Province of Cumaná was held by Bermudez. Canterac was sent off to Peru with his sorely diminished division. The garrison of Caracas and the division of La Torre held the line of the coast. Aldama, with another division, covered the line of the Lower Apure and protected San Fernando, and Calzada, with a light cavalry division, disputed with Paez the possession of the Province of Barinas. The peninsula of Paria, and the cities of Cumaná and Barcelona were held by 800 men, and the rest of the Royalist forces were distributed in various forts along the coast. Neither party had any plan of operations, both were waiting to see what the other would do.

Bolívar was at this time the one conspicuous figure in America. He received a despatch from the Director of the United Provinces of La Plata congratulating him upon his success, and prophesying the speedy union of their arms in the same cause. Bolívar replied by an address to the Argentine people:—

“The Republic of Venezuela, though plunged in mourning, offers you brotherhood. When, covered with laurels, she has crushed the tyrants who profane her soil, then she will invite your concurrence, that our emblem be the Union of South America.”

As steps towards constitutional government by the installation of a Congress Bolívar established a High Court of Justice, and on the 30th October presided at the opening of a Council of State to which he entrusted the management of civil affairs in his absence, hoping to strengthen his authority by “the first of all forces, public opinion.”

Bolívar then ascended the Orinoco with 1,500 well equipped troops, and crossed to the left bank, at about a hundred miles from Angostura. His intention was to join Saraza, who had 2,500 men, and with his aid to crush Morillo and retake Caracas. At the same time he wrote to Paez to co-operate in the scheme by advancing from Barinas. But on the 2nd December Saraza allowed himself to be surprised and completely routed by La Torre at Hogaza. The Patriots suffered a loss of 1,200 killed with three guns and all their flags, while the Royalists had only 200 killed and wounded, among the latter being La Torre himself.

Bolívar was forced to recross the Orinoco and return to Angostura. Then with some reinforcements he again ascended the river to join Paez, who, on the advance of Morillo and La Torre had prudently retired to Calabozo. The two commanders having united their forces marched with 2,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry on San Fernando.

On reaching the river Apure, Bolívar looked in vain for the boats which Paez had promised to provide, while on the opposite side were a number of canoes under guard of a Royalist gunboat and three armed flecheras. Bolívar was dressed in a green spencer with red facings and three rows of buttons; on his head was a dragoon’s helmet, which had been sent him as a sample; he wore Llanero gaiters, and carried in his hand a short lance with a black pennon adorned with a skull and cross bones, under which might be read the inscription “Liberty or Death.”

“Where are your boats?” asked Bolívar of Paez.

“There they are,” said Paez, pointing to the enemy’s boats.

“How shall we take them?”

“With cavalry,” answered Paez.

“And where are these horse marines?” asked Bolívar.

Paez turned to his guard of honour, and picking out fifty men under Colonel Aramendi, he put himself at their head, shouting:—

“Into the water, boys! Follow your Uncle!”

Then putting spurs to his horse he plunged into the river, followed by his men lance in hand, and yelling to frighten off the alligators which swarmed around them.

The armed boats opened fire upon them, but without effect; the terrified crews jumped overboard, and fourteen boats were captured.

“If I had not seen it, I never would have believed it possible!” said Bolívar.

Bolívar simply established a blockade of San Fernando, and marched without loss of time against Morillo, who had assembled 1,600 infantry and 300 horsemen near to Calabozo. His movements were so rapid that Morillo was taken by surprise on the morning of the 10th February, 1818, and was himself involved in the rout of his cavalry, and borne from the field by the fugitives. One company of light infantry covered the retreat, and perished to the last man. Morillo shut himself up in Calabozo, which was defended by four redoubts, while Bolívar withdrew to rest his men.

Morillo, without cavalry and without supplies, saw that resistance was hopeless; he buried his guns, and on the night of the 14th February marched off towards Sombrero on the river Guarico, taking his sick and wounded with him. At midday, on the 15th, he was overtaken by Bolívar with his cavalry. The horsemen could make no impression on the solid columns of the Spanish infantry, but they delayed their march and so gave time for the Patriot infantry to come up. During the night which followed Morillo continued his retreat, and the next day reached the wooded country about Sombrero. Here he took up a strong position on the river Guarico, where he repulsed several attacks of the Patriot infantry, and after nightfall, by a forced march, reached the valleys of Aragua.

Bolívar, still with Caracas on the brain, retired to Calabozo, where he had a stormy conference with Paez. The Llanero chieftain insisted that to attempt an offensive campaign while the fortress of San Fernando was still held by the Royalists was to lose the command of the plains. Bolívar let Paez depart with his division, but marched himself with 1,000 raw infantry and 1,200 horse for the valleys of Aragua, where he greatly increased his force by recruits. At Victoria he established a reserve under Urdaneta, and detached his cavalry and 200 infantry to occupy the pass at Cabrera. Morillo, who had concentrated his forces at Valencia, surprised Saraza at Cabrera, routed Monagas at Maracay on the road to Caracas, and advanced upon Victoria. Bolívar was compelled to make a hasty retreat.

He halted at La Puerta, for him a most ominous position, and was there attacked on the morning of the 16th March by the Royalist vanguard under Morales. He succeeded in repulsing this attack, but Morillo, in person, led up the main body, and though himself wounded, very quickly drove the Patriots from the field, with the loss of 400 killed and 600 wounded.

Bolívar lost in this battle even his private papers, and seemed to have lost his head also. He exposed himself in the most reckless manner wherever the fight was hottest, seeming to court death as some expiation of the errors he had committed. Fortunately for him, on the 6th March Paez had captured San Fernando, with twenty guns, eighteen armed vessels, and seventy-three flecheras, and now came to his assistance; as did also Cedeño with his guerillas.

La Torre, who had taken command of the Royalists, found another army in front of him when he advanced to Calabozo. He retreated to the heights of Ortiz on the river Poga, which command the entrance to the valleys. Here he was attacked by Bolívar and Paez with 800 infantry and 2,000 horse. The strength of his position enabled him to repulse several assaults, after which he prudently retreated to Cura, and later on to San Carlos.

Bolívar then detached Paez against San Carlos, and marched with the bulk of his force further to the West, always aiming at Caracas. Paez was met at Cojedes by La Torre with a very superior force. Carried away by his impetuosity, he charged at the head of one squadron, and bore down all before him, but found on his return to the field that his army had disappeared. Overwhelmed by numbers the infantry had been cut to pieces, the cavalry had fled. Paez returned to San Fernando with less than half the force with which he had commenced the campaign.

Still worse fortune befell Bolívar. He abandoned the plains and advanced into a country swarming with detached parties of Royalists. He, with his staff, were attacked at night as they slept in hammocks in a wood. He threw off his green spencer and brass helmet and escaped on foot, but wandered about all alone till next day, when he fell in with his dispersed troops, flying from their encampment where they had been surprised, and ultimately rejoined Paez at San Fernando.

Bolívar, downcast and sick but not disheartened, immediately set to work to raise fresh troops, and sent Cedeño with 1,300 men to re-occupy the plains of Calabozo. Cedeño was cut to pieces by Morales, who then advanced towards the Apure, but was there totally routed by Paez on the 28th May, 1818. Then came on the rainy season, and both parties were forced to remain in quarters. The Patriot army no longer existed, all the infantry had disappeared, the arms were ruined and the ammunition was exhausted. The Liberator had lost both his credit as a general and his civil authority. All threw upon him the blame for the ill-success of the Patriot arms, and time, which has enhanced his glory, confirms in this instance the judgment of his contemporaries. But there was yet the nucleus of an army on the Apure, and Guayana was still secure.

The position of the Royalists was not much better. Morillo had 12,000 men scattered about in detachments, but he had neither money, arms, nor supplies. As he himself reported to the Viceroy of Peru:—

“Twelve pitched battles, in which the best officers and troops of the enemy have fallen, have not lowered their pride or lessened the vigour of their attacks upon us.”

The Spanish squadron lay idle at Puerto Cabello, while Argentine and Venezuelan privateers scoured the Carribean Sea with the ports of Margarita as their head-quarters.

In the East the Patriot arms had been equally unfortunate. Mariño, recalled by his partisans and supported by Gomez, Governor of Margarita, had again established himself at Cumaná and openly renounced all allegiance to the Liberator. Bermudez, who remained faithful, was routed and driven across the Orinoco with the loss of his artillery. Monagas was isolated on the plains of Barcelona.

Bolívar returned to Angostura, leaving Paez in command of the Army of the Apure, and with indomitable energy set to work to create a new army. He raised recruits in the Missions of Coroni, re-organized the divisions of Saraza and Monagas, while Bermudez recruited his forces in Guayana. Brion brought him 5,000 muskets and a large supply of military stores from the West India Islands. He also effected a reconciliation with Mariño and made him general of the Army of Cumaná. The Army of the Apure, at the instigation of Colonel Wilson, an Englishman who had joined it with a contingent of volunteers, proclaimed Paez general-in-chief. This appointment was confirmed by the Llaneros, who adored him, but Paez, taking no notice of this, assisted the Liberator in every way he could.

Bolívar then sent General Santander, with 1,200 muskets and a group of officers, to raise a new army in the Province of Casanare, from the parties of Patriots scattered on the plains, with orders to threaten the frontier of New Granada, which step had very important results.

Santander was a native of New Granada, he had served through all the campaigns of the revolution, and was a well-educated man of great intelligence.

Bolívar also issued a prophetic proclamation to the people of New Granada:—

“The day of America has come. No human power can stay the course of Nature guided by Providence. Before the sun has again run his annual course altars to Liberty will arise throughout your land.”

Bolívar’s next step was to re-ascend the Orinoco with twenty vessels and some infantry to reinforce the Army of the Apure. He had a friendly interview with Paez, and leaving him in command, returned to Angostura to attend to the claims of civil government.

The country was not satisfied with the arbitrary government of one man, and demanded some sort of popular representation. Bolívar calmly reviewed the situation and acquiesced. He re-organized the Council of State, which had fallen to pieces in his absence, and charged it with the convention of a Constituent Congress. An electoral scheme was drawn up on the basis of joining Venezuela and New Granada in one Republic, and on the 22nd October, 1818, Bolívar published this plan in a proclamation, in which as usual he renounced all claim to the supreme power, but contradicted himself by saying:—“The first day of peace will be the last of my authority.”

The world was beginning now to turn its eyes to the great movement in Spanish America. The figure of Bolívar stood forth prominently. San Martin had fought and won the Battle of Maipó, and was preparing for the conquest of Peru. O’Higgins wrote from Chile to Bolívar, recognising him as a champion in the cause of America:—

“The cause which Chile defends is the same in which Buenos Ayres, New Granada, Mexico, and Venezuela are engaged; it is that of the whole Continent of America.”

Spain solicited the intervention of the European Powers to bring about a reconciliation. Bolívar replied by a solemn declaration:—

“That the Republic of Venezuela, by right Divine and human, is emancipated from the Spanish nation; that she neither had solicited nor would admit, the mediation of the Great Powers; that she would only treat with Spain as with an equal; and that the people of Venezuela, in defence of their sovereign rights, were resolved to bury themselves under its ruins, if Spain, Europe, and all the world were to unite to keep them under Spanish domination.”

On the 15th February, 1819, the second Congress of Venezuela was solemnly installed at Angostura. Into its hands the Dictator resigned his absolute power, and in a speech disclosed for the first time his plan of constitutional organization, the union of Venezuela and New Granada in one nation. He spoke in favour of democratic government, and against the system of federation, as organically weak. At the same time he showed that no Democracy had ever had the stability of Monarchies and Aristocracies, and held up the constitution of England as a model, at once Republican and Conservative. He proposed an hereditary Senate as the base of the constitutional edifice. In regard to the executive, the idea of a life President, which he had learned from his master, Simon Rodriguez, was in his head, but he dared not as yet propose it, it would not have met with any support:—

“The executive power in a Republic must be strong, for all conspire against it. In a Monarchy the power should rest in the legislature, for all conspire in favour of the monarch.”

On the 10th February, 1819, Congress unanimously elected him President, and from that day he always respected the liberty and opinions of that body; although he still remained de facto Dictator, he appealed to them in every emergency. When he abandoned Congress he fell.

Congress established a life Senate in place of the hereditary Senate proposed by Bolívar, and adopted a centralized form of government; fixed the presidential term at four years, the President being eligible for re-election once but not oftener; and arranged the other public offices on the republican system. This constitution had yet to be submitted to the vote of the people; this was at present impossible, and it never was actually adopted, the framework alone being established.

By decree, unlimited powers were granted to the President in all provinces which were the theatre of war, and it was also decreed that the Vice-President should have no authority over the armies. This was in fact the creation of a military dictatorship.

Bolívar delegated his power to Don Francisco Antonio Zea, with the title of Vice-President. Zea being a native of New Granada, this appointment formed a link between the sister colonies. Bolívar then took the field, followed by a battalion of 500 English, under command of Colonel Elsom, which had been raised in England in the preceding year.

Often have we made mention of European officers and men in the Patriot armies, more especially of Englishmen. Venezuela, spite of the virile strength of her men, and of their heroic efforts during eight years of struggle against the disciplined armies of Spain, was the only Republic of South America to seek the help of foreign volunteers, and which had in her pay entire corps of foreign soldiers commanded by their own officers. Bolívar was something of a cosmopolitan, and had none of the prejudices of his fellow-countrymen against foreigners. More a soldier by instinct than by education, he knew that results are only to be obtained by method and discipline. He saw how San Martin, with an army well organized and well led, had triumphed over the best of the Spanish troops, and understood that he himself needed a more solid nucleus for his armies than the light horsemen of the plains, and a better disciplined infantry, to ensure success. Taught by his late disasters, which were the result both of his own imprudence and of the lack of cohesion in his troops, he was convinced that without a properly disciplined army any advantage he might gain would be ephemeral, and that if he did eventually triumph, he would stand as a conqueror over ruins. Learning these lessons, he grew from a mere warrior to be a great captain; without the science and mathematical precision of San Martin, but with greater boldness and with a heavier crop of laurels.

In 1815 endeavours had been made to raise an auxiliary corps of Irish, but it was only in 1817 that a system of enlisting volunteers was instituted in England, through the agency of Don Luis Lopez Mendez, who was at that time the representative of Venezuela in London. Without this assistance and efficient co-operation, Bolívar averred that he would have accomplished nothing in the famous campaign of 1819, for which he was now preparing.

The soldiers received a bounty of $80 on enlisting, were paid two shillings a day and rations, and were to receive at the conclusion of the war $500 and an allotment of land.

In the year 1817, various English and German officers made contracts with Mendez to take to Venezuela organized corps of artillery, lancers, hussars, and rifles. The first expedition to leave England consisted of 120 hussars and lancers, under Colonel Hippisley. Their brilliant uniforms gave them more the appearance of a theatrical troupe than a body of soldiers going on active service; nevertheless they became the basis of a corps of regular cavalry.

Colonel Wilson and Colonel Skeenen organized another corps of cavalry, but Skeenen with 300 men suffered shipwreck on the coast of France. Campbell took out the nucleus of a battalion of riflemen, which afterwards did good service in Columbia; and a subaltern named Gilmour, with the title of Colonel, and with 90 men, formed the basis of a brigade of artillery.

Such enlistments were contrary to law in England, but in 1818 and in 1819 the number of volunteers increased considerably. General English, who had gone through the Peninsular War with Wellington, contracted for a division of 1,200 English, which about this time reached the Island of Margarita, and subsequently became the celebrated Carabobo battalion. The 500 men under Colonel Elsom, who accompanied Bolívar to the Apure, were at first called the “British Legion,” but were afterwards named the “Albion” battalion. Colonel Elsom had also brought out 300 Germans under Colonel Uzlar, who had been enlisted at Brussels, which corps was landed at Margarita.

General MacGregor, of whom we already know something, brought a foreign legion of 800 men. Besides smaller contingents, General Devereux, who had initiated the idea, brought an Irish legion, in which a son of the great Irish Tribune, O’Connell, was an officer.

On hearing of the arrival of General English and others at Margarita, Bolívar sent Urdaneta there to organize them. Urdaneta found 1,200 English and 300 Germans. These troops were destined for operations on the coast of Cumaná and Caracas, but were at this time almost in open mutiny against their officers. They were brought to order by the exertions of Colonel Montilla, who had become reconciled to Bolívar. He was the last of Bolívar’s enemies to become reconciled, and from this time to the end stood faithfully by him. Montilla had served in Spain, and had travelled much in Europe; he spoke the languages of these foreigners and understood their customs. He was also energetic and was possessed of some military skill. These acquirements gave him considerable influence over the auxiliaries, which he turned to good account.

On the 30th January, 1819, Morillo paraded 6,500 men, in seven battalions and sixteen squadrons, all perfectly equipped, and opened the campaign by advancing on San Fernando. Paez burned that city on his approach, and retired south of the Arauca with 4,000 men, among whom was a squadron of English dragoons. The Royalists dragged canoes with them across the plains, and on the 4th February forced the passage of the river.

Paez then changed his tactics: he sent his infantry to the rear, and remained himself facing the enemy, with 1,500 men well mounted. Morillo saw small parties of the enemy, who hovered on his flanks and rear, but who fled from him over the vast plain whenever they were attacked. He detached Morales with 3,000 men to reconnoitre and to drive in cattle. On the 14th February one of his squadrons was so occupied when Paez suddenly rushed upon it with 1,200 men, chased the fugitives to the encampment, charged the reserve, and then retired at full speed. After nightfall he again appeared in the rear. Morillo wearied out his troops in ineffectual pursuit, till after nine days of marchings to and fro upon the immense plain, he retreated to the Apure. He then threw up fresh entrenchments at San Fernando, and making that place his head-quarters, detached divisions to occupy Barinas, Calabozo, and Sombrero. At this juncture Bolívar arrived, and at once assumed the offensive, but had the worst of it in two small affairs, and prudently withdrew beyond the Arauco.

Again Morillo advanced. On the 3rd April Paez, with 150 picked horsemen, swam the river and galloped towards the camp. Eight hundred of the Royalist cavalry, with two small guns, sallied out to meet him. He slowly retreated, drawing them on to a place called “Las Queseras del Medio,” where a battalion of infantry lay in ambush by the river. Then splitting his men into groups of twenty, he charged the enemy on all sides, forcing them under the fire of the infantry, and recrossed the river with two killed and a few wounded, leaving the plain strewn with the dead of the enemy.[19] Morillo again retreated, and the rains put an end to further operations.

Bolívar, ever impatient of inactivity, heard at this time that Santander had raised 1,200 infantry and 600 horse in Casanare, and had driven back a Royalist army of 2,300 men under Colonel Barreiro, who had marched against him from New Granada. This gave him an idea; he resolved to cross the Cordillera and save Venezuela by reconquering New Granada. He summoned a council of war, and the idea was received with enthusiasm by his officers. It was decided that Paez, with a part of the army, should attract the attention of Morillo and of the Army of New Granada upon the plains of Barinas; that Urdaneta and Montilla should embark the auxiliaries on the vessels of Brion’s squadron, and should make a descent on the coasts of Caracas, menacing the rear of the Royalist army; while he with the rest of the Army of the Apure, and with the forces of Santander, should cross the Cordillera, and capture the capital of New Granada.

This was the greatest stroke of strategy that had emanated from the fertile genius of Bolívar. It changed the whole aspect of affairs, and had a similar effect to the passage of the Andes by San Martin.

CHAPTER XLIII.

BOYACA—COLUMBIA—CARABOBO.

1819—1822.

As the invading army left the plains for the mountains the scene changed. The snowy peaks of the eastern range of the Cordillera appeared in the distance, while instead of the peaceful lake through which they had waded they were met by great masses of water tumbling from the heights. The roads ran along the edges of precipices, and were bordered by gigantic trees, upon whose tops rested the clouds, which dissolved themselves in incessant rain. After four days’ march the horses were foundered; an entire squadron of Llaneros deserted on finding themselves on foot. The torrents were crossed on narrow trembling bridges, formed of trunks of trees, or by means of the aerial “taravitas.” Where they were fordable the current was so strong that the infantry had to pass two by two, with their arms thrown round each others shoulders, and woe to him who lost his footing, he lost his life too. Bolívar frequently passed and repassed these torrents on horseback, carrying behind him the sick and weakly, or the women who accompanied his men.

The temperature was moist and warm; life was supportable by the aid of a little firewood; but as they ascended the mountain the scene changed again. Immense rocks piled one upon another, and hills of snow, bounded the view on every side; below lay the clouds, veiling the depths of the abyss; an ice-cold wind cut through the stoutest clothing. At these heights no other noise is heard than that of the roaring torrents left behind, and the scream of the condor circling round the snowy peaks above. Vegetation disappears, only lichens are to be seen clinging to the rocks, and a tall plant bearing plumes instead of leaves, and crowned with yellow flowers, like to a funeral torch. To make the scene more dreary yet, the path was marked out by crosses erected in memory of travellers who had perished by the way.

On entering this glacial region the provisions gave out, the cattle they had brought with them as their chief resource could go no further. They reached the summit by the Paya pass, where a battalion could hold an entire army in check. It was held by an outpost of 300 men, who were dislodged by the vanguard under Santander without much difficulty.

Now the men began to murmur, and Bolívar called a council of war, to which he showed that still greater difficulties yet lay before them, and asked if they would persevere or not. All were of opinion that they should go on, a decision which infused fresh spirit into the weary troops.

In this passage more than a hundred men died of cold, fifty of whom were English; no horse had survived. It was necessary to leave the spare arms, and even some of those that were carried by the soldiers. It was a mere skeleton of an army which reached the beautiful valley of Sagamoso, in the heart of the Province of Tunja, on the 6th July, 1819. From this point Bolívar sent back assistance to the stragglers left behind, collected horses, detached parties to scour the country around, and communicated with some few guerillas who still roamed about. The enemy, knowing nothing of his numbers, took up strong positions, and remained on the defensive.

But Bolívar could not remain long inactive. Barreiro occupied a position which commanded the main road to Bogotá; it was necessary to attack him before he could receive reinforcements from that city or from Morillo. No sooner had he his army once more in hand than by a skilful flank movement Bolívar established himself on Barreiro’s rear, in a country abounding in resources. The Royalists were forced to evacuate their entrenchments, and a hard fought but indecisive action took place in the swamps of Vargas on the 25th July, after which Bolívar recrossed the Sagamoso river, and forced Barreiro to again change his position. Then, deceiving him by a retreat in the daytime, he rapidly countermarched by night, and on the 5th August captured the city of Tunja, where he found good store of arms and war material, and placed himself between Barreiro’s force and the army of Bogotá.

Barreiro, finding his communications cut, marched resolutely on the capital; but it was too late. Bolívar had command of all the roads, and seeing that the Royalists were advancing by the shortest route, which crosses the small river Boyacá by a bridge, he posted his army on the right bank and waited for them.

The battle of the 7th August commenced upon the bridge itself, where the Spanish skirmishers were driven back. Barreiro then formed his infantry in columns, with cavalry on the flanks, throwing out a battalion of light infantry on the right, whose fire might enfilade the attacking column of the Patriots. The Patriot centre and right wing drove in an advanced party of Royalist infantry, and crossing a shallow stream threw themselves upon the left flank of the Royalist army, while the left wing and the cavalry attacked in front. The Royalist cavalry fled, the infantry retreated to a fresh position, but on a second attack threw down their arms. The vanguard, under Santander, accounted for all who were not with the main body.

The victory was complete. Anzuátegui, who led the infantry of the right and centre, and Rondon, who led the final charge of the Llanero horse, were the heroes of the day. The English auxiliaries were seen for the first time under fire, and showed that British solidity for which they were always famous. The trophies of the victory were 1,600 prisoners, including Barreiro himself, and 37 officers, 100 killed, and all the artillery and small arms.

Boyacá is, after Maipó, the great battle of South America. It gave the preponderance to the Patriot arms in the North of the Continent, as Maipó had done in the South. It gave New Granada to the Patriots, and isolated Morillo in Venezuela.

Bogotá was panic-stricken. Sámano fled with 200 men to Cartagena, abandoning the archives and nearly a million dollars in the treasury. The rest of the garrison retreated under Colonel Calzada to the North. Bolívar, with a small escort, entered the capital in triumph on the 10th August, amid the shouts and blessings of the populace. This victory was not stained with blood. Bolívar was no longer the man of 1813 and 1814. He shot one only of the prisoners he took, the man who had headed the mutiny at Puerto Cabello in 1812. By incessant activity, he soon became master of the whole country, which responded with enthusiasm to his call. He raised new battalions and organized a fresh army to make head against Morillo.

Where Bolívar triumphed there could be no lack of honours. Washington and San Martin avoided ostentatious demonstrations of gratitude, but Bolívar delighted in them. The municipality of Bogotá gave him a cross of honour, a triumphal entry, and a crown of laurel. A picture of Liberty supported by Bolívar was set up in the council chamber, and it was decreed that the anniversary of the great battle should be celebrated for ever. The crown of laurel sat well upon his head, upon that of Washington it would have been a caricature.

But, great as was Bolívar’s vanity, there was room also in his head for great ideas. Making use of the ample powers conferred upon him by the Congress of Venezuela he founded the Republic of Columbia, which was the dream of his life, and named Santander Vice-President of New Granada.

During a temporary absence of Bolívar, Santander shot the thirty-eight Royalist officers who were taken prisoners at Boyacá, with Barreiro at their head, and finished off the hecatomb with a countryman who had protested against it on seeing the blood-stained benches. Santander justified his cruelty by saying that it was done in retaliation of similar barbarities committed by Barreiro; but some said it was done in revenge for the death of his mother, occasioned by the privations she had suffered while hiding herself from the persecutions of Sámano.

Bolívar returned to Angostura on the 11th December, and found that affairs had greatly changed there during his absence. Zea had been deposed by a revolution, and Arismendi was now Vice-President. Mariño was General-in-Chief, and he himself was branded as a deserter for having undertaken the reconquest of New Granada without authority from Congress. The news of Boyacá had fallen as a thunderbolt among the disaffected, and his return quelled them utterly. He acted with great magnanimity, pardoned everything, resumed his authority, and announced to Congress the union of Venezuela and New Granada, calling upon it to give legal consistency to an accomplished fact.

Congress, enlarged by the addition of five New Granadian deputies from the Province of Casanare, decreed the establishment of the Republic of Columbia, in three great departments: Venezuela, Quito, and Cundinamarca, each ruled by a Vice-President. A new city, which should be called Bolívar, was to be the capital. The tri-coloured flag raised by Miranda in 1806 was to be the flag of the new nation. A Constituent Congress was convened, to assemble at Cúcuta on the frontier of Venezuela. Bolívar was named provisional President of Columbia, Santander Vice-President of Cundinamarca, and Roscio Vice-President of Venezuela. The day of the installation of the Republic was fixed for the 25th December.

This great political business being settled, war again called for the attention of the Liberator. The Spanish armies in the north and west of Venezuela, and in Quito and Cartagena, amounted altogether to nearly 20,000 men, and reinforcements were expected from Spain. The new Republic was still beset by dangers, while the strength of the country was well-nigh exhausted.

Urdaneta and Montilla had been unfortunate in their expedition. Urdaneta captured Barcelona on the 17th July, but being there attacked by very superior forces was compelled to re-embark his men and retire to Paria, where with some reinforcements he made an attack on Cumaná on the 5th August, but was beaten off and withdrew to Maturín, with a greatly diminished force. MacGregor took Portobello on the 10th April, but was soon after driven out again with heavy loss. On the 5th October he took Rio Hacha, but the conduct of his troops was so bad that the citizens rose in arms against them, and forced him to re-embark. Happily at this time the first division of the Irish Legion, 1,200 strong, reached the island of Margarita. Bolívar placed them under the command of Montilla, with orders to threaten Cartagena and co-operate with the Army of New Granada on the Lower Magdalena, while the Army of the Apure advanced from the plains of Caracas upon the capital.

Paez had invaded Barinas with cavalry, but was soon forced to retire, after which Diaz captured ten armed flecheras on the Apure river, and on the 30th September the Patriots retook San Fernando, which gave them complete command of the Orinoco.

Morillo, thunderstruck by the invasion of New Granada, remained inactive at Calabozo, and simply detached La Torre with 1,000 men to the valley of Cúcuta, whence he was driven back by the division under Soublette, which crossed the hills against him from Pamplona.

Soublette then joined Paez on the plains in his advance upon Caracas. Bolívar reinforced them with two battalions of infantry, one of which was English, and sent a strong column of Venezuelan troops, under Colonel Valdez, to the south of New Granada, in order to act against Quito. Morillo, uncertain what to do, confined his attention to securing his base of operations in the western provinces of Venezuela.

Happily for America, and for Spain also, the reinforcements expected from Europe never arrived. They could but have prolonged the struggle. The revolution of 1820 prevented them from leaving the mother country. The new policy of Spain was felt as much in the north as in the south of the Continent. At the same time that San Martin broke up the armistice of Miraflores, Bolívar signed one with Morillo at Trujillo. When negotiations for peace recommenced as Punchauca, hostilities were renewed in Venezuela.

The armistice signed by Bolívar and Morillo on the 25th November, 1820, was of great service to the Patriots, giving them much-needed breathing time, in which the country recovered somewhat from the exhaustion produced by the long continuance of the struggle, and the institutions of the new Republic became to some degree consolidated. Now that the establishment of constitutional government in Spain gave hopes of a possible reconciliation, commissioners were sent to the mother country to treat for peace, and Morillo, despairing of ultimate success, resigned his command and returned to Europe, leaving La Torre as General-in-Chief of the Royalist armies.

The armistice was badly observed by both parties, more especially so by the Patriots. While it was still in force, and while the commissioners from Columbia were at Madrid, on the 28th January, 1821, the Province of Maracaibo declared itself independent, and made overtures for a union with the Republic of Columbia. La Torre declared that he should look upon the occupation of this province by the Patriots as an act of hostility. Bolívar acknowledged that such would be the case, but stated that the Revolution itself was an accomplished fact, and as such he had a right to support it. The armistice was accordingly declared to be at an end on the 28th April, 1821.

During this interval of repose the Patriot armies had been considerably strengthened. While the armistice still lasted Montilla had taken Rio Hacha and Santa Marta, and was now besieging Cartagena with 3,000 men. Bolívar had 5,000 men at Barinas, and Paez was in his rear with 4,000 more. Bermudez with 2,000 men threatened Caracas from the East; the army of New Granada held the valley of the Magdalena. La Torre had 9,000 men besides the garrisons of the towns on the coast, but his communications were interrupted by the revolution in Maracaibo.

Bermudez after retaking Caracas and meeting with varied fortune in desultory skirmishes, was compelled to retire, but his operations were of great effect in occupying the attention of a considerable portion of the Royalist army. Bolívar established his head-quarters at San Carlos, where he was joined by Urdaneta’s division and part of the cavalry of the Army of the Apure, and then marched with 6,000 men in search of the enemy. La Torre had 5,000 men under his immediate orders, including a strong body of cavalry commanded by Morales, but, uncertain of Bolívar’s intentions, he detached two battalions of infantry and one squadron of cavalry to reinforce a Royalist division which was stationed at Barquisimeto, thus materially weakening his force on the eve of a decisive action. The rest of his army he drew up on the wide plain of Carabobo, at the foot of the passes leading through the Cordillera.

Bolívar, after surprising the principal pass, on the 23rd June, occupied the heights looking down upon the plain. He could only descend at the risk of having his troops cut up in detail before they could deploy on open ground. As Bolívar hesitated, a guide told him of another road which would lead him to the flank of the enemy. The next morning he detached Paez, with 1,500 horse, the Apure battalion, and the British legion, to attack the right flank of the Royalists, while he with the bulk of the army remained on the heights ready to descend by the main pass when the coast was clear.

The exit from the smaller pass was through a belt of woods and across a stream, commanded by a hillock which was occupied by a detachment of Royalists. The Apure battalion was in front, led by Paez in person. La Torre, with three battalions and under cover of a heavy fire of artillery, attacked this battalion as it left the pass, and threw it into disorder, but the British legion, led by Colonel Ferrier, came quickly to its assistance, deployed in line, and with the front rank kneeling poured in so heavy a fire that the advance of the Royalists was checked. The Apure rallied, and the cavalry charged on the right flank. Ferrier, having burned all his cartridges, led on his men with the bayonet and drove the enemy before him, while the Llanero horse rode them down, and their ranks were disordered by the flight of their own cavalry. One battalion stubbornly kept its formation, and repulsed every charge made upon it during a retreat of twenty miles until it rejoined the rest of the routed army, which took refuge in Puerto Cabello.[20]

This battle, the complement of that of Boyacá, which has been called the Columbian Waterloo, secured for ever the independence of Venezuela and New Granada, as Maipó and the expedition to Peru had secured that of the South; the three battles combining to prepare the definitive triumph of the emancipation of South America.

Bolívar entered Caracas for the second time in triumph; no one could now deny him the glory of being the Liberator of his country. His retention of the supreme power, both civil and military, was more than ever a necessity. This was exactly the moment he chose for another resignation; but there was a reason for it.

The Constituent Congress was convened at Cúcuta on the 6th May. It was composed entirely of civilians, of whom the greater number were lawyers, and was radically republican, opposed both to the abuses of military rule and to the anti-democratic theories of the Liberator. His resignation was thus at once a protest against accusations made against him, and an indirect way of influencing public opinion.

Congress took no notice of his resignation, but quietly debated and enacted the Constitution of Columbia. It decided that the President should hold office for four years and should not be eligible for re-election; that the General-in-Chief of the army should, while on active service, have no political power, which was equivalent to the abolition of the military dictatorship; and that the Constitution should not be reformed for ten years. It only adopted the ideas of Bolívar in one respect, which was in the establishment of a centralized system of government. His plans of a life presidency and of an hereditary Senate, as also the life Senate decreed by the Congress of Angostura, were rejected. Bogotá was declared the capital of the Republic; Bolívar, “as he feared,” was named President, and Santander Vice-President.

Bolívar repeated his resignation, but added that he would yield if Congress persisted. Congress did persist, upon which he made an eloquent speech, in which he said:—

“A man, such as I am, is a dangerous citizen under a popular government. I wish to be a simple citizen in order to be free, and that all may be so likewise.”

The Dictator of Columbia, reduced in theory to the position of a Constitutional President, showed on this occasion, as on all others, that though ambitious he was not a despot, and had no wish to be. He swore the Constitution and proclaimed it, and devoting himself to his military duties left the administration in the hands of the Vice-President, but on the 9th October, 1821, he procured the passage of a law by Congress which gave him absolute power over the army, and empowered him to organize, as he pleased, the Provinces he might liberate until he saw fit to place them under the Constitution of the Republic.

On the 1st October, 1821, Cartagena capitulated to Montilla after a siege of fourteen months. The Provinces of Panama and Veraguas, situate on the Isthmus, immediately declared themselves independent, and announced their intention of joining the Republic of Columbia. On the 28th November the fortresses of Chagres and Portobello fell into the hands of the Patriots. In Venezuela the Spaniards, with 5,000 men, now held only Cumaná and Puerto Cabello on the Windward Coast. In order to round off the territory of Columbia it was now only necessary to subjugate Quito. Thither converged the victorious armies of Bolívar from the North, and those of San Martin from the South. San Martin was already in possession of one half of Peru, and had one foot on Guayaquil.

On the 1st August, 1822, Bolívar left Cúcuta for the South. Before going he divided Venezuela into three military departments under Mariño, Paez, and Bermudez, placing them under the superior orders of Soublette. On the 16th October Cumaná surrendered to Bermudez. Puerto Cabello was still held by a Royalist garrison of 4,000 men under Morales, who, at this time, succeeded La Torre in command. Morales displayed such activity and energy as for a time changed the aspect of the war. With 1,200 men he went by sea to Maracaibo, took that city on the 7th September, and on the 12th November routed a division of 1,000 men under Montilla. Then he overran the Province of Santa Marta, and on the 3rd December occupied the Province of Coro. But in January, 1823, Santa Marta was retaken by Montilla, and Coro by Soublette. Colonel Padilla with a Patriot flotilla, which had greatly aided in the capture of Cartagena, entered Lake Maracaibo under the fire of the forts, and on the 24th July totally defeated the Spanish squadron which was there stationed. On the 3rd August Morales capitulated.

Puerto Cabello was taken by assault by Paez on the 7th and 8th November, 1823, and the war in this part of the Continent was at an end.