The grandeur of those whose names attain immortality is measured not so much by their deeds or by their talents as by the effect their memory has upon the consciences of men, causing them to vibrate from one generation to another in sympathy with an idea or with a passion. The moral grandeur of San Martin consists in this: that nothing is known of the secret ambitions of his life; that he was in everything disinterested; that he confined himself strictly to his mission; and that he died in silence, showing neither weakness, pride, nor bitterness at seeing his work triumphant and his part in it forgotten.

San Martin was a man of stalwart frame; his face was the reflex of his mind, a fiery spirit hidden under a studious reserve of manner, which at times exploded. His head, which was of medium size, he carried very erect. His thick black hair he always wore cut short; the straight high forehead indicated the presence of a strong and healthy brain. The darkness of his complexion was deepened by exposure; his large black eyes were fringed by long lashes and overhung by heavy eyebrows, which met when he frowned; these eyes were the characteristic feature of his face, disclosing the intensity of his nature, but hiding his purpose. His nose was long, aquiline, and prominent; mouth small, with firm red lips; teeth strong and white. His chin and jaw showed strength of will and the absence of animal passions. His voice was rough, his gestures simple, and his whole person inspired at once respect and sympathy.[7]

San Martin gave verbal orders with great precision, and in ordinary conversation was fond of a joke. He wrote laconically in a style of his own, and was much given to reading French authors. Very reserved and of warm affections, he was a great observer of men, studying how he might best avail himself of such talents as they possessed. Haughty by nature, unobtrusive both by temperament and by system, he forced upon himself a stoical disregard of injuries. He was studiously moderate, and patient in the elaboration of his plans. A slave to duty himself, he was tolerant of human frailty in others, but could be severe when severity was requisite. He was, as with truth and with posthumous justice he has been styled by Vicuña Mackenna, “the greatest of the Creoles of the New World.”

CHAPTER III.

THE LAUTARO LODGE.

1812—1813.

A Legislative Assembly was convened, formed of deputies from the various provinces, which drew up a constitution which virtually gave back the executive power to the Cabildos. This Assembly was dissolved by the Triumvirate, a measure greatly applauded by the public, but which attacked the fundamental principle of government.

The Triumvirate then drew up and decreed a constitution of its own, providing for the periodical election of the Executive by a mixed assembly of notables and of representatives of different towns, who should also act as a legislative council until the convention of a National Congress.

These measures were far from satisfying the requirements of the democratic party, who called for the immediate convocation of a National Congress, which would give form and life to the Republic, though government was still carried on in the name of the King. The Triumvirate opposed the convocation of a Constituent Assembly, considering the time for this had not yet come. Hence came about a fourth political evolution, more dangerous and more important than any of the others.

San Martin returned to his native country a man unknown, but with a certain repute as a brave soldier and a skilful tactician. His comrade, Alvear, on the contrary, came of a family already well known in the River Plate. Ambitious of glory and of power, and of a brilliant imagination, he was a great contrast to San Martin, and assumed an attitude of protection to him, recommending him to the Government of the United Provinces as a good soldier.

Eight days after his arrival San Martin was confirmed in his rank as a lieutenant-colonel, and was entrusted with the organization of a squadron of cavalry, in which Alvear held the rank of major and Zapiola that of captain. This was the origin of the famous regiment of mounted grenadiers, which fought in all the battles of the War of Independence, which gave to America nineteen generals and more than two hundred officers, and of which, after shedding its blood and spreading its bones across the continent from La Plata to Pichincha, a remnant returned under the command of a trooper who in thirteen years had fought his way up to the rank of colonel, and brought back their old standard with them.

The experience of San Martin in Spain had taught him that success is not possible in a long war without a solid military organization. He had seen the Spanish armies, ever routed in spite of their heroism, when remoulded under English discipline triumph over the first soldiers of Europe. He knew that Spain, once free from war in the Peninsula, would send her best troops and her best generals to America. Coolly he studied the situation, and came to the conclusion that the war was but commencing, that the armies of the revolution had no consistence, that there was no plan of operations and no preparation for future emergencies. He said nothing of this publicly, but quietly set to work to found a new military school. Under his command the first squadron of the mounted grenadiers became the school of a generation of heroes. He did as Cromwell did in his day; he made one regiment the model for an army. Under strict discipline, which did not repress individual energy, he formed soldier and officer alike, one by one, instilling into them a passion for duty and that cool courage which is the secret of success.

His first work was to instruct the officers, who under his guidance became the monitors of the future school. To the companions of his voyage he added men who had already seen service in the war, preferring those who had risen from the ranks, but took none of higher rank than lieutenant. To them he added cadets, chosen from respectable families of the city of Buenos Ayres. He was their master both in tactics and in the use of arms, and taught them both to study and to manœuvre with heads erect. Their nerves he tried by nocturnal surprises, those who failed being dismissed, as he wished “to have only lions in the regiment.”

He also established a sort of vigilance committee among them, and in extreme cases gave permission to fight duels. On the first Sunday in each month he presided at a meeting of this committee. In an adjoining room each officer wrote on a blank ticket an account of any misconduct he had observed. These tickets were folded and dropped into the hat of the Major, and were then inspected by himself. If among them was any accusation, the accused was sent from the room while the matter was discussed. A committee of inquiry was named and directed to report at a special meeting, where each officer gave his opinion in writing, and a secret ballot decided whether the accused should remain in the corps or not. In the first case the president, in the name of the committee and in their presence, gave a full apology to the accused; in the second, a special committee was appointed to wait upon him and procure his resignation, he being at the same time notified that if he continued to wear the uniform he would be forcibly stripped of it by the first officer he met.

This tribunal had a concise and severe code which classified transgressions worthy of punishment, from the act of ducking the head in danger to that of refusing to fight a duel, be it just or unjust; also striking a woman, even if insulted by her; and included all sorts of personal misconduct.

The troopers were all carefully selected, short men not being admitted. He subjected them to strict discipline, and armed them with the long sabre of Napoleon’s cuirassiers, telling them that with this weapon they could split like a melon the head of any Goth[8] they met. In their first skirmish they gave practical proof of the truth of this lesson. Finally, he gave to each trooper a war-name, forbidding him to answer to any other.

Other squadrons were formed on the model of this one till a regiment was embodied, and Government sent San Martin his commission as colonel with these words:—

“Government sends you a commission as colonel of the mounted grenadiers, and hopes that by the continuance of your steadiness and zeal you may present the country with a corps capable alone of securing the liberties of your fellow-citizens.”

Meantime San Martin had married Doña Maria de los Remedios Escalada, a beautiful girl of one of the first families of the city.

San Martin made no pretence of being a politician, but among friends he spoke plainly his opinions:—

“Until now the United Provinces have fought for no one knows what, without a flag, and without any avowed principles to explain the origin and tendency of the insurrection. We must declare ourselves independent if we wish to be known and respected.”

With these ideas he did not hesitate to join those who desired the convocation of a Constituent Congress, but he saw the necessity of establishing some powerful nucleus of political force which should bring superior intelligence to influence popular movements, preparing among a few that which should be the apparent will of all. This idea he, aided by Alvear, carried into effect by the installation of the celebrated secret society known as The Lautaro Lodge, which exercised so great and so mysterious an influence upon the destinies of the revolution.

This Lodge was established in Buenos Ayres about the middle of the year 1812. Its members were of all political parties, but the majority were of the party at that time dominant in the State. The society was organised in various grades; in the first, neophytes were initiated according to the ritual of the Masonic lodges which were introduced into Buenos Ayres prior to the outbreak of the revolution; in the higher grades they were initiated into the higher purposes of the society, and behind these was hidden the central lodge (Logia Matriz), in which lay the supreme power of the society.

The declared object of the Lodge was:—

“To work systematically for the independence and happiness of America, proceeding with honour and justice.”

Thus membership was exclusively confined to men of American birth. By its constitution, if any of the brotherhood was elected supreme ruler of the State, he could take no important step without consulting the Lodge; he could not appoint a diplomatic agent, general-in-chief, governor of a province, judge of an upper court, high church dignitary, nor general officers, and could not punish any member of the brotherhood, by his own authority. It was a law of the Society that all members should mutually assist each other in all the exigencies of civil life; that at the risk of life they should uphold the decrees of the Lodge; and should inform it of anything which could influence public opinion, or affect the public security. To reveal the secret of the existence of the Lodge “by word or by sign” was punishable by death by such means “as might be found convenient.” This penalty, was, however, only intended to have a moral effect. By an addition to the constitution, it was arranged that when any brother of the Logia Matriz was named general of an army or governor of a province, he should have power to establish an affiliated society, with a smaller number of members.

The Society failed to secure the adhesion of the members of the then Government, but most of the popular leaders joined the Lodge, and its ramifications soon extended to all classes, the most notable adherent being Dr. Don Bernardo Monteagudo, who had great influence among the younger citizens.

Very exaggerated ideas have been held as to the influence of the Lautaro Lodge. Events have been attributed to its action and it has been held responsible for executions and crimes with which the Society had nothing whatever to do. It has been made the scapegoat of all the mistakes and errors of the epoch. The Lodge of Lautaro was not a machine of government or of speculative propaganda, it was an engine of revolution, of war against a common enemy, and of defence against internal dangers. In this sense it greatly contributed to give tone and direction to the revolution, concentrating the forces of government, giving unity and regularity to political evolutions, and a vigorous impulse to military operations. Under its auspices was created the first popular Assembly which gave form to the sovereignty of the people; to it was due that spirit of propaganda which characterized the Argentine revolution, and the maintenance of the alliance with Chile, which gave independence to half the continent; but there was danger in the secrecy of its debates, and in the irresponsibility of its collective power, which was manifest when it became a tool in the hands of personal ambition. The limited sphere in which its influence was felt proves that the Argentine revolution was impelled by forces of much greater power, and obeyed general laws over which it had no control.

The Portuguese army, then holding the left bank of the Uruguay, had agreed to retire within the frontier in pursuance of an armistice arranged, on the 26th May, 1812, by the interposition of the English minister, between the United Provinces and the Court of Rio Janeiro. The Spanish flag yet floated on the walls of Monte Video, but the road was now open and a strong patriot army was concentrated on the right bank of the Uruguay.

In Buenos Ayres public spirit revived on the discovery of a vast conspiracy of European Spaniards under Alzaga, which was to have broken out on the 5th July, in concert with the forces in Monte Video and the Spanish squadron in the roadstead, aided by the Portuguese army, which had not yet retired. The Triumvirate punished the conspirators with great severity, and the base of operations was solidly secured.

In the North the situation was less promising. The Royalist army, after completing the subjugation of Upper Peru, advanced in triumph to the heart of the United Provinces, and invaded the Province of Tucuman. The relics of the Patriot army were in retreat, under command of Belgrano, and it was only hoped that they might reach Cordoba in safety. At this critical juncture Belgrano, disregarding the positive orders of Government, turned on the enemy, who were double in number to his own forces, and completely routed them on the 24th September, near to the city of Tucuman, capturing flags and cannon, and thus saved the Argentine revolution.

By the constitution drawn up by the Triumvirate, it was established that one of their number should retire every six months. On the expiration of the first six months, they convened another Assembly to elect one in place of the outgoing Triumvir. This Assembly, repeating the errors of the previous one, took upon itself the attributes of a representative body. Government dissolved it as it had the former one, and called upon Don Juan Martin Pueyrredon to fill the vacant chair; but the national spirit was no longer confined within the limits of the municipality of Buenos Ayres, and demanded the immediate convocation of a National Congress, elected by the people. The Triumvirate proposed that a third Assembly should devote itself to drawing up a plan for the election of the Congress. This Assembly accordingly met on the 6th October, in the midst of the excitement caused by the news of the victory of Tucuman, and elected as Triumvir a nominee of the Executive. Public opinion saw in this only a continuance of the provisional system and was greatly incensed, both against the Triumvirate and against the Assembly.

Behind the popular movement was the Lautaro Lodge under the direction of Monteagudo, who secured the concurrence of San Martin and his grenadiers, as also that of Alvear. This movement was much more carefully prepared than that of the 25th May, 1810, or than that of the 5th and 6th April, 1811. The leaders drew up a plan of operations, defining the parts to be played by the people, by the corporations, and by the troops. They chose beforehand the members of the future Government, and even made a programme of the policy they should pursue.

At half-past eleven on the night of the 7th October the troops of the garrison commenced to defile into the Plaza Victoria, and took up positions in front of the Cabildo. The grenadiers, with sabres sheathed, were headed by San Martin and Alvear; after them came Colonel Ortiz Ocampo with the 2nd regiment, and Lieutenant-Colonel Pinto with the cavalry. At daybreak on the 8th, the bell of the municipality was rung and the people commenced to assemble. Soon three hundred persons, among whom were the principal members of the religious orders, occupied the galleries of the Chamber and presented to the Cabildo a petition with more than three hundred signatures, asking—

“Under protection of the military for the suspension of the Assembly and the deposition of the Triumvirate, so that the Cabildo, reassuming the authority delegated to it by the people on the 22nd May, 1810, might immediately create a new Executive encharged to convene a truly national Assembly.”

The Cabildo acceded to everything, declaring by proclamation that the Assembly when convened should have supreme power within limits defined by the towns, in order to draw up a Constitution. They also appointed an executive, consisting of Don Juan José Passo, Don Nicolas Rodriguez Peña, and Don Antonio Alvarez Jonte, under the rules of the Provisional Statute. All which was submitted to the people and approved of by acclamation.

This revolution, which was municipal in its form, was essentially national and democratic in its tendency. The principle of the sovereignty of the people was recognised by calling a general Congress; the old traditions, which gave supremacy to the capital, were set aside; and the first bold step was taken in the path of independence.

The new Triumvirate lost no time in setting about their appointed task; the Constituent Assembly was speedily convened, the victorious army of Tucuman was strongly reinforced, and another army was despatched to besiege Monte Video.

Thus in the space of seven months from the arrival of San Martin in Buenos Ayres the aspect of affairs was completely changed. Government was consolidated, its policy defined, public spirit was aroused, and the revolution, with two armies, boldly displayed the flag of independence. But the military situation was precarious, everything depended upon the result of a battle.

Monte Video was a fortress of the second class, was defended by 335 guns, of which 175 were in battery, was garrisoned by more than 3,000 troops and by 2,000 militia, and was further protected by a squadron of 14 ships of war, mounting 210 guns, and by a flotilla, while the United Provinces had not even a gunboat. Here was the centre of reaction and the natural base for any expedition from the Peninsula, while the state of relations with Brazil increased the danger from this quarter.

The Royalist army, beaten at Tucuman, had been strongly reinforced, and lay entrenched at Salta, waiting the arrival of another army from Upper Peru.

Government summoned a council of military chiefs—of whom San Martin was one—and of influential citizens, to aid the Cabildo in devising measures to meet these threatening dangers. It was decided that Monte Video must be taken at any cost, and that Belgrano should be instructed to drive the enemy from Salta, in order to open the road to the centre of the Spanish power at Lima.

CHAPTER IV.

SAN LORENZO.

1813—1814.

So was inaugurated the sovereignty of the Argentine people; a formal Declaration of Independence was now all that was wanting for the establishment of a republic.

The armies in the field swore obedience to the Assembly and marched with enthusiasm under the new flag upon the fortifications of Monte Video and upon the entrenchments of Salta; only upon the water did the spirit of revolution as yet make no progress. The maritime power of Spain seemed invincible in America; her ships of war dominated the coasts from California on the Pacific to the Gulf of Mexico on the Atlantic. The sailors of Monte Video dominated the River Plate and its affluents. One day they bombarded Buenos Ayres, another they spread terror along the banks of the Uruguay, and sacked defenceless towns on the Parana. Batteries were thrown up on the banks in front of Rosario and at Punta Gorda, which only diverted attack from these points to others more defenceless.

In October, 1812, the towns of San Nicolas and San Pedro, on the western bank of the Parana, were cannonaded and sacked. Then, with the object of diverting the attention of the Patriots from the siege of Monte Video, cutting off all communication by the rivers with the interior, and of procuring supplies for the garrison of Monte Video, a flotilla was organised under the command of a noted smuggler, Ruiz by name, on which was shipped a detachment of infantry, led by a red-haired Biscayan, named Zabala, a man of colossal stature and of approved valour.

The Government of Buenos Ayres, hearing of this expedition, ordered the battery at Rosario to be dismantled and the guns to be sent higher up the Parana, to Punta Gorda, where the garrison was strengthened. The colonel of the mounted grenadiers also received orders to march with two squadrons for the protection of the coast from Zarate to Santa Fé.

The Royalist expedition, under convoy of three small ships of war, concentrated at the mouth of the Guazu, below the delta of the Parana, about the middle of January, and were there delayed by a north wind, so that when San Martin reached the coast they were only commencing the ascent of the main river. Keeping his troops out of sight, San Martin, disguised in the hat and poncho of a countryman, kept watch upon their movements from the bank, by day and by night. On the 28th January they passed San Nicolas, and on the 29th anchored above Rosario, without having as yet made any attempt to land.

Escalada, commandant of Rosario, collected twenty-two men, carrying muskets, and thirty horsemen, and with a small gun prepared to make what resistance he could. At daybreak on the 30th the flotilla cast anchor inside the island of San Lorenzo, which lies in the middle of the river about seventeen miles to the north of Rosario. The western bank here consists of high bluffs, affording no landing-places except where narrow paths were cut through them to the water’s edge; in front of one of these cuttings the flotilla anchored. Beyond the low trees which bordered the edge of the bluff stood the lonely monastery of San Carlos, a two-storey building with a belfry on the roof.

About a hundred men landed, but all the provisions they could obtain from the peaceful friars were a few fowls and melons; all cattle had been withdrawn from the coast. As the monastery bell struck half-past seven, a cloud of dust was seen on the Rosario road. It was Escalada, with his fifty men and his one small gun. The Spaniards retreated with drums beating to their boats, and Escalada opened fire upon them from the edge of the bluff, but was obliged to draw off as the guns of the flotilla had much longer range than his one piece.

On the night of the 31st, a Paraguayan prisoner escaped from the flotilla, swimming ashore on a bundle of sticks. From him the Patriots learned that the whole force of the enemy did not exceed three hundred and fifty men, that they were mounting two small guns, intending to land next day in greater force for the purpose of searching the monastery for treasure which they supposed to be there hidden, and that after securing the treasure they intended to proceed up the river, passing the batteries of Punta Gorda by night, if they could not destroy them, and so cut off the trade with Paraguay.

Escalada sent out messengers with this news, one of whom met San Martin and his grenadiers, who, following the windings of the river had been left behind by the flotilla, which was favoured by a southerly breeze. Fortunately the wind now chopped round to the north and delayed the intended landing, so that when San Martin, by forced marches, reached the post-house of San Lorenzo, three miles from the monastery, on the night of the 2nd February, nothing had yet been done. At the post-house he found fresh horses waiting for him, sent there by Escalada.

In front of the post-house stood an old carriage without horses. Two troopers rode up to it, and asked:—

“Who is here?”

“A traveller,” answered a sleepy voice.

Another horseman rode up saying—

“Be careful; this is not an enemy, but an Englishman on his way to Paraguay.”

The traveller put his head out of one of the windows of the coach, and thinking he recognized the figure and voice, said:—

“Surely you are Colonel San Martin?”

“If so, you have a friend here, Mr. Robertson,” answered the other.

And so it was; this was the well-known traveller, William Parish Robertson, who was destined to witness the memorable events of the next day, and to record what he saw.

The two friends laughed together at their unexpected meeting in the dark, and San Martin spoke of his project.

“The enemy has double the number of men that we have, but I doubt if they get the better of us.”

“So say I,” replied the Englishman, offering his visitors wine to drink to their success, and asking permission to go with them.

“Agreed,” answered San Martin, “but take care; it is no part of your duty to fight. I will give you a horse, but if the day goes against us you must run for it.”

Then, giving the order to mount, he put himself with his friend at the head of the silent troopers, and soon after midnight reached the monastery, which they entered by a gateway in the rear of the edifice.

All the cells were vacant: not a sound was to be heard in the cloisters. The gate being shut the troopers dismounted in the large courtyard. The Colonel enjoined silence upon them, and forbade them to light fires.

“It brought to mind,” says the English traveller, “the Greek host hidden in the bowels of the wooden horse, so fatal to Troy.”

San Martin, with a night-glass, ascended the tower of the church, and saw by their lanterns that the enemy was yet there. He then carefully reconnoitered the country round him, and from information furnished by Escalada formed his plans.

On the river face of the monastery a level plain, apt for cavalry manœuvres, extended for three hundred and fifty yards to the edge of the bluff. Two winding paths, one only of which was practicable for infantry in formation, led to the beach below. He then withdrew his men from the courtyard and formed them, holding their horses by the bridle, behind the cloisters and outhouses, leaving Escalada and his volunteers within the edifice. At dawn he again mounted the tower. At five o’clock, as the shades of night melted away, boats laden with armed men, were seen to leave the flotilla for the shore. At half-past five, two small columns of infantry marched up the main path.

Then San Martin came down from his post of observation, and, meeting Robertson at the foot of the stairs, said:—

“In two minutes more we shall be upon them, sword in hand.”

A few paces off his orderly held his charger ready, a fine cream-coloured horse, fully caparisoned. In a moment he was in the saddle. Drawing his curved sabre he galloped off to his grenadiers, who were now to enter into action for the first time, and in a few words exhorted them to remember his lessons, and, above all, not to fire a shot, but to trust to their lances and sabres. He put himself at the head of the second squadron and gave command of the first to Captain José Bermudez, directing him to attack the flank and cut off the retreat of the invaders, and added:—

“We will meet in the centre of the enemy’s columns; there I will give you further orders.”

The enemy, about two hundred and fifty strong, had in the meantime advanced some two hundred and odd yards. They came on quickly to the sound of drums and fifes, and with a flag, in two parallel columns of half companies, with two four-pound guns between the columns and a little in advance. Then was heard for the first time the war clarion of the mounted grenadiers.

From the right and from the left of the monastery the two squadrons dashed forward at full gallop, sabre in hand. San Martin led the attack on the left, Bermudez that on the right. San Martin being nearest was the first to fall on the enemy. The fire of the two guns failed to check the onset; the heads of the Spanish columns were thrown into disorder, but, falling back, opened a heavy fire of musketry. San Martin with his squadron encountered the column led by Zabala in person; his horse was killed by the first volley, and a fierce hand-to-hand fight raged round him as he lay upon the ground caught by the leg by his fallen steed, in which he received a slight sabre cut in the face. A Spanish soldier ran forward to bayonet him, but was run through the body with a lance by a grenadier named Baigorria. Another trooper, named Juan Bautista Cabral, sprang from the saddle and released his leader from the fallen horse, and fell himself pierced by two mortal wounds, shouting:—

“I die content! We have beaten the enemy.”

Almost at the same moment, Cornet Bouchard killed the bearer of the Spanish ensign and captured the flag.

The other column was also driven back by the charge of the squadron led by Bermudez, and the Spaniards abandoning their guns, retreated to the bluff, where they attempted to form square under protection of the guns of the flotilla. Bermudez leading a second charge upon them was mortally wounded by a cannon-shot, and Lieutenant Manuel Diaz Velez, carried away by his enthusiasm, fell with his horse over the bluff, with a ball in his forehead, and two bayonet wounds in his chest, but the Spaniards were driven headlong to the beach, leaving behind them, besides their flag, their guns and fifty muskets, forty dead and fourteen prisoners. Many of those who escaped were wounded, one of these being Zabala, their leader.

The grenadiers had fifteen killed and twenty-seven wounded, among whom each of the United Provinces had at least one representative. Lieutenant Diaz Velez, being taken prisoner, was carried on board the flotilla.

San Martin assisted by Robertson, generously furnished the flotilla with fresh supplies for their wounded, and arranged for an exchange of prisoners, giving up those he had captured for three previously taken by the boats and for his wounded officer; but Velez died in the arms of his comrades a few hours after. One of these released prisoners was a Paraguayan named José Felix Bogado; he at once enlisted in the regiment, and during thirteen years’ service with it, from San Lorenzo to Ayacucho, won his way up to the rank of Colonel, and then returned to Buenos Ayres, accompanied by seven of the original troopers of the corps.

Still covered with the blood and dust of the fight, San Martin signed the despatch announcing his victory, under the shade of an old pine-tree which still stands in the garden of San Lorenzo.

The affair of San Lorenzo, though of little military importance, had a most beneficial effect upon the Patriot cause. The safety of the towns on the banks of the Parana and Uruguay was secured; communication with Entre Rios, which was the base of the army besieging Monte Video, was maintained; the expected supplies to this city were cut off; the trade with Paraguay was preserved; and above all, a new general given to the army and new vigour to the spirits of the men.

Three days afterwards, the discomfited flotilla descended the Parana, laden with wounded instead of plunder, and carried the news to Monte Video. At the same time San Martin returned to Buenos Ayres, and the enthusiasm of his reception somewhat deadened the calumnies which already began to embitter his life.

On the 20th February the Spanish army entrenched at Salta was completely routed by General Belgrano; the third victory in less than three months. The revolution of the 8th October and the influence of the Lautaro Lodge were justified by these results.

When San Martin returned to Buenos Ayres, he found that political parties, confined within the limits of the capital, weakened by local animosities, and ultimately enclosed by the four walls of the Lodge, had degenerated into circles ruled by personal influences, and like most of the influential men of that day he became imbued with the belief that a constitutional monarchy backed by Europe was the true solution of the political problem. Neither he nor they saw that the sentiment of the people was essentially republican.

Secret societies have been at times the only means of organization left to an enslaved people, but they have never accompanied the development of revolutionary ideas; as a general rule they have produced nothing beyond abortive conspiracies; among a free people they are impotent. Thus the continuance of the secret and irresponsible influence of the Lautaro Lodge, could have no other effect than to weaken the power of the General Assembly, its own creation.

Within the Lodge itself there soon arose two distinct parties, one strove only for democratic independence, the other was a personal party with Alvear at its head, which presently absorbed the whole society.

The dream of Alvear was military glory and a dictatorship. His friend Carrera was at this time (May, 1813), both a dictator and a general in his own country; he took him as his model, but was clear-sighted enough to see that their circumstances were not identical.

In June, 1813, the army of the North a second time invaded Upper Peru under the orders of Belgrano, but was badly beaten at Vilcapugio on the 1st October, and almost destroyed at Ayohuma on the 14th November. The remnant retreated to its former position, and Belgrano requested to be relieved of the command.

The United Provinces had not at this time any general conspicuous for military genius. The laurels gained by Don Antonio Gonsalez Balcarce at Suipacha were blighted at the Desaguadero. His brother, Don Martin Balcarce, was in Chili in command of Argentine auxiliaries. The victory of Don José Rondeau, in front of Monte Video, was the first and last of his career; he lacked the qualities of a commander-in-chief. Belgrano was wanting both in technical knowledge and in warlike instinct, but was the best of them all. Of the generals of division, none had as yet shown any capacity for separate command. The revolution which had been so far opposed by mediocre generals and badly-organized troops, had now to contend against skilful generals and well-disciplined troops.

Alvear applied for the command of the army of the North. San Martin, who considered the expedition against Monte Video of more importance, willingly gave place to him, but Alvear, ever vacillating and loth to leave the field of politics, changed his mind and recommended San Martin for the post. San Martin was anxious to free himself from the trammels of party in order to gain freedom of action in the course he had marked out for himself; he accordingly accepted the command of a reinforcement for the army of the North, and received instructions to assume the command-in-chief if he should deem it advisable.

This reinforcement consisted of the 7th battalion of infantry, 700 strong, two squadrons of the mounted grenadiers, and 100 artillerymen, and reached Tucuman before the close of the year 1813. Soon after San Martin and Belgrano met at Yatasto on the road to Salta, and swore friendship to each other, an oath most faithfully kept by both.

These two celebrated men had never met before, but had for some time corresponded. San Martin presented himself as a subordinate, but Belgrano looked to him as a master in the art of war, and regarded him as his successor. After some delay, due to the reluctance of San Martin to supersede his friend, he at length assumed the command on receipt of positive orders to that effect from Government, Belgrano remaining with him in command of a regiment. Belgrano died in the belief that San Martin was the tutelar genius of South America, and San Martin to the end of his days honoured the memory of his illustrious friend as that of one of the purest patriots of the New World.

On the 22nd January, 1814, the executive power was concentrated in one person, who took the title of Supreme Director. Don Gervasio Antonio Posadas was selected by the Lodge to fill this post, and was duly elected by the General Assembly. No one was more surprised than himself at this appointment, for which his only special recommendation was that he was the uncle of Alvear, who for the present contented himself with the command of the army of the capital, until such time as he could take command of the army of Monte Video, and there achieve such military glory as should entitle him to supreme power.

The first care of San Martin, on assuming command of the army of the North, was to insist upon the regular payment of his men. There existed in the army chest a sum of thirty-six thousand dollars, drawn from Upper Peru, which Government had directed should be paid over to the General Treasury. San Martin disobeyed the order and applied the money as he wished, giving Government at the same time his reasons for so doing. Government approved of his conduct as justified by necessity, for the army was at the time in the last stage of destitution.

CHAPTER V

UPPER PERU.

1814.

Upper Peru is divided by two spurs from the Andes into three districts. The western range runs parallel to the Pacific Ocean from the desert of Atacama—which is a high tableland—to the first valleys of Lower Peru on the coast, cutting off an arid and thinly-peopled district. The central plain, well peopled but inclement, is the natural road from the Argentine Republic to Lower Peru, and was the theatre of operations during the preceding campaigns. The eastern range, with lofty peaks covered with perpetual snow, looks down upon a truly intertropical paradise. At its foot extends to the west the smiling valley of Clisa, where stands the city of Cochabamba, with easy access over the hills to the central plateau, and to Chuquisaca by valleys on the south-east. Behind Cochabamba and to the east of the range lies the Valle Grande, which collects the mountain streams and delivers them to the Amazon. More to the north-east lies Santa Cruz da la Sierra in the midst of a vast grassy plain, which slopes gradually away to the confines of Brazil, Paraguay, and the Argentine Chaco.

The social organization of Upper Peru was a continuation of the system of the Incas, complicated by the antagonism of races. Europeans had established themselves in six cities, whose former inhabitants, driven out to the ice-covered hills or to the torrid valleys, worked as serfs for their lords and masters as cultivators of the soil or as miners. The lower class in these cities consisted of half-breeds, and formed the greater part of the population. All the rest of the country was peopled exclusively by two indigenous races, who paid a capitation tax, and had no civil rights. The language of the conquerors was unintelligible to the mass of the people.

In this country the first rebellion against the domination of Spain was quenched in blood in 1809, but news of the revolution of Buenos Ayres in 1810 rekindled the smouldering embers. The movement was supported by Argentine troops under Balcarce, who won the first victory of the war at Suipacha, but was afterwards totally defeated on the Desaguadero. The Patriots of Cochabamba being thus left alone, fought another battle by themselves at Sipe-Sipe on the 13th August, 1811, but were defeated. The repulse of the second invasion under Belgrano in 1813 was another great disappointment to them, but still the spirit of the people was not crushed. There was, however, no cohesion among them; they had the courage to resist and to die on the field of battle or on the scaffold, but they were unable to concert any plan of action; thus these successive disasters greatly weakened the ties which bound them to the Patriots of Buenos Ayres, but vain were the efforts of the Spaniards to overcome the passive resistance of the people. Heads of rebels were exposed along the public roads, the properties of such as had fled were confiscated and sold, towns were sacked, military commissions terrorized the country, prisoners taken in the last campaign were sold as slaves to the owners of the vineyards and plantations of Peru, but still insurrectionary movements constantly broke out; even the Indians, armed with nothing more than clubs, slings, and arrows, braved death with the utmost stoicism, certain that they would be avenged. The Spanish general, unable either to retreat or to advance, established his headquarters at Tupiza; and while a portion of his army kept open communications in the rear, his vanguard advanced to Salta, constantly harassed by the country people, who rose in arms on the retreat of the Patriot army to Tucuman.

The army which had twice defeated the armies of the United Provinces was almost entirely composed of natives of the Highlands of Lower Peru. They were men inured to hardships and privations, untiring on the march, faithful to their flag, obedient to their officers, and undaunted under fire. They were half-breeds, who spoke the same language as the people of the country in which they fought. The climate of this country was the same as that of their own, and they were accustomed to the peculiar requirements of mountain warfare. All this gave them great advantages over the Argentine troops on that field of action, and the remembrance of defeats disheartened the Patriot army.

Belgrano after the rout of Ayohuma had left Colonel Don Juan Antonio Alvarez de Arenales as governor of Cochabamba and commandant of the Patriot forces in the rear of the enemy, and Colonel Don Ignacio Warnes as governor of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, under the orders of Arenales. Only men of their stamp could have undertaken the desperate enterprise of keeping alive the flames of insurrection in the mountains of Upper Peru after such disasters.

Arenales is one of the most extraordinary characters of the Argentine revolution. Born in Spain and educated in Buenos Ayres, he embraced with ardour the American cause, and took a prominent part in the insurrection at Chuquisaca in 1809. Taken prisoner, he was sent to Peru, and remained in the casemates of Callao till set at liberty by the Cortes of Cadiz in 1812. At the time of the battle of Tucuman he was in Salta, and there headed a patriotic movement which was immediately quelled. Previous to the battle of Salta he had joined the army of Belgrano, and accompanied it to Upper Peru. To austere manners, tenacity of purpose, and untiring activity he added the virtues of a good citizen, great talents as an administrator, inflexible will, and a brain fertile in warlike stratagems. His face never displayed any signs of either pleasure or pain, and his stern look and voice joined to his lion-like head, marked him as one born to command; but under all lay a warm heart, more anxious to do right than to win glory.

Warnes was of English descent, but was born in Buenos Ayres, and in 1807 had distinguished himself in defence of his native city.

San Martin, on learning from Belgrano the character of Arenales, at once opened communications with him, and on two occasions sent him arms and ammunition, with officers, to aid him in his operations.

While Belgrano was in Upper Peru, Colonel Landivar, a Spaniard, was made prisoner at Santa Cruz de la Sierra. This man had been one of the most merciless agents of Goyeneche, and he was kept for trial by the General, “not for having fought against our system, but for the murders, robberies, burnings, violences, extortions, and other excesses perpetrated by him in contravention of the laws of war.” It was proved that he had executed fifty-four prisoners of war, whose heads and arms had been cut off and nailed to posts on the public roads. The accused alleged that he had only ordered the execution of thirty-three individuals, and that in obedience to express orders from Goyeneche, which he produced in evidence. The defence was ably conducted by an officer of the Grenadiers, who pleaded that the prisoner having acted only in obedience to the orders of his superior could not be looked upon as other than a prisoner of war. The Court pronounced sentence of death, which sentence was laid before San Martin on the 13th January, 1814, who at once signed it without consulting Government.

This trial gives an idea of the mode in which war was waged in Upper Peru. The cruelties of the Spaniards produced reprisals on the part of the insurgents, which so filled the land with bloodshed that “the inhabitants looked calmly upon these scenes; no one hesitated to risk his own life, and all sought to shed the blood of those of the other party.” Such was the war into which Arenales now entered as leader of the fifth insurrection of Cochabamba.

The Royalist army being in possession of the central plateau the position of Arenales at Cochabamba was untenable, but the road by the Valle Grande was open to him; he could join Warnes at Santa Cruz de la Sierra, and communicate with the Argentine Provinces by the Chaco, and from Santa Cruz he could march over well-wooded plains to Chuquisaca.

On the 29th November he commenced his retreat with sixty musketeers, four small guns, a few cavalry, and a crowd of countrymen armed with clubs and slings, who covered his flanks and rear. In the valley of Misque he attempted to make a stand, but was forced across the Cordillera to the head waters of the eastern streams. Overtaken at Chillán, he beat off his pursuers, and reached the Valle Grande, where he recruited his forces, forming an infantry battalion of one hundred and sixty-five men, and two squadrons of cavalry, and was joined by some guerilla chiefs.

The insurrection spread, and Pezuela despatched Colonel Blanco with six hundred men and three light guns, to subdue it. On his march Blanco met with six heads nailed to posts, a gage of defiance from the guerillas who swarmed in the adjacent valleys.

On the 4th February the two armies met. The Patriots had at first the advantage, till a part of their raw troops were seized with panic; the Royalists captured their guns and remained masters of the field. Blanco shot his prisoners, and cut off the heads of three leaders, after which he retreated to Chillán for reinforcements.

Arenales retreated to the frontier of Santa Cruz, taking his arms and spare ammunition with him on mule-back. Reinforced by Warnes he halted at Abapo on the Rio Grande, and in March had two hundred and four infantry and four small guns. Warnes refused to recognise his authority, and took up a position for himself at Horcas with a thousand men, advancing his outposts to Herradura and Petacas, passes of the Cordillera considered impregnable, as they were nothing more than flights of stairs cut in the sides of the mountain.

At the same time the Indians of the Chaco along the banks of the river Pilcomayo rose up in favour of the Patriots; guerilla chiefs aroused a part of the Province of La Plata; and the towns in Blanco’s rear were again in insurrection. Pezuela despatched Colonel Benavente with five hundred men, against this new insurrection; but in spite of sundry advantages gained by both columns, Benavente was so weakened that he was soon reduced to inaction, and Blanco, whose troops suffered greatly from fever, was forced to evacuate the Valle Grande early in April and to retreat to Misque.

Arenales, while encamped at Tumina, received information that Blanco, resuming the offensive, had forced the passes of Herradura and Petacas, and had dispersed the division under Warnes. He at once marched towards the scene of action, and met Warnes at the head of only three hundred men. The latter, learning wisdom by his reverses, placed himself under his orders. Blanco had in the meantime taken the city of Santa Cruz, and was now coming in search of them with six hundred men, of whom one-half were regular infantry.

On the 24th May the Royalists came in sight, and the Patriots retreated by a narrow defile, leaving a small party to draw on the enemy. At dawn on the 25th they reached the town of La Florida, on the river Piray. Arenales took up a position on the right of this small river, in an open space where the bank was about two yards high. Below, the river spread out, while in front lay a wide plain. His flanks were protected by dense brushwood; the town was behind him. He planted his guns on the open, placed his cavalry in ambuscade on each flank, with Warnes in command on the right and De la Riva on the left. At the foot of the bank he opened a trench, concealed by sand and brushwood, where he stationed his infantry, kneeling, and awaited the attack. His entire force numbered about eight hundred men.

Just before noon the same day a dropping fire was heard in the woods in front. It came from the outpost, who were retreating before the enemy. Soon after that the Royalist column debouched from the wood, preceded by skirmishers. Blanco drew up his men on the plain, with strong cavalry reserves on the flanks, and opened fire with his four-pounders. Then, as the infantry advanced firing, the Patriot guns opened upon them. When the skirmishers entered the river, the entrenched infantry poured in a volley, and, springing from their shelter, charged through the smoke with such impetuosity that, aided by the cavalry on the left, they completely routed the enemy, Colonel Blanco remaining dead upon the field.

Arenales headed the pursuit in person with so little caution that he was attacked by a group of fugitives, who left him for dead with fourteen wounds, three of them in the face. His men rushed in and saved him, carrying him on their shoulders back to the camp.

Two flags, two guns, two hundred muskets, one hundred killed, and ninety-nine prisoners, were the trophies of this victory, while the Patriots lost only one man killed and twenty-one wounded, including their leader.

Such was the action of La Florida, which saved Santa Cruz de la Sierra and compelled the retreat of the Royalist army from Salta. It gives the name to one of the principal streets of Buenos Ayres. For it Arenales was raised to the rank of general, and a badge of honour was decreed to the troops engaged.

Arenales was no sooner well of his wounds than he marched with his division and reoccupied the Valle Grande, routing a Royalist force of two hundred men at Postrer Valle on the 4th July, but was on the 5th August himself defeated at Sumapaita. Afterwards reinforced by Padilla with a body of Indian slingers, he forced Benavente to retreat from Tomina, and again reoccupied the Valle Grande.

Eighteen months he maintained this extraordinary war at a cost to the enemy of 1,300 men in killed, wounded, and missing, entering Cochabamba at last in triumph, and joining the Argentine army with 1,200 men.

Over the vast plains of La Plata the revolutionary spirit had spread almost unopposed, but where mountain ranges marked out the limits of Upper Peru the movement could only advance by force of arms. The map of the old Viceroyalty did not coincide with that of the social revolution of the United Provinces. Upper Peru had been the high road from Buenos Ayres to Lima in time of peace; it now remained for San Martin to decide whether the same road was strategically the proper road to Lima or not, in time of war.

CHAPTER VI.

THE WAR IN THE NORTH.

1814.

San Martin had at that time no regular plan, he neither knew his own resources nor the designs of the enemy, and confined his efforts to the reorganization of the army. After consultation with Colonel Dorrego, who commanded the advanced posts, he determined to confide these positions to the district militia and to concentrate his regular forces in Tucuman. In carrying out this plan he received most valuable assistance from the devotion of the country people, who masked all his movements and prevented the enemy from discovering anything either of his intentions or of his strength.

His first step was the construction of an entrenched camp to the north of the city, which put a stop to desertion, and he increased the number of his troops by recruiting. Here he stood on the defensive and limited his efforts to aiding the popular movements in Salta, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz de la Sierra.

In this entrenched camp, which is known to history as the citadel of Tucuman, he established a school of instruction, holding up the mounted grenadiers as a model for the rest of his force. Belgrano was a most docile pupil, but Dorrego, though his talents were highly esteemed by San Martin, was sent off to Santiago del Estero for insubordinate conduct. Belgrano soon afterwards left the army, giving as his last advice to his friends the maxim, “that war must be waged not with arms alone but with the force of public opinion,” which maxim was at that time exemplified by facts, for the Royalist armies held only the ground on which they stood, and their movements were paralyzed by the popular insurrections all around them.

In the Province of Salta the revolutionary movement was most pronounced. The first popular manifestation in the city produced the organization of the civic militia. In 1810 the urban guard was raised by the voluntary enlistment of youths of respectable families. Then arose spontaneously among the peasants of the campaña, a corps of cavalry, with the instincts of the Cossacks, and the qualities of the Mamelukes, headed by a chieftain who made his name famous for deeds of prowess.

Martin Güemes had first borne arms against the English in the reconquest of Buenos Ayres in 1806 and in the memorable defence of 1807. He with his men, formed the vanguard of the first Patriot army which invaded Upper Peru. His horsemen penetrated as far as Potosi, and covered every movement of the Patriots. At Suipacha he did good service. In 1811 he escorted the prisoners of the campaign to Buenos Ayres, where he was appointed to the general staff with the rank of captain. In 1813 he took part in the second siege of Monte Video, and was absent from his native province at the time of Belgrano’s expedition, but when San Martin took command of the army he was at Santiago del Estero on his way back.

The insurrection of Salta in the face of the victorious enemy, was carried out with equal deliberation and courage. The population emigrated en masse, the peasants abandoned their huts and the towns were left desolate. In the capital even the tongues were taken from the church bells, lest the enemy should use them to celebrate their victories. Two old friars alone remained in each convent to administer the sacraments to the sick and aged who could not go away.

When the Royalist vanguard occupied the city of Salta a lieutenant, named Ezenarro, was detached with thirty men to occupy a district thirty-two miles to the south in the valley of Lerma. The first Sunday after his arrival, one of the men of the place after morning mass, said:—

“We must rise against this canalla.”

“With what arms?” asked another.

“With those we take from them,” said yet another.

A proprietor, named Luis Burela, put himself at their head, surprised the guard, disarmed Ezenarro and his men, and sent them prisoners to Tucuman. Then, with the arms they had captured, they marched to within ten miles of Salta, where they were met by a company of Spanish troops, whom they charged at once, and completely routed, taking most of the men with their leader prisoners, and sending them also to Tucuman. Another proprietor, named Pedro Zabala, followed the example of Burela, armed his peons and some volunteers and took the field.

So began the resistance to the enemy, in which the whole people speedily joined, so that Salta became a bulwark to the United Provinces impregnable to Royalist arms, solely by the force of public opinion roused to action.

The Province of Salta, which at that time formed a part of the jurisdiction of Jujui, enters within the first spurs of the Andes which branch from the second of the two ranges which enclose Upper Peru, and has the same physical characteristics, plains, mountains, and an intermediate tropical zone. Its possession was thus of great importance to the invaders, as it was the gate to Argentine territory. The occupation of Jujui opened the road to the plains and valleys of Salta, but even the occupation of Salta itself did not secure their position. The agricultural lands, from which alone supplies could be drawn, lay in valleys to the south of the capital, and it was this part of the Province the guerillas undertook to defend. The nature of the country eminently adapted it to guerilla warfare. The inhabitants were a hard-working race of men, strong, active, and inured to hardships, individually brave, and with a natural instinct for the class of warfare they waged. They were horsemen, accustomed to go either up or down hill at full speed, whose ordinary equipment enabled them to gallop unharmed through thorny brushwood. They were good marksmen, either from the tree-tops or from horseback, or on foot from behind their horses if need were. San Martin made no mistake when he entrusted to them the task of keeping the Royalists at bay while he was engaged in the reorganization of the regular army at Tucuman. He had seen in Spain what might be accomplished by this class of irregular troops.

Pezuela, deceived by false despatches which San Martin caused to fall into his hands, believed that these raw levies were the vanguard of the Patriot army advancing on Salta, and in consequence lost much valuable time waiting for reinforcements.

In March the Royalist vanguard advanced from Salta into the valley of Lerma, in search of supplies, under the command of Colonel Saturnino Castro, a native of Salta, who had the repute of being the first cavalry officer of the Royalist army of Peru, and whose valour had decided the day at Vilcapugio. The guerillas, who became known to history as the Gauchos of Salta, greatly harassed the progress of the expedition, swarming in the woods along the line of march, cutting off stragglers, driving in small detachments, and firing upon the main body from any convenient shelter.

On the 24th, videttes on the Guachipas River at the end of the valley, descried fifty-six of the enemy, under Captain Fajardo, approaching them. Captain Saravia collected thirty men armed with short muskets, and a group of peasantry with clubs and pikes, charged upon them and completely routed them, killing eleven including the captain, and making twenty-seven prisoners, while he had only three men killed and one wounded.

Meantime Güemes had entered the Sierra to the east of Salta, and on the 9th and 18th, two parties of his Gauchos surprised two detachments of the enemy. On the 29th he came so close to the city that Castro sallied out against him for about a league with eighty men, but was completely routed, with the loss of half his force.

For this feat Güemes was named Commandant-General of the Vanguard, and on the recommendation of San Martin, was raised to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel.

Güemes then occupied the approaches to the city and harassed the garrison by daily attacks upon the suburbs. Being reinforced from Jujui, the Royalists then organised two expeditions of 500 men each. One, composed of a battalion of infantry and a squadron of light horse under Colonel Alvarez, marched early in June into the valley of Lerma. At the town of Sumalao, Alvarez found the vanguard of the Guachipas awaiting him. The Patriot outposts were driven in, but the main body sheltered by trees and broken ground, poured so heavy a fire upon him that he was forced to return to the city, with many killed and wounded, and with the loss of all the supplies he had seized.

The other column, also composed of infantry and cavalry, was under the command of Colonel Marquiegui, who like Castro was a native of Salta, and of great repute for skill and knowledge of the country. This column marched to the east and was met by Güemes in person, who made so stubborn a resistance that it was also forced back to the city, and the siege was re-established.

Pezuela had drawn in his reserves and advanced to Jujui. Thence he sent orders to Colonel Marquiegui to march with one hundred infantry and one hundred and fifty horse, by the north-eastern frontiers of Tucuman and Santiago del Estero, to the rear of the advanced guard of the Patriots on the river Pasaje. Marquiegui carried out his instructions with great skill, captured several forts, and learned from prisoners that the army of San Martin consisted only of three thousand recruits, and that the vanguard which gave them so much trouble, was nothing but a swarm of undisciplined Gauchos; but he also learned that the object of the campaign, which was the relief of Monte Video, was now impossible, that city having already fallen.

When news of this expedition reached Tucuman, Güemes was immediately reinforced by one hundred infantry and one hundred mounted grenadiers, and Marquiegui retreated, marching one hundred leagues in a semicircle, but was prevented from carrying off either horses or cattle.

This was the last attempt at invasion; five thousand men were not enough to capture Tucuman, much less to conquer the country. Pezuela withdrew his troops beyond the frontier, and sent off a strong detachment to Cuzco to crush an insurrection which had broken out in that city.

The object of the Royalist invasion was, by a powerful diversion, to compel the Argentine Government to withdraw their army from the Banda Oriental for the protection of the northern provinces, but meantime that government had armed and equipped a small naval force, which, under the command of an Irishman named BROWN, had, on the 16th May, defeated and almost destroyed the Spanish squadron stationed at Monte Video, which city soon after surrendered to the Argentine army then besieging it under the command of Alvear.

Before the conclusion of these events, the General of the Army of the North had disappeared from the theatre of war. San Martin, after careful study of the question, had clearly discerned that the road by Upper Peru was not the true strategical line of the South American revolution. His idea was to carry the war to the West, to pass the Andes, to occupy Chile, to secure the dominion of the Pacific, and to attack Lower Peru on the flank, continuing military operations to the North merely as a subordinate detail of the main design.

This plan, the merits of which were not appreciated by his contemporaries until it was crowned with victory, is looked upon by posterity as not merely the most simple, but as the only possible plan which could give the desired result. It was then held to be folly, whilst in reality the folly lay in persevering in the attempt to reach Lima with insufficient means and by an impracticable route. Knowing that it would be looked upon as folly, San Martin kept his idea to himself, as his secret, as he himself styled it in confidential intercourse, waiting to disclose it for the day when he should hold in his hand the thunderbolt which was to shatter the power of Spain in America. Three months after taking command of the Army of the North, he wrote to his friend, Don Nicolas Rodriguez Peña:—

“Don’t flatter yourself with thinking of what I can do here. I shall do nothing, and nothing here pleases me. Our country can do nothing more here than act on the defensive, for which war the brave Gauchos of Salta suffice, if aided by two squadrons of regular troops. To think otherwise is to throw men and money into an abyss. I have already told you my secret. A small, well-disciplined army in Mendoza, to cross to Chile and finish off the Goths there, aiding a government of trusty friends to put an end to the anarchy which reigns. Allying our forces, we shall then go by sea to Lima. This is our course, and no other.”