CHAPTER XXV.

PERU.

1820.

Peru was at the Conquest truly an imperial colony, embracing all the Spanish possessions in South America, from Cape Horn to the Equator. The word Peru became synonymous with wealth. After the creation of the Viceroyalties of New Granada and La Plata, that of Peru still stretched over a vast area, extending 25 degrees south of the Equator, and from the Pacific to the frontiers of Brazil, while its central position gave it a paramount influence over all its neighbours.

Lima was the capital of this imperial colony. This city stands not far from the sea, in a beautiful valley, at the foot of the Western Cordillera, where rain never falls, and where the thunder is heard to roll and the lightning is seen to flash but once in a century. A transparent veil of clouds tempers the fiery rays of the sun, while the moist southern breeze imparts a softness to the atmosphere which has its reflex in the temperament of the people.

Lima rivalled Mexico in wealth, and was the seat of a viceregal court, with its privileges, its pomps, and its enervating vices. It was also surrounded with walls, and Callao, with its castles and batteries, was but the port of the great city. She had also an official Church, a corrupt clergy, and an inquisition, the only one which had burnt heretics in America. Three-fifths of her population, like to that of ancient Rome, was composed of slaves, freedmen, and tributary Indians, with a passion for bullfights they had learnt from the Spaniards, and for chicha,[15] which they inherited from the Incas. Her women were celebrated for beauty and grace, and she was the natal city of the patron saint of America, Santa Rosa de Lima, among whose relics are shown the dice with which she played with her Divine spouse.

Situate in the tropic of Capricorn Peru has every climate known in the world, ranging from the torrid zone at the sea level to the eternal snow of her Cordillera. The Creoles of Peru were by nature intelligent, and cultivated science and the arts. They had also a literature of their own. The Mercurio Peruano, published in the eighteenth century, was the first periodical printed in South America. The University of Lima was as famous in America as that of Salamanca in Spain; the skill of her physicians was renowned all over the continent. Peru was also the centre of the Royalist reaction; for ten years she had held the revolution in check. Thus it was when the emancipating armies from the north and from the south closed in upon her in the year 1820. She was the Carthage of San Martin.

At the outbreak of the revolution Peru proper had a population of about a million and a half, and Upper Peru had nearly half a million. Of these the indigenous races formed about half, mixed races a fifth, negro slaves about fifty thousand, and Spaniards hardly a seventh, the remainder being Creoles, the descendants of Europeans born in America. The North and the South of Peru were two separate countries, which looked with jealousy one on the other, even for many years after they became one nation. The highlands of the interior and the lowlands of the coast were also two entirely different regions. The inhabitants of the lowlands were enervated by the climate, but the mixed races which inhabited the hills were very athletic, and made excellent infantry.

Spaniards and Creoles dwelt in cities on the coast, or in fertile valleys among the mountains. The indigenous races, who were serfs, were almost entirely confined to the hills; the mixed races and free negroes formed the working classes of the cities; the farms were cultivated by African slaves. The Peruvians were thus a people who had no cohesion among them, and were easily dominated by the powerful military clique which ruled the colony, while their passive inertness was a formidable barrier to the spread of revolutionary ideas among them.

In 1810 General Abascal was Viceroy of Peru; he was already old, but was possessed of great talents, both political and military. He was one in whom prudence was blended with decision and with perseverance. The flames of insurrection blazed around him, but he showed a bold front to the storm, and made Peru the citadel of the colonial power. If it had been possible to conquer the revolution he would have conquered it; as it was he greatly retarded its progress.

To counteract the contagion of the revolutionary spirit, he inspired the Peruvians with a spirit of devoted loyalty to the mother country, and to her exiled King. On the basis of the few Spanish troops he had with him, he raised a native army, recruited in the Highlands and officered by Peruvians. Their own generals led them to victory, till the struggle, from being a revolt against the domination of Spain assumed the aspect of a civil war, in which Americans fought against Americans in defence of American ideas.

Thus Abascal quelled the rebellion in Quito, stemmed the tide of Argentine invasion, and reconquered Chile. He was then reinforced by troops from Spain, led by generals who had proved their skill in the War of the Peninsula. The revolution was crushed wherever it had broken out, save only in the United Provinces and in a part of Venezuela. In 1817 the passage of the Andes by San Martin put a stop to his success. Chacabuco and Maipó turned the tide of victory against him, and the Royalist reaction was shut up in the Highlands of Peru, where the principle of loyalty to the flag of Spain had taken deep root in the hearts of the people.

Meantime Abascal had retired from the scene, full of years and of glory, and left Pezuela, the hero of Upper Peru, as Viceroy in his place. In 1816 General José de La Serna had arrived from Spain with reinforcements, and with a commission as General-in-Chief of the armies of Upper Peru. He was an experienced soldier, but was characterized by a moderation which made him at times irresolute. In politics he professed Liberal principles, and soon acquired a great ascendency over the army, introducing a new influence which later on had very important effects.

Although Peru was the centre of the Royalist reaction, nevertheless the American sentiment of independence was still latent within her, but the want of cohesion among the various races which formed her people rendered her helpless to work out her own destiny. All nations have passed through these periods of impotence. Chile and New Granada, under much better conditions, would never have redeemed themselves without Argentine and Columbian intervention.

The revolutionary movements of the year 1809 found an echo in Lima, and a young lawyer named Mateo Silva fell a victim to his patriotic ardour, dying in the casemates of Callao, after six years of imprisonment. In 1810 another conspiracy was discovered, and was also crushed; but the progress of Liberal opinion in Spain had its effect in Peru. From the mother country came liberty of the press in 1811, and in 1812 the establishment of Cabildos was decreed by the Regency of Spain, when Peruvians for the first time made use of the right of election. But when the Spanish Constitution fell in 1814, liberty of speech fell with it in the capital of Peru.

In 1811, 1812, and 1813, various insurrectionary movements, fomented by Argentine emissaries, broke out in Upper Peru, but were promptly crushed with great severity. In 1814 a much more formidable insurrection broke out in Cuzco, the ancient capital of the Incas, in which the clergy took a prominent part. In August a Junta was formed under the auspices of the Cabildos, General Pumacahua, a pure Indian, being named President, and José Angulo Captain-General. The new Government erected two gibbets in the principal square as a sign of their authority, devised a flag, raised an army, cast small cannon, and despatched emissaries to enter into alliance with the Argentine Provinces. Their first operations were crowned with success. Arequipa fell into their hands, and an expedition to the east captured the city of La Paz; but their hordes of half-naked Indians, armed with pikes and slings, were totally routed in two battles with great slaughter by troops from Lima, supported by militia. General Ramirez, being detached from the army of operations in Salta with 1,200 men and four guns, speedily retook La Paz and Arequipa, and in March, 1815, marched against the insurgents under Pumacahua, 20,000 strong with thirty-seven guns, cut them to pieces, and put an end to the insurrection. The head of Pumacahua was stuck on a post in the great square of Cuzco. Angulo and other leaders were shot.

From that time the Patriots of Peru thought no more of achieving liberty by their own efforts, but they continued their propaganda among the people by means of secret societies, which had their head-quarters in Lima. In 1817 these societies opened communication with San Martin, who responded to their overtures by sending Torres on a special mission to Lima, as is recorded in Chapter XVII. Torres in his secret interview received very valuable information from the Patriot leaders concerning the plans of the Viceroy and the forces at his disposal, and concerted with them the means of regular communication. The subsequent appearance of the Chilian squadron on the coast, and the proclamations of O’Higgins, San Martin, and Cochrane, greatly raised their hopes, and information furnished by them was of great service to the admiral in his operations. He was accompanied by Alvarez Jonte, who acted as intermediary between him and the Patriots of Peru, and was the bearer of special instructions to them from San Martin, who directed them to make no insurrectionary movement until he was in a position to support them, when local outbreaks might be of service in distracting the attention of the enemy.

San Martin also sent off to Peru three young officers of his, who were Peruvians by birth, one of whom betrayed his trust, and caused the arrest of several of the Patriots; but the other two fulfilled their mission with great skill, so that even in the army the revolutionary spirit made great progress. Colonel Gamarra, who was in command of troops drawn from Upper Peru, was discovered to have secret correspondence with Belgrano, but the Viceroy dared not prosecute him from fear of arousing a mutiny among his men.

Pezuela was fully alive to the dangers of his position, and wrote earnestly to Spain for support. At the same time he instructed his successor in command of the Army of Upper Peru, to advance into Argentine territory. La Serna was driven back by Martin Güemes and his gauchos, but in this campaign saw such evidence of the superior quality of his troops that he thought it necessary to take precautions against possible disloyalty among them. He accordingly put an end to their independent organization, and drafted them into his Spanish regiments, a measure which was eventually productive of great evil to the Royalist cause.

The American officers were all staunch Royalists, but the Spanish officers were more or less infected with the new ideas. Thus, the morale of the Army of Upper Peru became greatly deteriorated. A part of it was soon after withdrawn to Lower Peru to reinforce the army there, in preparation for meeting the threatened invasion from Chile, upon which La Serna, alleging that he held his commission direct from the King, and had the right to dispose of his troops as he chose, threw up his command. Olañeta, a Peruvian and an ardent Royalist, was appointed to succeed him, and La Serna retired to Lima.

The Royalist army was at this time led by many distinguished officers, among them being Camba, the historian, and Valdés, who was held by Americans to be the most skilful and the most noble of all their adversaries. The army which held Lima was more than 8,000 strong, that of Upper Peru was more than 7,000. The total force, including detached garrisons, consisted of 23,000 men, against whom San Martin matched himself with 4,000 men in the last struggle for the independence of America.

CHAPTER XXVI.

THE EXPEDITION TO PERU.

1820.

The expedition took the name of “The Liberating Army of Peru.” It consisted of six battalions of infantry and two regiments of cavalry, in all 4,430 officers and men, of which more than half belonged to the Army of the Andes, with thirty-one guns, two howitzers, and two mortars, and also spare arms and equipment for 15,000 men. General Las Heras was chief of the staff, having with him Arenales and Luzuriaga; Guido also went with his friend the general-in-chief as aide-de-camp, with the rank of colonel.

The squadron consisted of eight ships-of-war, mounting 247 guns, victualled for six months, and carrying 1,600 seamen and marines, of whom 600 were foreigners, chiefly English; also of sixteen transports, with four months’ provisions for the troops, and eleven gunboats. The military chest contained 180,392 dollars in coin and in letters of credit.

On the 20th August the expedition sailed from Valparaiso, Cochrane leading the way in the O’Higgins, San Martin and his staff bringing up the rear in the San Martin. The Chilian Congress had drawn up most implicit instructions for San Martin for the regulation of his policy in establishing an independent Government in Peru. O’Higgins had issued a proclamation to the Peruvian people, telling them that the object of the expedition was simply to liberate them from Spanish domination, and that they should be perfectly free to adopt any form of government they thought best; he knew also that in the face of a foe greatly superior in strength no general could afford to tie himself down to one fixed line of conduct; he therefore never delivered these instructions to San Martin, but left him perfectly free to carry out his own plan as he might deem it best. To Cochrane his instructions were very explicit, absolute obedience in everything to the orders of the commander-in-chief.

San Martin had thought of landing in the south of Peru, and effecting a junction with Belgrano; recent events rendered this impossible. His object now was to avoid coming into contact with the Royalist forces and to prevent their concentration, while he won over the people to act in concert with him, and arranged a combined plan of action with Bolívar, who was now master of New Granada. With these ends in view he effected a landing at Pisco, after a pleasant voyage of eighteen days, with the idea of drawing the attention of the enemy to the south and away from the real base of his operations, which he purposed establishing in the northernmost province of Trujillo. Cochrane tried in vain to persuade him to land near to Callao and march at once upon Lima.

The beach of Pisco is a long stretch of sand, lying at the foot of the Cordillera, about 160 miles south of Lima. In it the sea has cut out the bay of Paracas, seven miles to the north of which stands the town of Pisco, close to fertile valleys running up between spurs from the great mountain range.

The first division, under Las Heras, disembarked in the bay on the 8th September, and the same evening occupied the town without resistance. On the 13th the whole army was on shore and encamped in the valley of Chincha, while scouting parties scoured the country.

The Viceroy had scattered his forces all along the coast from Guayaquil to Arica. A detachment of 500 infantry, 100 horse, and two guns, under Colonel Quimper, was stationed at Pisco, but fled precipitately when the squadron anchored in the bay.

On landing San Martin issued a proclamation to his army:—

“Remember that you are come, not to conquer but to liberate a people; the Peruvians are our brothers.”

He denounced the most severe penalties on any found plundering or maltreating the inhabitants, and also issued a proclamation to the Peruvians, telling them that the new constitution established in Spain had in no way changed her colonial system:—

“The last Viceroy of Peru endeavours to maintain his decrepid authority. I come to put an end to this epoch of sorrow and humiliation.”

The invaders drew plentiful supplies from the surrounding country, mounted their cavalry and recruited their infantry with 600 slaves, giving freedom to all who would join their ranks.

Pezuela, very much against his will but in obedience to orders received from the Home Government, was at this time preparing for the public swearing of the new constitution, when, on the 11th September, he received news of the landing at Pisco. He at once sent a squadron of militia to reinforce Quimper, and stationed Colonel Camba with 2,000 horse on the high road from Lima to Pisco, and, in accordance with his instructions, proposed peace to San Martin, on condition that Chile should send representatives to the Spanish Cortes to arrange their differences. Similar proposals he also sent off to the United Provinces. By this measure he recognised Chile and the United Provinces as belligerent powers, but without directly acknowledging their independence.

San Martin appointed Guido and Garcia del Rio commissioners to treat with those of the Viceroy, who were the Count Villar de Fuente and Captain Capaz, late commander of the Maria Isabel. These commissioners met at the town of Miraflores, seven miles from Lima, and at once arranged an armistice.

The Chilian commissioners declined to accept the Spanish Constitution, and rejected the proposal to send Chilian deputies to the Cortes, on which the Royalist commissioners proposed that the invading army should return to Chile, and that everything should remain in statu quo, whilst Chilian representatives went to Spain and there arranged matters with the Home Government. The others acceded to the proposition that Chile should send representatives to Spain, but proposed that the army should occupy the provinces of Potosí, Cochabamba, Chuquisaca, and La Paz, considered to be the Argentine section of Upper Peru; that the Spanish garrison of Chiloe should be included in the armistice; and that in case Bolívar should conclude a similar armistice with Morillo, the Viceroy of Peru should not reinforce the garrison of Quito.

Neither party would consent to any modification of the terms proposed by them, so the conference came to an end on the 1st October. In a private interview with the Viceroy the Chilian commissioners had insisted upon the independence of Peru as a preliminary step to any arrangement, but had expressed their willingness to accept a Prince of the Royal House of Spain as monarch of Spanish America.

The Viceroy and his commissioners threw the blame of the rupture of the negotiations upon San Martin, which accusation he answered in a dignified address to the Peruvian people.

The armistice came to an end on the 5th October, and on the same day Arenales left the encampment in the valley of Chincha, at the head of a strong detachment of the Patriot army, for the Highlands, while San Martin masked the movement by manœuvring with the rest of his army on the road to Lima.

On the 24th October, San Martin issued a decree establishing the flag and escutcheon of the new Republic of Peru, the flag white and scarlet, the escutcheon a sun rising over mountains with a tranquil sea at their feet. On the following day he re-embarked his army and sailed off for the North, apparently leaving Arenales behind him, but in reality going off to meet him.

Cochrane in his Memoirs severely criticises the disembarkation and delay at Pisco, but Camba, who was better able to judge, speaks of this measure as the first step in the destruction of the military power of Peru. The same opinion was expressed by Pezuela in his report to Government. Cochrane seems to have been anxious only to conquer the country; the object of San Martin was to revolutionize it by winning the confidence of the Peruvian people, and so securing their concurrence in founding a republic of their own, which concurrence as yet only a minority of them were prepared to give.

CHAPTER XXVII.

THE OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN.

1820—1821.

On the 29th October the squadron sighted the island of San Lorenzo, and, passing it, entered the Bay of Callao, sailing in regular order beyond the range of the batteries, a glorious pageant. The ships of war came first, with their crews at quarters and the guns run out. Then came the long line of transports, their decks crowded with troops in all the varied uniforms of the Liberating Army, including those of the division left behind under Arenales. The walls of the city and the heights behind were crowded with spectators. One of these spectators, who has described the scene, says: “The Liberating expedition and the capital of Peru were on mutual exhibition.”

A part of the squadron remained to blockade Callao, the rest, with the transports, sailed on to the Bay of Ancon, twenty-two miles to the north of Lima. Two hundred infantry and forty of the grenadiers, under Captain Brandzen, landed, under command of Major Reyes, a Peruvian, with the object of occupying the village of Chancay, and collecting horses and provisions.

The Royalist army, encamped at Asnapuquio, six miles from Lima, sent against them a column of 600 men, under Colonel Valdés, upon which Reyes retired. Brandzen, who brought up the rear with his forty horsemen, turned upon the enemy as they passed a narrow defile, and charged with such impetuosity that he drove their cavalry back in confusion upon the infantry, and gained time for Reyes to make good his retreat with all the cattle he had collected.

Meantime two important events had occurred. Guayaquil had pronounced in favour of the Revolution, and Cochrane had cut out the frigate Esmeralda from under the guns of Callac.

The province of Guayaquil, once a dependency of Peru, now formed part of the Viceroyalty of New Granada, being attached to the district governed by the Captain-General of Quito, but from the exigencies of the moment was for a time again under the rule of the Viceroy of Peru. The port of Guayaquil was the arsenal of Spain on the Pacific, and, Callao being blockaded, was now the last refuge of the navy dispersed by Cochrane, and was garrisoned by a strong battalion of Spanish infantry.

Quito had remained quiet since the outbreak of 1809, but the advance of Bolívar on the north, the invasion of Peru by San Martin, and the victories of Cochrane on the Pacific, aroused a dangerous excitement among the people. On the 9th October a part of the garrison of Guayaquil rose in arms, and was supported by the people. The Province joined the movement, declared itself independent, appointed a Junta, and placed itself under the protection of San Martin and Bolívar. Melchor Aymerich, an experienced officer, was at this time Captain-General of Quito, and had 5,000 men under his command, exclusive of the garrison of Guayaquil.

The active spirit of Cochrane found nothing more to do upon the ocean. The Spanish fleet was reduced to three frigates, the Prueba, the Venganza, and the Esmeralda. The two first, after bringing from the southern ports a division of the army of Upper Peru, had taken refuge at Guayaquil. Cochrane boldly determined to capture the other frigate by cutting her and some smaller vessels out from under the fire of the 250 guns mounted on the batteries of Callao, a feat which would increase his renown, and might induce San Martin to adopt more active operations against Lima, for the Admiral had no sympathy for his dilatory proceedings. He informed San Martin of his intention, and the Generalissimo accepted the idea with enthusiasm.

Anchored near to the Esmeralda were the corvette Sebastiana, two brigs, two schooners, and three armed merchant vessels, within a semicircular line of twenty gunboats, all shut in by a boom, through which there was only one narrow entrance. Cochrane asked for volunteers. The whole of his crews offered themselves. From them he selected 160 seamen and 80 marines. Three days he employed in preparing fourteen boats, and in instructing the men. On the night of the 4th November the flotilla assembled alongside the flag-ship, under lee of the island of San Lorenzo, where they could not be seen from shore. On the 5th the three other vessels of the blockading squadron were sent for a cruise outside. The Spaniards, thinking the blockade was raised, celebrated the occasion by a banquet on the Esmeralda. After sundown, amid complete silence, an address from the Admiral was passed round the boats:—

“The moment of glory is approaching. I hope that the Chilians will fight as they have been accustomed to do, and that the English will act as they have ever done at home and abroad.”

Men and officers were all dressed in white, Cochrane himself wearing a blue band round his arm. At half-past ten the fourteen boats pulled with muffled oars silently away in two parallel lines, one led by Captain Crosbie, the other by Captain Guise. Cochrane went himself in another boat ahead of the rest. The British frigate Hyperion, and the United States frigate Macedonia, lay at anchor outside the boom. As the boats passed by the latter ship, her officers, in low voices, wished the crews good luck; but an officer of the Hyperion, who shouted “Hurrah!” as he saw them, was put under arrest, for Cochrane was not popular with the commanders of British ships, whatever sympathies he might have among the men. The last boat of the flotilla remained alongside the Macedonia, and Cochrane, knowing nothing of the desertion, went on, followed by only thirteen boats.

It was very dark when at midnight they reached the passage through the boom. It was guarded by a gunboat. Cochrane, pistol in hand, sprang on board, threatening instant death to any man who spoke. The crew surrendered, and the boats rowed on unperceived straight for the Esmeralda, where Captain Coig and his officers, after their banquet, were playing cards in the cabin. Cochrane, leaping into the chains, was the first on board, but was knocked back into the boat by the sentry on the poop. In a moment he was up again, followed by his crew. The sentry fired, but was immediately cut down.

“Up, my lads! she’s ours!” shouted Cochrane to the other boats, and then hailed the tops, which were already occupied by men previously told off for the purpose. The sails of the ship were at his orders, but the deck was yet held by the Spanish marines, who had seized their arms on hearing the shot fired by the sentry.

Cochrane, with the boats led by Crosbie, had boarded on the starboard quarter; now Guise and his division boarded on the port side. The two parties met on the quarter-deck, Guise and Cochrane shaking hands in the enthusiasm of the moment. From the forecastle the marines opened fire upon them. Cochrane was shot through the thigh. Seating himself on a gun, he bound up the wound with his handkerchief, and ordered a charge on the enemy. Twice the assailants were beaten back, and Guise was wounded; but again he led on the boarders, and the crew of the Esmeralda were either forced overboard or driven below the hatches.

The alarm-gun roared from the castle of Real Felipe; a gunboat opened fire on the frigate, by which Captain Coig was severely wounded, and one Chilian and two English seamen were killed. The other ships beat to quarters. Guise, who was now in command, saw the imprudence of attempting any further captures. He ordered the cables to be cut, the sails were set, and the Esmeralda sailed away in the hands of her captors. The ships and the shore batteries opened a heavy fire upon her. Some of the shot passing over the Hyperion and Macedonia, these vessels hung out distinguishing lights. This contingency Cochrane had foreseen. Immediately similar lights were displayed on the Esmeralda, and at half-past two she anchored off the island of San Lorenzo. The boats followed her with two gunboats in tow which they captured as she sailed off.

The loss of the expedition was eleven killed and thirty wounded. The Spaniards lost about 160 men killed or drowned, and 200 prisoners.

The Royalists on shore accused the neutral ships of complicity in this shameful defeat, more especially the men of the Macedonia, whose sympathy for the cause of South American Independence was well known. Next day, when one of her boats was sent ashore as usual for provisions, the crew was barbarously massacred by the infuriated populace.

Cochrane sent a flag of truce on shore proposing an exchange of prisoners, to which the Viceroy acceded. About 200 Chilians and Argentines, who had languished for years in the casemates of Callao, thus recovered their liberty.

The Esmeralda was renamed the Valdivia, in honour of Cochrane’s victory of the year before.

The moral effects of the capture of the Esmeralda were very great, but from a political point of view the revolution in Guayaquil was of yet more importance. Still San Martin turned a deaf ear to the counsels of Cochrane, who advised an immediate advance upon Lima, and on the 9th the convoy weighed anchor at Ancon, and sailed to the port of Huacho, which lies ninety miles to the north of Callao. On the 10th the disembarkation commenced, and D’Albe, the French engineer, threw up three redoubts to secure the place. He also improvised a mole to facilitate communication with the squadron.

The army marched inland, and on the 17th encamped in the beautiful valley of Huara, which is well watered, and abounds in trees, and was reputed healthy; but fevers are endemical along the coast in the summer, and dysentery in the autumn.

This valley is seven miles broad by fifty-two miles in length, and is intersected by a river of the same name which flows from the Cordillera to the sea. This river is fordable at several points, but offers many strong positions for defence against superior forces, of which San Martin took advantage, and established himself solidly on its bank, ready to act either on the defensive or on the offensive, as occasion might require. In his front stretched a sandy desert, while one of his flanks rested on Huacho, and the other on the Sierra. In this position he held Lima in check, cut off all communication between the northern provinces and the capital, could either advance or retreat at his pleasure, and was ready to effect a junction with Arenales when he should make his appearance.

Pezuela occupied the entrenched camp at Asnapuquio with nearly 7,000 men. He had sent off a small division against Arenales, and now threw out a vanguard of about 2,000 men to keep watch over the movements of San Martin. With this vanguard was the battalion of Numancia, the men of which were for the most part natives of Venezuela, and the officers were all Americans. The emissaries of San Martin had been actively at work with this battalion, and both officers and men now only waited for an opportunity to join the army of the Patriots. San Martin determined to give them this opportunity.

The cavalry being now well mounted, he detached Alvarado with 700 horse against the enemy’s vanguard. Alvarado marched away along the coast on the 24th November, sending Lieutenant Pringles in advance with eighteen grenadiers, as escort to a messenger who carried a missive to inform the disaffected regiment of the approach of the Patriot cavalry, and was charged to concert measures with them for their evasion. Pringles had strict orders not to fight on any account, but, after marching all night, he found himself at daybreak on the 27th close to the entire vanguard. In front was an advance party consisting of a squadron of dragoons led by Valdés. Upon them he charged impetuously with his eighteen men, but was beaten back. Finding his retreat cut off by another squadron, he attempted to cut his way through it, but lost three men killed and eleven wounded. Seeing escape was impossible, he then plunged into the sea with such of his men as could follow him, but, when Valdés galloped forward promising quarter, he surrendered.

The fifteen prisoners were paraded in triumph through the streets of Lima, where the account of this skirmish excited great enthusiasm. They were afterwards exchanged, and Pringles was tried by court-martial. He was censured for disobedience to orders, but both he and his companions received a badge of honour bearing the words, “Glory to the vanquished in Chancay.”

The skirmish with Pringles disclosed to Valdés the proximity of the Patriot cavalry, on which he retired from the coast into the valley of Chancay, placing the Numancia battalion on guard in the pass. Alvarado found his way into the valley by another pass; but his men and horses were so fatigued by the rapid march that he was forced to withdraw to a neighbouring farm in search of rest and forage. On the 1st December he again came up with the enemy, who retreated through a rugged defile, the Numancia battalion being left seven miles to the rear of the main body. On the 3rd this battalion took advantage of its position to join the Patriot column unmolested, a welcome contingent of 650 bayonets.

San Martin declared that “the battalion belongs to the army of Columbia, but shall remain incorporated with the army of Peru till the close of the war.” He showed his confidence in his new troops by confiding the flag of the Liberating army to their care.

These events encouraged the spirit of insurrection throughout Peru, which extended even into the ranks of the army. Hardly a day passed without some desertions being reported. On the 8th December thirty-eight officers and a cadet fled from Lima, and the leaders began to lose confidence in each other. Some of the principal citizens of Lima presented an address to the Viceroy, urging upon him the necessity of an honourable capitulation with San Martin. He was generally blamed for the untoward progress of the war, but was, in reality, powerless, his authority being undermined by a conspiracy which existed in the army to supplant him by La Serna.

On the 29th November San Martin drove the Royalists out of the populous department of Huaylas, which lay in his rear. The people, to the number of 70,000, swore the independence of Peru, immediately after which the whole of the Northern Provinces pronounced spontaneously in favour of the Revolution.

These were the producing provinces of Peru, and the chief source of the wealth of the Viceroyalty. They were almost entirely included in the Intendency of Trujillo, and had a mixed population of some 300,000 souls.

A Peruvian general, known as the Marquis of Torre-Tagle, was at that time Governor of Trujillo, and had been in secret correspondence with San Martin since he landed at Pisco. On the 24th December Torre-Tagle convened an open Cabildo at Trujillo, when, after showing the hopelessness of resistance to the superior force of San Martin, he advised submission. The Royalists, headed by the Bishop, stoutly opposed the proposition. He answered their arguments by shutting them up in prison, and on the 29th raised the banner invented at Pisco, and, with the mass of the people, swore to maintain the independence of Peru. In memory of this event, Trujillo bears to this day the name of “Departamento de la Libertad.”

Torre-Tagle then called upon the city of Piura to join the movement. This city was garrisoned by a Royalist battalion, and the people were unarmed; but the attitude of the Patriot leaders was so determined that the soldiery disbanded. In this way the whole of the North of Peru, from Chancay to Guayaquil, fell into the hands of the Patriots, and San Martin secured a safe base of operations, from which he could draw supplies and horses, and which gave him at once a reinforcement of 430 infantry and 200 cavalry.

On the 5th January, 1821, San Martin advanced with his whole army to Retes, seeking a junction with Arenales. La Serna, who was now in command of the Royalist army, with Canterac as chief of the staff, immediately prepared to attack him in a most disadvantageous position, but lost so many days in these preparations in consequence of the inefficient state of the army, that the friends of San Martin in Lima had time to advise him of his danger. Meantime he was joined by Arenales, and at once retired to his former position in the valley of Huara. The opportunity thus lost greatly increased the unpopularity of the Viceroy with the army. The effects of the blockade of Callao by Cochrane began now to be severely felt in Lima, and were greatly aggravated by the operations of bands of guerillas which San Martin had organized among the country-people. An Argentine from Salta named Villar, who had been a prisoner in the casemates of Callao, was the commander of these guerillas. They infested all the roads leading to the capital, and frequently destroyed small detached parties of troops or outposts of the Royalist army.

From Huara San Martin decreed a “Provisional Regulation,” by which the territory occupied by the Patriots was divided into four departments, each under a President, who had under him governors of districts, while a Court of Appeal was established at Trujillo. This was the first attempt at Constitutional administration in Peru, and prepared the way for a National Government.

In three months San Martin had achieved success as great as the winning of a pitched battle could have given him, a result which amply falsifies the accusations of inactivity or timidity which have been brought against him, for these successes were gained by an army of 4,000 men opposed to one of 23,000.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

THE FIRST CAMPAIGN IN THE HIGHLANDS.

1820—1821.

Under the Viceroys, Lower Peru was divided into eight “Intendencias”: the most northern of these was that of Trujillo, which was also the largest in extent, and by geographical position formed a distinct country. Those of Lima and Arequipa extended along the coast, those of Cuzco and Puno lay further inland to the South, bordering upon Upper Peru; while in the centre lay the Intendencias of Huancavelica, Huamanga, and Tarma. These three form the Highlands of Peru, and are intersected in every direction by foaming torrents, passable only by suspension bridges hanging from cables of raw hide.[16] The only roads from the coast into this region pass by deep gorges through the coast range of the Cordillera, and wind round the higher mountains along the edge of precipices, ever ascending till they reach the tableland lying between the range and the main Cordillera.

General Arenales had already distinguished himself in mountain warfare, as is set forth in Chapter V., and was thus selected by San Martin at Pisco to command the flying column, which was to make its way through the Highlands and rejoin the main army in the North, which went by sea. The chief object of this expedition was to spread the revolutionary propaganda through the interior of the country, but it would also distract the attention of the enemy, and possibly prevent the concentration of his forces at Lima.

The column consisted of two battalions of infantry under Major Dehesa and Colonel Aldunate; one squadron of cavalry under Major Lavalle, and two guns. Colonel Rojas was chief of the staff. On the night of the 5th October Arenales marched in a south-easterly direction upon Ica, where Colonel Quimper was stationed with 800 men. At his approach two companies of infantry passed over to him, and Quimper hastily retreated along the coast. He was pursued by Rojas with 250 men, and overtaken at the village of Nasca. The Patriot cavalry, led by Lavalle, charged at once, and taking the Royalists by surprise, utterly routed them, with a loss of 41 killed and 86 prisoners. On the following day, the 16th October, Lieutenant Suarez, with thirty light horse, captured the baggage, so that the first force detached from the army of Lima against the expedition was totally destroyed.

The movements of Arenales were so well masked by the manœuvres of the main army, that the Viceroy knew nothing of them until the 30th October, and then allowed several days to pass before he sent off reinforcements into the menaced district. Thus Arenales ascended the mountain passes unopposed, and on the 31st October occupied the city of Huamanga, after a march of 255 miles in ten days. Here he gave his troops some rest, but sent out detachments under Lavalle and Rojas, who routed several parties of the enemy very superior in number, and captured the city of Tarma, so that by the 21st November he was in complete possession of the valley of Jauja, which is watered by the Rio Grande.

After arming the militia and giving some political organization to the liberated districts, he marched on Pasco, which O’Reilly had occupied with a division of 1,000 men, sent from Lima. On the morning of the 6th December, during a heavy fall of snow, he occupied a hill in front of the town but separated from it by a small lake and by marshes. O’Reilly on perceiving him, drew up his men in front of the town, but the Patriot infantry-led by Aldunate and Dehesa, advanced resolutely under fire of the artillery, and drove them back into the town at the point of the bayonet, where they dispersed, while Lavalle, wading through the marshes, charged the enemy’s cavalry and put them to flight.

The trophies of this smart action were 343 prisoners, including General O’Reilly and Colonel Santa Cruz, a regimental flag, and two guns; but the most important effect of the victory was to open the road for communication with San Martin at Huara.

Arenales had left a strong rear-guard at Ica under two officers named Bermudez and Aldao, who being attacked by very superior forces, were compelled to follow the main body up the mountain passes to Huancayo, and were much harassed on their way by hordes of Indian slingers.

Meantime the Spanish General, Ricafort, who was on the march from Arequipa to Lima with a detachment of the reserve, heard of the doings of Arenales and ascended from the coast into the Highlands, where he was joined by a reinforcement from Cuzco, and having collected 1,300 men marched upon Huamanga. Here he was met by a horde of Indians, who had broken out in insurrection, and having got possession of some guns and a few muskets, opened fire upon him from the high ground in front of their city. He had no great difficulty in defeating them and gave no quarter. The fugitives being joined by other parties of insurgents, then occupied the village of Cangallo with about 4,000 men. Ricafort marched against them with 400 infantry and 200 horse, and again routed them on the 2nd December, killing a thousand of them without losing one man. The village was sacked and burnt.

Ricafort then returned to Huamanga, and then learning that Bermudez and Aldao had put themselves at the head of the insurgents of Huancayo, marched against them with his whole force, dispersed the raw Indian levies, captured the town and sacked it. Aldao, who with a small body of horse, had greatly distinguished himself in this affair, retired to Jauja, where, quarrelling with Bermudez, he put himself at the head of the insurrection in conjunction with Otero, an Argentine, who had been appointed Governor by the Patriots. Then learning that Arenales had marched to the coast, he retreated to Reyes, but afterwards hearing that Ricafort had withdrawn his force from the Highlands and gone to Lima, he returned, re-occupied Huancayo, and raised an army of 5,000 Indians, to which he gave some rough sort of military organization.

Arenales rejoined the main army on the 8th January, 1821, after a triumphant march of 840 miles through the centre of the enemy’s territory, with a hostile army on each side of him.

CHAPTER XXIX.

THE ARMISTICE OF PUNCHAUCA.

1821.

When Badajoz was besieged by the French in 1811, Colonel Menacho, who was San Martin’s first chief, was in command of the garrison. He died, and in a council of war then held, one officer only voted for holding out. The city surrendered. The following year the Regency, with the approval of the Cortes, declared that in such a case, “if one officer voted for resistance, even though he was a subaltern, the garrison should not capitulate, and the said officer should take the command.” The leaders of the Spanish forces in Peru maintained that this decision gave them the right to refuse to surrender. The Liberal ideas brought by late reinforcements from Spain, while they weakened political authority, strengthened the power of the military element.

The ill-concerted measures adopted by the Viceroy to meet invasion, the timid prosecution of the war, and the successes of the Patriots, deepened the antagonism of the different parties into which the Royalist camp was divided. The idea of treachery on the part of the Viceroy became general; it was believed that he contemplated a shameful capitulation. Before adopting extreme measures, the Liberal leaders, headed by La Serna and Valdés, prevailed upon Pezuela to create a “Junta of War,” which worked like a fifth wheel in a coach; and the inactivity of the Viceroy on the occasion when San Martin advanced to Retes, precipitated matters. It was resolved to depose him.

On the night of 28th January, 1821, La Serna withdrew from the encampment at Asnapuquio. The next day Canterac and Valdés paraded the army, and the officers being convened to a council of war, summoned the Viceroy to lay down the supreme command in four hours, “as the only means of preventing disturbances and preserving Peru to Spain.” Pezuela resigned, and the power fell into the hands of the Spanish Constitutionalists, who were thus forced, in defence of the rights of the mother country, to fight in the cause of an absolute King, against their own principles as upheld by the Patriots of America.

The first act of La Serna, now Viceroy, was to invite San Martin to send Commissioners to a conference, for the purpose of putting an end to the disputes between Spaniards and Americans. San Martin joyfully acceded, and named Guido and Alvarado representatives of the Patriot cause. La Serna on his side appointed Colonels Valdés and Loriga.

The Commissioners met at a farm-house near Retes, when the Spanish officers presented a modification of the proposals of Miraflores, on the basis of the acceptance of the Spanish Constitution. The others declined to negotiate on any other basis than the recognition of the independence of Peru.

Alvarado then asked Loriga to walk out with him, leaving the other two to discuss the question. The Spanish officer accepted the invitation, and during their promenade informed Alvarado that they thought of abandoning Lima and retiring to the more healthy Highlands, where, with abundant supplies at command, they could easily beat off any attack of the Patriots. This information was the only immediate result of the conference, but it gave rise to further negotiations, on the basis of the establishment of an independent monarchy in Peru.

The change of Viceroys in no way improved the position of the Royalists; on the contrary, fresh disasters befell the army of Lima, and the new general fell into the same errors as his predecessor. The scarcity of provisions became worse in the city, and yellow fever broke out in the army, while the arrival of a royal commissioner from Spain prevented La Serna from taking any decided step.

The condition of the Patriot army at Huara was not much better. It also suffered greatly from fever, so that barely a thousand men were fit for service. San Martin himself fell ill, but his guerillas cut off supplies from Lima, and expeditions along the coast or into the Highlands kept the enemy in continual alarm.

On the 25th March the envoy from the new Government of Spain, a naval officer named Abreu, arrived at Huara, where he was well received. Four days he remained there, holding long conversations with San Martin, for whom he conceived a great admiration. At his instigation La Serna attempted to negotiate privately with San Martin, but San Martin replied that he would listen to nothing which was not proposed officially, and about the same time sent a column of his sickly troops, commanded by Miller, to act under Cochrane’s orders against Callao, and another under Arenales into the Highlands. Then leaving a strong rear-guard in charge of the hospitals and park at Huara, he embarked the rest of his troops in transports, and dropped down the coast to Ancon, whence his cavalry, aided by guerillas, scoured the country, and shut up the Royalists within a small triangle formed by the encampment at Asnapuquio, Lima, and Callao, and there awaited the opening of a formal negotiation.

After the Liberal movement in Spain in 1820 the revolusionists of South America were no longer spoken of as rebels or insurgents, but were recognized by the Home Government as belligerents, and were now invited by King Ferdinand, by a proclamation, to treat for peace with their brethren of the old country, “as their equals,” but they were offered only the Constitution of 1812, which they had already rejected by declaring themselves independent, and were threatened with forcible compulsion in case of refusal. This olive-branch of peace, wafted across the seas, only supplied fresh fuel to the flames of war.

Envoys from Spain bearing this message of peace had reached the northern part of the continent in December, 1820, during an armistice between Bolívar and Morillo. They had persuaded Bolívar to send Columbian commissioners to Spain, but in April, 1821, before anything could be known as to their prospects of success, hostilities recommenced, and there were no further attempts at negotiation.

To Mexico also the same message was sent, a message apparently one of peace and conciliation, which, when looked into, was seen to mean submission or war, and to which, in Mexico as elsewhere, answer was given in one formula, independence or war.

When in 1820 the revolution broke out in Spain the revolution in Mexico was crushed. General Vicente Guerrero, with a handful of men, alone upheld the flag of insurrection in the rough country to the south. In Mexico the movement was chiefly the work of the indigenous element of the population, and assumed the character of a rising of the proletariat against the superior classes, thus arousing a spirit of resistance in the country itself, which powerfully aided the efforts of the Royalist troops for its suppression. But amid this discord of opinions a sentiment for independence was latent in the hearts of all, so that the defeat of the insurrection combined with the Liberal movement in Spain to bring about a pacific evolution.

The proclamation of a Liberal régime in the mother country produced in Mexico a split among the various parties who had upheld the colonial system. While Spaniards became Absolutists or Constitutionalists, the natives became Republicans or Monarchists. Apodaca was at that time Viceroy. He put himself at the head of a reaction, and is said to have been incited thereto by the King, who, fearful of the fate of Louis XVI., proposed withdrawing from Europe to Mexico, there to reign with absolute power, free from the trammels of a Constitution. This reaction could not triumph without the aid of the native Monarchists.

Among the Creoles who had served in the Royalist ranks, and had distinguished himself by cruelties to his own countrymen, was a man named Agustin Iturbide, then thirty-seven years of age. Unscrupulous in the pursuit of wealth, of life either dissolute or ascetic as best served his interests, and with some natural talent, he was possessed by a secret ambition, in which race-patriotism had a place. His sleep was broken by envious dreams of the laurels gained by Bolívar and San Martin, and though lacking the great qualities of either of them, he aspired to be the liberator of Central America. This was the man selected by Apodaca to aid his plan of reaction, by leading the natives to support his policy. He appointed him Commandant-General of the South, and sent him with a division of native troops to stamp out the embers of insurrection kept alive by Guerrero. Iturbide soon came to an understanding with Guerrero and threw off the mask.

On the 24th February, 1820, in the town of Iguala, one hundred and twenty-seven miles from the city of Mexico, Iturbide published a document known to history as the “Plan of Iguala.” In it he proclaimed the independence of Mexico, and at the same time hoisted a flag symbolic of the new revolution, a tri-colour, white, red, and green; white signifying religious purity, red signifying friendship with Spain, and green signifying the hope of emancipation. The plan was in three parts, from which it took the name of the plan of the “three guarantees,” a name which was also applied to the army which upheld it. The first part stipulated the establishment of the Catholic religion to the exclusion of every other; the second part declared Mexico an independent state, under a monarchical government tempered by a constitution; the third part stipulated the union of Americans and Europeans. King Ferdinand was recognized as Emperor of Mexico, if he would come and swear to the constitution, and after him his brothers in natural succession; in default of whom, Congress should name a prince of one of the royal houses of Europe. Further, the equality of all the races—indigenous, African, and European—was proclaimed, without other distinction between them than that given by individual merit or virtue.

The leaders of the insurrection, with Guerrero, abjuring for the moment their Republican principles, placed themselves under the orders of Iturbide for the sake of national independence. The Creoles who had opposed the revolution gave in their adhesion to the new “Plan.” The clergy adopted it in hatred of the reforms of the Spanish Liberals; the Spanish Absolutists in hatred of the Constitution; and the Constitutionalists for the sake of peace. The whole country pronounced in favour of the “Plan of Iguala.” The Royalists, conquered without fighting, held only the capital, the port of Vera Cruz, and the fortress of San Juan de Ulua. In July, 1821, Iturbide was acclaimed Liberator of the country.

By this means a solution was found for the dilemma—submission, or independence and war. The bond with the mother country was untied but was not broken. Thus was it understood by O’Donoju, the successor to Apodaca, who subscribed to the “Plan of Iguala” by treaty, in August, 1821.

In Brazil, about this time, took place an evolution similar to the plan proposed by Iturbide, while in Columbia the armistice was broken, and in Peru negotiations, based on ideas similar to those enunciated in the “Plan of Iguala,” came to an end.

We have nothing more to do with the history of Mexico. Suffice it that the Spanish Government rejected the treaty signed by O’Donoju; that Mexico was lost for ever to Spain; that Iturbide seated himself on the vacant throne and was crowned Emperor, only to be deposed soon afterwards and banished. On attempting to recover his dignity he was shot.

The negotiations initiated confidentially by the Viceroy in Peru were more formally carried forward by an official invitation from him. La Serna appointed Don Manuel de Llano y Najera and Don Mariano Galdiano, both of whom were Americans, as colleagues to Abreu. San Martin appointed Guido, Garcia del Rio, and José Ignacio de la Rosa, formerly Governor of San Juan, to represent the Patriots. The farm-house of Punchauca, fifteen miles from Lima, was made the meeting place of the Commissioners. Neither party made any preliminary stipulation, both professed to be anxious for peace and union.

The Royalist Commissioners were instructed to propose the acceptance of the Spanish Constitution, with some concessions in detail, in accordance with the spirit of the proclamation of King Ferdinand. Those of the Patriots were instructed by San Martin to reject the Spanish Constitution as a bond of union, and to insist upon the recognition of the independence of Chile, of the Provinces of the River Plate, and of Peru, without consenting to any armistice, except on this basis. In case it were proposed that the Patriots should send Commissioners to Spain to treat of this matter, they were to demand, as a preliminary, the evacuation of Lima, and were to refuse to enter into any treaty for the conduct of the war, which had been spoken of, as it had up to then been carried on in accordance with the law of Nations.

The Royalist Commissioners opened the discussion by presenting a note, on the 4th May, 1821, stating that in regard to the suggestion made by San Martin at Miraflores, that independence should be secured by the establishment of a monarchy with a sovereign from the royal house of Spain, they had no power to make any such arrangement, and recommended the adoption of the Spanish Constitution since it was a proof of the liberal sentiments of the Spanish Government and of their desire for reconciliation. Further, they proposed an armistice, while commissioners were sent by both parties to Spain, as had been done by Bolívar in Columbia. To this the Patriot Commissioners replied, on the day following, that no negotiations could be entertained except on the basis of the recognition of independence, but in view of the inability of the Spanish Commanders to make this recognition, they were willing to consent to a suspension of arms, with some guarantee, and that they hoped no further mention would be made of the Spanish Constitution, the very name being obnoxious to the liberties of the New World.

To this no answer was given, but an armistice of sixteen months was proposed by the Royalist Commissioners. Then the Patriots demanded that the fortifications of Callao should be handed over to them intact, as a guarantee, to be delivered up if hostilities should again break out, and their note concluded as follows:—

“If Don José de San Martin be determined to achieve the independence of America by arms or by negotiation, he is no less desirous of uniting this part of the New World to the mother country by those bonds of friendship and commerce which would redound to the prosperity of both.”

To the surprise of the Patriot Commissioners themselves, the Viceroy acceded to the terms of the proposed armistice, only stipulating that he should withdraw twelve heavy guns from Callao. It then became easy to arrange the terms of a provisional armistice of twenty days, during which it was stipulated that La Serna and San Martin, accompanied by their respective commissioners, should meet on the 23rd May.

Neither party seems to have acted in good faith on this occasion. La Serna had written, on the 7th April, to his generals in the Highlands, that he did not believe that the negotiation would lead to any result, and instructed them to occupy advantageous positions which they might hold during a possible suspension of hostilities. San Martin afterwards declared, in a confidential letter to O’Higgins, that the division of Arenales required a rest after passing through the Highlands, and that he himself had twelve hundred sick. He knew very well that arrogant Spain would never admit a recognition of independence which was forced upon her.

On the 2nd June, the interview between San Martin and La Serna took place at Punchauca. The two leaders met very cordially, with expressions of mutual esteem. San Martin proposed the appointment of a regency for the independent government of Peru, until the arrival of a prince of the Royal House of Spain; the said regency to consist of La Serna as President, with two colleagues, one named by the Royalists, the other by the Patriots, and offered to go himself to Spain as a commissioner to arrange matters with the Home Government.

Abreu expressed himself warmly in favour of the proposition, and the Viceroy appeared willing to accept it, but desired to consult the various corporations of the Viceroyalty before concluding so important an arrangement, and promised an answer in two days. They then discussed, informally, the mode in which the troops of both armies should unite in the public square of Lima to solemnise the declaration of the independence of Peru. To the interview succeeded a banquet, at which the most friendly toasts were exchanged.

In all this the policy of San Martin was fundamentally wrong. He had no authority to make any such proposition. It was not in accordance with the principles for which he fought, and the applause with which it was received by the Monarchists of the Holy Alliance, implies its condemnation by the Republicans of America.

La Serna was more clear-sighted. Instead of consulting the corporations he consulted his officers, who, without absolutely rejecting the proposition, declined to accept it immediately, as it was in direct contravention of their orders, which forbade them to treat on the basis of colonial independence. On this, La Serna sent Valdés and Camba to arrange, if possible, with San Martin for a suspension of hostilities, until he had time to consult the Home Government. On the refusal of San Martin to listen to this proposal the commissioners again met at Miraflores, and, as neither party was ready to resume hostilities, the armistice was prolonged for twelve days, and San Martin consented to relax the blockade of Lima so as to permit the entrance of supplies sufficient for the daily wants of the citizens, “as he did not make war upon the people.” This measure greatly increased the power of the partisans of the Patriot cause in the capital, and they prevailed upon the Cabildo to make a representation to the Viceroy in favour of peace, to which representation he paid no attention, and it produced great irritation in the army.

At this time San Martin received a visit from Captain Basil Hall, of the British navy, who, in his Journal, has given a very graphic account of the policy of the great General.[17]

During the rest of the armistice the Commissioners kept up appearances by still continuing to meet, while both parties actively prepared for the resumption of hostilities. La Serna detached Canterac with the most healthy of his troops, to occupy Huancavelica, thus to be ready to meet the advance of Arenales into the Highlands. San Martin returned with all his army to Huacho.

On the 4th July, the armistice having run out, La Serna publicly announced his determination to abandon Lima, and delegated the supreme authority to the Marquis of Montemira. He left a garrison of 2,000 men in the fortifications of Callao, 1,000 sick in the hospitals, and, on the morning of the 6th, marched off with barely 2,000 men, by the valley of Cañete.

The city was panic struck. The leading Spaniards fled with their families to Callao. The women rushed to the monasteries. San Martin hastened to reassure the people by a letter to the Archbishop, and, faithful to his declared policy, made no attempt to occupy the city. A deputation of the inhabitants waited upon him, asking his protection: whereupon he ordered the guerillas, of whom they were most afraid, to retire from the neighbourhood, and surrounded the city with a cordon of regular troops, placing them under the orders of the civil governor. Still the citizens could not believe that he was acting in good faith till an order from the Governor to a regiment of cavalry, which had encamped a mile and a half from the city, to retire to a greater distance, was at once obeyed, when confidence was restored, and, at the invitation of the authorities, at sundown on the 9th, a division of the army entered the city amid the shouts of the populace.

The next day, after sundown, San Martin, accompanied only by an aide-de-camp, rode quietly through the streets of the city to the palace of the Viceroys, where the citizens thronged to give him welcome, and the members of the Cabildo, hurriedly convened, presented him with an address. He soon wearied of their enthusiastic protestations of regard, and, remounting his horse at half past ten, he rode out to the village of Mirones, half-way to Callao, where he had established the headquarters of his army, as a preliminary step to laying siege to the fortress.

On the 11th he issued various proclamations to the citizens, and the royal arms were torn down from over the doors of the public offices, the escutcheon of Peru being put in their place, with the inscription Lima Independiente.

San Martin also issued a proclamation to the inhabitants of the liberated departments, calling them to arms, and promising, with their assistance, to finish the campaign in forty days. But he took no active measures in furtherance of this project. Apparently he attached too much importance to the possession of Lima, for, with the exception of Trujillo, the country had as yet made no effort to second him, and remained passively watching the course of events.

The Viceroy, with his dispirited army, was allowed to retreat almost unmolested, though his loss by desertion was very great. Canterac was already securely established in the Highlands. San Martin here repeated the mistake he was guilty of after Chacabuco. Again he showed want of energy in following up a victory. He attached too much importance to the success which had so far attended his political combinations.