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CHAPTER X.
THE SIEGE OF KNOXVILLE.

Knoxville is situated on the northern bank of the Holston river. For the most part the town is built on a table-land, which is nearly a mile square, and about one hundred and fifty feet above the river. On the north-east the town is bounded by a small creek. Beyond this creek is an elevation known as Temperance Hill. Still further to the east is Mayberry's Hill. On the north-west this table-land descends to a broad valley; on the south-west the town is bounded by a second creek. Beyond this is College Hill; and still further to the south-west is a high ridge, running nearly parallel with the road which enters Knoxville at this point. Benjamin's and Buckley's batteries occupied the unfinished bastion-work on the ridge just mentioned. This work was afterwards known as Fort Sanders. Roemer's battery was placed in position on College Hill. These batteries were supported by Ferrero's division of the Ninth Corps, his line extending from the Holston river on the left to the point where the East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad crosses the creek mentioned above as second creek. Hartranft connected with Ferrero's right, supporting Getting's and the Fifteenth Indiana batteries. His lines extended as far as first creek. The divisions of White and Hascall, of the Twenty-third Corps, occupied the ground between this point and the Holston river, on the north-east side of the town, with their artillery in position on Temperance and Mayberry's hills.

Knoxville at this time was by no means in a defensible condition. The bastion-work, occupied by Benjamin's and Buckley's batteries, was not only unfinished, but was little more than begun. It required two hundred negroes four hours to clear places for the guns. There was also a fort in process of construction on Temperance Hill. Nothing more had been done. But the work was now carried forward in earnest. As fast as the troops were placed in position they commenced the construction of rifle-pits in their front. Though wearied by three days of constant marching and fighting, they gave themselves to the work with all the energy of fresh men. Citizens and contrabands, also, were pressed into the service. Many of the former were loyal men, and devoted themselves to their tasks with a zeal which evinced the interest they felt in making good the defence of the town; but some of them were bitter rebels, and, as Captain Poe well remarked, "worked with a very poor grace, which blistered hands did not tend to improve." The contrabands engaged in the work with that heartiness which, during the war, characterized their labors in our service.

It was not till after his arrival in Knoxville that General Burnside received a despatch from General Grant, dated November 15th, two days before. It evinced the great anxiety which the General felt in reference to events transpiring in the vicinity of Knoxville. He said, "I do not know how to impress on you the necessity of holding on to East Tennessee in strong enough terms. It would seem that you should, if pressed to do it, hold on to Knoxville, and that portion of the valley you will necessarily possess, holding to that point. Should Longstreet move his whole force across the Little Tennessee, an effort should be made to cut his pontoons on that stream, even if it sacrificed half the cavalry of the Ohio army.... I should not think it advisable to concentrate a force near the Little Tennessee to resist the crossing, if it would be in danger of capture; but I would harass and embarrass progress in every way possible, reflecting on the fact that the Army of the Ohio is not the only army to resist the onward progress of the enemy." On the same day this despatch was received, November 17th, General Grant sent another to General Burnside. He said, "I have not heard from you since the 14th. What progress is Longstreet making, and what are your chances for defending yourself?" Later, on the same day, Grant wrote, "Your despatch received. You are doing exactly what appears to me to be right. I want the enemy's progress retarded at every point, all it can be, only giving up each place when it becomes evident that it cannot longer be held without endangering your force to capture." At ten o'clock that night Grant learned of Burnside's return to Knoxville, and telegraphed to Halleck, "Burnside speaks hopefully." On that day Grant issued orders to Sherman and Thomas for the battle of Chattanooga.

Longstreet followed our troops very cautiously. At noon his advance was a mile or two from our lines, and four companies of the Thirty-sixth Massachusetts—A, B, D, G—were thrown out as skirmishers, the line extending from the Holston river to the Kingston road. But the enemy was held in check at some little distance from the town by Sanders' division of cavalry. The hours thus gained for our work in the trenches were precious hours indeed. There was a lack of intrenching tools, and much remained to be done; but all day and all night the men continued their labor undisturbed, and on the morning of the 18th our line of works around the town presented a formidable appearance.

Throughout the forenoon of that day there was heavy skirmishing on the Kingston road; but our men—dismounted cavalry—still maintained their position. Later in the day, however, the enemy brought up a battery, which, opening a heavy fire, soon compelled our men to fall back. The rebels, now pressing forward, gained the ridge for which they had been contending, and established their lines within rifle range of our works. It was while endeavoring to check this advance that General Sanders was mortally wounded. Our picket line was now advanced so as to make our position as strong as possible. There was some firing on both sides for a short time, and then all was quiet. The night that followed was cold, but clear.

The enemy did not seem inclined to attack our position, but proceeded to invest the town on the north bank of the Holston. He then commenced the construction of a line of works.

On the morning of the 19th the four companies of the Thirty-sixth Massachusetts, which had been detailed for picket duty on the morning of the 17th, were relieved by the Forty-fifth Pennsylvania. The companies relieved were ordered to College Hill to support Roemer's battery. While on this duty the officers and men were quartered in the buildings of East Tennessee College. Prior to our occupation of East Tennessee these buildings had been used by the rebels as a hospital; but, after a vigorous use of the ordinary means of purification, they afforded us pleasant and comfortable quarters.

The other companies of the Thirty-sixth—C, E, F, H, I, K—took possession of the rifle-pits in front of the Powell house, a short distance to the left of the Kingston road. This was an elegant residence, built of brick, and when the siege commenced fresco-painters were at work ornamenting its parlors and halls. Throwing open its doors, Mr. Powell, a true Union man, invited Colonel Morrison and Major Draper to make it their head-quarters. He also designated a chamber for the sick of our regiment. Early during the siege the south-western and north-western fronts were loopholed by order of General Burnside, and instructions were given to post in the house, in case of an attack, two companies of the Thirty-sixth Massachusetts. When the order was announced to Mr. Powell, he said, "All right. Lay this house level with the ground, if it is necessary." A few feet from the south-western front of the house a small earthwork was thrown up by our men, in which was placed a section of Buckley's battery. This work was afterwards known as Battery Noble.

Throughout the siege both officers and men were on picket duty every third day. During this twenty-four hours of duty no one slept. The rest of the time we were on duty in the trenches, where one-third, and sometimes one-fourth, of the men were kept awake. The utmost vigilance was enjoined upon all.

Meanwhile, day by day, and night by night, with unflagging zeal, the troops gave themselves to the labor of strengthening the works. Immediately in front of the rifle-pits a chevaux de frise was constructed. This was formed of pointed stakes, thickly and firmly set in the ground, and inclining outwards at an angle of about forty-five degrees. The stakes were bound together with wire, so that they could not easily be torn apart by an assaulting party. They were nearly five feet in height. In front of Colonel Haskins' position, on the north side of the town, the chevaux de frise was constructed with the two thousand pikes which were captured at Cumberland Gap early in the fall. A few rods in front of the chevaux de frise was the abatis, formed of thick branches of trees, which likewise were firmly set in the ground. Still further to the front were wire entanglements, stretched a few inches above the ground, and fastened here and there to stakes and stumps. In front of a portion of our lines another obstacle was formed by constructing dams across first and second creeks, so called, and throwing back the water. The whole constituted a series of obstacles which could not be passed, in face of a heavy fire, without great difficulty and fearful loss.

Morrison's brigade held the line of defences from the Holston river—the extreme left of our line—to Fort Sanders. The following was the position of the several regiments of the brigade. The Forty-fifth Pennsylvania was on the left, its left on the river. On its right was the Thirty-sixth Massachusetts. Then came the Eighth Michigan. The Seventy-ninth New York (Highlanders) formed the garrison of Fort Sanders. Between the Eighth Michigan and Fort Sanders was the One Hundredth Pennsylvania (Roundheads).

On the evening of November 20th the Seventeenth Michigan made a sortie and drove the rebels from a house and out-buildings on the Kingston road, a short distance from Fort Sanders. It was a brick house, and afforded a near and safe position for the enemy's sharp-shooters, who of late had become somewhat annoying to the working parties at the fort. The movement was a hazardous one, but was successfully accomplished, with the loss of two men killed. This sortie waked up the rebel batteries, and a few shells were thrown into our lines; but soon all was quiet, and at length the light of the burning buildings went out.

In the afternoon of the 21st the four right companies of the Thirty-sixth Massachusetts,—A, B, D, G,—on duty at the East Tennessee College, moved out to the rifle-pits. The siege had now continued several days. The rebels had constructed works, offensive and defensive, in our front; but the greater part of their force seemed to have moved to the right. On the 22d of November, however, they returned, not having found evidently the weak place in our lines which they sought. It was now thought they might attack our front that night, and orders were given to the men on duty in the outer works to exercise the utmost vigilance. But the night—a beautiful moonlight night—passed quietly.[5]

With each day our confidence in the strength of our position increased, and we soon felt able to repel an assault from any quarter. But the question of supplies was a serious one. When the siege commenced there was in the Commissary Department at Knoxville little more than a day's ration for the whole army. Should the enemy gain possession of the south bank of the Holston our only means of subsistence would be cut off. Thus far his attempts in this direction had failed, and the whole country from the French Broad to the Holston, was open to our foraging parties. In this way a considerable quantity of corn and wheat was soon collected in Knoxville. Bread, made from a mixture of meal and flour, was issued to the men, but only in half and quarter rations. Occasionally a small quantity of fresh pork was also issued. Neither sugar nor coffee was issued after the first days of the siege.

The enemy, foiled in his attempts to seize the south bank of the Holston, now commenced the construction of a raft at Boyd's Ferry, above Knoxville. Floating this down the swift current of the stream, he hoped to carry away our pontoon, and thus cut off our communication with the country beyond. To thwart this plan an iron cable, one thousand feet in length, was stretched across the river above the bridge. This was done under the direction of Captain Poe. Afterwards a boom of logs, fastened end to end by chains, was constructed still farther up the river. The boom was fifteen hundred feet in length.

On the 23d the Thirty-sixth Massachusetts moved a little to the left, in order to make room for another regiment in the pits to our right. In the evening the rebels made an attack on our pickets in front of the left of the Second Division, Ninth Corps. In falling back our men fired the buildings on the ground abandoned, lest they should become a shelter for the enemy's sharp-shooters. Among the buildings thus destroyed were the arsenal and machine-shops near the depot. The light of the blazing buildings illuminated the whole town.

The next day, November 24th, the Twenty-first Massachusetts and the Forty-eighth Pennsylvania, the whole under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Hawkes of the Twenty-first, drove back the rebels at this point, and reoccupied our old position.

Early in the morning of the same day, an attack was made by the Second Michigan—one hundred and ninety-seven men—on the advanced parallel, which the enemy had so constructed as to envelop the north-west bastion of Fort Sanders. The works were gallantly carried; but, before the supporting columns could come up, our men were repulsed by fresh troops which the enemy had at hand. Our loss was severe, amounting to sixty-seven, including Major Byington, commanding the Second Michigan, who was left on the field mortally wounded.

That night we had orders that neither officers nor men should sleep. It was a long night of watching. There was a total eclipse of the moon during the night, and we were in shadow from two o'clock until four.

On the 25th of November the enemy, having on the day previous crossed the Holston at a point below us, made another unsuccessful attempt to occupy the heights opposite Knoxville. He succeeded, however, in planting a battery on a knob about one hundred and fifty feet above the river, and twenty-five hundred yards south of Fort Sanders. This position commanded Fort Sanders, so that it now became necessary to defilade the fort.

November 26th was our national Thanksgiving day, and General Burnside issued an order, in which he expressed the hope that the day would be observed by all, as far as military operations would allow. He knew that the rations were short, and that the day would be unlike the joyous festival we were wont to celebrate in our distant New England homes; and so he reminded us of the circumstances of trial under which our fathers first observed the day. He also reminded us of the debt of gratitude which we owed to Him who during the year had not only prospered our arms, but had kindly preserved our lives. Accordingly we ate our corn bread with thanksgiving; and, forgetting our own privations, thought only of the loved ones at home, who, uncertain of our fate, would that day find little cheer at the table and by the fireside.

Allusion has already been made to the bastion-work known as Fort Sanders, which was named for the gallant commander of the cavalry who laid down his life in front of Knoxville at the beginning of the siege. A more particular description of this fort is now needed. The main line, held by our troops, made almost a right angle at the fort, the north-west bastion being the salient of the angle. The ground in front of the fort, from which the wood had been cleared, sloped gradually for a distance of eighty yards, and then abruptly descended to a wide ravine. Under the direction of Lieutenant Benjamin, Second United States Artillery, and Chief of Artillery of the Army of the Ohio, the fort had now been made as strong as the means at his disposal and the rules of military art admitted. Eighty and thirty yards in front of the fort rifle-pits were constructed. These were to be used in case our men were driven in from the outer line. Between these pits and the fort were wire entanglements, running from stump to stump, and also an abatis. Sand-bags and barrels were arranged so as to cover the embrasures. Traverses, also, were built for the protection of the guns, and in passing from one position to another. In the fort were four twenty-pounder Parrotts (Benjamin's battery), four light twelve-pounders (of Buckley's battery), and two three-inch steel rifle-guns.

November 27th all was quiet along the lines, except an occasional shot from the rebel pickets, until evening, when cheers and strains of music enlivened the enemy's camp. We now know that the arrival of two brigades of Buckner's command, reinforcements from Bragg's army, was the occasion of their rejoicing; but at the time we could not solve the mystery. Was it possible that Grant had met with a reverse? we hesitatingly asked. Or had the enemy received reinforcements? While on picket that night our men could distinctly hear the rebels chopping on the knob that they had so recently occupied on the opposite bank of the river. They were clearing away the trees in front of the earthwork which they had constructed the day before. Would they attack at daybreak? So we thought, connecting the fact with the cheers and music of the earlier part of the night; but the morning opened as quietly as any of its predecessors. Late in the afternoon the enemy seemed to be placing his troops in position in our front, and our men stood in the trenches awaiting an attack; yet the day wore away without further demonstrations.

A little after eleven o'clock P.M., November 28th, we were called to our places in the trenches by heavy musketry to the right. It was a cloudy, dark night, and at a distance of only a few feet it was impossible to distinguish any object. The firing soon ceased, with the exception of an occasional shot on the picket line. An attack had evidently been made on our rifle-pits; but at what precise point, or with what success, was as yet unknown. Reports soon came in. The enemy had first driven in the pickets in front of Fort Sanders, and had then attacked our line, which was also obliged to fall back. The rebels in front of the Thirty-sixth, however, did not advance beyond the pits which our men had just vacated, and a new line was at once established by Captain Buffum, of Company D, our brigade officer of the day. We afterwards learned that the enemy had advanced along the whole line and established themselves as near as possible to our works.

It was now evident that the enemy intended an attack; but where would it be made? All that long, cold night—our men were without overcoats—we stood in the trenches pondering that question. Might not this demonstration in our front be only a feint to draw our attention from other parts of the line, where the chief blow was to be struck? So some thought. Gradually the night wore away.

A little after six o'clock the next morning the enemy suddenly opened a furious cannonade. This was mostly directed against Fort Sanders; but several shells struck the Powell House, in rear of Battery Noble. Roemer immediately responded from College Hill. In about twenty minutes the enemy's fire slackened, and in its stead rose the well-known rebel yell in the direction of the fort. Then followed the rattle of musketry, the roar of cannon, and the bursting of shells. The yells died away, and then rose again. Now the roar of musketry and artillery was redoubled. It was a moment of the deepest anxiety. Our straining eyes were fixed on the fort. The rebels had reached the ditch, and were now endeavoring to scale the parapet. Whose will be the victory,—oh, whose? The yells again died away, and then followed three loud Union cheers,—"Hurrah! hurrah! hurrah!" How those cheers thrilled our hearts, as we stood almost breathless at our posts in the trenches! They told us that the enemy had been repulsed, and that the victory was ours. Peering through the rising fog toward the fort, not a hundred yards away,—oh, glorious sight!—we dimly saw that our flag was still there.

Let us now go back a little. Longstreet had learned of the defeat of Bragg, and, in opposition to the advice of his generals, determined to make an assault on General Burnside's lines. "Our only safety," he said to them, "is in making the assault on the enemy's position." Port Sanders was made the point of attack, as it was evidently the key of the defences. Accordingly, having seized our rifle-pits, Longstreet, under the cover of the ridge on which Fort Sanders was built, formed his columns for the assault. The men were picked men,—the flower of his corps. "The force which was to attempt an enterprise which ranks with the most famous charges in military history," says Pollard, in his "Third Year of the War," pages 161, 162, "should be mentioned in detail. It consisted of three brigades of McLaws' division: that of General Wolford, the Sixteenth, Eighteenth, and Twenty-fourth Georgia Regiments, and Cobb's and Phillip's Georgia Legions; that of General Humphrey, the Thirteenth, Seventeenth, Twenty-first, Twenty-second, and Twenty-third Mississippi Regiments; and a brigade composed of General Anderson's and Bryant's brigades, embracing, among others, the Palmetto State Guard, the Fifteenth South Carolina Regiment, and the Fifty-first, Fifty-third, and Fifty-ninth Georgia Regiments." One brigade was to make the assault, two brigades were to support it, and two brigades were to watch our lines and keep up a constant fire. Five regiments formed the brigade selected for the assaulting column. These were placed in position "in column by division, closed in mass." When the fire of their artillery slackened, the order for the charge was given. The salient of the north-west bastion was the point of attack. The rebel lines were much broken in passing the abatis. But the wire entanglements proved a greater obstacle. Whole companies were prostrated. Benjamin now opened his triple-shotted guns. Nevertheless, the weight of their column carried the rebels forward, and in two minutes from the time the charge was commenced they had reached the ditch around the fort, and were endeavoring to scale the parapet. The guns, which had been trained to sweep the ditch, now opened a most destructive fire. Lieutenant Benjamin also took shells in his hand, and, lighting the fuse, tossed them over the parapet into the crowded ditch. "It stilled them down," he said. One of the rebel brigades in reserve, with added yells, now came up in support, and the slaughter was renewed. The ditch was filled, and several rebel flags were planted on the parapet. But the Highlanders and the Twenty-ninth Massachusetts Volunteers in the fort swept off with their muskets those who attempted to scale the parapet. The men in the ditch, satisfied of the hopelessness of the task they had undertaken, now surrendered. They represented eleven regiments, and numbered nearly three hundred. Among them were seventeen commissioned officers. Over two hundred dead and wounded, including three colonels, lay in the ditch alone. The body of General Humphrey was found near the ditch, while the ground in front of the fort was strewn with the bodies of the dead and wounded. Over one thousand stands of arms fell into our hands, and the battle-flags of the Thirteenth and Seventeenth Mississippi and Sixteenth Georgia. Our loss was eight men killed and five wounded.[6] Never was a victory more complete, and achieved at so slight a cost. Never, too, were brighter laurels won than were laid that morning on the brow of the hero of Fort Sanders, Lieutenant Benjamin, Second United States Artillery.[7]

Our only loss in the Thirty-sixth Massachusetts was private Haven, of Company G, who died of wounds received from a shell.

Longstreet had promised his men that they should dine that day in Knoxville. But, in order that he might bury his dead, General Burnside now tendered him an armistice until five o'clock P.M. It was accepted, and our ambulances were sent to assist the rebels in removing the bodies to the enemy's lines. At five o'clock two additional hours were asked, as the work was not yet completed. At seven o'clock a gun was fired from Fort Sanders, the rebels responded from an earthwork opposite, and the truce was at an end.

General Longstreet, in his official report, says: "On the 26th and 27th we had various rumors of a battle having been fought at Chattanooga, the most authentic being from telegraph operators. There seemed to be so many reports leading to the same conclusion that I determined that I must attack, and, if possible, get possession of Knoxville. The attack upon the fort was ordered on the 28th, but, in order to get our troops nearer the works, the assault was postponed until daylight of the 29th. The line of sharp-shooters along our entire front were ordered to be advanced at dark to within good rifle-range of the enemy's lines, and to sink rifle-pits during the night in their advanced positions, so that the sharp-shooters along our whole line might engage the enemy upon an equal footing, whilst our columns made the assault against the fort. Our advance at night was very successful, capturing sixty or seventy prisoners without any loss. The assault was ordered to be made by three of General McLaws' brigades, his fourth being held in readiness for further operations. General Jenkins was ordered to advance a brigade a little later than the assaulting columns, and to pass the enemy's lines east of the fort, and to continue the attack along the enemy's rear and flank. Two brigades of Major-General Buckner's division, under Brigadier-General B. R. Johnson, having arrived the day before, were ordered to move in rear of General McLaws, and, at a convenient distance, to be thrown in, as circumstances might require. On the night of the 28th General McLaws' letter of that date was received. General McLaws' letter was shown to General Leadbetter, and my answer was read to him. General Leadbetter then suggested the postscript which I added to the answer. The assault was made, at the appointed time, by Generals Wofford's, Humphrey's, and Byron's brigades. The troops were not formed as well to the front as they should have been. Their lines should have been formed close upon our line of rifle-pits, which would have given them about two hundred yards to advance under fire. Instead of this, the lines were formed several hundred yards in rear of the pits. My orders were that the advance should be made quietly until they entered the works, which was to be announced by a shout. The troops moved up in gallant style. As I approached the troops they seemed to be in good order at the edge of the ditch, and some of the colors appeared to be on the works. When in about five hundred yards of the fort I saw some of our men straggling back, and heard that the troops could not pass the ditch for want of ladders or other means. Almost at the same moment I saw that the men were beginning to retire in considerable numbers, and very soon the column broke up entirely and fell back in confusion. I ordered Buckner's brigades halted and retired, and sent the order for Anderson's brigade, of Hood's division, to be halted and retired; but the troops of the latter brigade had become excited, and rushed up to the same point from which the others had been repulsed, and were soon driven back. Officers were sent to rally the men, and good order was soon restored."[8]

We spent the day following the attack on Fort Sanders in strengthening our rifle-pits. The lines were now much nearer to those of the enemy. In some places not more than one hundred yards separated them. Our shells troubled the rebels when they relieved their picket in the forenoon. In the afternoon we received official notice of Bragg's defeat at Chattanooga. The night that followed was bitter cold, and our thinly clad men suffered much.

The next day, December 1st, General Burnside issued an order thanking his troops for their endurance and bravery, and congratulating them on their recent successes, and the success of Grant at Chattanooga. At noon, by order, a single gun—we were short of ammunition—was fired from Battery Noble, and the troops, standing in the trenches, gave three cheers for the victories we had won. They were hearty cheers, as the rebels across the ravine could testify. And they knew, too, what those cheers meant. Having defeated Bragg, General Grant was hurrying troops forward to relieve the besieged in Knoxville. Finding General Granger, whom he had selected for that task, lacking in energy, he turned the command over to General Sherman, November 29th, with orders to push on as rapidly as possible.[9] At the same time he sent a despatch to General Burnside congratulating him on the tenacity with which he had held out against vastly superior forces, and informing him of the movements in progress for his relief. By order of General Grant a copy of this despatch was suffered to fall into the enemy's hands, and from it, December 1st, Longstreet learned of Sherman's advance. Burnside did not receive the despatch till the following day. Longstreet now saw that the siege must be raised at once, and he made his preparations accordingly.[10]

December 2d it was rumored that General Burnside's resignation of his command had been accepted at Washington, and that he was to be relieved by General Foster, who was said to be at Tazewell,—a rumor by no means pleasing to the Ninth Corps. At nine o'clock in the evening there was an alarm, and we stood in our places in the trenches expecting an attack.

On the following day the enemy were very quiet, and we thought there were some indications that they were preparing to raise the siege. The number of their pickets was manifestly less than usual. The fact was that their wagon-trains were that day put in motion, and on the night of December 4th the rebels withdrew from their lines around Knoxville, crossed the Holston, and moved up the north bank of the river. The retreat was discovered early in the morning by the pickets of the Thirty-sixth Massachusetts, under Captain Ames, of Company B, who had the honor of first reporting that the siege of Knoxville was raised.

Sherman was then at Marysville, and December 5th sent the following note to Burnside: "I am here, and can bring twenty-five thousand men into Knoxville to-morrow; but Longstreet having retreated, I feel disposed to stop, for a stern chase is a long one. But I will do all that is possible. Without you specify that you want troops, I will let mine rest to-morrow, and ride in to see you." Accordingly Sherman halted his troops, except two of Granger's divisions, and December 6th he entered Knoxville, and reported in person to General Burnside.

In his official report General Sherman says: "On the morning of December 6th I rode from Marysville into Knoxville, and met General Burnside. General Granger arrived later in the day. We examined his lines of fortifications, which were a wonderful production for the short time allowed in their selection of ground and construction of work. It seemed to me that they were nearly impregnable. We examined the redoubt named 'Sanders,' where, on the Sunday previous, three brigades of the enemy had assaulted and met a bloody repulse. Now, all was peaceful and quiet; but a few hours before the deadly bullet sought its victims all round about that hilly barrier."[11]

The emergency having passed, General Burnside was of the opinion that General Sherman should return to Grant, leaving Granger's command. The necessary orders were given, and General Sherman put his columns in motion southward again. Too much praise cannot be awarded to General Sherman for the promptness with which he came to our relief; as General Burnside said, it was Sherman's approach that raised the siege.

In his official report of this campaign General Grant said: "The armies of the Cumberland and Tennessee, for their energy and unsurpassed bravery in the three days' battle of Chattanooga, their patient endurance in marching to the relief of Knoxville, and the army of the Ohio, for its masterly defence of Knoxville and repeated repulses of Longstreet's assaults upon that place, are deserving of the gratitude of their country." That gratitude they received. Thanks to Grant and his officers and men were voted by Congress, and a gold medal was struck, to be presented by the President to General Grant "in the name of the people of the United States of America." It was also voted that "The thanks of Congress be, and they hereby are, presented to Major-General Ambrose E. Burnside, and through him to the officers and men who have fought under his command, for their gallantry, good conduct, and soldier-like endurance." On the 7th of December President Lincoln issued a proclamation referring to the raising of the siege of Knoxville, "under circumstances rendering it probable that the Union forces cannot hereafter be dislodged from that important position," and recommending that "all loyal people do, on receipt of this information, assemble at their places of worship, and render special homage and gratitude to Almighty God for this great advancement of the national cause."

The noble bearing of General Burnside throughout the siege won the admiration of all his troops. December 11th he transferred the command of the Department of the Ohio to General Foster, the announcement of which was made in the following order:—