A strange surprise was now in store for Gonzalo Pizarro. The vessel in which the Viceroy, Blasco Nuñez, had sailed, had not long left the shore when Alvarez, the judge who had charge of him, presenting himself before him, announced that he was no longer a prisoner. He informed him at the same time that the ship was at his disposal. Blasco Nuñez eagerly availed himself of the circumstance; for his proud spirit revolted at the idea of returning home in disgrace. In an evil moment for himself he decided once more to try his fortune in Peru. He determined to direct his steps to Quito, and accordingly disembarked at Tumbez, where he issued a manifesto denouncing Pizarro and his followers as traitors, and calling on all true subjects to rally to the royal authority. Volunteers came in at his call; but before he was in a condition to fight, he received news of the arrival of one of Pizarro’s officers on the coast with a superior force. He then made such haste as he could to Quito, where he received the assurance of the support of Benalcazar, the governor of Popayan, upon which he made a counter-march to San Miguel.

At San Miguel, which was situated on the high-road along the Pacific, the Viceroy erected his standard, and in a few weeks he found himself at the head of a force of about five hundred men; but meanwhile Pizarro had not been idle. Being convinced that his only chance of ultimate safety lay in his present success, he did not tamely watch the Viceroy’s movements. Having left a strong garrison at Lima, he sent forward six hundred men to Truxillo, whither he himself repaired. Thence he marched to San Miguel, at which place the Viceroy would gladly have met him had he not been compelled to yield to the wishes of his adherents, who clamoured to be led into the upper country, where they might hope to be reinforced by the commander of Popayan. Pizarro arrived at San Miguel to find the enemy gone, and he lost not a moment in pursuing him. He reached the skirts of a mountain chain into which the Viceroy had entered only a few hours before. It was late in the evening, but Pizarro sent forward his lieutenant Carbajal with some light troops to overtake him. Carbajal overtook the slumbering enemy enveloped amongst the mountains at midnight. But one of his men had incautiously sounded a trumpet, and the Viceroy and his followers thus aroused poured a volley into the ranks of their pursuers, who were thrown into confusion and forced to retreat.

Pizarro, greatly disconcerted at this miscarriage, again sent Carbajal forward in pursuit of the Viceroy to retrieve his mistake. But the latter had profited by the delay, and it was many days before he was again overtaken. His baggage, however, fell into the hands of his pursuer. He and his men had to snatch such sleep as they could with their arms at hand and their steeds saddled beside them. At length they reached the desert of Paltos, a quagmire intersected by numerous streams, and which offered the most difficult passage for the weary and half-starved horses. Nor did Pizarro and his men suffer less than the Viceroy whom they were pursuing. It was a repetition of his trials on the expedition to the Amazons.

At length Blasco Nuñez entered Quito, which place, however, he quickly left, taking the road for Pastos, which was within the jurisdiction of Benalcazar, on whose support he mainly relied. Soon after his departure, Pizarro entered Quito, where he halted only long enough to refresh his men. His advance guard, tired and powerless, came up with the rear of the Viceroy’s force at Pastos; but the latter could not bring his soldiers to reverse the position they had so long been accustomed to, by attacking their pursuers. On the contrary, they profited by the exhaustion of the enemy to hasten their retreat. Pizarro, thus thwarted, did not care to trust himself further within the territories of Benalcazar, and made a counter-march on Quito, where his troops found time to rest, and where he received valuable reinforcements. Some of these were, however, soon despatched under Carbajal to suppress an insurrection which had broken out in the south.

The Viceroy had now reached Popayan, but with only one-fifth of the followers with whom he had begun his march, which had extended over two hundred leagues, and which had been marked by sufferings rarely equalled even in Spanish America. Still, however, when joined by Benalcazar, he could muster four hundred men. Pizarro, anxious to bring the struggle to a conclusion, had recourse to stratagem to effect this end. He himself, with the greater portion of his force, quitted Quito, under a pretence of joining his lieutenant in the south, but leaving a garrison in the above-named city. On these tidings reaching the Viceroy’s camp, Blasco Nuñez, quitting Popayan, moved rapidly on Quito, where, however, he found himself confronted by Pizarro’s entire force, entrenched in a strong position. In his endeavour to surprise Pizarro in his rear by means of a night-march, he put himself at a fatal disadvantage, having been misled by guides as to the distance to be traversed, and his men being exhausted, he entered Quito, the inhabitants of which city had declared themselves in favour of Pizarro.

In this emergency the Viceroy was recommended by his chief officer to try the effect of negotiation; but his haughty Castilian spirit rebelled at the notion of parleying with traitors. Calling his troops together, he addressed to them a few courageous words before he led them forth to fight on behalf of his king. The battle which ensued, as might be expected, when both sides had staked their all on the issue, was a desperate one. The cavalry, which was equally matched on either side, met in deadly shock, and when their lances were shivered the cavaliers fought with axe and sword. But the Viceroy’s horses, worn out by the march of the previous night, were unequal to the work, and the victory was not long in suspense. Blasco Nuñez and his followers, however, did all that brave men could do, until he was at length overwhelmed by numbers. His companions having fallen one by one, and he being wounded, the stroke of a battle-axe caused him to fall from his horse. He was then pointed out to the brother of Carbajal, the cavalier whom in a fit of passion he had so rashly struck with his poniard at Lima. In this unhappy situation the proud Viceroy’s career terminated by a stroke from the sabre of a negro slave. Thus ended the decisive day, and Gonzalo Pizarro was for the time being master of Peru.

This victory on the part of the colonists over the crown was looked upon as finally sealing the fate of the obnoxious ordinances, and was the cause of great joy throughout the country. Pizarro, for a time, rested in Quito, where he and his followers enjoyed the excesses which in those times usually succeeded excessive military privations and fatigues. But Gonzalo was no longer merely a victorious soldier. Upon him now rested the cares of state, for which, unfortunately, he was fitted neither by education nor by natural powers. He rewarded his followers by grants of land, and made various provisions for the welfare of the natives; but he does not seem to have entertained the idea of establishing an independent authority, since he was careful to collect the dues belonging to the crown. Indeed he urged upon the colonists so to conduct themselves as by their behaviour to bring about a revocation of the hated ordinances. In July 1546 he left Quito for the south, and was everywhere received with enthusiasm. At Lima he was met in triumph, the archbishop, with three other bishops of that place, riding by his side; while to crown his good fortune, he at the same time received the intelligence of the success of his arms in the south. From Quito to Chili his authority was undisputed, while the mines of Potosí supplied him with a kingly revenue. Had he been a man of as much force of character as a politician as he had proved himself to be as a military leader, he was now in a position to have founded a dynasty of Pizarros in Peru. Every Spanish soldier throughout the land obeyed him; the colonists looked on him as their champion; whilst he was no less the master of the fleet on the Pacific. No hostile force coming from Spain could encounter him until it should have rounded the Straits of Magellan or forced a passage across the primeval forests of Brazil. Yet the youngest Pizarro lacked the moral courage which till this supreme moment of its fortunes had never failed his upstart house; and the result was that, instead of anticipating the colonial revolution by two centuries and a half, he who had gone too far to hope for any safety save in defiance, determined to submit himself to Spain. The result was that, without sending a fleet through the Straits of Magellan or an army through the forests of Brazil, Pizarro was conquered by the address of one man, whose services the Emperor was enabled to command in this dire emergency. That man was the President Gasca.

CHAPTER XI.

PERU; THE PRESIDENT GASCA.

1545-1550.

In 1545 the prince afterwards known as Philip II., then regent of Spain during the absence of his father, called together a special council to deliberate on the measures to be pursued for the purpose of restoring order in Peru. The difficulties to be encountered in the way of suppressing the rebellion by force naturally presented themselves to the conclave, and it was accordingly resolved to endeavour to bring about an arrangement by conciliatory measures. A full pardon was to be granted to all such colonists as should make their submission, and due steps were to be taken to make them perceive that it was to their interest, as it was their duty, to return to their allegiance; and fortunately a man was found to carry out this policy whose single agency was of more avail than that of a fleet or an army. Pedro de la Gasca was of the ecclesiastical profession, but had nevertheless borne arms. He had filled with distinction several civil offices in Spain, and his discretion no less than his ability pointed him out for the position of agent to the crown in Peru, one of the most responsible missions ever confided to any individual. Gasca seems indeed, according to the estimate of all writers of history, to have been a model of character—courteous in demeanour but firm in his course, as beseemed a man who was strong in his rectitude of purpose. The choice made by the prince and his council was immediately ratified by the Emperor, who wrote to Gasca an autograph letter confirming it.

Gasca at once accepted the mission proposed to him, merely stipulating for powers sufficient to admit of its full success. The powers which he demanded were indeed so great that the ministers had not the authority to grant them; but on an appeal to the Emperor, who was by this time in Flanders, they were at once conceded. Gasca, now armed with greater authority than had ever hitherto been entrusted to a vassal of the Spanish crown, set sail for Peru early in 1546, under the title of President of the Royal Audience.[N] So modest was his train that only three thousand ducats were expended in equipping him. Under the above title he was placed at the head of every department in the colony. He indeed had the warrant to exercise the same powers as the Emperor himself; since he might declare war, appoint to all offices, and pardon all offences. He was, however, to proclaim at once the revocation of the obnoxious ordinances, and he might banish from Peru such ecclesiastics and others as might not be reached by the temporal authority. He had unlimited orders on the treasuries both of Panamá and Peru, and was furnished with letters to the chief authorities requiring their support. The Emperor and his advisers were safe in confiding these unbounded powers on a single-minded man, whose only worldly ambition was the bishopric which was held out to him, and which he declined to accept until he should have returned after fulfilling his mission.

In July of the above-mentioned year Gasca landed in the New World, where he was met by the intelligence of the defeat and death of the Viceroy and of the absolute supremacy of Gonzalo Pizarro. In this perplexing situation he steered his course with undeviating prudence and consummate skill. At Nombre de Dios he presented himself before the trusted partisan of Pizarro, to whose care that place had been committed, not with the military surroundings befitting the all-powerful alter ego of the Emperor, but as a humble ecclesiastic to whose admittance there could be no objection. Never probably in the course of history has the subtle effect of the sentiment of loyalty been more remarkably manifested. There was nothing in the appearance of Gasca or of his humble retinue to attract especial attention; yet no sooner was his mission known than Pizarro’s trusted officer was at his feet placing his powers in his hand. Once within the stronghold of the enemy, Gasca’s moral influence was forthwith felt. In contact with his singular powers—not those of mere oratory, but based on the foundation of the highest moral and secular authority,—the position of the officer who merely held his office in virtue of an order from the rebel Pizarro was at once untenable. Indeed Mexia does not seem to have made the slightest effort at impeding the progress of the President, who had with him the consolatory balm of pardon for all repentant rebels.

This first step gained was everything for the mission of Gasca. His advent was announced not, as had been that of the late Viceroy, as a despoiler of the colonists and a stern enforcer of obnoxious decrees. On the contrary, he came as a messenger of peace and conciliation, bearing an unheard-of admission on the part of the crown in justification of the colonists,—since the ordinances were repealed,—and granting full pardon for past offences to all such as should again declare themselves loyal subjects. Indeed Mexia, like Gonzalo Pizarro himself, and like most of his followers, had found himself a rebel owing to accidental circumstances and certainly not by design; and he was only too glad to avail himself of so unexpectedly favourable an opportunity of extricating himself from the disagreeable position into which circumstances had led him. Gonzalo, by rejecting the advice of his lieutenant Carbajal, had failed to bind all his followers to himself by the common tie of their being compromised rebels.

Having thus acquired so important an ally on land, the next step of the sagacious President was to obtain the command of Pizarro’s fleet of twenty-two vessels which lay in the harbour of Panamá. It was under the command of Hinojosa, an officer high in the confidence of Pizarro, and who was as loyal to him as was compatible with his supreme loyalty to his sovereign. But Pizarro was now destined to find that the same arts which had been employed to corrupt his own loyalty to the crown might again be made use of to seduce others from their loyalty to him. Mexia was employed by the President for this purpose. In the conflict of duties which were claimed from him on either side, Hinojosa asked to be allowed to see the powers of the President, and he likewise inquired whether they gave him authority to confirm Pizarro in the post he held. The President evaded the question; whereupon Hinojosa sent to Pizarro to acquaint him with his arrival and with the object of his coming.

But from the moment when Gasca had received a favourable opportunity for stating his mission, his success was practically assured, carrying with him as he did such ample moral force and such intellectual capacity to wield it. The same vessel which bore to Pizarro the news of his advent, carried likewise a Dominican who had been entrusted by Gasca with manifestoes proclaiming the glad tidings of the abolition of the ordinances, and of a free pardon to all rebels who should return to their obedience. The President likewise sent letters to the prelates and to the civic corporations. In short, the whole discipline, civil and ecclesiastic, in which the Spaniard of the day had been trained, was at once called into the service of the man whose singular ability proved him to be more than able to cope with the Dictator of Peru, who directed its civil government and commanded its army and fleet.

Gasca meanwhile calmly awaited the results of the measures he had adopted, and his courtesy and intelligence did not fail to have their due effect upon those with whom he was thrown into contact. Several cavaliers of Panamá, as well as officers of the squadron, offered him their services, and with their assistance the President was enabled to open communication with the Spanish authorities in Guatemala and Mexico, whom he required to abstain from holding any communication with the insurgents in Peru. By these means he acquired powerful allies for the Spanish Government. Lastly, he prevailed on the governor of Panamá to supply him with a ship, in which he despatched a letter from the Emperor to Gonzalo Pizarro, and likewise one from himself. The former was couched in the most conciliatory terms, making every allowance for the difficult circumstances in which the rebel chief had been placed, and throwing the blame on the Viceroy. In his own letter the President significantly remarked that the circumstances which had led Pizarro into his present position no longer existed, since all that the colonists had required when they appealed to arms was now conceded; it only remained, therefore, to show their loyalty by resuming their dutiful obedience. Should the contest be further prolonged, it would be open rebellion against the crown, without the pretext of an excuse; and against bringing about such a struggle the President invoked Pizarro’s sense of honour and duty. These important despatches, with others, were entrusted by the President to an adherent on whom he could rely, and who was likewise charged to distribute further manifestoes.

Some months passed away whilst Gasca and the governor of Panamá still awaited the decisive reply from Peru. Indeed Pizarro’s situation was such as to make him hesitate. He was still comparatively a young man, being forty-two years of age, and he found himself in the most dazzling position which any Spaniard not born in the purple could hold, and to which, moreover, he fancied he had a right as being the successor of his brother. Were he to resign this he would not only lay down that position, but he would put himself in the absolute power of another, before whom he would doubtless be charged with crimes that might be held to cancel the offers of pardon for past offences conveyed to him by the Emperor and the President. He had learned with no small apprehension the coming of the latter; but he was so simple as to be misled by the unostentatious manner in which the President had made his appearance. He ignored alike his personal qualities and the moral force which he represented. Having before him two plain roads, either of which might have led him into safety, if not into the ultimate realization of his ambition—that is to say, being free to choose either to make his submission to the President, or to appeal to arms against the crown,—he took the half-way course of keeping the President at a distance whilst he should meanwhile send an embassy to Spain to vindicate his past proceedings and solicit a confirmation of his authority, a course which could not but lead to his ruin.

Gasca was meanwhile put off by a letter, signed by seventy of the principal citizens of Lima, expressing their regret that he had arrived too late, and their opinion that, should he now continue his journey, his presence would only be the signal for the renewal of disturbance. But the result of Pizarro’s embassy to Spain was widely different from that which he had anticipated. No sooner had his ambassador, Aldana, been admitted into the presence of the President at Panamá than the embassy was at an end. The envoy now for the first time learned the full powers of the President, and likewise the full nature of the concessions made by the crown to the colonists. The ambassador, though sincerely devoted to Pizarro, instantly showed the example of submitting to the crown, whilst he wrote to his chief at Lima earnestly counselling him to do likewise. This example was followed by Hinojosa, the governor of Panamá, by whose submission Pizarro’s fleet was placed at the disposal of Gasca. On November 19th, 1546, Hinojosa and his officers, having delivered up their commissions, received them back from Gasca on taking the oath of allegiance.

Possessed of Panamá and the fleet, Gasca could now afford to take more active steps. He raised men and collected supplies, taking care that the soldiers were duly paid. He had no difficulty in obtaining loans on credit, and he made use of his powers to summon assistance from Guatemala and Mexico. Much good-will was shown on all sides in getting his expedition ready; but up to the latest moment the President employed every means in his power to induce Pizarro, ere it should be too late, to make his submission to the crown. With this object he sent in advance Aldana, with four ships, to the coast of Peru, with authenticated copies of his commission to be delivered to Pizarro. That chief, who as yet but dimly discerned the effect which was being slowly but surely produced by the proclamation of Gasca, called his councillors to aid him in determining what reply should be sent, or what course adopted, in reference to the letters of the Emperor and the President. His two chief advisers were Carbajal, a warrior of fourscore years, and Cepeda, a lawyer who had come out to the New World as one of the Audience of the late Viceroy. The former, with the wisdom of years, clearly discerned the nature of the situation and advised his master accordingly; but the lawyer, knowing as he did that he had appeared in arms against the Viceroy, whom he had been sent out to advise, trembled at the situation in which he should find himself were Pizarro to yield, and therefore used all his skill in persuading him to adopt a defiant course. Unfortunately for all concerned, his counsel prevailed.

It was not long after the departure of the messenger of Gasca, by whom Pizarro had sent back the rejection of his terms, that the latter received news of the defection from his cause both of the governor of Panamá and of his ambassador to Spain; and these unwelcome tidings were followed by certain indications that they were but the precursors of similar defections from his cause in other quarters. In fact, he was enveloped by a cloud of enemies in which quarter soever he might look. Gonzalo Pizarro, however, though wounded by the desertion of his friends on whom he had relied, yet, having thrown in his lot with the rebels who should adhere to him, determined to trust to the hazard of the die. He summoned his captains to his aid, reminding them of their obligations, and that their interests were identical with his own. He enforced levies in the capital, and soon saw himself at the head of a thousand men. He was supported by the veteran warrior Carbajal, and literally no money was spared in equipping his army. It was a desperate cause; and Pizarro and his men were reckless. There was a prevailing impression that his cause was a losing one, and consequently defections from his ranks were frequent.

The squadron under Aldana (Pizarro’s ambassador to Spain) was now off Callao, the commander having been welcomed at all the ports of Peru at which he had landed, receiving at the same time numerous promises of assistance on the part of those who were nominally Pizarro’s officers. Aldana, who had no rival ships to oppose him, caused copies of the President’s manifestoes to be circulated amongst the citizens of Lima, and they were not long in producing their effect, for indeed few persons there had been aware of the full powers entrusted to Gasca. The only general thought was for each one to secure his own safety. It was a case of sauve qui peut. Some escaped to the forests; some took refuge with the fleet; and others, essaying to escape, did not succeed in doing so, but fell into the hands of the subordinates of Carbajal, from whom they had little to hope. In this dilemma, Pizarro, seeing that whilst he should remain at Lima every day would add to the desertions from his cause, resolved to occupy Arequipa, where, however, owing to the frequent desertions, he found that his force did not muster more than five hundred men.

Pizarro and his forces having quitted Lima, the gates of the city were forthwith opened to Aldana, as the forerunner of the President. Gasca himself, however, had sailed from Panamá on April 10th, 1547. He encountered a stormy voyage, during which he displayed his habitual coolness and perseverance. In due time his storm-battered vessels arrived at Tumbez, where he was received with open arms; indeed thenceforth he was master of the situation, and had only to instruct his officers to execute his orders. He made his way towards Xauxa, where he was later joined by reinforcements from all quarters. On his arrival there the war was, in point of fact, to all appearance terminated, for he found advices to the effect that Gonzalo Pizarro was hemmed in on every side. In reply to the offers of service which he received, he had given a general rendezvous of Caxamalca, to which place he despatched Hinojosa with the soldiers at his disposal, with orders to take command of the levies and to join him at Xauxa. He then proceeded towards the same place by way of Truxillo. The President now found himself in sufficient strength to counter-order the force which he had summoned to his assistance from Guatemala and Mexico.

Meanwhile Pizarro had come to the determination to evacuate Peru and fall back upon Chili, which territory was beyond the jurisdiction of the President. But the passes lying on his route were held by Centeno with a force greater than his own, and who had declared for the President. Centeno had been his subordinate officer, and he tried, in the first place, the effect of negotiation. This, however, leading to no result, he marched against his force, which was encamped on Lake Titicaca. On October 26th the hostile forces met. Pizarro’s troops were about half as numerous as those of his opponent, his cavalry only numbering one-third of the horsemen opposed to him; but this inequality was compensated for in that of the opposing leaders. Whilst Centeno was so ill as to be compelled to delegate the command of his troops to others and to await the result off the field in a litter, his opponents were under the skilled leadership of Pizarro and Carbajal. Pizarro himself commanded the cavalry, placing himself at its head in a gorgeously-decorated suit of mail, which made him the most conspicuous object on the field.

Having arrived within firing distance of each other, the veteran Carbajal, deeming his situation favourable, resolved to halt and to receive the enemy’s attack. The experienced officers on either side saw that their advantage lay in keeping back, but whereas the trained musketeers on Pizarro’s side were under the immediate control of the veteran by whom they had been drilled, the impetuous soldiers of Centeno were not only without his restraining voice, but were further urged on by a senseless friar, who, forgetting that he was not in the pulpit, took upon himself to declare, in the words of ancient Scripture, that the Lord had delivered the enemy into their hands. His exclamation was premature, but it had the effect of urging Centeno’s soldiers forward and of bringing them within the full force of the opposing fire. Carbajal restrained his men until their antagonists were within a hundred yards of them. The volley which was then fired decided the day. Two hundred men are said to have fallen at the first discharge, which was followed by a second. On the other part of the field, where the cavalry contended, the result was different. Centeno’s horse being vastly superior in number, rode down their opponents, and Pizarro himself, though performing everything that skill and valour could effect, was compelled to spur his charger out of the scene of struggle. He was pursued, and had to defend himself in single combat until he was rescued by some of the men of Carbajal. The victorious cavalry tried again and again in vain to break the flank of Carbajal’s arquebusiers. The victory remained with Pizarro, who, with his followers, sat down to the feast which had been prepared in their opponents’ tents. It was estimated that more than two-thirds of Centeno’s men were killed or wounded; he himself escaped by flight. After this victory, Pizarro, being now recruited by considerable numbers, resolved to make his way to Cuzco, where he was received by the inhabitants in triumph, and where he resolved for the present to establish his quarters.

As might be expected, the unlooked-for news of Pizarro’s victory at Huarina fell like a thunderbolt on the court of the hitherto successful President. Gasca, however, was careful to put a good face on his disappointment, whilst he lost no time in adopting such measures as were best calculated to repair the disaster. Taking advantage of his own superiority of force, he resolved to march without delay against his opponent. He had before him a difficult and dreary march, but in its course he was cheered not only by the assurance that Pizarro’s victory had not had the effect of dispiriting the country, but also by the arrival in his camp, from various quarters, of several distinguished captains—of Benalcazar, the conqueror of Quito; of Valdivia, with laurels fresh from the conquest of Chili; and of Centeno, who had escaped through the forest and sierra, and who, restored to health, was burning to retrieve his late mischance.

It was the spring of the following year when Gasca mustered his forces for the final march on Cuzco. He now had two thousand men, which, it must be remembered, was a larger number than any European force that had hitherto been assembled in arms in Peru. They were commanded by Hinojosa. The first obstacle of importance which that officer had to encounter was the passage of the river Apurimac, one of the most considerable tributaries of the Amazons, and the bridges over which had been destroyed by order of Pizarro. Gasca, however, being apprised of this, had sent forward to select a suitable spot from which to throw a bridge across the stream, which was found at Cotopampa, whilst materials for a like purpose were laid down at two other points with a view to misleading the enemy.

The officer sent on in advance to Cotopampa had received positive commands to delay the actual construction of the bridge until he should be in sufficient strength to carry it through forthwith to completion; but he was so zealous that he took it upon himself to disregard his orders and to set about the operation at once. The bridge itself was to be one of those structures common in the Northern Andes, formed of cables of osier, thrown from side to side of the bank, and across which planks are laid. As such a bridge is swayed to and fro or upwards and downwards by the tramp of men, by burdens being borne across it, or by the wind, it is apt to inspire a feeling of insecurity both on the part of the traveller and on that of the onlooker from the shore, but it is in reality quite as safe a means of transit as is many a more solid structure. Gasca having heard with alarm that the work was going on, hastened his march in order to support his officer; but ere he had reached the river, information was brought to him that the enemy had cut the cables on the opposite bank. Valdivia was accordingly sent forward with two hundred men, whilst the main body hurried its pace. That energetic officer, on reaching the stream, at once procured some native boats, by means of which he passed his men over to the other side. He being now in considerably greater force than Pizarro’s men, the latter retreated with all speed to Cuzco, to report the affair to their chief.

Pizarro meanwhile, like the typical soldier of fortune of that age, had been enjoying the hour of sunshine, forgetful of the past, and not too much troubled about the future. Although no one ever questioned his leadership, he was not a leader to dispense with counsel; and his two chief advisers were still Cepeda and Carbajal. The advice he had of late received from each seems to have been the reverse of that which they had respectively given him when it was a question of the terms in which he should reply to the letters of the Emperor and of Gasca. Whilst Carbajal on the one hand now advised him to abandon Cuzco and retreat to the mountains, leaving an impoverished city behind him, he was urged by Cepeda on the other hand to make terms with the President. But Pizarro rejected either advice. He was, in fact, determined to stand the hazard of the die. The fortune which had stood his friend under the desperate circumstances in which he had been deserted by Orellana on the Amazons, and which had lately come to his rescue against enormous odds in his late engagement, might still stand him in good stead.

But in fact his fortune in these later times was in the sagacious advice and experience of Carbajal. It was the forethought and skill of that veteran that had won the victory of Huarina, and had Pizarro now listened to his voice he might still have continued lord of Peru. When the tidings came that the enemy were across the stream, the veteran saw that the moment had arrived which was to decide the struggle. He felt that he was the man to profit by the opportunity, and he pleaded with his commander to be allowed to go forward to the scene of action. In an evil hour for himself Pizarro refused his request, saying that he could not spare him so far away. Meanwhile the work of the bridge was rapidly pushed forward, and long ere the young cavalier who had been put in the place of Carbajal had reached his destination, the President’s force was in a position to defy him.

There was now only a question of the choice of a spot on which the final battle was to be fought. Pizarro determined to abandon Cuzco and to await his opponents in a valley five leagues distant. Even at this moment the President, having crossed the Andes and the river Apurimac, and being in force greatly superior to that of his antagonist, showed his utter absence of personal ill-feeling towards the latter, and also perhaps his appreciation of the difficulties which had brought him into his present position, by giving him one last chance of safety. By an emissary of his own he renewed the assurance of pardon to Pizarro in case he should lay down his arms and submit. Such at least is the statement of two Spanish historians, and it is in accordance with the character of the President. At length, on the morning of the 8th of April, the two opposing forces came within sight of each other. The numbers on either side were the reverse of large according to our ideas of the present day; but numbers do not always denote the importance of a battle, and we should remember that a similarly small European force at Plassey decided the fate of Hindostan. It may be remarked that the native Peruvians, for the most part, espoused the cause of Pizarro.

The President wisely left the conduct of the battle to his military officers, who were perfectly competent for the purpose, and he showed his habitual good sense in withdrawing, with his priests and civilians, out of the immediate range of action. The commanders on his side, Hinojosa and Valdivia, were a match for the military skill of Carbajal; and Pizarro himself had more in him of the daring, dauntless cavalier than of the strategic leader. As he had faced the situation with all its consequences plainly set before him, resolving fully to abide them, we cannot bestow much sympathy upon him in his present plight, though we must admire his unshaken courage and constancy. At the decisive moment of his fate he had taken the advice of Cepeda in resisting, in opposition to that of Carbajal; and it was the wretch Cepeda who now betrayed him by galloping over to the enemy in the face of both armies. But this act, although it was contagious, perhaps did Pizarro no considerable harm, for his fate was already sealed.

The leaders on either side gave the word for the advance; but the humane President, anxious to spare the shedding of blood, ordered his men to halt, since the rebel host from its frequent desertions was evidently falling to pieces. The Spaniards on Pizarro’s side deserted him in various directions; some went to seek pardon from the President ere it should be too late; others made for the mountains. Pizarro himself, seeing that there was but one thing for him to do, gave up his sword to the first officer of rank whom he encountered, and by him he was conducted into the presence of the President. The latter, we are told, inquired severely why he had thrown the country into such confusion? why he had revolted? why he had slain the Viceroy? why he had usurped the government? and finally, why he had refused the repeated offers of grace? On his reply, in which he attempted to justify himself, he was ordered into close confinement. Thus terminated the culminating encounter between the royal forces and those of Pizarro, in which the latter on the plain of Xaquixaguana, like those of the Assyrian of old, though “unsmote by the sword,” yet “vanished like snow.”

Gasca, having sent an officer to Cuzco to restrain the excesses which were to be expected, had next to concern himself with the trial of Pizarro and of Carbajal. It was of course a mere form, since they were taken in the act of opposing the royal forces in arms; and there could be no question of mercy, since they had both failed to avail themselves of the offers of the royal clemency repeatedly made. They were accordingly executed; Carbajal, who is said to have been eighty-four years of age, receiving his fate with the utmost indifference, and Pizarro meeting death with the dignified courage which he had ever shown. The estates of both were confiscated. It is satisfactory to add that the traitor Cepeda, though his head was not placed upon the block, yet was not allowed to go free. The President was indeed urged to send him to execution, since it had been by his advice that Pizarro had first refused the offers of grace; but Gasca refrained from doing so on account of the service which Cepeda had rendered the royal cause by his opportune desertion. He was accordingly sent a prisoner to Spain, where he was tried for high treason: during the progress of his trial he died in prison. It may be of interest here to remark that the fate which attended so many of the conquerors of Peru, spared neither Centeno, Hinojosa, nor Valdivia, the three foremost leaders on the side of the President, all of whom were soon afterwards cut off. The President thought it sufficient, in the interests of justice and of example, to execute Acosta and three or four other cavaliers who had surrendered with Pizarro. He then broke up his camp and marched to Cuzco.

On his arrival at the late capital of the Incas, Gasca had before him the task of winding up the affairs incident to the rebellion. Some dozen cavaliers, having been tried and condemned, were executed, whilst others were sentenced to minor punishments; but on the whole, considering the dimensions of the rebellion and the obstinacy of the insurgents in refusing grace, the President certainly does not seem to have acted with undue severity: a stern example was needed. He had now to apportion the rewards that were due to his followers, who, as usually happens in such cases, were not bashful in claiming them. Retiring from Cuzco to a neighbouring valley, attended only by the Archbishop of Lima and by his secretary, Gasca now devoted three months to a patient examination of the respective claims laid before him, and to elaborating a fair scheme of compensation.

This heavy task completed, the President could now retire to Lima, leaving his written decision with the archbishop, to be by him communicated to the army. The effect produced by the document on those respecting whose interests it was to decide, was of course one of disappointment. Each man valued his own services at his own price, and all were displeased at the fancied unfair preference given to others. It required some trouble and even some examples on the part of the commander at Cuzco to repress the tumult of discontent thus occasioned. Gasca was received by the inhabitants of Lima not only with the manifestations of loyalty which were his due as representing the crown, but likewise with every demonstration of gratitude and affection. His entry into the city was, however, strictly in the character of a priest and civilian, and no way in that of a warrior.

At Lima, the capital, a fresh series of business awaited him, for he had now to devise a new government to replace that of Pizarro; but being himself facile princeps in affairs, and being accompanied by able judges, he was enabled soon satisfactorily to despatch an immense amount of business. Nor were the natives neglected, the President devoting his sedulous attention to bettering their condition. He did not omit to send his own agents into different parts of the country, to inspect the allotments and ascertain the manner in which the Peruvians were treated, taking their statements from themselves. As the result of the information thus obtained, Gasca and his council drew up a system of taxation for the Peruvians, which might be a standard of appeal. He did not see his way to relieving them, under present circumstances, from the obligation of personal service, which proposed measure had indeed been the cause of the recent rebellion; but he was careful to provide that their service should be less burdensome than that which they had endured under the sway of the Incas. Their condition, in short, though not in all respects such as philanthropy might wish, was put on as good a footing as colonial exigencies might admit of. Indeed all the firmness of the government was needed to admit of the new regulations being peacefully acquiesced in.

Gasca likewise introduced reforms into the municipal government of the cities; and by financial and other arrangements placed the administration of the colony on such a basis as might afford a fair field for his successors to work on. He had been fifteen months in Lima and nearly three years in Peru; and his work being now accomplished, he was able to turn his face toward Spain, with the satisfaction of having been enabled to pay off the loan he had contracted for the war, exceeding nine hundred thousand pesos. He had, moreover, saved a million and a half ducats for the Government. The President Gasca had indeed proved himself fully deserving of the confidence which had been reposed in him by the Emperor and his advisers. He was a rare instance even amongst the best governors or statesmen of any country or of any period—one who, like General Gordon in our own time, was unconventional and utterly indifferent to the allurements of wealth, or indeed to any other call but that of honour and duty. Before his departure one more instance of his purity of character—if one were needed—was afforded. The Indian caciques, conscious of the benefits which he had rendered their people, and conscious also of the value which all Spaniards hitherto had placed upon the precious metals, offered him a large amount of gold plate in token of their gratitude. On Gasca’s natural refusal to accept it, the poor caciques feared they had fallen under his displeasure. This is not the instance referred to. A number of the colonists, no less grateful for the same reasons, wished to show their esteem in a like manner, and made up a purse for the President of fifty thousand castellanos. There could be no harm, they said, in his accepting this on leaving, as it could not be offered with a view to induce favour for the future. When the President returned it, the colonists, without his knowledge, concealed twenty thousand castellanos on board his vessel, which sum, on his arrival in Spain, not wishing to offend them by returning the donative, he distributed amongst the most needy relatives of the donors whom he could discover.