The Infantry Start Line had, naturally, to be located so that the ground upon which the tapes were to be pegged down was ground which was already within our possession, or accessible to us without coming dangerously near the enemy. It was a necessary consequence that portions of our always irregular front line of posts or trenches would lie beyond or on the enemy's side of the tape line.

It was always a rule of our practice, therefore, that any Infantry posted in advance of the taped line should be withdrawn, behind the tapes, an hour before the time of Zero. It was also customary to order that all assaulting troops should be spread, in their appropriate dispositions, along the tape line, also one hour before Zero.

The result of these arrangements was that for the last hour before the actual opening of the battle, all Infantry intended to take part in the assault was deployed along the tapes in a perfectly straight line, all along the battle front, while no troops previously in occupation of posts or trenches in advance of the tapes were left out in front, exposed to the risk of either being hit by our own Artillery, or mistaken, in the half light of dawn, for enemies by our own Infantry.

Complex and difficult as these arrangements may appear from this description, they worked out in actual practice with the utmost smoothness. The resulting simplification of the Artillery plans, in this as in similar previous battles, more than justified their adoption.

A liberal use was also made of direction boards, which marked the routes by which each separate body of assaulting Infantry should, during the last night, march from its place of assembly to the taped line or "jumping off" line, and also to mark the position which it was to take up upon that line. Each board had painted upon it the name of the unit to which it referred. Such preparatory measures, troublesome as they were, greatly reduced the risk of any confusion or mistake, and lessened the fatigue of the assaulting troops.

The moon would set, on the morning of the battle, at 3.37 a.m., and the sun would rise at 6.27 a.m. Zero hour, for the opening of the attack, was therefore fixed for twenty minutes past five.

Operations began inauspiciously. A soaking rain set in some two hours before, and made movement over the broken, clayey surface anything but pleasant. Although the troops were soon drenched to the skin, this did not in any way damp their spirits. It probably added much to the misery of the enemy, who could hardly fail to realize that, on any morning, a fresh attack might break upon him.

Modern war is in many ways unlike the wars of previous days, but in nothing so much as in the employment of what I have more than once referred to as "set-piece" operations. The term is one which should convey its own meaning. It is the direct result of the great extension, which this war has introduced, of mechanical warfare. It is a "set-piece" because the stage is elaborately set, parts are written for all the performers, and carefully rehearsed by many of them. The whole performance is controlled by a time-table, and, so long as all goes according to plan, there is no likelihood of unexpected happenings, or of interesting developments.

The Artillery barrage advances from line to line, in regular leaps, at regulated intervals of time, determined beforehand, and incapable of alteration once the battle has begun. Should the rate prove too slow and the Infantry could have advanced more quickly, it cannot be helped, and no great harm is done. On the other hand, if there be any risk of the barrage rate being too fast, one or two halts of ten or fifteen minutes are often introduced into the time-table to allow the infantry line, or any part of it which may be hung up for any reason, to catch up.

Following the barrage, comes line upon line of infantry in skirmishing order, together with the line of Tanks when such are used. The foremost lines advance to capture and hold the ground, the lines in rear to "mop up" and deal with the enemy either showing fight or hiding underground, the rearmost lines collect prisoners or our own wounded, or carry supplies, tools and ammunition.

In a well-planned battle of this nature, fully organized, powerfully covered by Artillery and Machine Gun barrages, given a resolute Infantry and that the enemy's guns are kept successfully silenced by our own counter-battery Artillery, nothing happens, nothing can happen, except the regular progress of the advance according to the plan arranged. The whole battle sweeps relentlessly and methodically across the ground until it reaches the line laid down as the final objective.

Such a set-piece battle lasts usually, from first to last, for 80 to 100 minutes; seldom for more. When the Artillery programme is ended the battle is either completely won, or to all intents and purposes completely lost. If the barrage for any reason gets away from our Infantry, and they are relegated to hand to hand fighting in order to complete their advance, the battle immediately assumes a totally different character, and is no longer a set-piece affair.

It will be obvious, therefore, that the more nearly such a battle proceeds according to plan, the more free it is from any incidents awakening any human interest. Only the externals and only the large aspects of such battles can be successfully recorded. It is for this reason that no stirring accounts exist of the more intimate details of such great set-pieces as Messines, Vimy, Hamel and many others. They will never be written, for there is no material upon which to base them. The story of what did take place on the day of battle would be a mere paraphrase of the battle orders prescribing all that was to take place.

On the other hand battles such as the second phase of August 8th, the battle for Mont St. Quentin, and the later battles of Bony and Beaurevoir were not set-piece operations. Therefore the developments from hour to hour, and even from moment to moment, are full of intense human interest, and replete with tales of individual courage and initiative. Some day, when all the material has been gathered, an abler pen than mine will write their story.

If the reader will bear in mind all these considerations, with special reference to the battle of Hargicourt on September 18th he will realize that, in describing the dispositions, the objectives, the time-table and the preparations for the battle, I have told practically all that there is to tell of the course it took, except only as regards the results actually achieved, in ground won and prisoners taken.

It has been difficult, nevertheless, to refrain from dwelling in detail upon the performances and experiences in battle of the individual fighting men. Any attempt to do so would, however, prove hopelessly inadequate. The numbers engaged were always so large, their activities so varied, the conditions of each battle so different in detail, that to do adequate justice and avoid unfair discrimination would make impossible demands upon the space available to me.

Popular interest naturally centres upon the Infantry, not only because they are the most numerous, but also because they are invariably in the forefront of the battle and often in immediate contact with the enemy. Without the slightest disparagement to the important rôle of the Infantryman and to the valour which its performance demands, it must never be forgotten that the work of the Artillery, Engineers, Pioneers, Machine Gunners, Trench Mortars, Air Service and Tanks is in every way equally important and essential to the success of any battle operation. Yet it is equally true that no battle can be won without the Infantry.

In a deliberately prepared battle it is not too much to say that the rôle of the Infantry is not, as a rule, the paramount one, provided that all goes well and that there is no breakdown in any part of the battle plan. That does not, however, imply that the Infantry task makes no high demand upon courage and resolution. On the contrary, these are the essentials upon which the success of the Infantry rôle and therefore of the whole battle depends.

The primary duty of the Infantry, in an assault covered by an Artillery barrage, is to follow up the barrage closely. The barrage is nothing more nor less than a steady shower of shells, bursting over the very heads of the leading lines of Infantry, and striking the ground some 80 to 120 yards in front of them. This shower is usually so dense that three to four shells per minute fall on every twenty yards of frontage. It is so intense a fire that no enemy, however courageous, could remain exposed to it. It falls on one line for three or four minutes, while the Infantry lie down flat. Suddenly, the barrage "lifts" or advances 100 yards. At a signal from the platoon or company commander the whole line rises and rushes at top speed to catch up to the barrage, again to throw itself flat upon the ground.

So long as no enemy are encountered, these successive rushes may go on without check for hundreds of yards. If during the course of any rush, trenches or strong points are met with and they contain enemy who do not immediately surrender, prompt use must be made of rifle and bayonet. But it is the primary business of the leading line of Infantry to push on and not to delay by engaging in close combat. The second and third lines of Infantry are there to "mop up," that is, to dispose, by destruction or capture, of any enemy overrun or ignored by the leading line. Where Tanks co-operate that is also their special business, and when it has been attended to they go forward at top speed to rejoin the leading line.

In such a methodical way the advance continues until the final objective is reached. This event can be recognized by the Infantry in any of three ways, firstly by reference to the clock time; for the arrival of the barrage at any line on the map or ground occurs in pursuance of a definite time-table; secondly by the topographical features, and thirdly by the expedient of maintaining the barrage stationary at the final objective for fifteen to thirty minutes. In some battles, I also adopted the device of firing from every gun in the barrage, three rounds of smoke shell in rapid succession, as a signal to the Commanders of the leading line of Infantry to call the final halt, to select a good line for trenches, and to dig-in rapidly, a process technically called "consolidation."

It would be too much to hope that in an attack covering a front of four or five miles, every part of the line should be able to advance without any check whatever up to the final halting place. But the expectation always is that by far the greater part of the whole line will be able to do so. If, here and there along the front, platoons or even whole companies were to be held up or delayed by special difficulties or obstacles such as thickets, or copses strongly manned by the enemy, or by belts of wire, or village ruins, such breaks in the general line of advance would matter but little to the success of the operations as a whole. The gaps discovered in the leading line of Infantry, when it had come to a halt at the final objective, would be speedily filled by supporting troops from both flanks of the gap, and thereby the enemy holding out further back, would be completely enveloped. His surrender would follow as soon as he realized his position, and that he had been cut off from any contact with his friends in his rear.

Such is the normal course of the Infantry action in a pitched battle. It makes great demands upon the iron resolution of the Infantryman to push on vigorously against all obstacles, and to put forth his utmost physical powers to keep up with the barrage, especially when the ground is wet and sticky, or when uncut wire has to be crawled through. All this he must do, utterly regardless of the enemy fire which may be directed against him, whether from Artillery or machine guns. His best hope of immunity is always to make his rush rapidly and determinedly, and to get to ground immediately that he reaches the halting place, close up to the barrage, when signalled by his officer.

Very different from such a stereotyped procedure is the action of the Infantry in any operation or any part of an operation which partakes of the character of open warfare. The main tactical purpose is still, as before, to advance to the seizure of an appointed objective, but there is no barrage, no time-table, no fixity of route, no prescribed formation or procedure. Everything must be left to the judgment, initiative and enterprise of the leader on the spot.

The tactical unit of Infantry is the platoon. The action of a whole battalion is compounded merely of the separate actions of its sixteen platoons, each performing the separate rôle, in a general plan, that may be laid down by the Battalion Commanders, some to advance and fight, some to act in support, some to lie in reserve, some to engage in a flank attack, others to fetch and carry food, water and munitions.

The platoon is commanded by a Lieutenant and comprises four sections, each under a Sergeant or Corporal. There are two sections of riflemen, a Lewis gun section and a section of rifle grenadiers. Each section may consist of from five to eight men. Let it be supposed that it is the business of the platoon to capture a small farmhouse which the enemy has fortified and in which he is holding out. Always supposing that the enemy garrison is not of a strength requiring more than one platoon for its capture the normal action of the attacking platoon would be somewhat as follows. The Lewis gun section would, from a concealed position, on one flank, keep the place under steady fire. The rifle grenadiers from the same or another flank would fire smoke grenades to make a smoke screen. One section of riflemen would endeavour to sneak up depressions and ditches or along hedges, so as to get well behind the farm and threaten it by fire from the rear. The other section of riflemen would choose some direct line of attack, over ground which offered concealment to them until they were close enough to take the objective with a rush.

Such in very bare outline is merely an imaginary example, but it is sufficient to show the amount of skill, resource and energy required on the part not only of the leader, but also of every man in the platoon. The secret of success of the Australian open fighting lay in the extraordinary vigour, judgment and team-work which characterized the many hundreds of little platoon battles which were fought on just such lines as I have tried to suggest in this example.

It will be readily seen that no comprehensive description is possible which would present an adequate picture of the widely varying activities of the Australian Infantryman in this campaign. There is only one source from which reliable narratives of individual fighting can be gathered, and that source is so voluminous that space forbids any but a meagre attempt to supply extracts from it. I refer to the recommendations made by Commanders for honours and rewards for individual acts of gallantry. A very small selection of these has been made and is presented in an appendix to this book.[20]

But to return to my narrative of September 18th. On that day each Division attacked on a frontage of two Brigades. No serious opposition was encountered except at La Verguier, which was not far from our start line. Nevertheless, the whole of the "red" line, which was the objective of the "set-piece" phase of the day's battle, was in our possession, throughout the whole length of the Corps front, well before 10 o'clock.

This gave us complete possession of the old British front line of March, 1918; but the Hindenburg outpost line yet lay before us, still distant another 1,500 to 2,000 yards. This latter line was to be the ultimate or exploitation objective of the day's operations, and I could hardly have dared to hope that a trench system of such considerable strength, which had defied the Fifth Army for so long, would fall into our hands so easily as it did.

Glasgow's Division pushed on without pause, and before nightfall had overwhelmed the garrison of the Hindenburg outpost line along its front. Maclagan's Division also fought its way forward to within 500 yards of that line. But the troops were by then very exhausted; all movement was in full view of the enemy; and the ground was very difficult. After a consultation with Maclagan I decided to rest the troops, and to make an attempt to reach the final objective (blue line) that same night.

Advantage was taken of this pause to advance the Artillery, so that the enemy's defences could be thoroughly bombarded before the final assault. At 11 o'clock the same night, the Fourth Division again attacked, and after severe fighting also captured the whole of the objective trench system.

It was a great victory. The Hindenburg outpost line had been vanquished. From it we could now look down upon the St. Quentin Canal, and sweep with fire the whole of the sloping ground which lay between us and the Canal, denying the use of that ground to the enemy, and making it impossible for him to withdraw the guns and stores which littered the area.

The overwhelming nature of the success can best be realized by the following almost incredible analysis of the material results of the day's fighting. The First Division attacked with a total strength of 2,854 Infantry. They suffered only 490 casualties (killed and wounded). They captured 1,700 prisoners, apart from the large numbers who were killed, and the wounded enemy who made good their escape.

The Fourth Division had a total assaulting strength of 3,048 of all ranks, of whom 532 became casualties. Their captures of live prisoners amounted to 2,543.

In addition, the Corps gathered in upwards of 80 guns, which had been overrun, and had to be abandoned by the enemy.

There is no record in this war of any previous success on such a scale, won with so little loss.

The Corps on either flank of me had successes of varying quality. The Ninth Corps on the south had reached the red line, but the exploitation phase of the operation was not pressed until a later day. The Third Corps, on my left, however, made indifferent progress. Their line still bent back sharply from my left flank, and none of the enemy's outpost system had been gained. This portion of the Army front was that which lay square opposite the Bellicourt tunnel, and the fact that in this part of the field the Fourth Army had not yet mastered the Hindenburg outpost system was to be fraught with very serious difficulties for me, not many days later.

The general plan propounded by General Rawlinson on September 13th had been realized in part, although not in its entirety. The successes gained on September 18th were nevertheless sufficiently important and decisive to justify immediate preparations for working out the plan for a great, combined and final effort to sweep the enemy out of the remainder of the last lines of defence which he had established in France.

The First and Fourth Australian Divisions had, however, as it turned out, fought their last fight in the war. Their long and brilliant fighting career, which had been opened three and a half years before, the one on the cliffs of Gallipoli, and the other in the desert of Egypt, thus ended in a blaze of glory. Although a number of the officers and non-commissioned officers of both these Divisions were called upon, very shortly after, to render one more valuable service to the Australian Corps, the Divisions themselves were destined, because of the termination of hostilities, not again to make their appearance on any battle front. Their labours ended, the troops were taken by motor bus and railway to a coastal district lying to the south-west of Amiens, there to rest and recuperate in the contemplation of a noble past devoted to the service of the Empire.

CHAPTER XIV
AMERICA JOINS IN

I had foreseen that the battle to be fought on September 18th was the last in which the First and Fourth Divisions could be called upon to participate during the remainder of the 1918 campaigning season. The wastage of their Battalions had gone on faster than the inflow of fresh drafts, or the return of convalescent sick and wounded. These two Divisions contained the original sixteen Battalions who had immortalized themselves, in 1915, in the landing on Gallipoli. I was strongly averse from disbanding any one of them to furnish drafts for the remainder. My hope then was that, if these Divisions could be allowed to rest over the winter, they could be sufficiently replenished by the spring of 1919 to be able to maintain all sixteen Battalions at a satisfactory fighting strength.

Of the remaining three Divisions, the Third and Fifth required at least another week's rest; and I had promised the Second Division that after their heroic efforts at Mont St. Quentin, they would not be again called upon until towards the end of September. I would thus be left with insufficient resources to maintain an immediate continuance of the pressure upon the enemy.

On explaining the situation to General Rawlinson, he suggested the interesting possibility of being able to obtain, very shortly, the services of the Second American Corps of two Divisions, and asked me whether I would be prepared to accept the responsibility of taking this large force under my command for the continuance of the operations.

I had no reason to hesitate. My experience of the quality of the American troops, both at the battle of Hamel and on the Chipilly spur, had been eminently satisfactory. It was true that this new American Corps had no previous battle service, but measures were possible to supply them with any technical guidance which they might lack.

I therefore accepted the suggestion, and Rawlinson then asked me to submit a proposal for a joint operation to take place towards the end of the month by these two American and the remaining three Australian Divisions, with the object of completing the task, so well begun, of breaking through the Hindenburg defences. I was to propose my objectives, to show how I intended to employ each of the five Divisions, and also to set out my requirements in Artillery, Tanks and other services.

It was anything but an easy task, and it had to be undertaken at a time when the preparations for the battle of Hargicourt were uppermost in my mind. Much time also had to be devoted to numerous distinguished visitors.

The outcome was a letter to the Fourth Army which foreshadowed, almost in its entirety, the battle plan which subsequently was actually employed. The substance of this letter is here reproduced. The text has been modified only by the omission of the reference letters to a large coloured map which accompanied it:

Corps Headquarters,
18th September, 1918.

Fourth Army.

1. I beg to submit the outlines of a plan for a series of operations for the capture of the Hindenburg Line in the Sector Bellicourt-Vendhuille, based upon the expectation that two American Divisions will be available immediately to supplement this Corps.

2. The resources of the Corps in Infantry, which will be available, are exclusive of the First and Fourth Australian Divisions, although the Artillery, Technical Troops and Machine Gun Battalions of those Divisions will continue to be available.

3. The plan is based upon the assumption that the objective Blue Line of the operations of September 18th is in our possession all along the Army Front, or can be seized in the very near future.

4. The accompanying Map shows the coloured lines referred to in the following description, as also the reference letters in blue.

5. This plan is in outline only, and the various objective lines and boundaries suggested are merely tentative, to form the basis for a general plan.

6. The Blue Line is the line of eventual exploitation for the operations of September 18th.

7. The present Corps front on the Blue Line extends a distance of 6,000 yards. It is suggested, either that the Corps front should be extended to a total frontage of 10,000 yards, or that it should be side-slipped northwards to a frontage of 6,000 yards. The latter would obviously be preferable, so far as the Corps is concerned, as enabling all its resources to be concentrated upon a smaller frontage.

8. The major outlines of the plan are as follows:

(a) An attack by two American Divisions for the capture of the Green Line.

(b) A subsequent attack by two Australian Divisions for the capture of the Red Line.

(c) Exploitation by the Cavalry from the Red Line, in an Easterly and north-easterly direction.

(d) A turning movement by the Ninth Corps, through Bellicourt and Nauroy to turn the Canal defences, operating from north to south—or alternatively.

(e) A turning movement by the Third Corps, operating through Le Catelet northwards.

9. The details of the above plan will run on the following lines:

(a) The new Corps front to be taken over at the earliest possible moment by two American Divisions, each Division deploying for this purpose only one Regiment of one Brigade. This will place in Line six Battalions on the Corps front, giving each Battalion about 1,000 yards. These troops will hold the line defensively, and will, with the assistance of technical troops, prepare the battle front.

(b) The battle troops of the two American Divisions will thus comprise three Regiments or nine Battalions for each Division. The allocation of objectives to these troops will be as follows:

(i) One Brigade (two Regiments) of the right Division to advance 4,500 yards on a frontage of 3,000 yards. This Brigade (six Battalions) would attack with four Battalions in Line (750 yards frontage each) and two Battalions in support for "mopping up" duties. Its principal objective, apart from the main trench systems, is Bellicourt.

(ii) Similarly, one Brigade (two Regiments) of the left Division, with similar dispositions. Its principal objective, apart from the main trench systems, is Catelet.

(iii) The odd Regiment of the right Division to be responsible for forming the south defensive flank.

(iv) The odd Regiment of the left Division to be responsible for forming the north defensive flank.

(c) It will be noted that the Green Line has been drawn so as to include all ground giving good observation northward, eastward and southwards, and to deny observation to the enemy. It is probable that the Field Artillery barrage will not be able to penetrate to the extreme limits of this proposed objective along the whole battle front without moving forward some of the batteries, particularly in the Northern Divisional Sector. This will probably necessitate a halt of an hour or an hour and a half, to enable Artillery to be advanced.

(d) Assuming that the battle opens about 6 a.m., the Green Line should be reached by 10 a.m. or earlier. By mobilizing ample resources in technical troops, both American and Australian, and ample tools and engineering material, it should be easily possible to construct not less than four roads, sufficiently developed for horse transport, from the Blue Line to the Green Line, by 2 p.m. These roads would be located so as to make use of existing roads, and trench crossings would be made by filling in with earth and not by bridging. It is estimated, therefore, that Mobile Artillery could move forward not later than 2 p.m. on Zero day.

(e) The Australian Infantry of two Divisions would move at such an hour as would enable them to reach and be deployed upon the Green Line by 2 p.m., shortly after which hour they would be joined by the necessary Mobile Artillery. This phase of the operation would also involve the capture of the Beaurevoir Line. It is assumed that Tanks would be available to deal with the crossing of the wire entanglements covering this line.

(f) The completion of the defensive flanks would be allocated to American troops.

(g) As soon as the Australian Infantry had passed the Green Line, the four American Regiments who had participated in the capture of the Green Line, would be concentrated, refitted and rested for operations eastwards.

10. The following considerations should be kept in view, in connection with this plan.

(a) There should be sufficient Field Artillery, not merely to provide an effective barrage for the time-table advance to the Green Line and its flanks, but also, in addition, sufficient Mobile Field Artillery, not employed in the barrage, to enable the Australian Infantry to be provided with at least six Artillery Brigades for the exploitation phase of the operation.

(b) There should be at least 60 Tanks available for the first phase, in order absolutely to guarantee the breaching of the main Hindenburg trench systems. There should, in addition, be available not less than 30 Tanks to assist the Australian Infantry through the Beaurevoir Line.

11. There should be a systematic destructive bombardment of the whole of the Hindenburg trench system on the battle front, lasting at least four days, in order not merely to destroy the defensive organization, but also to demoralize and starve the trench garrisons. This destructive bombardment should extend a considerable distance to the north and south of the battle front.

12. The rapid construction of usable roads, both for horse transport and mechanical transport, across the Canal tunnel, would have to be a special feature of the organization, so that the whole of our battle organization could be rapidly carried forward to maintain the battle eastward of the Red Line. This would involve the mobilization of a large amount of mechanical transport, ready loaded with road-stone, so that road-making can commence after Zero hour without any delay. For these works, there would be available the greater part of the Australian and American technical troops of seven Divisions, as well as Army Troops Companies.

John Monash,
Lieut.-General.
Commanding Australian Corps.

Some comment is necessary upon this proposal. The composition of the American Divisions, following the French and not the British precedent, differed materially from my own Divisions. The American Division consisted of two Brigades, each of two Regiments, each of three Battalions. Its total strength was nearly double that of an English Division.

It will be noted that my proposal involved a concentrated attack, not upon the canal, but upon that sector of 6,000 yards which lay over the Bellicourt-Catelet tunnel. This zone at that time lay clear of and to the north of my Corps area, and that is what involved the necessity of "side-slipping" the Corps front to the north.

Moreover, I put forward no suggestion that the Canal sector, then in front of me, should be the subject of a frontal attack at all. My proposal was that it should be taken by envelopment, through the breach to be made over the tunnel. At the time I regarded it as unlikely that the deep canal itself could be stormed except at great cost. I was not prepared to commit any Australian troops under my command to such an enterprise, and therefore naturally hesitated to propose that any other Corps should attempt it. For this reason I submitted an alternative plan of envelopment.

This was, however, a matter for the Army Commander to decide. My business was merely to show that the proposed action of my own Corps permitted of the co-operation of the other Corps of the Army in a specified way.

General Rawlinson's decisions were given on September 19th, at a conference which he assembled at my Headquarters. My plan for the action of the Australian and American Corps was to be adopted in its entirety, with the sole exception that the capture of the Beaurevoir line, on the first day of battle, was not to be included in the plan. It was to be left to await the results of the prior stages. In this modification I could readily concur.

As regards the action of the flank Corps, General Rawlinson held the view that a direct assault on the canal itself ought to be attempted, and that this should be entrusted to the Ninth Corps. He was doubtless influenced, in this view, by the knowledge, disclosed to us for the first time on that day, that he intended to propose that the attack on the Hindenburg Line would, if undertaken, extend over the front of at least three Armies, the French on the south, and the Fourth and Third British Armies. Such a simultaneous attack, over a very wide front, would naturally increase the prospects of success for every Corps participating.

As to the Third Corps, it was to take part only in the preliminaries of the battle, and not in the battle itself. Another Corps, the Thirteenth (Lieut.-General Sir T. L. N. Morland) was to join the Fourth Army. If the Australian Corps succeeded in effecting the breach of the Hindenburg Line as I had proposed to do, it was to be the Thirteenth Corps, and not the Third Corps, which, pouring through the breach, was to envelop the flank of the Hindenburg Line towards the north.

The main consideration that affected me was the approval of my plan for the action of the two American and three Australian Divisions. I was able to begin immediately the development in detail of that plan, a task which proved at once the most arduous, the most responsible, and the most difficult of any that I have had to undertake throughout the whole of the war.

The first step was to get the American Divisions into the line opposite their prospective battle fronts, and the next was to hand over what had hitherto been the Australian Corps front to the Ninth Corps.

The Ninth Corps battle front was to extend from Bellenglise to Bellicourt, mine from opposite Bellicourt to opposite Le Catelet.

The necessary troop movements and inter-divisional reliefs required nearly a week for their completion. By the evening of September 23rd, the last of the two Australian Divisions had been relieved by the Americans and the Ninth Corps, and on that night these stood on their respective battle frontages. I took over command of this new front, thus manned by Americans, in the forenoon of September 25th.

It is a somewhat noteworthy circumstance, but one which attracted no attention at the time, that between September 25th and September 29th, there was a period of five days during which no Australian troops were in the front line in any part of the French theatre of war. This was a situation which had never arisen since the first contingent of Australians arrived from Egypt in April, 1916. For nearly two and a half years, there had never previously been a moment when some Australians had not been confronting the enemy, somewhere or other in the long battle front in France.

I have said that I had been called upon to undertake the responsibility of directing in a great battle two Divisions (the 27th and 30th) of United States troops, numbering altogether some 50,000 men. These had been organized into a Corps, called the Second American Corps, and commanded by Major-General G. W. Read. It was certainly anomalous that a whole organized Corps should pass under the orders of a Corps Headquarters of another nationality, but in authorizing such an arrangement, General Rawlinson relied upon the good sense and mutual forbearance of the Corps Commanders concerned.

I am bound to say that the arrangement caused me no anxiety or difficulty. General Read and his Staff most readily adapted themselves to the situation. He established his Headquarters quite close to my own, and gave me perfect freedom of action in dealing direct with his two Divisional Commanders, so far as I found it necessary to do so. Read was a man of sound common sense and clear judgment, a reserved but agreeable and courteous personality. His only desire was the success of his Divisions, and he very generously took upon himself the role of an interested spectator, so that I might not be hampered in issuing orders or instructions to his troops. At the same time, I am sure that in his quiet, forceful way he did much to ensure on the part of his Divisional Commanders and Brigadiers a sympathetic attitude towards me and the demands I had to make upon them.

The Australian Corps had specialized in comprehensive and careful preparations for battle. Its methods had been reduced to a quite definite code of practice, with which every Staff Officer and Battalion Adjutant had, by experience, become intimately familiar. All this procedure was a closed book to the American troops, and they were severely handicapped accordingly.

I therefore proposed to General Read, and he gratefully accepted, the creation of an "Australian Mission" to his Corps, whose rôle would be to act as a body of expert advisers on all questions of tactical technique, and of supply and maintenance. This idea once accepted was worked out on a fully elaborated scale.

To the head of this Mission I appointed Major-General Maclagan, not only to command the personnel of the Mission itself, but also to live with and act as adviser to General Read's own Staff. The Mission comprised a total of 217 men, chosen from the First and Fourth Australian Divisions, and consisted of specially selected and very experienced officers and N.C.O.'s. The American Corps Headquarters was provided with a Major-General, assisted by one General Staff, one Administrative, one Signal, one Intelligence, and one Machine Gun Staff Officer. Each American Division had assigned to it an Australian Brigadier-General, assisted by several Staff Officers; each American Brigade had an Australian Battalion Commander and Signal Officer; and so on down the chain. Each American Battalion, even, had four highly expert Warrant or Non-commissioned officers to advise on every detail of supply, equipment and tactical employment of the troops.

By such an arrangement it became possible to talk to the whole American Corps in our own technical language. This saved me and my Staff a vast amount of time and energy, because the members of this Mission acted as interpreters of the technical terms and usages customary in the orders and maps of the Australian Corps, which were necessarily quite unfamiliar to the American troops.

Maclagan was a man eminently fitted for this task. In appearance and in temperament he is every inch a soldier. Of all my Divisional Commanders he was the only one who, immediately before the war, was a professional soldier of the Imperial Army. Although not Australian born, he was whole-heartedly Australian, for he had spent some years as Director of Military Training at the Royal Military College at Duntroon. On the outbreak of war he received the command of the 3rd Australian Brigade, and with it carried out the most difficult preliminary phase of the landing on the Gallipoli peninsula. He commanded the Fourth Australian Division from the autumn of 1917 until the conclusion of hostilities. His characteristic attitude of mind, so strongly in contrast to that of Rosenthal, was pessimistic. But that was not because he looked for difficulties, but because he preferred squarely to recognize and face all the difficulties there were. Yet he never failed in performance, and invariably contrived to do what he had urged could not be done. One could not afford to take him at his own modest estimate of himself. Both he and his Division always bettered any promise they gave.

I entertain no kind of doubt that it was only because of the creation of this Australian Mission to the Americans, and of Maclagan's tact, industry and judgment in controlling it, that the combined action of the two Corps in the great battle of the closing days of September proved as successful as it did. Under no other conditions would it have been possible to bring about any reasonable degree of co-operation between two forces whose war experiences, outlook, attitude towards their problems, training and temperament were so fundamentally different.

It is not necessary to indulge in either a panegyric or a condemnation of these American Divisions. Neither would be deserved or appropriate. They showed a fine spirit, a keen desire to learn, magnificent individual bravery, and splendid comradeship. But they were lacking in war experience, in training, and in knowledge of technique. They had not yet learned the virtues of unquestioning obedience, of punctuality, of quick initiative, of anticipating the next action. They were, many of them, unfamiliar with the weapons and instruments of fighting, with the numerous kinds of explosive materials, or with the routine of preparing and promulgating clear orders. They seriously underrated the necessity for a well-organized system of supply, particularly of food and water, to the battle troops. They hardly, as yet, appreciated the tactical expedients available for reducing losses in battle.

Yet all these shortcomings were the results only of inexperience, and it is perhaps unfair to contrast them with the Australian troops who had seen front-line service in France for two and a half years continuously, and whose leaders, high and low, had served a long and graduated apprenticeship in every branch of their duties.

The Australian Mission assisted greatly to minimize these difficulties. Although its members were vested with no executive powers, their advice and help were eagerly sought, and zealously adopted. In many ways, large and small, their assistance must have proved invaluable. How to interpret orders from above and how to issue them to those below, how to draw stores and how to distribute them, how to organize the signal service and how to ensure a flow of information—these ranked among the greater matters. In quite small things also, help was needed, such as the way to detonate mortar bombs, to equip the infantryman for battle, to organize and use the messenger (i.e., runner) service, and to keep battle stations clear of people who had no urgent business there.

It is not, of course, intended to convey that all these defects were present in every regiment. Some, however, were met with, by the officers of the Australian Mission, in all of them.

It greatly added to the burden cast upon the American Divisions that they were called upon to fight almost as soon as they had taken up duty in the line. The necessity for this was really a legacy from the Third Corps, whom they had relieved, and it is essential for an understanding of the course of events during these days to narrate them in proper chronological order.

I have explained that as the result of the battle of Hargicourt, the Australian Corps had succeeded in mastering the whole of the Hindenburg outpost line opposite its front, as far as a point a little north of and opposite to Bellicourt. The advance of the Third Corps, however, had failed to reach the same line, and had stopped short of it by an average distance of nearly a thousand yards. On my pointing out that the front I had taken over did not comply with the stipulations which I had made in my battle plan,[21] the Army Commander decided that prior to the main attack, the northern of the two American Divisions should make good this shortage, by an attack aiming at the capture of the remainder of the Hindenburg outpost line opposite the tunnel sector.

I must now anticipate an explanation of the main outlines of the plan which I had prepared for the great battle, by a brief reference to the situation and disposition of troops on September 25th. The two American Divisions were respectively the 30th, commanded by Major-General Lewis, on the right or south, and the 27th, commanded by Major-General O'Ryan, on the left or north, each lying on a frontage of three thousand yards. These two Divisions comprised, in all, eight regiments, each of three battalions. I had instructed each of them to place one regiment in the line, and to keep the remaining three, i.e., six in all, in reserve, for the main operation.

My first Corps conference dealing with the forthcoming operations was held at my Headquarters at Assevillers, on September 23rd. The American Generals Read, Lewis and O'Ryan, with their respective Staffs, attended, as also did the Australian Generals Maclagan, Brand and Mackay, who were members of the Australian Mission to the American Corps. None of the Australian Commanders destined to take part in the operations attended on this day, for two reasons, firstly, because I intended to confine myself entirely to that portion of the operation which concerned the American troops only, and secondly, because the date of the battle had not then been decided, and I wished to run no risk of confusing executive action by any premature announcements to the Australians, which subsequent events might modify.

The American rôle, had, however, sufficiently crystallized to enable me to explain it to the assembled Generals in great detail. As will subsequently appear, it was a plan which had, intentionally, been reduced to the simplest possible elements. It was to be a straightforward trench to trench attack, from a perfectly straight "jumping off" line to a perfectly straight objective line, under a dense Artillery and Machine-Gun barrage, and with the assistance of a large contingent of Tanks.

The advance was to be at a deliberate pace, and if due regard were had to a few elementary precautions, should prove a simple task for the American Infantry. It was, indeed, on quite stereotyped lines, such as had so often carried the Australian Infantry to victory in set-piece battles such as Messines, Broodseinde, Hamel and the first phase of August 8th.

It was, however, borne in upon me, very soon after this Conference opened, that I was now confronted with quite a different proposition from that to which I had been accustomed in the conferences attended by my own Divisional Generals. The exposition of the plan itself was brief and simple, but it elicited such a rain of questions, that in the end I found myself compelled to embark upon a very detailed exposition of the fundamental principles of my battle practice.

With blackboard and chalk, maps and diagrams, I had to speak for more than three hours in an endeavour to explain methods and reasons, mistakes and remedies, dangers and precautions, procedures and expedients. The proceedings left me with no doubt that the American Generals became fully informed as to the tasks and duties allotted to them, and fully understood them.

In the light of after events, I am not so sure that they succeeded in passing on the information to their subordinates—not by reason of any shortcomings on their own part, for they impressed me as able, strong men—but because their Divisions had not yet learned the methods and machinery of effectively and rapidly conveying instructions to large bodies of troops.

In one particular, subordinate though vital, there certainly was a serious failure to reach the troops. The enemy had, during 1916, met our assault tactics with an answer which proved disastrously effective against us until we had learned how to meet it. He provided his trench systems with many and roomy shell-proof dug-outs. Whenever our barrage fell upon his trenches, his garrisons promptly took cover in these dug-outs. When our assaulting infantry reached the enemy trenches they found but few of the enemy there, and they rushed headlong forward to the next objective trenches. From out of their dug-outs streamed the enemy, faced about, attacked our assaulting lines in rear and withered them with fire. Many an attack by the British on the Somme failed for just such reasons.

In 1917 we evolved, and applied for the first time at the battle of Messines, an effective answer to such tactics. Close on the heels of our first line of assaulting troops came a second line, whose rôle was to occupy the captured trench immediately, and to "mop it up." This meant the killing or disarming of all enemy found in hiding, the picketing of the entrances and exits of all dug-outs, and laying siege to them until their occupants surrendered, a course to which they were encouraged by a liberal use of phosphorus bombs or Mills's grenades.

This process of "mopping up" became an integral part of our attack procedure. Australian infantry soon learned its importance, and practised the method with a thoroughness and efficiency to which I remember no exception. Even a junior sergeant commanding a dozen men could be relied on to take all measures necessary to ensure that no enemy was ever left in hiding and unguarded behind his little party as they advanced.

In the forthcoming attack upon the Hindenburg defences, the process of "mopping up" became of supreme importance, because of the very fact, of which we had become well aware, that the whole defensive system had been provided, on quite an exceptional scale, with underground shelters, galleries, passages and dug-outs. I made the most of this knowledge in my talks to the Americans, emphasized the dangers as strongly as I was able, insisted that the "mopping up" organization of their infantry must be absolutely perfected, and ordered that of the total Infantry participating in the assault, not less than one-half should have the special role of safeguarding all underground exits and entrances.

The great fear was, of course, that these new troops, eager to show their mettle, would be carried away in the excitement of the moment, and would rush headlong forward, regardless of the dangers that lurked behind them. It is, after all, no small demand to make upon the discipline of an Infantry soldier, to expect him patiently and obediently to stand guard over some dug-out entrance, allowing the battle to sweep on, and his comrades to go forward to the excitement and glory of achieving the final objectives.

So indeed it happened. The American Infantry had either not been sufficiently tutored in this important matter, or the need of it had not penetrated their understanding. In the attacks carried out by these troops, while under my command, the "mopping up" was always badly done, even in the few cases where it was attempted. The result was failure to achieve a clean success, and a great addition to their own casualty list. This criticism will be fully borne out by the narrative of the great battle itself.

A second and much larger conference was held at my Headquarters on September 26th, for the really complete and final co-ordination of the whole of the procedure for the forthcoming battle. It was attended not only by the American Divisional Generals and Brigadiers, but also by the Commanders of the Second, Third and Fifth Australian Divisions, their Staffs, the Tanks, Air Force and Cavalry.

It was much the largest and was also destined to be the last of any assemblage of Commanders that it had been my privilege to call together in the course of this memorable campaign.

No one present will soon forget the tense interest and confident expectancy which characterized that meeting. America, a great English-speaking democracy on one shore of the Pacific, was to co-operate with Australia, its younger sister democracy on the opposite shore, in what was the greatest and what might be the most decisive battle of the great European War. Few present doubted that, if we were successful, the war could not last much longer—because the loss of the Hindenburg system would inevitably mean for the enemy his final enforced withdrawal from France.

While the conference was in full swing, the Field Marshal himself paid me a call. He had come to wish me success in the task before me. He was interested to find so many Divisional Commanders assembled, and was persuaded to address a few words to the gathering.

The conduct of the proceedings of this conference was a heavy strain. The main battle was to take place on September 29th, or within seventy-two hours, and part of my front line still stood a thousand yards west of the Hindenburg outpost lines. General Rawlinson had decided that this defect was to be made good prior to the main operation, and the attempt to do so had been timed to take place on September 27th, the day after the conference.

I had, therefore, to complete my organization upon the basis of a set of precedent conditions which had not yet been entirely realized. It was a new and a difficult situation. The whole of the powerful Artillery at my disposal for the battle, amounting now to over a thousand guns, was naturally clamouring for final decisions, so that final barrage maps could be submitted for my approval, printed by my very diligent and competent body of lithographic draughtsmen, and circulated to all the batteries and Infantry.

To await the result of the operation of the next day would have allowed insufficient time to complete the necessary maps and to distribute them before nightfall on September 28th. There was no option but to assume that General O'Ryan (27th American Division) would succeed in capturing the northern section of the outpost line still in enemy hands, and upon that assumption to fix the Artillery "start line" as falling to the east of that objective. For the first time I had to gamble on a chance. It was contrary to the policy which had governed all my previous battle plans, in which nothing had been left to chance.

At 5.30 a.m. next morning the 27th American Division carried out the attack, under a barrage, and assisted by Tanks. The principal objective points in the trench system under attack were Quennemont Farm and Gillemont Farm. Every trace of these once prosperous homesteads and plantations had, of course, long since disappeared. The names alone remained as memories of the fighting there of 1917.

What happened on that day will never be accurately known. For once, the information from the air did not harmonize with the claims made on behalf of the assaulting troops, perhaps because the troops, being untrained in the use of flares, or having been left unsupplied with them, failed to assist the aeroplanes in identifying their correct positions. However that may be, it became sufficiently clear, as the day proceeded, that no proper success for the operation could be claimed.

There remained no doubt that some enemy were still left in occupation of trenches on our side of the objective for that day, and such American troops as may have gained their objective could not therefore be reached. It appeared afterwards that small parties of Americans had reached the vicinity of their objectives and had very gallantly maintained themselves there, although surrounded on all sides, until relieved by the Australians on September 29th.

The non-success of this operation of September 27th appeared undoubtedly to be due to a failure to carry out "mopping up" duties satisfactorily. It considerably embarrassed the preparations for the main attack on the 29th. The knowledge that a number of American wounded were still lying out in front, and the suspicion that some of the American troops had succeeded in reaching Gillemont Farm, precluded any alteration of the Artillery plans for September 29th, even if there had still been time to do so without creating untold confusion. To have brought the Artillery start line, proposed for September 29th, back to the start line of September 27th would have brought our own barrage down upon these forward troops of ours.

I hastened to the Army Commander to put the position before him, stating that I felt grave concern for the success of the main operation, in view of the fact that my Artillery barrage would have to come down fully a thousand yards in front of what was still the front of the 27th Division. I suggested a postponement for a day to give this Division, which had ample resources in troops, another opportunity of retrieving the position. He explained, however, that it was now too late to alter the programme, because three whole Armies were committed to the date first appointed. He said that he was, under the circumstances, quite prepared for a partial failure at this point, and requested me to do my best to pursue the original plan, in spite of this difficult situation.

He agreed, however, to my further request, that additional Tanks, out of Army reserves, should be placed at my disposal, so that I might allot them to the 27th Division, to assist them in passing over the thousand yards which would bring them up level with the Artillery barrage. I hoped that this would enable the Division to catch up with the southern half of the battle line.

It was an unsatisfactory expedient, and gave no promise of certain success. It proved futile, and gravely affected the actual course, although not the ultimate success, of the battle still to come. It was the only occasion in the campaign on which I was compelled to accept preliminary arrangements which were not such as would absolutely guarantee success.

The genesis of the difficulty thus created had, however, been the failure of the Third Corps to complete their programme of September 18th. It had been confirmed by the subsequent failure of the 27th American Division to make up the deficiency on September 27th. I still think, as I then urged, that I should have been allowed to accept the situation as I found it on taking over this front on September 25th, and that the 27th Division should not have been called upon, at the eleventh hour, to endeavour to establish that new situation which had been originally assumed as the basis for the battle plan of September 29th. My original proposal of September 18th, in my letter of that date, paragraph 3 (see above), had, of course, been made before I could foresee that the Third Corps would fail to capture the start line contemplated in my first plan.

Of course, all is well that ends well. But, for an anxious and turbulent period of twenty-four hours on September 29th and 30th, the issue of the battle hung in grave doubt. The operation, although successful, did not proceed "according to plan" in its entirety, and it was due to the wonderful gallantry and skilful leading of the Third Australian Division that a very ugly situation was retrieved, a result to which the Fifth Australian Division also contributed in no small degree.