Ibrahim’s usual way of opening an audience was to brow‐beat the ambassador, and he indulged in frequent sarcasm and scornful laughter. To the envoys of Ferdinand in 1532 he railed at Ferdinand and “his tricks” and gibed at his faithlessness. “How is a man a king” he said “unless he keeps his word?”129 To Lamberg and Juritschitz (1530)130 he spoke of the quarrels among Christian rulers, twitting his auditors with Charles’s treatment of the Pope and of Francis I, declaring that the Turks would never do “so inhuman a thing,” and following this by a long talk “full of scorn and irony.”131

Ibrahim was enormously inquisitive, seeming to look upon a foreign embassy as an opportunity for gaining all sorts of general information. Sometimes he asked about such practical matters as the fortification of certain forts; at other times he asked such trivial questions as how old the rulers were, and how they pronounced their names. He once remarked that a man who did not try to learn all things is an incompetent man. Several times he boasted that in Turkey they knew all that was taking place in Europe.

His manner, as we have seen, was usually sharp and rude, but he could be elaborately courteous when he wished to please, as when he received an embassy from “our good friend” Francis I, and the Hungarian embassy of 1534. He was invariably boastful; during the earlier years he bragged of the sultan, his power and treasure; in the later embassies he boasted of himself.

One of the most important documents about Ibrahim that we possess is the account of the peace embassy sent by Ferdinand in 1533, the report being written by Hieronymus von Zara in Latin in September, 1533. This shows Ibrahim in a sharper light than we have had elsewhere, and brings out some traits in his character that have been growing steadily since his rise to such great power: his ambition and his towering pride.132

Ibrahim, splendidly clad, received the ambassadors for their first audience, without rising. He accepted the rich jewels they offered him, and appointed a later day for the business of the treaty. On the appointed day the envoys were permitted to kiss the garments of the grand vizir, and they saluted him as brother of their sovereigns, Ferdinand and Queen Marie of Hungary. Ibrahim had never acknowledged the sovereignty of Ferdinand, and had always spoken of him without any kingly title, to the amaze of the ambassadors.133 In this interview and throughout the whole conference Ibrahim spoke of Ferdinand as his brother, and as son to Suleiman. This was not mere personal vanity; under the pretext of the community of good which should exist between father and son he cloaked the Sultan’s usurpation of Hungary, and the fraternity of Ferdinand and Ibrahim served to disguise the humiliation of the former, who was placed in the same rank as a vizir.134 But in the long speech that Ibrahim Pasha made to the ambassadors, he revealed his personal pride. We quote from the speech: “It is I who govern this vast empire. What I do is done; I have all the power, all offices, all the rule. What I wish to give is given and cannot be taken away; what I do not give is not confirmed by any one. If ever the great Sultan wishes to give, or has given anything, if I do not please it is not carried out. All is in my hands, peace, war, treasure. I do not say these things for no reason, but to give you courage to speak freely.”135

When the letters of Emperor Charles were shown him, he examined the seals, remarking as he did so: “My master has two seals, of which one remains in his hands and the other is confided to me, for he wishes no difference between him and me; and if he has garments made for himself, he orders the same for me; he refuses to let me expend anything in building; this hall was built by him.”

Ibrahim seems to have lost his head during this, his last embassy, and to have uttered things that were not safe for any subject of an Oriental despot, however doting, to utter. Whether he spoke out of the sheer madness that the gods send upon those whom they would destroy, or whether he seriously aspired to assume literally and explicitly the power he held actually is impossible to say. Even as grand vizir of Turkey he seems never to have forgotten that he was a Greek. For years he ignored it, and behaved like a Turk and a loyal Moslem, but as he came to feel more secure in his high position, he became more careless, and spoke to these Christian ambassadors of the pride and generosity with which the Greeks are filled. It is a question whether any Greek, from the fall of Byzantium to our time, has not in his inmost heart felt his race superior to his Moslem conquerors, and the fitting ruler of the Eastern Empire. To that feeling are due some of the knottiest complexities in the Young Turk situation of 1911. Naturally this attitude has always been profoundly resented by the Turks; therefore Ibrahim was seriously jeopardizing his standing with the Ottoman Sultan when he remembered that he was both Greek and Christian by birth.

There were plenty at the court to take immediate advantage of any such slip. The courtiers had already been scandalized at the freedom the Pasha took with the Sultan, and thought that he had bewitched Suleiman.136 In the same interview he further expresses his relations to his imperial master in a parable:

The fiercest of animals, the lion, must be conquered not by force, but by cleverness; by the food which his master gives it and by the influence of habit. Its guardian should carry a stick to intimidate it, and should be the only one to feed it. The lion is the prince. The Emperor Charles is a lion. I, Ibrahim Pasha, control my master, the Sultan of the Turks, with the stick of truth and justice. Charles’ ambassador should also control him in the same way.

From this he went on to expatiate on his own power:

The mighty Sultan of the Turks has given to me, Ibrahim, all power and authority. It is I alone who do everything. I am above all the pashas. I can elevate a groom to a pasha. I give kingdoms and provinces to whom I will, without inquiry even from my master. If he orders a thing and I disapprove, it is not executed; but if I order a thing and he disapproves, it is done nevertheless. To make war or conclude peace is in my hands, and I can distribute all treasure. My master’s kingdoms, lands, treasure, are confided to me.

He also boasted of his past accomplishments, speaking of himself as having conquered Hungary, received ambassadors, and made peace. If Suleiman knew of these vauntings, he made no sign of resentment, but continued to repose the same confidence in Ibrahim as hitherto, but the courtiers held them in their hearts to use when the time should come.

Ibrahim’s importance and influence are taken for granted by foreign rulers and envoys. In all his instructions to his ambassadors Ferdinand tells them to see Ibrahim first, and the queen regent of France wrote to him, when she wrote to the sultan. The collections of Gévay and Charrière contain a number of letters from Ferdinand and Francis to Ibrahim. The Venetian baillies transacted all their business with Ibrahim and sent many reports to the Signoria of his power in the state and his influence over the sultan. The envoys brought him valuable presents which he did not hesitate to accept.137 He loved to receive jewels and there was a famous ruby once on the finger of Francis I which was sent by the first French envoy to the Porte, (the envoy who was killed in Bosnia) and which somehow came into Ibrahim’s possession when the Pasha of Bosnia was called to Constantinople to account for the murder.138

But although Ibrahim took presents, and even resented it if they were not offered him, he refused bribes again and again. Ferdinand empowered his envoys in three missions to offer an annual pension to Suleiman (a tribute under a name less offensive to Ferdinand) and at the same time an annual pension to the grand vizir. When Juritschitz and Lamberg offered Ibrahim five to six thousand Hungarian ducats139 annually for his aid in bringing about peace, he rejected it so indignantly that they apologized and withdrew their offer. He said that the previous ambassadors Hobordanacz and Weixelberger had offered him one hundred thousand florins to buy his protection, but that he said then and would now repeat that no sort of present could make him desert the interests of his master, and that he would prefer to aid in the conquest of the whole world than advise the Sultan to restore conquered territory.140

The passage just quoted would seem sufficient to disprove the assertion made by contemporary European historians that Ibrahim Pasha had lifted the siege of Vienna because he had been bought by the gold of the ambassadors. Suleiman gave him everything that he could have asked and much more than lay in the power of any European monarch to bestow. Ibrahim acquired vast wealth, but there is no evidence that his loyalty to Suleiman could be purchased, and while the Turkish historians speak often of the avarice of his successor Rustem Pasha, they never ascribe that quality to Ibrahim. If he had a price, it was too high for Ferdinand to pay.

It is apparent from what has been said that Ibrahim’s diplomatic methods were not subtle; they had no need to be. As the diplomacy of the Porte was usually either the introduction to, or the conclusion of a military campaign, small wonder that it usually attained its object. As the favor of the Porte was eagerly sought by France, Venice, Poland, Russia, Hungary and Austria, it required no finesse of diplomatic handling to deal with their ambassadors. Ibrahim, holding all the trumps, needed no great skill to play his cards well. He might be as rude and boastful as he would, and still the ambassadors would beg for his influence in making peace. Both Suleiman and Ibrahim treated Charles V and Ferdinand with great haughtiness, nevertheless pursuing an entirely successful policy; France, on the other hand, playing a subtle game, won considerable from the Porte. It would seem that the test of Turkish diplomacy was not its method but its general plan and large lines. The question then before us is, what were the objects and accomplishments of Turkish diplomacy between 1525 and 1540.

Suleiman had two objects, first to extend his conquering power further into Europe, and second to assist Francis I against the House of Hapsburg. In these two objects he was successful. His empire was greatly extended during his reign, both in territory and in influence, while the power of the rival House of Hapsburg was steadily diminished and limited. But that which makes of this period an epoch in European political history is not the territorial aggrandizement of Turkey, nor the recognition of its power by Europe, but the first entrance of Turkey into the European concert, if we may anticipate a later term, and the change from the consideration of the Turks as merely unbelievers and foes of Christianity to regarding them as political allies or foes, and as possible factors in the European question. At the close of the reign of Selim the Grim, Turkey, although it was a conquering nation, was still an excrescence in Europe. But the time had come when it must enter into the affairs of the Northern nations, and for that time Suleiman, unusually tolerant towards the West, with a great idea of the destiny of Turkey, and aided by his Christian grand vizir, was ready, and by the end of his reign he had made himself felt in every court on the continent, and had to be reckoned with in every European cabinet. But as a natural corollary to this fact, Turkey was never, after this time, wholly free from European influence. The fine wedge of French intervention was introduced by La Forest in the treaty of 1535, and conservative Turks of today look on Suleiman’s “capitulations” as the beginning of endless troubles for Turkey, while the French still rejoice over the triumphs of astute and far‐sighted Francis I. “Suleiman en sortant de son farouche isolement,” says Zeller, “François I^er en bravant les préventions de ses contemporains, accomplirent une véritable revolution dans la politique de l’Europe.”141 For four centuries France remained the most weighty foreign influence at the Porte. A fuller significance lay in what Lord Stratford de Redcliffe called the “extra‐koranic” character of the concessions made in this reign, the introduction of extra‐koranic legislation in both foreign and internal affairs, by the side of the maxims and rules of the Sheri or Holy Law. Turkey began to discover the inadequacy of Koran legislation for a modern state.142

How much did Ibrahim Pasha influence Suleiman in this policy? He undoubtedly had the details in his own hands, but did he inspire the plan? Probably not. Suleiman knew pretty clearly what he wanted, and he pursued the same policy with the same success after the death of Ibrahim. His contemporaries ascribed to Ibrahim the brain and the force of Turkish diplomacy, and later historians have given to him the exclusive credit of this political evolution. But Zeller’s view143 that too much importance may be given to the rôle of Ibrahim Pasha seems better substantiated. Zeller, nevertheless, in his introduction to La Diplomatie Française, accords to Ibrahim just that credit that peculiarly belongs to him, if we have rightly understood the work of the grand vizir, when he says: “Suleiman was not less enlightened than Francis; he had, as well as the latter, the knowledge of his own interests, and like him he was partially enfranchised from the prejudices of his nation.... At the same time we cannot doubt but that the grand vizir, whose ability and enlightenment are attested by all the ambassadors, contributed to open the mind of his master to the ideas outside his realm, to initiate him into a European Policy, to make him see the menace of the increasing power of Charles V, and the interest which he had to support France”. In the unusual liberality of thought and freedom from prejudice that Suleiman showed in his relation to Europe, we may see the influence of his intelligent favorite.

Thus the two together, Suleiman and Ibrahim, or Ibrahim and Suleiman, as Ferdinand often spoke of them, started the Ottoman Empire from the lonely path of independence and semibarbarism to the labyrinthine and noisy streets of European politics.

CHAPTER IV

Ibrahim the General

Suleiman’s reign was one of continuous war, and for the most part, conquest. His two most redoubtable enemies were the infidel Hungarians and the heretic Persians. His first great campaign was directed against Belgrad, which important city he took in 1521. This conquest he followed quickly by the victorious siege of Rhodes in 1522. In these two campaigns, Ibrahim seems to have taken no part, although he accompanied Suleiman to Rhodes in his capacity of favorite.144 But in the first Hungarian campaign the grand vizir Ibrahim was placed second in command, the sultan himself leading the expedition.

D’Ohsson gives an account of the ceremonial that used to precede war in Turkey.145 He says that the Porte never failed to legitimize a war by a fetva from the Sheik‐ul‐Islam given in grand council, after which the sheiks of the imperial mosques met in the Hall of the Divan and listened to the intoning of a chapter from the Koran, consecrated to military expeditions. The first war measure was the arrest of the ambassador of the country to be attacked, who was taken to the Seven Towers. The next day a manifesto was published and sent to each foreign legation; then followed a Hat‐i‐Shereef conferring command on the grand vizir. With the order he received a richly caparisoned steed and a jeweled sabre, at a most brilliant ceremonial. Generally war was declared in the autumn, the winter was occupied in preparation, and the campaign was undertaken in the spring. At the day and hour appointed by the court astrologer, the imperial standard was planted in the court of the grand vizir or the Sultan, while imams146 filled the air with blessings and chants. Forty days later the first encampment was set up with further ceremonies.

The splendor of the Turkish tents, arms and dress were admired by all observers. A Turkish camp was a lively place, crowded by priests, dervishes, adventurers and volunteers, irregular soldiers, servants, tents, and baggage; and, on the homeward way, laden with slaves and booty.

The Turkish army was at that time the finest in Europe, both in extent and discipline. The Turks were a fighting people, whose arms had steadily won them place and power from the time when their colonel Othman interfered in a Seljuk quarrel to the time when Suleiman’s armies were the terror of Europe, and the few hundred tents of Othman had become the extensive and powerful Ottoman Empire. The army grew and developed with the demands of the state, for as we have seen above, the army was the state. As Mr. Urquhart puts it:147 “The military branch includes the whole state. The army was the estates of the kingdom. The Army had its Courts of Law, and its operations on the field have never been abandoned to the caprice of a court or a cabinet.”

Mr. Urquhart classifies the Turkish army under three main heads:148

I. Permanent troops: janissaries, hired cavalry and regimental spahis of the grand artillery, etc.

II. Feudal troops.

III. Provincial troops (Ayalet Askeri).

He reckoned the number of troops at the close of the sixteenth century as follows:

Permanent.

Guards besides those drafted from Janissaries and Spahis—war levies:

Some explanation of these names will be desirable. The feudal and provincial troops were those whose military service was demanded by the feudal tenure of the timars or fiefs. Of the permanent troops, the celebrated body of the Spahis was recruited from the fiefs, sons of the Spahis being preferred, and were required to follow the banner of the Sultan himself. The Akinji were the light horse, the terror of the Germans and the Hungarians. The Ayab were infantry, a sort of Cossack on foot, as the Akinjis were Cossacks on horseback—without either the pay of the janissaries or the fiefs of the spahis. The famous corps of the janissaries was the heart of the army,—the most privileged, the most terrible, the most efficient of the soldiery. They were recruited from the children, taken in tribute from the conquered Christian states, a thousand a year, and generally became Moslems. The janissaries, the artillery and the guards were the only soldiery paid from the treasury. The Turkish conquerors made war pay for itself, living on the conquered country and carrying home immense loot. At the close of his careful pamphlet, Mr. Urquhart makes an interesting distinction between Janissary and Turkish principles. He claims that the former are “violence, corruption, and prostration of military strength, exhaustion of the treasury, resistance to all, and therefore to beneficial, change.” The Turkish principles, he claims, are altogether different and finer.149

The Turkish artillery was very formidable. It was by means of this and the setting of mines that Belgrad and Rhodes had been taken. There was no navy. There were a number of pirates, freebooters who put themselves at the service of the Sultan and won some considerable naval victories, but they were not a part of the regular Turkish force.

One constant order of battle was observed. The provincial troops of Asia formed the right wing, and those of Europe the left, the center being composed of regular bodies of cavalry and infantry, the janissaries forming the front line. In Europe the home contingents occupied the right wing. Thus were combined permanent and disciplined infantry and cavalry with irregular foot and horse; a feudal establishment with provincial armaments, and forces raised by conscription, by enlistment, and by tribute. By this arrangement the sultan could bring three enormous armies into the field simultaneously in the heart of Europe and Asia.150

A quaint description of the discipline of the Turkish army in 1585 was given by one William Watreman in his book entitled “The Fardle of Facions”, who thought that the speed, the courage and the obedience of the Turkish soldiers accounted easily for their great success in war for two hundred years,151 and said that they were little given to mutinies and “stirs”.

Watreman was evidently not speaking of the privileged janissaries here, for they were greatly given to mutinies and “stirs.” They realized the immense power that the army possessed, and how definitely the sultan was in their hands. That part of the army stationed at Constantinople as guard to His Imperial Majesty had it in their power to demand the degradation and the head of any hated official, and usually these demands were granted. Authorized by the laws of their predecessors and their own as well, they might furthermore imprison the sultan himself, put him to death, and place on the throne one of his relatives as his successor. When all the corps of this militia of Constantinople unite under the orders of the Ulema, who give the weight of law to the undertaking, the despotic sultan passes from the throne to a prison cell, where a mysterious and illegal death soon removes him.152 The long list of deposed sultans witnesses to this power. Little wonder then that Suleiman, after punishing the rebellious janissaries in 1525, planned to employ them immediately in a campaign.

On Monday, April 23rd, Suleiman left Constantinople with 100,000 men and 300 cannon.153 His grand vizir had started a week in advance, commanding the vanguard of the army, largely cavalry. At Sophia both armies encamped, and the grand vizir is said to have “dressed his tent like a tulip in purple veilings.”154 From this point the two armies separated. Ibrahim Pasha threw a bridge across the Save, and advanced to Peterwardein, a natural fort on the foot‐hills of the Fruska‐Gora mountains, which was manned by a thousand poorly equipped soldiers. Suleiman ordered Ibrahim Pasha to take Peterwardein, assuring him it would be but a bite to last him till breakfast in Vienna.155 The sultan then proceeded to Belgrad. The grand vizir began preparations for the siege, storming ladders were laid, and on July 15th the first attack was made and repulsed with loss. The next night Ibrahim sent a division of the army to the other side of the Danube, and the fight continued all the following day until late evening, both by river and land, a flotilla of small boats being on the Danube. In a second assault the Turks pressed into the lower city, but they were again repulsed. Ibrahim, convinced that storming was less easy then he had thought, now prepared for a regular siege. After several day’s fighting a great building in the fort fell, and the walls were broached in several places. Nevertheless the besieged withstood two more assaults, and made a sally by which the Turks sustained great loss. At length Ibrahim laid mines under the walls of the fort, and on the 23rd day of July, twelve days from the first attack, an explosion, followed by a great assault and hard fighting, resulted in the taking of the place. Only ninety men were left to lay down their arms. The Turkish loss also had been heavy.156

The successful siege, and doubtless also the rich reward of his padisha, decided Ibrahim Pasha to besiege Illok on the Danube, which he took in seven days. The sultan now announced that the objective point of the expedition was Buda. The Turkish army advanced along the Danube, devastating as it went, to the marshy plain of Mohacz. Here there was a battle of the first importance in its political results, as we have seen above, for it routed the Hungarian army, killed King Lewis, and gave Hungary into Suleiman’s hands. It was a brief and bloody battle, lasting but two hours. Petchevi gives picturesque scenes before the battle, and tells of the vast enthusiasm that seized “the holy army”, while Kemalpashazadeh gloats particularly on “the bloody festival.” The plan of the battle was made by the sultan in conjunction with his grand vizir, who visited the former several times during the evening preceding the battle. At dawn on August 29th, 1526, the Turkish army emerged from a wood and appeared before the Hungarians. First came the army of Roumelie, a part of the janissaries, and the artillery under Ibrahim Pasha. Then came 10,000 janissaries and the artillery of Anatolia under Behram Pasha; behind him was the Sultan and his body guards, janissaries and cavalry.

Towards noon the Sultan occupied the height commanding the town and saw his enemies ranged before him. The first attack was made by the Hungarians and was successful in producing confusion in the Turkish ranks. But the Turks rallied, and the Akinjis drew off the attack. Ibrahim was always in the forefront, animating his men and “fighting like a lion.” “By acts of intrepidity he snatched from the hearts of his heroes the arrow of the fear of death. He restored their failing spirits. Before the most fearful weapons he never moved an eyelash.”157 King Lewis, with thirty brave followers, pushed towards the Sultan in a desperate attempt to take his life, but it was the young king himself who fell instead in the terrible fight. The artillery, discharging its first volley, caused frightful confusion especially in the left wing. The Hungarian right wing, surrounded on all sides, broke and fled, being cut down by the Turks, or drowned in the marsh. The slaughter was fearful, as no prisoners were taken.158 The battle was so tragic to the Hungarians that to this day, when disaster overtakes one of them, the proverb is quoted: “No matter, more was lost on Mohacz field.”159

The artillery of the grand vizir seems to have turned the day and rendered the victory decisive for the Turks. The following day Suleiman, seated under a scarlet pavillion, on a golden throne brought from Constantinople, received the congratulations of his vizirs and beylerbeys and with his own hand placed an aigrette of diamonds on the head of his grand vizir. In gruesome contrast to this splendor was a pyramid of one thousand heads of noble Hungarians piled before the imperial tent. Mohacz was burned, and the Akinjis harried the country in horrid fashion,160 while the main army marched on to Buda. Here the keys of the city were offered to Suleiman, and the campaign was ended, except for the march back to Constantinople, with its details of massacre and spoliation.161

The credit for this successful Hungarian campaign is ascribed to the grand vizir by three very good authorities. Ibrahim himself, in a speech to the ambassador von Zara, claims to have conquered Hungary:162 the sultan, in a letter of victory to his provinces, gives honor to Ibrahim; and the sheik‐ul‐Islam Kemalpashazadeh, in his epic history of the battle of Mohacz, lavishes praise on the grand vizir as commander of the armies on that field. “Heaven has never seen,” he rhapsodizes, “and never will see a combat equal to that by the prince of the champions of the faith, of this Asaf of Wisdom, this experienced general, this lion‐hearted Ardeshir, I mean Ibrahim Pasha.163 The enemy of the enemies of the Holy War, in an instant he repulsed the shock of the enemies of the faith.”164

Suleiman in his letter gives Ibrahim credit for the taking of Peterwardein and Illok. As to Mohacz he says:165

“The accursed king (Lewis) accompanied by the soldiers of perdition fell before the army of Roumelie, which was commanded by the Beylerbey of Roumelie, my grand vizir, Ibrahim Pasha (May Allah glorify him eternally!). It was then that the hero displayed all his innate valor.”

The first mention of Ibrahim in this letter is in the following terms:

“The leopard of strength and valor, the tiger of the forest of courage, the hero filled with a holy zeal, the Rustem of the arena of victory, the lion of the restoration of dominion, the precious pearl of the ocean of all power, the champion of the faith, the Grand Vizir, Beylerbey of Roumelie, Ibrahim Pasha.”166

The flowers of the Sultan’s rhetoric may be accepted as a matter of course, but the fact that he mentions Ibrahim as deserving of any share in the glory of the imperial conquests is noteworthy, as in his letters of victory he usually reserves all the honor for Allah and himself.167

The campaign of Vienna was the next military event for Ibrahim. It was on the eve of this expedition that Suleiman invested the grand vizir with the office of Serasker.168

Says Petchevi:

One day, going from the Divan to the Vizir Khaneh, the great Lord and Conqueror calling the slaves before his presence addressed them with eloquent and pearl‐scattering words and with divine proceedings, saying: “Nothing prevents our extending our arms at once to all parts of our land, but in every case we cannot personally conduct affairs. Therefore we formulate a berat‐i‐shereef that Ibrahim Pasha, in the name of Serasker may receive obedience and respect.”

Here Petchevi quotes the berat that was given in Chapter III, and then continues with an account of the splendid presents sent to Ibrahim with the berat, and the congratulations of all the ulema and vizirs.169 According to D’Ohsson, the investiture of Ibrahim was unusually splendid and solemn. He tells of processions in the streets and visits to the palace and continued cermonial after the army had started. When the ambassadors had visited him with congratulations and hopes of his success, he always replied:

“Marching under the divine protection, under influence of the sacred banner, under the auspices of the grandest, most powerful of monarchs, I hope to gain brilliant victories over the enemies of the empire, and soon return triumphant.”170

It is not possible to go into all the details of the famous first siege of Vienna, to which entire books have been devoted.171 Our account of it must be brief. On September 28th, 1529, Ibrahim Pasha stood before Vienna with the Roumelian troops, and by the 28th the main body of the army headed by the sultan was encamped before the city. The defenses of Vienna were in bad repair, with only 16,000 men and 72 guns, against a Turkish army of 300,000. The garrison was commanded by Philip of Bavaria, Ferdinand remaining in Linz, in hopes of aid from the German princes. The defenders of the city made desperate efforts to strengthen it, tearing down houses that stood too close to the walls, leveling suburbs that might protect the enemy, and erecting earthen defences and new walls where necessary. To save some of the horrors of the siege, the old men, the women and children, and the priests were forced to leave the city.172 Suleiman thought the taking of this stronghold would be easy, and summoned the garrison to surrender, saying that if they refused he would breakfast in Vienna on the third day, and would spare no one. But the third day passed and many others and the Turks were still digging under the towers and walls and laying mines. They had been compelled by heavy rains to leave their siege guns behind them, and had only field pieces and musketry. The besieged replied to mine by countermine and effectually circumvented the Turkish plans. Storming parties of the Turks were met by sallies from the beleaguered, and Suleiman’s breakfast, as the Viennese scornfully told him, was getting cold. Breaches made in the walls on October 9th and 11th were repaired and defended by the undaunted Austrians, and after a splendid effort made on October 14th to storm the city, and an equally splendid and more successful resistance, the sultan was obliged to give up the siege. It was Suleiman’s first defeat, and he found it hard to accept it, but winter was coming on, provisions were inadequate for so long a campaign, the army was discouraged, and furthermore, outside help was known to be on the way to the beleaguered city from all quarters. On October 14th the signal for retreat was given. The loss to the Turkish army was great, and that of the Viennese slight.173

Ibrahim Pasha had charge of the operations during the siege, and went often to reconnoiter the fortifications, disguised in a colored turban instead of the usual one of white and gold.174 Count Christopher von Zedlitz, a prisoner in the Turkish camp, said: “In this expedition there was Ibrahim Pasha, who in this war counselled and directed everything.”175 There were at this siege, as in all campaigns, frequent largesses to keep up the courage of the soldiers. The grand vizir was surrounded by sacks of gold, of which he gave by the handful when an enemy’s head was brought in, or an important capture made. When the lure of gold was insufficient to arouse the ebbing courage of the soldiers in the prolonged siege, the officers with the grand vizir at their head urged them forward with blows of sticks and whips and sabres. On October 12th Ibrahim assembled the beys of Roumelie, spoke frankly of the discontent and hunger of the army, and urged one more assault, promising whether it were successful or not, to sound the retreat thereafter.176 As we have seen, the assault was made and failed, and the siege was raised and the retreat commenced. When Suleiman left Vienna the grand vizir remained for some time with cavalry in the neighborhood of the city, partly to cover the retreat, and partly to rally the akinji scattered on plundering expeditions. He also received proposals for an exchange of prisoners, to which he replied as follows:

Ibrahim Pasha, by the grace of God First Vizir, Secretary and Chief Councillor of the glorious, great and invincible Emperor, Sultan Suleiman, head and minister of his whole dominion, of his slaves and sandjaks, Generalissimo of his armies:

High‐born, magnanimous officers and commanders; having received your writing sent by your messenger, we have digested its contents. Know that we are not come to take your city into our possession, but only to seek out your Archduke Ferdinand, whom however we have not found, and hence have waited here so many days, without his appearing. Yesterday moreover we set free three of your prisoners, for which measure you should fain to do likewise of those in your possession, as we have desired your messenger to explain to you by word of mouth. You may therefore send hither one of your own people to seek out your countrymen, and without anxiety for our good faith, for what happened to those of Pesth was not our fault but their own.

In this letter Ibrahim makes the statement which Suleiman sent forth officially, namely,—that the Turks did not wish to take Vienna, but only to meet Ferdinand. A mile away from the camp the sultan halted and received congratulations as for a victory, and dispensed rewards, the grand vizir receiving four costly pellisses and five purses.177

The next fortress to be besieged by Ibrahim Pasha was Güns, in 1532. This was the critical point of Suleiman’s fifth Hungarian campaign. After the sultan alone had reduced some thirteen minor forts, he associated the grand vizir with him in this great siege. The little fortress of Güns was brilliantly defended by Nicholas Juritschitz, who had met Ibrahim in former days when ambassador at the Porte.

On August 9th the grand vizir encamped before Güns, and three days later Suleiman arrived. Many small cannon were used in this siege, the largest sending a ball the size of a goose egg, which was, nevertheless, very effective in destroying the battlements. Besides continual assaults, mines were laid, but it was twelve days before Ibrahim summoned the sturdy Juritschitz to surrender. Even then another assault was necessary, which was at first unsuccessful owing to a very curious event. The old men, women and children within the city, seeing the banners of the janissaries planted on the walls, uttered such piercing cries of fear and horror that the assailants were seized with a panic as at something supernatural, and fled from the spot. But their return was so fierce that a breach was made, and the brave Juritschitz, wounded and helpless, was obliged to accept Ibrahim‘s terms.178 Using his knowledge of the grand vizir’s nature obtained during his embassy to the Porte, he played on his vanity and obtained very good conditions.179] Güns was not pillaged, and only formally capitulated, ten janissaries being allowed to remain an hour in the place in order to erect a Turkish standard. So Juritschitz, writing to Ferdinand exclaims: “God Almighty delivered me and this people from the hand of tyranny, which honor all my life has not deserved.”

The delay and practical defeat sustained at Güns, together with the defeat of another Turkish army which was to enter Austria by the Semmering Pass proved the saving of Vienna. Suleiman had announced that he did not intend to attack Vienna on this campaign; nevertheless his vast preparation and the counter‐preparations of Charles V and of Germany suggested a more ambitious campaign than that which he carried out. In any case Suleiman decided to withdraw, and immediately after investing Gratz, which was well defended, he abandoned the enterprise and returned to the Porte.

When the Sultan made peace with Ferdinand in 1533, and temporarily ceased operations on his northern frontier, he turned his attention to conquests in two other directions, namely to the extension of his sea power, and to the reduction of Persia. The romantic story of the exploits of his great admiral Khaireddin Barbarosa does not come into our field, but the Persian campaign is the next object of our attention.

Ever since Suleiman’s accession to the throne the relations of the Porte with the Shah of Persia had been strained. The only reason that this had not resulted in open war was because Suleiman was more deeply concerned in Hungarian affairs. There was continual fighting on the frontier. When Shah Tahmasp succeeded his father Ismail, he was little inclined to humble himself before the Turkish monarch, so he resented an overbearing and threatening letter from Suleiman. Now seemed a favorable moment to execute the threat of war. The excuse was the betrayal of the Ottomans by the khan of Bitlis, who had gone over to the shah of Persia, while the Persians were irate because the Persian governor of Aserbaijan and Baghdad had joined the Turks and had taken with him the keys of Baghdad. The governor having been assassinated and Baghdad retaken by the Persians, Suleiman determined on immediate war.

Ibrahim, again invested with the office of serasker, was sent to Persia to retake Bitlis and Baghdad. He and his army marched as far as Konia, where he received the head of Sherefbey, after which he advanced to Aleppo to take up his winter quarters.180 He occupied his leisure during the winter by taking several neighboring fortresses. His next plan was to move on Baghdad, but the defterdar Iskender Chelebi who accompanied the expedition urged an immediate advance to Tebriz, recently abandoned by the shah, arguing that the fall of Tebriz would mean the taking of Baghdad. Ibrahim followed Iskender’s suggestion, and arrived before Tebriz the 13th of July, 1534. Receiving the submission of many fortresses en route, he triumphantly entered the Persian capital. To avert the evils generally incident to a Turkish occupation, he set up a judge at Tebriz, and a strong guard. This was unusual self‐restraint in a Turkish conqueror. At this time he suffered the loss of one of his armies in the defile of Kiseljedagh, but otherwise he met only with victory and submission.

On the 27th of September Suleiman joined the grand vizir at Aoudjan and immediately rewarded him and the other beylerbeys for their successes. The united armies continued their march towards Hamadan. The lateness of the season made the crossing of the mountains very difficult. Many pack animals died and the artillery was mired in the bad roads. In that perilous situation the army was attacked by the enemy and suffered considerable loss in men and supplies.

At last the army reached Baghdad. The governor sent a letter of submission, and then to secure his own safety, fled. The grand vizir immediately took possession of the city, shut the gates to prevent pillage, and sent the keys of the city to Suleiman who had not yet come up. Baghdad was the bulwark of the Persian empire and of great military importance. The army remained there four months while the sultan organized his new conquests. April 2nd, 1535, the Turkish army commenced its return to its capital, making a march of three months to Tebriz and thence of six months to Stambul.

In this campaign Ibrahim had little actual fighting, and slight use for the artillery and mines in which he was so well versed. The success of the campaign was due to the terror excited by the reputation of the Turkish army, and the endurance with which it made terrible marches, equalling the celebrated marches of the generals of antiquity.181 Ferdinand of Hungary wrote Ibrahim congratulating him on this successful campaign.

This was Ibrahim’s last campaign. His career was cut short at this point. In this Persian expedition the grand vizir had some personal experiences which do not properly belong to an account of his generalship, but rather to the next chapter dealing with his fall.

In these varied campaigns Ibrahim Pasha showed himself an able and generally successful general. In all of his battles and sieges he was defeated only at Vienna, and practically, although not nominally, at Güns. He was brilliant in his attacks, especially with artillery, the battle of Mohacz being the best illustration of this. He was excellent in mines and sieges, regardless of the fact that he did not succeed in reducing Vienna. He was strong in marching, as the great march across Persia witnesses. He generally had good control over his men, although at Vienna he failed to incite them to greater efforts. He was personally brave and fearless, leading his troops and betaking himself to the point of greatest danger. He seems to have been less cruel than was usual among Turkish conquerors, although his army committed some horrid atrocities. He followed the usual custom of looting, which made war so attractive to the Turkish soldier.182 He appreciated valor even in his enemies, as the story of his treatment of the prisoner Zedlitz and his freeing of him illustrates.183 The credit for the conquests of this period must be divided between Sultan Suleiman and his grand vizir, who was able to push all plans of Suleiman, whether military or diplomatic, to a fortunate conclusion.

CHAPTER V

Ibrahim’s Fall

On March 5th, 1536184 Ibrahim Pasha betook himself to the imperial palace in Stamboul to dine with the sultan and spend the night with his Majesty, according to a long established custom. In the morning his body was found with marks on it, showing that he had been strangled after a fierce struggle.185 A horse with black trappings carried the dishonored body home,186 and it was immediately buried in a dervish monastery in Galata, with no monument to mark its resting place.187 His immense property fell to the crown,188 and Ibrahim Pasha, the mighty grand vizir, was dropped out of mind and conversation as though he had not practically ruled the empire for thirteen years.

What caused this abrupt extinction of Suleiman’s love for his former favorite? Ibrahim naturally had many enemies, among them the most influential ones being the defterdar Iskender Chelebi, and Roxelana, the favorite wife of Suleiman. These appear to have worked for years to poison Suleiman’s mind against the grand vizir, but for a long time without success.189 What charges could they bring against him?

Ibrahim, we recall, was born a Christian, and probably accepted Islam only formally and not from conviction. Now and then in his career his Christian predilections appear and always injure his reputation. One instance of this was the case of the infidel Cabyz, towards whom Ibrahim was accused of being overlenient. Another illustration of lack of consideration for Moslem prejudices was when he brought home from Buda three statues taken from the royal palace and set them up in the Hippodrome. This was in defiance of the Moslem rule, observed literally, to permit the display of “no images of anything in the heaven above, the earth beneath, or the water under the earth.” Although Ibrahim was supported in this act by the tolerant sultan, it brought down on his head a clamor of horror. He was spoken of as an idolator, and the poet Fighani Chelebi composed a satire against him which was never forgotten. It ran: